\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: George Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-2821\\nGEORGE WALKER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 13-cv-07237 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. George Walker is an inmate at State-\\nville Correctional Center. He has an incurable motor neuron\\ndisease called primary lateral sclerosis (“PLS”) that causes\\nweakness in his voluntary muscles. Walker alleges that his\\nhealthcare providers at Stateville—Wexford Health Sources\\nand Dr. Saleh Obaisi—were deliberately indifferent to his\\nmedical needs after he underwent spinal surgery in March\\n\\f2 No. 17-2821\\n\\n2011.1 Specifically, Walker alleges defendants failed to: (1) en-\\nsure he received proper follow-up care after his surgery, and\\n(2) allowed undue delays in his treatment by outside experts.\\nDefendants’ failures, he asserts, delayed his diagnosis and\\ncaused him to suffer from the undiagnosed PLS in the interim.\\nDefendants successfully moved for summary judgment on all\\nof Walker’s claims. We affirm.\\n I. Background\\n During the relevant period, the State of Illinois subcon-\\ntracted with Wexford Health Sources to provide healthcare\\nservices to inmates at all the facilities managed by the Illinois\\nDepartment of Corrections (“IDOC”). Saleh Obaisi, M.D., was\\na Wexford employee who served as Stateville’s Medical Di-\\nrector from August 2012 until his death in December 2017.\\n A. Healthcare at Stateville\\n Stateville’s onsite healthcare facilities included an urgent\\ncare center, various medical clinics, and an infirmary. The\\nphysicians, nurse practitioners, and physician’s assistants at\\nStateville were Wexford employees; the nurses and other\\nmedical personnel were a mix of Wexford and IDOC employ-\\nees. All the medical providers at Stateville, whether employed\\nby Wexford or not, followed IDOC’s administrative policies\\nand procedures. Nonetheless, Wexford’s corporate repre-\\nsentative testified that when deciding how to provide the best\\ncare for patients, clinicians relied on their training and expe-\\nrience first, and the governing policies second.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1Originally, Warden Michael Lemke was a defendant, but the parties\\nagreed to dismiss him from the case.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 3\\n\\n When the medical professionals and facilities at Stateville\\ncould not address an inmate’s conditions, Wexford referred\\nsuch inmates to outside providers like the University of Illi-\\nnois at Chicago Medical Center (“UIC”). Typically, referrals\\nhad to go through a collegial peer review process, which Wex-\\nford called “Utilization Management” (“UM”). In the event of\\na medical emergency, however, Stateville’s Medical Director\\ncould make referrals to another hospital, St. Joseph’s Medical\\nCenter, without securing UM’s preapproval.\\n In practice, UM consisted of a weekly conference call in\\nwhich medical professionals reviewed an inmate’s case and\\nthe suggested treatment. Participants in the call included:\\nWexford’s UM Director for Illinois, Wexford’s Corporate UM\\nnurse, Wexford physicians, Wexford staff, and IDOC’s\\nhealthcare unit administrator. If the onsite Medical Director\\nwas ever dissatisfied with the alternative treatment plan UM\\nauthorized for a patient, the director could appeal that deci-\\nsion.\\n If UM approved a patient for an offsite consultation at\\nUIC, the UM department would enter the information into\\nWexford’s computer program (“WexCare”), which triggered\\nan electronic notice to the prison and UIC. Then, the staff at\\nIDOC and UIC would coordinate to schedule the inmate’s ap-\\npointment. With respect to surgery referrals, UM often issued\\na “global approval,” which authorized both the surgery and\\nany necessary follow-up care. Whenever UIC received a\\nglobal approval, it would call Stateville directly to arrange the\\nfollow-up care for the inmate.\\n UM’s authorizations were valid for ninety days. From\\n2011 to 2014, however, Wexford did not have a system in place\\n\\f4 No. 17-2821\\n\\nto alert its staff when an authorization expired before the in-\\nmate had received treatment.2\\n B. Walker’s Treatment History at Stateville\\n On March 1, 2010, a Wexford physician’s assistant exam-\\nined Walker, noting that he had right leg twitching and re-\\nports of weakness. Over the course of the next year, Walker\\nunderwent several examinations with specialists and other\\nmedical professionals. These appointments culminated in a\\nrecommendation by a UIC neurosurgeon, Dr. Sergey\\nNeckrysh, that Walker have spinal surgery to decompress and\\nfuse the lumbar spine. UM gave a global approval for the sur-\\ngery and follow-up care.\\n Walker had spinal surgery at UIC on March 23, 2011. He\\nremained at UIC for three days following his surgery. When\\nhe returned to Stateville, the infirmary admitted him; his dis-\\ncharge note from UIC called for a follow-up appointment\\nwith Dr. Neckrysh in three months, including a CT scan of the\\nlumbar spine. Walker testified that three UIC nurses told him\\nthey would see him in six to eight weeks for a follow-up CT\\nscan. The follow-up appointment never occurred. It was the\\nfirst of many delays that prompted Walker to bring this law-\\nsuit. As Walker testified, “it’s been all down hill ever since the\\nsurgery.” Walker also testified, however, that none of his\\ntreating doctors have ever told him that his condition would\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Fortunately, Wexford has since eliminated this vulnerability in its\\nsystem; it now requires doctors to enter a “service completion date” when\\nthey authorize an outside referral, and whenever treatment does not occur\\nbefore that service completion date, the inmate’s case returns to UM for\\ndiscussion and potential reauthorization.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 5\\n\\nhave improved if he had been sent back to UIC within three\\nmonths of his March 2011 surgery.\\n The medical records tell a more complicated story. During\\nWalker’s first three days at the infirmary, five treatment notes\\nrecorded that his surgical incision was healing well. When the\\ninfirmary staff removed Walker’s staples on April 7, 2011,\\nthey cleaned the incision site and did not record any signs or\\nsymptoms of redness or infection. Later that day, the infir-\\nmary discharged Walker, reporting his minimal discomfort\\nand giving him permits for low bunk, low gallery, and special\\nmedical restraints.\\n Approximately four weeks after the surgery, Walker re-\\nceived a physical therapy examination at Stateville. The ther-\\napist stated that Walker explained that his pain had resolved,\\nand that the surgical scar was well-healed with minor adhe-\\nsion (excessive growth of scar tissue). Between May 26, 2011,\\nand August 31, 2012, the record shows that Walker saw Stat-\\neville medical providers on eight different occasions and that\\nhe informed them of the improvement to his back following\\nthe surgery. Walker also completed two eight-week courses\\nof physical therapy with an onsite provider at Stateville. He\\nthen did sixteen months of physical therapy in his cell. During\\nWalker’s deposition, defendants’ lawyer asked: “Did your\\ncondition improve at all through the physical therapy?”\\nWalker responded: “It seemed like after the physical therapy\\nI would become more irritated and when I was let out of my\\ncell to take a shower I fall flat on my face. I couldn’t walk. The\\nirritation was just so tight.” The timing and nature of this irri-\\ntation, however, is unclear from Walker’s testimony.\\n Dr. Obaisi first examined Walker on September 26, 2012,\\nalmost exactly eighteen months after Walker’s surgery. He\\n\\f6 No. 17-2821\\n\\ndocumented that Walker complained of an unsteady gait,\\nweakness in his legs, upper thigh pain, and bilateral foot\\ndrop. Dr. Obaisi’s appointment note also stated that he sus-\\npected that Walker might have upper motor neuron syn-\\ndrome. As a result, Dr. Obaisi ordered x-rays and provided\\nWalker with muscle relaxers and anti-inflammatory medica-\\ntion. Once Dr. Obaisi received the results from one of the\\nblood tests and learned that Walker’s levels were elevated, Dr.\\nObaisi sought UM’s approval for a neurology consultation at\\nUIC. Wexford approved the referral on December 2, 2012, but\\nUIC did not schedule a neurology appointment until April 24,\\n2013.\\n At his deposition, Dr. Obaisi testified that his focus during\\nthis initial visit was Walker’s condition; he did not “really pay\\nattention” to whether Walker had seen UIC neurosurgery for\\nhis post-surgery visit. Nonetheless, when Walker’s attorney\\nspecifically asked Dr. Obaisi why he did not send Walker back\\nto UIC neurosurgery for the follow-up, Dr. Obaisi explained\\nhe wanted to see the results from some tests before presenting\\nWalker’s case to UM—this way, Dr. Obaisi could support his\\nconcern regarding upper motor neuron syndrome. He also\\ntestified that he did not have control over UIC’s scheduling,\\nthat specialists generally prioritize scheduling by the urgency\\nof cases, and that Dr. Neckrysh does not call people “very eas-\\nily.”\\n Walker continued to receive treatment from Dr. Obaisi\\nand several other medical professionals. A summary of this\\nlater treatment appears below in chronological order.\\n On April 9, 2013, Dr. Obaisi examined Walker for\\n swelling in his right leg that had persisted for two\\n weeks. Concerned that Walker was developing a\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 7\\n\\n blood clot in one of his veins, Dr. Obaisi transferred\\n Walker to St. Joseph on an emergency basis. The\\n hospital’s discharge notes state that Walker needed\\n a repeat ultrasound of the right leg in one week to\\n check for a blood clot.\\n On April 24, 2013, Walker was transferred offsite to\\n UIC neurology; he told Dr. Lawrence Zeidman that\\n his back “was not bothering him much,” that he\\n had pain in his legs and groin, but that he did not\\n want any medication. Dr. Zeidman requested a re-\\n peat MRI of the lumbar spine, an imaging test of the\\n right lower extremity to rule out a myelopathy3\\n given his blood test, and a rereferral to neurosur-\\n gery.4\\n On May 23, 2013, Walker received an MRI that\\n showed some degenerative changes to his L3-L4\\n spinal segments.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 “Myelopathy is an injury to the spinal cord due to severe compres-\\nsion that may result from trauma, congenital stenosis, degenerative dis-\\nease or disc herniation.” Myelopathy, John Hopkins Medicine,\\nhttps://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/mye-\\nlopathy (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).\\n 4 Dr. Zeidman testified that his recommendations for further treat-\\nment are always directed at the referring physician—regardless of\\nwhether the patient is an inmate or not—and “it’s optional to the prerog-\\native of the referring doctor whether they even want to follow the recom-\\nmendations.”\\n\\f8 No. 17-2821\\n\\n On May 28, 2013, Walker had a neurosurgery con-\\n sultation at UIC. The examining neurosurgeon ob-\\n served that Walker’s back pain and radiculopathy5\\n symptoms had improved, but that he had “right in-\\n guinal [(i.e., groin)] pain.” As a result, the doctor\\n recommended an x-ray of the lumbar spine. An x-\\n ray was taken that same day; the impression note\\n states: “Postsurgical changes with posterior spinal\\n fusion from L4 to S1. There is a suggestion of lu-\\n cency around the bilateral S1 screws suggesting\\n hardware loosening.”\\n On September 25, 2013, Dr. Zeidman examined\\n Walker, noting Walker was now in a wheelchair\\n and complaining of radiculopathy. Dr. Zeidman\\n further documented Walker’s May 2013 MRI iden-\\n tified a loose surgical screw at his S1 vertebrae, but\\n that UIC’s neurosurgery team, who had seen\\n Walker after the MRI, did not seem concerned\\n about it. Dr. Zeidman recommended reconsulting\\n with UIC’s neurosurgery team about the screw,\\n and having Walker receive another MRI due to his\\n presentment of a new symptom: brisk reflexes in\\n his ankle, and a referral to the UIC pain clinic for a\\n potential epidural steroid injection.\\n On March 27, 2014, Dr. Zeidman examined Walker,\\n noting that the neurosurgery follow-up and pain\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 “Radiculopathy describes a range of symptoms produced by the\\npinching of a nerve root in the spinal column.” Radiculopathy, John Hop-\\nkins Medicine, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-\\ndiseases/radiculopathy (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 9\\n\\n consult he had recommended had not been done.6\\n (Dr. Zeidman believed the recommended cervical\\n and thoracic MRI repeat had occurred, but that the\\n images had not been sent to him.) Accordingly,\\n Dr. Zeidman again referred Mr. Walker to neuro-\\n surgery and the pain clinic. Additionally, Dr. Zeid-\\n man’s notes state that Walker reported that one of\\n his medications (gabapentin) was improving his\\n pain but that he did not feel he was getting enough\\n physical therapy in prison.\\n On October 20, 2014, Walker received an MRI of his\\n cervical spine, which showed some degenerative\\n joint disease.\\n On October 30, 2014, Walker received an evaluation\\n at UIC’s pain clinic for his back and hip pain. Notes\\n from that visit show that Walker reported he vol-\\n untarily stopped taking pain medications because\\n he felt they made him constipated. The UIC pain\\n physicians instructed Walker to resume taking the\\n pain medications and advised him they were con-\\n sidering giving him an epidural steroid injection.\\n On November 6, 2014, Walker received a thoracic\\n spine MRI. The UIC radiologist found that that MRI\\n was similar to Walker’s 2011 (pre-surgery) MRI be-\\n cause both showed degenerative disc disease in his\\n back.\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Dr. Zeidman testified that he does not know how scheduling works\\nwith IDOC, Wexford, and UIC. He also opined that he did not think it\\nwould be “unreasonable” for it to take “a couple months” for an inmate\\nto get an appointment with him.\\n\\f10 No. 17-2821\\n\\n On January 8, 2015, Walker returned to UIC neurol-\\n ogy and reported continued back pain and that\\n switching prescriptions (from gabapentin to Mo-\\n bic) had helped his pain. Dr. Zeidman reviewed\\n Walker’s MRI and found that it showed degenera-\\n tive joint disease but no neural compromise. It was\\n Dr. Zeidman’s impression that Walker may have\\n had a stroke before the visit. Dr. Zeidman grew\\n concerned that Walker had started slurring his\\n speech and jerking his hands and fingers. Again,\\n Dr. Zeidman noted that despite his referrals,\\n Walker had not been sent to neurosurgery. Accord-\\n ingly, he issued another referral to neurosurgery.\\n He also asked to see Walker again in six months,\\n and he advised Walker to continue with physical\\n therapy and keep taking his pain medications.\\n On February 3, 2015, Walker went to UIC neurosur-\\n gery for a consultation; the neurosurgeon found\\n Walker had radiculopathy in the left leg and recom-\\n mended a CT myelogram7 to delineate any possible\\n neurosurgical issues at the lumbar spine.\\n On March 27, 2015, Walker received an MRI of his\\n brain that showed nonspecific scattered flare\\n changes but was otherwise unremarkable and\\n showed no acute or subacute stroke.\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 “A myelogram is a diagnostic imaging test generally done by a radi-\\n\\nologist. It uses a contrast dye and X-rays or computed tomography (CT)\\nto look for problems in the spinal canal.” Myelogram, John Hopkins Medi-\\ncine, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-ther-\\napies/myelogram (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 11\\n\\n On May 28, 2015, Walker underwent a CT myelo-\\n gram.\\n On July 1, 2015, Walker returned to UIC neurology\\n for a consultation. Dr. Zeidman noted that Walker\\n demonstrated problems with “word-finding.”\\n Dr. Zeidman concluded that Mr. Walker needed\\n “to see Dr. Neckrysh again given his ongoing lum-\\n bar radiculopathy issues.” He also recommended a\\n speech therapy consultation and that Walker con-\\n tinue taking pain medications and doing physical\\n therapy onsite at Stateville.\\n On August 11, 2015, Walker received an x-ray that\\n showed “no definitive evidence of hardware mal-\\n function” regarding the screw. He also had a con-\\n sultation with UIC neurosurgery; Dr. Neckrysh\\n concluded that Walker’s May 2015 myelogram\\n showed evidence of adjacent segment degeneration\\n at L3-4 and a grade 1 spine at L3-4, and he proposed\\n extending Walker’s prior surgery “up to the L-3-4\\n level.”8\\n On December 22, 2015, Walker returned to UIC\\n neurosurgery for an evaluation; the neurosurgeon\\n confirmed the 2011 surgery was effective and that\\n Walker did not complain of pain and weakness in\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8Dr. Obaisi testified that he is typically inclined to follow UIC neuro-\\nsurgery’s recommendations; specifically, in Walker’s case, Dr. Obaisi was\\nhappy to acquiesce to the surgery extension recommendation, though he\\ndid not believe it would affect Walker’s speech or any of the other prob-\\nlems Dr. Obaisi believed were caused by an issue with Walker’s nervous\\nsystem.\\n\\f12 No. 17-2821\\n\\n his legs for two years after the surgery.9 But be-\\n cause of Walker’s left-sided thigh pain, UIC neuro-\\n surgery recommended a revision and extension of\\n the 2011 spinal fusion to correct these newly-occur-\\n ring (as of 2015) complaints.\\n On March 30, 2016, Walker received the revision\\n and extension spinal fusion surgery at UIC. Before\\n his discharge, UIC physical therapy noted that\\n there were “signs and symptoms of [upper motor\\n neuron] involvement,” and that “[his] gait will\\n likely remain with current impairments unless\\n other means for spasticity/clonus are utilized.” The\\n post-surgery notes state that Walker reported\\n “much improvement in ‘nerve’ pain in both legs”\\n and a reduced amount of “drooling.”\\n While Walker remained at UIC following his sec-\\n ond spinal surgery, UIC’s medical staff diagnosed\\n him with PLS. During this time, Walker also con-\\n sulted with UIC speech and psychology staff re-\\n garding his diagnosis and what that meant for his\\n life going forward.\\n On April 14, 2016, UIC discharged Walker.\\n C. Expert Opinions\\n Each of the parties retained medical experts. Walker hired\\nNicholas Rizzo, M.D., who is board-certified in internal med-\\n\\n\\n 9Walker admits that the medical notes state as much, but he disputes\\nthe assertion that he did not complain of pain or weakness in his legs for\\ntwo years after surgery and only complained of left-sided thigh pain start-\\ning in 2015. As Walker testified, he asserts that he experienced pain almost\\nimmediately after his March 2011 surgery.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 13\\n\\nicine. He has neither worked in a prison or correctional insti-\\ntution, nor has he treated inmate populations. He provided\\nthe following opinions: (1) Wexford and Dr. Obaisi failed to\\nfollow the order for a three-month post-operative follow-up\\nwith the UIC neurosurgeon after Walker’s March 23, 2011 sur-\\ngery; (2) Walker’s condition deteriorated as a result of not be-\\ning seen by the neurosurgeon for two years following his\\nMarch 2011 surgery; (3) there was a lack of routine physical\\ntherapy; (4) Walker suffered additional pain as a result of not\\nbeing treated in an appropriate and timely fashion; (5) Wex-\\nford’s Medical Director at Stateville should have ensured that\\nWalker received timely and adequate treatment; and (6) Wex-\\nford should have had a procedure in place to ensure that or-\\nders for follow-up care were followed. Dr. Rizzo also gave the\\nfollowing relevant testimony:\\n The March 2011 surgery “was likely successful for\\n its goal at the time.”\\n The three-month post-surgery visit was not op-\\n tional; it was (and is) the “standard of care” and it\\n should have been done by UIC neurosurgery. At\\n that appointment, a few hypothetical scenarios\\n could have played out: (1) “If there was new symp-\\n tomatology …, they would have ordered additional\\n imaging”; (2) “If … his progress postoperatively\\n was not what they would have otherwise antici-\\n pated, they could have ordered a subsequent three-\\n month follow-up which would have obviously in-\\n creased the chance of picking up progressive symp-\\n tomatology”; (3) “If he had a perfect recovery from\\n the surgery and no symptomatology whatsoever\\n and no progression of symptoms, they may have\\n dismissed him from their care for that particular\\n\\f14 No. 17-2821\\n\\n surgery”; and (4) “If [his recovery was not perfect],\\n a continuity of care for lumbar disk disease in gen-\\n eral would have not been unreasonable.”\\n When asked whether it was his opinion that\\n Walker’s condition was going to deteriorate after\\n his March 2011 surgery, regardless of whether\\n Walker had had the three-month post-surgery fol-\\n low-up visit, Dr. Rizzo said: “There’s no way to\\n know if most patients are going to progress and de-\\n teriorate or not.”\\n Wexford employed William Davison, M.D., who is a\\nboard-certified neurologist. He provided the following rele-\\nvant testimony:\\n Walker’s condition deteriorated after his March\\n 2011 surgery, but the lumbar surgery could “[a]bso-\\n lutely” be ruled out as the cause of that deteriora-\\n tion.\\n Walker’s March 2011 surgery was a success because\\n the records suggest he had less pain going down his\\n right leg.\\n The missed post-surgery appointment did not con-\\n stitute inadequate medical care because Walker’s\\n problems could not be solved by neurosurgery any-\\n way.\\n The post-surgery follow-up visit was a recommen-\\n dation for the referring physician to consider.\\n A few months was a reasonable amount of time to\\n wait before going back to neurosurgery.\\n It was not inadequate medical treatment for de-\\n fendants not to refer Walker to the pain clinic be-\\n tween September 25, 2013, when Dr. Zeidman\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 15\\n\\n made that recommendation, and March 27, 2014,\\n when Dr. Zeidman noted it had not yet occurred,\\n because Walker was being seen at his local clinic for\\n pain and was on medication.\\n Although not an expert, Neil Fisher, M.D., provided testi-\\nmony as Wexford’s designated Federal Rule of Civil Proce-\\ndure 30(b)(6) witness. At the time of his deposition, he served\\nas Wexford’s Corporate Medical Director for Quality Manage-\\nment and Pharmacy. He previously served as Wexford’s Cor-\\nporate Director for UM from July 2012 until September 2014.\\nDr. Fisher holds a medical degree and is a general medical\\npractitioner. He provided the following pertinent testimony:\\n During this case, the WexCare system was able to\\n pull up a report of expired UM authorizations, but\\n he was not aware if there was a policy to pull that\\n report in 2011–2012.\\n Wexford is “usually very good at getting people\\n back to [UIC] during the period of time that special-\\n ist is requesting” because “this is a no-charge ser-\\n vice for us so we—these are specialists that we par-\\n ticularly want to satisfy what they are asking for.”\\n D. This Lawsuit\\n The operative complaint in this case alleges that Dr. Obaisi\\nwas deliberately indifferent to Walker’s serious medical needs\\nby (1) failing to timely return Walker to UIC after the March\\n2011 surgery and (2) generally ignoring the persistent delays\\nin Walker’s treatment after he assumed his care. Similarly,\\nWalker alleges that Wexford was deliberately indifferent to\\nhis serious medical needs by (1) failing to promulgate a policy\\n\\f16 No. 17-2821\\n\\nto alert the Medical Director that a previously approved refer-\\nral had lapsed before the authorized treatment came to frui-\\ntion and (2) relying on UIC doctors to schedule their own ap-\\npointments with inmates.\\n Dr. Obaisi and Wexford moved for summary judgment on\\nall of Walker’s claims. They argued that Walker failed to ex-\\nhaust his administrative remedies and that they were entitled\\nto judgment on the merits of Walker’s claims. The district\\ncourt agreed; it granted Dr. Obaisi and Wexford’s motion for\\nsummary judgment after concluding: (1) the Prison Litigation\\nReform Act’s exhaustion requirement barred Walker’s claims,\\n42 U.S.C. § 1997(e); (2) Dr. Obaisi was not working at the\\nprison during the relevant time when Walker wished to be\\nsent back to UIC for his three-month post-surgical neurosur-\\ngery follow-up appointment; (3) the totality of medical care\\nDr. Obaisi provided to Walker did not support a finding of\\ndeliberate indifference; (4) there was no testimony connecting\\nWalker’s condition to any failure by Dr. Obaisi; (5) some of\\nthe delays Walker blamed on Wexford were actually caused\\nby UIC; and (6) there was no evidence that Wexford denied\\nany medical care that one of its medical directors requested\\nfor Walker’s benefit or that any delay between appointments\\nwith specialists at UIC caused Walker’s deteriorating condi-\\ntion; and (7) the only testimony about what could have been\\ndone had Wexford personnel returned Walker to UIC for a\\npost-operative follow-up within three months of his 2011 sur-\\ngery was speculative, thus Walker could not establish the req-\\nuisite causal connection between Wexford’s allegedly uncon-\\nstitutional policies and practices, on the one hand, and his\\nmedical condition, on the other.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 17\\n\\n Walker appeals the district court’s decision to enter sum-\\nmary judgment for Dr. Obaisi and Wexford.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary\\njudgment de novo, interpreting all facts and drawing all rea-\\nsonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. O’Brien\\nv. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2018). “Summary\\njudgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of\\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-\\nter of law.” Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a)). And summary\\njudgment is inappropriate “if the evidence is such that a rea-\\nsonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”\\nAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may\\naffirm the grant of a motion for summary judgment on any\\nground supported in the record, so long as the parties ade-\\nquately presented the issue in the district court and the non-\\nmoving party had an opportunity to contest it. O’Brien, 900\\nF.3d at 928.\\n A. Dr. Obaisi\\n The Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference\\nto prisoners’ serious medical needs because it constitutes an\\n“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble,\\n429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,\\n173 (1976)). A failure-to-provide-adequate-medical-care claim\\nrequires proof that the prisoner suffered from “(1) an objec-\\ntively serious medical condition to which (2) a state official\\nwas deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.” Duckworth\\nv. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008). Defendants do not\\n\\f18 No. 17-2821\\n\\ndispute that Walker suffered from an objectively serious med-\\nical condition; only the subjective component is at issue here.\\n To establish the subjective component, Walker must show\\nthat Dr. Obaisi knew of facts from which he could infer that a\\nsubstantial risk of serious harm existed, and that he did, in\\nfact, draw that inference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,\\n837 (1994); see also Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (en banc). “[E]vidence of medical negligence is not\\nenough to prove deliberate indifference,” but evidence that a\\nmedical professional “knew better than to make the medical\\ndecision[ ] that [he] did” is enough to survive summary judg-\\nment. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662–\\n63 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Petties, 836 F.3d at 730–31).\\n In practice, “[s]tate-of-mind evidence sufficient to create a\\njury question might include the obviousness of the risk from\\na particular course of medical treatment; … persistence in a\\ncourse of treatment known to be ineffective; or proof that the\\ndefendant’s treatment decision departed so radically from ac-\\ncepted professional judgment, practice, or standards that a\\njury may reasonably infer that the decision was not based on\\nprofessional judgment.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 663 (citations\\nand quotation marks omitted). In cases such as this one—\\nwhere the plaintiff alleges the defendant delayed, rather than\\ndenied, medical treatment—we have required that the plain-\\ntiff present “verifying medical evidence” that the delay, and\\nnot the underlying condition, caused some harm. Jackson v.\\nPollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Williams v.\\nLiefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2007)). Most importantly,\\nthe plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions or inac-\\ntion caused the delay in his treatment. See Pepper v. Village of\\nOak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Under any theory,\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 19\\n\\nto be liable under § 1983, the individual defendant must have\\ncaused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” (cita-\\ntion and internal quotation marks omitted)).\\n Walker argues on appeal that Dr. Obaisi repeatedly failed\\nto ensure that he receive treatment within the timeline re-\\nquested by UIC specialists, and that this failure delayed the\\nultimate PLS diagnosis and precluded alternative treatment\\noptions in the interim. Walker also disputes the notion that\\nDr. Obaisi was powerless to ensure timely offsite appoint-\\nments.\\n In response, defendants argue that Dr. Obaisi had a prin-\\ncipled reason for not immediately making a referral, as he tes-\\ntified: He wanted to obtain and review Walker’s lab test re-\\nsults before presenting any follow-up care to UM for ap-\\nproval. Indeed, Dr. Obaisi ordered tests the day he first saw\\nWalker. Similarly, defendants highlight that Dr. Obaisi\\ntreated Walker’s symptoms while they awaited the test results\\nand continued to treat Walker’s changing condition in a vari-\\nety of ways as noted above. Thus, defendants assert that there\\nis no evidence that Dr. Obaisi did (or failed to do) something\\nthat (1) postponed Walker’s treatment and thereby caused his\\nneed for a second spinal surgery, (2) delayed the diagnosis or\\ntreatment of Walker’s PLS or other symptoms, or (3) pro-\\nlonged Walker’s pain. Finally, defendants emphasize that it is\\nundisputed that Dr. Obaisi could not schedule appointments\\nat UIC. Given Dr. Obaisi’s lack of personal involvement in\\nUIC scheduling, defendants insist that Dr. Obaisi cannot be\\nheld liable.\\n First, we conclude that Dr. Obaisi’s decision to wait for test\\nresults before referring Walker to UIC, even though Walker\\nwas months overdue for a follow-up appointment at UIC, is\\n\\f20 No. 17-2821\\n\\nnot evidence of Dr. Obaisi’s deliberate indifference. As\\nDr. Obaisi testified, during his first appointment with Walker,\\nhe was focused on Walker’s complaints—unsteady gait, occa-\\nsional falls, and weak legs—and his assessment that Walker\\nlikely had either upper neuron syndrome or a muscle disor-\\nder. To rule out a muscle disorder, Dr. Obaisi requested blood\\ntests, and he explained that he wanted those results—as well\\nas x-ray images—before making a case to UM that Walker\\nshould be referred to UIC.\\n Perhaps an immediate referral to UIC would have been\\nbeneficial, but as we have held before, “an inmate is not enti-\\ntled to demand specific care,” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742,\\n754 (7th Cir. 2011), and medical professionals may choose\\nfrom “a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing\\nstandards in the field,” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th\\nCir. 2008). We defer to medical professionals’ treatment deci-\\nsions unless there is evidence that “no minimally competent\\nprofessional would have so responded under those circum-\\nstances.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d\\n886, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2008)).\\n Here, Dr. Obaisi made a reasonable medical judgment to\\ndelay referring Walker until he had more information so that\\nhe could make a more informed referral request to UM. See,\\ne.g., Zackery v. Mesrobian, 299 F. App’x 598, 601–02 (7th Cir.\\n2008) (“Although it may have been prudent for Dr. Mesrobian\\nto order diagnostic testing in 2001, his failure to choose the\\nbest course of action does not amount to a constitutional vio-\\nlation.”).\\n Second, considering Walker’s treatment overall, we believe\\nthat the records do not show a pattern of deliberate indiffer-\\nence to Walker’s serious medical needs. To the contrary, the\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 21\\n\\nrecord shows that Dr. Obaisi responded to Walker’s changing\\nsymptoms and that he was receptive to the specialists’ recom-\\nmendations. He made referrals and re-referrals when neces-\\nsary, all the while treating Walker’s symptoms. This treatment\\nwas not outside the bounds of medical professionalism. See,\\ne.g., Harrison v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 669 F. App’x 797,\\n799 (7th Cir. 2016) (“During these 17 months [of treatment\\nwithout a referral], Dr. Obaisi regularly altered [the inmate’s]\\nprescriptions for pain-relieving, anti-inflammatory, and mus-\\ncle-relaxing drugs based on [the inmate’s] condition.\\nDr. Obaisi also ordered and reviewed [the inmate’s] MRI to\\nensure that he properly diagnosed his injury. Because the rec-\\nord does not contain evidence showing that Dr. Obaisi’s care\\nviolated professional medical standards, the district court\\nproperly granted Dr. Obaisi summary judgment.”).\\n That Walker’s pain and other symptoms did not subside is\\nnot evidence of Dr. Obaisi’s deliberate indifference, especially\\nconsidering that Walker voluntarily stopped taking pain\\nmedication at some point and Dr. Obaisi ordered a variety of\\ntherapies and requested several referrals to address Walker’s\\nongoing complaints.\\n Third, although there were clearly delays in Walker’s treat-\\nment, the evidence suggests Dr. Obaisi did what he could\\nwithin the limits of his role to move the ball forward. The\\nquestion is whether we can place all the scheduling blame on\\nUIC, because we can only hold Dr. Obaisi liable if he had con-\\ntrol over the circumstances that caused the delays. See Walker\\nv. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n Defendants have presented evidence that UIC employs a\\nprioritization scheme for scheduling appointments and that\\n\\f22 No. 17-2821\\n\\nStateville’s Medical Director was not involved in the schedul-\\ning process. Similarly, nothing in the record suggests that\\nDr. Obaisi’s actions or inaction caused any of the scheduling\\ndelays with Walker’s appointments at UIC. Such lack of per-\\nsonal involvement saves Dr. Obaisi from liability here. See\\nPepper, 430 F.3d at 810.\\n B. Wexford\\n The claim against Wexford “proceeds under the theory of\\nmunicipal liability announced in Monell v. Department of Social\\nServices, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which we have held applies in\\n§ 1983 claims brought against private companies acting under\\ncolor of state law.” Chatham v. Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (citing Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 795–96\\n(7th Cir. 2014)). Prevailing on such a claim requires evidence\\nthat a Wexford policy, practice, or custom caused a constitu-\\ntional violation. Whiting, 839 F.3d at 664.\\n We held in Glisson v. Indiana Department of Corrections,\\nhowever, that this list is not exclusive; rather, a “policy” can\\ntake the form of a hands-off approach or a policy to do noth-\\ning (a “policy of inaction”). 849 F.3d 372, 379–80 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(en banc); see also King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir.\\n2012) (explaining that when a municipality has “actual or con-\\nstructive knowledge that its agents will probably violate con-\\nstitutional rights, it may not adopt a policy of inaction.”);\\nThomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2010) (“[I]n situations where rules or regulations are required\\nto remedy a potentially dangerous practice, the County’s fail-\\nure to make a policy is also actionable.”); Sims v. Mulcahy, 902\\nF.2d 524, 543 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[I]n situations that call for pro-\\ncedures, rules or regulations, the failure to make policy itself\\nmay be actionable.”).\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 23\\n\\n When a § 1983 claim is based on a policy of inaction, the\\nplaintiff must present evidence that the institution made a\\nconscious decision not to act. Glisson, 849 F.3d at 381; see also\\nid. at 383 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (agreeing that a “a municipal-\\nity’s failure to have a formal policy in place on a particular\\nsubject may represent its intentional decision not to have such\\na policy—that is, a policy not to have a policy—and that insti-\\ntutional choice may in appropriate circumstances form the ba-\\nsis of a Monell claim.”). Consequently, in prison litigation, in-\\nmates generally cite other examples where a constitutional vi-\\nolation similarly occurred. Id. at 381.\\n Walker challenges two aspects of Wexford’s operations on\\nappeal: (1) that Wexford did not have a policy or practice of\\nensuring that offsite appointments authorized through UM\\noccurred; and (2) that Wexford had a practice of deferring to\\nUIC in scheduling offsite appointments. Walker attempts to\\nbolster his point that Wexford’s monitoring and scheduling\\npractices presented obvious risks by focusing on Dr. Obaisi’s\\ntestimony that there was no guarantee that UIC would call to\\nschedule a follow-up appointment,10 and to Dr. Fisher’s testi-\\nmony in separate litigation that as of August 2012, a large\\nnumber of authorized appointments were not happening. See\\nQuinn v. Obaisi, No. 14-cv-6633, 2018 WL 1184736, at *8 (N.D.\\nIll. Mar. 7, 2018).\\n In response, defendants deny responsibility for any offsite\\nappointments that were not scheduled as requested by plac-\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Indeed, during his deposition Dr. Obaisi remarked that it was\\n“sometimes debatable” whether UIC would call certain inmates for their\\nfollow-up appointments.\\n\\f24 No. 17-2821\\n\\ning the blame for such errors on the onsite prison staff mem-\\nber, who is “likely not a Wexford employee.” Defendants also\\ncast doubt on Walker’s assertion that it was foreseeable to\\nWexford that its monitoring and scheduling policies were\\n“highly likely” to lead to harm. For example, defendants note\\nthat despite Wexford’s financial incentive to avoid delays, it\\nhad no control over UIC’s schedule. Indeed, Walker has not\\nproduced any evidence that Wexford could control UIC’s\\nschedule; it is undisputed, as defendants emphasize, that UIC\\nis not in Wexford’s chain of command. Finally, defendants ar-\\ngue that Walker cannot prevail because he has no evidence\\nthat other inmates faced the same treatment issues and his\\ncase is not of the “rare” cases where evidence of his own ex-\\nperience is sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See,\\ne.g., Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 929\\n(7th Cir. 2004) (affirming a finding of Monell liability where\\nthe evidence showed the organization condoned its employ-\\nees’ repeated decisions to ignore its policies).\\n Neither Walker’s own experience nor the testimony from\\nDrs. Obaisi and Fisher admitting awareness that referrals to\\nUIC were sometimes never scheduled or, if scheduled, signif-\\nicantly delayed, is enough to establish that Wexford was de-\\nliberately indifferent to Walker’s serious medical needs. See\\nGlisson, 849 F.3d at 381. Wexford’s knowledge that some re-\\nferrals slipped through the cracks is not the same as Wex-\\nford’s knowledge that constitutionally necessary referrals\\nwere not happening with such frequency that it ignored an\\nobvious risk of serious harm. Similarly, Walker has not shown\\nthat the standby options of Stateville’s onsite medical care fa-\\ncilities and the nearby hospital were not sufficient as a backup\\nplan in the intervening periods of time where an inmate\\nawaited treatment with an outside expert.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 25\\n\\n As for the coordination of schedules with UIC, Walker’s\\ninstinct that Wexford should not be able to use UIC as a shield\\nis understandable. But Wexford cannot be accused of “defer-\\nring” to UIC when Wexford had no control over UIC. To defer\\nto another suggests the relinquishment of power or control,\\nwhich did not exist here. Practically speaking, Wexford refers\\nmany inmates, and the specialists at UIC have a finite number\\nof appointments available; thus, it seems unavoidable that, at\\ntimes, the wait for appointments will grow to a few months.\\nAbsent evidence that Wexford was on notice that these wait\\ntimes were likely to cause constitutional violations, but failed\\nto act in response, we cannot hold Wexford liable.\\n C. Exhaustion\\n Because we conclude that the district court appropriately\\nentered summary judgment against Walker on the merits, we\\nneed not address whether the district court correctly con-\\ncluded that Walker failed to exhaust his administrative reme-\\ndies.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4663,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4669731,"string":"4,669,731"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Henrikas Malukas v. William Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1633"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 19-1633\\nHENRIKAS MALUKAS,\\n Petitioner,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States,\\n Respondent.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n No. A72-569-248\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Henrikas Malukas, a citizen\\nof Lithuania, entered the United States in 1992 on a tourist\\nvisa and did not leave when it expired. In 1995 he was con-\\nvicted of several weapons-related felonies and sentenced to\\n52 months in prison. While he was imprisoned, immigration\\nofficials began removal proceedings. Malukas applied for\\ndiscretionary relief as the spouse of a U.S. citizen, but the\\n\\f2 No. 19-1633\\n\\nimmigration judge (and later the Board of Immigration Ap-\\npeals) concluded that his criminal conduct outweighed\\nwhatever equities his family and financial ties to the United\\nStates supplied.\\n The Board’s final order was entered in July 2003, and Ma-\\nlukas did not seek judicial review. He did file a timely mo-\\ntion for reconsideration, arguing that his criminal conduct\\nshould not have been deemed such a high obstacle to relief.\\nThe Board denied that motion in September 2003, and again\\nMalukas did not seek judicial review.\\n Malukas remained in the United States, in part because\\nhe had allowed his Lithuanian passport to expire and Lithu-\\nania would not issue new travel documents. In 2018 Malu-\\nkas filed with the Board a second motion to reconsider, and\\nan initial motion to reopen, contending that the removal or-\\nder is invalid because the proceeding began with a “Notice\\nto Appear” that did not include a date and time for the hear-\\ning. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). The date\\nand time were furnished in a later document, and Malukas\\ndid not argue at his removal hearing that he lacked adequate\\nnotice. Still, he maintained, the defect on the original Notice\\nto Appear deprived the immigration judge of jurisdiction\\nand vitiated the removal order. The motion also contended\\nthat he had been rehabilitated by the passage of time, so that\\nthe equities now weighed in his favor, and that Lithuania’s\\nfailure to accept his return also justifies discretionary relief.\\nThe Board denied this motion as time-and-number barred.\\n(Only one motion to reconsider is allowed, and the time limit\\nfor a motion to reopen is 90 days. 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(6)(A),\\n(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2).) The Board added\\n\\fNo. 19-1633 3\\n\\nthat a defect in a Notice to Appear does not affect jurisdic-\\ntion.\\n That aspect of the Board’s ruling has since been con-\\nfirmed by this court. Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th\\nCir. 2019). The BIA’s reasoning differs from that of Ortiz-\\nSantiago, but the bokom line is the same. This means that the\\nBoard did not commit a legal error that would permit judi-\\ncial review despite the fact that the motion to reopen is 15\\nyears late and that the second motion to reconsider is not on-\\nly untimely but also independently barred as successive.\\n Seeking to avoid the time-and-number problem, Malukas\\nasked the Board to reopen sua sponte—that is to say, on its\\nown volition. The time-and-number limits apply to aliens’\\nmotions and do not restrict the Board’s (or the Akorney\\nGeneral’s) authority to act independently of a motion. But\\nthe request that Malukas made—a motion to reopen sua\\nsponte—is an oxymoron. Reopening in response to a motion\\nis not sua sponte; it is a response to the motion and thus sub-\\nject to the time-and-number limits.\\n The Board’s time-and-number limits have a parallel in\\nthe federal law of collateral review. Only one motion for re-\\nview is permiked, unless the conditions for second or suc-\\ncessive motions have been satisfied. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,\\n2255(h). And if a court of appeals decides that those condi-\\ntions have not been satisfied, the disappointed applicant\\nmay not seek rehearing. 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(E). Prisoners\\nhave tried several ways to get around those limits. One is to\\ncharacterize a successive petition as a motion for relief under\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) from the adverse decision. The Justices\\nheld, however, that when such a motion rests on substantive\\narguments it counts as a forbidden successive petition. Gon-\\n\\f4 No. 19-1633\\n\\nzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005). Another approach has\\nbeen to ask the court of appeals to recall its mandate rather\\nthan to grant rehearing. The Justices stated that such a mo-\\ntion should be treated the same as a petition for rehearing,\\nsee Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554 (1998), though\\nthey added that if the court of appeals says that it would\\nhave recalled its mandate whether or not the prisoner sought\\nrelief, they will take the judges at their word.\\n By the standards of Gonzalez and Calderon, the document\\nthat Malukas filed with the Board is a motion for reopening\\nor reconsideration, properly denied on time-and-number\\ngrounds. The arguments that Malukas has rehabilitated\\nhimself, and that Lithuania’s decision not to accept his re-\\nturn affects the weighing of equities, are substantive. The\\nBoard stated its reasons for not reopening or reconsidering\\non the merits, thus satisfying Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528\\n(7th Cir. 2008). And the Board did not hint that it would\\nhave reopened in the absence of a motion; to the contrary, it\\ndenied the motion actually made, remarking:\\n While the respondent alternately requests that the Board exercise\\n our discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte,\\n that authority is reserved for rare, “exceptional” situations not\\n demonstrated here. 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(a); MaDer of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec.\\n 976 (BIA 1997); MaDer of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999).\\n Thus, we will deny the respondent’s motion.\\n\\nGonzalez and Calderon require us to reject Malukas’s position\\nthat adding the phrase “sua sponte” to an untimely or num-\\nber-barred motion makes those limits go away and opens the\\nBoard’s decision to plenary judicial review. Instead we reit-\\nerate the conclusion of Anaya-Aguilar v. Holder, 683 F.3d 369,\\n371–73 (7th Cir. 2012) that, because the Board has unfekered\\ndiscretion to reopen, or not, sua sponte, its decision is not\\n\\fNo. 19-1633 5\\n\\nsubject to judicial review at all. See 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B).\\nSee also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (no judicial re-\\nview when decision has been commiked to agency discre-\\ntion by law).\\n This is equally true if we deem a “motion to reopen sua\\nsponte” as equivalent to a request for mercy notwithstanding\\nall legal obstacles. Dealing with such a request is within the\\nBoard’s discretion, and no rules of law apply to the provi-\\nsion or withholding of administrative grace. Nor does the\\nholding of Iglesias that the Board must give reasons for deny-\\ning a genuine motion to reopen affect decisions, pro or con,\\nabout sua sponte relief; Iglesias concerned a timely initial mo-\\ntion to reopen, not an administrative decision to refrain from\\nsua sponte action.\\n One panel of this court recently held that, although\\n§1252(a)(2)(B) and Anaya-Aguilar render the merits of the\\nBoard’s decisions unreviewable, a court still can decide\\nwhether the Board has misunderstood the basis of the alien’s\\nrequest. Fuller v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 514, 519–20 (7th Cir.\\n2019). That decision conflicts with rulings in some other cir-\\ncuits. See, e.g., Butka v. ADorney General, 827 F.3d 1278, 1285–\\n86 (11th Cir. 2016); Rais v. Holder, 768 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2014).\\nIt is also hard to reconcile with the fact that this court rou-\\ntinely denies, without explanation, petitions for rehearing\\nand motions to recall the mandate—and we never explain\\nwhy we have not recalled a mandate sua sponte. What rule of\\nlaw requires the Board of Immigration Appeals to say more\\nthan “denied” in response to a motion about a subject over\\nwhich it possesses unbridled discretion? Why would an ex-\\nplanation, when given, permit judicial review of a subject\\ncommiked to agency discretion? The federal agency ex-\\n\\f6 No. 19-1633\\n\\nplained its action in Chaney, but the Court still held the deci-\\nsion not reviewable.\\n The Supreme Court may cast light on that question and\\nrelated subjects in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, No. 18–776 (cert.\\ngranted June 24, 2019) (to be argued Dec. 9, 2019), and De-\\npartment of Homeland Security v. University of California, No.\\n18–587 (cert. granted June 28, 2019) (to be argued Nov. 12,\\n2019). Guerrero-Lasprilla poses the question whether a court\\nof appeals may review the Board’s decision not to exercise\\nequitable tolling to excuse an untimely motion for reconsid-\\neration or reopening, while University of California poses the\\nquestion whether courts may set aside a discretionary prose-\\ncutorial decision about immigration status on the ground\\nthat a legal error may have influenced the exercise of that\\ndiscretion. Today’s case does not present any occasion to de-\\ntermine how far this court will take Fuller. The Board ex-\\nplained why it declined to reopen sua sponte, and that expla-\\nnation does not contain or imply any legal error. Judicial re-\\nview accordingly is unavailable. Diplomats rather than\\njudges must determine whether Malukas can be removed to\\nLithuania—and it is a maker of prosecutorial discretion\\nwhether the United States should continue to seek his re-\\nmoval in light of the events since 2003.\\n To the extent that the Board denied the motion to recon-\\nsider and reopen its decision of 2003, the petition for review\\nis denied. To the extent that the Board declined to reopen the\\nproceedings sua sponte, the petition for review is dismissed\\nfor want of jurisdiction.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4446984/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669731/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Henrikas Malukas v. William Barr\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 19-1633\nHENRIKAS MALUKAS,\n Petitioner,\n\n v.\n\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States,\n Respondent.\n ____________________\n\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\n No. A72-569-248\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Henrikas Malukas, a citizen\nof Lithuania, entered the United States in 1992 on a tourist\nvisa and did not leave when it expired. In 1995 he was con-\nvicted of several weapons-related felonies and sentenced to\n52 months in prison. While he was imprisoned, immigration\nofficials began removal proceedings. Malukas applied for\ndiscretionary relief as the spouse of a U.S. citizen, but the\n\f2 No. 19-1633\n\nimmigration judge (and later the Board of Immigration Ap-\npeals) concluded that his criminal conduct outweighed\nwhatever equities his family and financial ties to the United\nStates supplied.\n The Board’s final order was entered in July 2003, and Ma-\nlukas did not seek judicial review. He did file a timely mo-\ntion for reconsideration, arguing that his criminal conduct\nshould not have been deemed such a high obstacle to relief.\nThe Board denied that motion in September 2003, and again\nMalukas did not seek judicial review.\n Malukas remained in the United States, in part because\nhe had allowed his Lithuanian passport to expire and Lithu-\nania would not issue new travel documents. In 2018 Malu-\nkas filed with the Board a second motion to reconsider, and\nan initial motion to reopen, contending that the removal or-\nder is invalid because the proceeding began with a “Notice\nto Appear” that did not include a date and time for the hear-\ning. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). The date\nand time were furnished in a later document, and Malukas\ndid not argue at his removal hearing that he lacked adequate\nnotice. Still, he maintained, the defect on the original Notice\nto Appear deprived the immigration judge of jurisdiction\nand vitiated the removal order. The motion also contended\nthat he had been rehabilitated by the passage of time, so that\nthe equities now weighed in his favor, and that Lithuania’s\nfailure to accept his return also justifies discretionary relief.\nThe Board denied this motion as time-and-number barred.\n(Only one motion to reconsider is allowed, and the time limit\nfor a motion to reopen is 90 days. 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(6)(A),\n(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2).) The Board added\n\fNo. 19-1633 3\n\nthat a defect in a Notice to Appear does not affect jurisdic-\ntion.\n That aspect of the Board’s ruling has since been con-\nfirmed by this court. Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th\nCir. 2019). The BIA’s reasoning differs from that of Ortiz-\nSantiago, but the bokom line is the same. This means that the\nBoard did not commit a legal error that would permit judi-\ncial review despite the fact that the motion to reopen is 15\nyears late and that the second motion to reconsider is not on-\nly untimely but also independently barred as successive.\n Seeking to avoid the time-and-number problem, Malukas\nasked the Board to reopen sua sponte—that is to say, on its\nown volition. The time-and-number limits apply to aliens’\nmotions and do not restrict the Board’s (or the Akorney\nGeneral’s) authority to act independently of a motion. But\nthe request that Malukas made—a motion to reopen sua\nsponte—is an oxymoron. Reopening in response to a motion\nis not sua sponte; it is a response to the motion and thus sub-\nject to the time-and-number limits.\n The Board’s time-and-number limits have a parallel in\nthe federal law of collateral review. Only one motion for re-\nview is permiked, unless the conditions for second or suc-\ncessive motions have been satisfied. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,\n2255(h). And if a court of appeals decides that those condi-\ntions have not been satisfied, the disappointed applicant\nmay not seek rehearing. 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(E). Prisoners\nhave tried several ways to get around those limits. One is to\ncharacterize a successive petition as a motion for relief under\nFed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) from the adverse decision. The Justices\nheld, however, that when such a motion rests on substantive\narguments it counts as a forbidden successive petition. Gon-\n\f4 No. 19-1633\n\nzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005). Another approach has\nbeen to ask the court of appeals to recall its mandate rather\nthan to grant rehearing. The Justices stated that such a mo-\ntion should be treated the same as a petition for rehearing,\nsee Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554 (1998), though\nthey added that if the court of appeals says that it would\nhave recalled its mandate whether or not the prisoner sought\nrelief, they will take the judges at their word.\n By the standards of Gonzalez and Calderon, the document\nthat Malukas filed with the Board is a motion for reopening\nor reconsideration, properly denied on time-and-number\ngrounds. The arguments that Malukas has rehabilitated\nhimself, and that Lithuania’s decision not to accept his re-\nturn affects the weighing of equities, are substantive. The\nBoard stated its reasons for not reopening or reconsidering\non the merits, thus satisfying Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528\n(7th Cir. 2008). And the Board did not hint that it would\nhave reopened in the absence of a motion; to the contrary, it\ndenied the motion actually made, remarking:\n While the respondent alternately requests that the Board exercise\n our discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte,\n that authority is reserved for rare, “exceptional” situations not\n demonstrated here. 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(a); MaDer of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec.\n 976 (BIA 1997); MaDer of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999).\n Thus, we will deny the respondent’s motion.\n\nGonzalez and Calderon require us to reject Malukas’s position\nthat adding the phrase “sua sponte” to an untimely or num-\nber-barred motion makes those limits go away and opens the\nBoard’s decision to plenary judicial review. Instead we reit-\nerate the conclusion of Anaya-Aguilar v. Holder, 683 F.3d 369,\n371–73 (7th Cir. 2012) that, because the Board has unfekered\ndiscretion to reopen, or not, sua sponte, its decision is not\n\fNo. 19-1633 5\n\nsubject to judicial review at all. See 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B).\nSee also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (no judicial re-\nview when decision has been commiked to agency discre-\ntion by law).\n This is equally true if we deem a “motion to reopen sua\nsponte” as equivalent to a request for mercy notwithstanding\nall legal obstacles. Dealing with such a request is within the\nBoard’s discretion, and no rules of law apply to the provi-\nsion or withholding of administrative grace. Nor does the\nholding of Iglesias that the Board must give reasons for deny-\ning a genuine motion to reopen affect decisions, pro or con,\nabout sua sponte relief; Iglesias concerned a timely initial mo-\ntion to reopen, not an administrative decision to refrain from\nsua sponte action.\n One panel of this court recently held that, although\n§1252(a)(2)(B) and Anaya-Aguilar render the merits of the\nBoard’s decisions unreviewable, a court still can decide\nwhether the Board has misunderstood the basis of the alien’s\nrequest. Fuller v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 514, 519–20 (7th Cir.\n2019). That decision conflicts with rulings in some other cir-\ncuits. See, e.g., Butka v. ADorney General, 827 F.3d 1278, 1285–\n86 (11th Cir. 2016); Rais v. Holder, 768 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2014).\nIt is also hard to reconcile with the fact that this court rou-\ntinely denies, without explanation, petitions for rehearing\nand motions to recall the mandate—and we never explain\nwhy we have not recalled a mandate sua sponte. What rule of\nlaw requires the Board of Immigration Appeals to say more\nthan “denied” in response to a motion about a subject over\nwhich it possesses unbridled discretion? Why would an ex-\nplanation, when given, permit judicial review of a subject\ncommiked to agency discretion? The federal agency ex-\n\f6 No. 19-1633\n\nplained its action in Chaney, but the Court still held the deci-\nsion not reviewable.\n The Supreme Court may cast light on that question and\nrelated subjects in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, No. 18–776 (cert.\ngranted June 24, 2019) (to be argued Dec. 9, 2019), and De-\npartment of Homeland Security v. University of California, No.\n18–587 (cert. granted June 28, 2019) (to be argued Nov. 12,\n2019). Guerrero-Lasprilla poses the question whether a court\nof appeals may review the Board’s decision not to exercise\nequitable tolling to excuse an untimely motion for reconsid-\neration or reopening, while University of California poses the\nquestion whether courts may set aside a discretionary prose-\ncutorial decision about immigration status on the ground\nthat a legal error may have influenced the exercise of that\ndiscretion. Today’s case does not present any occasion to de-\ntermine how far this court will take Fuller. The Board ex-\nplained why it declined to reopen sua sponte, and that expla-\nnation does not contain or imply any legal error. Judicial re-\nview accordingly is unavailable. Diplomats rather than\njudges must determine whether Malukas can be removed to\nLithuania—and it is a maker of prosecutorial discretion\nwhether the United States should continue to seek his re-\nmoval in light of the events since 2003.\n To the extent that the Board denied the motion to recon-\nsider and reopen its decision of 2003, the petition for review\nis denied. To the extent that the Board declined to reopen the\nproceedings sua sponte, the petition for review is dismissed\nfor want of jurisdiction.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Henrikas Malukas v. William Barr\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 19-1633\\nHENRIKAS MALUKAS,\\n Petitioner,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States,\\n Respondent.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n No. A72-569-248\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Henrikas Malukas, a citizen\\nof Lithuania, entered the United States in 1992 on a tourist\\nvisa and did not leave when it expired. In 1995 he was con-\\nvicted of several weapons-related felonies and sentenced to\\n52 months in prison. While he was imprisoned, immigration\\nofficials began removal proceedings. Malukas applied for\\ndiscretionary relief as the spouse of a U.S. citizen, but the\\n\\f2 No. 19-1633\\n\\nimmigration judge (and later the Board of Immigration Ap-\\npeals) concluded that his criminal conduct outweighed\\nwhatever equities his family and financial ties to the United\\nStates supplied.\\n The Board’s final order was entered in July 2003, and Ma-\\nlukas did not seek judicial review. He did file a timely mo-\\ntion for reconsideration, arguing that his criminal conduct\\nshould not have been deemed such a high obstacle to relief.\\nThe Board denied that motion in September 2003, and again\\nMalukas did not seek judicial review.\\n Malukas remained in the United States, in part because\\nhe had allowed his Lithuanian passport to expire and Lithu-\\nania would not issue new travel documents. In 2018 Malu-\\nkas filed with the Board a second motion to reconsider, and\\nan initial motion to reopen, contending that the removal or-\\nder is invalid because the proceeding began with a “Notice\\nto Appear” that did not include a date and time for the hear-\\ning. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). The date\\nand time were furnished in a later document, and Malukas\\ndid not argue at his removal hearing that he lacked adequate\\nnotice. Still, he maintained, the defect on the original Notice\\nto Appear deprived the immigration judge of jurisdiction\\nand vitiated the removal order. The motion also contended\\nthat he had been rehabilitated by the passage of time, so that\\nthe equities now weighed in his favor, and that Lithuania’s\\nfailure to accept his return also justifies discretionary relief.\\nThe Board denied this motion as time-and-number barred.\\n(Only one motion to reconsider is allowed, and the time limit\\nfor a motion to reopen is 90 days. 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(6)(A),\\n(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2).) The Board added\\n\\fNo. 19-1633 3\\n\\nthat a defect in a Notice to Appear does not affect jurisdic-\\ntion.\\n That aspect of the Board’s ruling has since been con-\\nfirmed by this court. Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th\\nCir. 2019). The BIA’s reasoning differs from that of Ortiz-\\nSantiago, but the bokom line is the same. This means that the\\nBoard did not commit a legal error that would permit judi-\\ncial review despite the fact that the motion to reopen is 15\\nyears late and that the second motion to reconsider is not on-\\nly untimely but also independently barred as successive.\\n Seeking to avoid the time-and-number problem, Malukas\\nasked the Board to reopen sua sponte—that is to say, on its\\nown volition. The time-and-number limits apply to aliens’\\nmotions and do not restrict the Board’s (or the Akorney\\nGeneral’s) authority to act independently of a motion. But\\nthe request that Malukas made—a motion to reopen sua\\nsponte—is an oxymoron. Reopening in response to a motion\\nis not sua sponte; it is a response to the motion and thus sub-\\nject to the time-and-number limits.\\n The Board’s time-and-number limits have a parallel in\\nthe federal law of collateral review. Only one motion for re-\\nview is permiked, unless the conditions for second or suc-\\ncessive motions have been satisfied. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,\\n2255(h). And if a court of appeals decides that those condi-\\ntions have not been satisfied, the disappointed applicant\\nmay not seek rehearing. 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(E). Prisoners\\nhave tried several ways to get around those limits. One is to\\ncharacterize a successive petition as a motion for relief under\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) from the adverse decision. The Justices\\nheld, however, that when such a motion rests on substantive\\narguments it counts as a forbidden successive petition. Gon-\\n\\f4 No. 19-1633\\n\\nzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005). Another approach has\\nbeen to ask the court of appeals to recall its mandate rather\\nthan to grant rehearing. The Justices stated that such a mo-\\ntion should be treated the same as a petition for rehearing,\\nsee Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554 (1998), though\\nthey added that if the court of appeals says that it would\\nhave recalled its mandate whether or not the prisoner sought\\nrelief, they will take the judges at their word.\\n By the standards of Gonzalez and Calderon, the document\\nthat Malukas filed with the Board is a motion for reopening\\nor reconsideration, properly denied on time-and-number\\ngrounds. The arguments that Malukas has rehabilitated\\nhimself, and that Lithuania’s decision not to accept his re-\\nturn affects the weighing of equities, are substantive. The\\nBoard stated its reasons for not reopening or reconsidering\\non the merits, thus satisfying Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528\\n(7th Cir. 2008). And the Board did not hint that it would\\nhave reopened in the absence of a motion; to the contrary, it\\ndenied the motion actually made, remarking:\\n While the respondent alternately requests that the Board exercise\\n our discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte,\\n that authority is reserved for rare, “exceptional” situations not\\n demonstrated here. 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(a); MaDer of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec.\\n 976 (BIA 1997); MaDer of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999).\\n Thus, we will deny the respondent’s motion.\\n\\nGonzalez and Calderon require us to reject Malukas’s position\\nthat adding the phrase “sua sponte” to an untimely or num-\\nber-barred motion makes those limits go away and opens the\\nBoard’s decision to plenary judicial review. Instead we reit-\\nerate the conclusion of Anaya-Aguilar v. Holder, 683 F.3d 369,\\n371–73 (7th Cir. 2012) that, because the Board has unfekered\\ndiscretion to reopen, or not, sua sponte, its decision is not\\n\\fNo. 19-1633 5\\n\\nsubject to judicial review at all. See 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B).\\nSee also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (no judicial re-\\nview when decision has been commiked to agency discre-\\ntion by law).\\n This is equally true if we deem a “motion to reopen sua\\nsponte” as equivalent to a request for mercy notwithstanding\\nall legal obstacles. Dealing with such a request is within the\\nBoard’s discretion, and no rules of law apply to the provi-\\nsion or withholding of administrative grace. Nor does the\\nholding of Iglesias that the Board must give reasons for deny-\\ning a genuine motion to reopen affect decisions, pro or con,\\nabout sua sponte relief; Iglesias concerned a timely initial mo-\\ntion to reopen, not an administrative decision to refrain from\\nsua sponte action.\\n One panel of this court recently held that, although\\n§1252(a)(2)(B) and Anaya-Aguilar render the merits of the\\nBoard’s decisions unreviewable, a court still can decide\\nwhether the Board has misunderstood the basis of the alien’s\\nrequest. Fuller v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 514, 519–20 (7th Cir.\\n2019). That decision conflicts with rulings in some other cir-\\ncuits. See, e.g., Butka v. ADorney General, 827 F.3d 1278, 1285–\\n86 (11th Cir. 2016); Rais v. Holder, 768 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2014).\\nIt is also hard to reconcile with the fact that this court rou-\\ntinely denies, without explanation, petitions for rehearing\\nand motions to recall the mandate—and we never explain\\nwhy we have not recalled a mandate sua sponte. What rule of\\nlaw requires the Board of Immigration Appeals to say more\\nthan “denied” in response to a motion about a subject over\\nwhich it possesses unbridled discretion? Why would an ex-\\nplanation, when given, permit judicial review of a subject\\ncommiked to agency discretion? The federal agency ex-\\n\\f6 No. 19-1633\\n\\nplained its action in Chaney, but the Court still held the deci-\\nsion not reviewable.\\n The Supreme Court may cast light on that question and\\nrelated subjects in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, No. 18–776 (cert.\\ngranted June 24, 2019) (to be argued Dec. 9, 2019), and De-\\npartment of Homeland Security v. University of California, No.\\n18–587 (cert. granted June 28, 2019) (to be argued Nov. 12,\\n2019). Guerrero-Lasprilla poses the question whether a court\\nof appeals may review the Board’s decision not to exercise\\nequitable tolling to excuse an untimely motion for reconsid-\\neration or reopening, while University of California poses the\\nquestion whether courts may set aside a discretionary prose-\\ncutorial decision about immigration status on the ground\\nthat a legal error may have influenced the exercise of that\\ndiscretion. Today’s case does not present any occasion to de-\\ntermine how far this court will take Fuller. The Board ex-\\nplained why it declined to reopen sua sponte, and that expla-\\nnation does not contain or imply any legal error. Judicial re-\\nview accordingly is unavailable. Diplomats rather than\\njudges must determine whether Malukas can be removed to\\nLithuania—and it is a maker of prosecutorial discretion\\nwhether the United States should continue to seek his re-\\nmoval in light of the events since 2003.\\n To the extent that the Board denied the motion to recon-\\nsider and reopen its decision of 2003, the petition for review\\nis denied. To the extent that the Board declined to reopen the\\nproceedings sua sponte, the petition for review is dismissed\\nfor want of jurisdiction.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4664,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4669732,"string":"4,669,732"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"George Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2821"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-2821\\nGEORGE WALKER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 13-cv-07237 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. George Walker is an inmate at State-\\nville Correctional Center. He has an incurable motor neuron\\ndisease called primary lateral sclerosis (“PLS”) that causes\\nweakness in his voluntary muscles. Walker alleges that his\\nhealthcare providers at Stateville—Wexford Health Sources\\nand Dr. Saleh Obaisi—were deliberately indifferent to his\\nmedical needs after he underwent spinal surgery in March\\n\\f2 No. 17-2821\\n\\n2011.1 Specifically, Walker alleges defendants failed to: (1) en-\\nsure he received proper follow-up care after his surgery, and\\n(2) allowed undue delays in his treatment by outside experts.\\nDefendants’ failures, he asserts, delayed his diagnosis and\\ncaused him to suffer from the undiagnosed PLS in the interim.\\nDefendants successfully moved for summary judgment on all\\nof Walker’s claims. We affirm.\\n I. Background\\n During the relevant period, the State of Illinois subcon-\\ntracted with Wexford Health Sources to provide healthcare\\nservices to inmates at all the facilities managed by the Illinois\\nDepartment of Corrections (“IDOC”). Saleh Obaisi, M.D., was\\na Wexford employee who served as Stateville’s Medical Di-\\nrector from August 2012 until his death in December 2017.\\n A. Healthcare at Stateville\\n Stateville’s onsite healthcare facilities included an urgent\\ncare center, various medical clinics, and an infirmary. The\\nphysicians, nurse practitioners, and physician’s assistants at\\nStateville were Wexford employees; the nurses and other\\nmedical personnel were a mix of Wexford and IDOC employ-\\nees. All the medical providers at Stateville, whether employed\\nby Wexford or not, followed IDOC’s administrative policies\\nand procedures. Nonetheless, Wexford’s corporate repre-\\nsentative testified that when deciding how to provide the best\\ncare for patients, clinicians relied on their training and expe-\\nrience first, and the governing policies second.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1Originally, Warden Michael Lemke was a defendant, but the parties\\nagreed to dismiss him from the case.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 3\\n\\n When the medical professionals and facilities at Stateville\\ncould not address an inmate’s conditions, Wexford referred\\nsuch inmates to outside providers like the University of Illi-\\nnois at Chicago Medical Center (“UIC”). Typically, referrals\\nhad to go through a collegial peer review process, which Wex-\\nford called “Utilization Management” (“UM”). In the event of\\na medical emergency, however, Stateville’s Medical Director\\ncould make referrals to another hospital, St. Joseph’s Medical\\nCenter, without securing UM’s preapproval.\\n In practice, UM consisted of a weekly conference call in\\nwhich medical professionals reviewed an inmate’s case and\\nthe suggested treatment. Participants in the call included:\\nWexford’s UM Director for Illinois, Wexford’s Corporate UM\\nnurse, Wexford physicians, Wexford staff, and IDOC’s\\nhealthcare unit administrator. If the onsite Medical Director\\nwas ever dissatisfied with the alternative treatment plan UM\\nauthorized for a patient, the director could appeal that deci-\\nsion.\\n If UM approved a patient for an offsite consultation at\\nUIC, the UM department would enter the information into\\nWexford’s computer program (“WexCare”), which triggered\\nan electronic notice to the prison and UIC. Then, the staff at\\nIDOC and UIC would coordinate to schedule the inmate’s ap-\\npointment. With respect to surgery referrals, UM often issued\\na “global approval,” which authorized both the surgery and\\nany necessary follow-up care. Whenever UIC received a\\nglobal approval, it would call Stateville directly to arrange the\\nfollow-up care for the inmate.\\n UM’s authorizations were valid for ninety days. From\\n2011 to 2014, however, Wexford did not have a system in place\\n\\f4 No. 17-2821\\n\\nto alert its staff when an authorization expired before the in-\\nmate had received treatment.2\\n B. Walker’s Treatment History at Stateville\\n On March 1, 2010, a Wexford physician’s assistant exam-\\nined Walker, noting that he had right leg twitching and re-\\nports of weakness. Over the course of the next year, Walker\\nunderwent several examinations with specialists and other\\nmedical professionals. These appointments culminated in a\\nrecommendation by a UIC neurosurgeon, Dr. Sergey\\nNeckrysh, that Walker have spinal surgery to decompress and\\nfuse the lumbar spine. UM gave a global approval for the sur-\\ngery and follow-up care.\\n Walker had spinal surgery at UIC on March 23, 2011. He\\nremained at UIC for three days following his surgery. When\\nhe returned to Stateville, the infirmary admitted him; his dis-\\ncharge note from UIC called for a follow-up appointment\\nwith Dr. Neckrysh in three months, including a CT scan of the\\nlumbar spine. Walker testified that three UIC nurses told him\\nthey would see him in six to eight weeks for a follow-up CT\\nscan. The follow-up appointment never occurred. It was the\\nfirst of many delays that prompted Walker to bring this law-\\nsuit. As Walker testified, “it’s been all down hill ever since the\\nsurgery.” Walker also testified, however, that none of his\\ntreating doctors have ever told him that his condition would\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Fortunately, Wexford has since eliminated this vulnerability in its\\nsystem; it now requires doctors to enter a “service completion date” when\\nthey authorize an outside referral, and whenever treatment does not occur\\nbefore that service completion date, the inmate’s case returns to UM for\\ndiscussion and potential reauthorization.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 5\\n\\nhave improved if he had been sent back to UIC within three\\nmonths of his March 2011 surgery.\\n The medical records tell a more complicated story. During\\nWalker’s first three days at the infirmary, five treatment notes\\nrecorded that his surgical incision was healing well. When the\\ninfirmary staff removed Walker’s staples on April 7, 2011,\\nthey cleaned the incision site and did not record any signs or\\nsymptoms of redness or infection. Later that day, the infir-\\nmary discharged Walker, reporting his minimal discomfort\\nand giving him permits for low bunk, low gallery, and special\\nmedical restraints.\\n Approximately four weeks after the surgery, Walker re-\\nceived a physical therapy examination at Stateville. The ther-\\napist stated that Walker explained that his pain had resolved,\\nand that the surgical scar was well-healed with minor adhe-\\nsion (excessive growth of scar tissue). Between May 26, 2011,\\nand August 31, 2012, the record shows that Walker saw Stat-\\neville medical providers on eight different occasions and that\\nhe informed them of the improvement to his back following\\nthe surgery. Walker also completed two eight-week courses\\nof physical therapy with an onsite provider at Stateville. He\\nthen did sixteen months of physical therapy in his cell. During\\nWalker’s deposition, defendants’ lawyer asked: “Did your\\ncondition improve at all through the physical therapy?”\\nWalker responded: “It seemed like after the physical therapy\\nI would become more irritated and when I was let out of my\\ncell to take a shower I fall flat on my face. I couldn’t walk. The\\nirritation was just so tight.” The timing and nature of this irri-\\ntation, however, is unclear from Walker’s testimony.\\n Dr. Obaisi first examined Walker on September 26, 2012,\\nalmost exactly eighteen months after Walker’s surgery. He\\n\\f6 No. 17-2821\\n\\ndocumented that Walker complained of an unsteady gait,\\nweakness in his legs, upper thigh pain, and bilateral foot\\ndrop. Dr. Obaisi’s appointment note also stated that he sus-\\npected that Walker might have upper motor neuron syn-\\ndrome. As a result, Dr. Obaisi ordered x-rays and provided\\nWalker with muscle relaxers and anti-inflammatory medica-\\ntion. Once Dr. Obaisi received the results from one of the\\nblood tests and learned that Walker’s levels were elevated, Dr.\\nObaisi sought UM’s approval for a neurology consultation at\\nUIC. Wexford approved the referral on December 2, 2012, but\\nUIC did not schedule a neurology appointment until April 24,\\n2013.\\n At his deposition, Dr. Obaisi testified that his focus during\\nthis initial visit was Walker’s condition; he did not “really pay\\nattention” to whether Walker had seen UIC neurosurgery for\\nhis post-surgery visit. Nonetheless, when Walker’s attorney\\nspecifically asked Dr. Obaisi why he did not send Walker back\\nto UIC neurosurgery for the follow-up, Dr. Obaisi explained\\nhe wanted to see the results from some tests before presenting\\nWalker’s case to UM—this way, Dr. Obaisi could support his\\nconcern regarding upper motor neuron syndrome. He also\\ntestified that he did not have control over UIC’s scheduling,\\nthat specialists generally prioritize scheduling by the urgency\\nof cases, and that Dr. Neckrysh does not call people “very eas-\\nily.”\\n Walker continued to receive treatment from Dr. Obaisi\\nand several other medical professionals. A summary of this\\nlater treatment appears below in chronological order.\\n On April 9, 2013, Dr. Obaisi examined Walker for\\n swelling in his right leg that had persisted for two\\n weeks. Concerned that Walker was developing a\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 7\\n\\n blood clot in one of his veins, Dr. Obaisi transferred\\n Walker to St. Joseph on an emergency basis. The\\n hospital’s discharge notes state that Walker needed\\n a repeat ultrasound of the right leg in one week to\\n check for a blood clot.\\n On April 24, 2013, Walker was transferred offsite to\\n UIC neurology; he told Dr. Lawrence Zeidman that\\n his back “was not bothering him much,” that he\\n had pain in his legs and groin, but that he did not\\n want any medication. Dr. Zeidman requested a re-\\n peat MRI of the lumbar spine, an imaging test of the\\n right lower extremity to rule out a myelopathy3\\n given his blood test, and a rereferral to neurosur-\\n gery.4\\n On May 23, 2013, Walker received an MRI that\\n showed some degenerative changes to his L3-L4\\n spinal segments.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 “Myelopathy is an injury to the spinal cord due to severe compres-\\nsion that may result from trauma, congenital stenosis, degenerative dis-\\nease or disc herniation.” Myelopathy, John Hopkins Medicine,\\nhttps://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/mye-\\nlopathy (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).\\n 4 Dr. Zeidman testified that his recommendations for further treat-\\nment are always directed at the referring physician—regardless of\\nwhether the patient is an inmate or not—and “it’s optional to the prerog-\\native of the referring doctor whether they even want to follow the recom-\\nmendations.”\\n\\f8 No. 17-2821\\n\\n On May 28, 2013, Walker had a neurosurgery con-\\n sultation at UIC. The examining neurosurgeon ob-\\n served that Walker’s back pain and radiculopathy5\\n symptoms had improved, but that he had “right in-\\n guinal [(i.e., groin)] pain.” As a result, the doctor\\n recommended an x-ray of the lumbar spine. An x-\\n ray was taken that same day; the impression note\\n states: “Postsurgical changes with posterior spinal\\n fusion from L4 to S1. There is a suggestion of lu-\\n cency around the bilateral S1 screws suggesting\\n hardware loosening.”\\n On September 25, 2013, Dr. Zeidman examined\\n Walker, noting Walker was now in a wheelchair\\n and complaining of radiculopathy. Dr. Zeidman\\n further documented Walker’s May 2013 MRI iden-\\n tified a loose surgical screw at his S1 vertebrae, but\\n that UIC’s neurosurgery team, who had seen\\n Walker after the MRI, did not seem concerned\\n about it. Dr. Zeidman recommended reconsulting\\n with UIC’s neurosurgery team about the screw,\\n and having Walker receive another MRI due to his\\n presentment of a new symptom: brisk reflexes in\\n his ankle, and a referral to the UIC pain clinic for a\\n potential epidural steroid injection.\\n On March 27, 2014, Dr. Zeidman examined Walker,\\n noting that the neurosurgery follow-up and pain\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 “Radiculopathy describes a range of symptoms produced by the\\npinching of a nerve root in the spinal column.” Radiculopathy, John Hop-\\nkins Medicine, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-\\ndiseases/radiculopathy (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 9\\n\\n consult he had recommended had not been done.6\\n (Dr. Zeidman believed the recommended cervical\\n and thoracic MRI repeat had occurred, but that the\\n images had not been sent to him.) Accordingly,\\n Dr. Zeidman again referred Mr. Walker to neuro-\\n surgery and the pain clinic. Additionally, Dr. Zeid-\\n man’s notes state that Walker reported that one of\\n his medications (gabapentin) was improving his\\n pain but that he did not feel he was getting enough\\n physical therapy in prison.\\n On October 20, 2014, Walker received an MRI of his\\n cervical spine, which showed some degenerative\\n joint disease.\\n On October 30, 2014, Walker received an evaluation\\n at UIC’s pain clinic for his back and hip pain. Notes\\n from that visit show that Walker reported he vol-\\n untarily stopped taking pain medications because\\n he felt they made him constipated. The UIC pain\\n physicians instructed Walker to resume taking the\\n pain medications and advised him they were con-\\n sidering giving him an epidural steroid injection.\\n On November 6, 2014, Walker received a thoracic\\n spine MRI. The UIC radiologist found that that MRI\\n was similar to Walker’s 2011 (pre-surgery) MRI be-\\n cause both showed degenerative disc disease in his\\n back.\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Dr. Zeidman testified that he does not know how scheduling works\\nwith IDOC, Wexford, and UIC. He also opined that he did not think it\\nwould be “unreasonable” for it to take “a couple months” for an inmate\\nto get an appointment with him.\\n\\f10 No. 17-2821\\n\\n On January 8, 2015, Walker returned to UIC neurol-\\n ogy and reported continued back pain and that\\n switching prescriptions (from gabapentin to Mo-\\n bic) had helped his pain. Dr. Zeidman reviewed\\n Walker’s MRI and found that it showed degenera-\\n tive joint disease but no neural compromise. It was\\n Dr. Zeidman’s impression that Walker may have\\n had a stroke before the visit. Dr. Zeidman grew\\n concerned that Walker had started slurring his\\n speech and jerking his hands and fingers. Again,\\n Dr. Zeidman noted that despite his referrals,\\n Walker had not been sent to neurosurgery. Accord-\\n ingly, he issued another referral to neurosurgery.\\n He also asked to see Walker again in six months,\\n and he advised Walker to continue with physical\\n therapy and keep taking his pain medications.\\n On February 3, 2015, Walker went to UIC neurosur-\\n gery for a consultation; the neurosurgeon found\\n Walker had radiculopathy in the left leg and recom-\\n mended a CT myelogram7 to delineate any possible\\n neurosurgical issues at the lumbar spine.\\n On March 27, 2015, Walker received an MRI of his\\n brain that showed nonspecific scattered flare\\n changes but was otherwise unremarkable and\\n showed no acute or subacute stroke.\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 “A myelogram is a diagnostic imaging test generally done by a radi-\\n\\nologist. It uses a contrast dye and X-rays or computed tomography (CT)\\nto look for problems in the spinal canal.” Myelogram, John Hopkins Medi-\\ncine, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-ther-\\napies/myelogram (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 11\\n\\n On May 28, 2015, Walker underwent a CT myelo-\\n gram.\\n On July 1, 2015, Walker returned to UIC neurology\\n for a consultation. Dr. Zeidman noted that Walker\\n demonstrated problems with “word-finding.”\\n Dr. Zeidman concluded that Mr. Walker needed\\n “to see Dr. Neckrysh again given his ongoing lum-\\n bar radiculopathy issues.” He also recommended a\\n speech therapy consultation and that Walker con-\\n tinue taking pain medications and doing physical\\n therapy onsite at Stateville.\\n On August 11, 2015, Walker received an x-ray that\\n showed “no definitive evidence of hardware mal-\\n function” regarding the screw. He also had a con-\\n sultation with UIC neurosurgery; Dr. Neckrysh\\n concluded that Walker’s May 2015 myelogram\\n showed evidence of adjacent segment degeneration\\n at L3-4 and a grade 1 spine at L3-4, and he proposed\\n extending Walker’s prior surgery “up to the L-3-4\\n level.”8\\n On December 22, 2015, Walker returned to UIC\\n neurosurgery for an evaluation; the neurosurgeon\\n confirmed the 2011 surgery was effective and that\\n Walker did not complain of pain and weakness in\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8Dr. Obaisi testified that he is typically inclined to follow UIC neuro-\\nsurgery’s recommendations; specifically, in Walker’s case, Dr. Obaisi was\\nhappy to acquiesce to the surgery extension recommendation, though he\\ndid not believe it would affect Walker’s speech or any of the other prob-\\nlems Dr. Obaisi believed were caused by an issue with Walker’s nervous\\nsystem.\\n\\f12 No. 17-2821\\n\\n his legs for two years after the surgery.9 But be-\\n cause of Walker’s left-sided thigh pain, UIC neuro-\\n surgery recommended a revision and extension of\\n the 2011 spinal fusion to correct these newly-occur-\\n ring (as of 2015) complaints.\\n On March 30, 2016, Walker received the revision\\n and extension spinal fusion surgery at UIC. Before\\n his discharge, UIC physical therapy noted that\\n there were “signs and symptoms of [upper motor\\n neuron] involvement,” and that “[his] gait will\\n likely remain with current impairments unless\\n other means for spasticity/clonus are utilized.” The\\n post-surgery notes state that Walker reported\\n “much improvement in ‘nerve’ pain in both legs”\\n and a reduced amount of “drooling.”\\n While Walker remained at UIC following his sec-\\n ond spinal surgery, UIC’s medical staff diagnosed\\n him with PLS. During this time, Walker also con-\\n sulted with UIC speech and psychology staff re-\\n garding his diagnosis and what that meant for his\\n life going forward.\\n On April 14, 2016, UIC discharged Walker.\\n C. Expert Opinions\\n Each of the parties retained medical experts. Walker hired\\nNicholas Rizzo, M.D., who is board-certified in internal med-\\n\\n\\n 9Walker admits that the medical notes state as much, but he disputes\\nthe assertion that he did not complain of pain or weakness in his legs for\\ntwo years after surgery and only complained of left-sided thigh pain start-\\ning in 2015. As Walker testified, he asserts that he experienced pain almost\\nimmediately after his March 2011 surgery.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 13\\n\\nicine. He has neither worked in a prison or correctional insti-\\ntution, nor has he treated inmate populations. He provided\\nthe following opinions: (1) Wexford and Dr. Obaisi failed to\\nfollow the order for a three-month post-operative follow-up\\nwith the UIC neurosurgeon after Walker’s March 23, 2011 sur-\\ngery; (2) Walker’s condition deteriorated as a result of not be-\\ning seen by the neurosurgeon for two years following his\\nMarch 2011 surgery; (3) there was a lack of routine physical\\ntherapy; (4) Walker suffered additional pain as a result of not\\nbeing treated in an appropriate and timely fashion; (5) Wex-\\nford’s Medical Director at Stateville should have ensured that\\nWalker received timely and adequate treatment; and (6) Wex-\\nford should have had a procedure in place to ensure that or-\\nders for follow-up care were followed. Dr. Rizzo also gave the\\nfollowing relevant testimony:\\n The March 2011 surgery “was likely successful for\\n its goal at the time.”\\n The three-month post-surgery visit was not op-\\n tional; it was (and is) the “standard of care” and it\\n should have been done by UIC neurosurgery. At\\n that appointment, a few hypothetical scenarios\\n could have played out: (1) “If there was new symp-\\n tomatology …, they would have ordered additional\\n imaging”; (2) “If … his progress postoperatively\\n was not what they would have otherwise antici-\\n pated, they could have ordered a subsequent three-\\n month follow-up which would have obviously in-\\n creased the chance of picking up progressive symp-\\n tomatology”; (3) “If he had a perfect recovery from\\n the surgery and no symptomatology whatsoever\\n and no progression of symptoms, they may have\\n dismissed him from their care for that particular\\n\\f14 No. 17-2821\\n\\n surgery”; and (4) “If [his recovery was not perfect],\\n a continuity of care for lumbar disk disease in gen-\\n eral would have not been unreasonable.”\\n When asked whether it was his opinion that\\n Walker’s condition was going to deteriorate after\\n his March 2011 surgery, regardless of whether\\n Walker had had the three-month post-surgery fol-\\n low-up visit, Dr. Rizzo said: “There’s no way to\\n know if most patients are going to progress and de-\\n teriorate or not.”\\n Wexford employed William Davison, M.D., who is a\\nboard-certified neurologist. He provided the following rele-\\nvant testimony:\\n Walker’s condition deteriorated after his March\\n 2011 surgery, but the lumbar surgery could “[a]bso-\\n lutely” be ruled out as the cause of that deteriora-\\n tion.\\n Walker’s March 2011 surgery was a success because\\n the records suggest he had less pain going down his\\n right leg.\\n The missed post-surgery appointment did not con-\\n stitute inadequate medical care because Walker’s\\n problems could not be solved by neurosurgery any-\\n way.\\n The post-surgery follow-up visit was a recommen-\\n dation for the referring physician to consider.\\n A few months was a reasonable amount of time to\\n wait before going back to neurosurgery.\\n It was not inadequate medical treatment for de-\\n fendants not to refer Walker to the pain clinic be-\\n tween September 25, 2013, when Dr. Zeidman\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 15\\n\\n made that recommendation, and March 27, 2014,\\n when Dr. Zeidman noted it had not yet occurred,\\n because Walker was being seen at his local clinic for\\n pain and was on medication.\\n Although not an expert, Neil Fisher, M.D., provided testi-\\nmony as Wexford’s designated Federal Rule of Civil Proce-\\ndure 30(b)(6) witness. At the time of his deposition, he served\\nas Wexford’s Corporate Medical Director for Quality Manage-\\nment and Pharmacy. He previously served as Wexford’s Cor-\\nporate Director for UM from July 2012 until September 2014.\\nDr. Fisher holds a medical degree and is a general medical\\npractitioner. He provided the following pertinent testimony:\\n During this case, the WexCare system was able to\\n pull up a report of expired UM authorizations, but\\n he was not aware if there was a policy to pull that\\n report in 2011–2012.\\n Wexford is “usually very good at getting people\\n back to [UIC] during the period of time that special-\\n ist is requesting” because “this is a no-charge ser-\\n vice for us so we—these are specialists that we par-\\n ticularly want to satisfy what they are asking for.”\\n D. This Lawsuit\\n The operative complaint in this case alleges that Dr. Obaisi\\nwas deliberately indifferent to Walker’s serious medical needs\\nby (1) failing to timely return Walker to UIC after the March\\n2011 surgery and (2) generally ignoring the persistent delays\\nin Walker’s treatment after he assumed his care. Similarly,\\nWalker alleges that Wexford was deliberately indifferent to\\nhis serious medical needs by (1) failing to promulgate a policy\\n\\f16 No. 17-2821\\n\\nto alert the Medical Director that a previously approved refer-\\nral had lapsed before the authorized treatment came to frui-\\ntion and (2) relying on UIC doctors to schedule their own ap-\\npointments with inmates.\\n Dr. Obaisi and Wexford moved for summary judgment on\\nall of Walker’s claims. They argued that Walker failed to ex-\\nhaust his administrative remedies and that they were entitled\\nto judgment on the merits of Walker’s claims. The district\\ncourt agreed; it granted Dr. Obaisi and Wexford’s motion for\\nsummary judgment after concluding: (1) the Prison Litigation\\nReform Act’s exhaustion requirement barred Walker’s claims,\\n42 U.S.C. § 1997(e); (2) Dr. Obaisi was not working at the\\nprison during the relevant time when Walker wished to be\\nsent back to UIC for his three-month post-surgical neurosur-\\ngery follow-up appointment; (3) the totality of medical care\\nDr. Obaisi provided to Walker did not support a finding of\\ndeliberate indifference; (4) there was no testimony connecting\\nWalker’s condition to any failure by Dr. Obaisi; (5) some of\\nthe delays Walker blamed on Wexford were actually caused\\nby UIC; and (6) there was no evidence that Wexford denied\\nany medical care that one of its medical directors requested\\nfor Walker’s benefit or that any delay between appointments\\nwith specialists at UIC caused Walker’s deteriorating condi-\\ntion; and (7) the only testimony about what could have been\\ndone had Wexford personnel returned Walker to UIC for a\\npost-operative follow-up within three months of his 2011 sur-\\ngery was speculative, thus Walker could not establish the req-\\nuisite causal connection between Wexford’s allegedly uncon-\\nstitutional policies and practices, on the one hand, and his\\nmedical condition, on the other.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 17\\n\\n Walker appeals the district court’s decision to enter sum-\\nmary judgment for Dr. Obaisi and Wexford.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary\\njudgment de novo, interpreting all facts and drawing all rea-\\nsonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. O’Brien\\nv. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2018). “Summary\\njudgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of\\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-\\nter of law.” Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a)). And summary\\njudgment is inappropriate “if the evidence is such that a rea-\\nsonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”\\nAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may\\naffirm the grant of a motion for summary judgment on any\\nground supported in the record, so long as the parties ade-\\nquately presented the issue in the district court and the non-\\nmoving party had an opportunity to contest it. O’Brien, 900\\nF.3d at 928.\\n A. Dr. Obaisi\\n The Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference\\nto prisoners’ serious medical needs because it constitutes an\\n“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble,\\n429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,\\n173 (1976)). A failure-to-provide-adequate-medical-care claim\\nrequires proof that the prisoner suffered from “(1) an objec-\\ntively serious medical condition to which (2) a state official\\nwas deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.” Duckworth\\nv. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008). Defendants do not\\n\\f18 No. 17-2821\\n\\ndispute that Walker suffered from an objectively serious med-\\nical condition; only the subjective component is at issue here.\\n To establish the subjective component, Walker must show\\nthat Dr. Obaisi knew of facts from which he could infer that a\\nsubstantial risk of serious harm existed, and that he did, in\\nfact, draw that inference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,\\n837 (1994); see also Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (en banc). “[E]vidence of medical negligence is not\\nenough to prove deliberate indifference,” but evidence that a\\nmedical professional “knew better than to make the medical\\ndecision[ ] that [he] did” is enough to survive summary judg-\\nment. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662–\\n63 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Petties, 836 F.3d at 730–31).\\n In practice, “[s]tate-of-mind evidence sufficient to create a\\njury question might include the obviousness of the risk from\\na particular course of medical treatment; … persistence in a\\ncourse of treatment known to be ineffective; or proof that the\\ndefendant’s treatment decision departed so radically from ac-\\ncepted professional judgment, practice, or standards that a\\njury may reasonably infer that the decision was not based on\\nprofessional judgment.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 663 (citations\\nand quotation marks omitted). In cases such as this one—\\nwhere the plaintiff alleges the defendant delayed, rather than\\ndenied, medical treatment—we have required that the plain-\\ntiff present “verifying medical evidence” that the delay, and\\nnot the underlying condition, caused some harm. Jackson v.\\nPollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Williams v.\\nLiefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2007)). Most importantly,\\nthe plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions or inac-\\ntion caused the delay in his treatment. See Pepper v. Village of\\nOak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Under any theory,\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 19\\n\\nto be liable under § 1983, the individual defendant must have\\ncaused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” (cita-\\ntion and internal quotation marks omitted)).\\n Walker argues on appeal that Dr. Obaisi repeatedly failed\\nto ensure that he receive treatment within the timeline re-\\nquested by UIC specialists, and that this failure delayed the\\nultimate PLS diagnosis and precluded alternative treatment\\noptions in the interim. Walker also disputes the notion that\\nDr. Obaisi was powerless to ensure timely offsite appoint-\\nments.\\n In response, defendants argue that Dr. Obaisi had a prin-\\ncipled reason for not immediately making a referral, as he tes-\\ntified: He wanted to obtain and review Walker’s lab test re-\\nsults before presenting any follow-up care to UM for ap-\\nproval. Indeed, Dr. Obaisi ordered tests the day he first saw\\nWalker. Similarly, defendants highlight that Dr. Obaisi\\ntreated Walker’s symptoms while they awaited the test results\\nand continued to treat Walker’s changing condition in a vari-\\nety of ways as noted above. Thus, defendants assert that there\\nis no evidence that Dr. Obaisi did (or failed to do) something\\nthat (1) postponed Walker’s treatment and thereby caused his\\nneed for a second spinal surgery, (2) delayed the diagnosis or\\ntreatment of Walker’s PLS or other symptoms, or (3) pro-\\nlonged Walker’s pain. Finally, defendants emphasize that it is\\nundisputed that Dr. Obaisi could not schedule appointments\\nat UIC. Given Dr. Obaisi’s lack of personal involvement in\\nUIC scheduling, defendants insist that Dr. Obaisi cannot be\\nheld liable.\\n First, we conclude that Dr. Obaisi’s decision to wait for test\\nresults before referring Walker to UIC, even though Walker\\nwas months overdue for a follow-up appointment at UIC, is\\n\\f20 No. 17-2821\\n\\nnot evidence of Dr. Obaisi’s deliberate indifference. As\\nDr. Obaisi testified, during his first appointment with Walker,\\nhe was focused on Walker’s complaints—unsteady gait, occa-\\nsional falls, and weak legs—and his assessment that Walker\\nlikely had either upper neuron syndrome or a muscle disor-\\nder. To rule out a muscle disorder, Dr. Obaisi requested blood\\ntests, and he explained that he wanted those results—as well\\nas x-ray images—before making a case to UM that Walker\\nshould be referred to UIC.\\n Perhaps an immediate referral to UIC would have been\\nbeneficial, but as we have held before, “an inmate is not enti-\\ntled to demand specific care,” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742,\\n754 (7th Cir. 2011), and medical professionals may choose\\nfrom “a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing\\nstandards in the field,” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th\\nCir. 2008). We defer to medical professionals’ treatment deci-\\nsions unless there is evidence that “no minimally competent\\nprofessional would have so responded under those circum-\\nstances.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d\\n886, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2008)).\\n Here, Dr. Obaisi made a reasonable medical judgment to\\ndelay referring Walker until he had more information so that\\nhe could make a more informed referral request to UM. See,\\ne.g., Zackery v. Mesrobian, 299 F. App’x 598, 601–02 (7th Cir.\\n2008) (“Although it may have been prudent for Dr. Mesrobian\\nto order diagnostic testing in 2001, his failure to choose the\\nbest course of action does not amount to a constitutional vio-\\nlation.”).\\n Second, considering Walker’s treatment overall, we believe\\nthat the records do not show a pattern of deliberate indiffer-\\nence to Walker’s serious medical needs. To the contrary, the\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 21\\n\\nrecord shows that Dr. Obaisi responded to Walker’s changing\\nsymptoms and that he was receptive to the specialists’ recom-\\nmendations. He made referrals and re-referrals when neces-\\nsary, all the while treating Walker’s symptoms. This treatment\\nwas not outside the bounds of medical professionalism. See,\\ne.g., Harrison v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 669 F. App’x 797,\\n799 (7th Cir. 2016) (“During these 17 months [of treatment\\nwithout a referral], Dr. Obaisi regularly altered [the inmate’s]\\nprescriptions for pain-relieving, anti-inflammatory, and mus-\\ncle-relaxing drugs based on [the inmate’s] condition.\\nDr. Obaisi also ordered and reviewed [the inmate’s] MRI to\\nensure that he properly diagnosed his injury. Because the rec-\\nord does not contain evidence showing that Dr. Obaisi’s care\\nviolated professional medical standards, the district court\\nproperly granted Dr. Obaisi summary judgment.”).\\n That Walker’s pain and other symptoms did not subside is\\nnot evidence of Dr. Obaisi’s deliberate indifference, especially\\nconsidering that Walker voluntarily stopped taking pain\\nmedication at some point and Dr. Obaisi ordered a variety of\\ntherapies and requested several referrals to address Walker’s\\nongoing complaints.\\n Third, although there were clearly delays in Walker’s treat-\\nment, the evidence suggests Dr. Obaisi did what he could\\nwithin the limits of his role to move the ball forward. The\\nquestion is whether we can place all the scheduling blame on\\nUIC, because we can only hold Dr. Obaisi liable if he had con-\\ntrol over the circumstances that caused the delays. See Walker\\nv. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n Defendants have presented evidence that UIC employs a\\nprioritization scheme for scheduling appointments and that\\n\\f22 No. 17-2821\\n\\nStateville’s Medical Director was not involved in the schedul-\\ning process. Similarly, nothing in the record suggests that\\nDr. Obaisi’s actions or inaction caused any of the scheduling\\ndelays with Walker’s appointments at UIC. Such lack of per-\\nsonal involvement saves Dr. Obaisi from liability here. See\\nPepper, 430 F.3d at 810.\\n B. Wexford\\n The claim against Wexford “proceeds under the theory of\\nmunicipal liability announced in Monell v. Department of Social\\nServices, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which we have held applies in\\n§ 1983 claims brought against private companies acting under\\ncolor of state law.” Chatham v. Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (citing Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 795–96\\n(7th Cir. 2014)). Prevailing on such a claim requires evidence\\nthat a Wexford policy, practice, or custom caused a constitu-\\ntional violation. Whiting, 839 F.3d at 664.\\n We held in Glisson v. Indiana Department of Corrections,\\nhowever, that this list is not exclusive; rather, a “policy” can\\ntake the form of a hands-off approach or a policy to do noth-\\ning (a “policy of inaction”). 849 F.3d 372, 379–80 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(en banc); see also King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir.\\n2012) (explaining that when a municipality has “actual or con-\\nstructive knowledge that its agents will probably violate con-\\nstitutional rights, it may not adopt a policy of inaction.”);\\nThomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2010) (“[I]n situations where rules or regulations are required\\nto remedy a potentially dangerous practice, the County’s fail-\\nure to make a policy is also actionable.”); Sims v. Mulcahy, 902\\nF.2d 524, 543 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[I]n situations that call for pro-\\ncedures, rules or regulations, the failure to make policy itself\\nmay be actionable.”).\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 23\\n\\n When a § 1983 claim is based on a policy of inaction, the\\nplaintiff must present evidence that the institution made a\\nconscious decision not to act. Glisson, 849 F.3d at 381; see also\\nid. at 383 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (agreeing that a “a municipal-\\nity’s failure to have a formal policy in place on a particular\\nsubject may represent its intentional decision not to have such\\na policy—that is, a policy not to have a policy—and that insti-\\ntutional choice may in appropriate circumstances form the ba-\\nsis of a Monell claim.”). Consequently, in prison litigation, in-\\nmates generally cite other examples where a constitutional vi-\\nolation similarly occurred. Id. at 381.\\n Walker challenges two aspects of Wexford’s operations on\\nappeal: (1) that Wexford did not have a policy or practice of\\nensuring that offsite appointments authorized through UM\\noccurred; and (2) that Wexford had a practice of deferring to\\nUIC in scheduling offsite appointments. Walker attempts to\\nbolster his point that Wexford’s monitoring and scheduling\\npractices presented obvious risks by focusing on Dr. Obaisi’s\\ntestimony that there was no guarantee that UIC would call to\\nschedule a follow-up appointment,10 and to Dr. Fisher’s testi-\\nmony in separate litigation that as of August 2012, a large\\nnumber of authorized appointments were not happening. See\\nQuinn v. Obaisi, No. 14-cv-6633, 2018 WL 1184736, at *8 (N.D.\\nIll. Mar. 7, 2018).\\n In response, defendants deny responsibility for any offsite\\nappointments that were not scheduled as requested by plac-\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Indeed, during his deposition Dr. Obaisi remarked that it was\\n“sometimes debatable” whether UIC would call certain inmates for their\\nfollow-up appointments.\\n\\f24 No. 17-2821\\n\\ning the blame for such errors on the onsite prison staff mem-\\nber, who is “likely not a Wexford employee.” Defendants also\\ncast doubt on Walker’s assertion that it was foreseeable to\\nWexford that its monitoring and scheduling policies were\\n“highly likely” to lead to harm. For example, defendants note\\nthat despite Wexford’s financial incentive to avoid delays, it\\nhad no control over UIC’s schedule. Indeed, Walker has not\\nproduced any evidence that Wexford could control UIC’s\\nschedule; it is undisputed, as defendants emphasize, that UIC\\nis not in Wexford’s chain of command. Finally, defendants ar-\\ngue that Walker cannot prevail because he has no evidence\\nthat other inmates faced the same treatment issues and his\\ncase is not of the “rare” cases where evidence of his own ex-\\nperience is sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See,\\ne.g., Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 929\\n(7th Cir. 2004) (affirming a finding of Monell liability where\\nthe evidence showed the organization condoned its employ-\\nees’ repeated decisions to ignore its policies).\\n Neither Walker’s own experience nor the testimony from\\nDrs. Obaisi and Fisher admitting awareness that referrals to\\nUIC were sometimes never scheduled or, if scheduled, signif-\\nicantly delayed, is enough to establish that Wexford was de-\\nliberately indifferent to Walker’s serious medical needs. See\\nGlisson, 849 F.3d at 381. Wexford’s knowledge that some re-\\nferrals slipped through the cracks is not the same as Wex-\\nford’s knowledge that constitutionally necessary referrals\\nwere not happening with such frequency that it ignored an\\nobvious risk of serious harm. Similarly, Walker has not shown\\nthat the standby options of Stateville’s onsite medical care fa-\\ncilities and the nearby hospital were not sufficient as a backup\\nplan in the intervening periods of time where an inmate\\nawaited treatment with an outside expert.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 25\\n\\n As for the coordination of schedules with UIC, Walker’s\\ninstinct that Wexford should not be able to use UIC as a shield\\nis understandable. But Wexford cannot be accused of “defer-\\nring” to UIC when Wexford had no control over UIC. To defer\\nto another suggests the relinquishment of power or control,\\nwhich did not exist here. Practically speaking, Wexford refers\\nmany inmates, and the specialists at UIC have a finite number\\nof appointments available; thus, it seems unavoidable that, at\\ntimes, the wait for appointments will grow to a few months.\\nAbsent evidence that Wexford was on notice that these wait\\ntimes were likely to cause constitutional violations, but failed\\nto act in response, we cannot hold Wexford liable.\\n C. Exhaustion\\n Because we conclude that the district court appropriately\\nentered summary judgment against Walker on the merits, we\\nneed not address whether the district court correctly con-\\ncluded that Walker failed to exhaust his administrative reme-\\ndies.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4446985/\", \"author_raw\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669732/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: George Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2821\nGEORGE WALKER,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nWEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 13-cv-07237 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. George Walker is an inmate at State-\nville Correctional Center. He has an incurable motor neuron\ndisease called primary lateral sclerosis (“PLS”) that causes\nweakness in his voluntary muscles. Walker alleges that his\nhealthcare providers at Stateville—Wexford Health Sources\nand Dr. Saleh Obaisi—were deliberately indifferent to his\nmedical needs after he underwent spinal surgery in March\n\f2 No. 17-2821\n\n2011.1 Specifically, Walker alleges defendants failed to: (1) en-\nsure he received proper follow-up care after his surgery, and\n(2) allowed undue delays in his treatment by outside experts.\nDefendants’ failures, he asserts, delayed his diagnosis and\ncaused him to suffer from the undiagnosed PLS in the interim.\nDefendants successfully moved for summary judgment on all\nof Walker’s claims. We affirm.\n I. Background\n During the relevant period, the State of Illinois subcon-\ntracted with Wexford Health Sources to provide healthcare\nservices to inmates at all the facilities managed by the Illinois\nDepartment of Corrections (“IDOC”). Saleh Obaisi, M.D., was\na Wexford employee who served as Stateville’s Medical Di-\nrector from August 2012 until his death in December 2017.\n A. Healthcare at Stateville\n Stateville’s onsite healthcare facilities included an urgent\ncare center, various medical clinics, and an infirmary. The\nphysicians, nurse practitioners, and physician’s assistants at\nStateville were Wexford employees; the nurses and other\nmedical personnel were a mix of Wexford and IDOC employ-\nees. All the medical providers at Stateville, whether employed\nby Wexford or not, followed IDOC’s administrative policies\nand procedures. Nonetheless, Wexford’s corporate repre-\nsentative testified that when deciding how to provide the best\ncare for patients, clinicians relied on their training and expe-\nrience first, and the governing policies second.\n\n\n\n 1Originally, Warden Michael Lemke was a defendant, but the parties\nagreed to dismiss him from the case.\n\fNo. 17-2821 3\n\n When the medical professionals and facilities at Stateville\ncould not address an inmate’s conditions, Wexford referred\nsuch inmates to outside providers like the University of Illi-\nnois at Chicago Medical Center (“UIC”). Typically, referrals\nhad to go through a collegial peer review process, which Wex-\nford called “Utilization Management” (“UM”). In the event of\na medical emergency, however, Stateville’s Medical Director\ncould make referrals to another hospital, St. Joseph’s Medical\nCenter, without securing UM’s preapproval.\n In practice, UM consisted of a weekly conference call in\nwhich medical professionals reviewed an inmate’s case and\nthe suggested treatment. Participants in the call included:\nWexford’s UM Director for Illinois, Wexford’s Corporate UM\nnurse, Wexford physicians, Wexford staff, and IDOC’s\nhealthcare unit administrator. If the onsite Medical Director\nwas ever dissatisfied with the alternative treatment plan UM\nauthorized for a patient, the director could appeal that deci-\nsion.\n If UM approved a patient for an offsite consultation at\nUIC, the UM department would enter the information into\nWexford’s computer program (“WexCare”), which triggered\nan electronic notice to the prison and UIC. Then, the staff at\nIDOC and UIC would coordinate to schedule the inmate’s ap-\npointment. With respect to surgery referrals, UM often issued\na “global approval,” which authorized both the surgery and\nany necessary follow-up care. Whenever UIC received a\nglobal approval, it would call Stateville directly to arrange the\nfollow-up care for the inmate.\n UM’s authorizations were valid for ninety days. From\n2011 to 2014, however, Wexford did not have a system in place\n\f4 No. 17-2821\n\nto alert its staff when an authorization expired before the in-\nmate had received treatment.2\n B. Walker’s Treatment History at Stateville\n On March 1, 2010, a Wexford physician’s assistant exam-\nined Walker, noting that he had right leg twitching and re-\nports of weakness. Over the course of the next year, Walker\nunderwent several examinations with specialists and other\nmedical professionals. These appointments culminated in a\nrecommendation by a UIC neurosurgeon, Dr. Sergey\nNeckrysh, that Walker have spinal surgery to decompress and\nfuse the lumbar spine. UM gave a global approval for the sur-\ngery and follow-up care.\n Walker had spinal surgery at UIC on March 23, 2011. He\nremained at UIC for three days following his surgery. When\nhe returned to Stateville, the infirmary admitted him; his dis-\ncharge note from UIC called for a follow-up appointment\nwith Dr. Neckrysh in three months, including a CT scan of the\nlumbar spine. Walker testified that three UIC nurses told him\nthey would see him in six to eight weeks for a follow-up CT\nscan. The follow-up appointment never occurred. It was the\nfirst of many delays that prompted Walker to bring this law-\nsuit. As Walker testified, “it’s been all down hill ever since the\nsurgery.” Walker also testified, however, that none of his\ntreating doctors have ever told him that his condition would\n\n\n\n 2 Fortunately, Wexford has since eliminated this vulnerability in its\nsystem; it now requires doctors to enter a “service completion date” when\nthey authorize an outside referral, and whenever treatment does not occur\nbefore that service completion date, the inmate’s case returns to UM for\ndiscussion and potential reauthorization.\n\fNo. 17-2821 5\n\nhave improved if he had been sent back to UIC within three\nmonths of his March 2011 surgery.\n The medical records tell a more complicated story. During\nWalker’s first three days at the infirmary, five treatment notes\nrecorded that his surgical incision was healing well. When the\ninfirmary staff removed Walker’s staples on April 7, 2011,\nthey cleaned the incision site and did not record any signs or\nsymptoms of redness or infection. Later that day, the infir-\nmary discharged Walker, reporting his minimal discomfort\nand giving him permits for low bunk, low gallery, and special\nmedical restraints.\n Approximately four weeks after the surgery, Walker re-\nceived a physical therapy examination at Stateville. The ther-\napist stated that Walker explained that his pain had resolved,\nand that the surgical scar was well-healed with minor adhe-\nsion (excessive growth of scar tissue). Between May 26, 2011,\nand August 31, 2012, the record shows that Walker saw Stat-\neville medical providers on eight different occasions and that\nhe informed them of the improvement to his back following\nthe surgery. Walker also completed two eight-week courses\nof physical therapy with an onsite provider at Stateville. He\nthen did sixteen months of physical therapy in his cell. During\nWalker’s deposition, defendants’ lawyer asked: “Did your\ncondition improve at all through the physical therapy?”\nWalker responded: “It seemed like after the physical therapy\nI would become more irritated and when I was let out of my\ncell to take a shower I fall flat on my face. I couldn’t walk. The\nirritation was just so tight.” The timing and nature of this irri-\ntation, however, is unclear from Walker’s testimony.\n Dr. Obaisi first examined Walker on September 26, 2012,\nalmost exactly eighteen months after Walker’s surgery. He\n\f6 No. 17-2821\n\ndocumented that Walker complained of an unsteady gait,\nweakness in his legs, upper thigh pain, and bilateral foot\ndrop. Dr. Obaisi’s appointment note also stated that he sus-\npected that Walker might have upper motor neuron syn-\ndrome. As a result, Dr. Obaisi ordered x-rays and provided\nWalker with muscle relaxers and anti-inflammatory medica-\ntion. Once Dr. Obaisi received the results from one of the\nblood tests and learned that Walker’s levels were elevated, Dr.\nObaisi sought UM’s approval for a neurology consultation at\nUIC. Wexford approved the referral on December 2, 2012, but\nUIC did not schedule a neurology appointment until April 24,\n2013.\n At his deposition, Dr. Obaisi testified that his focus during\nthis initial visit was Walker’s condition; he did not “really pay\nattention” to whether Walker had seen UIC neurosurgery for\nhis post-surgery visit. Nonetheless, when Walker’s attorney\nspecifically asked Dr. Obaisi why he did not send Walker back\nto UIC neurosurgery for the follow-up, Dr. Obaisi explained\nhe wanted to see the results from some tests before presenting\nWalker’s case to UM—this way, Dr. Obaisi could support his\nconcern regarding upper motor neuron syndrome. He also\ntestified that he did not have control over UIC’s scheduling,\nthat specialists generally prioritize scheduling by the urgency\nof cases, and that Dr. Neckrysh does not call people “very eas-\nily.”\n Walker continued to receive treatment from Dr. Obaisi\nand several other medical professionals. A summary of this\nlater treatment appears below in chronological order.\n On April 9, 2013, Dr. Obaisi examined Walker for\n swelling in his right leg that had persisted for two\n weeks. Concerned that Walker was developing a\n\fNo. 17-2821 7\n\n blood clot in one of his veins, Dr. Obaisi transferred\n Walker to St. Joseph on an emergency basis. The\n hospital’s discharge notes state that Walker needed\n a repeat ultrasound of the right leg in one week to\n check for a blood clot.\n On April 24, 2013, Walker was transferred offsite to\n UIC neurology; he told Dr. Lawrence Zeidman that\n his back “was not bothering him much,” that he\n had pain in his legs and groin, but that he did not\n want any medication. Dr. Zeidman requested a re-\n peat MRI of the lumbar spine, an imaging test of the\n right lower extremity to rule out a myelopathy3\n given his blood test, and a rereferral to neurosur-\n gery.4\n On May 23, 2013, Walker received an MRI that\n showed some degenerative changes to his L3-L4\n spinal segments.\n\n\n\n\n 3 “Myelopathy is an injury to the spinal cord due to severe compres-\nsion that may result from trauma, congenital stenosis, degenerative dis-\nease or disc herniation.” Myelopathy, John Hopkins Medicine,\nhttps://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/mye-\nlopathy (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).\n 4 Dr. Zeidman testified that his recommendations for further treat-\nment are always directed at the referring physician—regardless of\nwhether the patient is an inmate or not—and “it’s optional to the prerog-\native of the referring doctor whether they even want to follow the recom-\nmendations.”\n\f8 No. 17-2821\n\n On May 28, 2013, Walker had a neurosurgery con-\n sultation at UIC. The examining neurosurgeon ob-\n served that Walker’s back pain and radiculopathy5\n symptoms had improved, but that he had “right in-\n guinal [(i.e., groin)] pain.” As a result, the doctor\n recommended an x-ray of the lumbar spine. An x-\n ray was taken that same day; the impression note\n states: “Postsurgical changes with posterior spinal\n fusion from L4 to S1. There is a suggestion of lu-\n cency around the bilateral S1 screws suggesting\n hardware loosening.”\n On September 25, 2013, Dr. Zeidman examined\n Walker, noting Walker was now in a wheelchair\n and complaining of radiculopathy. Dr. Zeidman\n further documented Walker’s May 2013 MRI iden-\n tified a loose surgical screw at his S1 vertebrae, but\n that UIC’s neurosurgery team, who had seen\n Walker after the MRI, did not seem concerned\n about it. Dr. Zeidman recommended reconsulting\n with UIC’s neurosurgery team about the screw,\n and having Walker receive another MRI due to his\n presentment of a new symptom: brisk reflexes in\n his ankle, and a referral to the UIC pain clinic for a\n potential epidural steroid injection.\n On March 27, 2014, Dr. Zeidman examined Walker,\n noting that the neurosurgery follow-up and pain\n\n\n\n 5 “Radiculopathy describes a range of symptoms produced by the\npinching of a nerve root in the spinal column.” Radiculopathy, John Hop-\nkins Medicine, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-\ndiseases/radiculopathy (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).\n\fNo. 17-2821 9\n\n consult he had recommended had not been done.6\n (Dr. Zeidman believed the recommended cervical\n and thoracic MRI repeat had occurred, but that the\n images had not been sent to him.) Accordingly,\n Dr. Zeidman again referred Mr. Walker to neuro-\n surgery and the pain clinic. Additionally, Dr. Zeid-\n man’s notes state that Walker reported that one of\n his medications (gabapentin) was improving his\n pain but that he did not feel he was getting enough\n physical therapy in prison.\n On October 20, 2014, Walker received an MRI of his\n cervical spine, which showed some degenerative\n joint disease.\n On October 30, 2014, Walker received an evaluation\n at UIC’s pain clinic for his back and hip pain. Notes\n from that visit show that Walker reported he vol-\n untarily stopped taking pain medications because\n he felt they made him constipated. The UIC pain\n physicians instructed Walker to resume taking the\n pain medications and advised him they were con-\n sidering giving him an epidural steroid injection.\n On November 6, 2014, Walker received a thoracic\n spine MRI. The UIC radiologist found that that MRI\n was similar to Walker’s 2011 (pre-surgery) MRI be-\n cause both showed degenerative disc disease in his\n back.\n\n\n\n 6 Dr. Zeidman testified that he does not know how scheduling works\nwith IDOC, Wexford, and UIC. He also opined that he did not think it\nwould be “unreasonable” for it to take “a couple months” for an inmate\nto get an appointment with him.\n\f10 No. 17-2821\n\n On January 8, 2015, Walker returned to UIC neurol-\n ogy and reported continued back pain and that\n switching prescriptions (from gabapentin to Mo-\n bic) had helped his pain. Dr. Zeidman reviewed\n Walker’s MRI and found that it showed degenera-\n tive joint disease but no neural compromise. It was\n Dr. Zeidman’s impression that Walker may have\n had a stroke before the visit. Dr. Zeidman grew\n concerned that Walker had started slurring his\n speech and jerking his hands and fingers. Again,\n Dr. Zeidman noted that despite his referrals,\n Walker had not been sent to neurosurgery. Accord-\n ingly, he issued another referral to neurosurgery.\n He also asked to see Walker again in six months,\n and he advised Walker to continue with physical\n therapy and keep taking his pain medications.\n On February 3, 2015, Walker went to UIC neurosur-\n gery for a consultation; the neurosurgeon found\n Walker had radiculopathy in the left leg and recom-\n mended a CT myelogram7 to delineate any possible\n neurosurgical issues at the lumbar spine.\n On March 27, 2015, Walker received an MRI of his\n brain that showed nonspecific scattered flare\n changes but was otherwise unremarkable and\n showed no acute or subacute stroke.\n\n\n\n 7 “A myelogram is a diagnostic imaging test generally done by a radi-\n\nologist. It uses a contrast dye and X-rays or computed tomography (CT)\nto look for problems in the spinal canal.” Myelogram, John Hopkins Medi-\ncine, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-ther-\napies/myelogram (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).\n\fNo. 17-2821 11\n\n On May 28, 2015, Walker underwent a CT myelo-\n gram.\n On July 1, 2015, Walker returned to UIC neurology\n for a consultation. Dr. Zeidman noted that Walker\n demonstrated problems with “word-finding.”\n Dr. Zeidman concluded that Mr. Walker needed\n “to see Dr. Neckrysh again given his ongoing lum-\n bar radiculopathy issues.” He also recommended a\n speech therapy consultation and that Walker con-\n tinue taking pain medications and doing physical\n therapy onsite at Stateville.\n On August 11, 2015, Walker received an x-ray that\n showed “no definitive evidence of hardware mal-\n function” regarding the screw. He also had a con-\n sultation with UIC neurosurgery; Dr. Neckrysh\n concluded that Walker’s May 2015 myelogram\n showed evidence of adjacent segment degeneration\n at L3-4 and a grade 1 spine at L3-4, and he proposed\n extending Walker’s prior surgery “up to the L-3-4\n level.”8\n On December 22, 2015, Walker returned to UIC\n neurosurgery for an evaluation; the neurosurgeon\n confirmed the 2011 surgery was effective and that\n Walker did not complain of pain and weakness in\n\n\n\n\n 8Dr. Obaisi testified that he is typically inclined to follow UIC neuro-\nsurgery’s recommendations; specifically, in Walker’s case, Dr. Obaisi was\nhappy to acquiesce to the surgery extension recommendation, though he\ndid not believe it would affect Walker’s speech or any of the other prob-\nlems Dr. Obaisi believed were caused by an issue with Walker’s nervous\nsystem.\n\f12 No. 17-2821\n\n his legs for two years after the surgery.9 But be-\n cause of Walker’s left-sided thigh pain, UIC neuro-\n surgery recommended a revision and extension of\n the 2011 spinal fusion to correct these newly-occur-\n ring (as of 2015) complaints.\n On March 30, 2016, Walker received the revision\n and extension spinal fusion surgery at UIC. Before\n his discharge, UIC physical therapy noted that\n there were “signs and symptoms of [upper motor\n neuron] involvement,” and that “[his] gait will\n likely remain with current impairments unless\n other means for spasticity/clonus are utilized.” The\n post-surgery notes state that Walker reported\n “much improvement in ‘nerve’ pain in both legs”\n and a reduced amount of “drooling.”\n While Walker remained at UIC following his sec-\n ond spinal surgery, UIC’s medical staff diagnosed\n him with PLS. During this time, Walker also con-\n sulted with UIC speech and psychology staff re-\n garding his diagnosis and what that meant for his\n life going forward.\n On April 14, 2016, UIC discharged Walker.\n C. Expert Opinions\n Each of the parties retained medical experts. Walker hired\nNicholas Rizzo, M.D., who is board-certified in internal med-\n\n\n 9Walker admits that the medical notes state as much, but he disputes\nthe assertion that he did not complain of pain or weakness in his legs for\ntwo years after surgery and only complained of left-sided thigh pain start-\ning in 2015. As Walker testified, he asserts that he experienced pain almost\nimmediately after his March 2011 surgery.\n\fNo. 17-2821 13\n\nicine. He has neither worked in a prison or correctional insti-\ntution, nor has he treated inmate populations. He provided\nthe following opinions: (1) Wexford and Dr. Obaisi failed to\nfollow the order for a three-month post-operative follow-up\nwith the UIC neurosurgeon after Walker’s March 23, 2011 sur-\ngery; (2) Walker’s condition deteriorated as a result of not be-\ning seen by the neurosurgeon for two years following his\nMarch 2011 surgery; (3) there was a lack of routine physical\ntherapy; (4) Walker suffered additional pain as a result of not\nbeing treated in an appropriate and timely fashion; (5) Wex-\nford’s Medical Director at Stateville should have ensured that\nWalker received timely and adequate treatment; and (6) Wex-\nford should have had a procedure in place to ensure that or-\nders for follow-up care were followed. Dr. Rizzo also gave the\nfollowing relevant testimony:\n The March 2011 surgery “was likely successful for\n its goal at the time.”\n The three-month post-surgery visit was not op-\n tional; it was (and is) the “standard of care” and it\n should have been done by UIC neurosurgery. At\n that appointment, a few hypothetical scenarios\n could have played out: (1) “If there was new symp-\n tomatology …, they would have ordered additional\n imaging”; (2) “If … his progress postoperatively\n was not what they would have otherwise antici-\n pated, they could have ordered a subsequent three-\n month follow-up which would have obviously in-\n creased the chance of picking up progressive symp-\n tomatology”; (3) “If he had a perfect recovery from\n the surgery and no symptomatology whatsoever\n and no progression of symptoms, they may have\n dismissed him from their care for that particular\n\f14 No. 17-2821\n\n surgery”; and (4) “If [his recovery was not perfect],\n a continuity of care for lumbar disk disease in gen-\n eral would have not been unreasonable.”\n When asked whether it was his opinion that\n Walker’s condition was going to deteriorate after\n his March 2011 surgery, regardless of whether\n Walker had had the three-month post-surgery fol-\n low-up visit, Dr. Rizzo said: “There’s no way to\n know if most patients are going to progress and de-\n teriorate or not.”\n Wexford employed William Davison, M.D., who is a\nboard-certified neurologist. He provided the following rele-\nvant testimony:\n Walker’s condition deteriorated after his March\n 2011 surgery, but the lumbar surgery could “[a]bso-\n lutely” be ruled out as the cause of that deteriora-\n tion.\n Walker’s March 2011 surgery was a success because\n the records suggest he had less pain going down his\n right leg.\n The missed post-surgery appointment did not con-\n stitute inadequate medical care because Walker’s\n problems could not be solved by neurosurgery any-\n way.\n The post-surgery follow-up visit was a recommen-\n dation for the referring physician to consider.\n A few months was a reasonable amount of time to\n wait before going back to neurosurgery.\n It was not inadequate medical treatment for de-\n fendants not to refer Walker to the pain clinic be-\n tween September 25, 2013, when Dr. Zeidman\n\fNo. 17-2821 15\n\n made that recommendation, and March 27, 2014,\n when Dr. Zeidman noted it had not yet occurred,\n because Walker was being seen at his local clinic for\n pain and was on medication.\n Although not an expert, Neil Fisher, M.D., provided testi-\nmony as Wexford’s designated Federal Rule of Civil Proce-\ndure 30(b)(6) witness. At the time of his deposition, he served\nas Wexford’s Corporate Medical Director for Quality Manage-\nment and Pharmacy. He previously served as Wexford’s Cor-\nporate Director for UM from July 2012 until September 2014.\nDr. Fisher holds a medical degree and is a general medical\npractitioner. He provided the following pertinent testimony:\n During this case, the WexCare system was able to\n pull up a report of expired UM authorizations, but\n he was not aware if there was a policy to pull that\n report in 2011–2012.\n Wexford is “usually very good at getting people\n back to [UIC] during the period of time that special-\n ist is requesting” because “this is a no-charge ser-\n vice for us so we—these are specialists that we par-\n ticularly want to satisfy what they are asking for.”\n D. This Lawsuit\n The operative complaint in this case alleges that Dr. Obaisi\nwas deliberately indifferent to Walker’s serious medical needs\nby (1) failing to timely return Walker to UIC after the March\n2011 surgery and (2) generally ignoring the persistent delays\nin Walker’s treatment after he assumed his care. Similarly,\nWalker alleges that Wexford was deliberately indifferent to\nhis serious medical needs by (1) failing to promulgate a policy\n\f16 No. 17-2821\n\nto alert the Medical Director that a previously approved refer-\nral had lapsed before the authorized treatment came to frui-\ntion and (2) relying on UIC doctors to schedule their own ap-\npointments with inmates.\n Dr. Obaisi and Wexford moved for summary judgment on\nall of Walker’s claims. They argued that Walker failed to ex-\nhaust his administrative remedies and that they were entitled\nto judgment on the merits of Walker’s claims. The district\ncourt agreed; it granted Dr. Obaisi and Wexford’s motion for\nsummary judgment after concluding: (1) the Prison Litigation\nReform Act’s exhaustion requirement barred Walker’s claims,\n42 U.S.C. § 1997(e); (2) Dr. Obaisi was not working at the\nprison during the relevant time when Walker wished to be\nsent back to UIC for his three-month post-surgical neurosur-\ngery follow-up appointment; (3) the totality of medical care\nDr. Obaisi provided to Walker did not support a finding of\ndeliberate indifference; (4) there was no testimony connecting\nWalker’s condition to any failure by Dr. Obaisi; (5) some of\nthe delays Walker blamed on Wexford were actually caused\nby UIC; and (6) there was no evidence that Wexford denied\nany medical care that one of its medical directors requested\nfor Walker’s benefit or that any delay between appointments\nwith specialists at UIC caused Walker’s deteriorating condi-\ntion; and (7) the only testimony about what could have been\ndone had Wexford personnel returned Walker to UIC for a\npost-operative follow-up within three months of his 2011 sur-\ngery was speculative, thus Walker could not establish the req-\nuisite causal connection between Wexford’s allegedly uncon-\nstitutional policies and practices, on the one hand, and his\nmedical condition, on the other.\n\fNo. 17-2821 17\n\n Walker appeals the district court’s decision to enter sum-\nmary judgment for Dr. Obaisi and Wexford.\n II. Discussion\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary\njudgment de novo, interpreting all facts and drawing all rea-\nsonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. O’Brien\nv. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2018). “Summary\njudgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-\nter of law.” Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673\n(7th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a)). And summary\njudgment is inappropriate “if the evidence is such that a rea-\nsonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”\nAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may\naffirm the grant of a motion for summary judgment on any\nground supported in the record, so long as the parties ade-\nquately presented the issue in the district court and the non-\nmoving party had an opportunity to contest it. O’Brien, 900\nF.3d at 928.\n A. Dr. Obaisi\n The Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference\nto prisoners’ serious medical needs because it constitutes an\n“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble,\n429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,\n173 (1976)). A failure-to-provide-adequate-medical-care claim\nrequires proof that the prisoner suffered from “(1) an objec-\ntively serious medical condition to which (2) a state official\nwas deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.” Duckworth\nv. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008). Defendants do not\n\f18 No. 17-2821\n\ndispute that Walker suffered from an objectively serious med-\nical condition; only the subjective component is at issue here.\n To establish the subjective component, Walker must show\nthat Dr. Obaisi knew of facts from which he could infer that a\nsubstantial risk of serious harm existed, and that he did, in\nfact, draw that inference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,\n837 (1994); see also Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir.\n2016) (en banc). “[E]vidence of medical negligence is not\nenough to prove deliberate indifference,” but evidence that a\nmedical professional “knew better than to make the medical\ndecision[ ] that [he] did” is enough to survive summary judg-\nment. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662–\n63 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Petties, 836 F.3d at 730–31).\n In practice, “[s]tate-of-mind evidence sufficient to create a\njury question might include the obviousness of the risk from\na particular course of medical treatment; … persistence in a\ncourse of treatment known to be ineffective; or proof that the\ndefendant’s treatment decision departed so radically from ac-\ncepted professional judgment, practice, or standards that a\njury may reasonably infer that the decision was not based on\nprofessional judgment.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 663 (citations\nand quotation marks omitted). In cases such as this one—\nwhere the plaintiff alleges the defendant delayed, rather than\ndenied, medical treatment—we have required that the plain-\ntiff present “verifying medical evidence” that the delay, and\nnot the underlying condition, caused some harm. Jackson v.\nPollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Williams v.\nLiefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2007)). Most importantly,\nthe plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions or inac-\ntion caused the delay in his treatment. See Pepper v. Village of\nOak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Under any theory,\n\fNo. 17-2821 19\n\nto be liable under § 1983, the individual defendant must have\ncaused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” (cita-\ntion and internal quotation marks omitted)).\n Walker argues on appeal that Dr. Obaisi repeatedly failed\nto ensure that he receive treatment within the timeline re-\nquested by UIC specialists, and that this failure delayed the\nultimate PLS diagnosis and precluded alternative treatment\noptions in the interim. Walker also disputes the notion that\nDr. Obaisi was powerless to ensure timely offsite appoint-\nments.\n In response, defendants argue that Dr. Obaisi had a prin-\ncipled reason for not immediately making a referral, as he tes-\ntified: He wanted to obtain and review Walker’s lab test re-\nsults before presenting any follow-up care to UM for ap-\nproval. Indeed, Dr. Obaisi ordered tests the day he first saw\nWalker. Similarly, defendants highlight that Dr. Obaisi\ntreated Walker’s symptoms while they awaited the test results\nand continued to treat Walker’s changing condition in a vari-\nety of ways as noted above. Thus, defendants assert that there\nis no evidence that Dr. Obaisi did (or failed to do) something\nthat (1) postponed Walker’s treatment and thereby caused his\nneed for a second spinal surgery, (2) delayed the diagnosis or\ntreatment of Walker’s PLS or other symptoms, or (3) pro-\nlonged Walker’s pain. Finally, defendants emphasize that it is\nundisputed that Dr. Obaisi could not schedule appointments\nat UIC. Given Dr. Obaisi’s lack of personal involvement in\nUIC scheduling, defendants insist that Dr. Obaisi cannot be\nheld liable.\n First, we conclude that Dr. Obaisi’s decision to wait for test\nresults before referring Walker to UIC, even though Walker\nwas months overdue for a follow-up appointment at UIC, is\n\f20 No. 17-2821\n\nnot evidence of Dr. Obaisi’s deliberate indifference. As\nDr. Obaisi testified, during his first appointment with Walker,\nhe was focused on Walker’s complaints—unsteady gait, occa-\nsional falls, and weak legs—and his assessment that Walker\nlikely had either upper neuron syndrome or a muscle disor-\nder. To rule out a muscle disorder, Dr. Obaisi requested blood\ntests, and he explained that he wanted those results—as well\nas x-ray images—before making a case to UM that Walker\nshould be referred to UIC.\n Perhaps an immediate referral to UIC would have been\nbeneficial, but as we have held before, “an inmate is not enti-\ntled to demand specific care,” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742,\n754 (7th Cir. 2011), and medical professionals may choose\nfrom “a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing\nstandards in the field,” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th\nCir. 2008). We defer to medical professionals’ treatment deci-\nsions unless there is evidence that “no minimally competent\nprofessional would have so responded under those circum-\nstances.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d\n886, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2008)).\n Here, Dr. Obaisi made a reasonable medical judgment to\ndelay referring Walker until he had more information so that\nhe could make a more informed referral request to UM. See,\ne.g., Zackery v. Mesrobian, 299 F. App’x 598, 601–02 (7th Cir.\n2008) (“Although it may have been prudent for Dr. Mesrobian\nto order diagnostic testing in 2001, his failure to choose the\nbest course of action does not amount to a constitutional vio-\nlation.”).\n Second, considering Walker’s treatment overall, we believe\nthat the records do not show a pattern of deliberate indiffer-\nence to Walker’s serious medical needs. To the contrary, the\n\fNo. 17-2821 21\n\nrecord shows that Dr. Obaisi responded to Walker’s changing\nsymptoms and that he was receptive to the specialists’ recom-\nmendations. He made referrals and re-referrals when neces-\nsary, all the while treating Walker’s symptoms. This treatment\nwas not outside the bounds of medical professionalism. See,\ne.g., Harrison v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 669 F. App’x 797,\n799 (7th Cir. 2016) (“During these 17 months [of treatment\nwithout a referral], Dr. Obaisi regularly altered [the inmate’s]\nprescriptions for pain-relieving, anti-inflammatory, and mus-\ncle-relaxing drugs based on [the inmate’s] condition.\nDr. Obaisi also ordered and reviewed [the inmate’s] MRI to\nensure that he properly diagnosed his injury. Because the rec-\nord does not contain evidence showing that Dr. Obaisi’s care\nviolated professional medical standards, the district court\nproperly granted Dr. Obaisi summary judgment.”).\n That Walker’s pain and other symptoms did not subside is\nnot evidence of Dr. Obaisi’s deliberate indifference, especially\nconsidering that Walker voluntarily stopped taking pain\nmedication at some point and Dr. Obaisi ordered a variety of\ntherapies and requested several referrals to address Walker’s\nongoing complaints.\n Third, although there were clearly delays in Walker’s treat-\nment, the evidence suggests Dr. Obaisi did what he could\nwithin the limits of his role to move the ball forward. The\nquestion is whether we can place all the scheduling blame on\nUIC, because we can only hold Dr. Obaisi liable if he had con-\ntrol over the circumstances that caused the delays. See Walker\nv. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002).\n Defendants have presented evidence that UIC employs a\nprioritization scheme for scheduling appointments and that\n\f22 No. 17-2821\n\nStateville’s Medical Director was not involved in the schedul-\ning process. Similarly, nothing in the record suggests that\nDr. Obaisi’s actions or inaction caused any of the scheduling\ndelays with Walker’s appointments at UIC. Such lack of per-\nsonal involvement saves Dr. Obaisi from liability here. See\nPepper, 430 F.3d at 810.\n B. Wexford\n The claim against Wexford “proceeds under the theory of\nmunicipal liability announced in Monell v. Department of Social\nServices, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which we have held applies in\n§ 1983 claims brought against private companies acting under\ncolor of state law.” Chatham v. Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir.\n2016) (citing Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 795–96\n(7th Cir. 2014)). Prevailing on such a claim requires evidence\nthat a Wexford policy, practice, or custom caused a constitu-\ntional violation. Whiting, 839 F.3d at 664.\n We held in Glisson v. Indiana Department of Corrections,\nhowever, that this list is not exclusive; rather, a “policy” can\ntake the form of a hands-off approach or a policy to do noth-\ning (a “policy of inaction”). 849 F.3d 372, 379–80 (7th Cir. 2017)\n(en banc); see also King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir.\n2012) (explaining that when a municipality has “actual or con-\nstructive knowledge that its agents will probably violate con-\nstitutional rights, it may not adopt a policy of inaction.”);\nThomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\n2010) (“[I]n situations where rules or regulations are required\nto remedy a potentially dangerous practice, the County’s fail-\nure to make a policy is also actionable.”); Sims v. Mulcahy, 902\nF.2d 524, 543 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[I]n situations that call for pro-\ncedures, rules or regulations, the failure to make policy itself\nmay be actionable.”).\n\fNo. 17-2821 23\n\n When a § 1983 claim is based on a policy of inaction, the\nplaintiff must present evidence that the institution made a\nconscious decision not to act. Glisson, 849 F.3d at 381; see also\nid. at 383 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (agreeing that a “a municipal-\nity’s failure to have a formal policy in place on a particular\nsubject may represent its intentional decision not to have such\na policy—that is, a policy not to have a policy—and that insti-\ntutional choice may in appropriate circumstances form the ba-\nsis of a Monell claim.”). Consequently, in prison litigation, in-\nmates generally cite other examples where a constitutional vi-\nolation similarly occurred. Id. at 381.\n Walker challenges two aspects of Wexford’s operations on\nappeal: (1) that Wexford did not have a policy or practice of\nensuring that offsite appointments authorized through UM\noccurred; and (2) that Wexford had a practice of deferring to\nUIC in scheduling offsite appointments. Walker attempts to\nbolster his point that Wexford’s monitoring and scheduling\npractices presented obvious risks by focusing on Dr. Obaisi’s\ntestimony that there was no guarantee that UIC would call to\nschedule a follow-up appointment,10 and to Dr. Fisher’s testi-\nmony in separate litigation that as of August 2012, a large\nnumber of authorized appointments were not happening. See\nQuinn v. Obaisi, No. 14-cv-6633, 2018 WL 1184736, at *8 (N.D.\nIll. Mar. 7, 2018).\n In response, defendants deny responsibility for any offsite\nappointments that were not scheduled as requested by plac-\n\n\n\n 10 Indeed, during his deposition Dr. Obaisi remarked that it was\n“sometimes debatable” whether UIC would call certain inmates for their\nfollow-up appointments.\n\f24 No. 17-2821\n\ning the blame for such errors on the onsite prison staff mem-\nber, who is “likely not a Wexford employee.” Defendants also\ncast doubt on Walker’s assertion that it was foreseeable to\nWexford that its monitoring and scheduling policies were\n“highly likely” to lead to harm. For example, defendants note\nthat despite Wexford’s financial incentive to avoid delays, it\nhad no control over UIC’s schedule. Indeed, Walker has not\nproduced any evidence that Wexford could control UIC’s\nschedule; it is undisputed, as defendants emphasize, that UIC\nis not in Wexford’s chain of command. Finally, defendants ar-\ngue that Walker cannot prevail because he has no evidence\nthat other inmates faced the same treatment issues and his\ncase is not of the “rare” cases where evidence of his own ex-\nperience is sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See,\ne.g., Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 929\n(7th Cir. 2004) (affirming a finding of Monell liability where\nthe evidence showed the organization condoned its employ-\nees’ repeated decisions to ignore its policies).\n Neither Walker’s own experience nor the testimony from\nDrs. Obaisi and Fisher admitting awareness that referrals to\nUIC were sometimes never scheduled or, if scheduled, signif-\nicantly delayed, is enough to establish that Wexford was de-\nliberately indifferent to Walker’s serious medical needs. See\nGlisson, 849 F.3d at 381. Wexford’s knowledge that some re-\nferrals slipped through the cracks is not the same as Wex-\nford’s knowledge that constitutionally necessary referrals\nwere not happening with such frequency that it ignored an\nobvious risk of serious harm. Similarly, Walker has not shown\nthat the standby options of Stateville’s onsite medical care fa-\ncilities and the nearby hospital were not sufficient as a backup\nplan in the intervening periods of time where an inmate\nawaited treatment with an outside expert.\n\fNo. 17-2821 25\n\n As for the coordination of schedules with UIC, Walker’s\ninstinct that Wexford should not be able to use UIC as a shield\nis understandable. But Wexford cannot be accused of “defer-\nring” to UIC when Wexford had no control over UIC. To defer\nto another suggests the relinquishment of power or control,\nwhich did not exist here. Practically speaking, Wexford refers\nmany inmates, and the specialists at UIC have a finite number\nof appointments available; thus, it seems unavoidable that, at\ntimes, the wait for appointments will grow to a few months.\nAbsent evidence that Wexford was on notice that these wait\ntimes were likely to cause constitutional violations, but failed\nto act in response, we cannot hold Wexford liable.\n C. Exhaustion\n Because we conclude that the district court appropriately\nentered summary judgment against Walker on the merits, we\nneed not address whether the district court correctly con-\ncluded that Walker failed to exhaust his administrative reme-\ndies.\n III. Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\ndistrict court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: George Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-2821\\nGEORGE WALKER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 13-cv-07237 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. George Walker is an inmate at State-\\nville Correctional Center. He has an incurable motor neuron\\ndisease called primary lateral sclerosis (“PLS”) that causes\\nweakness in his voluntary muscles. Walker alleges that his\\nhealthcare providers at Stateville—Wexford Health Sources\\nand Dr. Saleh Obaisi—were deliberately indifferent to his\\nmedical needs after he underwent spinal surgery in March\\n\\f2 No. 17-2821\\n\\n2011.1 Specifically, Walker alleges defendants failed to: (1) en-\\nsure he received proper follow-up care after his surgery, and\\n(2) allowed undue delays in his treatment by outside experts.\\nDefendants’ failures, he asserts, delayed his diagnosis and\\ncaused him to suffer from the undiagnosed PLS in the interim.\\nDefendants successfully moved for summary judgment on all\\nof Walker’s claims. We affirm.\\n I. Background\\n During the relevant period, the State of Illinois subcon-\\ntracted with Wexford Health Sources to provide healthcare\\nservices to inmates at all the facilities managed by the Illinois\\nDepartment of Corrections (“IDOC”). Saleh Obaisi, M.D., was\\na Wexford employee who served as Stateville’s Medical Di-\\nrector from August 2012 until his death in December 2017.\\n A. Healthcare at Stateville\\n Stateville’s onsite healthcare facilities included an urgent\\ncare center, various medical clinics, and an infirmary. The\\nphysicians, nurse practitioners, and physician’s assistants at\\nStateville were Wexford employees; the nurses and other\\nmedical personnel were a mix of Wexford and IDOC employ-\\nees. All the medical providers at Stateville, whether employed\\nby Wexford or not, followed IDOC’s administrative policies\\nand procedures. Nonetheless, Wexford’s corporate repre-\\nsentative testified that when deciding how to provide the best\\ncare for patients, clinicians relied on their training and expe-\\nrience first, and the governing policies second.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1Originally, Warden Michael Lemke was a defendant, but the parties\\nagreed to dismiss him from the case.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 3\\n\\n When the medical professionals and facilities at Stateville\\ncould not address an inmate’s conditions, Wexford referred\\nsuch inmates to outside providers like the University of Illi-\\nnois at Chicago Medical Center (“UIC”). Typically, referrals\\nhad to go through a collegial peer review process, which Wex-\\nford called “Utilization Management” (“UM”). In the event of\\na medical emergency, however, Stateville’s Medical Director\\ncould make referrals to another hospital, St. Joseph’s Medical\\nCenter, without securing UM’s preapproval.\\n In practice, UM consisted of a weekly conference call in\\nwhich medical professionals reviewed an inmate’s case and\\nthe suggested treatment. Participants in the call included:\\nWexford’s UM Director for Illinois, Wexford’s Corporate UM\\nnurse, Wexford physicians, Wexford staff, and IDOC’s\\nhealthcare unit administrator. If the onsite Medical Director\\nwas ever dissatisfied with the alternative treatment plan UM\\nauthorized for a patient, the director could appeal that deci-\\nsion.\\n If UM approved a patient for an offsite consultation at\\nUIC, the UM department would enter the information into\\nWexford’s computer program (“WexCare”), which triggered\\nan electronic notice to the prison and UIC. Then, the staff at\\nIDOC and UIC would coordinate to schedule the inmate’s ap-\\npointment. With respect to surgery referrals, UM often issued\\na “global approval,” which authorized both the surgery and\\nany necessary follow-up care. Whenever UIC received a\\nglobal approval, it would call Stateville directly to arrange the\\nfollow-up care for the inmate.\\n UM’s authorizations were valid for ninety days. From\\n2011 to 2014, however, Wexford did not have a system in place\\n\\f4 No. 17-2821\\n\\nto alert its staff when an authorization expired before the in-\\nmate had received treatment.2\\n B. Walker’s Treatment History at Stateville\\n On March 1, 2010, a Wexford physician’s assistant exam-\\nined Walker, noting that he had right leg twitching and re-\\nports of weakness. Over the course of the next year, Walker\\nunderwent several examinations with specialists and other\\nmedical professionals. These appointments culminated in a\\nrecommendation by a UIC neurosurgeon, Dr. Sergey\\nNeckrysh, that Walker have spinal surgery to decompress and\\nfuse the lumbar spine. UM gave a global approval for the sur-\\ngery and follow-up care.\\n Walker had spinal surgery at UIC on March 23, 2011. He\\nremained at UIC for three days following his surgery. When\\nhe returned to Stateville, the infirmary admitted him; his dis-\\ncharge note from UIC called for a follow-up appointment\\nwith Dr. Neckrysh in three months, including a CT scan of the\\nlumbar spine. Walker testified that three UIC nurses told him\\nthey would see him in six to eight weeks for a follow-up CT\\nscan. The follow-up appointment never occurred. It was the\\nfirst of many delays that prompted Walker to bring this law-\\nsuit. As Walker testified, “it’s been all down hill ever since the\\nsurgery.” Walker also testified, however, that none of his\\ntreating doctors have ever told him that his condition would\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Fortunately, Wexford has since eliminated this vulnerability in its\\nsystem; it now requires doctors to enter a “service completion date” when\\nthey authorize an outside referral, and whenever treatment does not occur\\nbefore that service completion date, the inmate’s case returns to UM for\\ndiscussion and potential reauthorization.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 5\\n\\nhave improved if he had been sent back to UIC within three\\nmonths of his March 2011 surgery.\\n The medical records tell a more complicated story. During\\nWalker’s first three days at the infirmary, five treatment notes\\nrecorded that his surgical incision was healing well. When the\\ninfirmary staff removed Walker’s staples on April 7, 2011,\\nthey cleaned the incision site and did not record any signs or\\nsymptoms of redness or infection. Later that day, the infir-\\nmary discharged Walker, reporting his minimal discomfort\\nand giving him permits for low bunk, low gallery, and special\\nmedical restraints.\\n Approximately four weeks after the surgery, Walker re-\\nceived a physical therapy examination at Stateville. The ther-\\napist stated that Walker explained that his pain had resolved,\\nand that the surgical scar was well-healed with minor adhe-\\nsion (excessive growth of scar tissue). Between May 26, 2011,\\nand August 31, 2012, the record shows that Walker saw Stat-\\neville medical providers on eight different occasions and that\\nhe informed them of the improvement to his back following\\nthe surgery. Walker also completed two eight-week courses\\nof physical therapy with an onsite provider at Stateville. He\\nthen did sixteen months of physical therapy in his cell. During\\nWalker’s deposition, defendants’ lawyer asked: “Did your\\ncondition improve at all through the physical therapy?”\\nWalker responded: “It seemed like after the physical therapy\\nI would become more irritated and when I was let out of my\\ncell to take a shower I fall flat on my face. I couldn’t walk. The\\nirritation was just so tight.” The timing and nature of this irri-\\ntation, however, is unclear from Walker’s testimony.\\n Dr. Obaisi first examined Walker on September 26, 2012,\\nalmost exactly eighteen months after Walker’s surgery. He\\n\\f6 No. 17-2821\\n\\ndocumented that Walker complained of an unsteady gait,\\nweakness in his legs, upper thigh pain, and bilateral foot\\ndrop. Dr. Obaisi’s appointment note also stated that he sus-\\npected that Walker might have upper motor neuron syn-\\ndrome. As a result, Dr. Obaisi ordered x-rays and provided\\nWalker with muscle relaxers and anti-inflammatory medica-\\ntion. Once Dr. Obaisi received the results from one of the\\nblood tests and learned that Walker’s levels were elevated, Dr.\\nObaisi sought UM’s approval for a neurology consultation at\\nUIC. Wexford approved the referral on December 2, 2012, but\\nUIC did not schedule a neurology appointment until April 24,\\n2013.\\n At his deposition, Dr. Obaisi testified that his focus during\\nthis initial visit was Walker’s condition; he did not “really pay\\nattention” to whether Walker had seen UIC neurosurgery for\\nhis post-surgery visit. Nonetheless, when Walker’s attorney\\nspecifically asked Dr. Obaisi why he did not send Walker back\\nto UIC neurosurgery for the follow-up, Dr. Obaisi explained\\nhe wanted to see the results from some tests before presenting\\nWalker’s case to UM—this way, Dr. Obaisi could support his\\nconcern regarding upper motor neuron syndrome. He also\\ntestified that he did not have control over UIC’s scheduling,\\nthat specialists generally prioritize scheduling by the urgency\\nof cases, and that Dr. Neckrysh does not call people “very eas-\\nily.”\\n Walker continued to receive treatment from Dr. Obaisi\\nand several other medical professionals. A summary of this\\nlater treatment appears below in chronological order.\\n On April 9, 2013, Dr. Obaisi examined Walker for\\n swelling in his right leg that had persisted for two\\n weeks. Concerned that Walker was developing a\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 7\\n\\n blood clot in one of his veins, Dr. Obaisi transferred\\n Walker to St. Joseph on an emergency basis. The\\n hospital’s discharge notes state that Walker needed\\n a repeat ultrasound of the right leg in one week to\\n check for a blood clot.\\n On April 24, 2013, Walker was transferred offsite to\\n UIC neurology; he told Dr. Lawrence Zeidman that\\n his back “was not bothering him much,” that he\\n had pain in his legs and groin, but that he did not\\n want any medication. Dr. Zeidman requested a re-\\n peat MRI of the lumbar spine, an imaging test of the\\n right lower extremity to rule out a myelopathy3\\n given his blood test, and a rereferral to neurosur-\\n gery.4\\n On May 23, 2013, Walker received an MRI that\\n showed some degenerative changes to his L3-L4\\n spinal segments.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 “Myelopathy is an injury to the spinal cord due to severe compres-\\nsion that may result from trauma, congenital stenosis, degenerative dis-\\nease or disc herniation.” Myelopathy, John Hopkins Medicine,\\nhttps://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/mye-\\nlopathy (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).\\n 4 Dr. Zeidman testified that his recommendations for further treat-\\nment are always directed at the referring physician—regardless of\\nwhether the patient is an inmate or not—and “it’s optional to the prerog-\\native of the referring doctor whether they even want to follow the recom-\\nmendations.”\\n\\f8 No. 17-2821\\n\\n On May 28, 2013, Walker had a neurosurgery con-\\n sultation at UIC. The examining neurosurgeon ob-\\n served that Walker’s back pain and radiculopathy5\\n symptoms had improved, but that he had “right in-\\n guinal [(i.e., groin)] pain.” As a result, the doctor\\n recommended an x-ray of the lumbar spine. An x-\\n ray was taken that same day; the impression note\\n states: “Postsurgical changes with posterior spinal\\n fusion from L4 to S1. There is a suggestion of lu-\\n cency around the bilateral S1 screws suggesting\\n hardware loosening.”\\n On September 25, 2013, Dr. Zeidman examined\\n Walker, noting Walker was now in a wheelchair\\n and complaining of radiculopathy. Dr. Zeidman\\n further documented Walker’s May 2013 MRI iden-\\n tified a loose surgical screw at his S1 vertebrae, but\\n that UIC’s neurosurgery team, who had seen\\n Walker after the MRI, did not seem concerned\\n about it. Dr. Zeidman recommended reconsulting\\n with UIC’s neurosurgery team about the screw,\\n and having Walker receive another MRI due to his\\n presentment of a new symptom: brisk reflexes in\\n his ankle, and a referral to the UIC pain clinic for a\\n potential epidural steroid injection.\\n On March 27, 2014, Dr. Zeidman examined Walker,\\n noting that the neurosurgery follow-up and pain\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 “Radiculopathy describes a range of symptoms produced by the\\npinching of a nerve root in the spinal column.” Radiculopathy, John Hop-\\nkins Medicine, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-\\ndiseases/radiculopathy (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 9\\n\\n consult he had recommended had not been done.6\\n (Dr. Zeidman believed the recommended cervical\\n and thoracic MRI repeat had occurred, but that the\\n images had not been sent to him.) Accordingly,\\n Dr. Zeidman again referred Mr. Walker to neuro-\\n surgery and the pain clinic. Additionally, Dr. Zeid-\\n man’s notes state that Walker reported that one of\\n his medications (gabapentin) was improving his\\n pain but that he did not feel he was getting enough\\n physical therapy in prison.\\n On October 20, 2014, Walker received an MRI of his\\n cervical spine, which showed some degenerative\\n joint disease.\\n On October 30, 2014, Walker received an evaluation\\n at UIC’s pain clinic for his back and hip pain. Notes\\n from that visit show that Walker reported he vol-\\n untarily stopped taking pain medications because\\n he felt they made him constipated. The UIC pain\\n physicians instructed Walker to resume taking the\\n pain medications and advised him they were con-\\n sidering giving him an epidural steroid injection.\\n On November 6, 2014, Walker received a thoracic\\n spine MRI. The UIC radiologist found that that MRI\\n was similar to Walker’s 2011 (pre-surgery) MRI be-\\n cause both showed degenerative disc disease in his\\n back.\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Dr. Zeidman testified that he does not know how scheduling works\\nwith IDOC, Wexford, and UIC. He also opined that he did not think it\\nwould be “unreasonable” for it to take “a couple months” for an inmate\\nto get an appointment with him.\\n\\f10 No. 17-2821\\n\\n On January 8, 2015, Walker returned to UIC neurol-\\n ogy and reported continued back pain and that\\n switching prescriptions (from gabapentin to Mo-\\n bic) had helped his pain. Dr. Zeidman reviewed\\n Walker’s MRI and found that it showed degenera-\\n tive joint disease but no neural compromise. It was\\n Dr. Zeidman’s impression that Walker may have\\n had a stroke before the visit. Dr. Zeidman grew\\n concerned that Walker had started slurring his\\n speech and jerking his hands and fingers. Again,\\n Dr. Zeidman noted that despite his referrals,\\n Walker had not been sent to neurosurgery. Accord-\\n ingly, he issued another referral to neurosurgery.\\n He also asked to see Walker again in six months,\\n and he advised Walker to continue with physical\\n therapy and keep taking his pain medications.\\n On February 3, 2015, Walker went to UIC neurosur-\\n gery for a consultation; the neurosurgeon found\\n Walker had radiculopathy in the left leg and recom-\\n mended a CT myelogram7 to delineate any possible\\n neurosurgical issues at the lumbar spine.\\n On March 27, 2015, Walker received an MRI of his\\n brain that showed nonspecific scattered flare\\n changes but was otherwise unremarkable and\\n showed no acute or subacute stroke.\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 “A myelogram is a diagnostic imaging test generally done by a radi-\\n\\nologist. It uses a contrast dye and X-rays or computed tomography (CT)\\nto look for problems in the spinal canal.” Myelogram, John Hopkins Medi-\\ncine, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-ther-\\napies/myelogram (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 11\\n\\n On May 28, 2015, Walker underwent a CT myelo-\\n gram.\\n On July 1, 2015, Walker returned to UIC neurology\\n for a consultation. Dr. Zeidman noted that Walker\\n demonstrated problems with “word-finding.”\\n Dr. Zeidman concluded that Mr. Walker needed\\n “to see Dr. Neckrysh again given his ongoing lum-\\n bar radiculopathy issues.” He also recommended a\\n speech therapy consultation and that Walker con-\\n tinue taking pain medications and doing physical\\n therapy onsite at Stateville.\\n On August 11, 2015, Walker received an x-ray that\\n showed “no definitive evidence of hardware mal-\\n function” regarding the screw. He also had a con-\\n sultation with UIC neurosurgery; Dr. Neckrysh\\n concluded that Walker’s May 2015 myelogram\\n showed evidence of adjacent segment degeneration\\n at L3-4 and a grade 1 spine at L3-4, and he proposed\\n extending Walker’s prior surgery “up to the L-3-4\\n level.”8\\n On December 22, 2015, Walker returned to UIC\\n neurosurgery for an evaluation; the neurosurgeon\\n confirmed the 2011 surgery was effective and that\\n Walker did not complain of pain and weakness in\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8Dr. Obaisi testified that he is typically inclined to follow UIC neuro-\\nsurgery’s recommendations; specifically, in Walker’s case, Dr. Obaisi was\\nhappy to acquiesce to the surgery extension recommendation, though he\\ndid not believe it would affect Walker’s speech or any of the other prob-\\nlems Dr. Obaisi believed were caused by an issue with Walker’s nervous\\nsystem.\\n\\f12 No. 17-2821\\n\\n his legs for two years after the surgery.9 But be-\\n cause of Walker’s left-sided thigh pain, UIC neuro-\\n surgery recommended a revision and extension of\\n the 2011 spinal fusion to correct these newly-occur-\\n ring (as of 2015) complaints.\\n On March 30, 2016, Walker received the revision\\n and extension spinal fusion surgery at UIC. Before\\n his discharge, UIC physical therapy noted that\\n there were “signs and symptoms of [upper motor\\n neuron] involvement,” and that “[his] gait will\\n likely remain with current impairments unless\\n other means for spasticity/clonus are utilized.” The\\n post-surgery notes state that Walker reported\\n “much improvement in ‘nerve’ pain in both legs”\\n and a reduced amount of “drooling.”\\n While Walker remained at UIC following his sec-\\n ond spinal surgery, UIC’s medical staff diagnosed\\n him with PLS. During this time, Walker also con-\\n sulted with UIC speech and psychology staff re-\\n garding his diagnosis and what that meant for his\\n life going forward.\\n On April 14, 2016, UIC discharged Walker.\\n C. Expert Opinions\\n Each of the parties retained medical experts. Walker hired\\nNicholas Rizzo, M.D., who is board-certified in internal med-\\n\\n\\n 9Walker admits that the medical notes state as much, but he disputes\\nthe assertion that he did not complain of pain or weakness in his legs for\\ntwo years after surgery and only complained of left-sided thigh pain start-\\ning in 2015. As Walker testified, he asserts that he experienced pain almost\\nimmediately after his March 2011 surgery.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 13\\n\\nicine. He has neither worked in a prison or correctional insti-\\ntution, nor has he treated inmate populations. He provided\\nthe following opinions: (1) Wexford and Dr. Obaisi failed to\\nfollow the order for a three-month post-operative follow-up\\nwith the UIC neurosurgeon after Walker’s March 23, 2011 sur-\\ngery; (2) Walker’s condition deteriorated as a result of not be-\\ning seen by the neurosurgeon for two years following his\\nMarch 2011 surgery; (3) there was a lack of routine physical\\ntherapy; (4) Walker suffered additional pain as a result of not\\nbeing treated in an appropriate and timely fashion; (5) Wex-\\nford’s Medical Director at Stateville should have ensured that\\nWalker received timely and adequate treatment; and (6) Wex-\\nford should have had a procedure in place to ensure that or-\\nders for follow-up care were followed. Dr. Rizzo also gave the\\nfollowing relevant testimony:\\n The March 2011 surgery “was likely successful for\\n its goal at the time.”\\n The three-month post-surgery visit was not op-\\n tional; it was (and is) the “standard of care” and it\\n should have been done by UIC neurosurgery. At\\n that appointment, a few hypothetical scenarios\\n could have played out: (1) “If there was new symp-\\n tomatology …, they would have ordered additional\\n imaging”; (2) “If … his progress postoperatively\\n was not what they would have otherwise antici-\\n pated, they could have ordered a subsequent three-\\n month follow-up which would have obviously in-\\n creased the chance of picking up progressive symp-\\n tomatology”; (3) “If he had a perfect recovery from\\n the surgery and no symptomatology whatsoever\\n and no progression of symptoms, they may have\\n dismissed him from their care for that particular\\n\\f14 No. 17-2821\\n\\n surgery”; and (4) “If [his recovery was not perfect],\\n a continuity of care for lumbar disk disease in gen-\\n eral would have not been unreasonable.”\\n When asked whether it was his opinion that\\n Walker’s condition was going to deteriorate after\\n his March 2011 surgery, regardless of whether\\n Walker had had the three-month post-surgery fol-\\n low-up visit, Dr. Rizzo said: “There’s no way to\\n know if most patients are going to progress and de-\\n teriorate or not.”\\n Wexford employed William Davison, M.D., who is a\\nboard-certified neurologist. He provided the following rele-\\nvant testimony:\\n Walker’s condition deteriorated after his March\\n 2011 surgery, but the lumbar surgery could “[a]bso-\\n lutely” be ruled out as the cause of that deteriora-\\n tion.\\n Walker’s March 2011 surgery was a success because\\n the records suggest he had less pain going down his\\n right leg.\\n The missed post-surgery appointment did not con-\\n stitute inadequate medical care because Walker’s\\n problems could not be solved by neurosurgery any-\\n way.\\n The post-surgery follow-up visit was a recommen-\\n dation for the referring physician to consider.\\n A few months was a reasonable amount of time to\\n wait before going back to neurosurgery.\\n It was not inadequate medical treatment for de-\\n fendants not to refer Walker to the pain clinic be-\\n tween September 25, 2013, when Dr. Zeidman\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 15\\n\\n made that recommendation, and March 27, 2014,\\n when Dr. Zeidman noted it had not yet occurred,\\n because Walker was being seen at his local clinic for\\n pain and was on medication.\\n Although not an expert, Neil Fisher, M.D., provided testi-\\nmony as Wexford’s designated Federal Rule of Civil Proce-\\ndure 30(b)(6) witness. At the time of his deposition, he served\\nas Wexford’s Corporate Medical Director for Quality Manage-\\nment and Pharmacy. He previously served as Wexford’s Cor-\\nporate Director for UM from July 2012 until September 2014.\\nDr. Fisher holds a medical degree and is a general medical\\npractitioner. He provided the following pertinent testimony:\\n During this case, the WexCare system was able to\\n pull up a report of expired UM authorizations, but\\n he was not aware if there was a policy to pull that\\n report in 2011–2012.\\n Wexford is “usually very good at getting people\\n back to [UIC] during the period of time that special-\\n ist is requesting” because “this is a no-charge ser-\\n vice for us so we—these are specialists that we par-\\n ticularly want to satisfy what they are asking for.”\\n D. This Lawsuit\\n The operative complaint in this case alleges that Dr. Obaisi\\nwas deliberately indifferent to Walker’s serious medical needs\\nby (1) failing to timely return Walker to UIC after the March\\n2011 surgery and (2) generally ignoring the persistent delays\\nin Walker’s treatment after he assumed his care. Similarly,\\nWalker alleges that Wexford was deliberately indifferent to\\nhis serious medical needs by (1) failing to promulgate a policy\\n\\f16 No. 17-2821\\n\\nto alert the Medical Director that a previously approved refer-\\nral had lapsed before the authorized treatment came to frui-\\ntion and (2) relying on UIC doctors to schedule their own ap-\\npointments with inmates.\\n Dr. Obaisi and Wexford moved for summary judgment on\\nall of Walker’s claims. They argued that Walker failed to ex-\\nhaust his administrative remedies and that they were entitled\\nto judgment on the merits of Walker’s claims. The district\\ncourt agreed; it granted Dr. Obaisi and Wexford’s motion for\\nsummary judgment after concluding: (1) the Prison Litigation\\nReform Act’s exhaustion requirement barred Walker’s claims,\\n42 U.S.C. § 1997(e); (2) Dr. Obaisi was not working at the\\nprison during the relevant time when Walker wished to be\\nsent back to UIC for his three-month post-surgical neurosur-\\ngery follow-up appointment; (3) the totality of medical care\\nDr. Obaisi provided to Walker did not support a finding of\\ndeliberate indifference; (4) there was no testimony connecting\\nWalker’s condition to any failure by Dr. Obaisi; (5) some of\\nthe delays Walker blamed on Wexford were actually caused\\nby UIC; and (6) there was no evidence that Wexford denied\\nany medical care that one of its medical directors requested\\nfor Walker’s benefit or that any delay between appointments\\nwith specialists at UIC caused Walker’s deteriorating condi-\\ntion; and (7) the only testimony about what could have been\\ndone had Wexford personnel returned Walker to UIC for a\\npost-operative follow-up within three months of his 2011 sur-\\ngery was speculative, thus Walker could not establish the req-\\nuisite causal connection between Wexford’s allegedly uncon-\\nstitutional policies and practices, on the one hand, and his\\nmedical condition, on the other.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 17\\n\\n Walker appeals the district court’s decision to enter sum-\\nmary judgment for Dr. Obaisi and Wexford.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary\\njudgment de novo, interpreting all facts and drawing all rea-\\nsonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. O’Brien\\nv. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2018). “Summary\\njudgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of\\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-\\nter of law.” Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a)). And summary\\njudgment is inappropriate “if the evidence is such that a rea-\\nsonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”\\nAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may\\naffirm the grant of a motion for summary judgment on any\\nground supported in the record, so long as the parties ade-\\nquately presented the issue in the district court and the non-\\nmoving party had an opportunity to contest it. O’Brien, 900\\nF.3d at 928.\\n A. Dr. Obaisi\\n The Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference\\nto prisoners’ serious medical needs because it constitutes an\\n“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble,\\n429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,\\n173 (1976)). A failure-to-provide-adequate-medical-care claim\\nrequires proof that the prisoner suffered from “(1) an objec-\\ntively serious medical condition to which (2) a state official\\nwas deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.” Duckworth\\nv. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008). Defendants do not\\n\\f18 No. 17-2821\\n\\ndispute that Walker suffered from an objectively serious med-\\nical condition; only the subjective component is at issue here.\\n To establish the subjective component, Walker must show\\nthat Dr. Obaisi knew of facts from which he could infer that a\\nsubstantial risk of serious harm existed, and that he did, in\\nfact, draw that inference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,\\n837 (1994); see also Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (en banc). “[E]vidence of medical negligence is not\\nenough to prove deliberate indifference,” but evidence that a\\nmedical professional “knew better than to make the medical\\ndecision[ ] that [he] did” is enough to survive summary judg-\\nment. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662–\\n63 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Petties, 836 F.3d at 730–31).\\n In practice, “[s]tate-of-mind evidence sufficient to create a\\njury question might include the obviousness of the risk from\\na particular course of medical treatment; … persistence in a\\ncourse of treatment known to be ineffective; or proof that the\\ndefendant’s treatment decision departed so radically from ac-\\ncepted professional judgment, practice, or standards that a\\njury may reasonably infer that the decision was not based on\\nprofessional judgment.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 663 (citations\\nand quotation marks omitted). In cases such as this one—\\nwhere the plaintiff alleges the defendant delayed, rather than\\ndenied, medical treatment—we have required that the plain-\\ntiff present “verifying medical evidence” that the delay, and\\nnot the underlying condition, caused some harm. Jackson v.\\nPollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Williams v.\\nLiefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2007)). Most importantly,\\nthe plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions or inac-\\ntion caused the delay in his treatment. See Pepper v. Village of\\nOak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Under any theory,\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 19\\n\\nto be liable under § 1983, the individual defendant must have\\ncaused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” (cita-\\ntion and internal quotation marks omitted)).\\n Walker argues on appeal that Dr. Obaisi repeatedly failed\\nto ensure that he receive treatment within the timeline re-\\nquested by UIC specialists, and that this failure delayed the\\nultimate PLS diagnosis and precluded alternative treatment\\noptions in the interim. Walker also disputes the notion that\\nDr. Obaisi was powerless to ensure timely offsite appoint-\\nments.\\n In response, defendants argue that Dr. Obaisi had a prin-\\ncipled reason for not immediately making a referral, as he tes-\\ntified: He wanted to obtain and review Walker’s lab test re-\\nsults before presenting any follow-up care to UM for ap-\\nproval. Indeed, Dr. Obaisi ordered tests the day he first saw\\nWalker. Similarly, defendants highlight that Dr. Obaisi\\ntreated Walker’s symptoms while they awaited the test results\\nand continued to treat Walker’s changing condition in a vari-\\nety of ways as noted above. Thus, defendants assert that there\\nis no evidence that Dr. Obaisi did (or failed to do) something\\nthat (1) postponed Walker’s treatment and thereby caused his\\nneed for a second spinal surgery, (2) delayed the diagnosis or\\ntreatment of Walker’s PLS or other symptoms, or (3) pro-\\nlonged Walker’s pain. Finally, defendants emphasize that it is\\nundisputed that Dr. Obaisi could not schedule appointments\\nat UIC. Given Dr. Obaisi’s lack of personal involvement in\\nUIC scheduling, defendants insist that Dr. Obaisi cannot be\\nheld liable.\\n First, we conclude that Dr. Obaisi’s decision to wait for test\\nresults before referring Walker to UIC, even though Walker\\nwas months overdue for a follow-up appointment at UIC, is\\n\\f20 No. 17-2821\\n\\nnot evidence of Dr. Obaisi’s deliberate indifference. As\\nDr. Obaisi testified, during his first appointment with Walker,\\nhe was focused on Walker’s complaints—unsteady gait, occa-\\nsional falls, and weak legs—and his assessment that Walker\\nlikely had either upper neuron syndrome or a muscle disor-\\nder. To rule out a muscle disorder, Dr. Obaisi requested blood\\ntests, and he explained that he wanted those results—as well\\nas x-ray images—before making a case to UM that Walker\\nshould be referred to UIC.\\n Perhaps an immediate referral to UIC would have been\\nbeneficial, but as we have held before, “an inmate is not enti-\\ntled to demand specific care,” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742,\\n754 (7th Cir. 2011), and medical professionals may choose\\nfrom “a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing\\nstandards in the field,” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th\\nCir. 2008). We defer to medical professionals’ treatment deci-\\nsions unless there is evidence that “no minimally competent\\nprofessional would have so responded under those circum-\\nstances.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d\\n886, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2008)).\\n Here, Dr. Obaisi made a reasonable medical judgment to\\ndelay referring Walker until he had more information so that\\nhe could make a more informed referral request to UM. See,\\ne.g., Zackery v. Mesrobian, 299 F. App’x 598, 601–02 (7th Cir.\\n2008) (“Although it may have been prudent for Dr. Mesrobian\\nto order diagnostic testing in 2001, his failure to choose the\\nbest course of action does not amount to a constitutional vio-\\nlation.”).\\n Second, considering Walker’s treatment overall, we believe\\nthat the records do not show a pattern of deliberate indiffer-\\nence to Walker’s serious medical needs. To the contrary, the\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 21\\n\\nrecord shows that Dr. Obaisi responded to Walker’s changing\\nsymptoms and that he was receptive to the specialists’ recom-\\nmendations. He made referrals and re-referrals when neces-\\nsary, all the while treating Walker’s symptoms. This treatment\\nwas not outside the bounds of medical professionalism. See,\\ne.g., Harrison v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 669 F. App’x 797,\\n799 (7th Cir. 2016) (“During these 17 months [of treatment\\nwithout a referral], Dr. Obaisi regularly altered [the inmate’s]\\nprescriptions for pain-relieving, anti-inflammatory, and mus-\\ncle-relaxing drugs based on [the inmate’s] condition.\\nDr. Obaisi also ordered and reviewed [the inmate’s] MRI to\\nensure that he properly diagnosed his injury. Because the rec-\\nord does not contain evidence showing that Dr. Obaisi’s care\\nviolated professional medical standards, the district court\\nproperly granted Dr. Obaisi summary judgment.”).\\n That Walker’s pain and other symptoms did not subside is\\nnot evidence of Dr. Obaisi’s deliberate indifference, especially\\nconsidering that Walker voluntarily stopped taking pain\\nmedication at some point and Dr. Obaisi ordered a variety of\\ntherapies and requested several referrals to address Walker’s\\nongoing complaints.\\n Third, although there were clearly delays in Walker’s treat-\\nment, the evidence suggests Dr. Obaisi did what he could\\nwithin the limits of his role to move the ball forward. The\\nquestion is whether we can place all the scheduling blame on\\nUIC, because we can only hold Dr. Obaisi liable if he had con-\\ntrol over the circumstances that caused the delays. See Walker\\nv. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n Defendants have presented evidence that UIC employs a\\nprioritization scheme for scheduling appointments and that\\n\\f22 No. 17-2821\\n\\nStateville’s Medical Director was not involved in the schedul-\\ning process. Similarly, nothing in the record suggests that\\nDr. Obaisi’s actions or inaction caused any of the scheduling\\ndelays with Walker’s appointments at UIC. Such lack of per-\\nsonal involvement saves Dr. Obaisi from liability here. See\\nPepper, 430 F.3d at 810.\\n B. Wexford\\n The claim against Wexford “proceeds under the theory of\\nmunicipal liability announced in Monell v. Department of Social\\nServices, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which we have held applies in\\n§ 1983 claims brought against private companies acting under\\ncolor of state law.” Chatham v. Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (citing Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 795–96\\n(7th Cir. 2014)). Prevailing on such a claim requires evidence\\nthat a Wexford policy, practice, or custom caused a constitu-\\ntional violation. Whiting, 839 F.3d at 664.\\n We held in Glisson v. Indiana Department of Corrections,\\nhowever, that this list is not exclusive; rather, a “policy” can\\ntake the form of a hands-off approach or a policy to do noth-\\ning (a “policy of inaction”). 849 F.3d 372, 379–80 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(en banc); see also King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir.\\n2012) (explaining that when a municipality has “actual or con-\\nstructive knowledge that its agents will probably violate con-\\nstitutional rights, it may not adopt a policy of inaction.”);\\nThomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2010) (“[I]n situations where rules or regulations are required\\nto remedy a potentially dangerous practice, the County’s fail-\\nure to make a policy is also actionable.”); Sims v. Mulcahy, 902\\nF.2d 524, 543 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[I]n situations that call for pro-\\ncedures, rules or regulations, the failure to make policy itself\\nmay be actionable.”).\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 23\\n\\n When a § 1983 claim is based on a policy of inaction, the\\nplaintiff must present evidence that the institution made a\\nconscious decision not to act. Glisson, 849 F.3d at 381; see also\\nid. at 383 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (agreeing that a “a municipal-\\nity’s failure to have a formal policy in place on a particular\\nsubject may represent its intentional decision not to have such\\na policy—that is, a policy not to have a policy—and that insti-\\ntutional choice may in appropriate circumstances form the ba-\\nsis of a Monell claim.”). Consequently, in prison litigation, in-\\nmates generally cite other examples where a constitutional vi-\\nolation similarly occurred. Id. at 381.\\n Walker challenges two aspects of Wexford’s operations on\\nappeal: (1) that Wexford did not have a policy or practice of\\nensuring that offsite appointments authorized through UM\\noccurred; and (2) that Wexford had a practice of deferring to\\nUIC in scheduling offsite appointments. Walker attempts to\\nbolster his point that Wexford’s monitoring and scheduling\\npractices presented obvious risks by focusing on Dr. Obaisi’s\\ntestimony that there was no guarantee that UIC would call to\\nschedule a follow-up appointment,10 and to Dr. Fisher’s testi-\\nmony in separate litigation that as of August 2012, a large\\nnumber of authorized appointments were not happening. See\\nQuinn v. Obaisi, No. 14-cv-6633, 2018 WL 1184736, at *8 (N.D.\\nIll. Mar. 7, 2018).\\n In response, defendants deny responsibility for any offsite\\nappointments that were not scheduled as requested by plac-\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Indeed, during his deposition Dr. Obaisi remarked that it was\\n“sometimes debatable” whether UIC would call certain inmates for their\\nfollow-up appointments.\\n\\f24 No. 17-2821\\n\\ning the blame for such errors on the onsite prison staff mem-\\nber, who is “likely not a Wexford employee.” Defendants also\\ncast doubt on Walker’s assertion that it was foreseeable to\\nWexford that its monitoring and scheduling policies were\\n“highly likely” to lead to harm. For example, defendants note\\nthat despite Wexford’s financial incentive to avoid delays, it\\nhad no control over UIC’s schedule. Indeed, Walker has not\\nproduced any evidence that Wexford could control UIC’s\\nschedule; it is undisputed, as defendants emphasize, that UIC\\nis not in Wexford’s chain of command. Finally, defendants ar-\\ngue that Walker cannot prevail because he has no evidence\\nthat other inmates faced the same treatment issues and his\\ncase is not of the “rare” cases where evidence of his own ex-\\nperience is sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See,\\ne.g., Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 929\\n(7th Cir. 2004) (affirming a finding of Monell liability where\\nthe evidence showed the organization condoned its employ-\\nees’ repeated decisions to ignore its policies).\\n Neither Walker’s own experience nor the testimony from\\nDrs. Obaisi and Fisher admitting awareness that referrals to\\nUIC were sometimes never scheduled or, if scheduled, signif-\\nicantly delayed, is enough to establish that Wexford was de-\\nliberately indifferent to Walker’s serious medical needs. See\\nGlisson, 849 F.3d at 381. Wexford’s knowledge that some re-\\nferrals slipped through the cracks is not the same as Wex-\\nford’s knowledge that constitutionally necessary referrals\\nwere not happening with such frequency that it ignored an\\nobvious risk of serious harm. Similarly, Walker has not shown\\nthat the standby options of Stateville’s onsite medical care fa-\\ncilities and the nearby hospital were not sufficient as a backup\\nplan in the intervening periods of time where an inmate\\nawaited treatment with an outside expert.\\n\\fNo. 17-2821 25\\n\\n As for the coordination of schedules with UIC, Walker’s\\ninstinct that Wexford should not be able to use UIC as a shield\\nis understandable. But Wexford cannot be accused of “defer-\\nring” to UIC when Wexford had no control over UIC. To defer\\nto another suggests the relinquishment of power or control,\\nwhich did not exist here. Practically speaking, Wexford refers\\nmany inmates, and the specialists at UIC have a finite number\\nof appointments available; thus, it seems unavoidable that, at\\ntimes, the wait for appointments will grow to a few months.\\nAbsent evidence that Wexford was on notice that these wait\\ntimes were likely to cause constitutional violations, but failed\\nto act in response, we cannot hold Wexford liable.\\n C. Exhaustion\\n Because we conclude that the district court appropriately\\nentered summary judgment against Walker on the merits, we\\nneed not address whether the district court correctly con-\\ncluded that Walker failed to exhaust his administrative reme-\\ndies.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4665,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4669897,"string":"4,669,897"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Chicago Studio Rental, Incorpo v. Illinois Department of Commerc"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3134"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18–3134\\nCHICAGO STUDIO RENTAL, INCORPORATED, CHICAGO STUDIO\\nCITY REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC\\nOPPORTUNITY, ILLINOIS FILM OFFICE, BETSY STEINBERG, in both\\nher official and individual capacity,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-CV-04099 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. For nearly 30 years, Chicago Studio\\nRental, Incorporated and Chicago Studio City Real Estate\\nHoldings, LLC (collectively, “Chicago Studio”) operated the\\nonly film studio in Chicago, Illinois. That changed around\\n2010 when Chicago Film Studio Holdings, LLC and Chicago\\n\\f2 No. 18-3134\\n\\nFilm Studio Industrial Real Estate Holdings, LLC (collec-\\ntively, “Cinespace”) opened a new studio. Within a handful\\nof years, Cinespace rapidly expanded its studio to include 26\\nmore stages and 24 times more floor space than Chicago Stu-\\ndio’s facility. Chicago Studio could not keep up, failed to at-\\ntract production business, and ultimately stopped making a\\nprofit.\\n Chicago Studio sought to blame others for its demise and\\nfiled this action against the Illinois Department of Commerce\\nand Economic Opportunity, Illinois Film Office, and Betsy\\nSteinberg—three Illinois state actors responsible for promot-\\ning the Illinois film industry. Chicago Studio alleged that De-\\nfendants unlawfully steered state incentives and business to\\nCinespace in violation of the Sherman Act and equal protec-\\ntion and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The\\ndistrict court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Sher-\\nman Act and due process claims. It later granted summary\\njudgment on the equal protection claim. Chicago Studio now\\nappeals these decisions on the Sherman Act and equal protec-\\ntion claims.\\n We affirm. The district court properly dismissed the Sher-\\nman Act claim because Chicago Studio failed to adequately\\nplead an antitrust injury. The complaint merely alleges inju-\\nries to Chicago Studio, not to competition. We also conclude\\nthat the district court properly granted summary judgment\\non the equal protection claim. Chicago Studio and Cinespace\\nare not similarly situated, and there was a rational basis for\\nSteinberg’s conduct. We further find that the district court did\\nnot abuse its discretion in striking Chicago Studio’s addi-\\ntional statement of facts for noncompliance.\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 3\\n\\n I. Background\\n Since 1979, Chicago Studio has operated a film and televi-\\nsion production studio in Chicago, Illinois. Chicago Studio\\nhas four studio stages measuring 62,000 square feet. It re-\\nquires production companies to lease its production equip-\\nment for a .4% charge. The studio does not have installed air\\nconditioning, but Chicago Studio can provide industry stand-\\nard portable air conditioning units for an additional charge. It\\ndoes not have scene docks, which would allow large trailers\\nto unload equipment inside the studio. During the relevant\\ntime period, Chicago Studio could accommodate one large or\\ntwo average projects at a given time.\\n Cinespace began operating a studio in Chicago around\\n2010. Cinespace is not a party to this action, but it is Chicago\\nStudio’s only competitor in the Chicago area. By the end of\\n2012, Cinespace had 600,000 square feet of floor space and 10\\nstages. The studio expanded to 1.5 million square feet of floor\\nspace and 30 stages by January 2015. Cinespace’s studio can\\naccommodate two-story sets and includes air conditioning,\\ninside breezeways and scene docks, concrete floors, sound-\\nproof walls, and new offices. Cinespace permits production\\ncompanies to use any equipment rentals they choose includ-\\ning an unaffiliated equipment rental company called\\nCinelease that charges .2%.\\n All three Defendants are Illinois state actors. The Illinois\\nDepartment of Commerce and Economic Opportunity\\n(“IDCEO”) is a division of Illinois government tasked with\\npromoting Illinois’s profile as a leading business destination.\\nTo promote the Illinois film industry, IDCEO administers\\ngrant programs to film studios and tax credits to film produc-\\ners. See 35 ILCS 16/10; Ill. Admin. Code tit. 14, § 528.70 (2013).\\n\\f4 No. 18-3134\\n\\nThe Illinois Film Office (“IFO”) is part of IDCEO, and Betsy\\nSteinberg served as the IFO Managing Director during Gov-\\nernor Patrick Quinn’s administration. The IFO’s principal\\npurpose is to support the Illinois film industry. See 35 ILCS\\n16/5 (“Illinois must move aggressively with new business de-\\nvelopment investment tools so that Illinois is more competi-\\ntive in site location decision-making for film productions.…It\\nis the purpose of this Act to preserve and expand the existing\\nhuman infrastructure for the motion picture industry in Illi-\\nnois.”)\\n Chicago Studio claims that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg\\nconspired with Cinespace to boycott Chicago Studio and to\\nsteer business towards Cinespace. They did so by administer-\\ning 30% film tax credits to producers and issuing five state\\ngrants totaling $27.3 million to Cinespace. Due to a change in\\nadministration, Cinespace returned $10 million to Illinois.\\nChicago Studio also alleges that Defendants failed to mention\\nChicago Studio to producers, encouraged producers to use\\nCinespace, excluded Chicago Studio from business meetings,\\nand did not allow Chicago Studio to bid on production op-\\nportunities. Chicago Studio states that it applied for two\\ngrants, but it did not receive either.\\n Cinespace consistently reached out to Steinberg and IFO\\nfor assistance with marketing and procuring film and televi-\\nsion production business. It also hired a lobbyist to apply for\\ngrant money from the State of Illinois. Steinberg provided\\nhelp to Chicago Studio whenever it asked, but it rarely did.\\nChicago Studio did not ask Steinberg to contact Hollywood\\nfilm producers on its behalf because it had done business with\\nthem for years. Chicago Studio does not identify a single\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 5\\n\\ninstance where it reached out to Steinberg for help, and Stein-\\nberg refused.\\n The Illinois film industry became more profitable over the\\nrelevant time period. In 2009, the Illinois film industry earned\\napproximately $104 million in gross revenue. In 2012 and\\n2013, it made approximately $184 million and $350 million in\\ngross revenue, respectively. The industry also created new\\njobs, approximately 7,082 in 2009 to 15,627 in 2013.\\n By steering business towards Cinespace, Chicago Studio\\nasserts that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg became active market\\nparticipants in the “Chicago Film Production Market,” which\\nit defines as entities providing production facilities in Chi-\\ncago. Defendants’ conduct resulted in the following alleged\\ninjuries: (1) a decrease in Chicago Studio’s market share from\\n100% to 10%, (2) Chicago Studio’s inability to compete in the\\nmarket, (3) a reduction in competition, and (4) an increase in\\ntransactional costs to produce film and television in Chicago\\nto consumers of those services.\\n Chicago Studio filed suit asserting violations of equal pro-\\ntection under the Fourteenth Amendment against Steinberg\\nin her individual capacity (Count I), Sections 1 and 2 of the\\nSherman Act against IDCEO and Steinberg in her official ca-\\npacity (Count II), and due process under the Fourteenth\\nAmendment against Steinberg in her individual capacity\\n(Count III). Defendants moved to dismiss the action under\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the district\\ncourt granted in part. Chicago Studio subsequently filed an\\namended complaint and added IFO as a defendant. Defend-\\nants again moved to dismiss the Sherman Act and due pro-\\ncess claims for failure to state a claim. The district court\\ngranted the motion. Steinberg later moved for summary\\n\\f6 No. 18-3134\\n\\njudgment on the equal protection claim. The district court\\ngranted Steinberg’s motion for summary judgment and\\nstruck Chicago Studio’s statement of additional facts for non-\\ncompliance. Chicago Studio now appeals both the district\\ncourt’s dismissal of the Sherman Act claim and the summary\\njudgment ruling.\\n II. Discussion\\nA. The Sherman Act\\n We review the district court’s motion to dismiss ruling de\\nnovo, assume all well-pleaded allegations are true, and con-\\nstrue reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Kemper v.\\nDeutsche Bank AG, 911 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2018). To survive\\na motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege\\n“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\\nface.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A\\nclaim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual\\ncontent that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference\\nthat the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ash-\\ncroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).\\n The district court dismissed Chicago Studio’s antitrust\\nclaim with prejudice. In doing so, it relied upon Czajkowski v.\\nIllinois, 460 F. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) and held that IDCEO,\\nIFO, and Steinberg in their official capacities are immune\\nfrom antitrust liability under the Eleventh Amendment. It\\nalso found that Chicago Studio had failed to allege an anti-\\ntrust injury.\\n The Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act does\\nnot prohibit anticompetitive state action. Parker v. Brown, 317\\nU.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (“The Sherman Act…gives no hint that\\nit was intended to restrain state action or official action\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 7\\n\\ndirected by a state.”). Since then, the Supreme Court has de-\\nvised three types of antitrust immunity: (1) ipso facto immun-\\nity, (2) Hallie immunity, and (3) Midcal immunity. See N.C.\\nState Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 1110–13\\n(2015); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38–40,\\n42 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567–69 (1984); Cal.\\nRetail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.\\n97, 105 (1980); see also Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Village of\\nBellwood, 929 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir. 2019); Lawline v. Am. Bar\\nAss’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1384 (7th Cir. 1992); Fuchs v. Rural Elec.\\nConvenience Coop. Inc., 858 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988).\\n The parties disagree on which immunity test applies here.\\nChicago Studio argues that Defendants are not subject to an-\\ntitrust immunity because the Midcal test applies, and Defend-\\nants do not satisfy the test. Defendants argue that they are\\nsubject to either ipso facto immunity or Hallie immunity. We\\ndo not need to decide whether Defendants are subject to anti-\\ntrust immunity because we find that Chicago Studio failed to\\nallege an antitrust injury.1 See, e.g., Paramount Media Grp., Inc.,\\n929 F.3d at 921.\\n The complaint asserts that Defendants violated Sections 1\\nand 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act pro-\\nhibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or\\notherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”\\n15 U.S.C. § 1. Chicago Studio alleges that IDCEO, IFO, and\\nSteinberg violated Section 1 by steering tax credits to produc-\\ners using Cinespace’s studio and state grants to Cinespace\\n\\n\\n 1Although we do not decide which immunity test should apply here,\\nboth parties acknowledge that the test outlined in Czajkowski v. Illinois, 460\\nF. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) is the wrong standard. We agree.\\n\\f8 No. 18-3134\\n\\nand boycotting Chicago Studio in restraint of trade. Section 2\\nof the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or at-\\ntempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other\\nperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or\\ncommerce among the several States….” 15 U.S.C. § 2. Chicago\\nStudio claims that Defendants and Cinespace conspired to\\nmonopolize and have attempted to monopolize the market\\nfor operating film studios in Chicago violating Section 2.\\n To state an antitrust injury, a plaintiff must allege an anti-\\ncompetitive injury that flows from defendant’s actions and\\nthat the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Brunswick\\nCorp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see\\nalso, e.g., Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir.\\n1995). “The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plain-\\ntiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-re-\\nducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior.” Atlantic\\nRichfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 (1990).\\nPlaintiff must assert an injury not only to itself, but to the rel-\\nevant market. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683\\nF.3d 328, 334–35 (7th Cir. 2012). The alleged injury must either\\nreduce output or raise prices to consumers. James Cape & Sons\\nCo. v. PCC Constr. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 2006); see also\\nMcGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankr. Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 937 F.3d\\n1056, 1065 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We usually presume that compet-\\nitors and consumers in the relevant market are the only par-\\nties who suffer antitrust injuries and are in a position to effi-\\nciently vindicate the antitrust laws.”). “The antitrust-injury\\ndoctrine was created to filter out complaints by competitors\\nand others who may be hurt by productive efficiencies, higher\\noutput, and lower prices, all of which the antitrust laws are\\ndesigned to encourage.” United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana\\nGas. Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 9\\n\\n At best, Chicago Studio has pleaded an injury to itself, not\\nan anticompetitive injury to the market. The complaint alleges\\nthe following injuries: (1) decrease in Chicago Studio’s share\\nof the film production market, (2) Chicago Studio’s inability\\nto compete in the market, (3) a reduction in competition, and\\n(4) an increase in transactional costs to produce films in Chi-\\ncago to other consumers of those services. Two of the alleged\\ninjuries—decrease in its share of the film production market\\nand inability to compete—are harms to Chicago Studio and\\nare not proper antitrust injuries. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon,\\nInc., 525 U.S. 128, 135, 139 (1998) (concluding that plaintiff\\n“must allege and prove harm, not just to a single competitor,\\nbut to the competitive process, i.e., to competition itself”). A\\nreduction in competition and an increase in transactional\\ncosts could be anticompetitive injuries, but Chicago Studio\\nfails to plausibly allege either. Although Chicago Studio gen-\\nerally claims, in a conclusory manner, that competition de-\\ncreased, the thrust of its complaint points the opposite way.\\nBefore 2009, Chicago Studio was the only film studio in the\\nChicago area. Cinespace came into the market, brought new\\ncapacity, and the Illinois film industry grew. The number of\\nfilm studios in Chicago increased from one to two, and the\\nIllinois film industry generated about $184 million and $350\\nmillion in revenue in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Chicago\\nStudio continued to operate in the market and does not allege\\nthat it was excluded from doing so. Chicago Studio also pro-\\nvides no facts to support its one-sentence, conclusory state-\\nment that transactional costs increased. The complaint does\\nnot allege what transactional costs increased, how much they\\nincreased by, and who experienced the increased costs. Nor\\ndoes the complaint allege reduced output or higher prices in\\nthe Chicago film market. In summary, Chicago Studio merely\\n\\f10 No. 18-3134\\n\\nstates these assertions in a conclusory fashion and fails to al-\\nlege factual allegations supporting the existence of an anti-\\ntrust injury. We will not accept such allegations as true. See\\nIqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of\\na cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,\\ndo not suffice.”)\\n Chicago Studio argues that its exclusion from the market\\nis a valid antitrust injury and cites Gulf States Reorganization\\nGroup, Inc. v. Nucor Corporation, 466 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2006)\\nand OverEnd Technologies, LLC v. Invista S.ÀR.L., 431 F. Supp.\\n2d 925 (E.D. Wis. 2006). Chicago Studio, however, does not\\nallege that it was entirely excluded from the market. “Transfer\\nof business from one company to another, however, without\\nan accompanying effect on competition, cannot be an anti-\\ntrust violation” because antitrust laws protect competition,\\nnot competitors. Tri-Gen Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs,\\nLocal 150, AFL-CIO, 433 F.3d 1024, 1031–32 (7th Cir. 2006).\\nMoreover, these cases are distinguishable because they in-\\nvolved exclusion of a potential competitor. See Gulf States Re-\\norganization Grp., Inc., 466 F.3d at 967–68; OverEnd Techs., LLC,\\n431 F. Supp. 2d at 930. Chicago Studio is not a potential com-\\npetitor; it has operated a film studio in Chicago since 1979 and\\ncontinued to do so after Cinespace entered the market. See Tri-\\nGen Inc., 433 F.3d at 1032.\\n Chicago Studio’s Section 2 claim also fails for an addi-\\ntional reason. The complaint does not plausibly allege that\\nDefendants conspired to monopolize or have attempted to\\nmonopolize the market for operating film studios in Chicago.\\nChicago Studio admitted that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg are\\nnot competitors of Chicago Studio. Instead Chicago Studio ar-\\ngues that they are market participants. This is implausible.\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 11\\n\\nDefendants do not provide studio space and do not compete\\nin the market. The complaint also does not allege any facts\\nregarding their market power or anticompetitive use of their\\npower. See Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 282–84 (7th\\nCir. 2000).\\n Because we find that Chicago Studio failed to plead an an-\\ntitrust injury, we do not address Defendants’ additional bases\\nfor dismissing the antitrust claim.\\nB. Equal Protection\\n We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling\\nde novo and in the light most favorable to Chicago Studio.\\nPeerless Network, Inc. v. MCI Commc’n Serv., Inc., 917 F.3d 538,\\n545 (7th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when\\n“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the\\nmovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.\\nCiv. P. 56(a).\\n Chicago Studio raises a “class-of-one” equal protection\\nclaim against Steinberg in her individual capacity. This claim\\nis based on the principle that similarly situated people must\\nbe treated alike unless there is a rational basis for treating\\nthem differently. See LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Win-\\nnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2010). To succeed, Chicago\\nStudio must prove that (1) it has been “intentionally treated\\ndifferently from others similarly situated,” and (2) “there is\\nno rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Paramount\\nMedia Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d at 920 (citation omitted). We have\\nyet to determine whether a plaintiff must also prove bad mo-\\ntive. See Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 913 (7th\\nCir. 2012) (Wood, J., dissenting). But we need not do so here\\n\\f12 No. 18-3134\\n\\nbecause Chicago Studio cannot survive summary judgment\\non the other elements of its equal protection claim.\\n To be similarly situated, competitors must be “identical or\\ndirectly comparable” “in all material aspects.” See Miller v.\\nCity of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting\\nLaBella Winnetka, Inc., 628 F.3d at 942). Chicago Studio must\\nshow that it was treated differently than another entity that is\\n“‘prima facie identical in all relevant respects.’” Paramount Me-\\ndia Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d at 920 (citing D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch.\\nCorp., 799 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2015)).\\n Here, Chicago Studio and Cinespace were not similarly\\nsituated because the undisputed facts demonstrate that they\\ndiffered in material ways. Chicago Studio has four stages\\nmeasuring 62,000 square feet, whereas Cinespace has 30\\nstages and 1.5 million square feet of floor space. Cinespace\\ncould also accommodate two-story sets. Chicago Studio does\\nnot have scene docks or installed air conditioning (only port-\\nable air conditioning units for an additional charge) while\\nCinespace has both. Chicago Studio charges .4% for equip-\\nment rentals and requires production companies to use its\\nequipment rentals. Cinespace permits production companies\\nto use any equipment rental company including Cinelease,\\nwhich charges .2%. Based on these facts, no rational fact finder\\nwould consider these studios to be similarly situated.\\n The equal protection claim also fails because there are ra-\\ntional bases for Steinberg’s conduct. “If we can come up with\\na rational basis for the challenged action, that will be the end\\nof the matter—animus or no.” Fares Pawn, LLC v. Indiana Dep’t\\nof Fin. Insts., 755 F.3d 839, 845 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2014). We just\\nneed to identify a conceivable rational basis for the different\\ntreatment; it does not need to be the actual basis for\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 13\\n\\ndefendant’s actions. D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681,\\n686 (7th Cir. 2013). There are several rational bases for Stein-\\nberg’s conduct. First, it was rational for Steinberg to offer\\nmore assistance to the studio that requested help. Cinespace\\nconsistently reached out to Steinberg for marketing support,\\nand Chicago Studio rarely did. It cannot now complain that\\nits failure to do so amounts to a constitutional injury. Second,\\nit was rational for Steinberg to promote the studios based on\\nproduction needs. Fox Studios, for example, decided to film\\nEmpire at Cinespace and occupied 250,000 square feet and up\\nto six stages. Lionsgate considered filming Divergent in Chi-\\ncago and requested 200,000 square feet of production space.\\nIt would have been rational for Steinberg to promote Cine-\\nspace over Chicago Studio for these projects because Chicago\\nStudio simply did not have enough studio space to accommo-\\ndate these productions and Cinespace did. We find that the\\ndistrict court properly granted summary judgment on the\\nequal protection claim.\\nC. Summary Judgment Practice\\n During summary judgment briefing, the parties filed a\\njoint statement of undisputed facts pursuant to Judge Ellis’s\\ncase management procedure. Chicago Studio subsequently\\nfiled a statement of additional facts, which it claimed con-\\ntained disputed facts. The district court found that Chicago\\nStudio’s additional facts were undisputed facts and a blatant\\nattempt to get around the court’s order permitting 50 addi-\\ntional facts. It therefore struck Chicago Studio’s statement of\\nadditional facts and granted Steinberg’s motion for summary\\njudgment.\\n On appeal, Chicago Studio argues that the district court’s\\nsummary judgment practice is overly burdensome and\\n\\f14 No. 18-3134\\n\\nviolates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56 and 83 and Local\\nRule 56.1 by allowing the court to determine material issues\\nof fact and disallowing a party to dispute an undisputed fact.\\nWe disagree.\\n As a threshold matter, Chicago Studio forfeited this argu-\\nment by failing to challenge the summary judgment practice\\nat the district court. See Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 540,\\n544 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A party generally forfeits issues and ar-\\nguments raised for the first time on appeal.”). Instead, Chi-\\ncago Studio and Defendants filed joint motions in compliance\\nwith the district court’s practice. If Chicago Studio objected to\\nthe district court’s practice, it should have made a record of\\nits objections at the district court and given the district court\\nthe opportunity to address the concern.2 It did not. We cannot\\nconsider this argument for the first time on appeal.\\n Even if it was not forfeited (or waived), Chicago Studio’s\\nchallenge nonetheless fails. We review the district court’s de-\\ncision on compliance with local rules for an abuse of discre-\\ntion. Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir.\\n2008). The relevant portion of Judge Ellis’s summary judg-\\nment practice states:\\n Parties are required to file a joint statement of\\n undisputed material facts that the parties agree\\n are not in dispute…The parties may not file –\\n\\n\\n 2Although not argued by the parties, Chicago Studio likely waived\\nthis argument as well. See, e.g., CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones Lang LaSalle\\nAmericas, Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018). At a hearing, Chicago Stu-\\ndio’s counsel stated that the summary judgment practice was “overly bur-\\ndensome.” But later, during the same hearing, Chicago Studio’s counsel\\nagreed to abide by the summary judgment practice.\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 15\\n\\n and the Court will not consider – separate\\n statements of undisputed facts. However, the\\n non-moving party may include facts in its re-\\n sponse to the motion for summary judgment\\n that it contends are disputed in order to demon-\\n strate that a genuine issue of material fact exists\\n that warrants denying the motion for summary\\n judgment. The non-moving party must include\\n citations to supporting material supporting the\\n dispute and attach the same. The moving party\\n may respond to these facts in its reply.\\n The parties shall not file more than 120 state-\\n ments of undisputed material facts without\\n prior leave of the Court….\\n If the parties cannot agree whether proposed\\n statements of fact are not in dispute, they may\\n file a joint motion prior to filing the motion for\\n summary judgment so the Court can determine\\n whether there is a basis for the alleged disputes.\\n That motion should set forth the proposed state-\\n ments of fact at issue, with supporting material.\\n Each statement should be followed by a re-\\n sponse by the other party explaining why that\\n party contends that the statement is actually in\\n dispute, with citation to supporting mate-\\n rial…The Court will then determine whether\\n the proposed statements of fact may be in-\\n cluded in the joint statement as undisputed\\n facts. Parties should provide the Court with suf-\\n ficient time to rule on factual disputes before\\n summary judgment motions are due.…\\n\\f16 No. 18-3134\\n\\n If the nonmoving party wholly refuses to join in\\n the joint statement of undisputed material facts,\\n the moving party will nevertheless be permitted\\n to file the motion for summary judgment, ac-\\n companied by a separate declaration of counsel\\n explaining why a joint statement of undisputed\\n material facts was not filed.\\nJudge Sara L. Ellis, Case Management Procedures, available at\\nhttps://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/judge-info.aspx?VyU/OurK-\\nKJRDT+FUM5tZmA== (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (emphasis\\nin original).\\n We have previously held that Judge Ellis’s summary judg-\\nment practice does not violate Local Rule 56.1. See Sweatt v.\\nUnion Pac. R.R. Co., 796 F.3d 701, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015). The\\nsummary judgment practice at issue in Sweatt is materially\\nsimilar to the one at issue here. It merely requires parties to\\nfile a joint statement of undisputed facts, if possible. The non-\\nmoving party may include disputed facts in its response brief,\\nand the moving party may respond to these disputed facts in\\nits reply brief. That is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 56(a), which requires parties to support their asser-\\ntion that a fact “cannot be or is genuinely disputed.” Nor is it\\nin conflict with Local Rule 56.1, which directs a moving party\\nto file a statement of material facts and a non-moving party to\\nrespond to the movant’s statement of material facts. N.D. Ill.\\nL.R. 56.1(a), (b)(3)(c); See Sweatt, 796 F.3d at 711 (“The lauda-\\nble goal of this [case management procedure] is to remove the\\nchaff from the grain in a given case, thereby allowing the par-\\nties—and the court—to focus on the facts that are actually in\\ndispute.”) “A judge may regulate practice in any manner con-\\nsistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 17\\n\\n2072 and 2075, and the district’s local rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n83(b).\\n Chicago Studio has not presented any reason why we\\nshould conclude otherwise here. We agree with the district\\ncourt that Chicago Studio’s statement is comprised of undis-\\nputed facts. The parties could have included these facts in\\ntheir joint statement of undisputed facts. The joint statement\\nincluded 91 undisputed facts, and the court’s summary judg-\\nment practice permits up to 120 undisputed facts without\\nleave of court. If the parties needed to present more than 120\\nundisputed facts, they should have requested leave to do so.\\nThey did not. We find that the district court did not abuse its\\ndiscretion by striking Chicago Studio’s statement of addi-\\ntional facts for noncompliance.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4447150/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669897/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Chicago Studio Rental, Incorpo v. Illinois Department of Commerc\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18–3134\nCHICAGO STUDIO RENTAL, INCORPORATED, CHICAGO STUDIO\nCITY REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC\nOPPORTUNITY, ILLINOIS FILM OFFICE, BETSY STEINBERG, in both\nher official and individual capacity,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:15-CV-04099 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. For nearly 30 years, Chicago Studio\nRental, Incorporated and Chicago Studio City Real Estate\nHoldings, LLC (collectively, “Chicago Studio”) operated the\nonly film studio in Chicago, Illinois. That changed around\n2010 when Chicago Film Studio Holdings, LLC and Chicago\n\f2 No. 18-3134\n\nFilm Studio Industrial Real Estate Holdings, LLC (collec-\ntively, “Cinespace”) opened a new studio. Within a handful\nof years, Cinespace rapidly expanded its studio to include 26\nmore stages and 24 times more floor space than Chicago Stu-\ndio’s facility. Chicago Studio could not keep up, failed to at-\ntract production business, and ultimately stopped making a\nprofit.\n Chicago Studio sought to blame others for its demise and\nfiled this action against the Illinois Department of Commerce\nand Economic Opportunity, Illinois Film Office, and Betsy\nSteinberg—three Illinois state actors responsible for promot-\ning the Illinois film industry. Chicago Studio alleged that De-\nfendants unlawfully steered state incentives and business to\nCinespace in violation of the Sherman Act and equal protec-\ntion and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The\ndistrict court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Sher-\nman Act and due process claims. It later granted summary\njudgment on the equal protection claim. Chicago Studio now\nappeals these decisions on the Sherman Act and equal protec-\ntion claims.\n We affirm. The district court properly dismissed the Sher-\nman Act claim because Chicago Studio failed to adequately\nplead an antitrust injury. The complaint merely alleges inju-\nries to Chicago Studio, not to competition. We also conclude\nthat the district court properly granted summary judgment\non the equal protection claim. Chicago Studio and Cinespace\nare not similarly situated, and there was a rational basis for\nSteinberg’s conduct. We further find that the district court did\nnot abuse its discretion in striking Chicago Studio’s addi-\ntional statement of facts for noncompliance.\n\fNo. 18-3134 3\n\n I. Background\n Since 1979, Chicago Studio has operated a film and televi-\nsion production studio in Chicago, Illinois. Chicago Studio\nhas four studio stages measuring 62,000 square feet. It re-\nquires production companies to lease its production equip-\nment for a .4% charge. The studio does not have installed air\nconditioning, but Chicago Studio can provide industry stand-\nard portable air conditioning units for an additional charge. It\ndoes not have scene docks, which would allow large trailers\nto unload equipment inside the studio. During the relevant\ntime period, Chicago Studio could accommodate one large or\ntwo average projects at a given time.\n Cinespace began operating a studio in Chicago around\n2010. Cinespace is not a party to this action, but it is Chicago\nStudio’s only competitor in the Chicago area. By the end of\n2012, Cinespace had 600,000 square feet of floor space and 10\nstages. The studio expanded to 1.5 million square feet of floor\nspace and 30 stages by January 2015. Cinespace’s studio can\naccommodate two-story sets and includes air conditioning,\ninside breezeways and scene docks, concrete floors, sound-\nproof walls, and new offices. Cinespace permits production\ncompanies to use any equipment rentals they choose includ-\ning an unaffiliated equipment rental company called\nCinelease that charges .2%.\n All three Defendants are Illinois state actors. The Illinois\nDepartment of Commerce and Economic Opportunity\n(“IDCEO”) is a division of Illinois government tasked with\npromoting Illinois’s profile as a leading business destination.\nTo promote the Illinois film industry, IDCEO administers\ngrant programs to film studios and tax credits to film produc-\ners. See 35 ILCS 16/10; Ill. Admin. Code tit. 14, § 528.70 (2013).\n\f4 No. 18-3134\n\nThe Illinois Film Office (“IFO”) is part of IDCEO, and Betsy\nSteinberg served as the IFO Managing Director during Gov-\nernor Patrick Quinn’s administration. The IFO’s principal\npurpose is to support the Illinois film industry. See 35 ILCS\n16/5 (“Illinois must move aggressively with new business de-\nvelopment investment tools so that Illinois is more competi-\ntive in site location decision-making for film productions.…It\nis the purpose of this Act to preserve and expand the existing\nhuman infrastructure for the motion picture industry in Illi-\nnois.”)\n Chicago Studio claims that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg\nconspired with Cinespace to boycott Chicago Studio and to\nsteer business towards Cinespace. They did so by administer-\ning 30% film tax credits to producers and issuing five state\ngrants totaling $27.3 million to Cinespace. Due to a change in\nadministration, Cinespace returned $10 million to Illinois.\nChicago Studio also alleges that Defendants failed to mention\nChicago Studio to producers, encouraged producers to use\nCinespace, excluded Chicago Studio from business meetings,\nand did not allow Chicago Studio to bid on production op-\nportunities. Chicago Studio states that it applied for two\ngrants, but it did not receive either.\n Cinespace consistently reached out to Steinberg and IFO\nfor assistance with marketing and procuring film and televi-\nsion production business. It also hired a lobbyist to apply for\ngrant money from the State of Illinois. Steinberg provided\nhelp to Chicago Studio whenever it asked, but it rarely did.\nChicago Studio did not ask Steinberg to contact Hollywood\nfilm producers on its behalf because it had done business with\nthem for years. Chicago Studio does not identify a single\n\fNo. 18-3134 5\n\ninstance where it reached out to Steinberg for help, and Stein-\nberg refused.\n The Illinois film industry became more profitable over the\nrelevant time period. In 2009, the Illinois film industry earned\napproximately $104 million in gross revenue. In 2012 and\n2013, it made approximately $184 million and $350 million in\ngross revenue, respectively. The industry also created new\njobs, approximately 7,082 in 2009 to 15,627 in 2013.\n By steering business towards Cinespace, Chicago Studio\nasserts that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg became active market\nparticipants in the “Chicago Film Production Market,” which\nit defines as entities providing production facilities in Chi-\ncago. Defendants’ conduct resulted in the following alleged\ninjuries: (1) a decrease in Chicago Studio’s market share from\n100% to 10%, (2) Chicago Studio’s inability to compete in the\nmarket, (3) a reduction in competition, and (4) an increase in\ntransactional costs to produce film and television in Chicago\nto consumers of those services.\n Chicago Studio filed suit asserting violations of equal pro-\ntection under the Fourteenth Amendment against Steinberg\nin her individual capacity (Count I), Sections 1 and 2 of the\nSherman Act against IDCEO and Steinberg in her official ca-\npacity (Count II), and due process under the Fourteenth\nAmendment against Steinberg in her individual capacity\n(Count III). Defendants moved to dismiss the action under\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the district\ncourt granted in part. Chicago Studio subsequently filed an\namended complaint and added IFO as a defendant. Defend-\nants again moved to dismiss the Sherman Act and due pro-\ncess claims for failure to state a claim. The district court\ngranted the motion. Steinberg later moved for summary\n\f6 No. 18-3134\n\njudgment on the equal protection claim. The district court\ngranted Steinberg’s motion for summary judgment and\nstruck Chicago Studio’s statement of additional facts for non-\ncompliance. Chicago Studio now appeals both the district\ncourt’s dismissal of the Sherman Act claim and the summary\njudgment ruling.\n II. Discussion\nA. The Sherman Act\n We review the district court’s motion to dismiss ruling de\nnovo, assume all well-pleaded allegations are true, and con-\nstrue reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Kemper v.\nDeutsche Bank AG, 911 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2018). To survive\na motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege\n“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\nface.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A\nclaim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual\ncontent that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference\nthat the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ash-\ncroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).\n The district court dismissed Chicago Studio’s antitrust\nclaim with prejudice. In doing so, it relied upon Czajkowski v.\nIllinois, 460 F. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) and held that IDCEO,\nIFO, and Steinberg in their official capacities are immune\nfrom antitrust liability under the Eleventh Amendment. It\nalso found that Chicago Studio had failed to allege an anti-\ntrust injury.\n The Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act does\nnot prohibit anticompetitive state action. Parker v. Brown, 317\nU.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (“The Sherman Act…gives no hint that\nit was intended to restrain state action or official action\n\fNo. 18-3134 7\n\ndirected by a state.”). Since then, the Supreme Court has de-\nvised three types of antitrust immunity: (1) ipso facto immun-\nity, (2) Hallie immunity, and (3) Midcal immunity. See N.C.\nState Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 1110–13\n(2015); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38–40,\n42 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567–69 (1984); Cal.\nRetail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.\n97, 105 (1980); see also Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Village of\nBellwood, 929 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir. 2019); Lawline v. Am. Bar\nAss’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1384 (7th Cir. 1992); Fuchs v. Rural Elec.\nConvenience Coop. Inc., 858 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988).\n The parties disagree on which immunity test applies here.\nChicago Studio argues that Defendants are not subject to an-\ntitrust immunity because the Midcal test applies, and Defend-\nants do not satisfy the test. Defendants argue that they are\nsubject to either ipso facto immunity or Hallie immunity. We\ndo not need to decide whether Defendants are subject to anti-\ntrust immunity because we find that Chicago Studio failed to\nallege an antitrust injury.1 See, e.g., Paramount Media Grp., Inc.,\n929 F.3d at 921.\n The complaint asserts that Defendants violated Sections 1\nand 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act pro-\nhibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or\notherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”\n15 U.S.C. § 1. Chicago Studio alleges that IDCEO, IFO, and\nSteinberg violated Section 1 by steering tax credits to produc-\ners using Cinespace’s studio and state grants to Cinespace\n\n\n 1Although we do not decide which immunity test should apply here,\nboth parties acknowledge that the test outlined in Czajkowski v. Illinois, 460\nF. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) is the wrong standard. We agree.\n\f8 No. 18-3134\n\nand boycotting Chicago Studio in restraint of trade. Section 2\nof the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or at-\ntempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other\nperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or\ncommerce among the several States….” 15 U.S.C. § 2. Chicago\nStudio claims that Defendants and Cinespace conspired to\nmonopolize and have attempted to monopolize the market\nfor operating film studios in Chicago violating Section 2.\n To state an antitrust injury, a plaintiff must allege an anti-\ncompetitive injury that flows from defendant’s actions and\nthat the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Brunswick\nCorp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see\nalso, e.g., Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir.\n1995). “The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plain-\ntiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-re-\nducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior.” Atlantic\nRichfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 (1990).\nPlaintiff must assert an injury not only to itself, but to the rel-\nevant market. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683\nF.3d 328, 334–35 (7th Cir. 2012). The alleged injury must either\nreduce output or raise prices to consumers. James Cape & Sons\nCo. v. PCC Constr. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 2006); see also\nMcGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankr. Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 937 F.3d\n1056, 1065 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We usually presume that compet-\nitors and consumers in the relevant market are the only par-\nties who suffer antitrust injuries and are in a position to effi-\nciently vindicate the antitrust laws.”). “The antitrust-injury\ndoctrine was created to filter out complaints by competitors\nand others who may be hurt by productive efficiencies, higher\noutput, and lower prices, all of which the antitrust laws are\ndesigned to encourage.” United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana\nGas. Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003).\n\fNo. 18-3134 9\n\n At best, Chicago Studio has pleaded an injury to itself, not\nan anticompetitive injury to the market. The complaint alleges\nthe following injuries: (1) decrease in Chicago Studio’s share\nof the film production market, (2) Chicago Studio’s inability\nto compete in the market, (3) a reduction in competition, and\n(4) an increase in transactional costs to produce films in Chi-\ncago to other consumers of those services. Two of the alleged\ninjuries—decrease in its share of the film production market\nand inability to compete—are harms to Chicago Studio and\nare not proper antitrust injuries. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon,\nInc., 525 U.S. 128, 135, 139 (1998) (concluding that plaintiff\n“must allege and prove harm, not just to a single competitor,\nbut to the competitive process, i.e., to competition itself”). A\nreduction in competition and an increase in transactional\ncosts could be anticompetitive injuries, but Chicago Studio\nfails to plausibly allege either. Although Chicago Studio gen-\nerally claims, in a conclusory manner, that competition de-\ncreased, the thrust of its complaint points the opposite way.\nBefore 2009, Chicago Studio was the only film studio in the\nChicago area. Cinespace came into the market, brought new\ncapacity, and the Illinois film industry grew. The number of\nfilm studios in Chicago increased from one to two, and the\nIllinois film industry generated about $184 million and $350\nmillion in revenue in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Chicago\nStudio continued to operate in the market and does not allege\nthat it was excluded from doing so. Chicago Studio also pro-\nvides no facts to support its one-sentence, conclusory state-\nment that transactional costs increased. The complaint does\nnot allege what transactional costs increased, how much they\nincreased by, and who experienced the increased costs. Nor\ndoes the complaint allege reduced output or higher prices in\nthe Chicago film market. In summary, Chicago Studio merely\n\f10 No. 18-3134\n\nstates these assertions in a conclusory fashion and fails to al-\nlege factual allegations supporting the existence of an anti-\ntrust injury. We will not accept such allegations as true. See\nIqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of\na cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,\ndo not suffice.”)\n Chicago Studio argues that its exclusion from the market\nis a valid antitrust injury and cites Gulf States Reorganization\nGroup, Inc. v. Nucor Corporation, 466 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2006)\nand OverEnd Technologies, LLC v. Invista S.ÀR.L., 431 F. Supp.\n2d 925 (E.D. Wis. 2006). Chicago Studio, however, does not\nallege that it was entirely excluded from the market. “Transfer\nof business from one company to another, however, without\nan accompanying effect on competition, cannot be an anti-\ntrust violation” because antitrust laws protect competition,\nnot competitors. Tri-Gen Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs,\nLocal 150, AFL-CIO, 433 F.3d 1024, 1031–32 (7th Cir. 2006).\nMoreover, these cases are distinguishable because they in-\nvolved exclusion of a potential competitor. See Gulf States Re-\norganization Grp., Inc., 466 F.3d at 967–68; OverEnd Techs., LLC,\n431 F. Supp. 2d at 930. Chicago Studio is not a potential com-\npetitor; it has operated a film studio in Chicago since 1979 and\ncontinued to do so after Cinespace entered the market. See Tri-\nGen Inc., 433 F.3d at 1032.\n Chicago Studio’s Section 2 claim also fails for an addi-\ntional reason. The complaint does not plausibly allege that\nDefendants conspired to monopolize or have attempted to\nmonopolize the market for operating film studios in Chicago.\nChicago Studio admitted that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg are\nnot competitors of Chicago Studio. Instead Chicago Studio ar-\ngues that they are market participants. This is implausible.\n\fNo. 18-3134 11\n\nDefendants do not provide studio space and do not compete\nin the market. The complaint also does not allege any facts\nregarding their market power or anticompetitive use of their\npower. See Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 282–84 (7th\nCir. 2000).\n Because we find that Chicago Studio failed to plead an an-\ntitrust injury, we do not address Defendants’ additional bases\nfor dismissing the antitrust claim.\nB. Equal Protection\n We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling\nde novo and in the light most favorable to Chicago Studio.\nPeerless Network, Inc. v. MCI Commc’n Serv., Inc., 917 F.3d 538,\n545 (7th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when\n“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the\nmovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.\nCiv. P. 56(a).\n Chicago Studio raises a “class-of-one” equal protection\nclaim against Steinberg in her individual capacity. This claim\nis based on the principle that similarly situated people must\nbe treated alike unless there is a rational basis for treating\nthem differently. See LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Win-\nnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2010). To succeed, Chicago\nStudio must prove that (1) it has been “intentionally treated\ndifferently from others similarly situated,” and (2) “there is\nno rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Paramount\nMedia Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d at 920 (citation omitted). We have\nyet to determine whether a plaintiff must also prove bad mo-\ntive. See Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 913 (7th\nCir. 2012) (Wood, J., dissenting). But we need not do so here\n\f12 No. 18-3134\n\nbecause Chicago Studio cannot survive summary judgment\non the other elements of its equal protection claim.\n To be similarly situated, competitors must be “identical or\ndirectly comparable” “in all material aspects.” See Miller v.\nCity of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting\nLaBella Winnetka, Inc., 628 F.3d at 942). Chicago Studio must\nshow that it was treated differently than another entity that is\n“‘prima facie identical in all relevant respects.’” Paramount Me-\ndia Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d at 920 (citing D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch.\nCorp., 799 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2015)).\n Here, Chicago Studio and Cinespace were not similarly\nsituated because the undisputed facts demonstrate that they\ndiffered in material ways. Chicago Studio has four stages\nmeasuring 62,000 square feet, whereas Cinespace has 30\nstages and 1.5 million square feet of floor space. Cinespace\ncould also accommodate two-story sets. Chicago Studio does\nnot have scene docks or installed air conditioning (only port-\nable air conditioning units for an additional charge) while\nCinespace has both. Chicago Studio charges .4% for equip-\nment rentals and requires production companies to use its\nequipment rentals. Cinespace permits production companies\nto use any equipment rental company including Cinelease,\nwhich charges .2%. Based on these facts, no rational fact finder\nwould consider these studios to be similarly situated.\n The equal protection claim also fails because there are ra-\ntional bases for Steinberg’s conduct. “If we can come up with\na rational basis for the challenged action, that will be the end\nof the matter—animus or no.” Fares Pawn, LLC v. Indiana Dep’t\nof Fin. Insts., 755 F.3d 839, 845 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2014). We just\nneed to identify a conceivable rational basis for the different\ntreatment; it does not need to be the actual basis for\n\fNo. 18-3134 13\n\ndefendant’s actions. D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681,\n686 (7th Cir. 2013). There are several rational bases for Stein-\nberg’s conduct. First, it was rational for Steinberg to offer\nmore assistance to the studio that requested help. Cinespace\nconsistently reached out to Steinberg for marketing support,\nand Chicago Studio rarely did. It cannot now complain that\nits failure to do so amounts to a constitutional injury. Second,\nit was rational for Steinberg to promote the studios based on\nproduction needs. Fox Studios, for example, decided to film\nEmpire at Cinespace and occupied 250,000 square feet and up\nto six stages. Lionsgate considered filming Divergent in Chi-\ncago and requested 200,000 square feet of production space.\nIt would have been rational for Steinberg to promote Cine-\nspace over Chicago Studio for these projects because Chicago\nStudio simply did not have enough studio space to accommo-\ndate these productions and Cinespace did. We find that the\ndistrict court properly granted summary judgment on the\nequal protection claim.\nC. Summary Judgment Practice\n During summary judgment briefing, the parties filed a\njoint statement of undisputed facts pursuant to Judge Ellis’s\ncase management procedure. Chicago Studio subsequently\nfiled a statement of additional facts, which it claimed con-\ntained disputed facts. The district court found that Chicago\nStudio’s additional facts were undisputed facts and a blatant\nattempt to get around the court’s order permitting 50 addi-\ntional facts. It therefore struck Chicago Studio’s statement of\nadditional facts and granted Steinberg’s motion for summary\njudgment.\n On appeal, Chicago Studio argues that the district court’s\nsummary judgment practice is overly burdensome and\n\f14 No. 18-3134\n\nviolates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56 and 83 and Local\nRule 56.1 by allowing the court to determine material issues\nof fact and disallowing a party to dispute an undisputed fact.\nWe disagree.\n As a threshold matter, Chicago Studio forfeited this argu-\nment by failing to challenge the summary judgment practice\nat the district court. See Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 540,\n544 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A party generally forfeits issues and ar-\nguments raised for the first time on appeal.”). Instead, Chi-\ncago Studio and Defendants filed joint motions in compliance\nwith the district court’s practice. If Chicago Studio objected to\nthe district court’s practice, it should have made a record of\nits objections at the district court and given the district court\nthe opportunity to address the concern.2 It did not. We cannot\nconsider this argument for the first time on appeal.\n Even if it was not forfeited (or waived), Chicago Studio’s\nchallenge nonetheless fails. We review the district court’s de-\ncision on compliance with local rules for an abuse of discre-\ntion. Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir.\n2008). The relevant portion of Judge Ellis’s summary judg-\nment practice states:\n Parties are required to file a joint statement of\n undisputed material facts that the parties agree\n are not in dispute…The parties may not file –\n\n\n 2Although not argued by the parties, Chicago Studio likely waived\nthis argument as well. See, e.g., CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones Lang LaSalle\nAmericas, Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018). At a hearing, Chicago Stu-\ndio’s counsel stated that the summary judgment practice was “overly bur-\ndensome.” But later, during the same hearing, Chicago Studio’s counsel\nagreed to abide by the summary judgment practice.\n\fNo. 18-3134 15\n\n and the Court will not consider – separate\n statements of undisputed facts. However, the\n non-moving party may include facts in its re-\n sponse to the motion for summary judgment\n that it contends are disputed in order to demon-\n strate that a genuine issue of material fact exists\n that warrants denying the motion for summary\n judgment. The non-moving party must include\n citations to supporting material supporting the\n dispute and attach the same. The moving party\n may respond to these facts in its reply.\n The parties shall not file more than 120 state-\n ments of undisputed material facts without\n prior leave of the Court….\n If the parties cannot agree whether proposed\n statements of fact are not in dispute, they may\n file a joint motion prior to filing the motion for\n summary judgment so the Court can determine\n whether there is a basis for the alleged disputes.\n That motion should set forth the proposed state-\n ments of fact at issue, with supporting material.\n Each statement should be followed by a re-\n sponse by the other party explaining why that\n party contends that the statement is actually in\n dispute, with citation to supporting mate-\n rial…The Court will then determine whether\n the proposed statements of fact may be in-\n cluded in the joint statement as undisputed\n facts. Parties should provide the Court with suf-\n ficient time to rule on factual disputes before\n summary judgment motions are due.…\n\f16 No. 18-3134\n\n If the nonmoving party wholly refuses to join in\n the joint statement of undisputed material facts,\n the moving party will nevertheless be permitted\n to file the motion for summary judgment, ac-\n companied by a separate declaration of counsel\n explaining why a joint statement of undisputed\n material facts was not filed.\nJudge Sara L. Ellis, Case Management Procedures, available at\nhttps://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/judge-info.aspx?VyU/OurK-\nKJRDT+FUM5tZmA== (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (emphasis\nin original).\n We have previously held that Judge Ellis’s summary judg-\nment practice does not violate Local Rule 56.1. See Sweatt v.\nUnion Pac. R.R. Co., 796 F.3d 701, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015). The\nsummary judgment practice at issue in Sweatt is materially\nsimilar to the one at issue here. It merely requires parties to\nfile a joint statement of undisputed facts, if possible. The non-\nmoving party may include disputed facts in its response brief,\nand the moving party may respond to these disputed facts in\nits reply brief. That is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil\nProcedure 56(a), which requires parties to support their asser-\ntion that a fact “cannot be or is genuinely disputed.” Nor is it\nin conflict with Local Rule 56.1, which directs a moving party\nto file a statement of material facts and a non-moving party to\nrespond to the movant’s statement of material facts. N.D. Ill.\nL.R. 56.1(a), (b)(3)(c); See Sweatt, 796 F.3d at 711 (“The lauda-\nble goal of this [case management procedure] is to remove the\nchaff from the grain in a given case, thereby allowing the par-\nties—and the court—to focus on the facts that are actually in\ndispute.”) “A judge may regulate practice in any manner con-\nsistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§\n\fNo. 18-3134 17\n\n2072 and 2075, and the district’s local rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P.\n83(b).\n Chicago Studio has not presented any reason why we\nshould conclude otherwise here. We agree with the district\ncourt that Chicago Studio’s statement is comprised of undis-\nputed facts. The parties could have included these facts in\ntheir joint statement of undisputed facts. The joint statement\nincluded 91 undisputed facts, and the court’s summary judg-\nment practice permits up to 120 undisputed facts without\nleave of court. If the parties needed to present more than 120\nundisputed facts, they should have requested leave to do so.\nThey did not. We find that the district court did not abuse its\ndiscretion by striking Chicago Studio’s statement of addi-\ntional facts for noncompliance.\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Chicago Studio Rental, Incorpo v. Illinois Department of Commerc\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18–3134\\nCHICAGO STUDIO RENTAL, INCORPORATED, CHICAGO STUDIO\\nCITY REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC\\nOPPORTUNITY, ILLINOIS FILM OFFICE, BETSY STEINBERG, in both\\nher official and individual capacity,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-CV-04099 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. For nearly 30 years, Chicago Studio\\nRental, Incorporated and Chicago Studio City Real Estate\\nHoldings, LLC (collectively, “Chicago Studio”) operated the\\nonly film studio in Chicago, Illinois. That changed around\\n2010 when Chicago Film Studio Holdings, LLC and Chicago\\n\\f2 No. 18-3134\\n\\nFilm Studio Industrial Real Estate Holdings, LLC (collec-\\ntively, “Cinespace”) opened a new studio. Within a handful\\nof years, Cinespace rapidly expanded its studio to include 26\\nmore stages and 24 times more floor space than Chicago Stu-\\ndio’s facility. Chicago Studio could not keep up, failed to at-\\ntract production business, and ultimately stopped making a\\nprofit.\\n Chicago Studio sought to blame others for its demise and\\nfiled this action against the Illinois Department of Commerce\\nand Economic Opportunity, Illinois Film Office, and Betsy\\nSteinberg—three Illinois state actors responsible for promot-\\ning the Illinois film industry. Chicago Studio alleged that De-\\nfendants unlawfully steered state incentives and business to\\nCinespace in violation of the Sherman Act and equal protec-\\ntion and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The\\ndistrict court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Sher-\\nman Act and due process claims. It later granted summary\\njudgment on the equal protection claim. Chicago Studio now\\nappeals these decisions on the Sherman Act and equal protec-\\ntion claims.\\n We affirm. The district court properly dismissed the Sher-\\nman Act claim because Chicago Studio failed to adequately\\nplead an antitrust injury. The complaint merely alleges inju-\\nries to Chicago Studio, not to competition. We also conclude\\nthat the district court properly granted summary judgment\\non the equal protection claim. Chicago Studio and Cinespace\\nare not similarly situated, and there was a rational basis for\\nSteinberg’s conduct. We further find that the district court did\\nnot abuse its discretion in striking Chicago Studio’s addi-\\ntional statement of facts for noncompliance.\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 3\\n\\n I. Background\\n Since 1979, Chicago Studio has operated a film and televi-\\nsion production studio in Chicago, Illinois. Chicago Studio\\nhas four studio stages measuring 62,000 square feet. It re-\\nquires production companies to lease its production equip-\\nment for a .4% charge. The studio does not have installed air\\nconditioning, but Chicago Studio can provide industry stand-\\nard portable air conditioning units for an additional charge. It\\ndoes not have scene docks, which would allow large trailers\\nto unload equipment inside the studio. During the relevant\\ntime period, Chicago Studio could accommodate one large or\\ntwo average projects at a given time.\\n Cinespace began operating a studio in Chicago around\\n2010. Cinespace is not a party to this action, but it is Chicago\\nStudio’s only competitor in the Chicago area. By the end of\\n2012, Cinespace had 600,000 square feet of floor space and 10\\nstages. The studio expanded to 1.5 million square feet of floor\\nspace and 30 stages by January 2015. Cinespace’s studio can\\naccommodate two-story sets and includes air conditioning,\\ninside breezeways and scene docks, concrete floors, sound-\\nproof walls, and new offices. Cinespace permits production\\ncompanies to use any equipment rentals they choose includ-\\ning an unaffiliated equipment rental company called\\nCinelease that charges .2%.\\n All three Defendants are Illinois state actors. The Illinois\\nDepartment of Commerce and Economic Opportunity\\n(“IDCEO”) is a division of Illinois government tasked with\\npromoting Illinois’s profile as a leading business destination.\\nTo promote the Illinois film industry, IDCEO administers\\ngrant programs to film studios and tax credits to film produc-\\ners. See 35 ILCS 16/10; Ill. Admin. Code tit. 14, § 528.70 (2013).\\n\\f4 No. 18-3134\\n\\nThe Illinois Film Office (“IFO”) is part of IDCEO, and Betsy\\nSteinberg served as the IFO Managing Director during Gov-\\nernor Patrick Quinn’s administration. The IFO’s principal\\npurpose is to support the Illinois film industry. See 35 ILCS\\n16/5 (“Illinois must move aggressively with new business de-\\nvelopment investment tools so that Illinois is more competi-\\ntive in site location decision-making for film productions.…It\\nis the purpose of this Act to preserve and expand the existing\\nhuman infrastructure for the motion picture industry in Illi-\\nnois.”)\\n Chicago Studio claims that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg\\nconspired with Cinespace to boycott Chicago Studio and to\\nsteer business towards Cinespace. They did so by administer-\\ning 30% film tax credits to producers and issuing five state\\ngrants totaling $27.3 million to Cinespace. Due to a change in\\nadministration, Cinespace returned $10 million to Illinois.\\nChicago Studio also alleges that Defendants failed to mention\\nChicago Studio to producers, encouraged producers to use\\nCinespace, excluded Chicago Studio from business meetings,\\nand did not allow Chicago Studio to bid on production op-\\nportunities. Chicago Studio states that it applied for two\\ngrants, but it did not receive either.\\n Cinespace consistently reached out to Steinberg and IFO\\nfor assistance with marketing and procuring film and televi-\\nsion production business. It also hired a lobbyist to apply for\\ngrant money from the State of Illinois. Steinberg provided\\nhelp to Chicago Studio whenever it asked, but it rarely did.\\nChicago Studio did not ask Steinberg to contact Hollywood\\nfilm producers on its behalf because it had done business with\\nthem for years. Chicago Studio does not identify a single\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 5\\n\\ninstance where it reached out to Steinberg for help, and Stein-\\nberg refused.\\n The Illinois film industry became more profitable over the\\nrelevant time period. In 2009, the Illinois film industry earned\\napproximately $104 million in gross revenue. In 2012 and\\n2013, it made approximately $184 million and $350 million in\\ngross revenue, respectively. The industry also created new\\njobs, approximately 7,082 in 2009 to 15,627 in 2013.\\n By steering business towards Cinespace, Chicago Studio\\nasserts that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg became active market\\nparticipants in the “Chicago Film Production Market,” which\\nit defines as entities providing production facilities in Chi-\\ncago. Defendants’ conduct resulted in the following alleged\\ninjuries: (1) a decrease in Chicago Studio’s market share from\\n100% to 10%, (2) Chicago Studio’s inability to compete in the\\nmarket, (3) a reduction in competition, and (4) an increase in\\ntransactional costs to produce film and television in Chicago\\nto consumers of those services.\\n Chicago Studio filed suit asserting violations of equal pro-\\ntection under the Fourteenth Amendment against Steinberg\\nin her individual capacity (Count I), Sections 1 and 2 of the\\nSherman Act against IDCEO and Steinberg in her official ca-\\npacity (Count II), and due process under the Fourteenth\\nAmendment against Steinberg in her individual capacity\\n(Count III). Defendants moved to dismiss the action under\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the district\\ncourt granted in part. Chicago Studio subsequently filed an\\namended complaint and added IFO as a defendant. Defend-\\nants again moved to dismiss the Sherman Act and due pro-\\ncess claims for failure to state a claim. The district court\\ngranted the motion. Steinberg later moved for summary\\n\\f6 No. 18-3134\\n\\njudgment on the equal protection claim. The district court\\ngranted Steinberg’s motion for summary judgment and\\nstruck Chicago Studio’s statement of additional facts for non-\\ncompliance. Chicago Studio now appeals both the district\\ncourt’s dismissal of the Sherman Act claim and the summary\\njudgment ruling.\\n II. Discussion\\nA. The Sherman Act\\n We review the district court’s motion to dismiss ruling de\\nnovo, assume all well-pleaded allegations are true, and con-\\nstrue reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Kemper v.\\nDeutsche Bank AG, 911 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2018). To survive\\na motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege\\n“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\\nface.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A\\nclaim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual\\ncontent that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference\\nthat the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ash-\\ncroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).\\n The district court dismissed Chicago Studio’s antitrust\\nclaim with prejudice. In doing so, it relied upon Czajkowski v.\\nIllinois, 460 F. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) and held that IDCEO,\\nIFO, and Steinberg in their official capacities are immune\\nfrom antitrust liability under the Eleventh Amendment. It\\nalso found that Chicago Studio had failed to allege an anti-\\ntrust injury.\\n The Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act does\\nnot prohibit anticompetitive state action. Parker v. Brown, 317\\nU.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (“The Sherman Act…gives no hint that\\nit was intended to restrain state action or official action\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 7\\n\\ndirected by a state.”). Since then, the Supreme Court has de-\\nvised three types of antitrust immunity: (1) ipso facto immun-\\nity, (2) Hallie immunity, and (3) Midcal immunity. See N.C.\\nState Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 1110–13\\n(2015); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38–40,\\n42 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567–69 (1984); Cal.\\nRetail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.\\n97, 105 (1980); see also Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Village of\\nBellwood, 929 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir. 2019); Lawline v. Am. Bar\\nAss’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1384 (7th Cir. 1992); Fuchs v. Rural Elec.\\nConvenience Coop. Inc., 858 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988).\\n The parties disagree on which immunity test applies here.\\nChicago Studio argues that Defendants are not subject to an-\\ntitrust immunity because the Midcal test applies, and Defend-\\nants do not satisfy the test. Defendants argue that they are\\nsubject to either ipso facto immunity or Hallie immunity. We\\ndo not need to decide whether Defendants are subject to anti-\\ntrust immunity because we find that Chicago Studio failed to\\nallege an antitrust injury.1 See, e.g., Paramount Media Grp., Inc.,\\n929 F.3d at 921.\\n The complaint asserts that Defendants violated Sections 1\\nand 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act pro-\\nhibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or\\notherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”\\n15 U.S.C. § 1. Chicago Studio alleges that IDCEO, IFO, and\\nSteinberg violated Section 1 by steering tax credits to produc-\\ners using Cinespace’s studio and state grants to Cinespace\\n\\n\\n 1Although we do not decide which immunity test should apply here,\\nboth parties acknowledge that the test outlined in Czajkowski v. Illinois, 460\\nF. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) is the wrong standard. We agree.\\n\\f8 No. 18-3134\\n\\nand boycotting Chicago Studio in restraint of trade. Section 2\\nof the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or at-\\ntempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other\\nperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or\\ncommerce among the several States….” 15 U.S.C. § 2. Chicago\\nStudio claims that Defendants and Cinespace conspired to\\nmonopolize and have attempted to monopolize the market\\nfor operating film studios in Chicago violating Section 2.\\n To state an antitrust injury, a plaintiff must allege an anti-\\ncompetitive injury that flows from defendant’s actions and\\nthat the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Brunswick\\nCorp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see\\nalso, e.g., Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir.\\n1995). “The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plain-\\ntiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-re-\\nducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior.” Atlantic\\nRichfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 (1990).\\nPlaintiff must assert an injury not only to itself, but to the rel-\\nevant market. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683\\nF.3d 328, 334–35 (7th Cir. 2012). The alleged injury must either\\nreduce output or raise prices to consumers. James Cape & Sons\\nCo. v. PCC Constr. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 2006); see also\\nMcGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankr. Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 937 F.3d\\n1056, 1065 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We usually presume that compet-\\nitors and consumers in the relevant market are the only par-\\nties who suffer antitrust injuries and are in a position to effi-\\nciently vindicate the antitrust laws.”). “The antitrust-injury\\ndoctrine was created to filter out complaints by competitors\\nand others who may be hurt by productive efficiencies, higher\\noutput, and lower prices, all of which the antitrust laws are\\ndesigned to encourage.” United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana\\nGas. Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 9\\n\\n At best, Chicago Studio has pleaded an injury to itself, not\\nan anticompetitive injury to the market. The complaint alleges\\nthe following injuries: (1) decrease in Chicago Studio’s share\\nof the film production market, (2) Chicago Studio’s inability\\nto compete in the market, (3) a reduction in competition, and\\n(4) an increase in transactional costs to produce films in Chi-\\ncago to other consumers of those services. Two of the alleged\\ninjuries—decrease in its share of the film production market\\nand inability to compete—are harms to Chicago Studio and\\nare not proper antitrust injuries. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon,\\nInc., 525 U.S. 128, 135, 139 (1998) (concluding that plaintiff\\n“must allege and prove harm, not just to a single competitor,\\nbut to the competitive process, i.e., to competition itself”). A\\nreduction in competition and an increase in transactional\\ncosts could be anticompetitive injuries, but Chicago Studio\\nfails to plausibly allege either. Although Chicago Studio gen-\\nerally claims, in a conclusory manner, that competition de-\\ncreased, the thrust of its complaint points the opposite way.\\nBefore 2009, Chicago Studio was the only film studio in the\\nChicago area. Cinespace came into the market, brought new\\ncapacity, and the Illinois film industry grew. The number of\\nfilm studios in Chicago increased from one to two, and the\\nIllinois film industry generated about $184 million and $350\\nmillion in revenue in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Chicago\\nStudio continued to operate in the market and does not allege\\nthat it was excluded from doing so. Chicago Studio also pro-\\nvides no facts to support its one-sentence, conclusory state-\\nment that transactional costs increased. The complaint does\\nnot allege what transactional costs increased, how much they\\nincreased by, and who experienced the increased costs. Nor\\ndoes the complaint allege reduced output or higher prices in\\nthe Chicago film market. In summary, Chicago Studio merely\\n\\f10 No. 18-3134\\n\\nstates these assertions in a conclusory fashion and fails to al-\\nlege factual allegations supporting the existence of an anti-\\ntrust injury. We will not accept such allegations as true. See\\nIqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of\\na cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,\\ndo not suffice.”)\\n Chicago Studio argues that its exclusion from the market\\nis a valid antitrust injury and cites Gulf States Reorganization\\nGroup, Inc. v. Nucor Corporation, 466 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2006)\\nand OverEnd Technologies, LLC v. Invista S.ÀR.L., 431 F. Supp.\\n2d 925 (E.D. Wis. 2006). Chicago Studio, however, does not\\nallege that it was entirely excluded from the market. “Transfer\\nof business from one company to another, however, without\\nan accompanying effect on competition, cannot be an anti-\\ntrust violation” because antitrust laws protect competition,\\nnot competitors. Tri-Gen Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs,\\nLocal 150, AFL-CIO, 433 F.3d 1024, 1031–32 (7th Cir. 2006).\\nMoreover, these cases are distinguishable because they in-\\nvolved exclusion of a potential competitor. See Gulf States Re-\\norganization Grp., Inc., 466 F.3d at 967–68; OverEnd Techs., LLC,\\n431 F. Supp. 2d at 930. Chicago Studio is not a potential com-\\npetitor; it has operated a film studio in Chicago since 1979 and\\ncontinued to do so after Cinespace entered the market. See Tri-\\nGen Inc., 433 F.3d at 1032.\\n Chicago Studio’s Section 2 claim also fails for an addi-\\ntional reason. The complaint does not plausibly allege that\\nDefendants conspired to monopolize or have attempted to\\nmonopolize the market for operating film studios in Chicago.\\nChicago Studio admitted that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg are\\nnot competitors of Chicago Studio. Instead Chicago Studio ar-\\ngues that they are market participants. This is implausible.\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 11\\n\\nDefendants do not provide studio space and do not compete\\nin the market. The complaint also does not allege any facts\\nregarding their market power or anticompetitive use of their\\npower. See Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 282–84 (7th\\nCir. 2000).\\n Because we find that Chicago Studio failed to plead an an-\\ntitrust injury, we do not address Defendants’ additional bases\\nfor dismissing the antitrust claim.\\nB. Equal Protection\\n We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling\\nde novo and in the light most favorable to Chicago Studio.\\nPeerless Network, Inc. v. MCI Commc’n Serv., Inc., 917 F.3d 538,\\n545 (7th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when\\n“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the\\nmovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.\\nCiv. P. 56(a).\\n Chicago Studio raises a “class-of-one” equal protection\\nclaim against Steinberg in her individual capacity. This claim\\nis based on the principle that similarly situated people must\\nbe treated alike unless there is a rational basis for treating\\nthem differently. See LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Win-\\nnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2010). To succeed, Chicago\\nStudio must prove that (1) it has been “intentionally treated\\ndifferently from others similarly situated,” and (2) “there is\\nno rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Paramount\\nMedia Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d at 920 (citation omitted). We have\\nyet to determine whether a plaintiff must also prove bad mo-\\ntive. See Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 913 (7th\\nCir. 2012) (Wood, J., dissenting). But we need not do so here\\n\\f12 No. 18-3134\\n\\nbecause Chicago Studio cannot survive summary judgment\\non the other elements of its equal protection claim.\\n To be similarly situated, competitors must be “identical or\\ndirectly comparable” “in all material aspects.” See Miller v.\\nCity of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting\\nLaBella Winnetka, Inc., 628 F.3d at 942). Chicago Studio must\\nshow that it was treated differently than another entity that is\\n“‘prima facie identical in all relevant respects.’” Paramount Me-\\ndia Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d at 920 (citing D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch.\\nCorp., 799 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2015)).\\n Here, Chicago Studio and Cinespace were not similarly\\nsituated because the undisputed facts demonstrate that they\\ndiffered in material ways. Chicago Studio has four stages\\nmeasuring 62,000 square feet, whereas Cinespace has 30\\nstages and 1.5 million square feet of floor space. Cinespace\\ncould also accommodate two-story sets. Chicago Studio does\\nnot have scene docks or installed air conditioning (only port-\\nable air conditioning units for an additional charge) while\\nCinespace has both. Chicago Studio charges .4% for equip-\\nment rentals and requires production companies to use its\\nequipment rentals. Cinespace permits production companies\\nto use any equipment rental company including Cinelease,\\nwhich charges .2%. Based on these facts, no rational fact finder\\nwould consider these studios to be similarly situated.\\n The equal protection claim also fails because there are ra-\\ntional bases for Steinberg’s conduct. “If we can come up with\\na rational basis for the challenged action, that will be the end\\nof the matter—animus or no.” Fares Pawn, LLC v. Indiana Dep’t\\nof Fin. Insts., 755 F.3d 839, 845 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2014). We just\\nneed to identify a conceivable rational basis for the different\\ntreatment; it does not need to be the actual basis for\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 13\\n\\ndefendant’s actions. D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681,\\n686 (7th Cir. 2013). There are several rational bases for Stein-\\nberg’s conduct. First, it was rational for Steinberg to offer\\nmore assistance to the studio that requested help. Cinespace\\nconsistently reached out to Steinberg for marketing support,\\nand Chicago Studio rarely did. It cannot now complain that\\nits failure to do so amounts to a constitutional injury. Second,\\nit was rational for Steinberg to promote the studios based on\\nproduction needs. Fox Studios, for example, decided to film\\nEmpire at Cinespace and occupied 250,000 square feet and up\\nto six stages. Lionsgate considered filming Divergent in Chi-\\ncago and requested 200,000 square feet of production space.\\nIt would have been rational for Steinberg to promote Cine-\\nspace over Chicago Studio for these projects because Chicago\\nStudio simply did not have enough studio space to accommo-\\ndate these productions and Cinespace did. We find that the\\ndistrict court properly granted summary judgment on the\\nequal protection claim.\\nC. Summary Judgment Practice\\n During summary judgment briefing, the parties filed a\\njoint statement of undisputed facts pursuant to Judge Ellis’s\\ncase management procedure. Chicago Studio subsequently\\nfiled a statement of additional facts, which it claimed con-\\ntained disputed facts. The district court found that Chicago\\nStudio’s additional facts were undisputed facts and a blatant\\nattempt to get around the court’s order permitting 50 addi-\\ntional facts. It therefore struck Chicago Studio’s statement of\\nadditional facts and granted Steinberg’s motion for summary\\njudgment.\\n On appeal, Chicago Studio argues that the district court’s\\nsummary judgment practice is overly burdensome and\\n\\f14 No. 18-3134\\n\\nviolates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56 and 83 and Local\\nRule 56.1 by allowing the court to determine material issues\\nof fact and disallowing a party to dispute an undisputed fact.\\nWe disagree.\\n As a threshold matter, Chicago Studio forfeited this argu-\\nment by failing to challenge the summary judgment practice\\nat the district court. See Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 540,\\n544 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A party generally forfeits issues and ar-\\nguments raised for the first time on appeal.”). Instead, Chi-\\ncago Studio and Defendants filed joint motions in compliance\\nwith the district court’s practice. If Chicago Studio objected to\\nthe district court’s practice, it should have made a record of\\nits objections at the district court and given the district court\\nthe opportunity to address the concern.2 It did not. We cannot\\nconsider this argument for the first time on appeal.\\n Even if it was not forfeited (or waived), Chicago Studio’s\\nchallenge nonetheless fails. We review the district court’s de-\\ncision on compliance with local rules for an abuse of discre-\\ntion. Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir.\\n2008). The relevant portion of Judge Ellis’s summary judg-\\nment practice states:\\n Parties are required to file a joint statement of\\n undisputed material facts that the parties agree\\n are not in dispute…The parties may not file –\\n\\n\\n 2Although not argued by the parties, Chicago Studio likely waived\\nthis argument as well. See, e.g., CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones Lang LaSalle\\nAmericas, Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018). At a hearing, Chicago Stu-\\ndio’s counsel stated that the summary judgment practice was “overly bur-\\ndensome.” But later, during the same hearing, Chicago Studio’s counsel\\nagreed to abide by the summary judgment practice.\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 15\\n\\n and the Court will not consider – separate\\n statements of undisputed facts. However, the\\n non-moving party may include facts in its re-\\n sponse to the motion for summary judgment\\n that it contends are disputed in order to demon-\\n strate that a genuine issue of material fact exists\\n that warrants denying the motion for summary\\n judgment. The non-moving party must include\\n citations to supporting material supporting the\\n dispute and attach the same. The moving party\\n may respond to these facts in its reply.\\n The parties shall not file more than 120 state-\\n ments of undisputed material facts without\\n prior leave of the Court….\\n If the parties cannot agree whether proposed\\n statements of fact are not in dispute, they may\\n file a joint motion prior to filing the motion for\\n summary judgment so the Court can determine\\n whether there is a basis for the alleged disputes.\\n That motion should set forth the proposed state-\\n ments of fact at issue, with supporting material.\\n Each statement should be followed by a re-\\n sponse by the other party explaining why that\\n party contends that the statement is actually in\\n dispute, with citation to supporting mate-\\n rial…The Court will then determine whether\\n the proposed statements of fact may be in-\\n cluded in the joint statement as undisputed\\n facts. Parties should provide the Court with suf-\\n ficient time to rule on factual disputes before\\n summary judgment motions are due.…\\n\\f16 No. 18-3134\\n\\n If the nonmoving party wholly refuses to join in\\n the joint statement of undisputed material facts,\\n the moving party will nevertheless be permitted\\n to file the motion for summary judgment, ac-\\n companied by a separate declaration of counsel\\n explaining why a joint statement of undisputed\\n material facts was not filed.\\nJudge Sara L. Ellis, Case Management Procedures, available at\\nhttps://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/judge-info.aspx?VyU/OurK-\\nKJRDT+FUM5tZmA== (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (emphasis\\nin original).\\n We have previously held that Judge Ellis’s summary judg-\\nment practice does not violate Local Rule 56.1. See Sweatt v.\\nUnion Pac. R.R. Co., 796 F.3d 701, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015). The\\nsummary judgment practice at issue in Sweatt is materially\\nsimilar to the one at issue here. It merely requires parties to\\nfile a joint statement of undisputed facts, if possible. The non-\\nmoving party may include disputed facts in its response brief,\\nand the moving party may respond to these disputed facts in\\nits reply brief. That is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 56(a), which requires parties to support their asser-\\ntion that a fact “cannot be or is genuinely disputed.” Nor is it\\nin conflict with Local Rule 56.1, which directs a moving party\\nto file a statement of material facts and a non-moving party to\\nrespond to the movant’s statement of material facts. N.D. Ill.\\nL.R. 56.1(a), (b)(3)(c); See Sweatt, 796 F.3d at 711 (“The lauda-\\nble goal of this [case management procedure] is to remove the\\nchaff from the grain in a given case, thereby allowing the par-\\nties—and the court—to focus on the facts that are actually in\\ndispute.”) “A judge may regulate practice in any manner con-\\nsistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 17\\n\\n2072 and 2075, and the district’s local rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n83(b).\\n Chicago Studio has not presented any reason why we\\nshould conclude otherwise here. We agree with the district\\ncourt that Chicago Studio’s statement is comprised of undis-\\nputed facts. The parties could have included these facts in\\ntheir joint statement of undisputed facts. The joint statement\\nincluded 91 undisputed facts, and the court’s summary judg-\\nment practice permits up to 120 undisputed facts without\\nleave of court. If the parties needed to present more than 120\\nundisputed facts, they should have requested leave to do so.\\nThey did not. We find that the district court did not abuse its\\ndiscretion by striking Chicago Studio’s statement of addi-\\ntional facts for noncompliance.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4666,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670066,"string":"4,670,066"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Marvin Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois Railroad Comp"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2153"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\nMARVIN ABERNATHY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nEASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:15-cv-03223-SEM-TSH — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Marvin Abernathy was\\ninjured while working for defendant Eastern Illinois Railroad\\nCompany. He sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability\\nAct (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., alleging that the Railroad\\nnegligently failed to provide reasonably safe working condi-\\ntions by failing to provide appropriate equipment for the job\\nhe was doing when he was hurt.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n A jury awarded Abernathy $525,000 in damages. The Rail-\\nroad moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.\\nThe district court denied both requests, and the Railroad has\\nappealed, raising a host of issues. Abernathy has filed a cross-\\nappeal asserting that the district court erred by not awarding\\nhim sufficient costs to cover his expert witness fees. We affirm\\nJudge Myerscough’s decisions in all respects.\\nI. Facts\\n Abernathy worked as a track inspector for the Eastern Illi-\\nnois Railroad Company. His duties included replacing and\\nrepairing railroad ties. On September 13, 2012, the Railroad\\nsent Abernathy and another employee, Richard Probus, to re-\\npair a railroad crossing about six or seven miles away from\\nthe Railroad’s yard in Charleston, Illinois. Abernathy was in\\ncharge of the job. The repair required him and Probus to\\ntransport six ties from the yard to the crossing.\\n In 2012, the Railroad had a “tie crane,” a vehicle that runs\\non the railroad tracks and is well-suited to transporting rail-\\nroad ties, but it had been out of commission for years. Aber-\\nnathy and Probus had only two options for transporting the\\nties: a backhoe or a pickup truck, either of which would need\\nto travel on public roads rather than railroad tracks. Aber-\\nnathy chose to use the backhoe. He testified that he had never\\nused the pickup truck to haul ties before, but that he had used\\nthe backhoe for similar jobs numerous times, although not on\\npublic roads and not with this heavy a load. Abernathy and\\nProbus loaded four ties into the bucket of the backhoe and\\ntwo across the top of the bucket, resting on the arms of the\\nmachine. Abernathy testified that when the bucket is rolled\\nback, it locks the resting ties into place. Abernathy drove the\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 3\\n\\nbackhoe along a public highway. Probus followed in the\\npickup, which was loaded with tools needed to install the ties.\\n Abernathy drove in low gear, but he started to experience\\n“road bounce.” He started braking, and two ties fell out of the\\nbackhoe’s bucket. Abernathy stopped on the shoulder of the\\nroad and tried to lift the ties back into the bucket. In lifting a\\ntie, he injured his back. He also smashed a finger between the\\ntie he was holding and another tie in the bucket. Despite the\\naccident, Abernathy and Probus were able to finish reloading\\nthe ties, and they resumed their trip and finished the repair\\njob. Abernathy remained in pain for the rest of the day.\\n The following morning, Abernathy reported the injury to\\nTim Allen, the general manager of the Railroad. Allen told\\nhim “to take it easy” and “be on light duty” for a while. Ab-\\nernathy worked through the pain on lighter duty for the next\\nyear but was unable to return to his regular work. The Rail-\\nroad terminated his employment in February 2014. He even-\\ntually had physical therapy, epidural injections, and then sur-\\ngery in 2016. After the surgery, he continued to experience\\npain in his back and legs. At the time of trial, his surgeon had\\nstill not cleared him for any type of work.\\nII. The Trial\\n Abernathy sued the Railroad under the FELA, 45 U.S.C\\n§ 51, alleging that it had been negligent in failing to provide\\nan operable tie crane and requiring him to use the backhoe,\\nwhich was inadequate for his assigned task of transporting\\nthe ties. The trial lasted three days. Abernathy testified and\\ncalled three other lay witnesses: his wife Carrie Abernathy,\\nRichard Probus, and Lowell McElwee, a Railroad engineer\\nwho worked with Abernathy.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n Probus testified that on the day of Abernathy’s injury, they\\ncould not have used the pickup truck to transport the ties be-\\ncause they needed the pickup truck to transport the other\\nequipment needed to install the ties. Probus also testified that\\nthe Railroad had acquired an operable tie crane after Aber-\\nnathy’s accident. Probus explained that the tie crane was now\\nbeing used to transport ties and that manual lifts of ties were\\nnot necessary with the new machine. He stated that the avail-\\nability of the tie crane makes his job safer.\\n Abernathy testified that when the Railroad’s tie crane had\\nbeen operational, he used it regularly. He explained that the\\ntie crane was the preferred method for moving ties because it\\ndid not require manual lifting or traveling on public roads. He\\nalso testified that before his 2012 injury, he had repeatedly\\nasked the Railroad to replace the tie crane.\\n Abernathy also presented the depositions of Doctors Renu\\nBajaj, James Kohlman, and Thomas Lee. Dr. Lee, Abernathy’s\\nsurgeon, offered testimony relevant to damages and causa-\\ntion. He testified that he did not expect Abernathy to regain\\nthe level of functionality he had prior to his accident. He also\\ntestified that Abernathy certainly would not be able to return\\nto work involving heavy manual labor. Dr. Lee also said that,\\nto a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Abernathy’s\\nsymptoms were caused or aggravated by the lifting accident\\nin September 2012.\\n The Railroad called four witnesses: general manager Tim\\nAllen; Everett Fletcher; Gayle Garrett, the office secretary for\\nthe Railroad; and Kendall Mulvaney, the superintendent of\\nR&R Contractors, testifying as an expert witness in railroad\\nrepair and maintenance. The Railroad defended on the theory\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 5\\n\\nthat a backhoe is a generally accepted method for transport-\\ning ties in the rail repair industry.\\n After the close of Abernathy’s case-in-chief, the Railroad\\nmoved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of\\nCivil Procedure 50(a), which the court denied. The Railroad\\nrenewed its motion under Rule 50(b) at the close of all evi-\\ndence and prior to the verdict, and the court again denied it.\\n The jury found that the Railroad was negligent and that its\\nnegligence contributed to Abernathy’s injuries. The jury cal-\\nculated Abernathy’s total damages to be $750,000. However,\\nthe jury found that Abernathy was also at fault for thirty per-\\ncent of the total fault, which meant the jury awarded a net\\nverdict of $525,000. The district court denied the Railroad’s\\npost-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new\\ntrial. The district court also awarded costs to Abernathy as the\\nprevailing party but rejected his request to include as costs\\n$3,800 in witness fees paid to Doctors Lee and Bajaj. The Rail-\\nroad has appealed the judgment against it, and Abernathy has\\ncross-appealed the denial of his request for expert witness\\nfees as part of his costs.\\nIII. Legal Analysis\\n We take up the issues on appeal in three groups. First, we\\naddress the Railroad’s arguments for judgment as a matter of\\nlaw on the theory that Abernathy’s evidence was insufficient.\\nSecond, we address the Railroad’s arguments that the district\\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at\\ntrial. Third, we address Abernathy’s cross-appeal on the\\naward of costs.\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n A. Judgment as a Matter of Law\\n The FELA provides a federal remedy for railroad employ-\\nees who are injured on the job. To prove a claim under the\\nFELA, a plaintiff must prove “the traditional common law el-\\nements of negligence, including foreseeability, duty, breach,\\nand causation.” Fulk v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 22 F.3d 120,\\n124 (7th Cir. 1994). However, “[b]ecause it is meant to offer\\nbroad remedial relief to railroad workers, a plaintiff’s burden\\nwhen suing under the FELA is significantly lighter than in an\\nordinary negligence case.” Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Rail-\\nway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Harbin v.\\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\\n1990) (“It is well established that the quantum of evidence re-\\nquired to establish liability in an FELA case is much less than\\nin an ordinary negligence action.”). A railroad-employer is li-\\nable where “employer negligence played any part, even the\\nslightest, in producing the injury.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific\\nRailroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).\\n The Railroad challenges the sufficiency of evidence as to\\nall elements of negligence. We consider duty and breach to-\\ngether, and foreseeability and causation separately. “This\\nCourt reviews sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo,\\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-\\nmoving party and drawing all inferences in [his] favor.”\\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2014).\\nWe “will overturn a jury verdict ‘only when there is a com-\\nplete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion\\nreached.’” Id. at 29596, quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645,\\n653 (1946). Here, probative evidence supported the jury’s ver-\\ndict that Abernathy established each element of negligence.\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 7\\n\\nThe district court did not err in declining to overturn the\\njury’s verdict.\\n 1. Duty & Breach\\n The Railroad had a duty to provide Abernathy a reasona-\\nbly safe working environment. See Crompton, 745 F.3d at 296.\\nThe Railroad points out correctly that it “could have provided\\na reasonably safe workplace notwithstanding the fact that\\nsafer workplace alternatives exist.” Taylor v. Illinois Central\\nRailroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993). The Railroad ar-\\ngues that Abernathy produced no evidence that the equip-\\nment available to haul ties (the backhoe and pickup truck) and\\nthe way in which he was trained to perform a manual lift were\\nunsafe. Instead, Abernathy produced evidence pertaining to\\nthe absence of the tie crane. The tie crane evidence, the Rail-\\nroad argues, showed only that there was a safer alternative to\\nthe backhoe and pickup, which is not sufficient to establish\\nnegligence. See Darrough v. CSX Transportation Inc., 321 F.3d\\n674, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (railroad does not have duty to provide\\nthe safest working environment).\\n The Railroad’s argument relies on the faulty premise that\\nevidence of safer alternatives can never even be relevant to\\nwhether an employer exercised reasonable care. When a rail-\\nroad assigns an employee a task using a particular method\\nand the employee is injured while executing the task, evi-\\ndence of a safer alternative method is relevant to whether the\\nmethod provided was reasonable. See Stone v. New York, Chi-\\ncago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344 U.S. 407, 409 (1953) (plaintiff\\nwas injured pulling ties using the method his supervisor in-\\nstructed him to use; evidence of three alternative methods for\\npulling ties was relevant to whether railroad was negligent).\\nBased on all the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nhave found that it was not reasonably safe to assign Aber-\\nnathy to replace the ties without an operable tie crane.\\n The Railroad’s argument as to the safety of a manual lift is\\nsimilarly flawed. Abernathy did not argue that under all cir-\\ncumstances, the Railroad is negligent if it requires an em-\\nployee to perform a manual lift. He argued that the Railroad\\nwas negligent where it could have provided employees with\\nequipment that prevented the need for impromptu manual\\nlifts on public roads but chose not to repair or replace this\\nequipment.\\n The Railroad’s reliance on Walker v. Northeast Regional\\nCommuter Railroad, 225 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2000), is thus mis-\\nplaced. In Walker, we affirmed summary judgment for a rail-\\nroad in an FELA case for injuries from performing a manual\\nlift. Plaintiff Walker worked as a machinist in a repair shop.\\nHe injured his back lifting a replacement blade for a machine\\nthat cut metal. Id. at 896. The blade weighed about 140\\npounds, and Walker lifted it with one other employee. Id. A\\ncrane and a forklift were available to the men but could not be\\nused to assist in the lift because of the configuration of the\\nshop. Walker argued that his employer was negligent in re-\\nquiring him to lift more than fifty pounds and “in configuring\\nthe shop in such a way as to prohibit the use of mechanical\\nlifting aids.” Id. at 898.\\n Walker is distinguishable. First, Walker actually made an\\nexplicit argument that his employer’s demand that he lift\\nmore than fifty pounds was sufficient by itself to support a\\nfinding of negligence. In rejecting this argument, we con-\\ntrasted the case with those in which plaintiffs “showed the\\navailability of alternative methods and safeguards that would\\nensure employee safety” and found telling that Walker\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 9\\n\\nproduced no evidence that he or any other machinists “had\\ncomplained about problems in changing the blade on other\\noccasions.” Id. In this case, Abernathy offered evidence of\\nsafer alternatives and prior employee complaints about the\\nlack of an operable tie crane. As to the second argument about\\nthe shop configuration, Walker presented no evidence that the\\nmanual lift in his case was not reasonably safe given the cir-\\ncumstances, and in fact he “testified that he and [his co-lifter]\\nassumed that they could pick up the blade” with no problem.\\nId. at 899.\\n Here, however, Abernathy offered evidence that the tie\\ncrane was the appropriate equipment to use for the job he was\\nperforming with a backhoe on the day he was injured. Allen’s\\ntestimony on cross-examination and Probus’s testimony al-\\nlowed the jury to find that the pickup truck was not an ade-\\nquate alternative. Abernathy and Probus both testified that an\\noperable tie crane made their work safer. Abernathy ex-\\nplained that the tie crane allowed employees to avoid manual\\nlifts and traveling on public roads. The jury could reasonably\\nhave found that the Railroad did not provide Abernathy with\\nequipment appropriate for the task he was assigned and that\\nhis working environment was not reasonably safe.\\n 2. Foreseeability\\n Abernathy was required to show that it was foreseeable to\\nthe Railroad that transporting ties using a backhoe or pickup\\nas opposed to a tie crane “would or might result in a mishap\\nand injury.” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685,\\n703 (2011), quoting Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,\\n372 U.S. 108, 118, n.7 (1963). To establish foreseeability, “a\\nplaintiff must show that the employer had actual or construc-\\ntive notice” of potential harm. Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nRailway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005). The railroad may\\nbe liable “even if ‘the extent of the [injury] or the manner in\\nwhich it occurred’ was not ‘probable’ or ‘foreseeable.’”\\nMcBride, 564 U.S. at 70304, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 12021\\n& n.8 (alteration in McBride; emphasis added here). The Rail-\\nroad argues that Abernathy failed to prove negligence be-\\ncause he failed to show that his injury was foreseeable. The\\nRailroad argues that it could not have known that Abernathy\\nwould use the backhoe or that doing so would result in\\ndropped ties. The backhoe, the Railroad points out, had been\\nused to transport ties without incident on multiple prior oc-\\ncasions and there was no defect in the machine that caused\\nthe tie to fall. Further, as the Railroad’s expert, Mulvaney, tes-\\ntified, a backhoe was an accepted method in the railroad re-\\npair injury for transporting ties. From these facts, the Railroad\\ncontends there was insufficient proof of foreseeability.\\n The Railroad’s argument misunderstands what the FELA\\nrequires. Abernathy does not need to show that the Railroad\\ncould have foreseen the particular consequences of its negli-\\ngence. He needed to show only that “a particular condi-\\ntion”—here, the absence of appropriate equipment—“would\\nor might result in” any type of “mishap and injury.” McBride,\\n564 U.S. at 703, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 118 n. 7 (emphasis\\nadded here); see Gallick, 372 U.S. at 11820 (potential harm\\nwas foreseeable where railroad had allowed stagnant pool of\\nfilthy water to remain near worksite and employee was bitten\\nby an insect, which led to infection and ultimately amputation\\nof both legs). Abernathy needed to show only “circumstances\\nwhich a reasonable person would foresee as creating a poten-\\ntial for harm.” McGinn v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 102\\nF.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1996).\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 11\\n\\n The evidence here supported a finding that a reasonable\\nperson in the Railroad’s position could have foreseen that\\ntransporting ties in a backhoe or pickup could lead to injury.\\nThe Railroad knew that its tie crane had not been operational\\nsince 2008. Abernathy offered evidence that he had repeatedly\\nasked the Railroad to repair or replace it. Abernathy and Pro-\\nbus both testified that the tie crane was safer to use in hauling\\nties, in part because it prevented employees from having to\\nlift ties manually and travel on public roads.\\n 3. Causation\\n In support of judgment as a matter of law, and now on\\nappeal, the Railroad argued that even if it was negligent in\\nfailing to provide a tie crane, Abernathy failed to prove that\\nthe alleged negligence caused his injuries. Abernathy’s man-\\nual lift, the Railroad contends, caused his injuries, and this lift\\nwas an act subsequent to and independent of any safety issues\\nthat arose because the tie crane was not available.\\n The Railroad’s argument conflicts with the liberal causa-\\ntion standard under the FELA. “Juries in such cases are\\nproperly instructed that a defendant railroad ‘caused or con-\\ntributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ‘if [the railroad’s] neg-\\nligence played a part—no matter how small—in bringing\\nabout the injury.” McBride, 564 U.S. at 705; see also Harbin v.\\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\\n1990), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S.\\n500, 506 (1957) (“For under the FELA, ‘the test of a jury case is\\nsimply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion\\nthat employer negligence played any part, even in the slightest,\\nin producing the injury… .”) (emphasis in Harbin). “The FELA\\nvests the jury with broad discretion to engage in common\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nsense inferences regarding issues of causation and fault.”\\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n There was sufficient evidence here that the Railroad’s neg-\\nligence played a part in bringing about Abernathy’s injury.\\nAbernathy had to use the backhoe on a public roadway to\\ntransport the ties because the Railroad had not repaired or re-\\nplaced its tie crane, which had been out of service for years.\\nVibrations caused a tie to fall off the backhoe and onto the\\npublic roadway that Abernathy was forced to use because of\\nthe absence of a tie crane. Abernathy had to remove the tie,\\nwhich was obstructing the public road, and he had to do it\\nquickly. He had no option other than to lift the tie manually\\nback into the backhoe, which injured his back. A reasonable\\njury could infer that the Railroad’s negligence played some\\npart in causing Abernathy’s injury. The district court correctly\\ndenied the Railroad’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.\\n B. New Trial Motion Based on Evidentiary Rulings\\n The Railroad also argues that the district judge erred in\\nthree decisions to admit evidence, contending that each is suf-\\nficient to warrant a new trial. We review the denial of a new\\ntrial motion for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen-\\neral Board of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist\\nChurch, 733 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2013); Kossman v. Northeast\\nIllinois Regional Commuter Railroad, 211 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th\\nCir. 2000). We find no abuse of discretion in any of the chal-\\nlenged evidentiary rulings.\\n 1. Testimony of Timothy Allen\\n First, the Railroad objects to a line of cross-examination of\\nits general manager, Timothy Allen, regarding his own use of\\na company pickup truck to transport railroad ties. The\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 13\\n\\nRailroad argues that Allen’s use of the truck was so dissimilar\\nfrom the way Abernathy might have used the truck on the day\\nhe was injured as to make the evidence irrelevant.\\n Again, Abernathy had to prove that the Railroad did not\\nprovide a reasonably safe method for transporting railroad\\nties. See Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 297–\\n98 (1949). The Railroad argued that the pickup truck was a\\nreasonably safe and available way for Abernathy to do his job.\\nAllen testified that he thought Abernathy should have used\\nthe pickup truck rather than using the backhoe to haul ties on\\na public road.\\n During cross-examination, Allen acknowledged that on\\none occasion, he had used the same pickup to take 20 to 25\\nrejected railroad ties to a friend. Allen admitted that, assum-\\ning each tie weighed just 140 pounds, hauling 20 ties would\\nhave meant the pickup truck was carrying 2,800 pounds.1 The\\npickup truck was rated to haul only 1,500 pounds. When\\nasked about this discrepancy, Allen said he had not been\\naware that he had been operating the pickup truck at almost\\ndouble its load capacity. Probus later testified that he and Ab-\\nernathy chose not to use the pickup on the day of Abernathy’s\\ninjury because they could not use it to haul both the ties and\\nthe tools needed for the job.\\n Judge Myerscough acted well within her discretion in al-\\nlowing this line of cross-examination. Evidence is relevant if\\nit has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of\\nconsequence to the determination of the action more probable\\n\\n 1 The jury heard conflicting testimony regarding the weight of rail-\\nroad ties. For purposes of this line of questioning, it was assumed that the\\naverage railroad tie weighs 140 pounds.\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nor less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.\\nR. Evid. 401. The testimony about Allen’s previous use of the\\npickup satisfied this definition. It was relevant for the jury to\\nknow that when Allen testified that the pickup truck was a\\nreasonably safe alternative method available to Abernathy—\\na key point for the Railroad’s defense—he was not familiar\\nwith the pickup’s hauling capacity. That rebuttal was espe-\\ncially relevant given Probus’s testimony that he and Aber-\\nnathy chose not to use the pickup in part because of the\\ntruck’s load limit.\\n 2. Testimony about ADM\\n Second, the Railroad objects to the admission of evidence\\nregarding the financial ties of its expert witness, Kevin Mul-\\nvaney, to the Railroad’s parent company, the agribusiness gi-\\nant Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”). Before trial,\\nthe district court had granted the Railroad’s unopposed mo-\\ntion in limine barring mention of its relationship to ADM. At\\ntrial, the court reversed that ruling after Abernathy’s counsel\\nexplained that they had not known before trial that Mulvaney\\nwould testify. The district court let Abernathy’s counsel ask\\nMulvaney whether ADM was the largest customer of his em-\\nployer. He answered “yes.” In response to the next question,\\nMulvaney said he did not know whether ADM was the Rail-\\nroad’s parent company.\\n The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these\\nquestions. Bias is a “permissible and established basis of im-\\npeachment.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (hold-\\ning that government’s evidence as to a defense witness’s bias\\nwas properly admitted). Bias is the “quintessentially appro-\\npriate topic for cross examination.” Bachenski v. Malnati, 11\\nF.3d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir. 1993). We have held repeatedly that\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 15\\n\\nparties should be granted reasonable latitude in cross-exam-\\nining witnesses for bias. See, e.g., United States v. Manske, 186\\nF.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Frankenthal,\\n582 F.2d 1102, 1106 (7th Cir. 1978).\\n The information involving ADM did not become relevant\\nto bias until Mulvaney took the stand. In choosing to call an\\nexpert witness with economic ties to ADM, the Railroad made\\nits parent-subsidiary relationship with ADM relevant to show\\npotential bias on the part of Mulvaney. The district court did\\nnot abuse its discretion by allowing this evidence of arguable\\nbias.\\n 3. The Tie Crane Evidence\\n The Railroad’s third evidentiary challenge is to admission\\nof evidence regarding the tie crane. The Railroad argues on\\nappeal, as it did at trial, that this evidence is not relevant to\\nwhether the available methods of transporting ties when Ab-\\nernathy was injured (i.e., the backhoe and the pickup truck)\\nwere reasonably safe. The Railroad also contends that this ev-\\nidence confused the jury because it implied that the Railroad\\nhad a duty to employ the safest methods available, instead of\\njust reasonably safe methods. The Railroad is particularly crit-\\nical of the court’s admission of evidence that it bought a new\\ntie crane after Abernathy’s injury. (The Railroad’s briefs on\\nappeal do not cite Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which ad-\\ndresses evidence of subsequent remedial measures, but its ar-\\nguments invoke that rule’s rationale.)\\n As explained above, the Railroad is right that an employer\\ncan provide a reasonably safe workplace even if safer work-\\nplace alternatives exist, and evidence of a safer alternative is\\nnot conclusive evidence of negligence. See Taylor v. Illinois\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nCentral Railroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993) (“proof of a\\nsafer alternative is not necessarily proof of negligence”). Nev-\\nertheless, evidence of safer alternative methods is still rele-\\nvant to show that the available methods were not reasonably\\nsafe. See Stone v. New York Central & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344\\nU.S. 407, 409 (1953). Such evidence is relevant to show indus-\\ntry standards and to establish whether a given method is rea-\\nsonably safe relative to alternatives. See Rogers v. Missouri Pa-\\ncific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 503 (1957) (reinstating jury ver-\\ndict for injured employee in light of evidence of safer alterna-\\ntive method). Thus, evidence of the tie crane was relevant to\\nthe issues of duty and breach, and specifically to determine\\nwhether the methods the Railroad made available to Aber-\\nnathy were in fact reasonably safe. The jury was permitted to\\nmake inferences from evidence presented on an alternative\\nmethod, the tie crane. That does not mean the jury applied an\\nincorrect standard (requiring the safest possible workplace).\\nThe jury instructions stated correctly that the applicable\\nstandard is that the “FELA requires defendant to exercise rea-\\nsonable care to provide a reasonably safe workplace.”\\n The evidence that a new tie crane was purchased after Ab-\\nernathy’s injury was also admissible. Rule 407 generally pre-\\nvents admission of evidence of subsequent remedial\\nmeasures to prove fault, but the rule and our precedents ex-\\npressly permit this evidence if, among other reasons, “the fea-\\nsibility of the remedial measure” is contested. See, e.g., Ross v.\\nBlack & Decker Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 1992) (af-\\nfirming admission of subsequent remedial measures where\\ndefendant disputed feasibility).\\n In this case, the Railroad chose to contest the feasibility of\\nboth purchasing a new tie crane and fixing the old one. At trial\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 17\\n\\nand in deposition testimony, the Railroad’s witnesses offered\\nseveral reasons why the Railroad chose not to make a tie crane\\navailable in the four years or so between the original tie\\ncrane’s breakdown and Abernathy’s injury. These reasons in-\\ncluded that the cost of repairing the original tie crane or buy-\\ning a new one was prohibitively high, that the original tie\\ncrane was not used enough to justify the expense, and that the\\nRailroad was concerned that any money spent would be\\nwasted because Abernathy would misuse the machine so that\\nit would soon break down again.\\n We can assume that if the Railroad had chosen to stipulate\\nbefore trial to the feasibility of making a tie crane available to\\nAbernathy, he would not have been allowed to present evi-\\ndence of the post-injury purchase of a new tie crane. See Ross,\\n977 F.2d at 1185. But the Railroad could not both dispute fea-\\nsibility and block Abernathy from introducing contrary evi-\\ndence to show that it would have been feasible to replace the\\nequipment. If the Railroad was concerned that the jury might\\nuse this evidence to infer negligence improperly, it also could\\nhave requested a limiting jury instruction. It did not. See\\nTrytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 1994), citing\\nUnited States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1980). The\\ndistrict court did not err by admitting this evidence.\\n C. Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs\\n Following trial, Abernathy filed a bill of costs. The only\\npoint of controversy is his claim for $3,800 for fees paid to his\\ntreating physicians for their depositions. The Railroad ob-\\njected to these costs on the ground that 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b)\\nlimits witness fees to forty dollars per day unless some other\\nprovision of law provides for a higher rate. The district court\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nagreed with the Railroad and limited the witness fees in the\\nbill of cost to forty dollars per witness per day.\\n We review the district court’s award of costs for an abuse\\nof discretion. See Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 690\\nF.3d 844, 852 (7th Cir. 2012); Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d\\n454, 464 (8th Cir. 2015). However, we review legal questions\\nrelated to the cost award de novo. See Central States, Southwest\\nAreas Pension Fund v. White, 258 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(standard of appellate review is de novo on a question of law\\nin interpreting a statute); see also Stanley, 784 F.3d at 464.\\n Both doctors’ video depositions were sought by Aber-\\nnathy himself, and he presented them as evidence at trial. He\\ncontends that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i)\\nand 54(d)(1) work together to supersede the forty-dollar-per-\\nday limit of § 1821 and allow him, as the prevailing party, to\\nrecover the entire “reasonable fee” he paid his expert wit-\\nnesses for their depositions.\\n We affirm the district court’s denial of the higher witness\\nfees. Abernathy’s argument is contrary to the Supreme\\nCourt’s interpretation of the interaction between these rules\\nset forth in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.\\n437 (1987), and is not supported by Seventh Circuit precedent.\\nThe district court properly limited the witness fees the Rail-\\nroad must pay to forty dollars per witness per day.\\n In Halasa, we affirmed the district court’s ruling that the\\nprevailing defendant could be reimbursed for fees related to\\nthe deposition of an expert witness in excess of forty dollars\\nper day under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). We held that the “reasona-\\nble fee” requirement in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) can, in certain cases,\\nsupersede the specific payment schedule in § 1821(b). 690 F.3d\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 19\\n\\nat 852. However, the district court decision in that case was\\nbased on the fact that the deposition of that expert witness,\\nthough initially paid for by the defendant, had been taken by\\nthe plaintiff. Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 2012 WL\\n639520, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2012) (“Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i) provides that the party who deposes\\nan expert witness—which in this case was Halasa—shall ‘pay\\nthe expert a reasonable fee for time spent.’”). The defendant\\nin Halasa had not insisted that plaintiff pay its witness at the\\ntime of the deposition, as it could have under Rule\\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). Instead, the defendant had paid its own witness\\nhis usual expert fee for time spent on the deposition the plain-\\ntiff had taken. The defendant waited until its final bill of costs\\nto request that payment under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).\\n Thus, because the defendant in Halasa was the prevailing\\nparty and because plaintiff, as the party who had sought the\\ndeposition of the defendant’s expert, had an obligation under\\nthe Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) to pay the costs of that deposition, the\\ndistrict court was permitted to order that the defendant be\\nawarded the amount of reasonable witness fees it actually\\npaid, regardless of the fee limits set forth in 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1821(b). Here, however, Abernathy is not asking that the\\ncosts of the depositions be reimbursed under Rule\\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). He instead seeks to have the costs of deposing\\nhis own expert witnesses reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1)\\nalone, a question that was not addressed in Halasa.\\n This case is much closer to the Supreme Court’s decision\\nin Crawford Fitting, which rejected Abernathy’s interpretation\\nof these rules. The issue in Crawford Fitting was whether a\\nparty could be reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1) for the higher\\nexpert fees it had paid to have its own expert witness testify\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nat trial. 482 U.S. at 438–39. The Court rejected that claim, hold-\\ning that “when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for\\nfees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound\\nby the limit of § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory\\nauthority to the contrary.” Id. at 439. The Court found that the\\nrule and statute did not conflict, and that while Rule 54(d)(1)\\npermits prevailing parties to recover costs, § 1821(b) places a\\nlimit on the amount that can be recovered. Id. at 444–45.\\n Abernathy argues that we should distinguish Crawford Fit-\\nting and instead follow and extend the reasoning of the Eighth\\nCircuit in Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d 454, 464–65 (8th Cir.\\n2015), which allowed Cottrell, the prevailing party, to recover\\nthe full expert witness fees it actually paid to Stanley under\\nRule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) during discovery to take the deposition of\\nStanley’s expert witness. Whether Stanley was correct or not\\non its own facts, its reasoning does not extend to the case be-\\nfore us, where the prevailing party seeks to recover full expert\\nfees for the depositions of his own expert witnesses. This is\\nCrawford Fitting, except that we address here expert deposi-\\ntions rather than expert trial testimony. It would be a mistake\\nto limit Crawford Fitting on that basis. If we held that prevail-\\ning parties could recover under Rule 54(d) the full costs of de-\\nposing their own expert witnesses before trial, but not of call-\\ning those expert witnesses to testify live at trial, see Crawford\\nFitting, we would create an incentive for parties to offer expert\\ndepositions at trial in lieu of live expert testimony. Nothing in\\nthe text or logic of the rules calls for such a perverse incentive,\\nand we see no persuasive reason to distinguish this case from\\nCrawford Fitting.\\n The judgment of the district court and its award of costs\\nare AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4447319/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670066/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Marvin Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois Railroad Comp\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\nMARVIN ABERNATHY,\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\n v.\n\nEASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY,\n Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 3:15-cv-03223-SEM-TSH — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Marvin Abernathy was\ninjured while working for defendant Eastern Illinois Railroad\nCompany. He sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability\nAct (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., alleging that the Railroad\nnegligently failed to provide reasonably safe working condi-\ntions by failing to provide appropriate equipment for the job\nhe was doing when he was hurt.\n\f2 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\n A jury awarded Abernathy $525,000 in damages. The Rail-\nroad moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.\nThe district court denied both requests, and the Railroad has\nappealed, raising a host of issues. Abernathy has filed a cross-\nappeal asserting that the district court erred by not awarding\nhim sufficient costs to cover his expert witness fees. We affirm\nJudge Myerscough’s decisions in all respects.\nI. Facts\n Abernathy worked as a track inspector for the Eastern Illi-\nnois Railroad Company. His duties included replacing and\nrepairing railroad ties. On September 13, 2012, the Railroad\nsent Abernathy and another employee, Richard Probus, to re-\npair a railroad crossing about six or seven miles away from\nthe Railroad’s yard in Charleston, Illinois. Abernathy was in\ncharge of the job. The repair required him and Probus to\ntransport six ties from the yard to the crossing.\n In 2012, the Railroad had a “tie crane,” a vehicle that runs\non the railroad tracks and is well-suited to transporting rail-\nroad ties, but it had been out of commission for years. Aber-\nnathy and Probus had only two options for transporting the\nties: a backhoe or a pickup truck, either of which would need\nto travel on public roads rather than railroad tracks. Aber-\nnathy chose to use the backhoe. He testified that he had never\nused the pickup truck to haul ties before, but that he had used\nthe backhoe for similar jobs numerous times, although not on\npublic roads and not with this heavy a load. Abernathy and\nProbus loaded four ties into the bucket of the backhoe and\ntwo across the top of the bucket, resting on the arms of the\nmachine. Abernathy testified that when the bucket is rolled\nback, it locks the resting ties into place. Abernathy drove the\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 3\n\nbackhoe along a public highway. Probus followed in the\npickup, which was loaded with tools needed to install the ties.\n Abernathy drove in low gear, but he started to experience\n“road bounce.” He started braking, and two ties fell out of the\nbackhoe’s bucket. Abernathy stopped on the shoulder of the\nroad and tried to lift the ties back into the bucket. In lifting a\ntie, he injured his back. He also smashed a finger between the\ntie he was holding and another tie in the bucket. Despite the\naccident, Abernathy and Probus were able to finish reloading\nthe ties, and they resumed their trip and finished the repair\njob. Abernathy remained in pain for the rest of the day.\n The following morning, Abernathy reported the injury to\nTim Allen, the general manager of the Railroad. Allen told\nhim “to take it easy” and “be on light duty” for a while. Ab-\nernathy worked through the pain on lighter duty for the next\nyear but was unable to return to his regular work. The Rail-\nroad terminated his employment in February 2014. He even-\ntually had physical therapy, epidural injections, and then sur-\ngery in 2016. After the surgery, he continued to experience\npain in his back and legs. At the time of trial, his surgeon had\nstill not cleared him for any type of work.\nII. The Trial\n Abernathy sued the Railroad under the FELA, 45 U.S.C\n§ 51, alleging that it had been negligent in failing to provide\nan operable tie crane and requiring him to use the backhoe,\nwhich was inadequate for his assigned task of transporting\nthe ties. The trial lasted three days. Abernathy testified and\ncalled three other lay witnesses: his wife Carrie Abernathy,\nRichard Probus, and Lowell McElwee, a Railroad engineer\nwho worked with Abernathy.\n\f4 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\n Probus testified that on the day of Abernathy’s injury, they\ncould not have used the pickup truck to transport the ties be-\ncause they needed the pickup truck to transport the other\nequipment needed to install the ties. Probus also testified that\nthe Railroad had acquired an operable tie crane after Aber-\nnathy’s accident. Probus explained that the tie crane was now\nbeing used to transport ties and that manual lifts of ties were\nnot necessary with the new machine. He stated that the avail-\nability of the tie crane makes his job safer.\n Abernathy testified that when the Railroad’s tie crane had\nbeen operational, he used it regularly. He explained that the\ntie crane was the preferred method for moving ties because it\ndid not require manual lifting or traveling on public roads. He\nalso testified that before his 2012 injury, he had repeatedly\nasked the Railroad to replace the tie crane.\n Abernathy also presented the depositions of Doctors Renu\nBajaj, James Kohlman, and Thomas Lee. Dr. Lee, Abernathy’s\nsurgeon, offered testimony relevant to damages and causa-\ntion. He testified that he did not expect Abernathy to regain\nthe level of functionality he had prior to his accident. He also\ntestified that Abernathy certainly would not be able to return\nto work involving heavy manual labor. Dr. Lee also said that,\nto a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Abernathy’s\nsymptoms were caused or aggravated by the lifting accident\nin September 2012.\n The Railroad called four witnesses: general manager Tim\nAllen; Everett Fletcher; Gayle Garrett, the office secretary for\nthe Railroad; and Kendall Mulvaney, the superintendent of\nR&R Contractors, testifying as an expert witness in railroad\nrepair and maintenance. The Railroad defended on the theory\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 5\n\nthat a backhoe is a generally accepted method for transport-\ning ties in the rail repair industry.\n After the close of Abernathy’s case-in-chief, the Railroad\nmoved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of\nCivil Procedure 50(a), which the court denied. The Railroad\nrenewed its motion under Rule 50(b) at the close of all evi-\ndence and prior to the verdict, and the court again denied it.\n The jury found that the Railroad was negligent and that its\nnegligence contributed to Abernathy’s injuries. The jury cal-\nculated Abernathy’s total damages to be $750,000. However,\nthe jury found that Abernathy was also at fault for thirty per-\ncent of the total fault, which meant the jury awarded a net\nverdict of $525,000. The district court denied the Railroad’s\npost-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new\ntrial. The district court also awarded costs to Abernathy as the\nprevailing party but rejected his request to include as costs\n$3,800 in witness fees paid to Doctors Lee and Bajaj. The Rail-\nroad has appealed the judgment against it, and Abernathy has\ncross-appealed the denial of his request for expert witness\nfees as part of his costs.\nIII. Legal Analysis\n We take up the issues on appeal in three groups. First, we\naddress the Railroad’s arguments for judgment as a matter of\nlaw on the theory that Abernathy’s evidence was insufficient.\nSecond, we address the Railroad’s arguments that the district\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at\ntrial. Third, we address Abernathy’s cross-appeal on the\naward of costs.\n\f6 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\n A. Judgment as a Matter of Law\n The FELA provides a federal remedy for railroad employ-\nees who are injured on the job. To prove a claim under the\nFELA, a plaintiff must prove “the traditional common law el-\nements of negligence, including foreseeability, duty, breach,\nand causation.” Fulk v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 22 F.3d 120,\n124 (7th Cir. 1994). However, “[b]ecause it is meant to offer\nbroad remedial relief to railroad workers, a plaintiff’s burden\nwhen suing under the FELA is significantly lighter than in an\nordinary negligence case.” Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Rail-\nway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Harbin v.\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\n1990) (“It is well established that the quantum of evidence re-\nquired to establish liability in an FELA case is much less than\nin an ordinary negligence action.”). A railroad-employer is li-\nable where “employer negligence played any part, even the\nslightest, in producing the injury.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific\nRailroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).\n The Railroad challenges the sufficiency of evidence as to\nall elements of negligence. We consider duty and breach to-\ngether, and foreseeability and causation separately. “This\nCourt reviews sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo,\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-\nmoving party and drawing all inferences in [his] favor.”\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2014).\nWe “will overturn a jury verdict ‘only when there is a com-\nplete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion\nreached.’” Id. at 29596, quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645,\n653 (1946). Here, probative evidence supported the jury’s ver-\ndict that Abernathy established each element of negligence.\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 7\n\nThe district court did not err in declining to overturn the\njury’s verdict.\n 1. Duty & Breach\n The Railroad had a duty to provide Abernathy a reasona-\nbly safe working environment. See Crompton, 745 F.3d at 296.\nThe Railroad points out correctly that it “could have provided\na reasonably safe workplace notwithstanding the fact that\nsafer workplace alternatives exist.” Taylor v. Illinois Central\nRailroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993). The Railroad ar-\ngues that Abernathy produced no evidence that the equip-\nment available to haul ties (the backhoe and pickup truck) and\nthe way in which he was trained to perform a manual lift were\nunsafe. Instead, Abernathy produced evidence pertaining to\nthe absence of the tie crane. The tie crane evidence, the Rail-\nroad argues, showed only that there was a safer alternative to\nthe backhoe and pickup, which is not sufficient to establish\nnegligence. See Darrough v. CSX Transportation Inc., 321 F.3d\n674, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (railroad does not have duty to provide\nthe safest working environment).\n The Railroad’s argument relies on the faulty premise that\nevidence of safer alternatives can never even be relevant to\nwhether an employer exercised reasonable care. When a rail-\nroad assigns an employee a task using a particular method\nand the employee is injured while executing the task, evi-\ndence of a safer alternative method is relevant to whether the\nmethod provided was reasonable. See Stone v. New York, Chi-\ncago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344 U.S. 407, 409 (1953) (plaintiff\nwas injured pulling ties using the method his supervisor in-\nstructed him to use; evidence of three alternative methods for\npulling ties was relevant to whether railroad was negligent).\nBased on all the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably\n\f8 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nhave found that it was not reasonably safe to assign Aber-\nnathy to replace the ties without an operable tie crane.\n The Railroad’s argument as to the safety of a manual lift is\nsimilarly flawed. Abernathy did not argue that under all cir-\ncumstances, the Railroad is negligent if it requires an em-\nployee to perform a manual lift. He argued that the Railroad\nwas negligent where it could have provided employees with\nequipment that prevented the need for impromptu manual\nlifts on public roads but chose not to repair or replace this\nequipment.\n The Railroad’s reliance on Walker v. Northeast Regional\nCommuter Railroad, 225 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2000), is thus mis-\nplaced. In Walker, we affirmed summary judgment for a rail-\nroad in an FELA case for injuries from performing a manual\nlift. Plaintiff Walker worked as a machinist in a repair shop.\nHe injured his back lifting a replacement blade for a machine\nthat cut metal. Id. at 896. The blade weighed about 140\npounds, and Walker lifted it with one other employee. Id. A\ncrane and a forklift were available to the men but could not be\nused to assist in the lift because of the configuration of the\nshop. Walker argued that his employer was negligent in re-\nquiring him to lift more than fifty pounds and “in configuring\nthe shop in such a way as to prohibit the use of mechanical\nlifting aids.” Id. at 898.\n Walker is distinguishable. First, Walker actually made an\nexplicit argument that his employer’s demand that he lift\nmore than fifty pounds was sufficient by itself to support a\nfinding of negligence. In rejecting this argument, we con-\ntrasted the case with those in which plaintiffs “showed the\navailability of alternative methods and safeguards that would\nensure employee safety” and found telling that Walker\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 9\n\nproduced no evidence that he or any other machinists “had\ncomplained about problems in changing the blade on other\noccasions.” Id. In this case, Abernathy offered evidence of\nsafer alternatives and prior employee complaints about the\nlack of an operable tie crane. As to the second argument about\nthe shop configuration, Walker presented no evidence that the\nmanual lift in his case was not reasonably safe given the cir-\ncumstances, and in fact he “testified that he and [his co-lifter]\nassumed that they could pick up the blade” with no problem.\nId. at 899.\n Here, however, Abernathy offered evidence that the tie\ncrane was the appropriate equipment to use for the job he was\nperforming with a backhoe on the day he was injured. Allen’s\ntestimony on cross-examination and Probus’s testimony al-\nlowed the jury to find that the pickup truck was not an ade-\nquate alternative. Abernathy and Probus both testified that an\noperable tie crane made their work safer. Abernathy ex-\nplained that the tie crane allowed employees to avoid manual\nlifts and traveling on public roads. The jury could reasonably\nhave found that the Railroad did not provide Abernathy with\nequipment appropriate for the task he was assigned and that\nhis working environment was not reasonably safe.\n 2. Foreseeability\n Abernathy was required to show that it was foreseeable to\nthe Railroad that transporting ties using a backhoe or pickup\nas opposed to a tie crane “would or might result in a mishap\nand injury.” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685,\n703 (2011), quoting Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,\n372 U.S. 108, 118, n.7 (1963). To establish foreseeability, “a\nplaintiff must show that the employer had actual or construc-\ntive notice” of potential harm. Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern\n\f10 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nRailway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005). The railroad may\nbe liable “even if ‘the extent of the [injury] or the manner in\nwhich it occurred’ was not ‘probable’ or ‘foreseeable.’”\nMcBride, 564 U.S. at 70304, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 12021\n& n.8 (alteration in McBride; emphasis added here). The Rail-\nroad argues that Abernathy failed to prove negligence be-\ncause he failed to show that his injury was foreseeable. The\nRailroad argues that it could not have known that Abernathy\nwould use the backhoe or that doing so would result in\ndropped ties. The backhoe, the Railroad points out, had been\nused to transport ties without incident on multiple prior oc-\ncasions and there was no defect in the machine that caused\nthe tie to fall. Further, as the Railroad’s expert, Mulvaney, tes-\ntified, a backhoe was an accepted method in the railroad re-\npair injury for transporting ties. From these facts, the Railroad\ncontends there was insufficient proof of foreseeability.\n The Railroad’s argument misunderstands what the FELA\nrequires. Abernathy does not need to show that the Railroad\ncould have foreseen the particular consequences of its negli-\ngence. He needed to show only that “a particular condi-\ntion”—here, the absence of appropriate equipment—“would\nor might result in” any type of “mishap and injury.” McBride,\n564 U.S. at 703, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 118 n. 7 (emphasis\nadded here); see Gallick, 372 U.S. at 11820 (potential harm\nwas foreseeable where railroad had allowed stagnant pool of\nfilthy water to remain near worksite and employee was bitten\nby an insect, which led to infection and ultimately amputation\nof both legs). Abernathy needed to show only “circumstances\nwhich a reasonable person would foresee as creating a poten-\ntial for harm.” McGinn v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 102\nF.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1996).\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 11\n\n The evidence here supported a finding that a reasonable\nperson in the Railroad’s position could have foreseen that\ntransporting ties in a backhoe or pickup could lead to injury.\nThe Railroad knew that its tie crane had not been operational\nsince 2008. Abernathy offered evidence that he had repeatedly\nasked the Railroad to repair or replace it. Abernathy and Pro-\nbus both testified that the tie crane was safer to use in hauling\nties, in part because it prevented employees from having to\nlift ties manually and travel on public roads.\n 3. Causation\n In support of judgment as a matter of law, and now on\nappeal, the Railroad argued that even if it was negligent in\nfailing to provide a tie crane, Abernathy failed to prove that\nthe alleged negligence caused his injuries. Abernathy’s man-\nual lift, the Railroad contends, caused his injuries, and this lift\nwas an act subsequent to and independent of any safety issues\nthat arose because the tie crane was not available.\n The Railroad’s argument conflicts with the liberal causa-\ntion standard under the FELA. “Juries in such cases are\nproperly instructed that a defendant railroad ‘caused or con-\ntributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ‘if [the railroad’s] neg-\nligence played a part—no matter how small—in bringing\nabout the injury.” McBride, 564 U.S. at 705; see also Harbin v.\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\n1990), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S.\n500, 506 (1957) (“For under the FELA, ‘the test of a jury case is\nsimply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion\nthat employer negligence played any part, even in the slightest,\nin producing the injury… .”) (emphasis in Harbin). “The FELA\nvests the jury with broad discretion to engage in common\n\f12 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nsense inferences regarding issues of causation and fault.”\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 2014).\n There was sufficient evidence here that the Railroad’s neg-\nligence played a part in bringing about Abernathy’s injury.\nAbernathy had to use the backhoe on a public roadway to\ntransport the ties because the Railroad had not repaired or re-\nplaced its tie crane, which had been out of service for years.\nVibrations caused a tie to fall off the backhoe and onto the\npublic roadway that Abernathy was forced to use because of\nthe absence of a tie crane. Abernathy had to remove the tie,\nwhich was obstructing the public road, and he had to do it\nquickly. He had no option other than to lift the tie manually\nback into the backhoe, which injured his back. A reasonable\njury could infer that the Railroad’s negligence played some\npart in causing Abernathy’s injury. The district court correctly\ndenied the Railroad’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.\n B. New Trial Motion Based on Evidentiary Rulings\n The Railroad also argues that the district judge erred in\nthree decisions to admit evidence, contending that each is suf-\nficient to warrant a new trial. We review the denial of a new\ntrial motion for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen-\neral Board of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist\nChurch, 733 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2013); Kossman v. Northeast\nIllinois Regional Commuter Railroad, 211 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th\nCir. 2000). We find no abuse of discretion in any of the chal-\nlenged evidentiary rulings.\n 1. Testimony of Timothy Allen\n First, the Railroad objects to a line of cross-examination of\nits general manager, Timothy Allen, regarding his own use of\na company pickup truck to transport railroad ties. The\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 13\n\nRailroad argues that Allen’s use of the truck was so dissimilar\nfrom the way Abernathy might have used the truck on the day\nhe was injured as to make the evidence irrelevant.\n Again, Abernathy had to prove that the Railroad did not\nprovide a reasonably safe method for transporting railroad\nties. See Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 297–\n98 (1949). The Railroad argued that the pickup truck was a\nreasonably safe and available way for Abernathy to do his job.\nAllen testified that he thought Abernathy should have used\nthe pickup truck rather than using the backhoe to haul ties on\na public road.\n During cross-examination, Allen acknowledged that on\none occasion, he had used the same pickup to take 20 to 25\nrejected railroad ties to a friend. Allen admitted that, assum-\ning each tie weighed just 140 pounds, hauling 20 ties would\nhave meant the pickup truck was carrying 2,800 pounds.1 The\npickup truck was rated to haul only 1,500 pounds. When\nasked about this discrepancy, Allen said he had not been\naware that he had been operating the pickup truck at almost\ndouble its load capacity. Probus later testified that he and Ab-\nernathy chose not to use the pickup on the day of Abernathy’s\ninjury because they could not use it to haul both the ties and\nthe tools needed for the job.\n Judge Myerscough acted well within her discretion in al-\nlowing this line of cross-examination. Evidence is relevant if\nit has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of\nconsequence to the determination of the action more probable\n\n 1 The jury heard conflicting testimony regarding the weight of rail-\nroad ties. For purposes of this line of questioning, it was assumed that the\naverage railroad tie weighs 140 pounds.\n\f14 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nor less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.\nR. Evid. 401. The testimony about Allen’s previous use of the\npickup satisfied this definition. It was relevant for the jury to\nknow that when Allen testified that the pickup truck was a\nreasonably safe alternative method available to Abernathy—\na key point for the Railroad’s defense—he was not familiar\nwith the pickup’s hauling capacity. That rebuttal was espe-\ncially relevant given Probus’s testimony that he and Aber-\nnathy chose not to use the pickup in part because of the\ntruck’s load limit.\n 2. Testimony about ADM\n Second, the Railroad objects to the admission of evidence\nregarding the financial ties of its expert witness, Kevin Mul-\nvaney, to the Railroad’s parent company, the agribusiness gi-\nant Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”). Before trial,\nthe district court had granted the Railroad’s unopposed mo-\ntion in limine barring mention of its relationship to ADM. At\ntrial, the court reversed that ruling after Abernathy’s counsel\nexplained that they had not known before trial that Mulvaney\nwould testify. The district court let Abernathy’s counsel ask\nMulvaney whether ADM was the largest customer of his em-\nployer. He answered “yes.” In response to the next question,\nMulvaney said he did not know whether ADM was the Rail-\nroad’s parent company.\n The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these\nquestions. Bias is a “permissible and established basis of im-\npeachment.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (hold-\ning that government’s evidence as to a defense witness’s bias\nwas properly admitted). Bias is the “quintessentially appro-\npriate topic for cross examination.” Bachenski v. Malnati, 11\nF.3d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir. 1993). We have held repeatedly that\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 15\n\nparties should be granted reasonable latitude in cross-exam-\nining witnesses for bias. See, e.g., United States v. Manske, 186\nF.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Frankenthal,\n582 F.2d 1102, 1106 (7th Cir. 1978).\n The information involving ADM did not become relevant\nto bias until Mulvaney took the stand. In choosing to call an\nexpert witness with economic ties to ADM, the Railroad made\nits parent-subsidiary relationship with ADM relevant to show\npotential bias on the part of Mulvaney. The district court did\nnot abuse its discretion by allowing this evidence of arguable\nbias.\n 3. The Tie Crane Evidence\n The Railroad’s third evidentiary challenge is to admission\nof evidence regarding the tie crane. The Railroad argues on\nappeal, as it did at trial, that this evidence is not relevant to\nwhether the available methods of transporting ties when Ab-\nernathy was injured (i.e., the backhoe and the pickup truck)\nwere reasonably safe. The Railroad also contends that this ev-\nidence confused the jury because it implied that the Railroad\nhad a duty to employ the safest methods available, instead of\njust reasonably safe methods. The Railroad is particularly crit-\nical of the court’s admission of evidence that it bought a new\ntie crane after Abernathy’s injury. (The Railroad’s briefs on\nappeal do not cite Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which ad-\ndresses evidence of subsequent remedial measures, but its ar-\nguments invoke that rule’s rationale.)\n As explained above, the Railroad is right that an employer\ncan provide a reasonably safe workplace even if safer work-\nplace alternatives exist, and evidence of a safer alternative is\nnot conclusive evidence of negligence. See Taylor v. Illinois\n\f16 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nCentral Railroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993) (“proof of a\nsafer alternative is not necessarily proof of negligence”). Nev-\nertheless, evidence of safer alternative methods is still rele-\nvant to show that the available methods were not reasonably\nsafe. See Stone v. New York Central & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344\nU.S. 407, 409 (1953). Such evidence is relevant to show indus-\ntry standards and to establish whether a given method is rea-\nsonably safe relative to alternatives. See Rogers v. Missouri Pa-\ncific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 503 (1957) (reinstating jury ver-\ndict for injured employee in light of evidence of safer alterna-\ntive method). Thus, evidence of the tie crane was relevant to\nthe issues of duty and breach, and specifically to determine\nwhether the methods the Railroad made available to Aber-\nnathy were in fact reasonably safe. The jury was permitted to\nmake inferences from evidence presented on an alternative\nmethod, the tie crane. That does not mean the jury applied an\nincorrect standard (requiring the safest possible workplace).\nThe jury instructions stated correctly that the applicable\nstandard is that the “FELA requires defendant to exercise rea-\nsonable care to provide a reasonably safe workplace.”\n The evidence that a new tie crane was purchased after Ab-\nernathy’s injury was also admissible. Rule 407 generally pre-\nvents admission of evidence of subsequent remedial\nmeasures to prove fault, but the rule and our precedents ex-\npressly permit this evidence if, among other reasons, “the fea-\nsibility of the remedial measure” is contested. See, e.g., Ross v.\nBlack & Decker Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 1992) (af-\nfirming admission of subsequent remedial measures where\ndefendant disputed feasibility).\n In this case, the Railroad chose to contest the feasibility of\nboth purchasing a new tie crane and fixing the old one. At trial\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 17\n\nand in deposition testimony, the Railroad’s witnesses offered\nseveral reasons why the Railroad chose not to make a tie crane\navailable in the four years or so between the original tie\ncrane’s breakdown and Abernathy’s injury. These reasons in-\ncluded that the cost of repairing the original tie crane or buy-\ning a new one was prohibitively high, that the original tie\ncrane was not used enough to justify the expense, and that the\nRailroad was concerned that any money spent would be\nwasted because Abernathy would misuse the machine so that\nit would soon break down again.\n We can assume that if the Railroad had chosen to stipulate\nbefore trial to the feasibility of making a tie crane available to\nAbernathy, he would not have been allowed to present evi-\ndence of the post-injury purchase of a new tie crane. See Ross,\n977 F.2d at 1185. But the Railroad could not both dispute fea-\nsibility and block Abernathy from introducing contrary evi-\ndence to show that it would have been feasible to replace the\nequipment. If the Railroad was concerned that the jury might\nuse this evidence to infer negligence improperly, it also could\nhave requested a limiting jury instruction. It did not. See\nTrytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 1994), citing\nUnited States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1980). The\ndistrict court did not err by admitting this evidence.\n C. Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs\n Following trial, Abernathy filed a bill of costs. The only\npoint of controversy is his claim for $3,800 for fees paid to his\ntreating physicians for their depositions. The Railroad ob-\njected to these costs on the ground that 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b)\nlimits witness fees to forty dollars per day unless some other\nprovision of law provides for a higher rate. The district court\n\f18 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nagreed with the Railroad and limited the witness fees in the\nbill of cost to forty dollars per witness per day.\n We review the district court’s award of costs for an abuse\nof discretion. See Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 690\nF.3d 844, 852 (7th Cir. 2012); Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d\n454, 464 (8th Cir. 2015). However, we review legal questions\nrelated to the cost award de novo. See Central States, Southwest\nAreas Pension Fund v. White, 258 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2001)\n(standard of appellate review is de novo on a question of law\nin interpreting a statute); see also Stanley, 784 F.3d at 464.\n Both doctors’ video depositions were sought by Aber-\nnathy himself, and he presented them as evidence at trial. He\ncontends that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i)\nand 54(d)(1) work together to supersede the forty-dollar-per-\nday limit of § 1821 and allow him, as the prevailing party, to\nrecover the entire “reasonable fee” he paid his expert wit-\nnesses for their depositions.\n We affirm the district court’s denial of the higher witness\nfees. Abernathy’s argument is contrary to the Supreme\nCourt’s interpretation of the interaction between these rules\nset forth in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.\n437 (1987), and is not supported by Seventh Circuit precedent.\nThe district court properly limited the witness fees the Rail-\nroad must pay to forty dollars per witness per day.\n In Halasa, we affirmed the district court’s ruling that the\nprevailing defendant could be reimbursed for fees related to\nthe deposition of an expert witness in excess of forty dollars\nper day under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). We held that the “reasona-\nble fee” requirement in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) can, in certain cases,\nsupersede the specific payment schedule in § 1821(b). 690 F.3d\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 19\n\nat 852. However, the district court decision in that case was\nbased on the fact that the deposition of that expert witness,\nthough initially paid for by the defendant, had been taken by\nthe plaintiff. Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 2012 WL\n639520, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2012) (“Federal Rule of Civil\nProcedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i) provides that the party who deposes\nan expert witness—which in this case was Halasa—shall ‘pay\nthe expert a reasonable fee for time spent.’”). The defendant\nin Halasa had not insisted that plaintiff pay its witness at the\ntime of the deposition, as it could have under Rule\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). Instead, the defendant had paid its own witness\nhis usual expert fee for time spent on the deposition the plain-\ntiff had taken. The defendant waited until its final bill of costs\nto request that payment under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).\n Thus, because the defendant in Halasa was the prevailing\nparty and because plaintiff, as the party who had sought the\ndeposition of the defendant’s expert, had an obligation under\nthe Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) to pay the costs of that deposition, the\ndistrict court was permitted to order that the defendant be\nawarded the amount of reasonable witness fees it actually\npaid, regardless of the fee limits set forth in 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1821(b). Here, however, Abernathy is not asking that the\ncosts of the depositions be reimbursed under Rule\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). He instead seeks to have the costs of deposing\nhis own expert witnesses reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1)\nalone, a question that was not addressed in Halasa.\n This case is much closer to the Supreme Court’s decision\nin Crawford Fitting, which rejected Abernathy’s interpretation\nof these rules. The issue in Crawford Fitting was whether a\nparty could be reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1) for the higher\nexpert fees it had paid to have its own expert witness testify\n\f20 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nat trial. 482 U.S. at 438–39. The Court rejected that claim, hold-\ning that “when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for\nfees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound\nby the limit of § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory\nauthority to the contrary.” Id. at 439. The Court found that the\nrule and statute did not conflict, and that while Rule 54(d)(1)\npermits prevailing parties to recover costs, § 1821(b) places a\nlimit on the amount that can be recovered. Id. at 444–45.\n Abernathy argues that we should distinguish Crawford Fit-\nting and instead follow and extend the reasoning of the Eighth\nCircuit in Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d 454, 464–65 (8th Cir.\n2015), which allowed Cottrell, the prevailing party, to recover\nthe full expert witness fees it actually paid to Stanley under\nRule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) during discovery to take the deposition of\nStanley’s expert witness. Whether Stanley was correct or not\non its own facts, its reasoning does not extend to the case be-\nfore us, where the prevailing party seeks to recover full expert\nfees for the depositions of his own expert witnesses. This is\nCrawford Fitting, except that we address here expert deposi-\ntions rather than expert trial testimony. It would be a mistake\nto limit Crawford Fitting on that basis. If we held that prevail-\ning parties could recover under Rule 54(d) the full costs of de-\nposing their own expert witnesses before trial, but not of call-\ning those expert witnesses to testify live at trial, see Crawford\nFitting, we would create an incentive for parties to offer expert\ndepositions at trial in lieu of live expert testimony. Nothing in\nthe text or logic of the rules calls for such a perverse incentive,\nand we see no persuasive reason to distinguish this case from\nCrawford Fitting.\n The judgment of the district court and its award of costs\nare AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Marvin Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois Railroad Comp\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\nMARVIN ABERNATHY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nEASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:15-cv-03223-SEM-TSH — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Marvin Abernathy was\\ninjured while working for defendant Eastern Illinois Railroad\\nCompany. He sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability\\nAct (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., alleging that the Railroad\\nnegligently failed to provide reasonably safe working condi-\\ntions by failing to provide appropriate equipment for the job\\nhe was doing when he was hurt.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n A jury awarded Abernathy $525,000 in damages. The Rail-\\nroad moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.\\nThe district court denied both requests, and the Railroad has\\nappealed, raising a host of issues. Abernathy has filed a cross-\\nappeal asserting that the district court erred by not awarding\\nhim sufficient costs to cover his expert witness fees. We affirm\\nJudge Myerscough’s decisions in all respects.\\nI. Facts\\n Abernathy worked as a track inspector for the Eastern Illi-\\nnois Railroad Company. His duties included replacing and\\nrepairing railroad ties. On September 13, 2012, the Railroad\\nsent Abernathy and another employee, Richard Probus, to re-\\npair a railroad crossing about six or seven miles away from\\nthe Railroad’s yard in Charleston, Illinois. Abernathy was in\\ncharge of the job. The repair required him and Probus to\\ntransport six ties from the yard to the crossing.\\n In 2012, the Railroad had a “tie crane,” a vehicle that runs\\non the railroad tracks and is well-suited to transporting rail-\\nroad ties, but it had been out of commission for years. Aber-\\nnathy and Probus had only two options for transporting the\\nties: a backhoe or a pickup truck, either of which would need\\nto travel on public roads rather than railroad tracks. Aber-\\nnathy chose to use the backhoe. He testified that he had never\\nused the pickup truck to haul ties before, but that he had used\\nthe backhoe for similar jobs numerous times, although not on\\npublic roads and not with this heavy a load. Abernathy and\\nProbus loaded four ties into the bucket of the backhoe and\\ntwo across the top of the bucket, resting on the arms of the\\nmachine. Abernathy testified that when the bucket is rolled\\nback, it locks the resting ties into place. Abernathy drove the\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 3\\n\\nbackhoe along a public highway. Probus followed in the\\npickup, which was loaded with tools needed to install the ties.\\n Abernathy drove in low gear, but he started to experience\\n“road bounce.” He started braking, and two ties fell out of the\\nbackhoe’s bucket. Abernathy stopped on the shoulder of the\\nroad and tried to lift the ties back into the bucket. In lifting a\\ntie, he injured his back. He also smashed a finger between the\\ntie he was holding and another tie in the bucket. Despite the\\naccident, Abernathy and Probus were able to finish reloading\\nthe ties, and they resumed their trip and finished the repair\\njob. Abernathy remained in pain for the rest of the day.\\n The following morning, Abernathy reported the injury to\\nTim Allen, the general manager of the Railroad. Allen told\\nhim “to take it easy” and “be on light duty” for a while. Ab-\\nernathy worked through the pain on lighter duty for the next\\nyear but was unable to return to his regular work. The Rail-\\nroad terminated his employment in February 2014. He even-\\ntually had physical therapy, epidural injections, and then sur-\\ngery in 2016. After the surgery, he continued to experience\\npain in his back and legs. At the time of trial, his surgeon had\\nstill not cleared him for any type of work.\\nII. The Trial\\n Abernathy sued the Railroad under the FELA, 45 U.S.C\\n§ 51, alleging that it had been negligent in failing to provide\\nan operable tie crane and requiring him to use the backhoe,\\nwhich was inadequate for his assigned task of transporting\\nthe ties. The trial lasted three days. Abernathy testified and\\ncalled three other lay witnesses: his wife Carrie Abernathy,\\nRichard Probus, and Lowell McElwee, a Railroad engineer\\nwho worked with Abernathy.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n Probus testified that on the day of Abernathy’s injury, they\\ncould not have used the pickup truck to transport the ties be-\\ncause they needed the pickup truck to transport the other\\nequipment needed to install the ties. Probus also testified that\\nthe Railroad had acquired an operable tie crane after Aber-\\nnathy’s accident. Probus explained that the tie crane was now\\nbeing used to transport ties and that manual lifts of ties were\\nnot necessary with the new machine. He stated that the avail-\\nability of the tie crane makes his job safer.\\n Abernathy testified that when the Railroad’s tie crane had\\nbeen operational, he used it regularly. He explained that the\\ntie crane was the preferred method for moving ties because it\\ndid not require manual lifting or traveling on public roads. He\\nalso testified that before his 2012 injury, he had repeatedly\\nasked the Railroad to replace the tie crane.\\n Abernathy also presented the depositions of Doctors Renu\\nBajaj, James Kohlman, and Thomas Lee. Dr. Lee, Abernathy’s\\nsurgeon, offered testimony relevant to damages and causa-\\ntion. He testified that he did not expect Abernathy to regain\\nthe level of functionality he had prior to his accident. He also\\ntestified that Abernathy certainly would not be able to return\\nto work involving heavy manual labor. Dr. Lee also said that,\\nto a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Abernathy’s\\nsymptoms were caused or aggravated by the lifting accident\\nin September 2012.\\n The Railroad called four witnesses: general manager Tim\\nAllen; Everett Fletcher; Gayle Garrett, the office secretary for\\nthe Railroad; and Kendall Mulvaney, the superintendent of\\nR&R Contractors, testifying as an expert witness in railroad\\nrepair and maintenance. The Railroad defended on the theory\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 5\\n\\nthat a backhoe is a generally accepted method for transport-\\ning ties in the rail repair industry.\\n After the close of Abernathy’s case-in-chief, the Railroad\\nmoved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of\\nCivil Procedure 50(a), which the court denied. The Railroad\\nrenewed its motion under Rule 50(b) at the close of all evi-\\ndence and prior to the verdict, and the court again denied it.\\n The jury found that the Railroad was negligent and that its\\nnegligence contributed to Abernathy’s injuries. The jury cal-\\nculated Abernathy’s total damages to be $750,000. However,\\nthe jury found that Abernathy was also at fault for thirty per-\\ncent of the total fault, which meant the jury awarded a net\\nverdict of $525,000. The district court denied the Railroad’s\\npost-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new\\ntrial. The district court also awarded costs to Abernathy as the\\nprevailing party but rejected his request to include as costs\\n$3,800 in witness fees paid to Doctors Lee and Bajaj. The Rail-\\nroad has appealed the judgment against it, and Abernathy has\\ncross-appealed the denial of his request for expert witness\\nfees as part of his costs.\\nIII. Legal Analysis\\n We take up the issues on appeal in three groups. First, we\\naddress the Railroad’s arguments for judgment as a matter of\\nlaw on the theory that Abernathy’s evidence was insufficient.\\nSecond, we address the Railroad’s arguments that the district\\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at\\ntrial. Third, we address Abernathy’s cross-appeal on the\\naward of costs.\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n A. Judgment as a Matter of Law\\n The FELA provides a federal remedy for railroad employ-\\nees who are injured on the job. To prove a claim under the\\nFELA, a plaintiff must prove “the traditional common law el-\\nements of negligence, including foreseeability, duty, breach,\\nand causation.” Fulk v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 22 F.3d 120,\\n124 (7th Cir. 1994). However, “[b]ecause it is meant to offer\\nbroad remedial relief to railroad workers, a plaintiff’s burden\\nwhen suing under the FELA is significantly lighter than in an\\nordinary negligence case.” Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Rail-\\nway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Harbin v.\\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\\n1990) (“It is well established that the quantum of evidence re-\\nquired to establish liability in an FELA case is much less than\\nin an ordinary negligence action.”). A railroad-employer is li-\\nable where “employer negligence played any part, even the\\nslightest, in producing the injury.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific\\nRailroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).\\n The Railroad challenges the sufficiency of evidence as to\\nall elements of negligence. We consider duty and breach to-\\ngether, and foreseeability and causation separately. “This\\nCourt reviews sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo,\\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-\\nmoving party and drawing all inferences in [his] favor.”\\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2014).\\nWe “will overturn a jury verdict ‘only when there is a com-\\nplete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion\\nreached.’” Id. at 29596, quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645,\\n653 (1946). Here, probative evidence supported the jury’s ver-\\ndict that Abernathy established each element of negligence.\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 7\\n\\nThe district court did not err in declining to overturn the\\njury’s verdict.\\n 1. Duty & Breach\\n The Railroad had a duty to provide Abernathy a reasona-\\nbly safe working environment. See Crompton, 745 F.3d at 296.\\nThe Railroad points out correctly that it “could have provided\\na reasonably safe workplace notwithstanding the fact that\\nsafer workplace alternatives exist.” Taylor v. Illinois Central\\nRailroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993). The Railroad ar-\\ngues that Abernathy produced no evidence that the equip-\\nment available to haul ties (the backhoe and pickup truck) and\\nthe way in which he was trained to perform a manual lift were\\nunsafe. Instead, Abernathy produced evidence pertaining to\\nthe absence of the tie crane. The tie crane evidence, the Rail-\\nroad argues, showed only that there was a safer alternative to\\nthe backhoe and pickup, which is not sufficient to establish\\nnegligence. See Darrough v. CSX Transportation Inc., 321 F.3d\\n674, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (railroad does not have duty to provide\\nthe safest working environment).\\n The Railroad’s argument relies on the faulty premise that\\nevidence of safer alternatives can never even be relevant to\\nwhether an employer exercised reasonable care. When a rail-\\nroad assigns an employee a task using a particular method\\nand the employee is injured while executing the task, evi-\\ndence of a safer alternative method is relevant to whether the\\nmethod provided was reasonable. See Stone v. New York, Chi-\\ncago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344 U.S. 407, 409 (1953) (plaintiff\\nwas injured pulling ties using the method his supervisor in-\\nstructed him to use; evidence of three alternative methods for\\npulling ties was relevant to whether railroad was negligent).\\nBased on all the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nhave found that it was not reasonably safe to assign Aber-\\nnathy to replace the ties without an operable tie crane.\\n The Railroad’s argument as to the safety of a manual lift is\\nsimilarly flawed. Abernathy did not argue that under all cir-\\ncumstances, the Railroad is negligent if it requires an em-\\nployee to perform a manual lift. He argued that the Railroad\\nwas negligent where it could have provided employees with\\nequipment that prevented the need for impromptu manual\\nlifts on public roads but chose not to repair or replace this\\nequipment.\\n The Railroad’s reliance on Walker v. Northeast Regional\\nCommuter Railroad, 225 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2000), is thus mis-\\nplaced. In Walker, we affirmed summary judgment for a rail-\\nroad in an FELA case for injuries from performing a manual\\nlift. Plaintiff Walker worked as a machinist in a repair shop.\\nHe injured his back lifting a replacement blade for a machine\\nthat cut metal. Id. at 896. The blade weighed about 140\\npounds, and Walker lifted it with one other employee. Id. A\\ncrane and a forklift were available to the men but could not be\\nused to assist in the lift because of the configuration of the\\nshop. Walker argued that his employer was negligent in re-\\nquiring him to lift more than fifty pounds and “in configuring\\nthe shop in such a way as to prohibit the use of mechanical\\nlifting aids.” Id. at 898.\\n Walker is distinguishable. First, Walker actually made an\\nexplicit argument that his employer’s demand that he lift\\nmore than fifty pounds was sufficient by itself to support a\\nfinding of negligence. In rejecting this argument, we con-\\ntrasted the case with those in which plaintiffs “showed the\\navailability of alternative methods and safeguards that would\\nensure employee safety” and found telling that Walker\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 9\\n\\nproduced no evidence that he or any other machinists “had\\ncomplained about problems in changing the blade on other\\noccasions.” Id. In this case, Abernathy offered evidence of\\nsafer alternatives and prior employee complaints about the\\nlack of an operable tie crane. As to the second argument about\\nthe shop configuration, Walker presented no evidence that the\\nmanual lift in his case was not reasonably safe given the cir-\\ncumstances, and in fact he “testified that he and [his co-lifter]\\nassumed that they could pick up the blade” with no problem.\\nId. at 899.\\n Here, however, Abernathy offered evidence that the tie\\ncrane was the appropriate equipment to use for the job he was\\nperforming with a backhoe on the day he was injured. Allen’s\\ntestimony on cross-examination and Probus’s testimony al-\\nlowed the jury to find that the pickup truck was not an ade-\\nquate alternative. Abernathy and Probus both testified that an\\noperable tie crane made their work safer. Abernathy ex-\\nplained that the tie crane allowed employees to avoid manual\\nlifts and traveling on public roads. The jury could reasonably\\nhave found that the Railroad did not provide Abernathy with\\nequipment appropriate for the task he was assigned and that\\nhis working environment was not reasonably safe.\\n 2. Foreseeability\\n Abernathy was required to show that it was foreseeable to\\nthe Railroad that transporting ties using a backhoe or pickup\\nas opposed to a tie crane “would or might result in a mishap\\nand injury.” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685,\\n703 (2011), quoting Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,\\n372 U.S. 108, 118, n.7 (1963). To establish foreseeability, “a\\nplaintiff must show that the employer had actual or construc-\\ntive notice” of potential harm. Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nRailway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005). The railroad may\\nbe liable “even if ‘the extent of the [injury] or the manner in\\nwhich it occurred’ was not ‘probable’ or ‘foreseeable.’”\\nMcBride, 564 U.S. at 70304, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 12021\\n& n.8 (alteration in McBride; emphasis added here). The Rail-\\nroad argues that Abernathy failed to prove negligence be-\\ncause he failed to show that his injury was foreseeable. The\\nRailroad argues that it could not have known that Abernathy\\nwould use the backhoe or that doing so would result in\\ndropped ties. The backhoe, the Railroad points out, had been\\nused to transport ties without incident on multiple prior oc-\\ncasions and there was no defect in the machine that caused\\nthe tie to fall. Further, as the Railroad’s expert, Mulvaney, tes-\\ntified, a backhoe was an accepted method in the railroad re-\\npair injury for transporting ties. From these facts, the Railroad\\ncontends there was insufficient proof of foreseeability.\\n The Railroad’s argument misunderstands what the FELA\\nrequires. Abernathy does not need to show that the Railroad\\ncould have foreseen the particular consequences of its negli-\\ngence. He needed to show only that “a particular condi-\\ntion”—here, the absence of appropriate equipment—“would\\nor might result in” any type of “mishap and injury.” McBride,\\n564 U.S. at 703, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 118 n. 7 (emphasis\\nadded here); see Gallick, 372 U.S. at 11820 (potential harm\\nwas foreseeable where railroad had allowed stagnant pool of\\nfilthy water to remain near worksite and employee was bitten\\nby an insect, which led to infection and ultimately amputation\\nof both legs). Abernathy needed to show only “circumstances\\nwhich a reasonable person would foresee as creating a poten-\\ntial for harm.” McGinn v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 102\\nF.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1996).\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 11\\n\\n The evidence here supported a finding that a reasonable\\nperson in the Railroad’s position could have foreseen that\\ntransporting ties in a backhoe or pickup could lead to injury.\\nThe Railroad knew that its tie crane had not been operational\\nsince 2008. Abernathy offered evidence that he had repeatedly\\nasked the Railroad to repair or replace it. Abernathy and Pro-\\nbus both testified that the tie crane was safer to use in hauling\\nties, in part because it prevented employees from having to\\nlift ties manually and travel on public roads.\\n 3. Causation\\n In support of judgment as a matter of law, and now on\\nappeal, the Railroad argued that even if it was negligent in\\nfailing to provide a tie crane, Abernathy failed to prove that\\nthe alleged negligence caused his injuries. Abernathy’s man-\\nual lift, the Railroad contends, caused his injuries, and this lift\\nwas an act subsequent to and independent of any safety issues\\nthat arose because the tie crane was not available.\\n The Railroad’s argument conflicts with the liberal causa-\\ntion standard under the FELA. “Juries in such cases are\\nproperly instructed that a defendant railroad ‘caused or con-\\ntributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ‘if [the railroad’s] neg-\\nligence played a part—no matter how small—in bringing\\nabout the injury.” McBride, 564 U.S. at 705; see also Harbin v.\\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\\n1990), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S.\\n500, 506 (1957) (“For under the FELA, ‘the test of a jury case is\\nsimply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion\\nthat employer negligence played any part, even in the slightest,\\nin producing the injury… .”) (emphasis in Harbin). “The FELA\\nvests the jury with broad discretion to engage in common\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nsense inferences regarding issues of causation and fault.”\\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n There was sufficient evidence here that the Railroad’s neg-\\nligence played a part in bringing about Abernathy’s injury.\\nAbernathy had to use the backhoe on a public roadway to\\ntransport the ties because the Railroad had not repaired or re-\\nplaced its tie crane, which had been out of service for years.\\nVibrations caused a tie to fall off the backhoe and onto the\\npublic roadway that Abernathy was forced to use because of\\nthe absence of a tie crane. Abernathy had to remove the tie,\\nwhich was obstructing the public road, and he had to do it\\nquickly. He had no option other than to lift the tie manually\\nback into the backhoe, which injured his back. A reasonable\\njury could infer that the Railroad’s negligence played some\\npart in causing Abernathy’s injury. The district court correctly\\ndenied the Railroad’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.\\n B. New Trial Motion Based on Evidentiary Rulings\\n The Railroad also argues that the district judge erred in\\nthree decisions to admit evidence, contending that each is suf-\\nficient to warrant a new trial. We review the denial of a new\\ntrial motion for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen-\\neral Board of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist\\nChurch, 733 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2013); Kossman v. Northeast\\nIllinois Regional Commuter Railroad, 211 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th\\nCir. 2000). We find no abuse of discretion in any of the chal-\\nlenged evidentiary rulings.\\n 1. Testimony of Timothy Allen\\n First, the Railroad objects to a line of cross-examination of\\nits general manager, Timothy Allen, regarding his own use of\\na company pickup truck to transport railroad ties. The\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 13\\n\\nRailroad argues that Allen’s use of the truck was so dissimilar\\nfrom the way Abernathy might have used the truck on the day\\nhe was injured as to make the evidence irrelevant.\\n Again, Abernathy had to prove that the Railroad did not\\nprovide a reasonably safe method for transporting railroad\\nties. See Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 297–\\n98 (1949). The Railroad argued that the pickup truck was a\\nreasonably safe and available way for Abernathy to do his job.\\nAllen testified that he thought Abernathy should have used\\nthe pickup truck rather than using the backhoe to haul ties on\\na public road.\\n During cross-examination, Allen acknowledged that on\\none occasion, he had used the same pickup to take 20 to 25\\nrejected railroad ties to a friend. Allen admitted that, assum-\\ning each tie weighed just 140 pounds, hauling 20 ties would\\nhave meant the pickup truck was carrying 2,800 pounds.1 The\\npickup truck was rated to haul only 1,500 pounds. When\\nasked about this discrepancy, Allen said he had not been\\naware that he had been operating the pickup truck at almost\\ndouble its load capacity. Probus later testified that he and Ab-\\nernathy chose not to use the pickup on the day of Abernathy’s\\ninjury because they could not use it to haul both the ties and\\nthe tools needed for the job.\\n Judge Myerscough acted well within her discretion in al-\\nlowing this line of cross-examination. Evidence is relevant if\\nit has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of\\nconsequence to the determination of the action more probable\\n\\n 1 The jury heard conflicting testimony regarding the weight of rail-\\nroad ties. For purposes of this line of questioning, it was assumed that the\\naverage railroad tie weighs 140 pounds.\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nor less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.\\nR. Evid. 401. The testimony about Allen’s previous use of the\\npickup satisfied this definition. It was relevant for the jury to\\nknow that when Allen testified that the pickup truck was a\\nreasonably safe alternative method available to Abernathy—\\na key point for the Railroad’s defense—he was not familiar\\nwith the pickup’s hauling capacity. That rebuttal was espe-\\ncially relevant given Probus’s testimony that he and Aber-\\nnathy chose not to use the pickup in part because of the\\ntruck’s load limit.\\n 2. Testimony about ADM\\n Second, the Railroad objects to the admission of evidence\\nregarding the financial ties of its expert witness, Kevin Mul-\\nvaney, to the Railroad’s parent company, the agribusiness gi-\\nant Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”). Before trial,\\nthe district court had granted the Railroad’s unopposed mo-\\ntion in limine barring mention of its relationship to ADM. At\\ntrial, the court reversed that ruling after Abernathy’s counsel\\nexplained that they had not known before trial that Mulvaney\\nwould testify. The district court let Abernathy’s counsel ask\\nMulvaney whether ADM was the largest customer of his em-\\nployer. He answered “yes.” In response to the next question,\\nMulvaney said he did not know whether ADM was the Rail-\\nroad’s parent company.\\n The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these\\nquestions. Bias is a “permissible and established basis of im-\\npeachment.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (hold-\\ning that government’s evidence as to a defense witness’s bias\\nwas properly admitted). Bias is the “quintessentially appro-\\npriate topic for cross examination.” Bachenski v. Malnati, 11\\nF.3d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir. 1993). We have held repeatedly that\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 15\\n\\nparties should be granted reasonable latitude in cross-exam-\\nining witnesses for bias. See, e.g., United States v. Manske, 186\\nF.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Frankenthal,\\n582 F.2d 1102, 1106 (7th Cir. 1978).\\n The information involving ADM did not become relevant\\nto bias until Mulvaney took the stand. In choosing to call an\\nexpert witness with economic ties to ADM, the Railroad made\\nits parent-subsidiary relationship with ADM relevant to show\\npotential bias on the part of Mulvaney. The district court did\\nnot abuse its discretion by allowing this evidence of arguable\\nbias.\\n 3. The Tie Crane Evidence\\n The Railroad’s third evidentiary challenge is to admission\\nof evidence regarding the tie crane. The Railroad argues on\\nappeal, as it did at trial, that this evidence is not relevant to\\nwhether the available methods of transporting ties when Ab-\\nernathy was injured (i.e., the backhoe and the pickup truck)\\nwere reasonably safe. The Railroad also contends that this ev-\\nidence confused the jury because it implied that the Railroad\\nhad a duty to employ the safest methods available, instead of\\njust reasonably safe methods. The Railroad is particularly crit-\\nical of the court’s admission of evidence that it bought a new\\ntie crane after Abernathy’s injury. (The Railroad’s briefs on\\nappeal do not cite Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which ad-\\ndresses evidence of subsequent remedial measures, but its ar-\\nguments invoke that rule’s rationale.)\\n As explained above, the Railroad is right that an employer\\ncan provide a reasonably safe workplace even if safer work-\\nplace alternatives exist, and evidence of a safer alternative is\\nnot conclusive evidence of negligence. See Taylor v. Illinois\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nCentral Railroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993) (“proof of a\\nsafer alternative is not necessarily proof of negligence”). Nev-\\nertheless, evidence of safer alternative methods is still rele-\\nvant to show that the available methods were not reasonably\\nsafe. See Stone v. New York Central & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344\\nU.S. 407, 409 (1953). Such evidence is relevant to show indus-\\ntry standards and to establish whether a given method is rea-\\nsonably safe relative to alternatives. See Rogers v. Missouri Pa-\\ncific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 503 (1957) (reinstating jury ver-\\ndict for injured employee in light of evidence of safer alterna-\\ntive method). Thus, evidence of the tie crane was relevant to\\nthe issues of duty and breach, and specifically to determine\\nwhether the methods the Railroad made available to Aber-\\nnathy were in fact reasonably safe. The jury was permitted to\\nmake inferences from evidence presented on an alternative\\nmethod, the tie crane. That does not mean the jury applied an\\nincorrect standard (requiring the safest possible workplace).\\nThe jury instructions stated correctly that the applicable\\nstandard is that the “FELA requires defendant to exercise rea-\\nsonable care to provide a reasonably safe workplace.”\\n The evidence that a new tie crane was purchased after Ab-\\nernathy’s injury was also admissible. Rule 407 generally pre-\\nvents admission of evidence of subsequent remedial\\nmeasures to prove fault, but the rule and our precedents ex-\\npressly permit this evidence if, among other reasons, “the fea-\\nsibility of the remedial measure” is contested. See, e.g., Ross v.\\nBlack & Decker Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 1992) (af-\\nfirming admission of subsequent remedial measures where\\ndefendant disputed feasibility).\\n In this case, the Railroad chose to contest the feasibility of\\nboth purchasing a new tie crane and fixing the old one. At trial\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 17\\n\\nand in deposition testimony, the Railroad’s witnesses offered\\nseveral reasons why the Railroad chose not to make a tie crane\\navailable in the four years or so between the original tie\\ncrane’s breakdown and Abernathy’s injury. These reasons in-\\ncluded that the cost of repairing the original tie crane or buy-\\ning a new one was prohibitively high, that the original tie\\ncrane was not used enough to justify the expense, and that the\\nRailroad was concerned that any money spent would be\\nwasted because Abernathy would misuse the machine so that\\nit would soon break down again.\\n We can assume that if the Railroad had chosen to stipulate\\nbefore trial to the feasibility of making a tie crane available to\\nAbernathy, he would not have been allowed to present evi-\\ndence of the post-injury purchase of a new tie crane. See Ross,\\n977 F.2d at 1185. But the Railroad could not both dispute fea-\\nsibility and block Abernathy from introducing contrary evi-\\ndence to show that it would have been feasible to replace the\\nequipment. If the Railroad was concerned that the jury might\\nuse this evidence to infer negligence improperly, it also could\\nhave requested a limiting jury instruction. It did not. See\\nTrytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 1994), citing\\nUnited States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1980). The\\ndistrict court did not err by admitting this evidence.\\n C. Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs\\n Following trial, Abernathy filed a bill of costs. The only\\npoint of controversy is his claim for $3,800 for fees paid to his\\ntreating physicians for their depositions. The Railroad ob-\\njected to these costs on the ground that 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b)\\nlimits witness fees to forty dollars per day unless some other\\nprovision of law provides for a higher rate. The district court\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nagreed with the Railroad and limited the witness fees in the\\nbill of cost to forty dollars per witness per day.\\n We review the district court’s award of costs for an abuse\\nof discretion. See Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 690\\nF.3d 844, 852 (7th Cir. 2012); Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d\\n454, 464 (8th Cir. 2015). However, we review legal questions\\nrelated to the cost award de novo. See Central States, Southwest\\nAreas Pension Fund v. White, 258 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(standard of appellate review is de novo on a question of law\\nin interpreting a statute); see also Stanley, 784 F.3d at 464.\\n Both doctors’ video depositions were sought by Aber-\\nnathy himself, and he presented them as evidence at trial. He\\ncontends that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i)\\nand 54(d)(1) work together to supersede the forty-dollar-per-\\nday limit of § 1821 and allow him, as the prevailing party, to\\nrecover the entire “reasonable fee” he paid his expert wit-\\nnesses for their depositions.\\n We affirm the district court’s denial of the higher witness\\nfees. Abernathy’s argument is contrary to the Supreme\\nCourt’s interpretation of the interaction between these rules\\nset forth in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.\\n437 (1987), and is not supported by Seventh Circuit precedent.\\nThe district court properly limited the witness fees the Rail-\\nroad must pay to forty dollars per witness per day.\\n In Halasa, we affirmed the district court’s ruling that the\\nprevailing defendant could be reimbursed for fees related to\\nthe deposition of an expert witness in excess of forty dollars\\nper day under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). We held that the “reasona-\\nble fee” requirement in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) can, in certain cases,\\nsupersede the specific payment schedule in § 1821(b). 690 F.3d\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 19\\n\\nat 852. However, the district court decision in that case was\\nbased on the fact that the deposition of that expert witness,\\nthough initially paid for by the defendant, had been taken by\\nthe plaintiff. Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 2012 WL\\n639520, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2012) (“Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i) provides that the party who deposes\\nan expert witness—which in this case was Halasa—shall ‘pay\\nthe expert a reasonable fee for time spent.’”). The defendant\\nin Halasa had not insisted that plaintiff pay its witness at the\\ntime of the deposition, as it could have under Rule\\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). Instead, the defendant had paid its own witness\\nhis usual expert fee for time spent on the deposition the plain-\\ntiff had taken. The defendant waited until its final bill of costs\\nto request that payment under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).\\n Thus, because the defendant in Halasa was the prevailing\\nparty and because plaintiff, as the party who had sought the\\ndeposition of the defendant’s expert, had an obligation under\\nthe Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) to pay the costs of that deposition, the\\ndistrict court was permitted to order that the defendant be\\nawarded the amount of reasonable witness fees it actually\\npaid, regardless of the fee limits set forth in 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1821(b). Here, however, Abernathy is not asking that the\\ncosts of the depositions be reimbursed under Rule\\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). He instead seeks to have the costs of deposing\\nhis own expert witnesses reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1)\\nalone, a question that was not addressed in Halasa.\\n This case is much closer to the Supreme Court’s decision\\nin Crawford Fitting, which rejected Abernathy’s interpretation\\nof these rules. The issue in Crawford Fitting was whether a\\nparty could be reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1) for the higher\\nexpert fees it had paid to have its own expert witness testify\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nat trial. 482 U.S. at 438–39. The Court rejected that claim, hold-\\ning that “when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for\\nfees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound\\nby the limit of § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory\\nauthority to the contrary.” Id. at 439. The Court found that the\\nrule and statute did not conflict, and that while Rule 54(d)(1)\\npermits prevailing parties to recover costs, § 1821(b) places a\\nlimit on the amount that can be recovered. Id. at 444–45.\\n Abernathy argues that we should distinguish Crawford Fit-\\nting and instead follow and extend the reasoning of the Eighth\\nCircuit in Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d 454, 464–65 (8th Cir.\\n2015), which allowed Cottrell, the prevailing party, to recover\\nthe full expert witness fees it actually paid to Stanley under\\nRule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) during discovery to take the deposition of\\nStanley’s expert witness. Whether Stanley was correct or not\\non its own facts, its reasoning does not extend to the case be-\\nfore us, where the prevailing party seeks to recover full expert\\nfees for the depositions of his own expert witnesses. This is\\nCrawford Fitting, except that we address here expert deposi-\\ntions rather than expert trial testimony. It would be a mistake\\nto limit Crawford Fitting on that basis. If we held that prevail-\\ning parties could recover under Rule 54(d) the full costs of de-\\nposing their own expert witnesses before trial, but not of call-\\ning those expert witnesses to testify live at trial, see Crawford\\nFitting, we would create an incentive for parties to offer expert\\ndepositions at trial in lieu of live expert testimony. Nothing in\\nthe text or logic of the rules calls for such a perverse incentive,\\nand we see no persuasive reason to distinguish this case from\\nCrawford Fitting.\\n The judgment of the district court and its award of costs\\nare AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4667,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670067,"string":"4,670,067"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Chicago Studio Rental, Incorpo v. Illinois Department of Commerc"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3134"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18–3134\\nCHICAGO STUDIO RENTAL, INCORPORATED, CHICAGO STUDIO\\nCITY REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC\\nOPPORTUNITY, ILLINOIS FILM OFFICE, BETSY STEINBERG, in both\\nher official and individual capacity,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-CV-04099 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. For nearly 30 years, Chicago Studio\\nRental, Incorporated and Chicago Studio City Real Estate\\nHoldings, LLC (collectively, “Chicago Studio”) operated the\\nonly film studio in Chicago, Illinois. That changed around\\n2010 when Chicago Film Studio Holdings, LLC and Chicago\\n\\f2 No. 18-3134\\n\\nFilm Studio Industrial Real Estate Holdings, LLC (collec-\\ntively, “Cinespace”) opened a new studio. Within a handful\\nof years, Cinespace rapidly expanded its studio to include 26\\nmore stages and 24 times more floor space than Chicago Stu-\\ndio’s facility. Chicago Studio could not keep up, failed to at-\\ntract production business, and ultimately stopped making a\\nprofit.\\n Chicago Studio sought to blame others for its demise and\\nfiled this action against the Illinois Department of Commerce\\nand Economic Opportunity, Illinois Film Office, and Betsy\\nSteinberg—three Illinois state actors responsible for promot-\\ning the Illinois film industry. Chicago Studio alleged that De-\\nfendants unlawfully steered state incentives and business to\\nCinespace in violation of the Sherman Act and equal protec-\\ntion and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The\\ndistrict court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Sher-\\nman Act and due process claims. It later granted summary\\njudgment on the equal protection claim. Chicago Studio now\\nappeals these decisions on the Sherman Act and equal protec-\\ntion claims.\\n We affirm. The district court properly dismissed the Sher-\\nman Act claim because Chicago Studio failed to adequately\\nplead an antitrust injury. The complaint merely alleges inju-\\nries to Chicago Studio, not to competition. We also conclude\\nthat the district court properly granted summary judgment\\non the equal protection claim. Chicago Studio and Cinespace\\nare not similarly situated, and there was a rational basis for\\nSteinberg’s conduct. We further find that the district court did\\nnot abuse its discretion in striking Chicago Studio’s addi-\\ntional statement of facts for noncompliance.\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 3\\n\\n I. Background\\n Since 1979, Chicago Studio has operated a film and televi-\\nsion production studio in Chicago, Illinois. Chicago Studio\\nhas four studio stages measuring 62,000 square feet. It re-\\nquires production companies to lease its production equip-\\nment for a .4% charge. The studio does not have installed air\\nconditioning, but Chicago Studio can provide industry stand-\\nard portable air conditioning units for an additional charge. It\\ndoes not have scene docks, which would allow large trailers\\nto unload equipment inside the studio. During the relevant\\ntime period, Chicago Studio could accommodate one large or\\ntwo average projects at a given time.\\n Cinespace began operating a studio in Chicago around\\n2010. Cinespace is not a party to this action, but it is Chicago\\nStudio’s only competitor in the Chicago area. By the end of\\n2012, Cinespace had 600,000 square feet of floor space and 10\\nstages. The studio expanded to 1.5 million square feet of floor\\nspace and 30 stages by January 2015. Cinespace’s studio can\\naccommodate two-story sets and includes air conditioning,\\ninside breezeways and scene docks, concrete floors, sound-\\nproof walls, and new offices. Cinespace permits production\\ncompanies to use any equipment rentals they choose includ-\\ning an unaffiliated equipment rental company called\\nCinelease that charges .2%.\\n All three Defendants are Illinois state actors. The Illinois\\nDepartment of Commerce and Economic Opportunity\\n(“IDCEO”) is a division of Illinois government tasked with\\npromoting Illinois’s profile as a leading business destination.\\nTo promote the Illinois film industry, IDCEO administers\\ngrant programs to film studios and tax credits to film produc-\\ners. See 35 ILCS 16/10; Ill. Admin. Code tit. 14, § 528.70 (2013).\\n\\f4 No. 18-3134\\n\\nThe Illinois Film Office (“IFO”) is part of IDCEO, and Betsy\\nSteinberg served as the IFO Managing Director during Gov-\\nernor Patrick Quinn’s administration. The IFO’s principal\\npurpose is to support the Illinois film industry. See 35 ILCS\\n16/5 (“Illinois must move aggressively with new business de-\\nvelopment investment tools so that Illinois is more competi-\\ntive in site location decision-making for film productions.…It\\nis the purpose of this Act to preserve and expand the existing\\nhuman infrastructure for the motion picture industry in Illi-\\nnois.”)\\n Chicago Studio claims that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg\\nconspired with Cinespace to boycott Chicago Studio and to\\nsteer business towards Cinespace. They did so by administer-\\ning 30% film tax credits to producers and issuing five state\\ngrants totaling $27.3 million to Cinespace. Due to a change in\\nadministration, Cinespace returned $10 million to Illinois.\\nChicago Studio also alleges that Defendants failed to mention\\nChicago Studio to producers, encouraged producers to use\\nCinespace, excluded Chicago Studio from business meetings,\\nand did not allow Chicago Studio to bid on production op-\\nportunities. Chicago Studio states that it applied for two\\ngrants, but it did not receive either.\\n Cinespace consistently reached out to Steinberg and IFO\\nfor assistance with marketing and procuring film and televi-\\nsion production business. It also hired a lobbyist to apply for\\ngrant money from the State of Illinois. Steinberg provided\\nhelp to Chicago Studio whenever it asked, but it rarely did.\\nChicago Studio did not ask Steinberg to contact Hollywood\\nfilm producers on its behalf because it had done business with\\nthem for years. Chicago Studio does not identify a single\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 5\\n\\ninstance where it reached out to Steinberg for help, and Stein-\\nberg refused.\\n The Illinois film industry became more profitable over the\\nrelevant time period. In 2009, the Illinois film industry earned\\napproximately $104 million in gross revenue. In 2012 and\\n2013, it made approximately $184 million and $350 million in\\ngross revenue, respectively. The industry also created new\\njobs, approximately 7,082 in 2009 to 15,627 in 2013.\\n By steering business towards Cinespace, Chicago Studio\\nasserts that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg became active market\\nparticipants in the “Chicago Film Production Market,” which\\nit defines as entities providing production facilities in Chi-\\ncago. Defendants’ conduct resulted in the following alleged\\ninjuries: (1) a decrease in Chicago Studio’s market share from\\n100% to 10%, (2) Chicago Studio’s inability to compete in the\\nmarket, (3) a reduction in competition, and (4) an increase in\\ntransactional costs to produce film and television in Chicago\\nto consumers of those services.\\n Chicago Studio filed suit asserting violations of equal pro-\\ntection under the Fourteenth Amendment against Steinberg\\nin her individual capacity (Count I), Sections 1 and 2 of the\\nSherman Act against IDCEO and Steinberg in her official ca-\\npacity (Count II), and due process under the Fourteenth\\nAmendment against Steinberg in her individual capacity\\n(Count III). Defendants moved to dismiss the action under\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the district\\ncourt granted in part. Chicago Studio subsequently filed an\\namended complaint and added IFO as a defendant. Defend-\\nants again moved to dismiss the Sherman Act and due pro-\\ncess claims for failure to state a claim. The district court\\ngranted the motion. Steinberg later moved for summary\\n\\f6 No. 18-3134\\n\\njudgment on the equal protection claim. The district court\\ngranted Steinberg’s motion for summary judgment and\\nstruck Chicago Studio’s statement of additional facts for non-\\ncompliance. Chicago Studio now appeals both the district\\ncourt’s dismissal of the Sherman Act claim and the summary\\njudgment ruling.\\n II. Discussion\\nA. The Sherman Act\\n We review the district court’s motion to dismiss ruling de\\nnovo, assume all well-pleaded allegations are true, and con-\\nstrue reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Kemper v.\\nDeutsche Bank AG, 911 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2018). To survive\\na motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege\\n“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\\nface.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A\\nclaim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual\\ncontent that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference\\nthat the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ash-\\ncroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).\\n The district court dismissed Chicago Studio’s antitrust\\nclaim with prejudice. In doing so, it relied upon Czajkowski v.\\nIllinois, 460 F. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) and held that IDCEO,\\nIFO, and Steinberg in their official capacities are immune\\nfrom antitrust liability under the Eleventh Amendment. It\\nalso found that Chicago Studio had failed to allege an anti-\\ntrust injury.\\n The Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act does\\nnot prohibit anticompetitive state action. Parker v. Brown, 317\\nU.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (“The Sherman Act…gives no hint that\\nit was intended to restrain state action or official action\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 7\\n\\ndirected by a state.”). Since then, the Supreme Court has de-\\nvised three types of antitrust immunity: (1) ipso facto immun-\\nity, (2) Hallie immunity, and (3) Midcal immunity. See N.C.\\nState Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 1110–13\\n(2015); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38–40,\\n42 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567–69 (1984); Cal.\\nRetail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.\\n97, 105 (1980); see also Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Village of\\nBellwood, 929 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir. 2019); Lawline v. Am. Bar\\nAss’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1384 (7th Cir. 1992); Fuchs v. Rural Elec.\\nConvenience Coop. Inc., 858 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988).\\n The parties disagree on which immunity test applies here.\\nChicago Studio argues that Defendants are not subject to an-\\ntitrust immunity because the Midcal test applies, and Defend-\\nants do not satisfy the test. Defendants argue that they are\\nsubject to either ipso facto immunity or Hallie immunity. We\\ndo not need to decide whether Defendants are subject to anti-\\ntrust immunity because we find that Chicago Studio failed to\\nallege an antitrust injury.1 See, e.g., Paramount Media Grp., Inc.,\\n929 F.3d at 921.\\n The complaint asserts that Defendants violated Sections 1\\nand 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act pro-\\nhibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or\\notherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”\\n15 U.S.C. § 1. Chicago Studio alleges that IDCEO, IFO, and\\nSteinberg violated Section 1 by steering tax credits to produc-\\ners using Cinespace’s studio and state grants to Cinespace\\n\\n\\n 1Although we do not decide which immunity test should apply here,\\nboth parties acknowledge that the test outlined in Czajkowski v. Illinois, 460\\nF. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) is the wrong standard. We agree.\\n\\f8 No. 18-3134\\n\\nand boycotting Chicago Studio in restraint of trade. Section 2\\nof the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or at-\\ntempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other\\nperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or\\ncommerce among the several States….” 15 U.S.C. § 2. Chicago\\nStudio claims that Defendants and Cinespace conspired to\\nmonopolize and have attempted to monopolize the market\\nfor operating film studios in Chicago violating Section 2.\\n To state an antitrust injury, a plaintiff must allege an anti-\\ncompetitive injury that flows from defendant’s actions and\\nthat the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Brunswick\\nCorp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see\\nalso, e.g., Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir.\\n1995). “The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plain-\\ntiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-re-\\nducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior.” Atlantic\\nRichfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 (1990).\\nPlaintiff must assert an injury not only to itself, but to the rel-\\nevant market. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683\\nF.3d 328, 334–35 (7th Cir. 2012). The alleged injury must either\\nreduce output or raise prices to consumers. James Cape & Sons\\nCo. v. PCC Constr. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 2006); see also\\nMcGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankr. Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 937 F.3d\\n1056, 1065 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We usually presume that compet-\\nitors and consumers in the relevant market are the only par-\\nties who suffer antitrust injuries and are in a position to effi-\\nciently vindicate the antitrust laws.”). “The antitrust-injury\\ndoctrine was created to filter out complaints by competitors\\nand others who may be hurt by productive efficiencies, higher\\noutput, and lower prices, all of which the antitrust laws are\\ndesigned to encourage.” United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana\\nGas. Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 9\\n\\n At best, Chicago Studio has pleaded an injury to itself, not\\nan anticompetitive injury to the market. The complaint alleges\\nthe following injuries: (1) decrease in Chicago Studio’s share\\nof the film production market, (2) Chicago Studio’s inability\\nto compete in the market, (3) a reduction in competition, and\\n(4) an increase in transactional costs to produce films in Chi-\\ncago to other consumers of those services. Two of the alleged\\ninjuries—decrease in its share of the film production market\\nand inability to compete—are harms to Chicago Studio and\\nare not proper antitrust injuries. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon,\\nInc., 525 U.S. 128, 135, 139 (1998) (concluding that plaintiff\\n“must allege and prove harm, not just to a single competitor,\\nbut to the competitive process, i.e., to competition itself”). A\\nreduction in competition and an increase in transactional\\ncosts could be anticompetitive injuries, but Chicago Studio\\nfails to plausibly allege either. Although Chicago Studio gen-\\nerally claims, in a conclusory manner, that competition de-\\ncreased, the thrust of its complaint points the opposite way.\\nBefore 2009, Chicago Studio was the only film studio in the\\nChicago area. Cinespace came into the market, brought new\\ncapacity, and the Illinois film industry grew. The number of\\nfilm studios in Chicago increased from one to two, and the\\nIllinois film industry generated about $184 million and $350\\nmillion in revenue in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Chicago\\nStudio continued to operate in the market and does not allege\\nthat it was excluded from doing so. Chicago Studio also pro-\\nvides no facts to support its one-sentence, conclusory state-\\nment that transactional costs increased. The complaint does\\nnot allege what transactional costs increased, how much they\\nincreased by, and who experienced the increased costs. Nor\\ndoes the complaint allege reduced output or higher prices in\\nthe Chicago film market. In summary, Chicago Studio merely\\n\\f10 No. 18-3134\\n\\nstates these assertions in a conclusory fashion and fails to al-\\nlege factual allegations supporting the existence of an anti-\\ntrust injury. We will not accept such allegations as true. See\\nIqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of\\na cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,\\ndo not suffice.”)\\n Chicago Studio argues that its exclusion from the market\\nis a valid antitrust injury and cites Gulf States Reorganization\\nGroup, Inc. v. Nucor Corporation, 466 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2006)\\nand OverEnd Technologies, LLC v. Invista S.ÀR.L., 431 F. Supp.\\n2d 925 (E.D. Wis. 2006). Chicago Studio, however, does not\\nallege that it was entirely excluded from the market. “Transfer\\nof business from one company to another, however, without\\nan accompanying effect on competition, cannot be an anti-\\ntrust violation” because antitrust laws protect competition,\\nnot competitors. Tri-Gen Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs,\\nLocal 150, AFL-CIO, 433 F.3d 1024, 1031–32 (7th Cir. 2006).\\nMoreover, these cases are distinguishable because they in-\\nvolved exclusion of a potential competitor. See Gulf States Re-\\norganization Grp., Inc., 466 F.3d at 967–68; OverEnd Techs., LLC,\\n431 F. Supp. 2d at 930. Chicago Studio is not a potential com-\\npetitor; it has operated a film studio in Chicago since 1979 and\\ncontinued to do so after Cinespace entered the market. See Tri-\\nGen Inc., 433 F.3d at 1032.\\n Chicago Studio’s Section 2 claim also fails for an addi-\\ntional reason. The complaint does not plausibly allege that\\nDefendants conspired to monopolize or have attempted to\\nmonopolize the market for operating film studios in Chicago.\\nChicago Studio admitted that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg are\\nnot competitors of Chicago Studio. Instead Chicago Studio ar-\\ngues that they are market participants. This is implausible.\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 11\\n\\nDefendants do not provide studio space and do not compete\\nin the market. The complaint also does not allege any facts\\nregarding their market power or anticompetitive use of their\\npower. See Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 282–84 (7th\\nCir. 2000).\\n Because we find that Chicago Studio failed to plead an an-\\ntitrust injury, we do not address Defendants’ additional bases\\nfor dismissing the antitrust claim.\\nB. Equal Protection\\n We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling\\nde novo and in the light most favorable to Chicago Studio.\\nPeerless Network, Inc. v. MCI Commc’n Serv., Inc., 917 F.3d 538,\\n545 (7th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when\\n“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the\\nmovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.\\nCiv. P. 56(a).\\n Chicago Studio raises a “class-of-one” equal protection\\nclaim against Steinberg in her individual capacity. This claim\\nis based on the principle that similarly situated people must\\nbe treated alike unless there is a rational basis for treating\\nthem differently. See LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Win-\\nnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2010). To succeed, Chicago\\nStudio must prove that (1) it has been “intentionally treated\\ndifferently from others similarly situated,” and (2) “there is\\nno rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Paramount\\nMedia Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d at 920 (citation omitted). We have\\nyet to determine whether a plaintiff must also prove bad mo-\\ntive. See Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 913 (7th\\nCir. 2012) (Wood, J., dissenting). But we need not do so here\\n\\f12 No. 18-3134\\n\\nbecause Chicago Studio cannot survive summary judgment\\non the other elements of its equal protection claim.\\n To be similarly situated, competitors must be “identical or\\ndirectly comparable” “in all material aspects.” See Miller v.\\nCity of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting\\nLaBella Winnetka, Inc., 628 F.3d at 942). Chicago Studio must\\nshow that it was treated differently than another entity that is\\n“‘prima facie identical in all relevant respects.’” Paramount Me-\\ndia Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d at 920 (citing D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch.\\nCorp., 799 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2015)).\\n Here, Chicago Studio and Cinespace were not similarly\\nsituated because the undisputed facts demonstrate that they\\ndiffered in material ways. Chicago Studio has four stages\\nmeasuring 62,000 square feet, whereas Cinespace has 30\\nstages and 1.5 million square feet of floor space. Cinespace\\ncould also accommodate two-story sets. Chicago Studio does\\nnot have scene docks or installed air conditioning (only port-\\nable air conditioning units for an additional charge) while\\nCinespace has both. Chicago Studio charges .4% for equip-\\nment rentals and requires production companies to use its\\nequipment rentals. Cinespace permits production companies\\nto use any equipment rental company including Cinelease,\\nwhich charges .2%. Based on these facts, no rational fact finder\\nwould consider these studios to be similarly situated.\\n The equal protection claim also fails because there are ra-\\ntional bases for Steinberg’s conduct. “If we can come up with\\na rational basis for the challenged action, that will be the end\\nof the matter—animus or no.” Fares Pawn, LLC v. Indiana Dep’t\\nof Fin. Insts., 755 F.3d 839, 845 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2014). We just\\nneed to identify a conceivable rational basis for the different\\ntreatment; it does not need to be the actual basis for\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 13\\n\\ndefendant’s actions. D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681,\\n686 (7th Cir. 2013). There are several rational bases for Stein-\\nberg’s conduct. First, it was rational for Steinberg to offer\\nmore assistance to the studio that requested help. Cinespace\\nconsistently reached out to Steinberg for marketing support,\\nand Chicago Studio rarely did. It cannot now complain that\\nits failure to do so amounts to a constitutional injury. Second,\\nit was rational for Steinberg to promote the studios based on\\nproduction needs. Fox Studios, for example, decided to film\\nEmpire at Cinespace and occupied 250,000 square feet and up\\nto six stages. Lionsgate considered filming Divergent in Chi-\\ncago and requested 200,000 square feet of production space.\\nIt would have been rational for Steinberg to promote Cine-\\nspace over Chicago Studio for these projects because Chicago\\nStudio simply did not have enough studio space to accommo-\\ndate these productions and Cinespace did. We find that the\\ndistrict court properly granted summary judgment on the\\nequal protection claim.\\nC. Summary Judgment Practice\\n During summary judgment briefing, the parties filed a\\njoint statement of undisputed facts pursuant to Judge Ellis’s\\ncase management procedure. Chicago Studio subsequently\\nfiled a statement of additional facts, which it claimed con-\\ntained disputed facts. The district court found that Chicago\\nStudio’s additional facts were undisputed facts and a blatant\\nattempt to get around the court’s order permitting 50 addi-\\ntional facts. It therefore struck Chicago Studio’s statement of\\nadditional facts and granted Steinberg’s motion for summary\\njudgment.\\n On appeal, Chicago Studio argues that the district court’s\\nsummary judgment practice is overly burdensome and\\n\\f14 No. 18-3134\\n\\nviolates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56 and 83 and Local\\nRule 56.1 by allowing the court to determine material issues\\nof fact and disallowing a party to dispute an undisputed fact.\\nWe disagree.\\n As a threshold matter, Chicago Studio forfeited this argu-\\nment by failing to challenge the summary judgment practice\\nat the district court. See Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 540,\\n544 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A party generally forfeits issues and ar-\\nguments raised for the first time on appeal.”). Instead, Chi-\\ncago Studio and Defendants filed joint motions in compliance\\nwith the district court’s practice. If Chicago Studio objected to\\nthe district court’s practice, it should have made a record of\\nits objections at the district court and given the district court\\nthe opportunity to address the concern.2 It did not. We cannot\\nconsider this argument for the first time on appeal.\\n Even if it was not forfeited (or waived), Chicago Studio’s\\nchallenge nonetheless fails. We review the district court’s de-\\ncision on compliance with local rules for an abuse of discre-\\ntion. Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir.\\n2008). The relevant portion of Judge Ellis’s summary judg-\\nment practice states:\\n Parties are required to file a joint statement of\\n undisputed material facts that the parties agree\\n are not in dispute…The parties may not file –\\n\\n\\n 2Although not argued by the parties, Chicago Studio likely waived\\nthis argument as well. See, e.g., CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones Lang LaSalle\\nAmericas, Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018). At a hearing, Chicago Stu-\\ndio’s counsel stated that the summary judgment practice was “overly bur-\\ndensome.” But later, during the same hearing, Chicago Studio’s counsel\\nagreed to abide by the summary judgment practice.\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 15\\n\\n and the Court will not consider – separate\\n statements of undisputed facts. However, the\\n non-moving party may include facts in its re-\\n sponse to the motion for summary judgment\\n that it contends are disputed in order to demon-\\n strate that a genuine issue of material fact exists\\n that warrants denying the motion for summary\\n judgment. The non-moving party must include\\n citations to supporting material supporting the\\n dispute and attach the same. The moving party\\n may respond to these facts in its reply.\\n The parties shall not file more than 120 state-\\n ments of undisputed material facts without\\n prior leave of the Court….\\n If the parties cannot agree whether proposed\\n statements of fact are not in dispute, they may\\n file a joint motion prior to filing the motion for\\n summary judgment so the Court can determine\\n whether there is a basis for the alleged disputes.\\n That motion should set forth the proposed state-\\n ments of fact at issue, with supporting material.\\n Each statement should be followed by a re-\\n sponse by the other party explaining why that\\n party contends that the statement is actually in\\n dispute, with citation to supporting mate-\\n rial…The Court will then determine whether\\n the proposed statements of fact may be in-\\n cluded in the joint statement as undisputed\\n facts. Parties should provide the Court with suf-\\n ficient time to rule on factual disputes before\\n summary judgment motions are due.…\\n\\f16 No. 18-3134\\n\\n If the nonmoving party wholly refuses to join in\\n the joint statement of undisputed material facts,\\n the moving party will nevertheless be permitted\\n to file the motion for summary judgment, ac-\\n companied by a separate declaration of counsel\\n explaining why a joint statement of undisputed\\n material facts was not filed.\\nJudge Sara L. Ellis, Case Management Procedures, available at\\nhttps://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/judge-info.aspx?VyU/OurK-\\nKJRDT+FUM5tZmA== (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (emphasis\\nin original).\\n We have previously held that Judge Ellis’s summary judg-\\nment practice does not violate Local Rule 56.1. See Sweatt v.\\nUnion Pac. R.R. Co., 796 F.3d 701, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015). The\\nsummary judgment practice at issue in Sweatt is materially\\nsimilar to the one at issue here. It merely requires parties to\\nfile a joint statement of undisputed facts, if possible. The non-\\nmoving party may include disputed facts in its response brief,\\nand the moving party may respond to these disputed facts in\\nits reply brief. That is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 56(a), which requires parties to support their asser-\\ntion that a fact “cannot be or is genuinely disputed.” Nor is it\\nin conflict with Local Rule 56.1, which directs a moving party\\nto file a statement of material facts and a non-moving party to\\nrespond to the movant’s statement of material facts. N.D. Ill.\\nL.R. 56.1(a), (b)(3)(c); See Sweatt, 796 F.3d at 711 (“The lauda-\\nble goal of this [case management procedure] is to remove the\\nchaff from the grain in a given case, thereby allowing the par-\\nties—and the court—to focus on the facts that are actually in\\ndispute.”) “A judge may regulate practice in any manner con-\\nsistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 17\\n\\n2072 and 2075, and the district’s local rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n83(b).\\n Chicago Studio has not presented any reason why we\\nshould conclude otherwise here. We agree with the district\\ncourt that Chicago Studio’s statement is comprised of undis-\\nputed facts. The parties could have included these facts in\\ntheir joint statement of undisputed facts. The joint statement\\nincluded 91 undisputed facts, and the court’s summary judg-\\nment practice permits up to 120 undisputed facts without\\nleave of court. If the parties needed to present more than 120\\nundisputed facts, they should have requested leave to do so.\\nThey did not. We find that the district court did not abuse its\\ndiscretion by striking Chicago Studio’s statement of addi-\\ntional facts for noncompliance.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4447320/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670067/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Chicago Studio Rental, Incorpo v. Illinois Department of Commerc\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18–3134\nCHICAGO STUDIO RENTAL, INCORPORATED, CHICAGO STUDIO\nCITY REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC\nOPPORTUNITY, ILLINOIS FILM OFFICE, BETSY STEINBERG, in both\nher official and individual capacity,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:15-CV-04099 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. For nearly 30 years, Chicago Studio\nRental, Incorporated and Chicago Studio City Real Estate\nHoldings, LLC (collectively, “Chicago Studio”) operated the\nonly film studio in Chicago, Illinois. That changed around\n2010 when Chicago Film Studio Holdings, LLC and Chicago\n\f2 No. 18-3134\n\nFilm Studio Industrial Real Estate Holdings, LLC (collec-\ntively, “Cinespace”) opened a new studio. Within a handful\nof years, Cinespace rapidly expanded its studio to include 26\nmore stages and 24 times more floor space than Chicago Stu-\ndio’s facility. Chicago Studio could not keep up, failed to at-\ntract production business, and ultimately stopped making a\nprofit.\n Chicago Studio sought to blame others for its demise and\nfiled this action against the Illinois Department of Commerce\nand Economic Opportunity, Illinois Film Office, and Betsy\nSteinberg—three Illinois state actors responsible for promot-\ning the Illinois film industry. Chicago Studio alleged that De-\nfendants unlawfully steered state incentives and business to\nCinespace in violation of the Sherman Act and equal protec-\ntion and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The\ndistrict court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Sher-\nman Act and due process claims. It later granted summary\njudgment on the equal protection claim. Chicago Studio now\nappeals these decisions on the Sherman Act and equal protec-\ntion claims.\n We affirm. The district court properly dismissed the Sher-\nman Act claim because Chicago Studio failed to adequately\nplead an antitrust injury. The complaint merely alleges inju-\nries to Chicago Studio, not to competition. We also conclude\nthat the district court properly granted summary judgment\non the equal protection claim. Chicago Studio and Cinespace\nare not similarly situated, and there was a rational basis for\nSteinberg’s conduct. We further find that the district court did\nnot abuse its discretion in striking Chicago Studio’s addi-\ntional statement of facts for noncompliance.\n\fNo. 18-3134 3\n\n I. Background\n Since 1979, Chicago Studio has operated a film and televi-\nsion production studio in Chicago, Illinois. Chicago Studio\nhas four studio stages measuring 62,000 square feet. It re-\nquires production companies to lease its production equip-\nment for a .4% charge. The studio does not have installed air\nconditioning, but Chicago Studio can provide industry stand-\nard portable air conditioning units for an additional charge. It\ndoes not have scene docks, which would allow large trailers\nto unload equipment inside the studio. During the relevant\ntime period, Chicago Studio could accommodate one large or\ntwo average projects at a given time.\n Cinespace began operating a studio in Chicago around\n2010. Cinespace is not a party to this action, but it is Chicago\nStudio’s only competitor in the Chicago area. By the end of\n2012, Cinespace had 600,000 square feet of floor space and 10\nstages. The studio expanded to 1.5 million square feet of floor\nspace and 30 stages by January 2015. Cinespace’s studio can\naccommodate two-story sets and includes air conditioning,\ninside breezeways and scene docks, concrete floors, sound-\nproof walls, and new offices. Cinespace permits production\ncompanies to use any equipment rentals they choose includ-\ning an unaffiliated equipment rental company called\nCinelease that charges .2%.\n All three Defendants are Illinois state actors. The Illinois\nDepartment of Commerce and Economic Opportunity\n(“IDCEO”) is a division of Illinois government tasked with\npromoting Illinois’s profile as a leading business destination.\nTo promote the Illinois film industry, IDCEO administers\ngrant programs to film studios and tax credits to film produc-\ners. See 35 ILCS 16/10; Ill. Admin. Code tit. 14, § 528.70 (2013).\n\f4 No. 18-3134\n\nThe Illinois Film Office (“IFO”) is part of IDCEO, and Betsy\nSteinberg served as the IFO Managing Director during Gov-\nernor Patrick Quinn’s administration. The IFO’s principal\npurpose is to support the Illinois film industry. See 35 ILCS\n16/5 (“Illinois must move aggressively with new business de-\nvelopment investment tools so that Illinois is more competi-\ntive in site location decision-making for film productions.…It\nis the purpose of this Act to preserve and expand the existing\nhuman infrastructure for the motion picture industry in Illi-\nnois.”)\n Chicago Studio claims that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg\nconspired with Cinespace to boycott Chicago Studio and to\nsteer business towards Cinespace. They did so by administer-\ning 30% film tax credits to producers and issuing five state\ngrants totaling $27.3 million to Cinespace. Due to a change in\nadministration, Cinespace returned $10 million to Illinois.\nChicago Studio also alleges that Defendants failed to mention\nChicago Studio to producers, encouraged producers to use\nCinespace, excluded Chicago Studio from business meetings,\nand did not allow Chicago Studio to bid on production op-\nportunities. Chicago Studio states that it applied for two\ngrants, but it did not receive either.\n Cinespace consistently reached out to Steinberg and IFO\nfor assistance with marketing and procuring film and televi-\nsion production business. It also hired a lobbyist to apply for\ngrant money from the State of Illinois. Steinberg provided\nhelp to Chicago Studio whenever it asked, but it rarely did.\nChicago Studio did not ask Steinberg to contact Hollywood\nfilm producers on its behalf because it had done business with\nthem for years. Chicago Studio does not identify a single\n\fNo. 18-3134 5\n\ninstance where it reached out to Steinberg for help, and Stein-\nberg refused.\n The Illinois film industry became more profitable over the\nrelevant time period. In 2009, the Illinois film industry earned\napproximately $104 million in gross revenue. In 2012 and\n2013, it made approximately $184 million and $350 million in\ngross revenue, respectively. The industry also created new\njobs, approximately 7,082 in 2009 to 15,627 in 2013.\n By steering business towards Cinespace, Chicago Studio\nasserts that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg became active market\nparticipants in the “Chicago Film Production Market,” which\nit defines as entities providing production facilities in Chi-\ncago. Defendants’ conduct resulted in the following alleged\ninjuries: (1) a decrease in Chicago Studio’s market share from\n100% to 10%, (2) Chicago Studio’s inability to compete in the\nmarket, (3) a reduction in competition, and (4) an increase in\ntransactional costs to produce film and television in Chicago\nto consumers of those services.\n Chicago Studio filed suit asserting violations of equal pro-\ntection under the Fourteenth Amendment against Steinberg\nin her individual capacity (Count I), Sections 1 and 2 of the\nSherman Act against IDCEO and Steinberg in her official ca-\npacity (Count II), and due process under the Fourteenth\nAmendment against Steinberg in her individual capacity\n(Count III). Defendants moved to dismiss the action under\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the district\ncourt granted in part. Chicago Studio subsequently filed an\namended complaint and added IFO as a defendant. Defend-\nants again moved to dismiss the Sherman Act and due pro-\ncess claims for failure to state a claim. The district court\ngranted the motion. Steinberg later moved for summary\n\f6 No. 18-3134\n\njudgment on the equal protection claim. The district court\ngranted Steinberg’s motion for summary judgment and\nstruck Chicago Studio’s statement of additional facts for non-\ncompliance. Chicago Studio now appeals both the district\ncourt’s dismissal of the Sherman Act claim and the summary\njudgment ruling.\n II. Discussion\nA. The Sherman Act\n We review the district court’s motion to dismiss ruling de\nnovo, assume all well-pleaded allegations are true, and con-\nstrue reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Kemper v.\nDeutsche Bank AG, 911 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2018). To survive\na motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege\n“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\nface.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A\nclaim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual\ncontent that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference\nthat the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ash-\ncroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).\n The district court dismissed Chicago Studio’s antitrust\nclaim with prejudice. In doing so, it relied upon Czajkowski v.\nIllinois, 460 F. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) and held that IDCEO,\nIFO, and Steinberg in their official capacities are immune\nfrom antitrust liability under the Eleventh Amendment. It\nalso found that Chicago Studio had failed to allege an anti-\ntrust injury.\n The Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act does\nnot prohibit anticompetitive state action. Parker v. Brown, 317\nU.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (“The Sherman Act…gives no hint that\nit was intended to restrain state action or official action\n\fNo. 18-3134 7\n\ndirected by a state.”). Since then, the Supreme Court has de-\nvised three types of antitrust immunity: (1) ipso facto immun-\nity, (2) Hallie immunity, and (3) Midcal immunity. See N.C.\nState Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 1110–13\n(2015); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38–40,\n42 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567–69 (1984); Cal.\nRetail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.\n97, 105 (1980); see also Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Village of\nBellwood, 929 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir. 2019); Lawline v. Am. Bar\nAss’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1384 (7th Cir. 1992); Fuchs v. Rural Elec.\nConvenience Coop. Inc., 858 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988).\n The parties disagree on which immunity test applies here.\nChicago Studio argues that Defendants are not subject to an-\ntitrust immunity because the Midcal test applies, and Defend-\nants do not satisfy the test. Defendants argue that they are\nsubject to either ipso facto immunity or Hallie immunity. We\ndo not need to decide whether Defendants are subject to anti-\ntrust immunity because we find that Chicago Studio failed to\nallege an antitrust injury.1 See, e.g., Paramount Media Grp., Inc.,\n929 F.3d at 921.\n The complaint asserts that Defendants violated Sections 1\nand 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act pro-\nhibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or\notherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”\n15 U.S.C. § 1. Chicago Studio alleges that IDCEO, IFO, and\nSteinberg violated Section 1 by steering tax credits to produc-\ners using Cinespace’s studio and state grants to Cinespace\n\n\n 1Although we do not decide which immunity test should apply here,\nboth parties acknowledge that the test outlined in Czajkowski v. Illinois, 460\nF. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) is the wrong standard. We agree.\n\f8 No. 18-3134\n\nand boycotting Chicago Studio in restraint of trade. Section 2\nof the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or at-\ntempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other\nperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or\ncommerce among the several States….” 15 U.S.C. § 2. Chicago\nStudio claims that Defendants and Cinespace conspired to\nmonopolize and have attempted to monopolize the market\nfor operating film studios in Chicago violating Section 2.\n To state an antitrust injury, a plaintiff must allege an anti-\ncompetitive injury that flows from defendant’s actions and\nthat the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Brunswick\nCorp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see\nalso, e.g., Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir.\n1995). “The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plain-\ntiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-re-\nducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior.” Atlantic\nRichfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 (1990).\nPlaintiff must assert an injury not only to itself, but to the rel-\nevant market. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683\nF.3d 328, 334–35 (7th Cir. 2012). The alleged injury must either\nreduce output or raise prices to consumers. James Cape & Sons\nCo. v. PCC Constr. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 2006); see also\nMcGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankr. Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 937 F.3d\n1056, 1065 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We usually presume that compet-\nitors and consumers in the relevant market are the only par-\nties who suffer antitrust injuries and are in a position to effi-\nciently vindicate the antitrust laws.”). “The antitrust-injury\ndoctrine was created to filter out complaints by competitors\nand others who may be hurt by productive efficiencies, higher\noutput, and lower prices, all of which the antitrust laws are\ndesigned to encourage.” United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana\nGas. Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003).\n\fNo. 18-3134 9\n\n At best, Chicago Studio has pleaded an injury to itself, not\nan anticompetitive injury to the market. The complaint alleges\nthe following injuries: (1) decrease in Chicago Studio’s share\nof the film production market, (2) Chicago Studio’s inability\nto compete in the market, (3) a reduction in competition, and\n(4) an increase in transactional costs to produce films in Chi-\ncago to other consumers of those services. Two of the alleged\ninjuries—decrease in its share of the film production market\nand inability to compete—are harms to Chicago Studio and\nare not proper antitrust injuries. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon,\nInc., 525 U.S. 128, 135, 139 (1998) (concluding that plaintiff\n“must allege and prove harm, not just to a single competitor,\nbut to the competitive process, i.e., to competition itself”). A\nreduction in competition and an increase in transactional\ncosts could be anticompetitive injuries, but Chicago Studio\nfails to plausibly allege either. Although Chicago Studio gen-\nerally claims, in a conclusory manner, that competition de-\ncreased, the thrust of its complaint points the opposite way.\nBefore 2009, Chicago Studio was the only film studio in the\nChicago area. Cinespace came into the market, brought new\ncapacity, and the Illinois film industry grew. The number of\nfilm studios in Chicago increased from one to two, and the\nIllinois film industry generated about $184 million and $350\nmillion in revenue in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Chicago\nStudio continued to operate in the market and does not allege\nthat it was excluded from doing so. Chicago Studio also pro-\nvides no facts to support its one-sentence, conclusory state-\nment that transactional costs increased. The complaint does\nnot allege what transactional costs increased, how much they\nincreased by, and who experienced the increased costs. Nor\ndoes the complaint allege reduced output or higher prices in\nthe Chicago film market. In summary, Chicago Studio merely\n\f10 No. 18-3134\n\nstates these assertions in a conclusory fashion and fails to al-\nlege factual allegations supporting the existence of an anti-\ntrust injury. We will not accept such allegations as true. See\nIqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of\na cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,\ndo not suffice.”)\n Chicago Studio argues that its exclusion from the market\nis a valid antitrust injury and cites Gulf States Reorganization\nGroup, Inc. v. Nucor Corporation, 466 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2006)\nand OverEnd Technologies, LLC v. Invista S.ÀR.L., 431 F. Supp.\n2d 925 (E.D. Wis. 2006). Chicago Studio, however, does not\nallege that it was entirely excluded from the market. “Transfer\nof business from one company to another, however, without\nan accompanying effect on competition, cannot be an anti-\ntrust violation” because antitrust laws protect competition,\nnot competitors. Tri-Gen Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs,\nLocal 150, AFL-CIO, 433 F.3d 1024, 1031–32 (7th Cir. 2006).\nMoreover, these cases are distinguishable because they in-\nvolved exclusion of a potential competitor. See Gulf States Re-\norganization Grp., Inc., 466 F.3d at 967–68; OverEnd Techs., LLC,\n431 F. Supp. 2d at 930. Chicago Studio is not a potential com-\npetitor; it has operated a film studio in Chicago since 1979 and\ncontinued to do so after Cinespace entered the market. See Tri-\nGen Inc., 433 F.3d at 1032.\n Chicago Studio’s Section 2 claim also fails for an addi-\ntional reason. The complaint does not plausibly allege that\nDefendants conspired to monopolize or have attempted to\nmonopolize the market for operating film studios in Chicago.\nChicago Studio admitted that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg are\nnot competitors of Chicago Studio. Instead Chicago Studio ar-\ngues that they are market participants. This is implausible.\n\fNo. 18-3134 11\n\nDefendants do not provide studio space and do not compete\nin the market. The complaint also does not allege any facts\nregarding their market power or anticompetitive use of their\npower. See Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 282–84 (7th\nCir. 2000).\n Because we find that Chicago Studio failed to plead an an-\ntitrust injury, we do not address Defendants’ additional bases\nfor dismissing the antitrust claim.\nB. Equal Protection\n We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling\nde novo and in the light most favorable to Chicago Studio.\nPeerless Network, Inc. v. MCI Commc’n Serv., Inc., 917 F.3d 538,\n545 (7th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when\n“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the\nmovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.\nCiv. P. 56(a).\n Chicago Studio raises a “class-of-one” equal protection\nclaim against Steinberg in her individual capacity. This claim\nis based on the principle that similarly situated people must\nbe treated alike unless there is a rational basis for treating\nthem differently. See LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Win-\nnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2010). To succeed, Chicago\nStudio must prove that (1) it has been “intentionally treated\ndifferently from others similarly situated,” and (2) “there is\nno rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Paramount\nMedia Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d at 920 (citation omitted). We have\nyet to determine whether a plaintiff must also prove bad mo-\ntive. See Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 913 (7th\nCir. 2012) (Wood, J., dissenting). But we need not do so here\n\f12 No. 18-3134\n\nbecause Chicago Studio cannot survive summary judgment\non the other elements of its equal protection claim.\n To be similarly situated, competitors must be “identical or\ndirectly comparable” “in all material aspects.” See Miller v.\nCity of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting\nLaBella Winnetka, Inc., 628 F.3d at 942). Chicago Studio must\nshow that it was treated differently than another entity that is\n“‘prima facie identical in all relevant respects.’” Paramount Me-\ndia Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d at 920 (citing D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch.\nCorp., 799 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2015)).\n Here, Chicago Studio and Cinespace were not similarly\nsituated because the undisputed facts demonstrate that they\ndiffered in material ways. Chicago Studio has four stages\nmeasuring 62,000 square feet, whereas Cinespace has 30\nstages and 1.5 million square feet of floor space. Cinespace\ncould also accommodate two-story sets. Chicago Studio does\nnot have scene docks or installed air conditioning (only port-\nable air conditioning units for an additional charge) while\nCinespace has both. Chicago Studio charges .4% for equip-\nment rentals and requires production companies to use its\nequipment rentals. Cinespace permits production companies\nto use any equipment rental company including Cinelease,\nwhich charges .2%. Based on these facts, no rational fact finder\nwould consider these studios to be similarly situated.\n The equal protection claim also fails because there are ra-\ntional bases for Steinberg’s conduct. “If we can come up with\na rational basis for the challenged action, that will be the end\nof the matter—animus or no.” Fares Pawn, LLC v. Indiana Dep’t\nof Fin. Insts., 755 F.3d 839, 845 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2014). We just\nneed to identify a conceivable rational basis for the different\ntreatment; it does not need to be the actual basis for\n\fNo. 18-3134 13\n\ndefendant’s actions. D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681,\n686 (7th Cir. 2013). There are several rational bases for Stein-\nberg’s conduct. First, it was rational for Steinberg to offer\nmore assistance to the studio that requested help. Cinespace\nconsistently reached out to Steinberg for marketing support,\nand Chicago Studio rarely did. It cannot now complain that\nits failure to do so amounts to a constitutional injury. Second,\nit was rational for Steinberg to promote the studios based on\nproduction needs. Fox Studios, for example, decided to film\nEmpire at Cinespace and occupied 250,000 square feet and up\nto six stages. Lionsgate considered filming Divergent in Chi-\ncago and requested 200,000 square feet of production space.\nIt would have been rational for Steinberg to promote Cine-\nspace over Chicago Studio for these projects because Chicago\nStudio simply did not have enough studio space to accommo-\ndate these productions and Cinespace did. We find that the\ndistrict court properly granted summary judgment on the\nequal protection claim.\nC. Summary Judgment Practice\n During summary judgment briefing, the parties filed a\njoint statement of undisputed facts pursuant to Judge Ellis’s\ncase management procedure. Chicago Studio subsequently\nfiled a statement of additional facts, which it claimed con-\ntained disputed facts. The district court found that Chicago\nStudio’s additional facts were undisputed facts and a blatant\nattempt to get around the court’s order permitting 50 addi-\ntional facts. It therefore struck Chicago Studio’s statement of\nadditional facts and granted Steinberg’s motion for summary\njudgment.\n On appeal, Chicago Studio argues that the district court’s\nsummary judgment practice is overly burdensome and\n\f14 No. 18-3134\n\nviolates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56 and 83 and Local\nRule 56.1 by allowing the court to determine material issues\nof fact and disallowing a party to dispute an undisputed fact.\nWe disagree.\n As a threshold matter, Chicago Studio forfeited this argu-\nment by failing to challenge the summary judgment practice\nat the district court. See Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 540,\n544 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A party generally forfeits issues and ar-\nguments raised for the first time on appeal.”). Instead, Chi-\ncago Studio and Defendants filed joint motions in compliance\nwith the district court’s practice. If Chicago Studio objected to\nthe district court’s practice, it should have made a record of\nits objections at the district court and given the district court\nthe opportunity to address the concern.2 It did not. We cannot\nconsider this argument for the first time on appeal.\n Even if it was not forfeited (or waived), Chicago Studio’s\nchallenge nonetheless fails. We review the district court’s de-\ncision on compliance with local rules for an abuse of discre-\ntion. Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir.\n2008). The relevant portion of Judge Ellis’s summary judg-\nment practice states:\n Parties are required to file a joint statement of\n undisputed material facts that the parties agree\n are not in dispute…The parties may not file –\n\n\n 2Although not argued by the parties, Chicago Studio likely waived\nthis argument as well. See, e.g., CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones Lang LaSalle\nAmericas, Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018). At a hearing, Chicago Stu-\ndio’s counsel stated that the summary judgment practice was “overly bur-\ndensome.” But later, during the same hearing, Chicago Studio’s counsel\nagreed to abide by the summary judgment practice.\n\fNo. 18-3134 15\n\n and the Court will not consider – separate\n statements of undisputed facts. However, the\n non-moving party may include facts in its re-\n sponse to the motion for summary judgment\n that it contends are disputed in order to demon-\n strate that a genuine issue of material fact exists\n that warrants denying the motion for summary\n judgment. The non-moving party must include\n citations to supporting material supporting the\n dispute and attach the same. The moving party\n may respond to these facts in its reply.\n The parties shall not file more than 120 state-\n ments of undisputed material facts without\n prior leave of the Court….\n If the parties cannot agree whether proposed\n statements of fact are not in dispute, they may\n file a joint motion prior to filing the motion for\n summary judgment so the Court can determine\n whether there is a basis for the alleged disputes.\n That motion should set forth the proposed state-\n ments of fact at issue, with supporting material.\n Each statement should be followed by a re-\n sponse by the other party explaining why that\n party contends that the statement is actually in\n dispute, with citation to supporting mate-\n rial…The Court will then determine whether\n the proposed statements of fact may be in-\n cluded in the joint statement as undisputed\n facts. Parties should provide the Court with suf-\n ficient time to rule on factual disputes before\n summary judgment motions are due.…\n\f16 No. 18-3134\n\n If the nonmoving party wholly refuses to join in\n the joint statement of undisputed material facts,\n the moving party will nevertheless be permitted\n to file the motion for summary judgment, ac-\n companied by a separate declaration of counsel\n explaining why a joint statement of undisputed\n material facts was not filed.\nJudge Sara L. Ellis, Case Management Procedures, available at\nhttps://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/judge-info.aspx?VyU/OurK-\nKJRDT+FUM5tZmA== (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (emphasis\nin original).\n We have previously held that Judge Ellis’s summary judg-\nment practice does not violate Local Rule 56.1. See Sweatt v.\nUnion Pac. R.R. Co., 796 F.3d 701, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015). The\nsummary judgment practice at issue in Sweatt is materially\nsimilar to the one at issue here. It merely requires parties to\nfile a joint statement of undisputed facts, if possible. The non-\nmoving party may include disputed facts in its response brief,\nand the moving party may respond to these disputed facts in\nits reply brief. That is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil\nProcedure 56(a), which requires parties to support their asser-\ntion that a fact “cannot be or is genuinely disputed.” Nor is it\nin conflict with Local Rule 56.1, which directs a moving party\nto file a statement of material facts and a non-moving party to\nrespond to the movant’s statement of material facts. N.D. Ill.\nL.R. 56.1(a), (b)(3)(c); See Sweatt, 796 F.3d at 711 (“The lauda-\nble goal of this [case management procedure] is to remove the\nchaff from the grain in a given case, thereby allowing the par-\nties—and the court—to focus on the facts that are actually in\ndispute.”) “A judge may regulate practice in any manner con-\nsistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§\n\fNo. 18-3134 17\n\n2072 and 2075, and the district’s local rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P.\n83(b).\n Chicago Studio has not presented any reason why we\nshould conclude otherwise here. We agree with the district\ncourt that Chicago Studio’s statement is comprised of undis-\nputed facts. The parties could have included these facts in\ntheir joint statement of undisputed facts. The joint statement\nincluded 91 undisputed facts, and the court’s summary judg-\nment practice permits up to 120 undisputed facts without\nleave of court. If the parties needed to present more than 120\nundisputed facts, they should have requested leave to do so.\nThey did not. We find that the district court did not abuse its\ndiscretion by striking Chicago Studio’s statement of addi-\ntional facts for noncompliance.\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Chicago Studio Rental, Incorpo v. Illinois Department of Commerc\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18–3134\\nCHICAGO STUDIO RENTAL, INCORPORATED, CHICAGO STUDIO\\nCITY REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC\\nOPPORTUNITY, ILLINOIS FILM OFFICE, BETSY STEINBERG, in both\\nher official and individual capacity,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-CV-04099 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. For nearly 30 years, Chicago Studio\\nRental, Incorporated and Chicago Studio City Real Estate\\nHoldings, LLC (collectively, “Chicago Studio”) operated the\\nonly film studio in Chicago, Illinois. That changed around\\n2010 when Chicago Film Studio Holdings, LLC and Chicago\\n\\f2 No. 18-3134\\n\\nFilm Studio Industrial Real Estate Holdings, LLC (collec-\\ntively, “Cinespace”) opened a new studio. Within a handful\\nof years, Cinespace rapidly expanded its studio to include 26\\nmore stages and 24 times more floor space than Chicago Stu-\\ndio’s facility. Chicago Studio could not keep up, failed to at-\\ntract production business, and ultimately stopped making a\\nprofit.\\n Chicago Studio sought to blame others for its demise and\\nfiled this action against the Illinois Department of Commerce\\nand Economic Opportunity, Illinois Film Office, and Betsy\\nSteinberg—three Illinois state actors responsible for promot-\\ning the Illinois film industry. Chicago Studio alleged that De-\\nfendants unlawfully steered state incentives and business to\\nCinespace in violation of the Sherman Act and equal protec-\\ntion and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The\\ndistrict court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Sher-\\nman Act and due process claims. It later granted summary\\njudgment on the equal protection claim. Chicago Studio now\\nappeals these decisions on the Sherman Act and equal protec-\\ntion claims.\\n We affirm. The district court properly dismissed the Sher-\\nman Act claim because Chicago Studio failed to adequately\\nplead an antitrust injury. The complaint merely alleges inju-\\nries to Chicago Studio, not to competition. We also conclude\\nthat the district court properly granted summary judgment\\non the equal protection claim. Chicago Studio and Cinespace\\nare not similarly situated, and there was a rational basis for\\nSteinberg’s conduct. We further find that the district court did\\nnot abuse its discretion in striking Chicago Studio’s addi-\\ntional statement of facts for noncompliance.\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 3\\n\\n I. Background\\n Since 1979, Chicago Studio has operated a film and televi-\\nsion production studio in Chicago, Illinois. Chicago Studio\\nhas four studio stages measuring 62,000 square feet. It re-\\nquires production companies to lease its production equip-\\nment for a .4% charge. The studio does not have installed air\\nconditioning, but Chicago Studio can provide industry stand-\\nard portable air conditioning units for an additional charge. It\\ndoes not have scene docks, which would allow large trailers\\nto unload equipment inside the studio. During the relevant\\ntime period, Chicago Studio could accommodate one large or\\ntwo average projects at a given time.\\n Cinespace began operating a studio in Chicago around\\n2010. Cinespace is not a party to this action, but it is Chicago\\nStudio’s only competitor in the Chicago area. By the end of\\n2012, Cinespace had 600,000 square feet of floor space and 10\\nstages. The studio expanded to 1.5 million square feet of floor\\nspace and 30 stages by January 2015. Cinespace’s studio can\\naccommodate two-story sets and includes air conditioning,\\ninside breezeways and scene docks, concrete floors, sound-\\nproof walls, and new offices. Cinespace permits production\\ncompanies to use any equipment rentals they choose includ-\\ning an unaffiliated equipment rental company called\\nCinelease that charges .2%.\\n All three Defendants are Illinois state actors. The Illinois\\nDepartment of Commerce and Economic Opportunity\\n(“IDCEO”) is a division of Illinois government tasked with\\npromoting Illinois’s profile as a leading business destination.\\nTo promote the Illinois film industry, IDCEO administers\\ngrant programs to film studios and tax credits to film produc-\\ners. See 35 ILCS 16/10; Ill. Admin. Code tit. 14, § 528.70 (2013).\\n\\f4 No. 18-3134\\n\\nThe Illinois Film Office (“IFO”) is part of IDCEO, and Betsy\\nSteinberg served as the IFO Managing Director during Gov-\\nernor Patrick Quinn’s administration. The IFO’s principal\\npurpose is to support the Illinois film industry. See 35 ILCS\\n16/5 (“Illinois must move aggressively with new business de-\\nvelopment investment tools so that Illinois is more competi-\\ntive in site location decision-making for film productions.…It\\nis the purpose of this Act to preserve and expand the existing\\nhuman infrastructure for the motion picture industry in Illi-\\nnois.”)\\n Chicago Studio claims that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg\\nconspired with Cinespace to boycott Chicago Studio and to\\nsteer business towards Cinespace. They did so by administer-\\ning 30% film tax credits to producers and issuing five state\\ngrants totaling $27.3 million to Cinespace. Due to a change in\\nadministration, Cinespace returned $10 million to Illinois.\\nChicago Studio also alleges that Defendants failed to mention\\nChicago Studio to producers, encouraged producers to use\\nCinespace, excluded Chicago Studio from business meetings,\\nand did not allow Chicago Studio to bid on production op-\\nportunities. Chicago Studio states that it applied for two\\ngrants, but it did not receive either.\\n Cinespace consistently reached out to Steinberg and IFO\\nfor assistance with marketing and procuring film and televi-\\nsion production business. It also hired a lobbyist to apply for\\ngrant money from the State of Illinois. Steinberg provided\\nhelp to Chicago Studio whenever it asked, but it rarely did.\\nChicago Studio did not ask Steinberg to contact Hollywood\\nfilm producers on its behalf because it had done business with\\nthem for years. Chicago Studio does not identify a single\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 5\\n\\ninstance where it reached out to Steinberg for help, and Stein-\\nberg refused.\\n The Illinois film industry became more profitable over the\\nrelevant time period. In 2009, the Illinois film industry earned\\napproximately $104 million in gross revenue. In 2012 and\\n2013, it made approximately $184 million and $350 million in\\ngross revenue, respectively. The industry also created new\\njobs, approximately 7,082 in 2009 to 15,627 in 2013.\\n By steering business towards Cinespace, Chicago Studio\\nasserts that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg became active market\\nparticipants in the “Chicago Film Production Market,” which\\nit defines as entities providing production facilities in Chi-\\ncago. Defendants’ conduct resulted in the following alleged\\ninjuries: (1) a decrease in Chicago Studio’s market share from\\n100% to 10%, (2) Chicago Studio’s inability to compete in the\\nmarket, (3) a reduction in competition, and (4) an increase in\\ntransactional costs to produce film and television in Chicago\\nto consumers of those services.\\n Chicago Studio filed suit asserting violations of equal pro-\\ntection under the Fourteenth Amendment against Steinberg\\nin her individual capacity (Count I), Sections 1 and 2 of the\\nSherman Act against IDCEO and Steinberg in her official ca-\\npacity (Count II), and due process under the Fourteenth\\nAmendment against Steinberg in her individual capacity\\n(Count III). Defendants moved to dismiss the action under\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the district\\ncourt granted in part. Chicago Studio subsequently filed an\\namended complaint and added IFO as a defendant. Defend-\\nants again moved to dismiss the Sherman Act and due pro-\\ncess claims for failure to state a claim. The district court\\ngranted the motion. Steinberg later moved for summary\\n\\f6 No. 18-3134\\n\\njudgment on the equal protection claim. The district court\\ngranted Steinberg’s motion for summary judgment and\\nstruck Chicago Studio’s statement of additional facts for non-\\ncompliance. Chicago Studio now appeals both the district\\ncourt’s dismissal of the Sherman Act claim and the summary\\njudgment ruling.\\n II. Discussion\\nA. The Sherman Act\\n We review the district court’s motion to dismiss ruling de\\nnovo, assume all well-pleaded allegations are true, and con-\\nstrue reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Kemper v.\\nDeutsche Bank AG, 911 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2018). To survive\\na motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege\\n“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\\nface.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A\\nclaim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual\\ncontent that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference\\nthat the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ash-\\ncroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).\\n The district court dismissed Chicago Studio’s antitrust\\nclaim with prejudice. In doing so, it relied upon Czajkowski v.\\nIllinois, 460 F. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) and held that IDCEO,\\nIFO, and Steinberg in their official capacities are immune\\nfrom antitrust liability under the Eleventh Amendment. It\\nalso found that Chicago Studio had failed to allege an anti-\\ntrust injury.\\n The Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act does\\nnot prohibit anticompetitive state action. Parker v. Brown, 317\\nU.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (“The Sherman Act…gives no hint that\\nit was intended to restrain state action or official action\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 7\\n\\ndirected by a state.”). Since then, the Supreme Court has de-\\nvised three types of antitrust immunity: (1) ipso facto immun-\\nity, (2) Hallie immunity, and (3) Midcal immunity. See N.C.\\nState Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 1110–13\\n(2015); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38–40,\\n42 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567–69 (1984); Cal.\\nRetail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.\\n97, 105 (1980); see also Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Village of\\nBellwood, 929 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir. 2019); Lawline v. Am. Bar\\nAss’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1384 (7th Cir. 1992); Fuchs v. Rural Elec.\\nConvenience Coop. Inc., 858 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988).\\n The parties disagree on which immunity test applies here.\\nChicago Studio argues that Defendants are not subject to an-\\ntitrust immunity because the Midcal test applies, and Defend-\\nants do not satisfy the test. Defendants argue that they are\\nsubject to either ipso facto immunity or Hallie immunity. We\\ndo not need to decide whether Defendants are subject to anti-\\ntrust immunity because we find that Chicago Studio failed to\\nallege an antitrust injury.1 See, e.g., Paramount Media Grp., Inc.,\\n929 F.3d at 921.\\n The complaint asserts that Defendants violated Sections 1\\nand 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act pro-\\nhibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or\\notherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”\\n15 U.S.C. § 1. Chicago Studio alleges that IDCEO, IFO, and\\nSteinberg violated Section 1 by steering tax credits to produc-\\ners using Cinespace’s studio and state grants to Cinespace\\n\\n\\n 1Although we do not decide which immunity test should apply here,\\nboth parties acknowledge that the test outlined in Czajkowski v. Illinois, 460\\nF. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) is the wrong standard. We agree.\\n\\f8 No. 18-3134\\n\\nand boycotting Chicago Studio in restraint of trade. Section 2\\nof the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or at-\\ntempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other\\nperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or\\ncommerce among the several States….” 15 U.S.C. § 2. Chicago\\nStudio claims that Defendants and Cinespace conspired to\\nmonopolize and have attempted to monopolize the market\\nfor operating film studios in Chicago violating Section 2.\\n To state an antitrust injury, a plaintiff must allege an anti-\\ncompetitive injury that flows from defendant’s actions and\\nthat the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Brunswick\\nCorp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see\\nalso, e.g., Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir.\\n1995). “The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plain-\\ntiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-re-\\nducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior.” Atlantic\\nRichfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 (1990).\\nPlaintiff must assert an injury not only to itself, but to the rel-\\nevant market. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683\\nF.3d 328, 334–35 (7th Cir. 2012). The alleged injury must either\\nreduce output or raise prices to consumers. James Cape & Sons\\nCo. v. PCC Constr. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 2006); see also\\nMcGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankr. Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 937 F.3d\\n1056, 1065 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We usually presume that compet-\\nitors and consumers in the relevant market are the only par-\\nties who suffer antitrust injuries and are in a position to effi-\\nciently vindicate the antitrust laws.”). “The antitrust-injury\\ndoctrine was created to filter out complaints by competitors\\nand others who may be hurt by productive efficiencies, higher\\noutput, and lower prices, all of which the antitrust laws are\\ndesigned to encourage.” United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana\\nGas. Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 9\\n\\n At best, Chicago Studio has pleaded an injury to itself, not\\nan anticompetitive injury to the market. The complaint alleges\\nthe following injuries: (1) decrease in Chicago Studio’s share\\nof the film production market, (2) Chicago Studio’s inability\\nto compete in the market, (3) a reduction in competition, and\\n(4) an increase in transactional costs to produce films in Chi-\\ncago to other consumers of those services. Two of the alleged\\ninjuries—decrease in its share of the film production market\\nand inability to compete—are harms to Chicago Studio and\\nare not proper antitrust injuries. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon,\\nInc., 525 U.S. 128, 135, 139 (1998) (concluding that plaintiff\\n“must allege and prove harm, not just to a single competitor,\\nbut to the competitive process, i.e., to competition itself”). A\\nreduction in competition and an increase in transactional\\ncosts could be anticompetitive injuries, but Chicago Studio\\nfails to plausibly allege either. Although Chicago Studio gen-\\nerally claims, in a conclusory manner, that competition de-\\ncreased, the thrust of its complaint points the opposite way.\\nBefore 2009, Chicago Studio was the only film studio in the\\nChicago area. Cinespace came into the market, brought new\\ncapacity, and the Illinois film industry grew. The number of\\nfilm studios in Chicago increased from one to two, and the\\nIllinois film industry generated about $184 million and $350\\nmillion in revenue in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Chicago\\nStudio continued to operate in the market and does not allege\\nthat it was excluded from doing so. Chicago Studio also pro-\\nvides no facts to support its one-sentence, conclusory state-\\nment that transactional costs increased. The complaint does\\nnot allege what transactional costs increased, how much they\\nincreased by, and who experienced the increased costs. Nor\\ndoes the complaint allege reduced output or higher prices in\\nthe Chicago film market. In summary, Chicago Studio merely\\n\\f10 No. 18-3134\\n\\nstates these assertions in a conclusory fashion and fails to al-\\nlege factual allegations supporting the existence of an anti-\\ntrust injury. We will not accept such allegations as true. See\\nIqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of\\na cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,\\ndo not suffice.”)\\n Chicago Studio argues that its exclusion from the market\\nis a valid antitrust injury and cites Gulf States Reorganization\\nGroup, Inc. v. Nucor Corporation, 466 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2006)\\nand OverEnd Technologies, LLC v. Invista S.ÀR.L., 431 F. Supp.\\n2d 925 (E.D. Wis. 2006). Chicago Studio, however, does not\\nallege that it was entirely excluded from the market. “Transfer\\nof business from one company to another, however, without\\nan accompanying effect on competition, cannot be an anti-\\ntrust violation” because antitrust laws protect competition,\\nnot competitors. Tri-Gen Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs,\\nLocal 150, AFL-CIO, 433 F.3d 1024, 1031–32 (7th Cir. 2006).\\nMoreover, these cases are distinguishable because they in-\\nvolved exclusion of a potential competitor. See Gulf States Re-\\norganization Grp., Inc., 466 F.3d at 967–68; OverEnd Techs., LLC,\\n431 F. Supp. 2d at 930. Chicago Studio is not a potential com-\\npetitor; it has operated a film studio in Chicago since 1979 and\\ncontinued to do so after Cinespace entered the market. See Tri-\\nGen Inc., 433 F.3d at 1032.\\n Chicago Studio’s Section 2 claim also fails for an addi-\\ntional reason. The complaint does not plausibly allege that\\nDefendants conspired to monopolize or have attempted to\\nmonopolize the market for operating film studios in Chicago.\\nChicago Studio admitted that IDCEO, IFO, and Steinberg are\\nnot competitors of Chicago Studio. Instead Chicago Studio ar-\\ngues that they are market participants. This is implausible.\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 11\\n\\nDefendants do not provide studio space and do not compete\\nin the market. The complaint also does not allege any facts\\nregarding their market power or anticompetitive use of their\\npower. See Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 282–84 (7th\\nCir. 2000).\\n Because we find that Chicago Studio failed to plead an an-\\ntitrust injury, we do not address Defendants’ additional bases\\nfor dismissing the antitrust claim.\\nB. Equal Protection\\n We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling\\nde novo and in the light most favorable to Chicago Studio.\\nPeerless Network, Inc. v. MCI Commc’n Serv., Inc., 917 F.3d 538,\\n545 (7th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when\\n“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the\\nmovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.\\nCiv. P. 56(a).\\n Chicago Studio raises a “class-of-one” equal protection\\nclaim against Steinberg in her individual capacity. This claim\\nis based on the principle that similarly situated people must\\nbe treated alike unless there is a rational basis for treating\\nthem differently. See LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Win-\\nnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2010). To succeed, Chicago\\nStudio must prove that (1) it has been “intentionally treated\\ndifferently from others similarly situated,” and (2) “there is\\nno rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Paramount\\nMedia Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d at 920 (citation omitted). We have\\nyet to determine whether a plaintiff must also prove bad mo-\\ntive. See Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 913 (7th\\nCir. 2012) (Wood, J., dissenting). But we need not do so here\\n\\f12 No. 18-3134\\n\\nbecause Chicago Studio cannot survive summary judgment\\non the other elements of its equal protection claim.\\n To be similarly situated, competitors must be “identical or\\ndirectly comparable” “in all material aspects.” See Miller v.\\nCity of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting\\nLaBella Winnetka, Inc., 628 F.3d at 942). Chicago Studio must\\nshow that it was treated differently than another entity that is\\n“‘prima facie identical in all relevant respects.’” Paramount Me-\\ndia Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d at 920 (citing D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch.\\nCorp., 799 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2015)).\\n Here, Chicago Studio and Cinespace were not similarly\\nsituated because the undisputed facts demonstrate that they\\ndiffered in material ways. Chicago Studio has four stages\\nmeasuring 62,000 square feet, whereas Cinespace has 30\\nstages and 1.5 million square feet of floor space. Cinespace\\ncould also accommodate two-story sets. Chicago Studio does\\nnot have scene docks or installed air conditioning (only port-\\nable air conditioning units for an additional charge) while\\nCinespace has both. Chicago Studio charges .4% for equip-\\nment rentals and requires production companies to use its\\nequipment rentals. Cinespace permits production companies\\nto use any equipment rental company including Cinelease,\\nwhich charges .2%. Based on these facts, no rational fact finder\\nwould consider these studios to be similarly situated.\\n The equal protection claim also fails because there are ra-\\ntional bases for Steinberg’s conduct. “If we can come up with\\na rational basis for the challenged action, that will be the end\\nof the matter—animus or no.” Fares Pawn, LLC v. Indiana Dep’t\\nof Fin. Insts., 755 F.3d 839, 845 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2014). We just\\nneed to identify a conceivable rational basis for the different\\ntreatment; it does not need to be the actual basis for\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 13\\n\\ndefendant’s actions. D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681,\\n686 (7th Cir. 2013). There are several rational bases for Stein-\\nberg’s conduct. First, it was rational for Steinberg to offer\\nmore assistance to the studio that requested help. Cinespace\\nconsistently reached out to Steinberg for marketing support,\\nand Chicago Studio rarely did. It cannot now complain that\\nits failure to do so amounts to a constitutional injury. Second,\\nit was rational for Steinberg to promote the studios based on\\nproduction needs. Fox Studios, for example, decided to film\\nEmpire at Cinespace and occupied 250,000 square feet and up\\nto six stages. Lionsgate considered filming Divergent in Chi-\\ncago and requested 200,000 square feet of production space.\\nIt would have been rational for Steinberg to promote Cine-\\nspace over Chicago Studio for these projects because Chicago\\nStudio simply did not have enough studio space to accommo-\\ndate these productions and Cinespace did. We find that the\\ndistrict court properly granted summary judgment on the\\nequal protection claim.\\nC. Summary Judgment Practice\\n During summary judgment briefing, the parties filed a\\njoint statement of undisputed facts pursuant to Judge Ellis’s\\ncase management procedure. Chicago Studio subsequently\\nfiled a statement of additional facts, which it claimed con-\\ntained disputed facts. The district court found that Chicago\\nStudio’s additional facts were undisputed facts and a blatant\\nattempt to get around the court’s order permitting 50 addi-\\ntional facts. It therefore struck Chicago Studio’s statement of\\nadditional facts and granted Steinberg’s motion for summary\\njudgment.\\n On appeal, Chicago Studio argues that the district court’s\\nsummary judgment practice is overly burdensome and\\n\\f14 No. 18-3134\\n\\nviolates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56 and 83 and Local\\nRule 56.1 by allowing the court to determine material issues\\nof fact and disallowing a party to dispute an undisputed fact.\\nWe disagree.\\n As a threshold matter, Chicago Studio forfeited this argu-\\nment by failing to challenge the summary judgment practice\\nat the district court. See Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 540,\\n544 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A party generally forfeits issues and ar-\\nguments raised for the first time on appeal.”). Instead, Chi-\\ncago Studio and Defendants filed joint motions in compliance\\nwith the district court’s practice. If Chicago Studio objected to\\nthe district court’s practice, it should have made a record of\\nits objections at the district court and given the district court\\nthe opportunity to address the concern.2 It did not. We cannot\\nconsider this argument for the first time on appeal.\\n Even if it was not forfeited (or waived), Chicago Studio’s\\nchallenge nonetheless fails. We review the district court’s de-\\ncision on compliance with local rules for an abuse of discre-\\ntion. Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir.\\n2008). The relevant portion of Judge Ellis’s summary judg-\\nment practice states:\\n Parties are required to file a joint statement of\\n undisputed material facts that the parties agree\\n are not in dispute…The parties may not file –\\n\\n\\n 2Although not argued by the parties, Chicago Studio likely waived\\nthis argument as well. See, e.g., CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones Lang LaSalle\\nAmericas, Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018). At a hearing, Chicago Stu-\\ndio’s counsel stated that the summary judgment practice was “overly bur-\\ndensome.” But later, during the same hearing, Chicago Studio’s counsel\\nagreed to abide by the summary judgment practice.\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 15\\n\\n and the Court will not consider – separate\\n statements of undisputed facts. However, the\\n non-moving party may include facts in its re-\\n sponse to the motion for summary judgment\\n that it contends are disputed in order to demon-\\n strate that a genuine issue of material fact exists\\n that warrants denying the motion for summary\\n judgment. The non-moving party must include\\n citations to supporting material supporting the\\n dispute and attach the same. The moving party\\n may respond to these facts in its reply.\\n The parties shall not file more than 120 state-\\n ments of undisputed material facts without\\n prior leave of the Court….\\n If the parties cannot agree whether proposed\\n statements of fact are not in dispute, they may\\n file a joint motion prior to filing the motion for\\n summary judgment so the Court can determine\\n whether there is a basis for the alleged disputes.\\n That motion should set forth the proposed state-\\n ments of fact at issue, with supporting material.\\n Each statement should be followed by a re-\\n sponse by the other party explaining why that\\n party contends that the statement is actually in\\n dispute, with citation to supporting mate-\\n rial…The Court will then determine whether\\n the proposed statements of fact may be in-\\n cluded in the joint statement as undisputed\\n facts. Parties should provide the Court with suf-\\n ficient time to rule on factual disputes before\\n summary judgment motions are due.…\\n\\f16 No. 18-3134\\n\\n If the nonmoving party wholly refuses to join in\\n the joint statement of undisputed material facts,\\n the moving party will nevertheless be permitted\\n to file the motion for summary judgment, ac-\\n companied by a separate declaration of counsel\\n explaining why a joint statement of undisputed\\n material facts was not filed.\\nJudge Sara L. Ellis, Case Management Procedures, available at\\nhttps://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/judge-info.aspx?VyU/OurK-\\nKJRDT+FUM5tZmA== (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (emphasis\\nin original).\\n We have previously held that Judge Ellis’s summary judg-\\nment practice does not violate Local Rule 56.1. See Sweatt v.\\nUnion Pac. R.R. Co., 796 F.3d 701, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015). The\\nsummary judgment practice at issue in Sweatt is materially\\nsimilar to the one at issue here. It merely requires parties to\\nfile a joint statement of undisputed facts, if possible. The non-\\nmoving party may include disputed facts in its response brief,\\nand the moving party may respond to these disputed facts in\\nits reply brief. That is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 56(a), which requires parties to support their asser-\\ntion that a fact “cannot be or is genuinely disputed.” Nor is it\\nin conflict with Local Rule 56.1, which directs a moving party\\nto file a statement of material facts and a non-moving party to\\nrespond to the movant’s statement of material facts. N.D. Ill.\\nL.R. 56.1(a), (b)(3)(c); See Sweatt, 796 F.3d at 711 (“The lauda-\\nble goal of this [case management procedure] is to remove the\\nchaff from the grain in a given case, thereby allowing the par-\\nties—and the court—to focus on the facts that are actually in\\ndispute.”) “A judge may regulate practice in any manner con-\\nsistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§\\n\\fNo. 18-3134 17\\n\\n2072 and 2075, and the district’s local rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n83(b).\\n Chicago Studio has not presented any reason why we\\nshould conclude otherwise here. We agree with the district\\ncourt that Chicago Studio’s statement is comprised of undis-\\nputed facts. The parties could have included these facts in\\ntheir joint statement of undisputed facts. The joint statement\\nincluded 91 undisputed facts, and the court’s summary judg-\\nment practice permits up to 120 undisputed facts without\\nleave of court. If the parties needed to present more than 120\\nundisputed facts, they should have requested leave to do so.\\nThey did not. We find that the district court did not abuse its\\ndiscretion by striking Chicago Studio’s statement of addi-\\ntional facts for noncompliance.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4668,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670079,"string":"4,670,079"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Marvin Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois Railroad Comp"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2153"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\nMARVIN ABERNATHY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nEASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:15-cv-03223-SEM-TSH — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Marvin Abernathy was\\ninjured while working for defendant Eastern Illinois Railroad\\nCompany. He sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability\\nAct (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., alleging that the Railroad\\nnegligently failed to provide reasonably safe working condi-\\ntions by failing to provide appropriate equipment for the job\\nhe was doing when he was hurt.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n A jury awarded Abernathy $525,000 in damages. The Rail-\\nroad moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.\\nThe district court denied both requests, and the Railroad has\\nappealed, raising a host of issues. Abernathy has filed a cross-\\nappeal asserting that the district court erred by not awarding\\nhim sufficient costs to cover his expert witness fees. We affirm\\nJudge Myerscough’s decisions in all respects.\\nI. Facts\\n Abernathy worked as a track inspector for the Eastern Illi-\\nnois Railroad Company. His duties included replacing and\\nrepairing railroad ties. On September 13, 2012, the Railroad\\nsent Abernathy and another employee, Richard Probus, to re-\\npair a railroad crossing about six or seven miles away from\\nthe Railroad’s yard in Charleston, Illinois. Abernathy was in\\ncharge of the job. The repair required him and Probus to\\ntransport six ties from the yard to the crossing.\\n In 2012, the Railroad had a “tie crane,” a vehicle that runs\\non the railroad tracks and is well-suited to transporting rail-\\nroad ties, but it had been out of commission for years. Aber-\\nnathy and Probus had only two options for transporting the\\nties: a backhoe or a pickup truck, either of which would need\\nto travel on public roads rather than railroad tracks. Aber-\\nnathy chose to use the backhoe. He testified that he had never\\nused the pickup truck to haul ties before, but that he had used\\nthe backhoe for similar jobs numerous times, although not on\\npublic roads and not with this heavy a load. Abernathy and\\nProbus loaded four ties into the bucket of the backhoe and\\ntwo across the top of the bucket, resting on the arms of the\\nmachine. Abernathy testified that when the bucket is rolled\\nback, it locks the resting ties into place. Abernathy drove the\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 3\\n\\nbackhoe along a public highway. Probus followed in the\\npickup, which was loaded with tools needed to install the ties.\\n Abernathy drove in low gear, but he started to experience\\n“road bounce.” He started braking, and two ties fell out of the\\nbackhoe’s bucket. Abernathy stopped on the shoulder of the\\nroad and tried to lift the ties back into the bucket. In lifting a\\ntie, he injured his back. He also smashed a finger between the\\ntie he was holding and another tie in the bucket. Despite the\\naccident, Abernathy and Probus were able to finish reloading\\nthe ties, and they resumed their trip and finished the repair\\njob. Abernathy remained in pain for the rest of the day.\\n The following morning, Abernathy reported the injury to\\nTim Allen, the general manager of the Railroad. Allen told\\nhim “to take it easy” and “be on light duty” for a while. Ab-\\nernathy worked through the pain on lighter duty for the next\\nyear but was unable to return to his regular work. The Rail-\\nroad terminated his employment in February 2014. He even-\\ntually had physical therapy, epidural injections, and then sur-\\ngery in 2016. After the surgery, he continued to experience\\npain in his back and legs. At the time of trial, his surgeon had\\nstill not cleared him for any type of work.\\nII. The Trial\\n Abernathy sued the Railroad under the FELA, 45 U.S.C\\n§ 51, alleging that it had been negligent in failing to provide\\nan operable tie crane and requiring him to use the backhoe,\\nwhich was inadequate for his assigned task of transporting\\nthe ties. The trial lasted three days. Abernathy testified and\\ncalled three other lay witnesses: his wife Carrie Abernathy,\\nRichard Probus, and Lowell McElwee, a Railroad engineer\\nwho worked with Abernathy.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n Probus testified that on the day of Abernathy’s injury, they\\ncould not have used the pickup truck to transport the ties be-\\ncause they needed the pickup truck to transport the other\\nequipment needed to install the ties. Probus also testified that\\nthe Railroad had acquired an operable tie crane after Aber-\\nnathy’s accident. Probus explained that the tie crane was now\\nbeing used to transport ties and that manual lifts of ties were\\nnot necessary with the new machine. He stated that the avail-\\nability of the tie crane makes his job safer.\\n Abernathy testified that when the Railroad’s tie crane had\\nbeen operational, he used it regularly. He explained that the\\ntie crane was the preferred method for moving ties because it\\ndid not require manual lifting or traveling on public roads. He\\nalso testified that before his 2012 injury, he had repeatedly\\nasked the Railroad to replace the tie crane.\\n Abernathy also presented the depositions of Doctors Renu\\nBajaj, James Kohlman, and Thomas Lee. Dr. Lee, Abernathy’s\\nsurgeon, offered testimony relevant to damages and causa-\\ntion. He testified that he did not expect Abernathy to regain\\nthe level of functionality he had prior to his accident. He also\\ntestified that Abernathy certainly would not be able to return\\nto work involving heavy manual labor. Dr. Lee also said that,\\nto a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Abernathy’s\\nsymptoms were caused or aggravated by the lifting accident\\nin September 2012.\\n The Railroad called four witnesses: general manager Tim\\nAllen; Everett Fletcher; Gayle Garrett, the office secretary for\\nthe Railroad; and Kendall Mulvaney, the superintendent of\\nR&R Contractors, testifying as an expert witness in railroad\\nrepair and maintenance. The Railroad defended on the theory\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 5\\n\\nthat a backhoe is a generally accepted method for transport-\\ning ties in the rail repair industry.\\n After the close of Abernathy’s case-in-chief, the Railroad\\nmoved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of\\nCivil Procedure 50(a), which the court denied. The Railroad\\nrenewed its motion under Rule 50(b) at the close of all evi-\\ndence and prior to the verdict, and the court again denied it.\\n The jury found that the Railroad was negligent and that its\\nnegligence contributed to Abernathy’s injuries. The jury cal-\\nculated Abernathy’s total damages to be $750,000. However,\\nthe jury found that Abernathy was also at fault for thirty per-\\ncent of the total fault, which meant the jury awarded a net\\nverdict of $525,000. The district court denied the Railroad’s\\npost-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new\\ntrial. The district court also awarded costs to Abernathy as the\\nprevailing party but rejected his request to include as costs\\n$3,800 in witness fees paid to Doctors Lee and Bajaj. The Rail-\\nroad has appealed the judgment against it, and Abernathy has\\ncross-appealed the denial of his request for expert witness\\nfees as part of his costs.\\nIII. Legal Analysis\\n We take up the issues on appeal in three groups. First, we\\naddress the Railroad’s arguments for judgment as a matter of\\nlaw on the theory that Abernathy’s evidence was insufficient.\\nSecond, we address the Railroad’s arguments that the district\\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at\\ntrial. Third, we address Abernathy’s cross-appeal on the\\naward of costs.\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n A. Judgment as a Matter of Law\\n The FELA provides a federal remedy for railroad employ-\\nees who are injured on the job. To prove a claim under the\\nFELA, a plaintiff must prove “the traditional common law el-\\nements of negligence, including foreseeability, duty, breach,\\nand causation.” Fulk v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 22 F.3d 120,\\n124 (7th Cir. 1994). However, “[b]ecause it is meant to offer\\nbroad remedial relief to railroad workers, a plaintiff’s burden\\nwhen suing under the FELA is significantly lighter than in an\\nordinary negligence case.” Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Rail-\\nway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Harbin v.\\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\\n1990) (“It is well established that the quantum of evidence re-\\nquired to establish liability in an FELA case is much less than\\nin an ordinary negligence action.”). A railroad-employer is li-\\nable where “employer negligence played any part, even the\\nslightest, in producing the injury.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific\\nRailroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).\\n The Railroad challenges the sufficiency of evidence as to\\nall elements of negligence. We consider duty and breach to-\\ngether, and foreseeability and causation separately. “This\\nCourt reviews sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo,\\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-\\nmoving party and drawing all inferences in [his] favor.”\\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2014).\\nWe “will overturn a jury verdict ‘only when there is a com-\\nplete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion\\nreached.’” Id. at 29596, quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645,\\n653 (1946). Here, probative evidence supported the jury’s ver-\\ndict that Abernathy established each element of negligence.\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 7\\n\\nThe district court did not err in declining to overturn the\\njury’s verdict.\\n 1. Duty & Breach\\n The Railroad had a duty to provide Abernathy a reasona-\\nbly safe working environment. See Crompton, 745 F.3d at 296.\\nThe Railroad points out correctly that it “could have provided\\na reasonably safe workplace notwithstanding the fact that\\nsafer workplace alternatives exist.” Taylor v. Illinois Central\\nRailroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993). The Railroad ar-\\ngues that Abernathy produced no evidence that the equip-\\nment available to haul ties (the backhoe and pickup truck) and\\nthe way in which he was trained to perform a manual lift were\\nunsafe. Instead, Abernathy produced evidence pertaining to\\nthe absence of the tie crane. The tie crane evidence, the Rail-\\nroad argues, showed only that there was a safer alternative to\\nthe backhoe and pickup, which is not sufficient to establish\\nnegligence. See Darrough v. CSX Transportation Inc., 321 F.3d\\n674, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (railroad does not have duty to provide\\nthe safest working environment).\\n The Railroad’s argument relies on the faulty premise that\\nevidence of safer alternatives can never even be relevant to\\nwhether an employer exercised reasonable care. When a rail-\\nroad assigns an employee a task using a particular method\\nand the employee is injured while executing the task, evi-\\ndence of a safer alternative method is relevant to whether the\\nmethod provided was reasonable. See Stone v. New York, Chi-\\ncago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344 U.S. 407, 409 (1953) (plaintiff\\nwas injured pulling ties using the method his supervisor in-\\nstructed him to use; evidence of three alternative methods for\\npulling ties was relevant to whether railroad was negligent).\\nBased on all the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nhave found that it was not reasonably safe to assign Aber-\\nnathy to replace the ties without an operable tie crane.\\n The Railroad’s argument as to the safety of a manual lift is\\nsimilarly flawed. Abernathy did not argue that under all cir-\\ncumstances, the Railroad is negligent if it requires an em-\\nployee to perform a manual lift. He argued that the Railroad\\nwas negligent where it could have provided employees with\\nequipment that prevented the need for impromptu manual\\nlifts on public roads but chose not to repair or replace this\\nequipment.\\n The Railroad’s reliance on Walker v. Northeast Regional\\nCommuter Railroad, 225 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2000), is thus mis-\\nplaced. In Walker, we affirmed summary judgment for a rail-\\nroad in an FELA case for injuries from performing a manual\\nlift. Plaintiff Walker worked as a machinist in a repair shop.\\nHe injured his back lifting a replacement blade for a machine\\nthat cut metal. Id. at 896. The blade weighed about 140\\npounds, and Walker lifted it with one other employee. Id. A\\ncrane and a forklift were available to the men but could not be\\nused to assist in the lift because of the configuration of the\\nshop. Walker argued that his employer was negligent in re-\\nquiring him to lift more than fifty pounds and “in configuring\\nthe shop in such a way as to prohibit the use of mechanical\\nlifting aids.” Id. at 898.\\n Walker is distinguishable. First, Walker actually made an\\nexplicit argument that his employer’s demand that he lift\\nmore than fifty pounds was sufficient by itself to support a\\nfinding of negligence. In rejecting this argument, we con-\\ntrasted the case with those in which plaintiffs “showed the\\navailability of alternative methods and safeguards that would\\nensure employee safety” and found telling that Walker\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 9\\n\\nproduced no evidence that he or any other machinists “had\\ncomplained about problems in changing the blade on other\\noccasions.” Id. In this case, Abernathy offered evidence of\\nsafer alternatives and prior employee complaints about the\\nlack of an operable tie crane. As to the second argument about\\nthe shop configuration, Walker presented no evidence that the\\nmanual lift in his case was not reasonably safe given the cir-\\ncumstances, and in fact he “testified that he and [his co-lifter]\\nassumed that they could pick up the blade” with no problem.\\nId. at 899.\\n Here, however, Abernathy offered evidence that the tie\\ncrane was the appropriate equipment to use for the job he was\\nperforming with a backhoe on the day he was injured. Allen’s\\ntestimony on cross-examination and Probus’s testimony al-\\nlowed the jury to find that the pickup truck was not an ade-\\nquate alternative. Abernathy and Probus both testified that an\\noperable tie crane made their work safer. Abernathy ex-\\nplained that the tie crane allowed employees to avoid manual\\nlifts and traveling on public roads. The jury could reasonably\\nhave found that the Railroad did not provide Abernathy with\\nequipment appropriate for the task he was assigned and that\\nhis working environment was not reasonably safe.\\n 2. Foreseeability\\n Abernathy was required to show that it was foreseeable to\\nthe Railroad that transporting ties using a backhoe or pickup\\nas opposed to a tie crane “would or might result in a mishap\\nand injury.” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685,\\n703 (2011), quoting Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,\\n372 U.S. 108, 118, n.7 (1963). To establish foreseeability, “a\\nplaintiff must show that the employer had actual or construc-\\ntive notice” of potential harm. Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nRailway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005). The railroad may\\nbe liable “even if ‘the extent of the [injury] or the manner in\\nwhich it occurred’ was not ‘probable’ or ‘foreseeable.’”\\nMcBride, 564 U.S. at 70304, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 12021\\n& n.8 (alteration in McBride; emphasis added here). The Rail-\\nroad argues that Abernathy failed to prove negligence be-\\ncause he failed to show that his injury was foreseeable. The\\nRailroad argues that it could not have known that Abernathy\\nwould use the backhoe or that doing so would result in\\ndropped ties. The backhoe, the Railroad points out, had been\\nused to transport ties without incident on multiple prior oc-\\ncasions and there was no defect in the machine that caused\\nthe tie to fall. Further, as the Railroad’s expert, Mulvaney, tes-\\ntified, a backhoe was an accepted method in the railroad re-\\npair injury for transporting ties. From these facts, the Railroad\\ncontends there was insufficient proof of foreseeability.\\n The Railroad’s argument misunderstands what the FELA\\nrequires. Abernathy does not need to show that the Railroad\\ncould have foreseen the particular consequences of its negli-\\ngence. He needed to show only that “a particular condi-\\ntion”—here, the absence of appropriate equipment—“would\\nor might result in” any type of “mishap and injury.” McBride,\\n564 U.S. at 703, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 118 n. 7 (emphasis\\nadded here); see Gallick, 372 U.S. at 11820 (potential harm\\nwas foreseeable where railroad had allowed stagnant pool of\\nfilthy water to remain near worksite and employee was bitten\\nby an insect, which led to infection and ultimately amputation\\nof both legs). Abernathy needed to show only “circumstances\\nwhich a reasonable person would foresee as creating a poten-\\ntial for harm.” McGinn v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 102\\nF.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1996).\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 11\\n\\n The evidence here supported a finding that a reasonable\\nperson in the Railroad’s position could have foreseen that\\ntransporting ties in a backhoe or pickup could lead to injury.\\nThe Railroad knew that its tie crane had not been operational\\nsince 2008. Abernathy offered evidence that he had repeatedly\\nasked the Railroad to repair or replace it. Abernathy and Pro-\\nbus both testified that the tie crane was safer to use in hauling\\nties, in part because it prevented employees from having to\\nlift ties manually and travel on public roads.\\n 3. Causation\\n In support of judgment as a matter of law, and now on\\nappeal, the Railroad argued that even if it was negligent in\\nfailing to provide a tie crane, Abernathy failed to prove that\\nthe alleged negligence caused his injuries. Abernathy’s man-\\nual lift, the Railroad contends, caused his injuries, and this lift\\nwas an act subsequent to and independent of any safety issues\\nthat arose because the tie crane was not available.\\n The Railroad’s argument conflicts with the liberal causa-\\ntion standard under the FELA. “Juries in such cases are\\nproperly instructed that a defendant railroad ‘caused or con-\\ntributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ‘if [the railroad’s] neg-\\nligence played a part—no matter how small—in bringing\\nabout the injury.” McBride, 564 U.S. at 705; see also Harbin v.\\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\\n1990), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S.\\n500, 506 (1957) (“For under the FELA, ‘the test of a jury case is\\nsimply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion\\nthat employer negligence played any part, even in the slightest,\\nin producing the injury… .”) (emphasis in Harbin). “The FELA\\nvests the jury with broad discretion to engage in common\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nsense inferences regarding issues of causation and fault.”\\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n There was sufficient evidence here that the Railroad’s neg-\\nligence played a part in bringing about Abernathy’s injury.\\nAbernathy had to use the backhoe on a public roadway to\\ntransport the ties because the Railroad had not repaired or re-\\nplaced its tie crane, which had been out of service for years.\\nVibrations caused a tie to fall off the backhoe and onto the\\npublic roadway that Abernathy was forced to use because of\\nthe absence of a tie crane. Abernathy had to remove the tie,\\nwhich was obstructing the public road, and he had to do it\\nquickly. He had no option other than to lift the tie manually\\nback into the backhoe, which injured his back. A reasonable\\njury could infer that the Railroad’s negligence played some\\npart in causing Abernathy’s injury. The district court correctly\\ndenied the Railroad’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.\\n B. New Trial Motion Based on Evidentiary Rulings\\n The Railroad also argues that the district judge erred in\\nthree decisions to admit evidence, contending that each is suf-\\nficient to warrant a new trial. We review the denial of a new\\ntrial motion for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen-\\neral Board of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist\\nChurch, 733 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2013); Kossman v. Northeast\\nIllinois Regional Commuter Railroad, 211 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th\\nCir. 2000). We find no abuse of discretion in any of the chal-\\nlenged evidentiary rulings.\\n 1. Testimony of Timothy Allen\\n First, the Railroad objects to a line of cross-examination of\\nits general manager, Timothy Allen, regarding his own use of\\na company pickup truck to transport railroad ties. The\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 13\\n\\nRailroad argues that Allen’s use of the truck was so dissimilar\\nfrom the way Abernathy might have used the truck on the day\\nhe was injured as to make the evidence irrelevant.\\n Again, Abernathy had to prove that the Railroad did not\\nprovide a reasonably safe method for transporting railroad\\nties. See Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 297–\\n98 (1949). The Railroad argued that the pickup truck was a\\nreasonably safe and available way for Abernathy to do his job.\\nAllen testified that he thought Abernathy should have used\\nthe pickup truck rather than using the backhoe to haul ties on\\na public road.\\n During cross-examination, Allen acknowledged that on\\none occasion, he had used the same pickup to take 20 to 25\\nrejected railroad ties to a friend. Allen admitted that, assum-\\ning each tie weighed just 140 pounds, hauling 20 ties would\\nhave meant the pickup truck was carrying 2,800 pounds.1 The\\npickup truck was rated to haul only 1,500 pounds. When\\nasked about this discrepancy, Allen said he had not been\\naware that he had been operating the pickup truck at almost\\ndouble its load capacity. Probus later testified that he and Ab-\\nernathy chose not to use the pickup on the day of Abernathy’s\\ninjury because they could not use it to haul both the ties and\\nthe tools needed for the job.\\n Judge Myerscough acted well within her discretion in al-\\nlowing this line of cross-examination. Evidence is relevant if\\nit has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of\\nconsequence to the determination of the action more probable\\n\\n 1 The jury heard conflicting testimony regarding the weight of rail-\\nroad ties. For purposes of this line of questioning, it was assumed that the\\naverage railroad tie weighs 140 pounds.\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nor less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.\\nR. Evid. 401. The testimony about Allen’s previous use of the\\npickup satisfied this definition. It was relevant for the jury to\\nknow that when Allen testified that the pickup truck was a\\nreasonably safe alternative method available to Abernathy—\\na key point for the Railroad’s defense—he was not familiar\\nwith the pickup’s hauling capacity. That rebuttal was espe-\\ncially relevant given Probus’s testimony that he and Aber-\\nnathy chose not to use the pickup in part because of the\\ntruck’s load limit.\\n 2. Testimony about ADM\\n Second, the Railroad objects to the admission of evidence\\nregarding the financial ties of its expert witness, Kevin Mul-\\nvaney, to the Railroad’s parent company, the agribusiness gi-\\nant Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”). Before trial,\\nthe district court had granted the Railroad’s unopposed mo-\\ntion in limine barring mention of its relationship to ADM. At\\ntrial, the court reversed that ruling after Abernathy’s counsel\\nexplained that they had not known before trial that Mulvaney\\nwould testify. The district court let Abernathy’s counsel ask\\nMulvaney whether ADM was the largest customer of his em-\\nployer. He answered “yes.” In response to the next question,\\nMulvaney said he did not know whether ADM was the Rail-\\nroad’s parent company.\\n The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these\\nquestions. Bias is a “permissible and established basis of im-\\npeachment.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (hold-\\ning that government’s evidence as to a defense witness’s bias\\nwas properly admitted). Bias is the “quintessentially appro-\\npriate topic for cross examination.” Bachenski v. Malnati, 11\\nF.3d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir. 1993). We have held repeatedly that\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 15\\n\\nparties should be granted reasonable latitude in cross-exam-\\nining witnesses for bias. See, e.g., United States v. Manske, 186\\nF.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Frankenthal,\\n582 F.2d 1102, 1106 (7th Cir. 1978).\\n The information involving ADM did not become relevant\\nto bias until Mulvaney took the stand. In choosing to call an\\nexpert witness with economic ties to ADM, the Railroad made\\nits parent-subsidiary relationship with ADM relevant to show\\npotential bias on the part of Mulvaney. The district court did\\nnot abuse its discretion by allowing this evidence of arguable\\nbias.\\n 3. The Tie Crane Evidence\\n The Railroad’s third evidentiary challenge is to admission\\nof evidence regarding the tie crane. The Railroad argues on\\nappeal, as it did at trial, that this evidence is not relevant to\\nwhether the available methods of transporting ties when Ab-\\nernathy was injured (i.e., the backhoe and the pickup truck)\\nwere reasonably safe. The Railroad also contends that this ev-\\nidence confused the jury because it implied that the Railroad\\nhad a duty to employ the safest methods available, instead of\\njust reasonably safe methods. The Railroad is particularly crit-\\nical of the court’s admission of evidence that it bought a new\\ntie crane after Abernathy’s injury. (The Railroad’s briefs on\\nappeal do not cite Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which ad-\\ndresses evidence of subsequent remedial measures, but its ar-\\nguments invoke that rule’s rationale.)\\n As explained above, the Railroad is right that an employer\\ncan provide a reasonably safe workplace even if safer work-\\nplace alternatives exist, and evidence of a safer alternative is\\nnot conclusive evidence of negligence. See Taylor v. Illinois\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nCentral Railroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993) (“proof of a\\nsafer alternative is not necessarily proof of negligence”). Nev-\\nertheless, evidence of safer alternative methods is still rele-\\nvant to show that the available methods were not reasonably\\nsafe. See Stone v. New York Central & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344\\nU.S. 407, 409 (1953). Such evidence is relevant to show indus-\\ntry standards and to establish whether a given method is rea-\\nsonably safe relative to alternatives. See Rogers v. Missouri Pa-\\ncific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 503 (1957) (reinstating jury ver-\\ndict for injured employee in light of evidence of safer alterna-\\ntive method). Thus, evidence of the tie crane was relevant to\\nthe issues of duty and breach, and specifically to determine\\nwhether the methods the Railroad made available to Aber-\\nnathy were in fact reasonably safe. The jury was permitted to\\nmake inferences from evidence presented on an alternative\\nmethod, the tie crane. That does not mean the jury applied an\\nincorrect standard (requiring the safest possible workplace).\\nThe jury instructions stated correctly that the applicable\\nstandard is that the “FELA requires defendant to exercise rea-\\nsonable care to provide a reasonably safe workplace.”\\n The evidence that a new tie crane was purchased after Ab-\\nernathy’s injury was also admissible. Rule 407 generally pre-\\nvents admission of evidence of subsequent remedial\\nmeasures to prove fault, but the rule and our precedents ex-\\npressly permit this evidence if, among other reasons, “the fea-\\nsibility of the remedial measure” is contested. See, e.g., Ross v.\\nBlack & Decker Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 1992) (af-\\nfirming admission of subsequent remedial measures where\\ndefendant disputed feasibility).\\n In this case, the Railroad chose to contest the feasibility of\\nboth purchasing a new tie crane and fixing the old one. At trial\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 17\\n\\nand in deposition testimony, the Railroad’s witnesses offered\\nseveral reasons why the Railroad chose not to make a tie crane\\navailable in the four years or so between the original tie\\ncrane’s breakdown and Abernathy’s injury. These reasons in-\\ncluded that the cost of repairing the original tie crane or buy-\\ning a new one was prohibitively high, that the original tie\\ncrane was not used enough to justify the expense, and that the\\nRailroad was concerned that any money spent would be\\nwasted because Abernathy would misuse the machine so that\\nit would soon break down again.\\n We can assume that if the Railroad had chosen to stipulate\\nbefore trial to the feasibility of making a tie crane available to\\nAbernathy, he would not have been allowed to present evi-\\ndence of the post-injury purchase of a new tie crane. See Ross,\\n977 F.2d at 1185. But the Railroad could not both dispute fea-\\nsibility and block Abernathy from introducing contrary evi-\\ndence to show that it would have been feasible to replace the\\nequipment. If the Railroad was concerned that the jury might\\nuse this evidence to infer negligence improperly, it also could\\nhave requested a limiting jury instruction. It did not. See\\nTrytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 1994), citing\\nUnited States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1980). The\\ndistrict court did not err by admitting this evidence.\\n C. Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs\\n Following trial, Abernathy filed a bill of costs. The only\\npoint of controversy is his claim for $3,800 for fees paid to his\\ntreating physicians for their depositions. The Railroad ob-\\njected to these costs on the ground that 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b)\\nlimits witness fees to forty dollars per day unless some other\\nprovision of law provides for a higher rate. The district court\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nagreed with the Railroad and limited the witness fees in the\\nbill of cost to forty dollars per witness per day.\\n We review the district court’s award of costs for an abuse\\nof discretion. See Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 690\\nF.3d 844, 852 (7th Cir. 2012); Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d\\n454, 464 (8th Cir. 2015). However, we review legal questions\\nrelated to the cost award de novo. See Central States, Southwest\\nAreas Pension Fund v. White, 258 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(standard of appellate review is de novo on a question of law\\nin interpreting a statute); see also Stanley, 784 F.3d at 464.\\n Both doctors’ video depositions were sought by Aber-\\nnathy himself, and he presented them as evidence at trial. He\\ncontends that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i)\\nand 54(d)(1) work together to supersede the forty-dollar-per-\\nday limit of § 1821 and allow him, as the prevailing party, to\\nrecover the entire “reasonable fee” he paid his expert wit-\\nnesses for their depositions.\\n We affirm the district court’s denial of the higher witness\\nfees. Abernathy’s argument is contrary to the Supreme\\nCourt’s interpretation of the interaction between these rules\\nset forth in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.\\n437 (1987), and is not supported by Seventh Circuit precedent.\\nThe district court properly limited the witness fees the Rail-\\nroad must pay to forty dollars per witness per day.\\n In Halasa, we affirmed the district court’s ruling that the\\nprevailing defendant could be reimbursed for fees related to\\nthe deposition of an expert witness in excess of forty dollars\\nper day under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). We held that the “reasona-\\nble fee” requirement in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) can, in certain cases,\\nsupersede the specific payment schedule in § 1821(b). 690 F.3d\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 19\\n\\nat 852. However, the district court decision in that case was\\nbased on the fact that the deposition of that expert witness,\\nthough initially paid for by the defendant, had been taken by\\nthe plaintiff. Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 2012 WL\\n639520, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2012) (“Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i) provides that the party who deposes\\nan expert witness—which in this case was Halasa—shall ‘pay\\nthe expert a reasonable fee for time spent.’”). The defendant\\nin Halasa had not insisted that plaintiff pay its witness at the\\ntime of the deposition, as it could have under Rule\\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). Instead, the defendant had paid its own witness\\nhis usual expert fee for time spent on the deposition the plain-\\ntiff had taken. The defendant waited until its final bill of costs\\nto request that payment under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).\\n Thus, because the defendant in Halasa was the prevailing\\nparty and because plaintiff, as the party who had sought the\\ndeposition of the defendant’s expert, had an obligation under\\nthe Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) to pay the costs of that deposition, the\\ndistrict court was permitted to order that the defendant be\\nawarded the amount of reasonable witness fees it actually\\npaid, regardless of the fee limits set forth in 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1821(b). Here, however, Abernathy is not asking that the\\ncosts of the depositions be reimbursed under Rule\\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). He instead seeks to have the costs of deposing\\nhis own expert witnesses reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1)\\nalone, a question that was not addressed in Halasa.\\n This case is much closer to the Supreme Court’s decision\\nin Crawford Fitting, which rejected Abernathy’s interpretation\\nof these rules. The issue in Crawford Fitting was whether a\\nparty could be reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1) for the higher\\nexpert fees it had paid to have its own expert witness testify\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nat trial. 482 U.S. at 438–39. The Court rejected that claim, hold-\\ning that “when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for\\nfees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound\\nby the limit of § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory\\nauthority to the contrary.” Id. at 439. The Court found that the\\nrule and statute did not conflict, and that while Rule 54(d)(1)\\npermits prevailing parties to recover costs, § 1821(b) places a\\nlimit on the amount that can be recovered. Id. at 444–45.\\n Abernathy argues that we should distinguish Crawford Fit-\\nting and instead follow and extend the reasoning of the Eighth\\nCircuit in Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d 454, 464–65 (8th Cir.\\n2015), which allowed Cottrell, the prevailing party, to recover\\nthe full expert witness fees it actually paid to Stanley under\\nRule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) during discovery to take the deposition of\\nStanley’s expert witness. Whether Stanley was correct or not\\non its own facts, its reasoning does not extend to the case be-\\nfore us, where the prevailing party seeks to recover full expert\\nfees for the depositions of his own expert witnesses. This is\\nCrawford Fitting, except that we address here expert deposi-\\ntions rather than expert trial testimony. It would be a mistake\\nto limit Crawford Fitting on that basis. If we held that prevail-\\ning parties could recover under Rule 54(d) the full costs of de-\\nposing their own expert witnesses before trial, but not of call-\\ning those expert witnesses to testify live at trial, see Crawford\\nFitting, we would create an incentive for parties to offer expert\\ndepositions at trial in lieu of live expert testimony. Nothing in\\nthe text or logic of the rules calls for such a perverse incentive,\\nand we see no persuasive reason to distinguish this case from\\nCrawford Fitting.\\n The judgment of the district court and its award of costs\\nare AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4447332/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670079/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Marvin Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois Railroad Comp\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\nMARVIN ABERNATHY,\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\n v.\n\nEASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY,\n Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 3:15-cv-03223-SEM-TSH — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Marvin Abernathy was\ninjured while working for defendant Eastern Illinois Railroad\nCompany. He sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability\nAct (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., alleging that the Railroad\nnegligently failed to provide reasonably safe working condi-\ntions by failing to provide appropriate equipment for the job\nhe was doing when he was hurt.\n\f2 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\n A jury awarded Abernathy $525,000 in damages. The Rail-\nroad moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.\nThe district court denied both requests, and the Railroad has\nappealed, raising a host of issues. Abernathy has filed a cross-\nappeal asserting that the district court erred by not awarding\nhim sufficient costs to cover his expert witness fees. We affirm\nJudge Myerscough’s decisions in all respects.\nI. Facts\n Abernathy worked as a track inspector for the Eastern Illi-\nnois Railroad Company. His duties included replacing and\nrepairing railroad ties. On September 13, 2012, the Railroad\nsent Abernathy and another employee, Richard Probus, to re-\npair a railroad crossing about six or seven miles away from\nthe Railroad’s yard in Charleston, Illinois. Abernathy was in\ncharge of the job. The repair required him and Probus to\ntransport six ties from the yard to the crossing.\n In 2012, the Railroad had a “tie crane,” a vehicle that runs\non the railroad tracks and is well-suited to transporting rail-\nroad ties, but it had been out of commission for years. Aber-\nnathy and Probus had only two options for transporting the\nties: a backhoe or a pickup truck, either of which would need\nto travel on public roads rather than railroad tracks. Aber-\nnathy chose to use the backhoe. He testified that he had never\nused the pickup truck to haul ties before, but that he had used\nthe backhoe for similar jobs numerous times, although not on\npublic roads and not with this heavy a load. Abernathy and\nProbus loaded four ties into the bucket of the backhoe and\ntwo across the top of the bucket, resting on the arms of the\nmachine. Abernathy testified that when the bucket is rolled\nback, it locks the resting ties into place. Abernathy drove the\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 3\n\nbackhoe along a public highway. Probus followed in the\npickup, which was loaded with tools needed to install the ties.\n Abernathy drove in low gear, but he started to experience\n“road bounce.” He started braking, and two ties fell out of the\nbackhoe’s bucket. Abernathy stopped on the shoulder of the\nroad and tried to lift the ties back into the bucket. In lifting a\ntie, he injured his back. He also smashed a finger between the\ntie he was holding and another tie in the bucket. Despite the\naccident, Abernathy and Probus were able to finish reloading\nthe ties, and they resumed their trip and finished the repair\njob. Abernathy remained in pain for the rest of the day.\n The following morning, Abernathy reported the injury to\nTim Allen, the general manager of the Railroad. Allen told\nhim “to take it easy” and “be on light duty” for a while. Ab-\nernathy worked through the pain on lighter duty for the next\nyear but was unable to return to his regular work. The Rail-\nroad terminated his employment in February 2014. He even-\ntually had physical therapy, epidural injections, and then sur-\ngery in 2016. After the surgery, he continued to experience\npain in his back and legs. At the time of trial, his surgeon had\nstill not cleared him for any type of work.\nII. The Trial\n Abernathy sued the Railroad under the FELA, 45 U.S.C\n§ 51, alleging that it had been negligent in failing to provide\nan operable tie crane and requiring him to use the backhoe,\nwhich was inadequate for his assigned task of transporting\nthe ties. The trial lasted three days. Abernathy testified and\ncalled three other lay witnesses: his wife Carrie Abernathy,\nRichard Probus, and Lowell McElwee, a Railroad engineer\nwho worked with Abernathy.\n\f4 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\n Probus testified that on the day of Abernathy’s injury, they\ncould not have used the pickup truck to transport the ties be-\ncause they needed the pickup truck to transport the other\nequipment needed to install the ties. Probus also testified that\nthe Railroad had acquired an operable tie crane after Aber-\nnathy’s accident. Probus explained that the tie crane was now\nbeing used to transport ties and that manual lifts of ties were\nnot necessary with the new machine. He stated that the avail-\nability of the tie crane makes his job safer.\n Abernathy testified that when the Railroad’s tie crane had\nbeen operational, he used it regularly. He explained that the\ntie crane was the preferred method for moving ties because it\ndid not require manual lifting or traveling on public roads. He\nalso testified that before his 2012 injury, he had repeatedly\nasked the Railroad to replace the tie crane.\n Abernathy also presented the depositions of Doctors Renu\nBajaj, James Kohlman, and Thomas Lee. Dr. Lee, Abernathy’s\nsurgeon, offered testimony relevant to damages and causa-\ntion. He testified that he did not expect Abernathy to regain\nthe level of functionality he had prior to his accident. He also\ntestified that Abernathy certainly would not be able to return\nto work involving heavy manual labor. Dr. Lee also said that,\nto a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Abernathy’s\nsymptoms were caused or aggravated by the lifting accident\nin September 2012.\n The Railroad called four witnesses: general manager Tim\nAllen; Everett Fletcher; Gayle Garrett, the office secretary for\nthe Railroad; and Kendall Mulvaney, the superintendent of\nR&R Contractors, testifying as an expert witness in railroad\nrepair and maintenance. The Railroad defended on the theory\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 5\n\nthat a backhoe is a generally accepted method for transport-\ning ties in the rail repair industry.\n After the close of Abernathy’s case-in-chief, the Railroad\nmoved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of\nCivil Procedure 50(a), which the court denied. The Railroad\nrenewed its motion under Rule 50(b) at the close of all evi-\ndence and prior to the verdict, and the court again denied it.\n The jury found that the Railroad was negligent and that its\nnegligence contributed to Abernathy’s injuries. The jury cal-\nculated Abernathy’s total damages to be $750,000. However,\nthe jury found that Abernathy was also at fault for thirty per-\ncent of the total fault, which meant the jury awarded a net\nverdict of $525,000. The district court denied the Railroad’s\npost-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new\ntrial. The district court also awarded costs to Abernathy as the\nprevailing party but rejected his request to include as costs\n$3,800 in witness fees paid to Doctors Lee and Bajaj. The Rail-\nroad has appealed the judgment against it, and Abernathy has\ncross-appealed the denial of his request for expert witness\nfees as part of his costs.\nIII. Legal Analysis\n We take up the issues on appeal in three groups. First, we\naddress the Railroad’s arguments for judgment as a matter of\nlaw on the theory that Abernathy’s evidence was insufficient.\nSecond, we address the Railroad’s arguments that the district\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at\ntrial. Third, we address Abernathy’s cross-appeal on the\naward of costs.\n\f6 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\n A. Judgment as a Matter of Law\n The FELA provides a federal remedy for railroad employ-\nees who are injured on the job. To prove a claim under the\nFELA, a plaintiff must prove “the traditional common law el-\nements of negligence, including foreseeability, duty, breach,\nand causation.” Fulk v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 22 F.3d 120,\n124 (7th Cir. 1994). However, “[b]ecause it is meant to offer\nbroad remedial relief to railroad workers, a plaintiff’s burden\nwhen suing under the FELA is significantly lighter than in an\nordinary negligence case.” Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Rail-\nway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Harbin v.\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\n1990) (“It is well established that the quantum of evidence re-\nquired to establish liability in an FELA case is much less than\nin an ordinary negligence action.”). A railroad-employer is li-\nable where “employer negligence played any part, even the\nslightest, in producing the injury.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific\nRailroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).\n The Railroad challenges the sufficiency of evidence as to\nall elements of negligence. We consider duty and breach to-\ngether, and foreseeability and causation separately. “This\nCourt reviews sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo,\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-\nmoving party and drawing all inferences in [his] favor.”\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2014).\nWe “will overturn a jury verdict ‘only when there is a com-\nplete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion\nreached.’” Id. at 29596, quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645,\n653 (1946). Here, probative evidence supported the jury’s ver-\ndict that Abernathy established each element of negligence.\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 7\n\nThe district court did not err in declining to overturn the\njury’s verdict.\n 1. Duty & Breach\n The Railroad had a duty to provide Abernathy a reasona-\nbly safe working environment. See Crompton, 745 F.3d at 296.\nThe Railroad points out correctly that it “could have provided\na reasonably safe workplace notwithstanding the fact that\nsafer workplace alternatives exist.” Taylor v. Illinois Central\nRailroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993). The Railroad ar-\ngues that Abernathy produced no evidence that the equip-\nment available to haul ties (the backhoe and pickup truck) and\nthe way in which he was trained to perform a manual lift were\nunsafe. Instead, Abernathy produced evidence pertaining to\nthe absence of the tie crane. The tie crane evidence, the Rail-\nroad argues, showed only that there was a safer alternative to\nthe backhoe and pickup, which is not sufficient to establish\nnegligence. See Darrough v. CSX Transportation Inc., 321 F.3d\n674, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (railroad does not have duty to provide\nthe safest working environment).\n The Railroad’s argument relies on the faulty premise that\nevidence of safer alternatives can never even be relevant to\nwhether an employer exercised reasonable care. When a rail-\nroad assigns an employee a task using a particular method\nand the employee is injured while executing the task, evi-\ndence of a safer alternative method is relevant to whether the\nmethod provided was reasonable. See Stone v. New York, Chi-\ncago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344 U.S. 407, 409 (1953) (plaintiff\nwas injured pulling ties using the method his supervisor in-\nstructed him to use; evidence of three alternative methods for\npulling ties was relevant to whether railroad was negligent).\nBased on all the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably\n\f8 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nhave found that it was not reasonably safe to assign Aber-\nnathy to replace the ties without an operable tie crane.\n The Railroad’s argument as to the safety of a manual lift is\nsimilarly flawed. Abernathy did not argue that under all cir-\ncumstances, the Railroad is negligent if it requires an em-\nployee to perform a manual lift. He argued that the Railroad\nwas negligent where it could have provided employees with\nequipment that prevented the need for impromptu manual\nlifts on public roads but chose not to repair or replace this\nequipment.\n The Railroad’s reliance on Walker v. Northeast Regional\nCommuter Railroad, 225 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2000), is thus mis-\nplaced. In Walker, we affirmed summary judgment for a rail-\nroad in an FELA case for injuries from performing a manual\nlift. Plaintiff Walker worked as a machinist in a repair shop.\nHe injured his back lifting a replacement blade for a machine\nthat cut metal. Id. at 896. The blade weighed about 140\npounds, and Walker lifted it with one other employee. Id. A\ncrane and a forklift were available to the men but could not be\nused to assist in the lift because of the configuration of the\nshop. Walker argued that his employer was negligent in re-\nquiring him to lift more than fifty pounds and “in configuring\nthe shop in such a way as to prohibit the use of mechanical\nlifting aids.” Id. at 898.\n Walker is distinguishable. First, Walker actually made an\nexplicit argument that his employer’s demand that he lift\nmore than fifty pounds was sufficient by itself to support a\nfinding of negligence. In rejecting this argument, we con-\ntrasted the case with those in which plaintiffs “showed the\navailability of alternative methods and safeguards that would\nensure employee safety” and found telling that Walker\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 9\n\nproduced no evidence that he or any other machinists “had\ncomplained about problems in changing the blade on other\noccasions.” Id. In this case, Abernathy offered evidence of\nsafer alternatives and prior employee complaints about the\nlack of an operable tie crane. As to the second argument about\nthe shop configuration, Walker presented no evidence that the\nmanual lift in his case was not reasonably safe given the cir-\ncumstances, and in fact he “testified that he and [his co-lifter]\nassumed that they could pick up the blade” with no problem.\nId. at 899.\n Here, however, Abernathy offered evidence that the tie\ncrane was the appropriate equipment to use for the job he was\nperforming with a backhoe on the day he was injured. Allen’s\ntestimony on cross-examination and Probus’s testimony al-\nlowed the jury to find that the pickup truck was not an ade-\nquate alternative. Abernathy and Probus both testified that an\noperable tie crane made their work safer. Abernathy ex-\nplained that the tie crane allowed employees to avoid manual\nlifts and traveling on public roads. The jury could reasonably\nhave found that the Railroad did not provide Abernathy with\nequipment appropriate for the task he was assigned and that\nhis working environment was not reasonably safe.\n 2. Foreseeability\n Abernathy was required to show that it was foreseeable to\nthe Railroad that transporting ties using a backhoe or pickup\nas opposed to a tie crane “would or might result in a mishap\nand injury.” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685,\n703 (2011), quoting Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,\n372 U.S. 108, 118, n.7 (1963). To establish foreseeability, “a\nplaintiff must show that the employer had actual or construc-\ntive notice” of potential harm. Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern\n\f10 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nRailway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005). The railroad may\nbe liable “even if ‘the extent of the [injury] or the manner in\nwhich it occurred’ was not ‘probable’ or ‘foreseeable.’”\nMcBride, 564 U.S. at 70304, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 12021\n& n.8 (alteration in McBride; emphasis added here). The Rail-\nroad argues that Abernathy failed to prove negligence be-\ncause he failed to show that his injury was foreseeable. The\nRailroad argues that it could not have known that Abernathy\nwould use the backhoe or that doing so would result in\ndropped ties. The backhoe, the Railroad points out, had been\nused to transport ties without incident on multiple prior oc-\ncasions and there was no defect in the machine that caused\nthe tie to fall. Further, as the Railroad’s expert, Mulvaney, tes-\ntified, a backhoe was an accepted method in the railroad re-\npair injury for transporting ties. From these facts, the Railroad\ncontends there was insufficient proof of foreseeability.\n The Railroad’s argument misunderstands what the FELA\nrequires. Abernathy does not need to show that the Railroad\ncould have foreseen the particular consequences of its negli-\ngence. He needed to show only that “a particular condi-\ntion”—here, the absence of appropriate equipment—“would\nor might result in” any type of “mishap and injury.” McBride,\n564 U.S. at 703, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 118 n. 7 (emphasis\nadded here); see Gallick, 372 U.S. at 11820 (potential harm\nwas foreseeable where railroad had allowed stagnant pool of\nfilthy water to remain near worksite and employee was bitten\nby an insect, which led to infection and ultimately amputation\nof both legs). Abernathy needed to show only “circumstances\nwhich a reasonable person would foresee as creating a poten-\ntial for harm.” McGinn v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 102\nF.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1996).\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 11\n\n The evidence here supported a finding that a reasonable\nperson in the Railroad’s position could have foreseen that\ntransporting ties in a backhoe or pickup could lead to injury.\nThe Railroad knew that its tie crane had not been operational\nsince 2008. Abernathy offered evidence that he had repeatedly\nasked the Railroad to repair or replace it. Abernathy and Pro-\nbus both testified that the tie crane was safer to use in hauling\nties, in part because it prevented employees from having to\nlift ties manually and travel on public roads.\n 3. Causation\n In support of judgment as a matter of law, and now on\nappeal, the Railroad argued that even if it was negligent in\nfailing to provide a tie crane, Abernathy failed to prove that\nthe alleged negligence caused his injuries. Abernathy’s man-\nual lift, the Railroad contends, caused his injuries, and this lift\nwas an act subsequent to and independent of any safety issues\nthat arose because the tie crane was not available.\n The Railroad’s argument conflicts with the liberal causa-\ntion standard under the FELA. “Juries in such cases are\nproperly instructed that a defendant railroad ‘caused or con-\ntributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ‘if [the railroad’s] neg-\nligence played a part—no matter how small—in bringing\nabout the injury.” McBride, 564 U.S. at 705; see also Harbin v.\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\n1990), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S.\n500, 506 (1957) (“For under the FELA, ‘the test of a jury case is\nsimply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion\nthat employer negligence played any part, even in the slightest,\nin producing the injury… .”) (emphasis in Harbin). “The FELA\nvests the jury with broad discretion to engage in common\n\f12 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nsense inferences regarding issues of causation and fault.”\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 2014).\n There was sufficient evidence here that the Railroad’s neg-\nligence played a part in bringing about Abernathy’s injury.\nAbernathy had to use the backhoe on a public roadway to\ntransport the ties because the Railroad had not repaired or re-\nplaced its tie crane, which had been out of service for years.\nVibrations caused a tie to fall off the backhoe and onto the\npublic roadway that Abernathy was forced to use because of\nthe absence of a tie crane. Abernathy had to remove the tie,\nwhich was obstructing the public road, and he had to do it\nquickly. He had no option other than to lift the tie manually\nback into the backhoe, which injured his back. A reasonable\njury could infer that the Railroad’s negligence played some\npart in causing Abernathy’s injury. The district court correctly\ndenied the Railroad’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.\n B. New Trial Motion Based on Evidentiary Rulings\n The Railroad also argues that the district judge erred in\nthree decisions to admit evidence, contending that each is suf-\nficient to warrant a new trial. We review the denial of a new\ntrial motion for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen-\neral Board of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist\nChurch, 733 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2013); Kossman v. Northeast\nIllinois Regional Commuter Railroad, 211 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th\nCir. 2000). We find no abuse of discretion in any of the chal-\nlenged evidentiary rulings.\n 1. Testimony of Timothy Allen\n First, the Railroad objects to a line of cross-examination of\nits general manager, Timothy Allen, regarding his own use of\na company pickup truck to transport railroad ties. The\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 13\n\nRailroad argues that Allen’s use of the truck was so dissimilar\nfrom the way Abernathy might have used the truck on the day\nhe was injured as to make the evidence irrelevant.\n Again, Abernathy had to prove that the Railroad did not\nprovide a reasonably safe method for transporting railroad\nties. See Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 297–\n98 (1949). The Railroad argued that the pickup truck was a\nreasonably safe and available way for Abernathy to do his job.\nAllen testified that he thought Abernathy should have used\nthe pickup truck rather than using the backhoe to haul ties on\na public road.\n During cross-examination, Allen acknowledged that on\none occasion, he had used the same pickup to take 20 to 25\nrejected railroad ties to a friend. Allen admitted that, assum-\ning each tie weighed just 140 pounds, hauling 20 ties would\nhave meant the pickup truck was carrying 2,800 pounds.1 The\npickup truck was rated to haul only 1,500 pounds. When\nasked about this discrepancy, Allen said he had not been\naware that he had been operating the pickup truck at almost\ndouble its load capacity. Probus later testified that he and Ab-\nernathy chose not to use the pickup on the day of Abernathy’s\ninjury because they could not use it to haul both the ties and\nthe tools needed for the job.\n Judge Myerscough acted well within her discretion in al-\nlowing this line of cross-examination. Evidence is relevant if\nit has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of\nconsequence to the determination of the action more probable\n\n 1 The jury heard conflicting testimony regarding the weight of rail-\nroad ties. For purposes of this line of questioning, it was assumed that the\naverage railroad tie weighs 140 pounds.\n\f14 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nor less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.\nR. Evid. 401. The testimony about Allen’s previous use of the\npickup satisfied this definition. It was relevant for the jury to\nknow that when Allen testified that the pickup truck was a\nreasonably safe alternative method available to Abernathy—\na key point for the Railroad’s defense—he was not familiar\nwith the pickup’s hauling capacity. That rebuttal was espe-\ncially relevant given Probus’s testimony that he and Aber-\nnathy chose not to use the pickup in part because of the\ntruck’s load limit.\n 2. Testimony about ADM\n Second, the Railroad objects to the admission of evidence\nregarding the financial ties of its expert witness, Kevin Mul-\nvaney, to the Railroad’s parent company, the agribusiness gi-\nant Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”). Before trial,\nthe district court had granted the Railroad’s unopposed mo-\ntion in limine barring mention of its relationship to ADM. At\ntrial, the court reversed that ruling after Abernathy’s counsel\nexplained that they had not known before trial that Mulvaney\nwould testify. The district court let Abernathy’s counsel ask\nMulvaney whether ADM was the largest customer of his em-\nployer. He answered “yes.” In response to the next question,\nMulvaney said he did not know whether ADM was the Rail-\nroad’s parent company.\n The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these\nquestions. Bias is a “permissible and established basis of im-\npeachment.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (hold-\ning that government’s evidence as to a defense witness’s bias\nwas properly admitted). Bias is the “quintessentially appro-\npriate topic for cross examination.” Bachenski v. Malnati, 11\nF.3d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir. 1993). We have held repeatedly that\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 15\n\nparties should be granted reasonable latitude in cross-exam-\nining witnesses for bias. See, e.g., United States v. Manske, 186\nF.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Frankenthal,\n582 F.2d 1102, 1106 (7th Cir. 1978).\n The information involving ADM did not become relevant\nto bias until Mulvaney took the stand. In choosing to call an\nexpert witness with economic ties to ADM, the Railroad made\nits parent-subsidiary relationship with ADM relevant to show\npotential bias on the part of Mulvaney. The district court did\nnot abuse its discretion by allowing this evidence of arguable\nbias.\n 3. The Tie Crane Evidence\n The Railroad’s third evidentiary challenge is to admission\nof evidence regarding the tie crane. The Railroad argues on\nappeal, as it did at trial, that this evidence is not relevant to\nwhether the available methods of transporting ties when Ab-\nernathy was injured (i.e., the backhoe and the pickup truck)\nwere reasonably safe. The Railroad also contends that this ev-\nidence confused the jury because it implied that the Railroad\nhad a duty to employ the safest methods available, instead of\njust reasonably safe methods. The Railroad is particularly crit-\nical of the court’s admission of evidence that it bought a new\ntie crane after Abernathy’s injury. (The Railroad’s briefs on\nappeal do not cite Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which ad-\ndresses evidence of subsequent remedial measures, but its ar-\nguments invoke that rule’s rationale.)\n As explained above, the Railroad is right that an employer\ncan provide a reasonably safe workplace even if safer work-\nplace alternatives exist, and evidence of a safer alternative is\nnot conclusive evidence of negligence. See Taylor v. Illinois\n\f16 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nCentral Railroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993) (“proof of a\nsafer alternative is not necessarily proof of negligence”). Nev-\nertheless, evidence of safer alternative methods is still rele-\nvant to show that the available methods were not reasonably\nsafe. See Stone v. New York Central & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344\nU.S. 407, 409 (1953). Such evidence is relevant to show indus-\ntry standards and to establish whether a given method is rea-\nsonably safe relative to alternatives. See Rogers v. Missouri Pa-\ncific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 503 (1957) (reinstating jury ver-\ndict for injured employee in light of evidence of safer alterna-\ntive method). Thus, evidence of the tie crane was relevant to\nthe issues of duty and breach, and specifically to determine\nwhether the methods the Railroad made available to Aber-\nnathy were in fact reasonably safe. The jury was permitted to\nmake inferences from evidence presented on an alternative\nmethod, the tie crane. That does not mean the jury applied an\nincorrect standard (requiring the safest possible workplace).\nThe jury instructions stated correctly that the applicable\nstandard is that the “FELA requires defendant to exercise rea-\nsonable care to provide a reasonably safe workplace.”\n The evidence that a new tie crane was purchased after Ab-\nernathy’s injury was also admissible. Rule 407 generally pre-\nvents admission of evidence of subsequent remedial\nmeasures to prove fault, but the rule and our precedents ex-\npressly permit this evidence if, among other reasons, “the fea-\nsibility of the remedial measure” is contested. See, e.g., Ross v.\nBlack & Decker Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 1992) (af-\nfirming admission of subsequent remedial measures where\ndefendant disputed feasibility).\n In this case, the Railroad chose to contest the feasibility of\nboth purchasing a new tie crane and fixing the old one. At trial\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 17\n\nand in deposition testimony, the Railroad’s witnesses offered\nseveral reasons why the Railroad chose not to make a tie crane\navailable in the four years or so between the original tie\ncrane’s breakdown and Abernathy’s injury. These reasons in-\ncluded that the cost of repairing the original tie crane or buy-\ning a new one was prohibitively high, that the original tie\ncrane was not used enough to justify the expense, and that the\nRailroad was concerned that any money spent would be\nwasted because Abernathy would misuse the machine so that\nit would soon break down again.\n We can assume that if the Railroad had chosen to stipulate\nbefore trial to the feasibility of making a tie crane available to\nAbernathy, he would not have been allowed to present evi-\ndence of the post-injury purchase of a new tie crane. See Ross,\n977 F.2d at 1185. But the Railroad could not both dispute fea-\nsibility and block Abernathy from introducing contrary evi-\ndence to show that it would have been feasible to replace the\nequipment. If the Railroad was concerned that the jury might\nuse this evidence to infer negligence improperly, it also could\nhave requested a limiting jury instruction. It did not. See\nTrytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 1994), citing\nUnited States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1980). The\ndistrict court did not err by admitting this evidence.\n C. Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs\n Following trial, Abernathy filed a bill of costs. The only\npoint of controversy is his claim for $3,800 for fees paid to his\ntreating physicians for their depositions. The Railroad ob-\njected to these costs on the ground that 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b)\nlimits witness fees to forty dollars per day unless some other\nprovision of law provides for a higher rate. The district court\n\f18 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nagreed with the Railroad and limited the witness fees in the\nbill of cost to forty dollars per witness per day.\n We review the district court’s award of costs for an abuse\nof discretion. See Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 690\nF.3d 844, 852 (7th Cir. 2012); Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d\n454, 464 (8th Cir. 2015). However, we review legal questions\nrelated to the cost award de novo. See Central States, Southwest\nAreas Pension Fund v. White, 258 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2001)\n(standard of appellate review is de novo on a question of law\nin interpreting a statute); see also Stanley, 784 F.3d at 464.\n Both doctors’ video depositions were sought by Aber-\nnathy himself, and he presented them as evidence at trial. He\ncontends that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i)\nand 54(d)(1) work together to supersede the forty-dollar-per-\nday limit of § 1821 and allow him, as the prevailing party, to\nrecover the entire “reasonable fee” he paid his expert wit-\nnesses for their depositions.\n We affirm the district court’s denial of the higher witness\nfees. Abernathy’s argument is contrary to the Supreme\nCourt’s interpretation of the interaction between these rules\nset forth in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.\n437 (1987), and is not supported by Seventh Circuit precedent.\nThe district court properly limited the witness fees the Rail-\nroad must pay to forty dollars per witness per day.\n In Halasa, we affirmed the district court’s ruling that the\nprevailing defendant could be reimbursed for fees related to\nthe deposition of an expert witness in excess of forty dollars\nper day under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). We held that the “reasona-\nble fee” requirement in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) can, in certain cases,\nsupersede the specific payment schedule in § 1821(b). 690 F.3d\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 19\n\nat 852. However, the district court decision in that case was\nbased on the fact that the deposition of that expert witness,\nthough initially paid for by the defendant, had been taken by\nthe plaintiff. Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 2012 WL\n639520, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2012) (“Federal Rule of Civil\nProcedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i) provides that the party who deposes\nan expert witness—which in this case was Halasa—shall ‘pay\nthe expert a reasonable fee for time spent.’”). The defendant\nin Halasa had not insisted that plaintiff pay its witness at the\ntime of the deposition, as it could have under Rule\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). Instead, the defendant had paid its own witness\nhis usual expert fee for time spent on the deposition the plain-\ntiff had taken. The defendant waited until its final bill of costs\nto request that payment under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).\n Thus, because the defendant in Halasa was the prevailing\nparty and because plaintiff, as the party who had sought the\ndeposition of the defendant’s expert, had an obligation under\nthe Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) to pay the costs of that deposition, the\ndistrict court was permitted to order that the defendant be\nawarded the amount of reasonable witness fees it actually\npaid, regardless of the fee limits set forth in 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1821(b). Here, however, Abernathy is not asking that the\ncosts of the depositions be reimbursed under Rule\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). He instead seeks to have the costs of deposing\nhis own expert witnesses reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1)\nalone, a question that was not addressed in Halasa.\n This case is much closer to the Supreme Court’s decision\nin Crawford Fitting, which rejected Abernathy’s interpretation\nof these rules. The issue in Crawford Fitting was whether a\nparty could be reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1) for the higher\nexpert fees it had paid to have its own expert witness testify\n\f20 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nat trial. 482 U.S. at 438–39. The Court rejected that claim, hold-\ning that “when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for\nfees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound\nby the limit of § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory\nauthority to the contrary.” Id. at 439. The Court found that the\nrule and statute did not conflict, and that while Rule 54(d)(1)\npermits prevailing parties to recover costs, § 1821(b) places a\nlimit on the amount that can be recovered. Id. at 444–45.\n Abernathy argues that we should distinguish Crawford Fit-\nting and instead follow and extend the reasoning of the Eighth\nCircuit in Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d 454, 464–65 (8th Cir.\n2015), which allowed Cottrell, the prevailing party, to recover\nthe full expert witness fees it actually paid to Stanley under\nRule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) during discovery to take the deposition of\nStanley’s expert witness. Whether Stanley was correct or not\non its own facts, its reasoning does not extend to the case be-\nfore us, where the prevailing party seeks to recover full expert\nfees for the depositions of his own expert witnesses. This is\nCrawford Fitting, except that we address here expert deposi-\ntions rather than expert trial testimony. It would be a mistake\nto limit Crawford Fitting on that basis. If we held that prevail-\ning parties could recover under Rule 54(d) the full costs of de-\nposing their own expert witnesses before trial, but not of call-\ning those expert witnesses to testify live at trial, see Crawford\nFitting, we would create an incentive for parties to offer expert\ndepositions at trial in lieu of live expert testimony. Nothing in\nthe text or logic of the rules calls for such a perverse incentive,\nand we see no persuasive reason to distinguish this case from\nCrawford Fitting.\n The judgment of the district court and its award of costs\nare AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Marvin Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois Railroad Comp\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\nMARVIN ABERNATHY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nEASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:15-cv-03223-SEM-TSH — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Marvin Abernathy was\\ninjured while working for defendant Eastern Illinois Railroad\\nCompany. He sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability\\nAct (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., alleging that the Railroad\\nnegligently failed to provide reasonably safe working condi-\\ntions by failing to provide appropriate equipment for the job\\nhe was doing when he was hurt.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n A jury awarded Abernathy $525,000 in damages. The Rail-\\nroad moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.\\nThe district court denied both requests, and the Railroad has\\nappealed, raising a host of issues. Abernathy has filed a cross-\\nappeal asserting that the district court erred by not awarding\\nhim sufficient costs to cover his expert witness fees. We affirm\\nJudge Myerscough’s decisions in all respects.\\nI. Facts\\n Abernathy worked as a track inspector for the Eastern Illi-\\nnois Railroad Company. His duties included replacing and\\nrepairing railroad ties. On September 13, 2012, the Railroad\\nsent Abernathy and another employee, Richard Probus, to re-\\npair a railroad crossing about six or seven miles away from\\nthe Railroad’s yard in Charleston, Illinois. Abernathy was in\\ncharge of the job. The repair required him and Probus to\\ntransport six ties from the yard to the crossing.\\n In 2012, the Railroad had a “tie crane,” a vehicle that runs\\non the railroad tracks and is well-suited to transporting rail-\\nroad ties, but it had been out of commission for years. Aber-\\nnathy and Probus had only two options for transporting the\\nties: a backhoe or a pickup truck, either of which would need\\nto travel on public roads rather than railroad tracks. Aber-\\nnathy chose to use the backhoe. He testified that he had never\\nused the pickup truck to haul ties before, but that he had used\\nthe backhoe for similar jobs numerous times, although not on\\npublic roads and not with this heavy a load. Abernathy and\\nProbus loaded four ties into the bucket of the backhoe and\\ntwo across the top of the bucket, resting on the arms of the\\nmachine. Abernathy testified that when the bucket is rolled\\nback, it locks the resting ties into place. Abernathy drove the\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 3\\n\\nbackhoe along a public highway. Probus followed in the\\npickup, which was loaded with tools needed to install the ties.\\n Abernathy drove in low gear, but he started to experience\\n“road bounce.” He started braking, and two ties fell out of the\\nbackhoe’s bucket. Abernathy stopped on the shoulder of the\\nroad and tried to lift the ties back into the bucket. In lifting a\\ntie, he injured his back. He also smashed a finger between the\\ntie he was holding and another tie in the bucket. Despite the\\naccident, Abernathy and Probus were able to finish reloading\\nthe ties, and they resumed their trip and finished the repair\\njob. Abernathy remained in pain for the rest of the day.\\n The following morning, Abernathy reported the injury to\\nTim Allen, the general manager of the Railroad. Allen told\\nhim “to take it easy” and “be on light duty” for a while. Ab-\\nernathy worked through the pain on lighter duty for the next\\nyear but was unable to return to his regular work. The Rail-\\nroad terminated his employment in February 2014. He even-\\ntually had physical therapy, epidural injections, and then sur-\\ngery in 2016. After the surgery, he continued to experience\\npain in his back and legs. At the time of trial, his surgeon had\\nstill not cleared him for any type of work.\\nII. The Trial\\n Abernathy sued the Railroad under the FELA, 45 U.S.C\\n§ 51, alleging that it had been negligent in failing to provide\\nan operable tie crane and requiring him to use the backhoe,\\nwhich was inadequate for his assigned task of transporting\\nthe ties. The trial lasted three days. Abernathy testified and\\ncalled three other lay witnesses: his wife Carrie Abernathy,\\nRichard Probus, and Lowell McElwee, a Railroad engineer\\nwho worked with Abernathy.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n Probus testified that on the day of Abernathy’s injury, they\\ncould not have used the pickup truck to transport the ties be-\\ncause they needed the pickup truck to transport the other\\nequipment needed to install the ties. Probus also testified that\\nthe Railroad had acquired an operable tie crane after Aber-\\nnathy’s accident. Probus explained that the tie crane was now\\nbeing used to transport ties and that manual lifts of ties were\\nnot necessary with the new machine. He stated that the avail-\\nability of the tie crane makes his job safer.\\n Abernathy testified that when the Railroad’s tie crane had\\nbeen operational, he used it regularly. He explained that the\\ntie crane was the preferred method for moving ties because it\\ndid not require manual lifting or traveling on public roads. He\\nalso testified that before his 2012 injury, he had repeatedly\\nasked the Railroad to replace the tie crane.\\n Abernathy also presented the depositions of Doctors Renu\\nBajaj, James Kohlman, and Thomas Lee. Dr. Lee, Abernathy’s\\nsurgeon, offered testimony relevant to damages and causa-\\ntion. He testified that he did not expect Abernathy to regain\\nthe level of functionality he had prior to his accident. He also\\ntestified that Abernathy certainly would not be able to return\\nto work involving heavy manual labor. Dr. Lee also said that,\\nto a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Abernathy’s\\nsymptoms were caused or aggravated by the lifting accident\\nin September 2012.\\n The Railroad called four witnesses: general manager Tim\\nAllen; Everett Fletcher; Gayle Garrett, the office secretary for\\nthe Railroad; and Kendall Mulvaney, the superintendent of\\nR&R Contractors, testifying as an expert witness in railroad\\nrepair and maintenance. The Railroad defended on the theory\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 5\\n\\nthat a backhoe is a generally accepted method for transport-\\ning ties in the rail repair industry.\\n After the close of Abernathy’s case-in-chief, the Railroad\\nmoved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of\\nCivil Procedure 50(a), which the court denied. The Railroad\\nrenewed its motion under Rule 50(b) at the close of all evi-\\ndence and prior to the verdict, and the court again denied it.\\n The jury found that the Railroad was negligent and that its\\nnegligence contributed to Abernathy’s injuries. The jury cal-\\nculated Abernathy’s total damages to be $750,000. However,\\nthe jury found that Abernathy was also at fault for thirty per-\\ncent of the total fault, which meant the jury awarded a net\\nverdict of $525,000. The district court denied the Railroad’s\\npost-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new\\ntrial. The district court also awarded costs to Abernathy as the\\nprevailing party but rejected his request to include as costs\\n$3,800 in witness fees paid to Doctors Lee and Bajaj. The Rail-\\nroad has appealed the judgment against it, and Abernathy has\\ncross-appealed the denial of his request for expert witness\\nfees as part of his costs.\\nIII. Legal Analysis\\n We take up the issues on appeal in three groups. First, we\\naddress the Railroad’s arguments for judgment as a matter of\\nlaw on the theory that Abernathy’s evidence was insufficient.\\nSecond, we address the Railroad’s arguments that the district\\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at\\ntrial. Third, we address Abernathy’s cross-appeal on the\\naward of costs.\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n A. Judgment as a Matter of Law\\n The FELA provides a federal remedy for railroad employ-\\nees who are injured on the job. To prove a claim under the\\nFELA, a plaintiff must prove “the traditional common law el-\\nements of negligence, including foreseeability, duty, breach,\\nand causation.” Fulk v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 22 F.3d 120,\\n124 (7th Cir. 1994). However, “[b]ecause it is meant to offer\\nbroad remedial relief to railroad workers, a plaintiff’s burden\\nwhen suing under the FELA is significantly lighter than in an\\nordinary negligence case.” Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Rail-\\nway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Harbin v.\\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\\n1990) (“It is well established that the quantum of evidence re-\\nquired to establish liability in an FELA case is much less than\\nin an ordinary negligence action.”). A railroad-employer is li-\\nable where “employer negligence played any part, even the\\nslightest, in producing the injury.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific\\nRailroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).\\n The Railroad challenges the sufficiency of evidence as to\\nall elements of negligence. We consider duty and breach to-\\ngether, and foreseeability and causation separately. “This\\nCourt reviews sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo,\\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-\\nmoving party and drawing all inferences in [his] favor.”\\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2014).\\nWe “will overturn a jury verdict ‘only when there is a com-\\nplete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion\\nreached.’” Id. at 29596, quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645,\\n653 (1946). Here, probative evidence supported the jury’s ver-\\ndict that Abernathy established each element of negligence.\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 7\\n\\nThe district court did not err in declining to overturn the\\njury’s verdict.\\n 1. Duty & Breach\\n The Railroad had a duty to provide Abernathy a reasona-\\nbly safe working environment. See Crompton, 745 F.3d at 296.\\nThe Railroad points out correctly that it “could have provided\\na reasonably safe workplace notwithstanding the fact that\\nsafer workplace alternatives exist.” Taylor v. Illinois Central\\nRailroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993). The Railroad ar-\\ngues that Abernathy produced no evidence that the equip-\\nment available to haul ties (the backhoe and pickup truck) and\\nthe way in which he was trained to perform a manual lift were\\nunsafe. Instead, Abernathy produced evidence pertaining to\\nthe absence of the tie crane. The tie crane evidence, the Rail-\\nroad argues, showed only that there was a safer alternative to\\nthe backhoe and pickup, which is not sufficient to establish\\nnegligence. See Darrough v. CSX Transportation Inc., 321 F.3d\\n674, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (railroad does not have duty to provide\\nthe safest working environment).\\n The Railroad’s argument relies on the faulty premise that\\nevidence of safer alternatives can never even be relevant to\\nwhether an employer exercised reasonable care. When a rail-\\nroad assigns an employee a task using a particular method\\nand the employee is injured while executing the task, evi-\\ndence of a safer alternative method is relevant to whether the\\nmethod provided was reasonable. See Stone v. New York, Chi-\\ncago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344 U.S. 407, 409 (1953) (plaintiff\\nwas injured pulling ties using the method his supervisor in-\\nstructed him to use; evidence of three alternative methods for\\npulling ties was relevant to whether railroad was negligent).\\nBased on all the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nhave found that it was not reasonably safe to assign Aber-\\nnathy to replace the ties without an operable tie crane.\\n The Railroad’s argument as to the safety of a manual lift is\\nsimilarly flawed. Abernathy did not argue that under all cir-\\ncumstances, the Railroad is negligent if it requires an em-\\nployee to perform a manual lift. He argued that the Railroad\\nwas negligent where it could have provided employees with\\nequipment that prevented the need for impromptu manual\\nlifts on public roads but chose not to repair or replace this\\nequipment.\\n The Railroad’s reliance on Walker v. Northeast Regional\\nCommuter Railroad, 225 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2000), is thus mis-\\nplaced. In Walker, we affirmed summary judgment for a rail-\\nroad in an FELA case for injuries from performing a manual\\nlift. Plaintiff Walker worked as a machinist in a repair shop.\\nHe injured his back lifting a replacement blade for a machine\\nthat cut metal. Id. at 896. The blade weighed about 140\\npounds, and Walker lifted it with one other employee. Id. A\\ncrane and a forklift were available to the men but could not be\\nused to assist in the lift because of the configuration of the\\nshop. Walker argued that his employer was negligent in re-\\nquiring him to lift more than fifty pounds and “in configuring\\nthe shop in such a way as to prohibit the use of mechanical\\nlifting aids.” Id. at 898.\\n Walker is distinguishable. First, Walker actually made an\\nexplicit argument that his employer’s demand that he lift\\nmore than fifty pounds was sufficient by itself to support a\\nfinding of negligence. In rejecting this argument, we con-\\ntrasted the case with those in which plaintiffs “showed the\\navailability of alternative methods and safeguards that would\\nensure employee safety” and found telling that Walker\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 9\\n\\nproduced no evidence that he or any other machinists “had\\ncomplained about problems in changing the blade on other\\noccasions.” Id. In this case, Abernathy offered evidence of\\nsafer alternatives and prior employee complaints about the\\nlack of an operable tie crane. As to the second argument about\\nthe shop configuration, Walker presented no evidence that the\\nmanual lift in his case was not reasonably safe given the cir-\\ncumstances, and in fact he “testified that he and [his co-lifter]\\nassumed that they could pick up the blade” with no problem.\\nId. at 899.\\n Here, however, Abernathy offered evidence that the tie\\ncrane was the appropriate equipment to use for the job he was\\nperforming with a backhoe on the day he was injured. Allen’s\\ntestimony on cross-examination and Probus’s testimony al-\\nlowed the jury to find that the pickup truck was not an ade-\\nquate alternative. Abernathy and Probus both testified that an\\noperable tie crane made their work safer. Abernathy ex-\\nplained that the tie crane allowed employees to avoid manual\\nlifts and traveling on public roads. The jury could reasonably\\nhave found that the Railroad did not provide Abernathy with\\nequipment appropriate for the task he was assigned and that\\nhis working environment was not reasonably safe.\\n 2. Foreseeability\\n Abernathy was required to show that it was foreseeable to\\nthe Railroad that transporting ties using a backhoe or pickup\\nas opposed to a tie crane “would or might result in a mishap\\nand injury.” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685,\\n703 (2011), quoting Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,\\n372 U.S. 108, 118, n.7 (1963). To establish foreseeability, “a\\nplaintiff must show that the employer had actual or construc-\\ntive notice” of potential harm. Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nRailway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005). The railroad may\\nbe liable “even if ‘the extent of the [injury] or the manner in\\nwhich it occurred’ was not ‘probable’ or ‘foreseeable.’”\\nMcBride, 564 U.S. at 70304, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 12021\\n& n.8 (alteration in McBride; emphasis added here). The Rail-\\nroad argues that Abernathy failed to prove negligence be-\\ncause he failed to show that his injury was foreseeable. The\\nRailroad argues that it could not have known that Abernathy\\nwould use the backhoe or that doing so would result in\\ndropped ties. The backhoe, the Railroad points out, had been\\nused to transport ties without incident on multiple prior oc-\\ncasions and there was no defect in the machine that caused\\nthe tie to fall. Further, as the Railroad’s expert, Mulvaney, tes-\\ntified, a backhoe was an accepted method in the railroad re-\\npair injury for transporting ties. From these facts, the Railroad\\ncontends there was insufficient proof of foreseeability.\\n The Railroad’s argument misunderstands what the FELA\\nrequires. Abernathy does not need to show that the Railroad\\ncould have foreseen the particular consequences of its negli-\\ngence. He needed to show only that “a particular condi-\\ntion”—here, the absence of appropriate equipment—“would\\nor might result in” any type of “mishap and injury.” McBride,\\n564 U.S. at 703, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 118 n. 7 (emphasis\\nadded here); see Gallick, 372 U.S. at 11820 (potential harm\\nwas foreseeable where railroad had allowed stagnant pool of\\nfilthy water to remain near worksite and employee was bitten\\nby an insect, which led to infection and ultimately amputation\\nof both legs). Abernathy needed to show only “circumstances\\nwhich a reasonable person would foresee as creating a poten-\\ntial for harm.” McGinn v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 102\\nF.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1996).\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 11\\n\\n The evidence here supported a finding that a reasonable\\nperson in the Railroad’s position could have foreseen that\\ntransporting ties in a backhoe or pickup could lead to injury.\\nThe Railroad knew that its tie crane had not been operational\\nsince 2008. Abernathy offered evidence that he had repeatedly\\nasked the Railroad to repair or replace it. Abernathy and Pro-\\nbus both testified that the tie crane was safer to use in hauling\\nties, in part because it prevented employees from having to\\nlift ties manually and travel on public roads.\\n 3. Causation\\n In support of judgment as a matter of law, and now on\\nappeal, the Railroad argued that even if it was negligent in\\nfailing to provide a tie crane, Abernathy failed to prove that\\nthe alleged negligence caused his injuries. Abernathy’s man-\\nual lift, the Railroad contends, caused his injuries, and this lift\\nwas an act subsequent to and independent of any safety issues\\nthat arose because the tie crane was not available.\\n The Railroad’s argument conflicts with the liberal causa-\\ntion standard under the FELA. “Juries in such cases are\\nproperly instructed that a defendant railroad ‘caused or con-\\ntributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ‘if [the railroad’s] neg-\\nligence played a part—no matter how small—in bringing\\nabout the injury.” McBride, 564 U.S. at 705; see also Harbin v.\\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\\n1990), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S.\\n500, 506 (1957) (“For under the FELA, ‘the test of a jury case is\\nsimply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion\\nthat employer negligence played any part, even in the slightest,\\nin producing the injury… .”) (emphasis in Harbin). “The FELA\\nvests the jury with broad discretion to engage in common\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nsense inferences regarding issues of causation and fault.”\\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n There was sufficient evidence here that the Railroad’s neg-\\nligence played a part in bringing about Abernathy’s injury.\\nAbernathy had to use the backhoe on a public roadway to\\ntransport the ties because the Railroad had not repaired or re-\\nplaced its tie crane, which had been out of service for years.\\nVibrations caused a tie to fall off the backhoe and onto the\\npublic roadway that Abernathy was forced to use because of\\nthe absence of a tie crane. Abernathy had to remove the tie,\\nwhich was obstructing the public road, and he had to do it\\nquickly. He had no option other than to lift the tie manually\\nback into the backhoe, which injured his back. A reasonable\\njury could infer that the Railroad’s negligence played some\\npart in causing Abernathy’s injury. The district court correctly\\ndenied the Railroad’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.\\n B. New Trial Motion Based on Evidentiary Rulings\\n The Railroad also argues that the district judge erred in\\nthree decisions to admit evidence, contending that each is suf-\\nficient to warrant a new trial. We review the denial of a new\\ntrial motion for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen-\\neral Board of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist\\nChurch, 733 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2013); Kossman v. Northeast\\nIllinois Regional Commuter Railroad, 211 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th\\nCir. 2000). We find no abuse of discretion in any of the chal-\\nlenged evidentiary rulings.\\n 1. Testimony of Timothy Allen\\n First, the Railroad objects to a line of cross-examination of\\nits general manager, Timothy Allen, regarding his own use of\\na company pickup truck to transport railroad ties. The\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 13\\n\\nRailroad argues that Allen’s use of the truck was so dissimilar\\nfrom the way Abernathy might have used the truck on the day\\nhe was injured as to make the evidence irrelevant.\\n Again, Abernathy had to prove that the Railroad did not\\nprovide a reasonably safe method for transporting railroad\\nties. See Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 297–\\n98 (1949). The Railroad argued that the pickup truck was a\\nreasonably safe and available way for Abernathy to do his job.\\nAllen testified that he thought Abernathy should have used\\nthe pickup truck rather than using the backhoe to haul ties on\\na public road.\\n During cross-examination, Allen acknowledged that on\\none occasion, he had used the same pickup to take 20 to 25\\nrejected railroad ties to a friend. Allen admitted that, assum-\\ning each tie weighed just 140 pounds, hauling 20 ties would\\nhave meant the pickup truck was carrying 2,800 pounds.1 The\\npickup truck was rated to haul only 1,500 pounds. When\\nasked about this discrepancy, Allen said he had not been\\naware that he had been operating the pickup truck at almost\\ndouble its load capacity. Probus later testified that he and Ab-\\nernathy chose not to use the pickup on the day of Abernathy’s\\ninjury because they could not use it to haul both the ties and\\nthe tools needed for the job.\\n Judge Myerscough acted well within her discretion in al-\\nlowing this line of cross-examination. Evidence is relevant if\\nit has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of\\nconsequence to the determination of the action more probable\\n\\n 1 The jury heard conflicting testimony regarding the weight of rail-\\nroad ties. For purposes of this line of questioning, it was assumed that the\\naverage railroad tie weighs 140 pounds.\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nor less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.\\nR. Evid. 401. The testimony about Allen’s previous use of the\\npickup satisfied this definition. It was relevant for the jury to\\nknow that when Allen testified that the pickup truck was a\\nreasonably safe alternative method available to Abernathy—\\na key point for the Railroad’s defense—he was not familiar\\nwith the pickup’s hauling capacity. That rebuttal was espe-\\ncially relevant given Probus’s testimony that he and Aber-\\nnathy chose not to use the pickup in part because of the\\ntruck’s load limit.\\n 2. Testimony about ADM\\n Second, the Railroad objects to the admission of evidence\\nregarding the financial ties of its expert witness, Kevin Mul-\\nvaney, to the Railroad’s parent company, the agribusiness gi-\\nant Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”). Before trial,\\nthe district court had granted the Railroad’s unopposed mo-\\ntion in limine barring mention of its relationship to ADM. At\\ntrial, the court reversed that ruling after Abernathy’s counsel\\nexplained that they had not known before trial that Mulvaney\\nwould testify. The district court let Abernathy’s counsel ask\\nMulvaney whether ADM was the largest customer of his em-\\nployer. He answered “yes.” In response to the next question,\\nMulvaney said he did not know whether ADM was the Rail-\\nroad’s parent company.\\n The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these\\nquestions. Bias is a “permissible and established basis of im-\\npeachment.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (hold-\\ning that government’s evidence as to a defense witness’s bias\\nwas properly admitted). Bias is the “quintessentially appro-\\npriate topic for cross examination.” Bachenski v. Malnati, 11\\nF.3d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir. 1993). We have held repeatedly that\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 15\\n\\nparties should be granted reasonable latitude in cross-exam-\\nining witnesses for bias. See, e.g., United States v. Manske, 186\\nF.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Frankenthal,\\n582 F.2d 1102, 1106 (7th Cir. 1978).\\n The information involving ADM did not become relevant\\nto bias until Mulvaney took the stand. In choosing to call an\\nexpert witness with economic ties to ADM, the Railroad made\\nits parent-subsidiary relationship with ADM relevant to show\\npotential bias on the part of Mulvaney. The district court did\\nnot abuse its discretion by allowing this evidence of arguable\\nbias.\\n 3. The Tie Crane Evidence\\n The Railroad’s third evidentiary challenge is to admission\\nof evidence regarding the tie crane. The Railroad argues on\\nappeal, as it did at trial, that this evidence is not relevant to\\nwhether the available methods of transporting ties when Ab-\\nernathy was injured (i.e., the backhoe and the pickup truck)\\nwere reasonably safe. The Railroad also contends that this ev-\\nidence confused the jury because it implied that the Railroad\\nhad a duty to employ the safest methods available, instead of\\njust reasonably safe methods. The Railroad is particularly crit-\\nical of the court’s admission of evidence that it bought a new\\ntie crane after Abernathy’s injury. (The Railroad’s briefs on\\nappeal do not cite Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which ad-\\ndresses evidence of subsequent remedial measures, but its ar-\\nguments invoke that rule’s rationale.)\\n As explained above, the Railroad is right that an employer\\ncan provide a reasonably safe workplace even if safer work-\\nplace alternatives exist, and evidence of a safer alternative is\\nnot conclusive evidence of negligence. See Taylor v. Illinois\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nCentral Railroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993) (“proof of a\\nsafer alternative is not necessarily proof of negligence”). Nev-\\nertheless, evidence of safer alternative methods is still rele-\\nvant to show that the available methods were not reasonably\\nsafe. See Stone v. New York Central & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344\\nU.S. 407, 409 (1953). Such evidence is relevant to show indus-\\ntry standards and to establish whether a given method is rea-\\nsonably safe relative to alternatives. See Rogers v. Missouri Pa-\\ncific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 503 (1957) (reinstating jury ver-\\ndict for injured employee in light of evidence of safer alterna-\\ntive method). Thus, evidence of the tie crane was relevant to\\nthe issues of duty and breach, and specifically to determine\\nwhether the methods the Railroad made available to Aber-\\nnathy were in fact reasonably safe. The jury was permitted to\\nmake inferences from evidence presented on an alternative\\nmethod, the tie crane. That does not mean the jury applied an\\nincorrect standard (requiring the safest possible workplace).\\nThe jury instructions stated correctly that the applicable\\nstandard is that the “FELA requires defendant to exercise rea-\\nsonable care to provide a reasonably safe workplace.”\\n The evidence that a new tie crane was purchased after Ab-\\nernathy’s injury was also admissible. Rule 407 generally pre-\\nvents admission of evidence of subsequent remedial\\nmeasures to prove fault, but the rule and our precedents ex-\\npressly permit this evidence if, among other reasons, “the fea-\\nsibility of the remedial measure” is contested. See, e.g., Ross v.\\nBlack & Decker Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 1992) (af-\\nfirming admission of subsequent remedial measures where\\ndefendant disputed feasibility).\\n In this case, the Railroad chose to contest the feasibility of\\nboth purchasing a new tie crane and fixing the old one. At trial\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 17\\n\\nand in deposition testimony, the Railroad’s witnesses offered\\nseveral reasons why the Railroad chose not to make a tie crane\\navailable in the four years or so between the original tie\\ncrane’s breakdown and Abernathy’s injury. These reasons in-\\ncluded that the cost of repairing the original tie crane or buy-\\ning a new one was prohibitively high, that the original tie\\ncrane was not used enough to justify the expense, and that the\\nRailroad was concerned that any money spent would be\\nwasted because Abernathy would misuse the machine so that\\nit would soon break down again.\\n We can assume that if the Railroad had chosen to stipulate\\nbefore trial to the feasibility of making a tie crane available to\\nAbernathy, he would not have been allowed to present evi-\\ndence of the post-injury purchase of a new tie crane. See Ross,\\n977 F.2d at 1185. But the Railroad could not both dispute fea-\\nsibility and block Abernathy from introducing contrary evi-\\ndence to show that it would have been feasible to replace the\\nequipment. If the Railroad was concerned that the jury might\\nuse this evidence to infer negligence improperly, it also could\\nhave requested a limiting jury instruction. It did not. See\\nTrytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 1994), citing\\nUnited States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1980). The\\ndistrict court did not err by admitting this evidence.\\n C. Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs\\n Following trial, Abernathy filed a bill of costs. The only\\npoint of controversy is his claim for $3,800 for fees paid to his\\ntreating physicians for their depositions. The Railroad ob-\\njected to these costs on the ground that 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b)\\nlimits witness fees to forty dollars per day unless some other\\nprovision of law provides for a higher rate. The district court\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nagreed with the Railroad and limited the witness fees in the\\nbill of cost to forty dollars per witness per day.\\n We review the district court’s award of costs for an abuse\\nof discretion. See Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 690\\nF.3d 844, 852 (7th Cir. 2012); Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d\\n454, 464 (8th Cir. 2015). However, we review legal questions\\nrelated to the cost award de novo. See Central States, Southwest\\nAreas Pension Fund v. White, 258 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(standard of appellate review is de novo on a question of law\\nin interpreting a statute); see also Stanley, 784 F.3d at 464.\\n Both doctors’ video depositions were sought by Aber-\\nnathy himself, and he presented them as evidence at trial. He\\ncontends that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i)\\nand 54(d)(1) work together to supersede the forty-dollar-per-\\nday limit of § 1821 and allow him, as the prevailing party, to\\nrecover the entire “reasonable fee” he paid his expert wit-\\nnesses for their depositions.\\n We affirm the district court’s denial of the higher witness\\nfees. Abernathy’s argument is contrary to the Supreme\\nCourt’s interpretation of the interaction between these rules\\nset forth in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.\\n437 (1987), and is not supported by Seventh Circuit precedent.\\nThe district court properly limited the witness fees the Rail-\\nroad must pay to forty dollars per witness per day.\\n In Halasa, we affirmed the district court’s ruling that the\\nprevailing defendant could be reimbursed for fees related to\\nthe deposition of an expert witness in excess of forty dollars\\nper day under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). We held that the “reasona-\\nble fee” requirement in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) can, in certain cases,\\nsupersede the specific payment schedule in § 1821(b). 690 F.3d\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 19\\n\\nat 852. However, the district court decision in that case was\\nbased on the fact that the deposition of that expert witness,\\nthough initially paid for by the defendant, had been taken by\\nthe plaintiff. Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 2012 WL\\n639520, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2012) (“Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i) provides that the party who deposes\\nan expert witness—which in this case was Halasa—shall ‘pay\\nthe expert a reasonable fee for time spent.’”). The defendant\\nin Halasa had not insisted that plaintiff pay its witness at the\\ntime of the deposition, as it could have under Rule\\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). Instead, the defendant had paid its own witness\\nhis usual expert fee for time spent on the deposition the plain-\\ntiff had taken. The defendant waited until its final bill of costs\\nto request that payment under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).\\n Thus, because the defendant in Halasa was the prevailing\\nparty and because plaintiff, as the party who had sought the\\ndeposition of the defendant’s expert, had an obligation under\\nthe Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) to pay the costs of that deposition, the\\ndistrict court was permitted to order that the defendant be\\nawarded the amount of reasonable witness fees it actually\\npaid, regardless of the fee limits set forth in 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1821(b). Here, however, Abernathy is not asking that the\\ncosts of the depositions be reimbursed under Rule\\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). He instead seeks to have the costs of deposing\\nhis own expert witnesses reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1)\\nalone, a question that was not addressed in Halasa.\\n This case is much closer to the Supreme Court’s decision\\nin Crawford Fitting, which rejected Abernathy’s interpretation\\nof these rules. The issue in Crawford Fitting was whether a\\nparty could be reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1) for the higher\\nexpert fees it had paid to have its own expert witness testify\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nat trial. 482 U.S. at 438–39. The Court rejected that claim, hold-\\ning that “when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for\\nfees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound\\nby the limit of § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory\\nauthority to the contrary.” Id. at 439. The Court found that the\\nrule and statute did not conflict, and that while Rule 54(d)(1)\\npermits prevailing parties to recover costs, § 1821(b) places a\\nlimit on the amount that can be recovered. Id. at 444–45.\\n Abernathy argues that we should distinguish Crawford Fit-\\nting and instead follow and extend the reasoning of the Eighth\\nCircuit in Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d 454, 464–65 (8th Cir.\\n2015), which allowed Cottrell, the prevailing party, to recover\\nthe full expert witness fees it actually paid to Stanley under\\nRule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) during discovery to take the deposition of\\nStanley’s expert witness. Whether Stanley was correct or not\\non its own facts, its reasoning does not extend to the case be-\\nfore us, where the prevailing party seeks to recover full expert\\nfees for the depositions of his own expert witnesses. This is\\nCrawford Fitting, except that we address here expert deposi-\\ntions rather than expert trial testimony. It would be a mistake\\nto limit Crawford Fitting on that basis. If we held that prevail-\\ning parties could recover under Rule 54(d) the full costs of de-\\nposing their own expert witnesses before trial, but not of call-\\ning those expert witnesses to testify live at trial, see Crawford\\nFitting, we would create an incentive for parties to offer expert\\ndepositions at trial in lieu of live expert testimony. Nothing in\\nthe text or logic of the rules calls for such a perverse incentive,\\nand we see no persuasive reason to distinguish this case from\\nCrawford Fitting.\\n The judgment of the district court and its award of costs\\nare AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4669,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670112,"string":"4,670,112"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Marvin Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois Railroad Comp"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2153"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\nMARVIN ABERNATHY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nEASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:15-cv-03223-SEM-TSH — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Marvin Abernathy was\\ninjured while working for defendant Eastern Illinois Railroad\\nCompany. He sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability\\nAct (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., alleging that the Railroad\\nnegligently failed to provide reasonably safe working condi-\\ntions by failing to provide appropriate equipment for the job\\nhe was doing when he was hurt.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n A jury awarded Abernathy $525,000 in damages. The Rail-\\nroad moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.\\nThe district court denied both requests, and the Railroad has\\nappealed, raising a host of issues. Abernathy has filed a cross-\\nappeal asserting that the district court erred by not awarding\\nhim sufficient costs to cover his expert witness fees. We affirm\\nJudge Myerscough’s decisions in all respects.\\nI. Facts\\n Abernathy worked as a track inspector for the Eastern Illi-\\nnois Railroad Company. His duties included replacing and\\nrepairing railroad ties. On September 13, 2012, the Railroad\\nsent Abernathy and another employee, Richard Probus, to re-\\npair a railroad crossing about six or seven miles away from\\nthe Railroad’s yard in Charleston, Illinois. Abernathy was in\\ncharge of the job. The repair required him and Probus to\\ntransport six ties from the yard to the crossing.\\n In 2012, the Railroad had a “tie crane,” a vehicle that runs\\non the railroad tracks and is well-suited to transporting rail-\\nroad ties, but it had been out of commission for years. Aber-\\nnathy and Probus had only two options for transporting the\\nties: a backhoe or a pickup truck, either of which would need\\nto travel on public roads rather than railroad tracks. Aber-\\nnathy chose to use the backhoe. He testified that he had never\\nused the pickup truck to haul ties before, but that he had used\\nthe backhoe for similar jobs numerous times, although not on\\npublic roads and not with this heavy a load. Abernathy and\\nProbus loaded four ties into the bucket of the backhoe and\\ntwo across the top of the bucket, resting on the arms of the\\nmachine. Abernathy testified that when the bucket is rolled\\nback, it locks the resting ties into place. Abernathy drove the\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 3\\n\\nbackhoe along a public highway. Probus followed in the\\npickup, which was loaded with tools needed to install the ties.\\n Abernathy drove in low gear, but he started to experience\\n“road bounce.” He started braking, and two ties fell out of the\\nbackhoe’s bucket. Abernathy stopped on the shoulder of the\\nroad and tried to lift the ties back into the bucket. In lifting a\\ntie, he injured his back. He also smashed a finger between the\\ntie he was holding and another tie in the bucket. Despite the\\naccident, Abernathy and Probus were able to finish reloading\\nthe ties, and they resumed their trip and finished the repair\\njob. Abernathy remained in pain for the rest of the day.\\n The following morning, Abernathy reported the injury to\\nTim Allen, the general manager of the Railroad. Allen told\\nhim “to take it easy” and “be on light duty” for a while. Ab-\\nernathy worked through the pain on lighter duty for the next\\nyear but was unable to return to his regular work. The Rail-\\nroad terminated his employment in February 2014. He even-\\ntually had physical therapy, epidural injections, and then sur-\\ngery in 2016. After the surgery, he continued to experience\\npain in his back and legs. At the time of trial, his surgeon had\\nstill not cleared him for any type of work.\\nII. The Trial\\n Abernathy sued the Railroad under the FELA, 45 U.S.C\\n§ 51, alleging that it had been negligent in failing to provide\\nan operable tie crane and requiring him to use the backhoe,\\nwhich was inadequate for his assigned task of transporting\\nthe ties. The trial lasted three days. Abernathy testified and\\ncalled three other lay witnesses: his wife Carrie Abernathy,\\nRichard Probus, and Lowell McElwee, a Railroad engineer\\nwho worked with Abernathy.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n Probus testified that on the day of Abernathy’s injury, they\\ncould not have used the pickup truck to transport the ties be-\\ncause they needed the pickup truck to transport the other\\nequipment needed to install the ties. Probus also testified that\\nthe Railroad had acquired an operable tie crane after Aber-\\nnathy’s accident. Probus explained that the tie crane was now\\nbeing used to transport ties and that manual lifts of ties were\\nnot necessary with the new machine. He stated that the avail-\\nability of the tie crane makes his job safer.\\n Abernathy testified that when the Railroad’s tie crane had\\nbeen operational, he used it regularly. He explained that the\\ntie crane was the preferred method for moving ties because it\\ndid not require manual lifting or traveling on public roads. He\\nalso testified that before his 2012 injury, he had repeatedly\\nasked the Railroad to replace the tie crane.\\n Abernathy also presented the depositions of Doctors Renu\\nBajaj, James Kohlman, and Thomas Lee. Dr. Lee, Abernathy’s\\nsurgeon, offered testimony relevant to damages and causa-\\ntion. He testified that he did not expect Abernathy to regain\\nthe level of functionality he had prior to his accident. He also\\ntestified that Abernathy certainly would not be able to return\\nto work involving heavy manual labor. Dr. Lee also said that,\\nto a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Abernathy’s\\nsymptoms were caused or aggravated by the lifting accident\\nin September 2012.\\n The Railroad called four witnesses: general manager Tim\\nAllen; Everett Fletcher; Gayle Garrett, the office secretary for\\nthe Railroad; and Kendall Mulvaney, the superintendent of\\nR&R Contractors, testifying as an expert witness in railroad\\nrepair and maintenance. The Railroad defended on the theory\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 5\\n\\nthat a backhoe is a generally accepted method for transport-\\ning ties in the rail repair industry.\\n After the close of Abernathy’s case-in-chief, the Railroad\\nmoved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of\\nCivil Procedure 50(a), which the court denied. The Railroad\\nrenewed its motion under Rule 50(b) at the close of all evi-\\ndence and prior to the verdict, and the court again denied it.\\n The jury found that the Railroad was negligent and that its\\nnegligence contributed to Abernathy’s injuries. The jury cal-\\nculated Abernathy’s total damages to be $750,000. However,\\nthe jury found that Abernathy was also at fault for thirty per-\\ncent of the total fault, which meant the jury awarded a net\\nverdict of $525,000. The district court denied the Railroad’s\\npost-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new\\ntrial. The district court also awarded costs to Abernathy as the\\nprevailing party but rejected his request to include as costs\\n$3,800 in witness fees paid to Doctors Lee and Bajaj. The Rail-\\nroad has appealed the judgment against it, and Abernathy has\\ncross-appealed the denial of his request for expert witness\\nfees as part of his costs.\\nIII. Legal Analysis\\n We take up the issues on appeal in three groups. First, we\\naddress the Railroad’s arguments for judgment as a matter of\\nlaw on the theory that Abernathy’s evidence was insufficient.\\nSecond, we address the Railroad’s arguments that the district\\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at\\ntrial. Third, we address Abernathy’s cross-appeal on the\\naward of costs.\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n A. Judgment as a Matter of Law\\n The FELA provides a federal remedy for railroad employ-\\nees who are injured on the job. To prove a claim under the\\nFELA, a plaintiff must prove “the traditional common law el-\\nements of negligence, including foreseeability, duty, breach,\\nand causation.” Fulk v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 22 F.3d 120,\\n124 (7th Cir. 1994). However, “[b]ecause it is meant to offer\\nbroad remedial relief to railroad workers, a plaintiff’s burden\\nwhen suing under the FELA is significantly lighter than in an\\nordinary negligence case.” Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Rail-\\nway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Harbin v.\\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\\n1990) (“It is well established that the quantum of evidence re-\\nquired to establish liability in an FELA case is much less than\\nin an ordinary negligence action.”). A railroad-employer is li-\\nable where “employer negligence played any part, even the\\nslightest, in producing the injury.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific\\nRailroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).\\n The Railroad challenges the sufficiency of evidence as to\\nall elements of negligence. We consider duty and breach to-\\ngether, and foreseeability and causation separately. “This\\nCourt reviews sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo,\\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-\\nmoving party and drawing all inferences in [his] favor.”\\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2014).\\nWe “will overturn a jury verdict ‘only when there is a com-\\nplete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion\\nreached.’” Id. at 29596, quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645,\\n653 (1946). Here, probative evidence supported the jury’s ver-\\ndict that Abernathy established each element of negligence.\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 7\\n\\nThe district court did not err in declining to overturn the\\njury’s verdict.\\n 1. Duty & Breach\\n The Railroad had a duty to provide Abernathy a reasona-\\nbly safe working environment. See Crompton, 745 F.3d at 296.\\nThe Railroad points out correctly that it “could have provided\\na reasonably safe workplace notwithstanding the fact that\\nsafer workplace alternatives exist.” Taylor v. Illinois Central\\nRailroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993). The Railroad ar-\\ngues that Abernathy produced no evidence that the equip-\\nment available to haul ties (the backhoe and pickup truck) and\\nthe way in which he was trained to perform a manual lift were\\nunsafe. Instead, Abernathy produced evidence pertaining to\\nthe absence of the tie crane. The tie crane evidence, the Rail-\\nroad argues, showed only that there was a safer alternative to\\nthe backhoe and pickup, which is not sufficient to establish\\nnegligence. See Darrough v. CSX Transportation Inc., 321 F.3d\\n674, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (railroad does not have duty to provide\\nthe safest working environment).\\n The Railroad’s argument relies on the faulty premise that\\nevidence of safer alternatives can never even be relevant to\\nwhether an employer exercised reasonable care. When a rail-\\nroad assigns an employee a task using a particular method\\nand the employee is injured while executing the task, evi-\\ndence of a safer alternative method is relevant to whether the\\nmethod provided was reasonable. See Stone v. New York, Chi-\\ncago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344 U.S. 407, 409 (1953) (plaintiff\\nwas injured pulling ties using the method his supervisor in-\\nstructed him to use; evidence of three alternative methods for\\npulling ties was relevant to whether railroad was negligent).\\nBased on all the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nhave found that it was not reasonably safe to assign Aber-\\nnathy to replace the ties without an operable tie crane.\\n The Railroad’s argument as to the safety of a manual lift is\\nsimilarly flawed. Abernathy did not argue that under all cir-\\ncumstances, the Railroad is negligent if it requires an em-\\nployee to perform a manual lift. He argued that the Railroad\\nwas negligent where it could have provided employees with\\nequipment that prevented the need for impromptu manual\\nlifts on public roads but chose not to repair or replace this\\nequipment.\\n The Railroad’s reliance on Walker v. Northeast Regional\\nCommuter Railroad, 225 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2000), is thus mis-\\nplaced. In Walker, we affirmed summary judgment for a rail-\\nroad in an FELA case for injuries from performing a manual\\nlift. Plaintiff Walker worked as a machinist in a repair shop.\\nHe injured his back lifting a replacement blade for a machine\\nthat cut metal. Id. at 896. The blade weighed about 140\\npounds, and Walker lifted it with one other employee. Id. A\\ncrane and a forklift were available to the men but could not be\\nused to assist in the lift because of the configuration of the\\nshop. Walker argued that his employer was negligent in re-\\nquiring him to lift more than fifty pounds and “in configuring\\nthe shop in such a way as to prohibit the use of mechanical\\nlifting aids.” Id. at 898.\\n Walker is distinguishable. First, Walker actually made an\\nexplicit argument that his employer’s demand that he lift\\nmore than fifty pounds was sufficient by itself to support a\\nfinding of negligence. In rejecting this argument, we con-\\ntrasted the case with those in which plaintiffs “showed the\\navailability of alternative methods and safeguards that would\\nensure employee safety” and found telling that Walker\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 9\\n\\nproduced no evidence that he or any other machinists “had\\ncomplained about problems in changing the blade on other\\noccasions.” Id. In this case, Abernathy offered evidence of\\nsafer alternatives and prior employee complaints about the\\nlack of an operable tie crane. As to the second argument about\\nthe shop configuration, Walker presented no evidence that the\\nmanual lift in his case was not reasonably safe given the cir-\\ncumstances, and in fact he “testified that he and [his co-lifter]\\nassumed that they could pick up the blade” with no problem.\\nId. at 899.\\n Here, however, Abernathy offered evidence that the tie\\ncrane was the appropriate equipment to use for the job he was\\nperforming with a backhoe on the day he was injured. Allen’s\\ntestimony on cross-examination and Probus’s testimony al-\\nlowed the jury to find that the pickup truck was not an ade-\\nquate alternative. Abernathy and Probus both testified that an\\noperable tie crane made their work safer. Abernathy ex-\\nplained that the tie crane allowed employees to avoid manual\\nlifts and traveling on public roads. The jury could reasonably\\nhave found that the Railroad did not provide Abernathy with\\nequipment appropriate for the task he was assigned and that\\nhis working environment was not reasonably safe.\\n 2. Foreseeability\\n Abernathy was required to show that it was foreseeable to\\nthe Railroad that transporting ties using a backhoe or pickup\\nas opposed to a tie crane “would or might result in a mishap\\nand injury.” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685,\\n703 (2011), quoting Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,\\n372 U.S. 108, 118, n.7 (1963). To establish foreseeability, “a\\nplaintiff must show that the employer had actual or construc-\\ntive notice” of potential harm. Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nRailway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005). The railroad may\\nbe liable “even if ‘the extent of the [injury] or the manner in\\nwhich it occurred’ was not ‘probable’ or ‘foreseeable.’”\\nMcBride, 564 U.S. at 70304, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 12021\\n& n.8 (alteration in McBride; emphasis added here). The Rail-\\nroad argues that Abernathy failed to prove negligence be-\\ncause he failed to show that his injury was foreseeable. The\\nRailroad argues that it could not have known that Abernathy\\nwould use the backhoe or that doing so would result in\\ndropped ties. The backhoe, the Railroad points out, had been\\nused to transport ties without incident on multiple prior oc-\\ncasions and there was no defect in the machine that caused\\nthe tie to fall. Further, as the Railroad’s expert, Mulvaney, tes-\\ntified, a backhoe was an accepted method in the railroad re-\\npair injury for transporting ties. From these facts, the Railroad\\ncontends there was insufficient proof of foreseeability.\\n The Railroad’s argument misunderstands what the FELA\\nrequires. Abernathy does not need to show that the Railroad\\ncould have foreseen the particular consequences of its negli-\\ngence. He needed to show only that “a particular condi-\\ntion”—here, the absence of appropriate equipment—“would\\nor might result in” any type of “mishap and injury.” McBride,\\n564 U.S. at 703, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 118 n. 7 (emphasis\\nadded here); see Gallick, 372 U.S. at 11820 (potential harm\\nwas foreseeable where railroad had allowed stagnant pool of\\nfilthy water to remain near worksite and employee was bitten\\nby an insect, which led to infection and ultimately amputation\\nof both legs). Abernathy needed to show only “circumstances\\nwhich a reasonable person would foresee as creating a poten-\\ntial for harm.” McGinn v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 102\\nF.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1996).\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 11\\n\\n The evidence here supported a finding that a reasonable\\nperson in the Railroad’s position could have foreseen that\\ntransporting ties in a backhoe or pickup could lead to injury.\\nThe Railroad knew that its tie crane had not been operational\\nsince 2008. Abernathy offered evidence that he had repeatedly\\nasked the Railroad to repair or replace it. Abernathy and Pro-\\nbus both testified that the tie crane was safer to use in hauling\\nties, in part because it prevented employees from having to\\nlift ties manually and travel on public roads.\\n 3. Causation\\n In support of judgment as a matter of law, and now on\\nappeal, the Railroad argued that even if it was negligent in\\nfailing to provide a tie crane, Abernathy failed to prove that\\nthe alleged negligence caused his injuries. Abernathy’s man-\\nual lift, the Railroad contends, caused his injuries, and this lift\\nwas an act subsequent to and independent of any safety issues\\nthat arose because the tie crane was not available.\\n The Railroad’s argument conflicts with the liberal causa-\\ntion standard under the FELA. “Juries in such cases are\\nproperly instructed that a defendant railroad ‘caused or con-\\ntributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ‘if [the railroad’s] neg-\\nligence played a part—no matter how small—in bringing\\nabout the injury.” McBride, 564 U.S. at 705; see also Harbin v.\\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\\n1990), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S.\\n500, 506 (1957) (“For under the FELA, ‘the test of a jury case is\\nsimply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion\\nthat employer negligence played any part, even in the slightest,\\nin producing the injury… .”) (emphasis in Harbin). “The FELA\\nvests the jury with broad discretion to engage in common\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nsense inferences regarding issues of causation and fault.”\\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n There was sufficient evidence here that the Railroad’s neg-\\nligence played a part in bringing about Abernathy’s injury.\\nAbernathy had to use the backhoe on a public roadway to\\ntransport the ties because the Railroad had not repaired or re-\\nplaced its tie crane, which had been out of service for years.\\nVibrations caused a tie to fall off the backhoe and onto the\\npublic roadway that Abernathy was forced to use because of\\nthe absence of a tie crane. Abernathy had to remove the tie,\\nwhich was obstructing the public road, and he had to do it\\nquickly. He had no option other than to lift the tie manually\\nback into the backhoe, which injured his back. A reasonable\\njury could infer that the Railroad’s negligence played some\\npart in causing Abernathy’s injury. The district court correctly\\ndenied the Railroad’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.\\n B. New Trial Motion Based on Evidentiary Rulings\\n The Railroad also argues that the district judge erred in\\nthree decisions to admit evidence, contending that each is suf-\\nficient to warrant a new trial. We review the denial of a new\\ntrial motion for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen-\\neral Board of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist\\nChurch, 733 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2013); Kossman v. Northeast\\nIllinois Regional Commuter Railroad, 211 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th\\nCir. 2000). We find no abuse of discretion in any of the chal-\\nlenged evidentiary rulings.\\n 1. Testimony of Timothy Allen\\n First, the Railroad objects to a line of cross-examination of\\nits general manager, Timothy Allen, regarding his own use of\\na company pickup truck to transport railroad ties. The\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 13\\n\\nRailroad argues that Allen’s use of the truck was so dissimilar\\nfrom the way Abernathy might have used the truck on the day\\nhe was injured as to make the evidence irrelevant.\\n Again, Abernathy had to prove that the Railroad did not\\nprovide a reasonably safe method for transporting railroad\\nties. See Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 297–\\n98 (1949). The Railroad argued that the pickup truck was a\\nreasonably safe and available way for Abernathy to do his job.\\nAllen testified that he thought Abernathy should have used\\nthe pickup truck rather than using the backhoe to haul ties on\\na public road.\\n During cross-examination, Allen acknowledged that on\\none occasion, he had used the same pickup to take 20 to 25\\nrejected railroad ties to a friend. Allen admitted that, assum-\\ning each tie weighed just 140 pounds, hauling 20 ties would\\nhave meant the pickup truck was carrying 2,800 pounds.1 The\\npickup truck was rated to haul only 1,500 pounds. When\\nasked about this discrepancy, Allen said he had not been\\naware that he had been operating the pickup truck at almost\\ndouble its load capacity. Probus later testified that he and Ab-\\nernathy chose not to use the pickup on the day of Abernathy’s\\ninjury because they could not use it to haul both the ties and\\nthe tools needed for the job.\\n Judge Myerscough acted well within her discretion in al-\\nlowing this line of cross-examination. Evidence is relevant if\\nit has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of\\nconsequence to the determination of the action more probable\\n\\n 1 The jury heard conflicting testimony regarding the weight of rail-\\nroad ties. For purposes of this line of questioning, it was assumed that the\\naverage railroad tie weighs 140 pounds.\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nor less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.\\nR. Evid. 401. The testimony about Allen’s previous use of the\\npickup satisfied this definition. It was relevant for the jury to\\nknow that when Allen testified that the pickup truck was a\\nreasonably safe alternative method available to Abernathy—\\na key point for the Railroad’s defense—he was not familiar\\nwith the pickup’s hauling capacity. That rebuttal was espe-\\ncially relevant given Probus’s testimony that he and Aber-\\nnathy chose not to use the pickup in part because of the\\ntruck’s load limit.\\n 2. Testimony about ADM\\n Second, the Railroad objects to the admission of evidence\\nregarding the financial ties of its expert witness, Kevin Mul-\\nvaney, to the Railroad’s parent company, the agribusiness gi-\\nant Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”). Before trial,\\nthe district court had granted the Railroad’s unopposed mo-\\ntion in limine barring mention of its relationship to ADM. At\\ntrial, the court reversed that ruling after Abernathy’s counsel\\nexplained that they had not known before trial that Mulvaney\\nwould testify. The district court let Abernathy’s counsel ask\\nMulvaney whether ADM was the largest customer of his em-\\nployer. He answered “yes.” In response to the next question,\\nMulvaney said he did not know whether ADM was the Rail-\\nroad’s parent company.\\n The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these\\nquestions. Bias is a “permissible and established basis of im-\\npeachment.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (hold-\\ning that government’s evidence as to a defense witness’s bias\\nwas properly admitted). Bias is the “quintessentially appro-\\npriate topic for cross examination.” Bachenski v. Malnati, 11\\nF.3d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir. 1993). We have held repeatedly that\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 15\\n\\nparties should be granted reasonable latitude in cross-exam-\\nining witnesses for bias. See, e.g., United States v. Manske, 186\\nF.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Frankenthal,\\n582 F.2d 1102, 1106 (7th Cir. 1978).\\n The information involving ADM did not become relevant\\nto bias until Mulvaney took the stand. In choosing to call an\\nexpert witness with economic ties to ADM, the Railroad made\\nits parent-subsidiary relationship with ADM relevant to show\\npotential bias on the part of Mulvaney. The district court did\\nnot abuse its discretion by allowing this evidence of arguable\\nbias.\\n 3. The Tie Crane Evidence\\n The Railroad’s third evidentiary challenge is to admission\\nof evidence regarding the tie crane. The Railroad argues on\\nappeal, as it did at trial, that this evidence is not relevant to\\nwhether the available methods of transporting ties when Ab-\\nernathy was injured (i.e., the backhoe and the pickup truck)\\nwere reasonably safe. The Railroad also contends that this ev-\\nidence confused the jury because it implied that the Railroad\\nhad a duty to employ the safest methods available, instead of\\njust reasonably safe methods. The Railroad is particularly crit-\\nical of the court’s admission of evidence that it bought a new\\ntie crane after Abernathy’s injury. (The Railroad’s briefs on\\nappeal do not cite Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which ad-\\ndresses evidence of subsequent remedial measures, but its ar-\\nguments invoke that rule’s rationale.)\\n As explained above, the Railroad is right that an employer\\ncan provide a reasonably safe workplace even if safer work-\\nplace alternatives exist, and evidence of a safer alternative is\\nnot conclusive evidence of negligence. See Taylor v. Illinois\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nCentral Railroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993) (“proof of a\\nsafer alternative is not necessarily proof of negligence”). Nev-\\nertheless, evidence of safer alternative methods is still rele-\\nvant to show that the available methods were not reasonably\\nsafe. See Stone v. New York Central & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344\\nU.S. 407, 409 (1953). Such evidence is relevant to show indus-\\ntry standards and to establish whether a given method is rea-\\nsonably safe relative to alternatives. See Rogers v. Missouri Pa-\\ncific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 503 (1957) (reinstating jury ver-\\ndict for injured employee in light of evidence of safer alterna-\\ntive method). Thus, evidence of the tie crane was relevant to\\nthe issues of duty and breach, and specifically to determine\\nwhether the methods the Railroad made available to Aber-\\nnathy were in fact reasonably safe. The jury was permitted to\\nmake inferences from evidence presented on an alternative\\nmethod, the tie crane. That does not mean the jury applied an\\nincorrect standard (requiring the safest possible workplace).\\nThe jury instructions stated correctly that the applicable\\nstandard is that the “FELA requires defendant to exercise rea-\\nsonable care to provide a reasonably safe workplace.”\\n The evidence that a new tie crane was purchased after Ab-\\nernathy’s injury was also admissible. Rule 407 generally pre-\\nvents admission of evidence of subsequent remedial\\nmeasures to prove fault, but the rule and our precedents ex-\\npressly permit this evidence if, among other reasons, “the fea-\\nsibility of the remedial measure” is contested. See, e.g., Ross v.\\nBlack & Decker Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 1992) (af-\\nfirming admission of subsequent remedial measures where\\ndefendant disputed feasibility).\\n In this case, the Railroad chose to contest the feasibility of\\nboth purchasing a new tie crane and fixing the old one. At trial\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 17\\n\\nand in deposition testimony, the Railroad’s witnesses offered\\nseveral reasons why the Railroad chose not to make a tie crane\\navailable in the four years or so between the original tie\\ncrane’s breakdown and Abernathy’s injury. These reasons in-\\ncluded that the cost of repairing the original tie crane or buy-\\ning a new one was prohibitively high, that the original tie\\ncrane was not used enough to justify the expense, and that the\\nRailroad was concerned that any money spent would be\\nwasted because Abernathy would misuse the machine so that\\nit would soon break down again.\\n We can assume that if the Railroad had chosen to stipulate\\nbefore trial to the feasibility of making a tie crane available to\\nAbernathy, he would not have been allowed to present evi-\\ndence of the post-injury purchase of a new tie crane. See Ross,\\n977 F.2d at 1185. But the Railroad could not both dispute fea-\\nsibility and block Abernathy from introducing contrary evi-\\ndence to show that it would have been feasible to replace the\\nequipment. If the Railroad was concerned that the jury might\\nuse this evidence to infer negligence improperly, it also could\\nhave requested a limiting jury instruction. It did not. See\\nTrytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 1994), citing\\nUnited States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1980). The\\ndistrict court did not err by admitting this evidence.\\n C. Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs\\n Following trial, Abernathy filed a bill of costs. The only\\npoint of controversy is his claim for $3,800 for fees paid to his\\ntreating physicians for their depositions. The Railroad ob-\\njected to these costs on the ground that 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b)\\nlimits witness fees to forty dollars per day unless some other\\nprovision of law provides for a higher rate. The district court\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nagreed with the Railroad and limited the witness fees in the\\nbill of cost to forty dollars per witness per day.\\n We review the district court’s award of costs for an abuse\\nof discretion. See Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 690\\nF.3d 844, 852 (7th Cir. 2012); Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d\\n454, 464 (8th Cir. 2015). However, we review legal questions\\nrelated to the cost award de novo. See Central States, Southwest\\nAreas Pension Fund v. White, 258 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(standard of appellate review is de novo on a question of law\\nin interpreting a statute); see also Stanley, 784 F.3d at 464.\\n Both doctors’ video depositions were sought by Aber-\\nnathy himself, and he presented them as evidence at trial. He\\ncontends that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i)\\nand 54(d)(1) work together to supersede the forty-dollar-per-\\nday limit of § 1821 and allow him, as the prevailing party, to\\nrecover the entire “reasonable fee” he paid his expert wit-\\nnesses for their depositions.\\n We affirm the district court’s denial of the higher witness\\nfees. Abernathy’s argument is contrary to the Supreme\\nCourt’s interpretation of the interaction between these rules\\nset forth in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.\\n437 (1987), and is not supported by Seventh Circuit precedent.\\nThe district court properly limited the witness fees the Rail-\\nroad must pay to forty dollars per witness per day.\\n In Halasa, we affirmed the district court’s ruling that the\\nprevailing defendant could be reimbursed for fees related to\\nthe deposition of an expert witness in excess of forty dollars\\nper day under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). We held that the “reasona-\\nble fee” requirement in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) can, in certain cases,\\nsupersede the specific payment schedule in § 1821(b). 690 F.3d\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 19\\n\\nat 852. However, the district court decision in that case was\\nbased on the fact that the deposition of that expert witness,\\nthough initially paid for by the defendant, had been taken by\\nthe plaintiff. Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 2012 WL\\n639520, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2012) (“Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i) provides that the party who deposes\\nan expert witness—which in this case was Halasa—shall ‘pay\\nthe expert a reasonable fee for time spent.’”). The defendant\\nin Halasa had not insisted that plaintiff pay its witness at the\\ntime of the deposition, as it could have under Rule\\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). Instead, the defendant had paid its own witness\\nhis usual expert fee for time spent on the deposition the plain-\\ntiff had taken. The defendant waited until its final bill of costs\\nto request that payment under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).\\n Thus, because the defendant in Halasa was the prevailing\\nparty and because plaintiff, as the party who had sought the\\ndeposition of the defendant’s expert, had an obligation under\\nthe Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) to pay the costs of that deposition, the\\ndistrict court was permitted to order that the defendant be\\nawarded the amount of reasonable witness fees it actually\\npaid, regardless of the fee limits set forth in 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1821(b). Here, however, Abernathy is not asking that the\\ncosts of the depositions be reimbursed under Rule\\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). He instead seeks to have the costs of deposing\\nhis own expert witnesses reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1)\\nalone, a question that was not addressed in Halasa.\\n This case is much closer to the Supreme Court’s decision\\nin Crawford Fitting, which rejected Abernathy’s interpretation\\nof these rules. The issue in Crawford Fitting was whether a\\nparty could be reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1) for the higher\\nexpert fees it had paid to have its own expert witness testify\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nat trial. 482 U.S. at 438–39. The Court rejected that claim, hold-\\ning that “when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for\\nfees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound\\nby the limit of § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory\\nauthority to the contrary.” Id. at 439. The Court found that the\\nrule and statute did not conflict, and that while Rule 54(d)(1)\\npermits prevailing parties to recover costs, § 1821(b) places a\\nlimit on the amount that can be recovered. Id. at 444–45.\\n Abernathy argues that we should distinguish Crawford Fit-\\nting and instead follow and extend the reasoning of the Eighth\\nCircuit in Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d 454, 464–65 (8th Cir.\\n2015), which allowed Cottrell, the prevailing party, to recover\\nthe full expert witness fees it actually paid to Stanley under\\nRule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) during discovery to take the deposition of\\nStanley’s expert witness. Whether Stanley was correct or not\\non its own facts, its reasoning does not extend to the case be-\\nfore us, where the prevailing party seeks to recover full expert\\nfees for the depositions of his own expert witnesses. This is\\nCrawford Fitting, except that we address here expert deposi-\\ntions rather than expert trial testimony. It would be a mistake\\nto limit Crawford Fitting on that basis. If we held that prevail-\\ning parties could recover under Rule 54(d) the full costs of de-\\nposing their own expert witnesses before trial, but not of call-\\ning those expert witnesses to testify live at trial, see Crawford\\nFitting, we would create an incentive for parties to offer expert\\ndepositions at trial in lieu of live expert testimony. Nothing in\\nthe text or logic of the rules calls for such a perverse incentive,\\nand we see no persuasive reason to distinguish this case from\\nCrawford Fitting.\\n The judgment of the district court and its award of costs\\nare AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4447365/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670112/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Marvin Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois Railroad Comp\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\nMARVIN ABERNATHY,\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\n v.\n\nEASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY,\n Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 3:15-cv-03223-SEM-TSH — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Marvin Abernathy was\ninjured while working for defendant Eastern Illinois Railroad\nCompany. He sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability\nAct (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., alleging that the Railroad\nnegligently failed to provide reasonably safe working condi-\ntions by failing to provide appropriate equipment for the job\nhe was doing when he was hurt.\n\f2 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\n A jury awarded Abernathy $525,000 in damages. The Rail-\nroad moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.\nThe district court denied both requests, and the Railroad has\nappealed, raising a host of issues. Abernathy has filed a cross-\nappeal asserting that the district court erred by not awarding\nhim sufficient costs to cover his expert witness fees. We affirm\nJudge Myerscough’s decisions in all respects.\nI. Facts\n Abernathy worked as a track inspector for the Eastern Illi-\nnois Railroad Company. His duties included replacing and\nrepairing railroad ties. On September 13, 2012, the Railroad\nsent Abernathy and another employee, Richard Probus, to re-\npair a railroad crossing about six or seven miles away from\nthe Railroad’s yard in Charleston, Illinois. Abernathy was in\ncharge of the job. The repair required him and Probus to\ntransport six ties from the yard to the crossing.\n In 2012, the Railroad had a “tie crane,” a vehicle that runs\non the railroad tracks and is well-suited to transporting rail-\nroad ties, but it had been out of commission for years. Aber-\nnathy and Probus had only two options for transporting the\nties: a backhoe or a pickup truck, either of which would need\nto travel on public roads rather than railroad tracks. Aber-\nnathy chose to use the backhoe. He testified that he had never\nused the pickup truck to haul ties before, but that he had used\nthe backhoe for similar jobs numerous times, although not on\npublic roads and not with this heavy a load. Abernathy and\nProbus loaded four ties into the bucket of the backhoe and\ntwo across the top of the bucket, resting on the arms of the\nmachine. Abernathy testified that when the bucket is rolled\nback, it locks the resting ties into place. Abernathy drove the\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 3\n\nbackhoe along a public highway. Probus followed in the\npickup, which was loaded with tools needed to install the ties.\n Abernathy drove in low gear, but he started to experience\n“road bounce.” He started braking, and two ties fell out of the\nbackhoe’s bucket. Abernathy stopped on the shoulder of the\nroad and tried to lift the ties back into the bucket. In lifting a\ntie, he injured his back. He also smashed a finger between the\ntie he was holding and another tie in the bucket. Despite the\naccident, Abernathy and Probus were able to finish reloading\nthe ties, and they resumed their trip and finished the repair\njob. Abernathy remained in pain for the rest of the day.\n The following morning, Abernathy reported the injury to\nTim Allen, the general manager of the Railroad. Allen told\nhim “to take it easy” and “be on light duty” for a while. Ab-\nernathy worked through the pain on lighter duty for the next\nyear but was unable to return to his regular work. The Rail-\nroad terminated his employment in February 2014. He even-\ntually had physical therapy, epidural injections, and then sur-\ngery in 2016. After the surgery, he continued to experience\npain in his back and legs. At the time of trial, his surgeon had\nstill not cleared him for any type of work.\nII. The Trial\n Abernathy sued the Railroad under the FELA, 45 U.S.C\n§ 51, alleging that it had been negligent in failing to provide\nan operable tie crane and requiring him to use the backhoe,\nwhich was inadequate for his assigned task of transporting\nthe ties. The trial lasted three days. Abernathy testified and\ncalled three other lay witnesses: his wife Carrie Abernathy,\nRichard Probus, and Lowell McElwee, a Railroad engineer\nwho worked with Abernathy.\n\f4 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\n Probus testified that on the day of Abernathy’s injury, they\ncould not have used the pickup truck to transport the ties be-\ncause they needed the pickup truck to transport the other\nequipment needed to install the ties. Probus also testified that\nthe Railroad had acquired an operable tie crane after Aber-\nnathy’s accident. Probus explained that the tie crane was now\nbeing used to transport ties and that manual lifts of ties were\nnot necessary with the new machine. He stated that the avail-\nability of the tie crane makes his job safer.\n Abernathy testified that when the Railroad’s tie crane had\nbeen operational, he used it regularly. He explained that the\ntie crane was the preferred method for moving ties because it\ndid not require manual lifting or traveling on public roads. He\nalso testified that before his 2012 injury, he had repeatedly\nasked the Railroad to replace the tie crane.\n Abernathy also presented the depositions of Doctors Renu\nBajaj, James Kohlman, and Thomas Lee. Dr. Lee, Abernathy’s\nsurgeon, offered testimony relevant to damages and causa-\ntion. He testified that he did not expect Abernathy to regain\nthe level of functionality he had prior to his accident. He also\ntestified that Abernathy certainly would not be able to return\nto work involving heavy manual labor. Dr. Lee also said that,\nto a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Abernathy’s\nsymptoms were caused or aggravated by the lifting accident\nin September 2012.\n The Railroad called four witnesses: general manager Tim\nAllen; Everett Fletcher; Gayle Garrett, the office secretary for\nthe Railroad; and Kendall Mulvaney, the superintendent of\nR&R Contractors, testifying as an expert witness in railroad\nrepair and maintenance. The Railroad defended on the theory\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 5\n\nthat a backhoe is a generally accepted method for transport-\ning ties in the rail repair industry.\n After the close of Abernathy’s case-in-chief, the Railroad\nmoved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of\nCivil Procedure 50(a), which the court denied. The Railroad\nrenewed its motion under Rule 50(b) at the close of all evi-\ndence and prior to the verdict, and the court again denied it.\n The jury found that the Railroad was negligent and that its\nnegligence contributed to Abernathy’s injuries. The jury cal-\nculated Abernathy’s total damages to be $750,000. However,\nthe jury found that Abernathy was also at fault for thirty per-\ncent of the total fault, which meant the jury awarded a net\nverdict of $525,000. The district court denied the Railroad’s\npost-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new\ntrial. The district court also awarded costs to Abernathy as the\nprevailing party but rejected his request to include as costs\n$3,800 in witness fees paid to Doctors Lee and Bajaj. The Rail-\nroad has appealed the judgment against it, and Abernathy has\ncross-appealed the denial of his request for expert witness\nfees as part of his costs.\nIII. Legal Analysis\n We take up the issues on appeal in three groups. First, we\naddress the Railroad’s arguments for judgment as a matter of\nlaw on the theory that Abernathy’s evidence was insufficient.\nSecond, we address the Railroad’s arguments that the district\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at\ntrial. Third, we address Abernathy’s cross-appeal on the\naward of costs.\n\f6 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\n A. Judgment as a Matter of Law\n The FELA provides a federal remedy for railroad employ-\nees who are injured on the job. To prove a claim under the\nFELA, a plaintiff must prove “the traditional common law el-\nements of negligence, including foreseeability, duty, breach,\nand causation.” Fulk v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 22 F.3d 120,\n124 (7th Cir. 1994). However, “[b]ecause it is meant to offer\nbroad remedial relief to railroad workers, a plaintiff’s burden\nwhen suing under the FELA is significantly lighter than in an\nordinary negligence case.” Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Rail-\nway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Harbin v.\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\n1990) (“It is well established that the quantum of evidence re-\nquired to establish liability in an FELA case is much less than\nin an ordinary negligence action.”). A railroad-employer is li-\nable where “employer negligence played any part, even the\nslightest, in producing the injury.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific\nRailroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).\n The Railroad challenges the sufficiency of evidence as to\nall elements of negligence. We consider duty and breach to-\ngether, and foreseeability and causation separately. “This\nCourt reviews sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo,\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-\nmoving party and drawing all inferences in [his] favor.”\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2014).\nWe “will overturn a jury verdict ‘only when there is a com-\nplete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion\nreached.’” Id. at 29596, quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645,\n653 (1946). Here, probative evidence supported the jury’s ver-\ndict that Abernathy established each element of negligence.\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 7\n\nThe district court did not err in declining to overturn the\njury’s verdict.\n 1. Duty & Breach\n The Railroad had a duty to provide Abernathy a reasona-\nbly safe working environment. See Crompton, 745 F.3d at 296.\nThe Railroad points out correctly that it “could have provided\na reasonably safe workplace notwithstanding the fact that\nsafer workplace alternatives exist.” Taylor v. Illinois Central\nRailroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993). The Railroad ar-\ngues that Abernathy produced no evidence that the equip-\nment available to haul ties (the backhoe and pickup truck) and\nthe way in which he was trained to perform a manual lift were\nunsafe. Instead, Abernathy produced evidence pertaining to\nthe absence of the tie crane. The tie crane evidence, the Rail-\nroad argues, showed only that there was a safer alternative to\nthe backhoe and pickup, which is not sufficient to establish\nnegligence. See Darrough v. CSX Transportation Inc., 321 F.3d\n674, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (railroad does not have duty to provide\nthe safest working environment).\n The Railroad’s argument relies on the faulty premise that\nevidence of safer alternatives can never even be relevant to\nwhether an employer exercised reasonable care. When a rail-\nroad assigns an employee a task using a particular method\nand the employee is injured while executing the task, evi-\ndence of a safer alternative method is relevant to whether the\nmethod provided was reasonable. See Stone v. New York, Chi-\ncago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344 U.S. 407, 409 (1953) (plaintiff\nwas injured pulling ties using the method his supervisor in-\nstructed him to use; evidence of three alternative methods for\npulling ties was relevant to whether railroad was negligent).\nBased on all the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably\n\f8 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nhave found that it was not reasonably safe to assign Aber-\nnathy to replace the ties without an operable tie crane.\n The Railroad’s argument as to the safety of a manual lift is\nsimilarly flawed. Abernathy did not argue that under all cir-\ncumstances, the Railroad is negligent if it requires an em-\nployee to perform a manual lift. He argued that the Railroad\nwas negligent where it could have provided employees with\nequipment that prevented the need for impromptu manual\nlifts on public roads but chose not to repair or replace this\nequipment.\n The Railroad’s reliance on Walker v. Northeast Regional\nCommuter Railroad, 225 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2000), is thus mis-\nplaced. In Walker, we affirmed summary judgment for a rail-\nroad in an FELA case for injuries from performing a manual\nlift. Plaintiff Walker worked as a machinist in a repair shop.\nHe injured his back lifting a replacement blade for a machine\nthat cut metal. Id. at 896. The blade weighed about 140\npounds, and Walker lifted it with one other employee. Id. A\ncrane and a forklift were available to the men but could not be\nused to assist in the lift because of the configuration of the\nshop. Walker argued that his employer was negligent in re-\nquiring him to lift more than fifty pounds and “in configuring\nthe shop in such a way as to prohibit the use of mechanical\nlifting aids.” Id. at 898.\n Walker is distinguishable. First, Walker actually made an\nexplicit argument that his employer’s demand that he lift\nmore than fifty pounds was sufficient by itself to support a\nfinding of negligence. In rejecting this argument, we con-\ntrasted the case with those in which plaintiffs “showed the\navailability of alternative methods and safeguards that would\nensure employee safety” and found telling that Walker\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 9\n\nproduced no evidence that he or any other machinists “had\ncomplained about problems in changing the blade on other\noccasions.” Id. In this case, Abernathy offered evidence of\nsafer alternatives and prior employee complaints about the\nlack of an operable tie crane. As to the second argument about\nthe shop configuration, Walker presented no evidence that the\nmanual lift in his case was not reasonably safe given the cir-\ncumstances, and in fact he “testified that he and [his co-lifter]\nassumed that they could pick up the blade” with no problem.\nId. at 899.\n Here, however, Abernathy offered evidence that the tie\ncrane was the appropriate equipment to use for the job he was\nperforming with a backhoe on the day he was injured. Allen’s\ntestimony on cross-examination and Probus’s testimony al-\nlowed the jury to find that the pickup truck was not an ade-\nquate alternative. Abernathy and Probus both testified that an\noperable tie crane made their work safer. Abernathy ex-\nplained that the tie crane allowed employees to avoid manual\nlifts and traveling on public roads. The jury could reasonably\nhave found that the Railroad did not provide Abernathy with\nequipment appropriate for the task he was assigned and that\nhis working environment was not reasonably safe.\n 2. Foreseeability\n Abernathy was required to show that it was foreseeable to\nthe Railroad that transporting ties using a backhoe or pickup\nas opposed to a tie crane “would or might result in a mishap\nand injury.” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685,\n703 (2011), quoting Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,\n372 U.S. 108, 118, n.7 (1963). To establish foreseeability, “a\nplaintiff must show that the employer had actual or construc-\ntive notice” of potential harm. Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern\n\f10 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nRailway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005). The railroad may\nbe liable “even if ‘the extent of the [injury] or the manner in\nwhich it occurred’ was not ‘probable’ or ‘foreseeable.’”\nMcBride, 564 U.S. at 70304, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 12021\n& n.8 (alteration in McBride; emphasis added here). The Rail-\nroad argues that Abernathy failed to prove negligence be-\ncause he failed to show that his injury was foreseeable. The\nRailroad argues that it could not have known that Abernathy\nwould use the backhoe or that doing so would result in\ndropped ties. The backhoe, the Railroad points out, had been\nused to transport ties without incident on multiple prior oc-\ncasions and there was no defect in the machine that caused\nthe tie to fall. Further, as the Railroad’s expert, Mulvaney, tes-\ntified, a backhoe was an accepted method in the railroad re-\npair injury for transporting ties. From these facts, the Railroad\ncontends there was insufficient proof of foreseeability.\n The Railroad’s argument misunderstands what the FELA\nrequires. Abernathy does not need to show that the Railroad\ncould have foreseen the particular consequences of its negli-\ngence. He needed to show only that “a particular condi-\ntion”—here, the absence of appropriate equipment—“would\nor might result in” any type of “mishap and injury.” McBride,\n564 U.S. at 703, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 118 n. 7 (emphasis\nadded here); see Gallick, 372 U.S. at 11820 (potential harm\nwas foreseeable where railroad had allowed stagnant pool of\nfilthy water to remain near worksite and employee was bitten\nby an insect, which led to infection and ultimately amputation\nof both legs). Abernathy needed to show only “circumstances\nwhich a reasonable person would foresee as creating a poten-\ntial for harm.” McGinn v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 102\nF.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1996).\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 11\n\n The evidence here supported a finding that a reasonable\nperson in the Railroad’s position could have foreseen that\ntransporting ties in a backhoe or pickup could lead to injury.\nThe Railroad knew that its tie crane had not been operational\nsince 2008. Abernathy offered evidence that he had repeatedly\nasked the Railroad to repair or replace it. Abernathy and Pro-\nbus both testified that the tie crane was safer to use in hauling\nties, in part because it prevented employees from having to\nlift ties manually and travel on public roads.\n 3. Causation\n In support of judgment as a matter of law, and now on\nappeal, the Railroad argued that even if it was negligent in\nfailing to provide a tie crane, Abernathy failed to prove that\nthe alleged negligence caused his injuries. Abernathy’s man-\nual lift, the Railroad contends, caused his injuries, and this lift\nwas an act subsequent to and independent of any safety issues\nthat arose because the tie crane was not available.\n The Railroad’s argument conflicts with the liberal causa-\ntion standard under the FELA. “Juries in such cases are\nproperly instructed that a defendant railroad ‘caused or con-\ntributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ‘if [the railroad’s] neg-\nligence played a part—no matter how small—in bringing\nabout the injury.” McBride, 564 U.S. at 705; see also Harbin v.\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\n1990), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S.\n500, 506 (1957) (“For under the FELA, ‘the test of a jury case is\nsimply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion\nthat employer negligence played any part, even in the slightest,\nin producing the injury… .”) (emphasis in Harbin). “The FELA\nvests the jury with broad discretion to engage in common\n\f12 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nsense inferences regarding issues of causation and fault.”\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 2014).\n There was sufficient evidence here that the Railroad’s neg-\nligence played a part in bringing about Abernathy’s injury.\nAbernathy had to use the backhoe on a public roadway to\ntransport the ties because the Railroad had not repaired or re-\nplaced its tie crane, which had been out of service for years.\nVibrations caused a tie to fall off the backhoe and onto the\npublic roadway that Abernathy was forced to use because of\nthe absence of a tie crane. Abernathy had to remove the tie,\nwhich was obstructing the public road, and he had to do it\nquickly. He had no option other than to lift the tie manually\nback into the backhoe, which injured his back. A reasonable\njury could infer that the Railroad’s negligence played some\npart in causing Abernathy’s injury. The district court correctly\ndenied the Railroad’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.\n B. New Trial Motion Based on Evidentiary Rulings\n The Railroad also argues that the district judge erred in\nthree decisions to admit evidence, contending that each is suf-\nficient to warrant a new trial. We review the denial of a new\ntrial motion for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen-\neral Board of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist\nChurch, 733 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2013); Kossman v. Northeast\nIllinois Regional Commuter Railroad, 211 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th\nCir. 2000). We find no abuse of discretion in any of the chal-\nlenged evidentiary rulings.\n 1. Testimony of Timothy Allen\n First, the Railroad objects to a line of cross-examination of\nits general manager, Timothy Allen, regarding his own use of\na company pickup truck to transport railroad ties. The\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 13\n\nRailroad argues that Allen’s use of the truck was so dissimilar\nfrom the way Abernathy might have used the truck on the day\nhe was injured as to make the evidence irrelevant.\n Again, Abernathy had to prove that the Railroad did not\nprovide a reasonably safe method for transporting railroad\nties. See Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 297–\n98 (1949). The Railroad argued that the pickup truck was a\nreasonably safe and available way for Abernathy to do his job.\nAllen testified that he thought Abernathy should have used\nthe pickup truck rather than using the backhoe to haul ties on\na public road.\n During cross-examination, Allen acknowledged that on\none occasion, he had used the same pickup to take 20 to 25\nrejected railroad ties to a friend. Allen admitted that, assum-\ning each tie weighed just 140 pounds, hauling 20 ties would\nhave meant the pickup truck was carrying 2,800 pounds.1 The\npickup truck was rated to haul only 1,500 pounds. When\nasked about this discrepancy, Allen said he had not been\naware that he had been operating the pickup truck at almost\ndouble its load capacity. Probus later testified that he and Ab-\nernathy chose not to use the pickup on the day of Abernathy’s\ninjury because they could not use it to haul both the ties and\nthe tools needed for the job.\n Judge Myerscough acted well within her discretion in al-\nlowing this line of cross-examination. Evidence is relevant if\nit has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of\nconsequence to the determination of the action more probable\n\n 1 The jury heard conflicting testimony regarding the weight of rail-\nroad ties. For purposes of this line of questioning, it was assumed that the\naverage railroad tie weighs 140 pounds.\n\f14 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nor less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.\nR. Evid. 401. The testimony about Allen’s previous use of the\npickup satisfied this definition. It was relevant for the jury to\nknow that when Allen testified that the pickup truck was a\nreasonably safe alternative method available to Abernathy—\na key point for the Railroad’s defense—he was not familiar\nwith the pickup’s hauling capacity. That rebuttal was espe-\ncially relevant given Probus’s testimony that he and Aber-\nnathy chose not to use the pickup in part because of the\ntruck’s load limit.\n 2. Testimony about ADM\n Second, the Railroad objects to the admission of evidence\nregarding the financial ties of its expert witness, Kevin Mul-\nvaney, to the Railroad’s parent company, the agribusiness gi-\nant Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”). Before trial,\nthe district court had granted the Railroad’s unopposed mo-\ntion in limine barring mention of its relationship to ADM. At\ntrial, the court reversed that ruling after Abernathy’s counsel\nexplained that they had not known before trial that Mulvaney\nwould testify. The district court let Abernathy’s counsel ask\nMulvaney whether ADM was the largest customer of his em-\nployer. He answered “yes.” In response to the next question,\nMulvaney said he did not know whether ADM was the Rail-\nroad’s parent company.\n The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these\nquestions. Bias is a “permissible and established basis of im-\npeachment.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (hold-\ning that government’s evidence as to a defense witness’s bias\nwas properly admitted). Bias is the “quintessentially appro-\npriate topic for cross examination.” Bachenski v. Malnati, 11\nF.3d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir. 1993). We have held repeatedly that\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 15\n\nparties should be granted reasonable latitude in cross-exam-\nining witnesses for bias. See, e.g., United States v. Manske, 186\nF.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Frankenthal,\n582 F.2d 1102, 1106 (7th Cir. 1978).\n The information involving ADM did not become relevant\nto bias until Mulvaney took the stand. In choosing to call an\nexpert witness with economic ties to ADM, the Railroad made\nits parent-subsidiary relationship with ADM relevant to show\npotential bias on the part of Mulvaney. The district court did\nnot abuse its discretion by allowing this evidence of arguable\nbias.\n 3. The Tie Crane Evidence\n The Railroad’s third evidentiary challenge is to admission\nof evidence regarding the tie crane. The Railroad argues on\nappeal, as it did at trial, that this evidence is not relevant to\nwhether the available methods of transporting ties when Ab-\nernathy was injured (i.e., the backhoe and the pickup truck)\nwere reasonably safe. The Railroad also contends that this ev-\nidence confused the jury because it implied that the Railroad\nhad a duty to employ the safest methods available, instead of\njust reasonably safe methods. The Railroad is particularly crit-\nical of the court’s admission of evidence that it bought a new\ntie crane after Abernathy’s injury. (The Railroad’s briefs on\nappeal do not cite Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which ad-\ndresses evidence of subsequent remedial measures, but its ar-\nguments invoke that rule’s rationale.)\n As explained above, the Railroad is right that an employer\ncan provide a reasonably safe workplace even if safer work-\nplace alternatives exist, and evidence of a safer alternative is\nnot conclusive evidence of negligence. See Taylor v. Illinois\n\f16 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nCentral Railroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993) (“proof of a\nsafer alternative is not necessarily proof of negligence”). Nev-\nertheless, evidence of safer alternative methods is still rele-\nvant to show that the available methods were not reasonably\nsafe. See Stone v. New York Central & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344\nU.S. 407, 409 (1953). Such evidence is relevant to show indus-\ntry standards and to establish whether a given method is rea-\nsonably safe relative to alternatives. See Rogers v. Missouri Pa-\ncific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 503 (1957) (reinstating jury ver-\ndict for injured employee in light of evidence of safer alterna-\ntive method). Thus, evidence of the tie crane was relevant to\nthe issues of duty and breach, and specifically to determine\nwhether the methods the Railroad made available to Aber-\nnathy were in fact reasonably safe. The jury was permitted to\nmake inferences from evidence presented on an alternative\nmethod, the tie crane. That does not mean the jury applied an\nincorrect standard (requiring the safest possible workplace).\nThe jury instructions stated correctly that the applicable\nstandard is that the “FELA requires defendant to exercise rea-\nsonable care to provide a reasonably safe workplace.”\n The evidence that a new tie crane was purchased after Ab-\nernathy’s injury was also admissible. Rule 407 generally pre-\nvents admission of evidence of subsequent remedial\nmeasures to prove fault, but the rule and our precedents ex-\npressly permit this evidence if, among other reasons, “the fea-\nsibility of the remedial measure” is contested. See, e.g., Ross v.\nBlack & Decker Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 1992) (af-\nfirming admission of subsequent remedial measures where\ndefendant disputed feasibility).\n In this case, the Railroad chose to contest the feasibility of\nboth purchasing a new tie crane and fixing the old one. At trial\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 17\n\nand in deposition testimony, the Railroad’s witnesses offered\nseveral reasons why the Railroad chose not to make a tie crane\navailable in the four years or so between the original tie\ncrane’s breakdown and Abernathy’s injury. These reasons in-\ncluded that the cost of repairing the original tie crane or buy-\ning a new one was prohibitively high, that the original tie\ncrane was not used enough to justify the expense, and that the\nRailroad was concerned that any money spent would be\nwasted because Abernathy would misuse the machine so that\nit would soon break down again.\n We can assume that if the Railroad had chosen to stipulate\nbefore trial to the feasibility of making a tie crane available to\nAbernathy, he would not have been allowed to present evi-\ndence of the post-injury purchase of a new tie crane. See Ross,\n977 F.2d at 1185. But the Railroad could not both dispute fea-\nsibility and block Abernathy from introducing contrary evi-\ndence to show that it would have been feasible to replace the\nequipment. If the Railroad was concerned that the jury might\nuse this evidence to infer negligence improperly, it also could\nhave requested a limiting jury instruction. It did not. See\nTrytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 1994), citing\nUnited States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1980). The\ndistrict court did not err by admitting this evidence.\n C. Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs\n Following trial, Abernathy filed a bill of costs. The only\npoint of controversy is his claim for $3,800 for fees paid to his\ntreating physicians for their depositions. The Railroad ob-\njected to these costs on the ground that 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b)\nlimits witness fees to forty dollars per day unless some other\nprovision of law provides for a higher rate. The district court\n\f18 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nagreed with the Railroad and limited the witness fees in the\nbill of cost to forty dollars per witness per day.\n We review the district court’s award of costs for an abuse\nof discretion. See Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 690\nF.3d 844, 852 (7th Cir. 2012); Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d\n454, 464 (8th Cir. 2015). However, we review legal questions\nrelated to the cost award de novo. See Central States, Southwest\nAreas Pension Fund v. White, 258 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2001)\n(standard of appellate review is de novo on a question of law\nin interpreting a statute); see also Stanley, 784 F.3d at 464.\n Both doctors’ video depositions were sought by Aber-\nnathy himself, and he presented them as evidence at trial. He\ncontends that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i)\nand 54(d)(1) work together to supersede the forty-dollar-per-\nday limit of § 1821 and allow him, as the prevailing party, to\nrecover the entire “reasonable fee” he paid his expert wit-\nnesses for their depositions.\n We affirm the district court’s denial of the higher witness\nfees. Abernathy’s argument is contrary to the Supreme\nCourt’s interpretation of the interaction between these rules\nset forth in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.\n437 (1987), and is not supported by Seventh Circuit precedent.\nThe district court properly limited the witness fees the Rail-\nroad must pay to forty dollars per witness per day.\n In Halasa, we affirmed the district court’s ruling that the\nprevailing defendant could be reimbursed for fees related to\nthe deposition of an expert witness in excess of forty dollars\nper day under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). We held that the “reasona-\nble fee” requirement in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) can, in certain cases,\nsupersede the specific payment schedule in § 1821(b). 690 F.3d\n\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 19\n\nat 852. However, the district court decision in that case was\nbased on the fact that the deposition of that expert witness,\nthough initially paid for by the defendant, had been taken by\nthe plaintiff. Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 2012 WL\n639520, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2012) (“Federal Rule of Civil\nProcedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i) provides that the party who deposes\nan expert witness—which in this case was Halasa—shall ‘pay\nthe expert a reasonable fee for time spent.’”). The defendant\nin Halasa had not insisted that plaintiff pay its witness at the\ntime of the deposition, as it could have under Rule\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). Instead, the defendant had paid its own witness\nhis usual expert fee for time spent on the deposition the plain-\ntiff had taken. The defendant waited until its final bill of costs\nto request that payment under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).\n Thus, because the defendant in Halasa was the prevailing\nparty and because plaintiff, as the party who had sought the\ndeposition of the defendant’s expert, had an obligation under\nthe Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) to pay the costs of that deposition, the\ndistrict court was permitted to order that the defendant be\nawarded the amount of reasonable witness fees it actually\npaid, regardless of the fee limits set forth in 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1821(b). Here, however, Abernathy is not asking that the\ncosts of the depositions be reimbursed under Rule\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). He instead seeks to have the costs of deposing\nhis own expert witnesses reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1)\nalone, a question that was not addressed in Halasa.\n This case is much closer to the Supreme Court’s decision\nin Crawford Fitting, which rejected Abernathy’s interpretation\nof these rules. The issue in Crawford Fitting was whether a\nparty could be reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1) for the higher\nexpert fees it had paid to have its own expert witness testify\n\f20 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\n\nat trial. 482 U.S. at 438–39. The Court rejected that claim, hold-\ning that “when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for\nfees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound\nby the limit of § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory\nauthority to the contrary.” Id. at 439. The Court found that the\nrule and statute did not conflict, and that while Rule 54(d)(1)\npermits prevailing parties to recover costs, § 1821(b) places a\nlimit on the amount that can be recovered. Id. at 444–45.\n Abernathy argues that we should distinguish Crawford Fit-\nting and instead follow and extend the reasoning of the Eighth\nCircuit in Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d 454, 464–65 (8th Cir.\n2015), which allowed Cottrell, the prevailing party, to recover\nthe full expert witness fees it actually paid to Stanley under\nRule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) during discovery to take the deposition of\nStanley’s expert witness. Whether Stanley was correct or not\non its own facts, its reasoning does not extend to the case be-\nfore us, where the prevailing party seeks to recover full expert\nfees for the depositions of his own expert witnesses. This is\nCrawford Fitting, except that we address here expert deposi-\ntions rather than expert trial testimony. It would be a mistake\nto limit Crawford Fitting on that basis. If we held that prevail-\ning parties could recover under Rule 54(d) the full costs of de-\nposing their own expert witnesses before trial, but not of call-\ning those expert witnesses to testify live at trial, see Crawford\nFitting, we would create an incentive for parties to offer expert\ndepositions at trial in lieu of live expert testimony. Nothing in\nthe text or logic of the rules calls for such a perverse incentive,\nand we see no persuasive reason to distinguish this case from\nCrawford Fitting.\n The judgment of the district court and its award of costs\nare AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Marvin Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois Railroad Comp\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\nMARVIN ABERNATHY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nEASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:15-cv-03223-SEM-TSH — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Marvin Abernathy was\\ninjured while working for defendant Eastern Illinois Railroad\\nCompany. He sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability\\nAct (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., alleging that the Railroad\\nnegligently failed to provide reasonably safe working condi-\\ntions by failing to provide appropriate equipment for the job\\nhe was doing when he was hurt.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n A jury awarded Abernathy $525,000 in damages. The Rail-\\nroad moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.\\nThe district court denied both requests, and the Railroad has\\nappealed, raising a host of issues. Abernathy has filed a cross-\\nappeal asserting that the district court erred by not awarding\\nhim sufficient costs to cover his expert witness fees. We affirm\\nJudge Myerscough’s decisions in all respects.\\nI. Facts\\n Abernathy worked as a track inspector for the Eastern Illi-\\nnois Railroad Company. His duties included replacing and\\nrepairing railroad ties. On September 13, 2012, the Railroad\\nsent Abernathy and another employee, Richard Probus, to re-\\npair a railroad crossing about six or seven miles away from\\nthe Railroad’s yard in Charleston, Illinois. Abernathy was in\\ncharge of the job. The repair required him and Probus to\\ntransport six ties from the yard to the crossing.\\n In 2012, the Railroad had a “tie crane,” a vehicle that runs\\non the railroad tracks and is well-suited to transporting rail-\\nroad ties, but it had been out of commission for years. Aber-\\nnathy and Probus had only two options for transporting the\\nties: a backhoe or a pickup truck, either of which would need\\nto travel on public roads rather than railroad tracks. Aber-\\nnathy chose to use the backhoe. He testified that he had never\\nused the pickup truck to haul ties before, but that he had used\\nthe backhoe for similar jobs numerous times, although not on\\npublic roads and not with this heavy a load. Abernathy and\\nProbus loaded four ties into the bucket of the backhoe and\\ntwo across the top of the bucket, resting on the arms of the\\nmachine. Abernathy testified that when the bucket is rolled\\nback, it locks the resting ties into place. Abernathy drove the\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 3\\n\\nbackhoe along a public highway. Probus followed in the\\npickup, which was loaded with tools needed to install the ties.\\n Abernathy drove in low gear, but he started to experience\\n“road bounce.” He started braking, and two ties fell out of the\\nbackhoe’s bucket. Abernathy stopped on the shoulder of the\\nroad and tried to lift the ties back into the bucket. In lifting a\\ntie, he injured his back. He also smashed a finger between the\\ntie he was holding and another tie in the bucket. Despite the\\naccident, Abernathy and Probus were able to finish reloading\\nthe ties, and they resumed their trip and finished the repair\\njob. Abernathy remained in pain for the rest of the day.\\n The following morning, Abernathy reported the injury to\\nTim Allen, the general manager of the Railroad. Allen told\\nhim “to take it easy” and “be on light duty” for a while. Ab-\\nernathy worked through the pain on lighter duty for the next\\nyear but was unable to return to his regular work. The Rail-\\nroad terminated his employment in February 2014. He even-\\ntually had physical therapy, epidural injections, and then sur-\\ngery in 2016. After the surgery, he continued to experience\\npain in his back and legs. At the time of trial, his surgeon had\\nstill not cleared him for any type of work.\\nII. The Trial\\n Abernathy sued the Railroad under the FELA, 45 U.S.C\\n§ 51, alleging that it had been negligent in failing to provide\\nan operable tie crane and requiring him to use the backhoe,\\nwhich was inadequate for his assigned task of transporting\\nthe ties. The trial lasted three days. Abernathy testified and\\ncalled three other lay witnesses: his wife Carrie Abernathy,\\nRichard Probus, and Lowell McElwee, a Railroad engineer\\nwho worked with Abernathy.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n Probus testified that on the day of Abernathy’s injury, they\\ncould not have used the pickup truck to transport the ties be-\\ncause they needed the pickup truck to transport the other\\nequipment needed to install the ties. Probus also testified that\\nthe Railroad had acquired an operable tie crane after Aber-\\nnathy’s accident. Probus explained that the tie crane was now\\nbeing used to transport ties and that manual lifts of ties were\\nnot necessary with the new machine. He stated that the avail-\\nability of the tie crane makes his job safer.\\n Abernathy testified that when the Railroad’s tie crane had\\nbeen operational, he used it regularly. He explained that the\\ntie crane was the preferred method for moving ties because it\\ndid not require manual lifting or traveling on public roads. He\\nalso testified that before his 2012 injury, he had repeatedly\\nasked the Railroad to replace the tie crane.\\n Abernathy also presented the depositions of Doctors Renu\\nBajaj, James Kohlman, and Thomas Lee. Dr. Lee, Abernathy’s\\nsurgeon, offered testimony relevant to damages and causa-\\ntion. He testified that he did not expect Abernathy to regain\\nthe level of functionality he had prior to his accident. He also\\ntestified that Abernathy certainly would not be able to return\\nto work involving heavy manual labor. Dr. Lee also said that,\\nto a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Abernathy’s\\nsymptoms were caused or aggravated by the lifting accident\\nin September 2012.\\n The Railroad called four witnesses: general manager Tim\\nAllen; Everett Fletcher; Gayle Garrett, the office secretary for\\nthe Railroad; and Kendall Mulvaney, the superintendent of\\nR&R Contractors, testifying as an expert witness in railroad\\nrepair and maintenance. The Railroad defended on the theory\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 5\\n\\nthat a backhoe is a generally accepted method for transport-\\ning ties in the rail repair industry.\\n After the close of Abernathy’s case-in-chief, the Railroad\\nmoved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of\\nCivil Procedure 50(a), which the court denied. The Railroad\\nrenewed its motion under Rule 50(b) at the close of all evi-\\ndence and prior to the verdict, and the court again denied it.\\n The jury found that the Railroad was negligent and that its\\nnegligence contributed to Abernathy’s injuries. The jury cal-\\nculated Abernathy’s total damages to be $750,000. However,\\nthe jury found that Abernathy was also at fault for thirty per-\\ncent of the total fault, which meant the jury awarded a net\\nverdict of $525,000. The district court denied the Railroad’s\\npost-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new\\ntrial. The district court also awarded costs to Abernathy as the\\nprevailing party but rejected his request to include as costs\\n$3,800 in witness fees paid to Doctors Lee and Bajaj. The Rail-\\nroad has appealed the judgment against it, and Abernathy has\\ncross-appealed the denial of his request for expert witness\\nfees as part of his costs.\\nIII. Legal Analysis\\n We take up the issues on appeal in three groups. First, we\\naddress the Railroad’s arguments for judgment as a matter of\\nlaw on the theory that Abernathy’s evidence was insufficient.\\nSecond, we address the Railroad’s arguments that the district\\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at\\ntrial. Third, we address Abernathy’s cross-appeal on the\\naward of costs.\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\n A. Judgment as a Matter of Law\\n The FELA provides a federal remedy for railroad employ-\\nees who are injured on the job. To prove a claim under the\\nFELA, a plaintiff must prove “the traditional common law el-\\nements of negligence, including foreseeability, duty, breach,\\nand causation.” Fulk v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 22 F.3d 120,\\n124 (7th Cir. 1994). However, “[b]ecause it is meant to offer\\nbroad remedial relief to railroad workers, a plaintiff’s burden\\nwhen suing under the FELA is significantly lighter than in an\\nordinary negligence case.” Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Rail-\\nway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Harbin v.\\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\\n1990) (“It is well established that the quantum of evidence re-\\nquired to establish liability in an FELA case is much less than\\nin an ordinary negligence action.”). A railroad-employer is li-\\nable where “employer negligence played any part, even the\\nslightest, in producing the injury.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific\\nRailroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).\\n The Railroad challenges the sufficiency of evidence as to\\nall elements of negligence. We consider duty and breach to-\\ngether, and foreseeability and causation separately. “This\\nCourt reviews sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo,\\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-\\nmoving party and drawing all inferences in [his] favor.”\\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2014).\\nWe “will overturn a jury verdict ‘only when there is a com-\\nplete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion\\nreached.’” Id. at 29596, quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645,\\n653 (1946). Here, probative evidence supported the jury’s ver-\\ndict that Abernathy established each element of negligence.\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 7\\n\\nThe district court did not err in declining to overturn the\\njury’s verdict.\\n 1. Duty & Breach\\n The Railroad had a duty to provide Abernathy a reasona-\\nbly safe working environment. See Crompton, 745 F.3d at 296.\\nThe Railroad points out correctly that it “could have provided\\na reasonably safe workplace notwithstanding the fact that\\nsafer workplace alternatives exist.” Taylor v. Illinois Central\\nRailroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993). The Railroad ar-\\ngues that Abernathy produced no evidence that the equip-\\nment available to haul ties (the backhoe and pickup truck) and\\nthe way in which he was trained to perform a manual lift were\\nunsafe. Instead, Abernathy produced evidence pertaining to\\nthe absence of the tie crane. The tie crane evidence, the Rail-\\nroad argues, showed only that there was a safer alternative to\\nthe backhoe and pickup, which is not sufficient to establish\\nnegligence. See Darrough v. CSX Transportation Inc., 321 F.3d\\n674, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (railroad does not have duty to provide\\nthe safest working environment).\\n The Railroad’s argument relies on the faulty premise that\\nevidence of safer alternatives can never even be relevant to\\nwhether an employer exercised reasonable care. When a rail-\\nroad assigns an employee a task using a particular method\\nand the employee is injured while executing the task, evi-\\ndence of a safer alternative method is relevant to whether the\\nmethod provided was reasonable. See Stone v. New York, Chi-\\ncago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344 U.S. 407, 409 (1953) (plaintiff\\nwas injured pulling ties using the method his supervisor in-\\nstructed him to use; evidence of three alternative methods for\\npulling ties was relevant to whether railroad was negligent).\\nBased on all the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nhave found that it was not reasonably safe to assign Aber-\\nnathy to replace the ties without an operable tie crane.\\n The Railroad’s argument as to the safety of a manual lift is\\nsimilarly flawed. Abernathy did not argue that under all cir-\\ncumstances, the Railroad is negligent if it requires an em-\\nployee to perform a manual lift. He argued that the Railroad\\nwas negligent where it could have provided employees with\\nequipment that prevented the need for impromptu manual\\nlifts on public roads but chose not to repair or replace this\\nequipment.\\n The Railroad’s reliance on Walker v. Northeast Regional\\nCommuter Railroad, 225 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2000), is thus mis-\\nplaced. In Walker, we affirmed summary judgment for a rail-\\nroad in an FELA case for injuries from performing a manual\\nlift. Plaintiff Walker worked as a machinist in a repair shop.\\nHe injured his back lifting a replacement blade for a machine\\nthat cut metal. Id. at 896. The blade weighed about 140\\npounds, and Walker lifted it with one other employee. Id. A\\ncrane and a forklift were available to the men but could not be\\nused to assist in the lift because of the configuration of the\\nshop. Walker argued that his employer was negligent in re-\\nquiring him to lift more than fifty pounds and “in configuring\\nthe shop in such a way as to prohibit the use of mechanical\\nlifting aids.” Id. at 898.\\n Walker is distinguishable. First, Walker actually made an\\nexplicit argument that his employer’s demand that he lift\\nmore than fifty pounds was sufficient by itself to support a\\nfinding of negligence. In rejecting this argument, we con-\\ntrasted the case with those in which plaintiffs “showed the\\navailability of alternative methods and safeguards that would\\nensure employee safety” and found telling that Walker\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 9\\n\\nproduced no evidence that he or any other machinists “had\\ncomplained about problems in changing the blade on other\\noccasions.” Id. In this case, Abernathy offered evidence of\\nsafer alternatives and prior employee complaints about the\\nlack of an operable tie crane. As to the second argument about\\nthe shop configuration, Walker presented no evidence that the\\nmanual lift in his case was not reasonably safe given the cir-\\ncumstances, and in fact he “testified that he and [his co-lifter]\\nassumed that they could pick up the blade” with no problem.\\nId. at 899.\\n Here, however, Abernathy offered evidence that the tie\\ncrane was the appropriate equipment to use for the job he was\\nperforming with a backhoe on the day he was injured. Allen’s\\ntestimony on cross-examination and Probus’s testimony al-\\nlowed the jury to find that the pickup truck was not an ade-\\nquate alternative. Abernathy and Probus both testified that an\\noperable tie crane made their work safer. Abernathy ex-\\nplained that the tie crane allowed employees to avoid manual\\nlifts and traveling on public roads. The jury could reasonably\\nhave found that the Railroad did not provide Abernathy with\\nequipment appropriate for the task he was assigned and that\\nhis working environment was not reasonably safe.\\n 2. Foreseeability\\n Abernathy was required to show that it was foreseeable to\\nthe Railroad that transporting ties using a backhoe or pickup\\nas opposed to a tie crane “would or might result in a mishap\\nand injury.” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685,\\n703 (2011), quoting Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,\\n372 U.S. 108, 118, n.7 (1963). To establish foreseeability, “a\\nplaintiff must show that the employer had actual or construc-\\ntive notice” of potential harm. Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nRailway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005). The railroad may\\nbe liable “even if ‘the extent of the [injury] or the manner in\\nwhich it occurred’ was not ‘probable’ or ‘foreseeable.’”\\nMcBride, 564 U.S. at 70304, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 12021\\n& n.8 (alteration in McBride; emphasis added here). The Rail-\\nroad argues that Abernathy failed to prove negligence be-\\ncause he failed to show that his injury was foreseeable. The\\nRailroad argues that it could not have known that Abernathy\\nwould use the backhoe or that doing so would result in\\ndropped ties. The backhoe, the Railroad points out, had been\\nused to transport ties without incident on multiple prior oc-\\ncasions and there was no defect in the machine that caused\\nthe tie to fall. Further, as the Railroad’s expert, Mulvaney, tes-\\ntified, a backhoe was an accepted method in the railroad re-\\npair injury for transporting ties. From these facts, the Railroad\\ncontends there was insufficient proof of foreseeability.\\n The Railroad’s argument misunderstands what the FELA\\nrequires. Abernathy does not need to show that the Railroad\\ncould have foreseen the particular consequences of its negli-\\ngence. He needed to show only that “a particular condi-\\ntion”—here, the absence of appropriate equipment—“would\\nor might result in” any type of “mishap and injury.” McBride,\\n564 U.S. at 703, quoting Gallick, 372 U.S. at 118 n. 7 (emphasis\\nadded here); see Gallick, 372 U.S. at 11820 (potential harm\\nwas foreseeable where railroad had allowed stagnant pool of\\nfilthy water to remain near worksite and employee was bitten\\nby an insect, which led to infection and ultimately amputation\\nof both legs). Abernathy needed to show only “circumstances\\nwhich a reasonable person would foresee as creating a poten-\\ntial for harm.” McGinn v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 102\\nF.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1996).\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 11\\n\\n The evidence here supported a finding that a reasonable\\nperson in the Railroad’s position could have foreseen that\\ntransporting ties in a backhoe or pickup could lead to injury.\\nThe Railroad knew that its tie crane had not been operational\\nsince 2008. Abernathy offered evidence that he had repeatedly\\nasked the Railroad to repair or replace it. Abernathy and Pro-\\nbus both testified that the tie crane was safer to use in hauling\\nties, in part because it prevented employees from having to\\nlift ties manually and travel on public roads.\\n 3. Causation\\n In support of judgment as a matter of law, and now on\\nappeal, the Railroad argued that even if it was negligent in\\nfailing to provide a tie crane, Abernathy failed to prove that\\nthe alleged negligence caused his injuries. Abernathy’s man-\\nual lift, the Railroad contends, caused his injuries, and this lift\\nwas an act subsequent to and independent of any safety issues\\nthat arose because the tie crane was not available.\\n The Railroad’s argument conflicts with the liberal causa-\\ntion standard under the FELA. “Juries in such cases are\\nproperly instructed that a defendant railroad ‘caused or con-\\ntributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ‘if [the railroad’s] neg-\\nligence played a part—no matter how small—in bringing\\nabout the injury.” McBride, 564 U.S. at 705; see also Harbin v.\\nBurlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.\\n1990), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S.\\n500, 506 (1957) (“For under the FELA, ‘the test of a jury case is\\nsimply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion\\nthat employer negligence played any part, even in the slightest,\\nin producing the injury… .”) (emphasis in Harbin). “The FELA\\nvests the jury with broad discretion to engage in common\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nsense inferences regarding issues of causation and fault.”\\nCrompton v. BNSF Railway Co., 745 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n There was sufficient evidence here that the Railroad’s neg-\\nligence played a part in bringing about Abernathy’s injury.\\nAbernathy had to use the backhoe on a public roadway to\\ntransport the ties because the Railroad had not repaired or re-\\nplaced its tie crane, which had been out of service for years.\\nVibrations caused a tie to fall off the backhoe and onto the\\npublic roadway that Abernathy was forced to use because of\\nthe absence of a tie crane. Abernathy had to remove the tie,\\nwhich was obstructing the public road, and he had to do it\\nquickly. He had no option other than to lift the tie manually\\nback into the backhoe, which injured his back. A reasonable\\njury could infer that the Railroad’s negligence played some\\npart in causing Abernathy’s injury. The district court correctly\\ndenied the Railroad’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.\\n B. New Trial Motion Based on Evidentiary Rulings\\n The Railroad also argues that the district judge erred in\\nthree decisions to admit evidence, contending that each is suf-\\nficient to warrant a new trial. We review the denial of a new\\ntrial motion for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen-\\neral Board of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist\\nChurch, 733 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2013); Kossman v. Northeast\\nIllinois Regional Commuter Railroad, 211 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th\\nCir. 2000). We find no abuse of discretion in any of the chal-\\nlenged evidentiary rulings.\\n 1. Testimony of Timothy Allen\\n First, the Railroad objects to a line of cross-examination of\\nits general manager, Timothy Allen, regarding his own use of\\na company pickup truck to transport railroad ties. The\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 13\\n\\nRailroad argues that Allen’s use of the truck was so dissimilar\\nfrom the way Abernathy might have used the truck on the day\\nhe was injured as to make the evidence irrelevant.\\n Again, Abernathy had to prove that the Railroad did not\\nprovide a reasonably safe method for transporting railroad\\nties. See Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 297–\\n98 (1949). The Railroad argued that the pickup truck was a\\nreasonably safe and available way for Abernathy to do his job.\\nAllen testified that he thought Abernathy should have used\\nthe pickup truck rather than using the backhoe to haul ties on\\na public road.\\n During cross-examination, Allen acknowledged that on\\none occasion, he had used the same pickup to take 20 to 25\\nrejected railroad ties to a friend. Allen admitted that, assum-\\ning each tie weighed just 140 pounds, hauling 20 ties would\\nhave meant the pickup truck was carrying 2,800 pounds.1 The\\npickup truck was rated to haul only 1,500 pounds. When\\nasked about this discrepancy, Allen said he had not been\\naware that he had been operating the pickup truck at almost\\ndouble its load capacity. Probus later testified that he and Ab-\\nernathy chose not to use the pickup on the day of Abernathy’s\\ninjury because they could not use it to haul both the ties and\\nthe tools needed for the job.\\n Judge Myerscough acted well within her discretion in al-\\nlowing this line of cross-examination. Evidence is relevant if\\nit has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of\\nconsequence to the determination of the action more probable\\n\\n 1 The jury heard conflicting testimony regarding the weight of rail-\\nroad ties. For purposes of this line of questioning, it was assumed that the\\naverage railroad tie weighs 140 pounds.\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nor less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.\\nR. Evid. 401. The testimony about Allen’s previous use of the\\npickup satisfied this definition. It was relevant for the jury to\\nknow that when Allen testified that the pickup truck was a\\nreasonably safe alternative method available to Abernathy—\\na key point for the Railroad’s defense—he was not familiar\\nwith the pickup’s hauling capacity. That rebuttal was espe-\\ncially relevant given Probus’s testimony that he and Aber-\\nnathy chose not to use the pickup in part because of the\\ntruck’s load limit.\\n 2. Testimony about ADM\\n Second, the Railroad objects to the admission of evidence\\nregarding the financial ties of its expert witness, Kevin Mul-\\nvaney, to the Railroad’s parent company, the agribusiness gi-\\nant Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”). Before trial,\\nthe district court had granted the Railroad’s unopposed mo-\\ntion in limine barring mention of its relationship to ADM. At\\ntrial, the court reversed that ruling after Abernathy’s counsel\\nexplained that they had not known before trial that Mulvaney\\nwould testify. The district court let Abernathy’s counsel ask\\nMulvaney whether ADM was the largest customer of his em-\\nployer. He answered “yes.” In response to the next question,\\nMulvaney said he did not know whether ADM was the Rail-\\nroad’s parent company.\\n The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these\\nquestions. Bias is a “permissible and established basis of im-\\npeachment.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (hold-\\ning that government’s evidence as to a defense witness’s bias\\nwas properly admitted). Bias is the “quintessentially appro-\\npriate topic for cross examination.” Bachenski v. Malnati, 11\\nF.3d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir. 1993). We have held repeatedly that\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 15\\n\\nparties should be granted reasonable latitude in cross-exam-\\nining witnesses for bias. See, e.g., United States v. Manske, 186\\nF.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999), citing United States v. Frankenthal,\\n582 F.2d 1102, 1106 (7th Cir. 1978).\\n The information involving ADM did not become relevant\\nto bias until Mulvaney took the stand. In choosing to call an\\nexpert witness with economic ties to ADM, the Railroad made\\nits parent-subsidiary relationship with ADM relevant to show\\npotential bias on the part of Mulvaney. The district court did\\nnot abuse its discretion by allowing this evidence of arguable\\nbias.\\n 3. The Tie Crane Evidence\\n The Railroad’s third evidentiary challenge is to admission\\nof evidence regarding the tie crane. The Railroad argues on\\nappeal, as it did at trial, that this evidence is not relevant to\\nwhether the available methods of transporting ties when Ab-\\nernathy was injured (i.e., the backhoe and the pickup truck)\\nwere reasonably safe. The Railroad also contends that this ev-\\nidence confused the jury because it implied that the Railroad\\nhad a duty to employ the safest methods available, instead of\\njust reasonably safe methods. The Railroad is particularly crit-\\nical of the court’s admission of evidence that it bought a new\\ntie crane after Abernathy’s injury. (The Railroad’s briefs on\\nappeal do not cite Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which ad-\\ndresses evidence of subsequent remedial measures, but its ar-\\nguments invoke that rule’s rationale.)\\n As explained above, the Railroad is right that an employer\\ncan provide a reasonably safe workplace even if safer work-\\nplace alternatives exist, and evidence of a safer alternative is\\nnot conclusive evidence of negligence. See Taylor v. Illinois\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nCentral Railroad Co., 8 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1993) (“proof of a\\nsafer alternative is not necessarily proof of negligence”). Nev-\\nertheless, evidence of safer alternative methods is still rele-\\nvant to show that the available methods were not reasonably\\nsafe. See Stone v. New York Central & St. Louis Railroad Co., 344\\nU.S. 407, 409 (1953). Such evidence is relevant to show indus-\\ntry standards and to establish whether a given method is rea-\\nsonably safe relative to alternatives. See Rogers v. Missouri Pa-\\ncific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 503 (1957) (reinstating jury ver-\\ndict for injured employee in light of evidence of safer alterna-\\ntive method). Thus, evidence of the tie crane was relevant to\\nthe issues of duty and breach, and specifically to determine\\nwhether the methods the Railroad made available to Aber-\\nnathy were in fact reasonably safe. The jury was permitted to\\nmake inferences from evidence presented on an alternative\\nmethod, the tie crane. That does not mean the jury applied an\\nincorrect standard (requiring the safest possible workplace).\\nThe jury instructions stated correctly that the applicable\\nstandard is that the “FELA requires defendant to exercise rea-\\nsonable care to provide a reasonably safe workplace.”\\n The evidence that a new tie crane was purchased after Ab-\\nernathy’s injury was also admissible. Rule 407 generally pre-\\nvents admission of evidence of subsequent remedial\\nmeasures to prove fault, but the rule and our precedents ex-\\npressly permit this evidence if, among other reasons, “the fea-\\nsibility of the remedial measure” is contested. See, e.g., Ross v.\\nBlack & Decker Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 1992) (af-\\nfirming admission of subsequent remedial measures where\\ndefendant disputed feasibility).\\n In this case, the Railroad chose to contest the feasibility of\\nboth purchasing a new tie crane and fixing the old one. At trial\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 17\\n\\nand in deposition testimony, the Railroad’s witnesses offered\\nseveral reasons why the Railroad chose not to make a tie crane\\navailable in the four years or so between the original tie\\ncrane’s breakdown and Abernathy’s injury. These reasons in-\\ncluded that the cost of repairing the original tie crane or buy-\\ning a new one was prohibitively high, that the original tie\\ncrane was not used enough to justify the expense, and that the\\nRailroad was concerned that any money spent would be\\nwasted because Abernathy would misuse the machine so that\\nit would soon break down again.\\n We can assume that if the Railroad had chosen to stipulate\\nbefore trial to the feasibility of making a tie crane available to\\nAbernathy, he would not have been allowed to present evi-\\ndence of the post-injury purchase of a new tie crane. See Ross,\\n977 F.2d at 1185. But the Railroad could not both dispute fea-\\nsibility and block Abernathy from introducing contrary evi-\\ndence to show that it would have been feasible to replace the\\nequipment. If the Railroad was concerned that the jury might\\nuse this evidence to infer negligence improperly, it also could\\nhave requested a limiting jury instruction. It did not. See\\nTrytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 1994), citing\\nUnited States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1980). The\\ndistrict court did not err by admitting this evidence.\\n C. Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs\\n Following trial, Abernathy filed a bill of costs. The only\\npoint of controversy is his claim for $3,800 for fees paid to his\\ntreating physicians for their depositions. The Railroad ob-\\njected to these costs on the ground that 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b)\\nlimits witness fees to forty dollars per day unless some other\\nprovision of law provides for a higher rate. The district court\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nagreed with the Railroad and limited the witness fees in the\\nbill of cost to forty dollars per witness per day.\\n We review the district court’s award of costs for an abuse\\nof discretion. See Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 690\\nF.3d 844, 852 (7th Cir. 2012); Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d\\n454, 464 (8th Cir. 2015). However, we review legal questions\\nrelated to the cost award de novo. See Central States, Southwest\\nAreas Pension Fund v. White, 258 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(standard of appellate review is de novo on a question of law\\nin interpreting a statute); see also Stanley, 784 F.3d at 464.\\n Both doctors’ video depositions were sought by Aber-\\nnathy himself, and he presented them as evidence at trial. He\\ncontends that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i)\\nand 54(d)(1) work together to supersede the forty-dollar-per-\\nday limit of § 1821 and allow him, as the prevailing party, to\\nrecover the entire “reasonable fee” he paid his expert wit-\\nnesses for their depositions.\\n We affirm the district court’s denial of the higher witness\\nfees. Abernathy’s argument is contrary to the Supreme\\nCourt’s interpretation of the interaction between these rules\\nset forth in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.\\n437 (1987), and is not supported by Seventh Circuit precedent.\\nThe district court properly limited the witness fees the Rail-\\nroad must pay to forty dollars per witness per day.\\n In Halasa, we affirmed the district court’s ruling that the\\nprevailing defendant could be reimbursed for fees related to\\nthe deposition of an expert witness in excess of forty dollars\\nper day under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). We held that the “reasona-\\nble fee” requirement in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) can, in certain cases,\\nsupersede the specific payment schedule in § 1821(b). 690 F.3d\\n\\fNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153 19\\n\\nat 852. However, the district court decision in that case was\\nbased on the fact that the deposition of that expert witness,\\nthough initially paid for by the defendant, had been taken by\\nthe plaintiff. Halasa v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., 2012 WL\\n639520, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2012) (“Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i) provides that the party who deposes\\nan expert witness—which in this case was Halasa—shall ‘pay\\nthe expert a reasonable fee for time spent.’”). The defendant\\nin Halasa had not insisted that plaintiff pay its witness at the\\ntime of the deposition, as it could have under Rule\\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). Instead, the defendant had paid its own witness\\nhis usual expert fee for time spent on the deposition the plain-\\ntiff had taken. The defendant waited until its final bill of costs\\nto request that payment under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).\\n Thus, because the defendant in Halasa was the prevailing\\nparty and because plaintiff, as the party who had sought the\\ndeposition of the defendant’s expert, had an obligation under\\nthe Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) to pay the costs of that deposition, the\\ndistrict court was permitted to order that the defendant be\\nawarded the amount of reasonable witness fees it actually\\npaid, regardless of the fee limits set forth in 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1821(b). Here, however, Abernathy is not asking that the\\ncosts of the depositions be reimbursed under Rule\\n26(b)(4)(E)(i). He instead seeks to have the costs of deposing\\nhis own expert witnesses reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1)\\nalone, a question that was not addressed in Halasa.\\n This case is much closer to the Supreme Court’s decision\\nin Crawford Fitting, which rejected Abernathy’s interpretation\\nof these rules. The issue in Crawford Fitting was whether a\\nparty could be reimbursed under Rule 54(d)(1) for the higher\\nexpert fees it had paid to have its own expert witness testify\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\\n\\nat trial. 482 U.S. at 438–39. The Court rejected that claim, hold-\\ning that “when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for\\nfees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound\\nby the limit of § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory\\nauthority to the contrary.” Id. at 439. The Court found that the\\nrule and statute did not conflict, and that while Rule 54(d)(1)\\npermits prevailing parties to recover costs, § 1821(b) places a\\nlimit on the amount that can be recovered. Id. at 444–45.\\n Abernathy argues that we should distinguish Crawford Fit-\\nting and instead follow and extend the reasoning of the Eighth\\nCircuit in Stanley v. Cottrell, Inc., 784 F.3d 454, 464–65 (8th Cir.\\n2015), which allowed Cottrell, the prevailing party, to recover\\nthe full expert witness fees it actually paid to Stanley under\\nRule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) during discovery to take the deposition of\\nStanley’s expert witness. Whether Stanley was correct or not\\non its own facts, its reasoning does not extend to the case be-\\nfore us, where the prevailing party seeks to recover full expert\\nfees for the depositions of his own expert witnesses. This is\\nCrawford Fitting, except that we address here expert deposi-\\ntions rather than expert trial testimony. It would be a mistake\\nto limit Crawford Fitting on that basis. If we held that prevail-\\ning parties could recover under Rule 54(d) the full costs of de-\\nposing their own expert witnesses before trial, but not of call-\\ning those expert witnesses to testify live at trial, see Crawford\\nFitting, we would create an incentive for parties to offer expert\\ndepositions at trial in lieu of live expert testimony. Nothing in\\nthe text or logic of the rules calls for such a perverse incentive,\\nand we see no persuasive reason to distinguish this case from\\nCrawford Fitting.\\n The judgment of the district court and its award of costs\\nare AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4670,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670525,"string":"4,670,525"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Priscilla Rainey v. Jayceon Taylor"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-17"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2990"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\nPRISCILLA RAINEY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJAYCEON T. TAYLOR,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 6844 — Gary Feinerman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 25, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 17, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Rapper Jayceon Taylor, better known\\nas “The Game,” starred in a VH1 television show called She’s\\nGot Game, an imitation of the long-running reality dating\\nseries The Bachelor. While filming in Chicago in 2015, Taylor\\ntook contestant Priscilla Rainey on an off-camera date at a\\nsuburban sports bar. There Taylor sexually assaulted her by\\nrepeatedly lifting her skirt, grabbing her bare buttocks and\\n\\f2 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nvagina, and “juggling” her breasts in front of a large crowd\\nof onlookers.\\n Rainey sued Taylor for sexual battery. Taylor did not take\\nthe litigation seriously. He evaded process, trolled Rainey on\\nsocial media, dodged a settlement conference, and did not\\nbother to show up at trial. His attorney asked for a continu-\\nance, but the judge denied that request, dismissing Taylor’s\\nproffered excuse as an elaborate ruse. The judge instructed\\nthe jurors that they could infer from Taylor’s absence that his\\ntestimony would have been unfavorable to him. The jury\\nreturned a verdict for Rainey, awarding $1.13 million in\\ncompensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.\\n Taylor moved for a new trial, challenging the denial of a\\ncontinuance, the missing-witness instruction, and the gen-\\neral weight of the evidence. Alternatively, he sought a\\nremittitur of damages. The judge denied the motions. Taylor\\nappeals, reprising the arguments in his posttrial motions and\\nadding a claim of evidentiary error.\\n We affirm. District judges have wide discretion to man-\\nage their proceedings and resolve evidentiary issues, and the\\nrulings here lie well within that discretion. Taylor has only\\nhimself to blame for the missing-witness instruction, which\\nwas plainly justified. The verdict is well supported by the\\nevidence, and we see no reason to disturb the jury’s deter-\\nmination of damages. The compensatory award is not\\nexcessive under Illinois law, and the punitive award sur-\\nvives constitutional scrutiny.\\n I. Background\\n Jayceon Taylor—a/k/a “The Game”—is an internationally\\nknown, Grammy-nominated rap artist. For a brief time, he\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 3\\n\\nwas also a minor reality-show star. Marrying the Game ran on\\nVH1 from 2012–2014 and chronicled the collapse of his\\nengagement to his longtime girlfriend and mother of his\\nchildren. When that show ended, his celebrity friends helped\\nhim create another VH1 reality show called She’s Got Game,\\nwhich featured a competition among women who might be\\na match for him.\\n Priscilla Rainey, a realtor and entrepreneur from Florida,\\nwas a contestant on She’s Got Game. In May 2015, while the\\nshow was filming in Chicago, Rainey and Taylor went on an\\noff-camera date in apparent violation of the competition\\nrules. Taylor took Rainey to a suburban sports bar, and at\\none point during the evening, they were on an elevated\\nstage in full view of club patrons. With a stage light shining\\non them, Taylor lifted Rainey’s skirt and grabbed her bare\\nbuttocks and vagina. She tried to break away, but he did it\\nagain—this time lifting her rear end up and exposing her\\nintimate parts to the gawking crowd. As Rainey struggled to\\npush him away and lower her skirt, he grabbed her bare\\nbuttocks and vagina a third time. He also grabbed and\\n“juggled” her breasts for the entertainment of the onlookers.\\n Three days later Rainey confronted Taylor about the as-\\nsault. The two were on the show’s tour bus with other cast\\nmembers, and a film crew caught the entire exchange on\\ncamera. The video begins with another contestant announc-\\ning that Rainey had a secret date with Taylor (that’s cheat-\\ning, as we said) and returned to the hotel visibly upset.\\nRainey responded that she told the crew about it but no one\\nelse. Taylor then reminded her that he had instructed her not\\nto mention it to anybody—and “don’t mention it means\\ndon’t mention it.” A heated argument ensued. Rainey re-\\n\\f4 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\npeatedly tried to tell him that she had a “problem” with\\nwhat had happened and was “bothered” by it. Taylor angri-\\nly commanded her to keep quiet: “What you can do is be a\\nwoman and shut up, like you can shut up right now.” She\\ndid not shut up. Instead, she described the assault in graphic\\ndetail. After an expletive-laden exchange, Taylor ordered her\\nto “[g]et off this bus before you get your ass strangled” and\\nthreatened to “choke [her] ass up.”\\n In August 2015, just before the show’s debut, Rainey\\nsued Taylor for sexual battery in federal court in Chicago.\\nTaylor repeatedly evaded service and otherwise tried to\\nobstruct and delay the litigation. Five process servers across\\nthree states made multiple attempts to serve him with the\\ncomplaint and summons. One process server alone made\\n41 unsuccessful attempts to serve Taylor at his California\\nhome. The district judge authorized alternative service. In\\nthe meantime, the suit was widely reported in the press and\\ngenerated lots of chatter on social media.\\n Taylor did not answer or otherwise plead, so on\\nFebruary 1, 2016, the judge entered a default under\\nRule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ten days\\nlater Florida attorney Andrew Williams appeared for Taylor\\nand moved to quash service and set aside the default. The\\njudge denied the motion to quash but set aside the default\\nand scheduled trial for November 14, 2016. A magistrate\\njudge set a settlement conference for June 16 and ordered\\nRainey and Taylor to appear in person. On June 2 Taylor\\nmoved to reschedule the settlement conference, feigning\\nconcern for his safety based on Chicago’s gun-violence\\nproblem:\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 5\\n\\n This past Memorial Day Weekend sadly almost\\n 70 people were shot in the city of Chicago. Due\\n to high volume of violence and likelihood of\\n reprisals due to such violence the Defendant\\n has grave concerns for his safety and for those\\n who assist him during his travels due to his ce-\\n lebrity status.\\nThe magistrate judge canceled the settlement conference for\\nother reasons. It was never rescheduled.\\n Taylor’s dilatory conduct didn’t stop there. In July he\\nmoved to transfer the case to either the Central District of\\nCalifornia or the Southern District of Florida. The judge\\ndenied the motion. In September he moved to continue the\\ntrial. The judge denied that motion as well. In October he\\nagain moved for a continuance, which the judge likewise\\ndenied. Meanwhile, Taylor railed against the lawsuit on\\nsocial media, insulting Rainey in exceedingly vulgar terms.\\n Jury selection commenced as scheduled on Monday,\\nNovember 14. Taylor did not show up. Williams, his attor-\\nney, assured the court that his client would be present the\\nnext day. When trial resumed on Tuesday, Taylor was again\\nabsent. Williams asked for a continuance, saying that he had\\nlearned on Monday night that Taylor had an emergency\\ndental procedure that day. He produced a note from a\\nCalifornia dental clinic and invited the judge to call to\\nconfirm this excuse. The judge made the call, and an endo-\\ndontist explained that Taylor had “basically more or less a\\nroot canal procedure, two of them” on Monday. It was not\\nclear from either the note or the call whether the dental\\nproblem was a longstanding one or a sudden onset. The\\nendodontist explained that he was not Taylor’s regular\\n\\f6 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\ndentist and did not know his history; rather, Taylor had\\ncalled his emergency line at about 6 p.m. on Sunday even-\\ning.\\n Rainey’s counsel responded by submitting several\\nscreenshots from Taylor’s Snapchat account. The photos\\ndepicted Taylor smoking something in a dark room under\\npink neon lights at 2:44 a.m. on Monday, November 14. As\\nthe judge described the images, it looked as if Taylor was\\n“out partying” in the middle of the night just a few hours\\nafter he placed a call to an “emergency dental hotline” and a\\nfew hours before he was due in court in Chicago. The judge\\ndenied the continuance motion, stating that Taylor’s actions\\nwere “indicative of somebody who had no intention of\\nappearing” at trial.\\n On Wednesday Taylor again did not appear. Williams\\nrenewed his continuance motion and offered copies of\\nairline and hotel reservations as evidence of Taylor’s intent\\nto attend trial. The judge noted that the flight times—leaving\\nLos Angeles on Monday at 11:25 p.m., arriving in Chicago at\\n5:12 a.m. on Tuesday; and leaving Chicago on Wednesday at\\n7:50 p.m.—didn’t align with the expected week-long trial\\nschedule. And the lone hotel room listed on the reservation\\ncouldn’t accommodate Taylor and the three people traveling\\nwith him. The judge again denied the continuance motion,\\nconcluding that Taylor’s “dental emergency” excuse was a\\n“ruse.” Trial continued through Friday. Taylor never showed\\nup.\\n Among other evidence, Rainey offered her own testimo-\\nny about the sexual assault and its aftermath; the video of\\nthe tour-bus confrontation; and documentary and other\\nevidence of damages, including testimony from a colleague\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 7\\n\\nwho corroborated the emotional pain she suffered and the\\nlingering effects of the assault on her personal and profes-\\nsional life. Williams put on a brief defense for his missing\\nclient, including calling a witness who testified from\\nCalifornia by videoconference. Tellingly, he did not ask the\\ncourt’s permission for Taylor to testify by videoconference.\\n When both sides rested on Friday, Williams renewed the\\ncontinuance motion, citing the same grounds as before. He\\ndid not submit an affidavit from Taylor or a dental profes-\\nsional to substantiate his claim that the dental procedure was\\nan emergency. The judge again denied the motion.\\n In light of Taylor’s absence, the judge gave the following\\njury instruction: “Defendant Jayceon Terrell Taylor was\\nmentioned at trial but did not testify in person in court. You\\nmay, but are not required to, assume that Mr. Taylor’s\\ntestimony would have been unfavorable to Mr. Taylor.” The\\njury returned a verdict for Rainey, awarding $1.13 million in\\ncompensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.\\n Taylor moved for a new trial on several grounds. He\\nagain attacked the denial of a continuance and the related\\nmissing-witness instruction. He also argued that the jury’s\\nverdict was against the weight of the evidence. Alternatively,\\nhe sought a remittitur of damages. The judge denied the\\nmotions and entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.\\n II. Discussion\\n Taylor challenges three of the judge’s rulings during trial:\\n(1) the denial of a continuance; (2) the decision to give the\\nmissing-witness instruction; and (3) the admission of the\\nvideo of the tour-bus confrontation. He also repeats his\\nposttrial claim that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of\\n\\f8 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nthe evidence. Alternatively, he argues that the compensatory\\nand punitive awards are excessive and should be vacated or\\nreduced.\\nA. Refusal to Reschedule the Trial\\n Taylor’s first argument is a challenge to the denial of his\\nseveral continuance motions. We review continuance rulings\\nunder the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Research\\nSys. Corp. v. IPSOS Publicité, 276 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n“The decision concerning whether to grant a continuance is\\nleft to the broad discretion of the district court,” id. (quota-\\ntion marks omitted), and “[t]he occasions for intervention\\nare rare,” United States v. Winbush, 580 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir.\\n2009) (quotation marks omitted).\\n The judge was well within his discretion to refuse to\\ngrant a continuance. Taylor’s claim that he had a dental\\nemergency on Sunday was not substantiated by reliable\\nevidence and was hard to take seriously given Taylor’s\\nevasive litigation conduct and the Snapchat photos. A good-\\nfaith litigant would have notified his counsel immediately if\\na true emergency prevented his appearance at trial. Yet\\nWilliams did not learn about Taylor’s dental procedure until\\nMonday night. And he submitted no affidavit from Taylor or\\na dental professional to substantiate the claimed emergency.\\nWhen Taylor was still a no-show by mid-week, Williams\\nproduced airline and hotel reservations in a last-ditch effort\\nto show that his client intended to attend the trial. But the\\ndates did not match the trial schedule, and the lone room\\nreservation was obviously insufficient to accommodate\\neveryone in Taylor’s travel entourage.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 9\\n\\n The Snapchat posts, moreover, gave the judge good rea-\\nson to doubt that Taylor’s dental issue was a true emergen-\\ncy. The screenshots showed Taylor smoking something\\nunder pink neon lights in the middle of the night just a few\\nhours after he called a dental emergency hotline and a few\\nhours before he was due in court in Chicago. Add to this mix\\nTaylor’s evasion of service and other dilatory conduct\\nduring the litigation, and the judge was quite understanda-\\nbly unconvinced.\\n Taylor insists that the note from the dentist’s office and\\nthe judge’s phone call to the endodontist should have been\\nenough to win a continuance. But the judge was justified in\\ntreating this information with skepticism. It remained un-\\nclear whether Taylor’s dental issue was a previously known\\ncondition or a sudden-onset emergency—a material fact in\\nevaluating whether this was a good-faith excuse for skipping\\ntrial or just a ruse. Taylor also argues that the judge gave too\\nmuch weight to the Snapchat posts. He objects that the\\nscreenshots are not clear enough to establish that he is in fact\\nthe person in the photos. And he tries to create doubt by\\nnoting that his staff can also post to his Snapchat account.\\nBut it’s not our role to reweigh the evidence. The judge\\ncarefully considered the entire record and made a reasonable\\njudgment that Taylor was unjustifiably absent. We find no\\nerror.\\nB. Missing-Witness Instruction\\n Relatedly, Taylor challenges the missing-witness instruc-\\ntion. This argument is woefully undeveloped; no legal\\nauthority is cited. We could call that a waiver, see Lewis v.\\nMills, 677 F.3d 324, 332 (7th Cir. 2012), but the argument also\\nclearly fails on the merits. District judges have broad discre-\\n\\f10 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\ntion to decide whether to give a missing-witness instruction.\\nHoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2004).\\nWe’ve said the instruction is appropriate if the proponent\\nestablishes that “the missing witness was peculiarly in the\\npower of the other party to produce.” Oxman v. WLS-TV,\\n12 F.3d 652, 661 (7th Cir. 1993). If “the witness is physically\\navailable only to the opponent,” the instruction is warrant-\\ned. Id.\\n The judge used our pattern missing-witness instruction.\\nSee FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH\\nCIRCUIT § 1.19 (2005 rev.). Though it’s framed for use in a\\ncase involving a missing nonparty witness, the instruction\\ncertainly fits this situation. Taylor was in complete control of\\nhis own appearance at trial. His choice to stay away for the\\nduration of the trial carried consequences, one of which was\\nthe likelihood that the judge would give a missing-witness\\ninstruction. The judge was on solid ground in giving this\\ninstruction.\\nC. Video of the Tour-Bus Confrontation\\n Over Taylor’s objection, the judge admitted the video of\\nthe tour-bus confrontation between Rainey and Taylor.1\\nTaylor renews his objection on appeal, arguing that the\\nvideo was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal\\nRules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting the\\ndistrict court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative\\nvalue is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair\\nprejudice”). We give special deference to the judge’s applica-\\n\\n1 Though we use the singular “video,” we note for completeness that it\\nwas actually a combination of three recordings, each of which captured\\nthe tour-bus confrontation from a different angle.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 11\\n\\ntion of Rule 403’s balancing test; we will reverse only if “no\\nreasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial\\ncourt.” Davies v. Benbenek, 836 F.3d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 2016)\\n(quotation marks omitted).\\n Taylor doesn’t come close to clearing this high bar. The\\nvideo had obvious probative value on the key question\\nbefore the jury: whether to credit Rainey’s testimony that\\nTaylor sexually assaulted her. Taylor’s reaction when she\\nconfronted him is telling. He angrily ordered her to “shut\\nup” just as she was on the brink of divulging what hap-\\npened during the unauthorized private date. When she\\nfinally spilled the details of the assault, there is no denial;\\ninstead, Taylor erupted in a torrent of profanities, ordered\\nher off the bus, and threatened to “strangle” and “choke”\\nher. This conduct reflects consciousness of guilt.\\n The video was also relevant as impeachment evidence.\\nThough Taylor did not appear at trial, Rainey played parts\\nof his recorded deposition testimony for the jury, including a\\npassage in which he denied that Rainey confronted him\\nabout the assault on the tour bus. The video exposes this\\ndeposition testimony as false.\\n Finally, as the judge aptly noted, the video helped the ju-\\nry to evaluate the parties’ body language and credibility\\nsoon after the assault: “The plaintiff’s and the defendant’s\\ninteractions after … the incident … can be probative for the\\njury in deciding who is telling the truth, what they say to\\none another, how they react, their facial expressions.” We\\nagree with the judge’s assessment that this video evidence\\nhad substantial probative value.\\n\\f12 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\n And the judge appropriately balanced the probative val-\\nue against the risk of unfair prejudice. Taylor complains that\\nthe jury saw a “scuffle” featuring pervasive foul language.\\nBut the recording captured both parties using profanity and\\nengaging in a scuffle. Taylor also suggests that the jury\\nmight have been distracted or misled by the slang he used\\nduring the confrontation. But he does not say how his\\nlanguage might have been misinterpreted. Like the district\\njudge, we see little risk that the video could have induced\\nthe jury to decide this case on an improper basis. United\\nStates v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700, 713 (7th Cir. 2009).\\nD. Weight of the Evidence\\n Taylor next asks us to order a new trial because the jury’s\\nverdict is against the weight of the evidence. Once again, our\\nreview is deferential; we will reverse the judge’s denial of a\\nnew trial only if we find an abuse of discretion. Clarett v.\\nRoberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). “A new trial should\\nbe granted only when the record shows that the jury’s\\nverdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the\\nverdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks\\nour conscience.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).\\n This verdict is neither conscience-shocking nor unjust.\\nQuite the contrary. Rainey’s testimony about the sexual\\nassault went largely unimpeached. A security guard for the\\nVH1 show provided some corroboration, testifying that he\\nencountered Rainey crying in the hotel hallway soon after\\nher return from the sports bar. We’ve already described the\\nstrong probative value of the tour-bus confrontation video.\\nAnd the missing-witness instruction permitted the jury to\\ndraw an adverse inference from Taylor’s nonappearance.\\nThe jury’s liability finding is well supported by the evidence.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 13\\n\\nE. Compensatory Damages\\n Next up is Taylor’s claim that the compensatory damages\\nare excessive. We review the judge’s denial of a remittitur\\nfor abuse of discretion. See Gracia v. SigmaTron Int’l, Inc.,\\n842 F.3d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 2016). In rejecting Taylor’s\\nargument, the judge noted some confusion in our caselaw\\nabout the applicable standard for reviewing a jury’s com-\\npensatory award in cases involving state-law claims. He’s\\nright; we haven’t always been clear about whether state or\\nfederal law controls. Compare Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co.,\\n444 F.3d 593, 611 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying state law), with\\nJutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(suggesting in dicta that the federal standard applies); see\\nalso Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 2008)\\n(same). We take this opportunity to clarify.\\n The Supreme Court has held that state-law standards for\\nevaluating a jury’s compensatory award are substantive, not\\nprocedural, for purposes of Erie analysis. Gasperini v. Ctr. for\\nHumanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996). Accordingly, when\\na federal jury awards compensatory damages in a state-law\\nclaim, state law determines whether that award is excessive.\\nSmart Mktg. Grp. v. Publ’ns. Int’l Ltd., 624 F.3d 824, 832 (7th\\nCir. 2010); accord 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.\\nMILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4511 (3d ed.\\n2016).\\n So Illinois law controls. The main difference between the\\nIllinois and federal standards is that the latter considers\\nwhether the compensatory award is “roughly comparable to\\nawards made in similar cases,” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care\\nCtr., 610 F.3d 434, 446 (7th Cir. 2010), while “the clear weight\\nof Illinois authority … reject[s] the ‘comparison’ concept,”\\n\\f14 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nTierney v. Cmty. Mem’l Gen. Hosp., 645 N.E.2d 284, 289 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1994); accord Richardson v. Chapman, 676 N.E.2d 621,\\n628 (Ill. 1997). Under Illinois law it’s neither necessary nor\\nappropriate to evaluate a jury’s compensatory award against\\nawards in similar cases; a comparative analysis is not part of\\nthe state framework. Rather, remittitur is appropriate “only\\nwhen a jury’s award falls outside the range of fair and\\nreasonable compensation, appears to be the result of passion\\nor prejudice, or is so large that it shocks the judicial con-\\nscience.” Klingelhoets v. Charlton-Perrin, 983 N.E.2d 1095,\\n1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). Conversely, remittitur “should not\\nbe ordered if the award falls within the flexible range of\\nconclusions which can reasonably be supported by the\\nfacts.” Id. at 1113–14 (quotation marks omitted).\\n The jury’s $1.13 million award represents a fair and rea-\\nsonable compensation for this intentional tort; it also finds\\nadequate support in the facts established at trial. 2 The jury\\nheard extensive testimony from Rainey about the severe\\nemotional distress she experienced and her subsequent\\ntreatment for anxiety, nightmares, and depression. She also\\nexplained how Taylor’s aggressive response when confront-\\ned on the tour bus made her feel “violated, degraded, [and]\\nattacked” all over again. Her business partner testified that\\nthe assault took a serious toll on Rainey’s personal and\\nprofessional life. And the jury was given documentary\\nevidence in the form of her medical history and therapy\\n\\n\\n2 The award is the sum of seven individual compensatory awards: $6,100\\nfor past medical expenses; $24,000 for future medical expenses; $500,000\\nfor future loss of normal life; $100,000 for past pain and suffering;\\n$200,000 for future pain and suffering; $100,000 for past emotional\\ndistress; and $200,000 for future emotional distress.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 15\\n\\nbills. We owe “a decent respect for the collective wisdom of\\nthe jury,” Mejia v. Cook County, 650 F.3d 631, 633 n.1 (7th Cir.\\n2011) (quotation marks omitted), and there’s more than\\nenough here to support its assessment of compensatory\\ndamages.\\n Taylor challenges the compensatory award in three ways.\\nFirst, he claims it lacks sufficient evidentiary support be-\\ncause none of Rainey’s treating physicians or therapists\\ntestified at trial. But Illinois doesn’t require expert testimony\\nto establish damages of this kind. See, e.g., Thornton v.\\nGarcini, 928 N.E.2d 804, 809 (Ill. 2010) (“The absence of\\nmedical testimony does not preclude recovery for emotional\\ndistress.”); Rainey v. City of Salem, 568 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1991) (explaining that expert testimony is not\\nnecessary to prove future medical expenses). Next, Taylor\\ncriticizes Rainey’s testimony as “logically insufficient to\\nsupport her battery claims and damages sought.” This is just\\na rehash of his argument against liability. And finally, Taylor\\nasserts that the award is out of line with awards made in\\nsimilar cases. But as we said, Illinois law rejects the use of\\ncomparisons.\\nF. Punitive Damages\\n Lastly, Taylor claims that the punitive award of $6 mil-\\nlion violates the Due Process Clause. We review this ques-\\ntion of law de novo. Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747,\\n756 (7th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has established three\\n“guideposts” for testing an award of punitive damages for\\ncompliance with due process: (1) the reprehensibility of the\\ndefendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual\\nharm suffered and the punitive award; and (3) the difference\\nbetween the award authorized by the jury and the penalties\\n\\f16 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nimposed in comparable cases. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.\\nGore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). Our evaluation of these factors\\nfavors affirming this award.\\n The first factor—the reprehensibility of the defendant’s\\nconduct—is the most important. Id. We consider whether\\n the harm caused was physical as opposed to\\n economic; the tortious conduct evinced an in-\\n difference to or a reckless disregard of the\\n health or safety of others; the target of the con-\\n duct had financial vulnerability; the conduct\\n involved repeated actions or was an isolated\\n incident; and the harm was the result of inten-\\n tional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere acci-\\n dent.\\nState Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419\\n(2003). We presume that Rainey was made whole by the\\ncompensatory award, so punitive damages are justified only\\nif Taylor’s culpability “is so reprehensible as to warrant the\\nimposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or\\ndeterrence.” Id.\\n That standard is clearly satisfied here. Taylor’s conduct\\nwas deeply reprehensible. He lifted Rainey’s skirt, grabbed\\nher bare buttocks and vagina, and exposed these most\\nintimate of her body parts to a large crowd—not once but\\nthree times. He also “juggled” her breasts as if to entertain\\nthe onlookers. This was a particularly degrading act of\\nsexual objectification. The conduct satisfies several of the\\nvariables identified in State Farm: (1) it was an intentional\\ninfliction of physical harm; (2) it demonstrated a reckless\\ndisregard for Rainey’s health and safety; and (3) Taylor\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 17\\n\\ncontinued to grope and expose Rainey’s most intimate body\\nparts even after she protested, so his misconduct was both\\nrepetitious and malicious. In short, Taylor knew Rainey “was\\nsuffering but continued to abuse” her. See Estate of Moreland,\\n395 F.3d at 757 (observing that the “prolonged nature” of an\\nassault “compounded” the plaintiff’s suffering and “exacer-\\nbate[d] the reprehensibility of [the defendants’] behavior”).\\n That Taylor’s cruelty continued after the assault com-\\npounded Rainey’s pain and humiliation. We’ve already\\ndescribed his aggressive response when she confronted him\\non the tour bus. But that’s not all. Taylor also launched a\\nseries of vile public attacks against Rainey on social media.\\nFor instance, after she filed this suit, Taylor viciously insult-\\ned her in a public Instagram post. Depicting himself as a\\nfighter wearing boxing gloves, Taylor called Rainey a\\n“thirsty Gatorade mascot of a transvestite”; accused her of\\nhaving “a history of a lot of other ‘Tranny Panty’ activity”;\\nand claimed that she sued him because she was eliminated\\nfrom the She’s Got Game competition. (There’s more, but we\\nsee no need to repeat Taylor’s most vulgar insults.) The\\nInstagram post concludes with this: “See you in court Mister\\nRainey.” On these facts it’s abundantly clear that Taylor’s\\nconduct warranted further sanction.\\n Moving to the second guidepost, the ratio between the\\ncompensatory and punitive damages is not unreasonable.\\nThe Supreme Court has declined to set a fixed ratio to limit\\npunitive damages; indeed, the Court’s observations on this\\nsubject do not provide much guidance. Compare State Farm,\\n538 U.S. at 425 (noting that “few awards exceeding a single-\\ndigit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages …\\nwill satisfy due process”), with Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 (suggest-\\n\\f18 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\ning that a punitive award four times larger than the compen-\\nsatory award “might be close to the line … of constitutional\\nimpropriety”) (quotation marks omitted). Our job is to\\n“police a range, not a point.” Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging,\\nInc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n The punitive award is approximately six times the com-\\npensatory award. We’ve upheld similar ratios in the past.\\nSee, e.g., Gracia, 842 F.3d at 1025 (approving a 5:1 ratio);\\nNeuros Co. v. KTurbo, Inc., 698 F.3d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 2012)\\n(affirming a 5:1 ratio while opining that the award was still\\n“too small”). We’ve even upheld higher ratios. See, e.g.,\\nMathias, 347 F.3d at 676–78 (affirming a 37:1 ratio); Lampley v.\\nOnyx Acceptance Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 485–86 (7th Cir. 2003)\\n(finding a 9:1 ratio acceptable).\\n To be sure, many of these cases involved much smaller\\ncompensatory awards, which is a relevant factor. See State\\nFarm, 538 U.S. at 425 (noting that when “compensatory\\ndamages are substantial,” then a “lesser ratio” can be justi-\\nfied under the Constitution). But the truly egregious nature\\nof Taylor’s conduct supports the size of this punitive award\\neven with the significant compensatory award. The sheer\\nmaliciousness of the tort is extreme. And the public humilia-\\ntion of this assault, combined with Taylor’s post-assault\\ninsults and threats, warrant a substantial punitive award.\\n The final guidepost—the difference between the award\\nauthorized by the jury and the penalties imposed in compa-\\nrable cases—doesn’t change our conclusion. Taylor’s entire\\nargument on this point comprises only a few sentences, so\\nagain we could find a waiver. But even if the punitive award\\nis higher than those in comparable cases, this guidepost\\ngenerally deserves less weight than the other two. Kemp v.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 19\\n\\nAT&T Co., 393 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Willow\\nInn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 238 (3d Cir.\\n2005) (“[W]e are reluctant to overturn the punitive damages\\naward on [the] basis [of the third guidepost] alone.”). The\\npunitive award raises no constitutional concerns.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4447778/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670525/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Priscilla Rainey v. Jayceon Taylor\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-17\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\nPRISCILLA RAINEY,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nJAYCEON T. TAYLOR,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15 C 6844 — Gary Feinerman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 25, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 17, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit\nJudges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Rapper Jayceon Taylor, better known\nas “The Game,” starred in a VH1 television show called She’s\nGot Game, an imitation of the long-running reality dating\nseries The Bachelor. While filming in Chicago in 2015, Taylor\ntook contestant Priscilla Rainey on an off-camera date at a\nsuburban sports bar. There Taylor sexually assaulted her by\nrepeatedly lifting her skirt, grabbing her bare buttocks and\n\f2 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\nvagina, and “juggling” her breasts in front of a large crowd\nof onlookers.\n Rainey sued Taylor for sexual battery. Taylor did not take\nthe litigation seriously. He evaded process, trolled Rainey on\nsocial media, dodged a settlement conference, and did not\nbother to show up at trial. His attorney asked for a continu-\nance, but the judge denied that request, dismissing Taylor’s\nproffered excuse as an elaborate ruse. The judge instructed\nthe jurors that they could infer from Taylor’s absence that his\ntestimony would have been unfavorable to him. The jury\nreturned a verdict for Rainey, awarding $1.13 million in\ncompensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.\n Taylor moved for a new trial, challenging the denial of a\ncontinuance, the missing-witness instruction, and the gen-\neral weight of the evidence. Alternatively, he sought a\nremittitur of damages. The judge denied the motions. Taylor\nappeals, reprising the arguments in his posttrial motions and\nadding a claim of evidentiary error.\n We affirm. District judges have wide discretion to man-\nage their proceedings and resolve evidentiary issues, and the\nrulings here lie well within that discretion. Taylor has only\nhimself to blame for the missing-witness instruction, which\nwas plainly justified. The verdict is well supported by the\nevidence, and we see no reason to disturb the jury’s deter-\nmination of damages. The compensatory award is not\nexcessive under Illinois law, and the punitive award sur-\nvives constitutional scrutiny.\n I. Background\n Jayceon Taylor—a/k/a “The Game”—is an internationally\nknown, Grammy-nominated rap artist. For a brief time, he\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 3\n\nwas also a minor reality-show star. Marrying the Game ran on\nVH1 from 2012–2014 and chronicled the collapse of his\nengagement to his longtime girlfriend and mother of his\nchildren. When that show ended, his celebrity friends helped\nhim create another VH1 reality show called She’s Got Game,\nwhich featured a competition among women who might be\na match for him.\n Priscilla Rainey, a realtor and entrepreneur from Florida,\nwas a contestant on She’s Got Game. In May 2015, while the\nshow was filming in Chicago, Rainey and Taylor went on an\noff-camera date in apparent violation of the competition\nrules. Taylor took Rainey to a suburban sports bar, and at\none point during the evening, they were on an elevated\nstage in full view of club patrons. With a stage light shining\non them, Taylor lifted Rainey’s skirt and grabbed her bare\nbuttocks and vagina. She tried to break away, but he did it\nagain—this time lifting her rear end up and exposing her\nintimate parts to the gawking crowd. As Rainey struggled to\npush him away and lower her skirt, he grabbed her bare\nbuttocks and vagina a third time. He also grabbed and\n“juggled” her breasts for the entertainment of the onlookers.\n Three days later Rainey confronted Taylor about the as-\nsault. The two were on the show’s tour bus with other cast\nmembers, and a film crew caught the entire exchange on\ncamera. The video begins with another contestant announc-\ning that Rainey had a secret date with Taylor (that’s cheat-\ning, as we said) and returned to the hotel visibly upset.\nRainey responded that she told the crew about it but no one\nelse. Taylor then reminded her that he had instructed her not\nto mention it to anybody—and “don’t mention it means\ndon’t mention it.” A heated argument ensued. Rainey re-\n\f4 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\npeatedly tried to tell him that she had a “problem” with\nwhat had happened and was “bothered” by it. Taylor angri-\nly commanded her to keep quiet: “What you can do is be a\nwoman and shut up, like you can shut up right now.” She\ndid not shut up. Instead, she described the assault in graphic\ndetail. After an expletive-laden exchange, Taylor ordered her\nto “[g]et off this bus before you get your ass strangled” and\nthreatened to “choke [her] ass up.”\n In August 2015, just before the show’s debut, Rainey\nsued Taylor for sexual battery in federal court in Chicago.\nTaylor repeatedly evaded service and otherwise tried to\nobstruct and delay the litigation. Five process servers across\nthree states made multiple attempts to serve him with the\ncomplaint and summons. One process server alone made\n41 unsuccessful attempts to serve Taylor at his California\nhome. The district judge authorized alternative service. In\nthe meantime, the suit was widely reported in the press and\ngenerated lots of chatter on social media.\n Taylor did not answer or otherwise plead, so on\nFebruary 1, 2016, the judge entered a default under\nRule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ten days\nlater Florida attorney Andrew Williams appeared for Taylor\nand moved to quash service and set aside the default. The\njudge denied the motion to quash but set aside the default\nand scheduled trial for November 14, 2016. A magistrate\njudge set a settlement conference for June 16 and ordered\nRainey and Taylor to appear in person. On June 2 Taylor\nmoved to reschedule the settlement conference, feigning\nconcern for his safety based on Chicago’s gun-violence\nproblem:\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 5\n\n This past Memorial Day Weekend sadly almost\n 70 people were shot in the city of Chicago. Due\n to high volume of violence and likelihood of\n reprisals due to such violence the Defendant\n has grave concerns for his safety and for those\n who assist him during his travels due to his ce-\n lebrity status.\nThe magistrate judge canceled the settlement conference for\nother reasons. It was never rescheduled.\n Taylor’s dilatory conduct didn’t stop there. In July he\nmoved to transfer the case to either the Central District of\nCalifornia or the Southern District of Florida. The judge\ndenied the motion. In September he moved to continue the\ntrial. The judge denied that motion as well. In October he\nagain moved for a continuance, which the judge likewise\ndenied. Meanwhile, Taylor railed against the lawsuit on\nsocial media, insulting Rainey in exceedingly vulgar terms.\n Jury selection commenced as scheduled on Monday,\nNovember 14. Taylor did not show up. Williams, his attor-\nney, assured the court that his client would be present the\nnext day. When trial resumed on Tuesday, Taylor was again\nabsent. Williams asked for a continuance, saying that he had\nlearned on Monday night that Taylor had an emergency\ndental procedure that day. He produced a note from a\nCalifornia dental clinic and invited the judge to call to\nconfirm this excuse. The judge made the call, and an endo-\ndontist explained that Taylor had “basically more or less a\nroot canal procedure, two of them” on Monday. It was not\nclear from either the note or the call whether the dental\nproblem was a longstanding one or a sudden onset. The\nendodontist explained that he was not Taylor’s regular\n\f6 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\ndentist and did not know his history; rather, Taylor had\ncalled his emergency line at about 6 p.m. on Sunday even-\ning.\n Rainey’s counsel responded by submitting several\nscreenshots from Taylor’s Snapchat account. The photos\ndepicted Taylor smoking something in a dark room under\npink neon lights at 2:44 a.m. on Monday, November 14. As\nthe judge described the images, it looked as if Taylor was\n“out partying” in the middle of the night just a few hours\nafter he placed a call to an “emergency dental hotline” and a\nfew hours before he was due in court in Chicago. The judge\ndenied the continuance motion, stating that Taylor’s actions\nwere “indicative of somebody who had no intention of\nappearing” at trial.\n On Wednesday Taylor again did not appear. Williams\nrenewed his continuance motion and offered copies of\nairline and hotel reservations as evidence of Taylor’s intent\nto attend trial. The judge noted that the flight times—leaving\nLos Angeles on Monday at 11:25 p.m., arriving in Chicago at\n5:12 a.m. on Tuesday; and leaving Chicago on Wednesday at\n7:50 p.m.—didn’t align with the expected week-long trial\nschedule. And the lone hotel room listed on the reservation\ncouldn’t accommodate Taylor and the three people traveling\nwith him. The judge again denied the continuance motion,\nconcluding that Taylor’s “dental emergency” excuse was a\n“ruse.” Trial continued through Friday. Taylor never showed\nup.\n Among other evidence, Rainey offered her own testimo-\nny about the sexual assault and its aftermath; the video of\nthe tour-bus confrontation; and documentary and other\nevidence of damages, including testimony from a colleague\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 7\n\nwho corroborated the emotional pain she suffered and the\nlingering effects of the assault on her personal and profes-\nsional life. Williams put on a brief defense for his missing\nclient, including calling a witness who testified from\nCalifornia by videoconference. Tellingly, he did not ask the\ncourt’s permission for Taylor to testify by videoconference.\n When both sides rested on Friday, Williams renewed the\ncontinuance motion, citing the same grounds as before. He\ndid not submit an affidavit from Taylor or a dental profes-\nsional to substantiate his claim that the dental procedure was\nan emergency. The judge again denied the motion.\n In light of Taylor’s absence, the judge gave the following\njury instruction: “Defendant Jayceon Terrell Taylor was\nmentioned at trial but did not testify in person in court. You\nmay, but are not required to, assume that Mr. Taylor’s\ntestimony would have been unfavorable to Mr. Taylor.” The\njury returned a verdict for Rainey, awarding $1.13 million in\ncompensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.\n Taylor moved for a new trial on several grounds. He\nagain attacked the denial of a continuance and the related\nmissing-witness instruction. He also argued that the jury’s\nverdict was against the weight of the evidence. Alternatively,\nhe sought a remittitur of damages. The judge denied the\nmotions and entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.\n II. Discussion\n Taylor challenges three of the judge’s rulings during trial:\n(1) the denial of a continuance; (2) the decision to give the\nmissing-witness instruction; and (3) the admission of the\nvideo of the tour-bus confrontation. He also repeats his\nposttrial claim that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of\n\f8 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\nthe evidence. Alternatively, he argues that the compensatory\nand punitive awards are excessive and should be vacated or\nreduced.\nA. Refusal to Reschedule the Trial\n Taylor’s first argument is a challenge to the denial of his\nseveral continuance motions. We review continuance rulings\nunder the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Research\nSys. Corp. v. IPSOS Publicité, 276 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2002).\n“The decision concerning whether to grant a continuance is\nleft to the broad discretion of the district court,” id. (quota-\ntion marks omitted), and “[t]he occasions for intervention\nare rare,” United States v. Winbush, 580 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir.\n2009) (quotation marks omitted).\n The judge was well within his discretion to refuse to\ngrant a continuance. Taylor’s claim that he had a dental\nemergency on Sunday was not substantiated by reliable\nevidence and was hard to take seriously given Taylor’s\nevasive litigation conduct and the Snapchat photos. A good-\nfaith litigant would have notified his counsel immediately if\na true emergency prevented his appearance at trial. Yet\nWilliams did not learn about Taylor’s dental procedure until\nMonday night. And he submitted no affidavit from Taylor or\na dental professional to substantiate the claimed emergency.\nWhen Taylor was still a no-show by mid-week, Williams\nproduced airline and hotel reservations in a last-ditch effort\nto show that his client intended to attend the trial. But the\ndates did not match the trial schedule, and the lone room\nreservation was obviously insufficient to accommodate\neveryone in Taylor’s travel entourage.\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 9\n\n The Snapchat posts, moreover, gave the judge good rea-\nson to doubt that Taylor’s dental issue was a true emergen-\ncy. The screenshots showed Taylor smoking something\nunder pink neon lights in the middle of the night just a few\nhours after he called a dental emergency hotline and a few\nhours before he was due in court in Chicago. Add to this mix\nTaylor’s evasion of service and other dilatory conduct\nduring the litigation, and the judge was quite understanda-\nbly unconvinced.\n Taylor insists that the note from the dentist’s office and\nthe judge’s phone call to the endodontist should have been\nenough to win a continuance. But the judge was justified in\ntreating this information with skepticism. It remained un-\nclear whether Taylor’s dental issue was a previously known\ncondition or a sudden-onset emergency—a material fact in\nevaluating whether this was a good-faith excuse for skipping\ntrial or just a ruse. Taylor also argues that the judge gave too\nmuch weight to the Snapchat posts. He objects that the\nscreenshots are not clear enough to establish that he is in fact\nthe person in the photos. And he tries to create doubt by\nnoting that his staff can also post to his Snapchat account.\nBut it’s not our role to reweigh the evidence. The judge\ncarefully considered the entire record and made a reasonable\njudgment that Taylor was unjustifiably absent. We find no\nerror.\nB. Missing-Witness Instruction\n Relatedly, Taylor challenges the missing-witness instruc-\ntion. This argument is woefully undeveloped; no legal\nauthority is cited. We could call that a waiver, see Lewis v.\nMills, 677 F.3d 324, 332 (7th Cir. 2012), but the argument also\nclearly fails on the merits. District judges have broad discre-\n\f10 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\ntion to decide whether to give a missing-witness instruction.\nHoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2004).\nWe’ve said the instruction is appropriate if the proponent\nestablishes that “the missing witness was peculiarly in the\npower of the other party to produce.” Oxman v. WLS-TV,\n12 F.3d 652, 661 (7th Cir. 1993). If “the witness is physically\navailable only to the opponent,” the instruction is warrant-\ned. Id.\n The judge used our pattern missing-witness instruction.\nSee FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH\nCIRCUIT § 1.19 (2005 rev.). Though it’s framed for use in a\ncase involving a missing nonparty witness, the instruction\ncertainly fits this situation. Taylor was in complete control of\nhis own appearance at trial. His choice to stay away for the\nduration of the trial carried consequences, one of which was\nthe likelihood that the judge would give a missing-witness\ninstruction. The judge was on solid ground in giving this\ninstruction.\nC. Video of the Tour-Bus Confrontation\n Over Taylor’s objection, the judge admitted the video of\nthe tour-bus confrontation between Rainey and Taylor.1\nTaylor renews his objection on appeal, arguing that the\nvideo was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal\nRules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting the\ndistrict court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative\nvalue is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair\nprejudice”). We give special deference to the judge’s applica-\n\n1 Though we use the singular “video,” we note for completeness that it\nwas actually a combination of three recordings, each of which captured\nthe tour-bus confrontation from a different angle.\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 11\n\ntion of Rule 403’s balancing test; we will reverse only if “no\nreasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial\ncourt.” Davies v. Benbenek, 836 F.3d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 2016)\n(quotation marks omitted).\n Taylor doesn’t come close to clearing this high bar. The\nvideo had obvious probative value on the key question\nbefore the jury: whether to credit Rainey’s testimony that\nTaylor sexually assaulted her. Taylor’s reaction when she\nconfronted him is telling. He angrily ordered her to “shut\nup” just as she was on the brink of divulging what hap-\npened during the unauthorized private date. When she\nfinally spilled the details of the assault, there is no denial;\ninstead, Taylor erupted in a torrent of profanities, ordered\nher off the bus, and threatened to “strangle” and “choke”\nher. This conduct reflects consciousness of guilt.\n The video was also relevant as impeachment evidence.\nThough Taylor did not appear at trial, Rainey played parts\nof his recorded deposition testimony for the jury, including a\npassage in which he denied that Rainey confronted him\nabout the assault on the tour bus. The video exposes this\ndeposition testimony as false.\n Finally, as the judge aptly noted, the video helped the ju-\nry to evaluate the parties’ body language and credibility\nsoon after the assault: “The plaintiff’s and the defendant’s\ninteractions after … the incident … can be probative for the\njury in deciding who is telling the truth, what they say to\none another, how they react, their facial expressions.” We\nagree with the judge’s assessment that this video evidence\nhad substantial probative value.\n\f12 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\n And the judge appropriately balanced the probative val-\nue against the risk of unfair prejudice. Taylor complains that\nthe jury saw a “scuffle” featuring pervasive foul language.\nBut the recording captured both parties using profanity and\nengaging in a scuffle. Taylor also suggests that the jury\nmight have been distracted or misled by the slang he used\nduring the confrontation. But he does not say how his\nlanguage might have been misinterpreted. Like the district\njudge, we see little risk that the video could have induced\nthe jury to decide this case on an improper basis. United\nStates v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700, 713 (7th Cir. 2009).\nD. Weight of the Evidence\n Taylor next asks us to order a new trial because the jury’s\nverdict is against the weight of the evidence. Once again, our\nreview is deferential; we will reverse the judge’s denial of a\nnew trial only if we find an abuse of discretion. Clarett v.\nRoberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). “A new trial should\nbe granted only when the record shows that the jury’s\nverdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the\nverdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks\nour conscience.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).\n This verdict is neither conscience-shocking nor unjust.\nQuite the contrary. Rainey’s testimony about the sexual\nassault went largely unimpeached. A security guard for the\nVH1 show provided some corroboration, testifying that he\nencountered Rainey crying in the hotel hallway soon after\nher return from the sports bar. We’ve already described the\nstrong probative value of the tour-bus confrontation video.\nAnd the missing-witness instruction permitted the jury to\ndraw an adverse inference from Taylor’s nonappearance.\nThe jury’s liability finding is well supported by the evidence.\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 13\n\nE. Compensatory Damages\n Next up is Taylor’s claim that the compensatory damages\nare excessive. We review the judge’s denial of a remittitur\nfor abuse of discretion. See Gracia v. SigmaTron Int’l, Inc.,\n842 F.3d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 2016). In rejecting Taylor’s\nargument, the judge noted some confusion in our caselaw\nabout the applicable standard for reviewing a jury’s com-\npensatory award in cases involving state-law claims. He’s\nright; we haven’t always been clear about whether state or\nfederal law controls. Compare Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co.,\n444 F.3d 593, 611 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying state law), with\nJutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001)\n(suggesting in dicta that the federal standard applies); see\nalso Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 2008)\n(same). We take this opportunity to clarify.\n The Supreme Court has held that state-law standards for\nevaluating a jury’s compensatory award are substantive, not\nprocedural, for purposes of Erie analysis. Gasperini v. Ctr. for\nHumanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996). Accordingly, when\na federal jury awards compensatory damages in a state-law\nclaim, state law determines whether that award is excessive.\nSmart Mktg. Grp. v. Publ’ns. Int’l Ltd., 624 F.3d 824, 832 (7th\nCir. 2010); accord 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.\nMILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4511 (3d ed.\n2016).\n So Illinois law controls. The main difference between the\nIllinois and federal standards is that the latter considers\nwhether the compensatory award is “roughly comparable to\nawards made in similar cases,” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care\nCtr., 610 F.3d 434, 446 (7th Cir. 2010), while “the clear weight\nof Illinois authority … reject[s] the ‘comparison’ concept,”\n\f14 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\nTierney v. Cmty. Mem’l Gen. Hosp., 645 N.E.2d 284, 289 (Ill.\nApp. Ct. 1994); accord Richardson v. Chapman, 676 N.E.2d 621,\n628 (Ill. 1997). Under Illinois law it’s neither necessary nor\nappropriate to evaluate a jury’s compensatory award against\nawards in similar cases; a comparative analysis is not part of\nthe state framework. Rather, remittitur is appropriate “only\nwhen a jury’s award falls outside the range of fair and\nreasonable compensation, appears to be the result of passion\nor prejudice, or is so large that it shocks the judicial con-\nscience.” Klingelhoets v. Charlton-Perrin, 983 N.E.2d 1095,\n1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). Conversely, remittitur “should not\nbe ordered if the award falls within the flexible range of\nconclusions which can reasonably be supported by the\nfacts.” Id. at 1113–14 (quotation marks omitted).\n The jury’s $1.13 million award represents a fair and rea-\nsonable compensation for this intentional tort; it also finds\nadequate support in the facts established at trial. 2 The jury\nheard extensive testimony from Rainey about the severe\nemotional distress she experienced and her subsequent\ntreatment for anxiety, nightmares, and depression. She also\nexplained how Taylor’s aggressive response when confront-\ned on the tour bus made her feel “violated, degraded, [and]\nattacked” all over again. Her business partner testified that\nthe assault took a serious toll on Rainey’s personal and\nprofessional life. And the jury was given documentary\nevidence in the form of her medical history and therapy\n\n\n2 The award is the sum of seven individual compensatory awards: $6,100\nfor past medical expenses; $24,000 for future medical expenses; $500,000\nfor future loss of normal life; $100,000 for past pain and suffering;\n$200,000 for future pain and suffering; $100,000 for past emotional\ndistress; and $200,000 for future emotional distress.\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 15\n\nbills. We owe “a decent respect for the collective wisdom of\nthe jury,” Mejia v. Cook County, 650 F.3d 631, 633 n.1 (7th Cir.\n2011) (quotation marks omitted), and there’s more than\nenough here to support its assessment of compensatory\ndamages.\n Taylor challenges the compensatory award in three ways.\nFirst, he claims it lacks sufficient evidentiary support be-\ncause none of Rainey’s treating physicians or therapists\ntestified at trial. But Illinois doesn’t require expert testimony\nto establish damages of this kind. See, e.g., Thornton v.\nGarcini, 928 N.E.2d 804, 809 (Ill. 2010) (“The absence of\nmedical testimony does not preclude recovery for emotional\ndistress.”); Rainey v. City of Salem, 568 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill.\nApp. Ct. 1991) (explaining that expert testimony is not\nnecessary to prove future medical expenses). Next, Taylor\ncriticizes Rainey’s testimony as “logically insufficient to\nsupport her battery claims and damages sought.” This is just\na rehash of his argument against liability. And finally, Taylor\nasserts that the award is out of line with awards made in\nsimilar cases. But as we said, Illinois law rejects the use of\ncomparisons.\nF. Punitive Damages\n Lastly, Taylor claims that the punitive award of $6 mil-\nlion violates the Due Process Clause. We review this ques-\ntion of law de novo. Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747,\n756 (7th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has established three\n“guideposts” for testing an award of punitive damages for\ncompliance with due process: (1) the reprehensibility of the\ndefendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual\nharm suffered and the punitive award; and (3) the difference\nbetween the award authorized by the jury and the penalties\n\f16 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\nimposed in comparable cases. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.\nGore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). Our evaluation of these factors\nfavors affirming this award.\n The first factor—the reprehensibility of the defendant’s\nconduct—is the most important. Id. We consider whether\n the harm caused was physical as opposed to\n economic; the tortious conduct evinced an in-\n difference to or a reckless disregard of the\n health or safety of others; the target of the con-\n duct had financial vulnerability; the conduct\n involved repeated actions or was an isolated\n incident; and the harm was the result of inten-\n tional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere acci-\n dent.\nState Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419\n(2003). We presume that Rainey was made whole by the\ncompensatory award, so punitive damages are justified only\nif Taylor’s culpability “is so reprehensible as to warrant the\nimposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or\ndeterrence.” Id.\n That standard is clearly satisfied here. Taylor’s conduct\nwas deeply reprehensible. He lifted Rainey’s skirt, grabbed\nher bare buttocks and vagina, and exposed these most\nintimate of her body parts to a large crowd—not once but\nthree times. He also “juggled” her breasts as if to entertain\nthe onlookers. This was a particularly degrading act of\nsexual objectification. The conduct satisfies several of the\nvariables identified in State Farm: (1) it was an intentional\ninfliction of physical harm; (2) it demonstrated a reckless\ndisregard for Rainey’s health and safety; and (3) Taylor\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 17\n\ncontinued to grope and expose Rainey’s most intimate body\nparts even after she protested, so his misconduct was both\nrepetitious and malicious. In short, Taylor knew Rainey “was\nsuffering but continued to abuse” her. See Estate of Moreland,\n395 F.3d at 757 (observing that the “prolonged nature” of an\nassault “compounded” the plaintiff’s suffering and “exacer-\nbate[d] the reprehensibility of [the defendants’] behavior”).\n That Taylor’s cruelty continued after the assault com-\npounded Rainey’s pain and humiliation. We’ve already\ndescribed his aggressive response when she confronted him\non the tour bus. But that’s not all. Taylor also launched a\nseries of vile public attacks against Rainey on social media.\nFor instance, after she filed this suit, Taylor viciously insult-\ned her in a public Instagram post. Depicting himself as a\nfighter wearing boxing gloves, Taylor called Rainey a\n“thirsty Gatorade mascot of a transvestite”; accused her of\nhaving “a history of a lot of other ‘Tranny Panty’ activity”;\nand claimed that she sued him because she was eliminated\nfrom the She’s Got Game competition. (There’s more, but we\nsee no need to repeat Taylor’s most vulgar insults.) The\nInstagram post concludes with this: “See you in court Mister\nRainey.” On these facts it’s abundantly clear that Taylor’s\nconduct warranted further sanction.\n Moving to the second guidepost, the ratio between the\ncompensatory and punitive damages is not unreasonable.\nThe Supreme Court has declined to set a fixed ratio to limit\npunitive damages; indeed, the Court’s observations on this\nsubject do not provide much guidance. Compare State Farm,\n538 U.S. at 425 (noting that “few awards exceeding a single-\ndigit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages …\nwill satisfy due process”), with Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 (suggest-\n\f18 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\ning that a punitive award four times larger than the compen-\nsatory award “might be close to the line … of constitutional\nimpropriety”) (quotation marks omitted). Our job is to\n“police a range, not a point.” Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging,\nInc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).\n The punitive award is approximately six times the com-\npensatory award. We’ve upheld similar ratios in the past.\nSee, e.g., Gracia, 842 F.3d at 1025 (approving a 5:1 ratio);\nNeuros Co. v. KTurbo, Inc., 698 F.3d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 2012)\n(affirming a 5:1 ratio while opining that the award was still\n“too small”). We’ve even upheld higher ratios. See, e.g.,\nMathias, 347 F.3d at 676–78 (affirming a 37:1 ratio); Lampley v.\nOnyx Acceptance Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 485–86 (7th Cir. 2003)\n(finding a 9:1 ratio acceptable).\n To be sure, many of these cases involved much smaller\ncompensatory awards, which is a relevant factor. See State\nFarm, 538 U.S. at 425 (noting that when “compensatory\ndamages are substantial,” then a “lesser ratio” can be justi-\nfied under the Constitution). But the truly egregious nature\nof Taylor’s conduct supports the size of this punitive award\neven with the significant compensatory award. The sheer\nmaliciousness of the tort is extreme. And the public humilia-\ntion of this assault, combined with Taylor’s post-assault\ninsults and threats, warrant a substantial punitive award.\n The final guidepost—the difference between the award\nauthorized by the jury and the penalties imposed in compa-\nrable cases—doesn’t change our conclusion. Taylor’s entire\nargument on this point comprises only a few sentences, so\nagain we could find a waiver. But even if the punitive award\nis higher than those in comparable cases, this guidepost\ngenerally deserves less weight than the other two. Kemp v.\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 19\n\nAT&T Co., 393 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Willow\nInn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 238 (3d Cir.\n2005) (“[W]e are reluctant to overturn the punitive damages\naward on [the] basis [of the third guidepost] alone.”). The\npunitive award raises no constitutional concerns.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Priscilla Rainey v. Jayceon Taylor\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-17\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\nPRISCILLA RAINEY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJAYCEON T. TAYLOR,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 6844 — Gary Feinerman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 25, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 17, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Rapper Jayceon Taylor, better known\\nas “The Game,” starred in a VH1 television show called She’s\\nGot Game, an imitation of the long-running reality dating\\nseries The Bachelor. While filming in Chicago in 2015, Taylor\\ntook contestant Priscilla Rainey on an off-camera date at a\\nsuburban sports bar. There Taylor sexually assaulted her by\\nrepeatedly lifting her skirt, grabbing her bare buttocks and\\n\\f2 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nvagina, and “juggling” her breasts in front of a large crowd\\nof onlookers.\\n Rainey sued Taylor for sexual battery. Taylor did not take\\nthe litigation seriously. He evaded process, trolled Rainey on\\nsocial media, dodged a settlement conference, and did not\\nbother to show up at trial. His attorney asked for a continu-\\nance, but the judge denied that request, dismissing Taylor’s\\nproffered excuse as an elaborate ruse. The judge instructed\\nthe jurors that they could infer from Taylor’s absence that his\\ntestimony would have been unfavorable to him. The jury\\nreturned a verdict for Rainey, awarding $1.13 million in\\ncompensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.\\n Taylor moved for a new trial, challenging the denial of a\\ncontinuance, the missing-witness instruction, and the gen-\\neral weight of the evidence. Alternatively, he sought a\\nremittitur of damages. The judge denied the motions. Taylor\\nappeals, reprising the arguments in his posttrial motions and\\nadding a claim of evidentiary error.\\n We affirm. District judges have wide discretion to man-\\nage their proceedings and resolve evidentiary issues, and the\\nrulings here lie well within that discretion. Taylor has only\\nhimself to blame for the missing-witness instruction, which\\nwas plainly justified. The verdict is well supported by the\\nevidence, and we see no reason to disturb the jury’s deter-\\nmination of damages. The compensatory award is not\\nexcessive under Illinois law, and the punitive award sur-\\nvives constitutional scrutiny.\\n I. Background\\n Jayceon Taylor—a/k/a “The Game”—is an internationally\\nknown, Grammy-nominated rap artist. For a brief time, he\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 3\\n\\nwas also a minor reality-show star. Marrying the Game ran on\\nVH1 from 2012–2014 and chronicled the collapse of his\\nengagement to his longtime girlfriend and mother of his\\nchildren. When that show ended, his celebrity friends helped\\nhim create another VH1 reality show called She’s Got Game,\\nwhich featured a competition among women who might be\\na match for him.\\n Priscilla Rainey, a realtor and entrepreneur from Florida,\\nwas a contestant on She’s Got Game. In May 2015, while the\\nshow was filming in Chicago, Rainey and Taylor went on an\\noff-camera date in apparent violation of the competition\\nrules. Taylor took Rainey to a suburban sports bar, and at\\none point during the evening, they were on an elevated\\nstage in full view of club patrons. With a stage light shining\\non them, Taylor lifted Rainey’s skirt and grabbed her bare\\nbuttocks and vagina. She tried to break away, but he did it\\nagain—this time lifting her rear end up and exposing her\\nintimate parts to the gawking crowd. As Rainey struggled to\\npush him away and lower her skirt, he grabbed her bare\\nbuttocks and vagina a third time. He also grabbed and\\n“juggled” her breasts for the entertainment of the onlookers.\\n Three days later Rainey confronted Taylor about the as-\\nsault. The two were on the show’s tour bus with other cast\\nmembers, and a film crew caught the entire exchange on\\ncamera. The video begins with another contestant announc-\\ning that Rainey had a secret date with Taylor (that’s cheat-\\ning, as we said) and returned to the hotel visibly upset.\\nRainey responded that she told the crew about it but no one\\nelse. Taylor then reminded her that he had instructed her not\\nto mention it to anybody—and “don’t mention it means\\ndon’t mention it.” A heated argument ensued. Rainey re-\\n\\f4 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\npeatedly tried to tell him that she had a “problem” with\\nwhat had happened and was “bothered” by it. Taylor angri-\\nly commanded her to keep quiet: “What you can do is be a\\nwoman and shut up, like you can shut up right now.” She\\ndid not shut up. Instead, she described the assault in graphic\\ndetail. After an expletive-laden exchange, Taylor ordered her\\nto “[g]et off this bus before you get your ass strangled” and\\nthreatened to “choke [her] ass up.”\\n In August 2015, just before the show’s debut, Rainey\\nsued Taylor for sexual battery in federal court in Chicago.\\nTaylor repeatedly evaded service and otherwise tried to\\nobstruct and delay the litigation. Five process servers across\\nthree states made multiple attempts to serve him with the\\ncomplaint and summons. One process server alone made\\n41 unsuccessful attempts to serve Taylor at his California\\nhome. The district judge authorized alternative service. In\\nthe meantime, the suit was widely reported in the press and\\ngenerated lots of chatter on social media.\\n Taylor did not answer or otherwise plead, so on\\nFebruary 1, 2016, the judge entered a default under\\nRule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ten days\\nlater Florida attorney Andrew Williams appeared for Taylor\\nand moved to quash service and set aside the default. The\\njudge denied the motion to quash but set aside the default\\nand scheduled trial for November 14, 2016. A magistrate\\njudge set a settlement conference for June 16 and ordered\\nRainey and Taylor to appear in person. On June 2 Taylor\\nmoved to reschedule the settlement conference, feigning\\nconcern for his safety based on Chicago’s gun-violence\\nproblem:\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 5\\n\\n This past Memorial Day Weekend sadly almost\\n 70 people were shot in the city of Chicago. Due\\n to high volume of violence and likelihood of\\n reprisals due to such violence the Defendant\\n has grave concerns for his safety and for those\\n who assist him during his travels due to his ce-\\n lebrity status.\\nThe magistrate judge canceled the settlement conference for\\nother reasons. It was never rescheduled.\\n Taylor’s dilatory conduct didn’t stop there. In July he\\nmoved to transfer the case to either the Central District of\\nCalifornia or the Southern District of Florida. The judge\\ndenied the motion. In September he moved to continue the\\ntrial. The judge denied that motion as well. In October he\\nagain moved for a continuance, which the judge likewise\\ndenied. Meanwhile, Taylor railed against the lawsuit on\\nsocial media, insulting Rainey in exceedingly vulgar terms.\\n Jury selection commenced as scheduled on Monday,\\nNovember 14. Taylor did not show up. Williams, his attor-\\nney, assured the court that his client would be present the\\nnext day. When trial resumed on Tuesday, Taylor was again\\nabsent. Williams asked for a continuance, saying that he had\\nlearned on Monday night that Taylor had an emergency\\ndental procedure that day. He produced a note from a\\nCalifornia dental clinic and invited the judge to call to\\nconfirm this excuse. The judge made the call, and an endo-\\ndontist explained that Taylor had “basically more or less a\\nroot canal procedure, two of them” on Monday. It was not\\nclear from either the note or the call whether the dental\\nproblem was a longstanding one or a sudden onset. The\\nendodontist explained that he was not Taylor’s regular\\n\\f6 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\ndentist and did not know his history; rather, Taylor had\\ncalled his emergency line at about 6 p.m. on Sunday even-\\ning.\\n Rainey’s counsel responded by submitting several\\nscreenshots from Taylor’s Snapchat account. The photos\\ndepicted Taylor smoking something in a dark room under\\npink neon lights at 2:44 a.m. on Monday, November 14. As\\nthe judge described the images, it looked as if Taylor was\\n“out partying” in the middle of the night just a few hours\\nafter he placed a call to an “emergency dental hotline” and a\\nfew hours before he was due in court in Chicago. The judge\\ndenied the continuance motion, stating that Taylor’s actions\\nwere “indicative of somebody who had no intention of\\nappearing” at trial.\\n On Wednesday Taylor again did not appear. Williams\\nrenewed his continuance motion and offered copies of\\nairline and hotel reservations as evidence of Taylor’s intent\\nto attend trial. The judge noted that the flight times—leaving\\nLos Angeles on Monday at 11:25 p.m., arriving in Chicago at\\n5:12 a.m. on Tuesday; and leaving Chicago on Wednesday at\\n7:50 p.m.—didn’t align with the expected week-long trial\\nschedule. And the lone hotel room listed on the reservation\\ncouldn’t accommodate Taylor and the three people traveling\\nwith him. The judge again denied the continuance motion,\\nconcluding that Taylor’s “dental emergency” excuse was a\\n“ruse.” Trial continued through Friday. Taylor never showed\\nup.\\n Among other evidence, Rainey offered her own testimo-\\nny about the sexual assault and its aftermath; the video of\\nthe tour-bus confrontation; and documentary and other\\nevidence of damages, including testimony from a colleague\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 7\\n\\nwho corroborated the emotional pain she suffered and the\\nlingering effects of the assault on her personal and profes-\\nsional life. Williams put on a brief defense for his missing\\nclient, including calling a witness who testified from\\nCalifornia by videoconference. Tellingly, he did not ask the\\ncourt’s permission for Taylor to testify by videoconference.\\n When both sides rested on Friday, Williams renewed the\\ncontinuance motion, citing the same grounds as before. He\\ndid not submit an affidavit from Taylor or a dental profes-\\nsional to substantiate his claim that the dental procedure was\\nan emergency. The judge again denied the motion.\\n In light of Taylor’s absence, the judge gave the following\\njury instruction: “Defendant Jayceon Terrell Taylor was\\nmentioned at trial but did not testify in person in court. You\\nmay, but are not required to, assume that Mr. Taylor’s\\ntestimony would have been unfavorable to Mr. Taylor.” The\\njury returned a verdict for Rainey, awarding $1.13 million in\\ncompensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.\\n Taylor moved for a new trial on several grounds. He\\nagain attacked the denial of a continuance and the related\\nmissing-witness instruction. He also argued that the jury’s\\nverdict was against the weight of the evidence. Alternatively,\\nhe sought a remittitur of damages. The judge denied the\\nmotions and entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.\\n II. Discussion\\n Taylor challenges three of the judge’s rulings during trial:\\n(1) the denial of a continuance; (2) the decision to give the\\nmissing-witness instruction; and (3) the admission of the\\nvideo of the tour-bus confrontation. He also repeats his\\nposttrial claim that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of\\n\\f8 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nthe evidence. Alternatively, he argues that the compensatory\\nand punitive awards are excessive and should be vacated or\\nreduced.\\nA. Refusal to Reschedule the Trial\\n Taylor’s first argument is a challenge to the denial of his\\nseveral continuance motions. We review continuance rulings\\nunder the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Research\\nSys. Corp. v. IPSOS Publicité, 276 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n“The decision concerning whether to grant a continuance is\\nleft to the broad discretion of the district court,” id. (quota-\\ntion marks omitted), and “[t]he occasions for intervention\\nare rare,” United States v. Winbush, 580 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir.\\n2009) (quotation marks omitted).\\n The judge was well within his discretion to refuse to\\ngrant a continuance. Taylor’s claim that he had a dental\\nemergency on Sunday was not substantiated by reliable\\nevidence and was hard to take seriously given Taylor’s\\nevasive litigation conduct and the Snapchat photos. A good-\\nfaith litigant would have notified his counsel immediately if\\na true emergency prevented his appearance at trial. Yet\\nWilliams did not learn about Taylor’s dental procedure until\\nMonday night. And he submitted no affidavit from Taylor or\\na dental professional to substantiate the claimed emergency.\\nWhen Taylor was still a no-show by mid-week, Williams\\nproduced airline and hotel reservations in a last-ditch effort\\nto show that his client intended to attend the trial. But the\\ndates did not match the trial schedule, and the lone room\\nreservation was obviously insufficient to accommodate\\neveryone in Taylor’s travel entourage.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 9\\n\\n The Snapchat posts, moreover, gave the judge good rea-\\nson to doubt that Taylor’s dental issue was a true emergen-\\ncy. The screenshots showed Taylor smoking something\\nunder pink neon lights in the middle of the night just a few\\nhours after he called a dental emergency hotline and a few\\nhours before he was due in court in Chicago. Add to this mix\\nTaylor’s evasion of service and other dilatory conduct\\nduring the litigation, and the judge was quite understanda-\\nbly unconvinced.\\n Taylor insists that the note from the dentist’s office and\\nthe judge’s phone call to the endodontist should have been\\nenough to win a continuance. But the judge was justified in\\ntreating this information with skepticism. It remained un-\\nclear whether Taylor’s dental issue was a previously known\\ncondition or a sudden-onset emergency—a material fact in\\nevaluating whether this was a good-faith excuse for skipping\\ntrial or just a ruse. Taylor also argues that the judge gave too\\nmuch weight to the Snapchat posts. He objects that the\\nscreenshots are not clear enough to establish that he is in fact\\nthe person in the photos. And he tries to create doubt by\\nnoting that his staff can also post to his Snapchat account.\\nBut it’s not our role to reweigh the evidence. The judge\\ncarefully considered the entire record and made a reasonable\\njudgment that Taylor was unjustifiably absent. We find no\\nerror.\\nB. Missing-Witness Instruction\\n Relatedly, Taylor challenges the missing-witness instruc-\\ntion. This argument is woefully undeveloped; no legal\\nauthority is cited. We could call that a waiver, see Lewis v.\\nMills, 677 F.3d 324, 332 (7th Cir. 2012), but the argument also\\nclearly fails on the merits. District judges have broad discre-\\n\\f10 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\ntion to decide whether to give a missing-witness instruction.\\nHoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2004).\\nWe’ve said the instruction is appropriate if the proponent\\nestablishes that “the missing witness was peculiarly in the\\npower of the other party to produce.” Oxman v. WLS-TV,\\n12 F.3d 652, 661 (7th Cir. 1993). If “the witness is physically\\navailable only to the opponent,” the instruction is warrant-\\ned. Id.\\n The judge used our pattern missing-witness instruction.\\nSee FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH\\nCIRCUIT § 1.19 (2005 rev.). Though it’s framed for use in a\\ncase involving a missing nonparty witness, the instruction\\ncertainly fits this situation. Taylor was in complete control of\\nhis own appearance at trial. His choice to stay away for the\\nduration of the trial carried consequences, one of which was\\nthe likelihood that the judge would give a missing-witness\\ninstruction. The judge was on solid ground in giving this\\ninstruction.\\nC. Video of the Tour-Bus Confrontation\\n Over Taylor’s objection, the judge admitted the video of\\nthe tour-bus confrontation between Rainey and Taylor.1\\nTaylor renews his objection on appeal, arguing that the\\nvideo was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal\\nRules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting the\\ndistrict court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative\\nvalue is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair\\nprejudice”). We give special deference to the judge’s applica-\\n\\n1 Though we use the singular “video,” we note for completeness that it\\nwas actually a combination of three recordings, each of which captured\\nthe tour-bus confrontation from a different angle.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 11\\n\\ntion of Rule 403’s balancing test; we will reverse only if “no\\nreasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial\\ncourt.” Davies v. Benbenek, 836 F.3d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 2016)\\n(quotation marks omitted).\\n Taylor doesn’t come close to clearing this high bar. The\\nvideo had obvious probative value on the key question\\nbefore the jury: whether to credit Rainey’s testimony that\\nTaylor sexually assaulted her. Taylor’s reaction when she\\nconfronted him is telling. He angrily ordered her to “shut\\nup” just as she was on the brink of divulging what hap-\\npened during the unauthorized private date. When she\\nfinally spilled the details of the assault, there is no denial;\\ninstead, Taylor erupted in a torrent of profanities, ordered\\nher off the bus, and threatened to “strangle” and “choke”\\nher. This conduct reflects consciousness of guilt.\\n The video was also relevant as impeachment evidence.\\nThough Taylor did not appear at trial, Rainey played parts\\nof his recorded deposition testimony for the jury, including a\\npassage in which he denied that Rainey confronted him\\nabout the assault on the tour bus. The video exposes this\\ndeposition testimony as false.\\n Finally, as the judge aptly noted, the video helped the ju-\\nry to evaluate the parties’ body language and credibility\\nsoon after the assault: “The plaintiff’s and the defendant’s\\ninteractions after … the incident … can be probative for the\\njury in deciding who is telling the truth, what they say to\\none another, how they react, their facial expressions.” We\\nagree with the judge’s assessment that this video evidence\\nhad substantial probative value.\\n\\f12 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\n And the judge appropriately balanced the probative val-\\nue against the risk of unfair prejudice. Taylor complains that\\nthe jury saw a “scuffle” featuring pervasive foul language.\\nBut the recording captured both parties using profanity and\\nengaging in a scuffle. Taylor also suggests that the jury\\nmight have been distracted or misled by the slang he used\\nduring the confrontation. But he does not say how his\\nlanguage might have been misinterpreted. Like the district\\njudge, we see little risk that the video could have induced\\nthe jury to decide this case on an improper basis. United\\nStates v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700, 713 (7th Cir. 2009).\\nD. Weight of the Evidence\\n Taylor next asks us to order a new trial because the jury’s\\nverdict is against the weight of the evidence. Once again, our\\nreview is deferential; we will reverse the judge’s denial of a\\nnew trial only if we find an abuse of discretion. Clarett v.\\nRoberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). “A new trial should\\nbe granted only when the record shows that the jury’s\\nverdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the\\nverdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks\\nour conscience.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).\\n This verdict is neither conscience-shocking nor unjust.\\nQuite the contrary. Rainey’s testimony about the sexual\\nassault went largely unimpeached. A security guard for the\\nVH1 show provided some corroboration, testifying that he\\nencountered Rainey crying in the hotel hallway soon after\\nher return from the sports bar. We’ve already described the\\nstrong probative value of the tour-bus confrontation video.\\nAnd the missing-witness instruction permitted the jury to\\ndraw an adverse inference from Taylor’s nonappearance.\\nThe jury’s liability finding is well supported by the evidence.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 13\\n\\nE. Compensatory Damages\\n Next up is Taylor’s claim that the compensatory damages\\nare excessive. We review the judge’s denial of a remittitur\\nfor abuse of discretion. See Gracia v. SigmaTron Int’l, Inc.,\\n842 F.3d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 2016). In rejecting Taylor’s\\nargument, the judge noted some confusion in our caselaw\\nabout the applicable standard for reviewing a jury’s com-\\npensatory award in cases involving state-law claims. He’s\\nright; we haven’t always been clear about whether state or\\nfederal law controls. Compare Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co.,\\n444 F.3d 593, 611 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying state law), with\\nJutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(suggesting in dicta that the federal standard applies); see\\nalso Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 2008)\\n(same). We take this opportunity to clarify.\\n The Supreme Court has held that state-law standards for\\nevaluating a jury’s compensatory award are substantive, not\\nprocedural, for purposes of Erie analysis. Gasperini v. Ctr. for\\nHumanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996). Accordingly, when\\na federal jury awards compensatory damages in a state-law\\nclaim, state law determines whether that award is excessive.\\nSmart Mktg. Grp. v. Publ’ns. Int’l Ltd., 624 F.3d 824, 832 (7th\\nCir. 2010); accord 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.\\nMILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4511 (3d ed.\\n2016).\\n So Illinois law controls. The main difference between the\\nIllinois and federal standards is that the latter considers\\nwhether the compensatory award is “roughly comparable to\\nawards made in similar cases,” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care\\nCtr., 610 F.3d 434, 446 (7th Cir. 2010), while “the clear weight\\nof Illinois authority … reject[s] the ‘comparison’ concept,”\\n\\f14 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nTierney v. Cmty. Mem’l Gen. Hosp., 645 N.E.2d 284, 289 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1994); accord Richardson v. Chapman, 676 N.E.2d 621,\\n628 (Ill. 1997). Under Illinois law it’s neither necessary nor\\nappropriate to evaluate a jury’s compensatory award against\\nawards in similar cases; a comparative analysis is not part of\\nthe state framework. Rather, remittitur is appropriate “only\\nwhen a jury’s award falls outside the range of fair and\\nreasonable compensation, appears to be the result of passion\\nor prejudice, or is so large that it shocks the judicial con-\\nscience.” Klingelhoets v. Charlton-Perrin, 983 N.E.2d 1095,\\n1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). Conversely, remittitur “should not\\nbe ordered if the award falls within the flexible range of\\nconclusions which can reasonably be supported by the\\nfacts.” Id. at 1113–14 (quotation marks omitted).\\n The jury’s $1.13 million award represents a fair and rea-\\nsonable compensation for this intentional tort; it also finds\\nadequate support in the facts established at trial. 2 The jury\\nheard extensive testimony from Rainey about the severe\\nemotional distress she experienced and her subsequent\\ntreatment for anxiety, nightmares, and depression. She also\\nexplained how Taylor’s aggressive response when confront-\\ned on the tour bus made her feel “violated, degraded, [and]\\nattacked” all over again. Her business partner testified that\\nthe assault took a serious toll on Rainey’s personal and\\nprofessional life. And the jury was given documentary\\nevidence in the form of her medical history and therapy\\n\\n\\n2 The award is the sum of seven individual compensatory awards: $6,100\\nfor past medical expenses; $24,000 for future medical expenses; $500,000\\nfor future loss of normal life; $100,000 for past pain and suffering;\\n$200,000 for future pain and suffering; $100,000 for past emotional\\ndistress; and $200,000 for future emotional distress.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 15\\n\\nbills. We owe “a decent respect for the collective wisdom of\\nthe jury,” Mejia v. Cook County, 650 F.3d 631, 633 n.1 (7th Cir.\\n2011) (quotation marks omitted), and there’s more than\\nenough here to support its assessment of compensatory\\ndamages.\\n Taylor challenges the compensatory award in three ways.\\nFirst, he claims it lacks sufficient evidentiary support be-\\ncause none of Rainey’s treating physicians or therapists\\ntestified at trial. But Illinois doesn’t require expert testimony\\nto establish damages of this kind. See, e.g., Thornton v.\\nGarcini, 928 N.E.2d 804, 809 (Ill. 2010) (“The absence of\\nmedical testimony does not preclude recovery for emotional\\ndistress.”); Rainey v. City of Salem, 568 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1991) (explaining that expert testimony is not\\nnecessary to prove future medical expenses). Next, Taylor\\ncriticizes Rainey’s testimony as “logically insufficient to\\nsupport her battery claims and damages sought.” This is just\\na rehash of his argument against liability. And finally, Taylor\\nasserts that the award is out of line with awards made in\\nsimilar cases. But as we said, Illinois law rejects the use of\\ncomparisons.\\nF. Punitive Damages\\n Lastly, Taylor claims that the punitive award of $6 mil-\\nlion violates the Due Process Clause. We review this ques-\\ntion of law de novo. Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747,\\n756 (7th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has established three\\n“guideposts” for testing an award of punitive damages for\\ncompliance with due process: (1) the reprehensibility of the\\ndefendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual\\nharm suffered and the punitive award; and (3) the difference\\nbetween the award authorized by the jury and the penalties\\n\\f16 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nimposed in comparable cases. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.\\nGore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). Our evaluation of these factors\\nfavors affirming this award.\\n The first factor—the reprehensibility of the defendant’s\\nconduct—is the most important. Id. We consider whether\\n the harm caused was physical as opposed to\\n economic; the tortious conduct evinced an in-\\n difference to or a reckless disregard of the\\n health or safety of others; the target of the con-\\n duct had financial vulnerability; the conduct\\n involved repeated actions or was an isolated\\n incident; and the harm was the result of inten-\\n tional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere acci-\\n dent.\\nState Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419\\n(2003). We presume that Rainey was made whole by the\\ncompensatory award, so punitive damages are justified only\\nif Taylor’s culpability “is so reprehensible as to warrant the\\nimposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or\\ndeterrence.” Id.\\n That standard is clearly satisfied here. Taylor’s conduct\\nwas deeply reprehensible. He lifted Rainey’s skirt, grabbed\\nher bare buttocks and vagina, and exposed these most\\nintimate of her body parts to a large crowd—not once but\\nthree times. He also “juggled” her breasts as if to entertain\\nthe onlookers. This was a particularly degrading act of\\nsexual objectification. The conduct satisfies several of the\\nvariables identified in State Farm: (1) it was an intentional\\ninfliction of physical harm; (2) it demonstrated a reckless\\ndisregard for Rainey’s health and safety; and (3) Taylor\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 17\\n\\ncontinued to grope and expose Rainey’s most intimate body\\nparts even after she protested, so his misconduct was both\\nrepetitious and malicious. In short, Taylor knew Rainey “was\\nsuffering but continued to abuse” her. See Estate of Moreland,\\n395 F.3d at 757 (observing that the “prolonged nature” of an\\nassault “compounded” the plaintiff’s suffering and “exacer-\\nbate[d] the reprehensibility of [the defendants’] behavior”).\\n That Taylor’s cruelty continued after the assault com-\\npounded Rainey’s pain and humiliation. We’ve already\\ndescribed his aggressive response when she confronted him\\non the tour bus. But that’s not all. Taylor also launched a\\nseries of vile public attacks against Rainey on social media.\\nFor instance, after she filed this suit, Taylor viciously insult-\\ned her in a public Instagram post. Depicting himself as a\\nfighter wearing boxing gloves, Taylor called Rainey a\\n“thirsty Gatorade mascot of a transvestite”; accused her of\\nhaving “a history of a lot of other ‘Tranny Panty’ activity”;\\nand claimed that she sued him because she was eliminated\\nfrom the She’s Got Game competition. (There’s more, but we\\nsee no need to repeat Taylor’s most vulgar insults.) The\\nInstagram post concludes with this: “See you in court Mister\\nRainey.” On these facts it’s abundantly clear that Taylor’s\\nconduct warranted further sanction.\\n Moving to the second guidepost, the ratio between the\\ncompensatory and punitive damages is not unreasonable.\\nThe Supreme Court has declined to set a fixed ratio to limit\\npunitive damages; indeed, the Court’s observations on this\\nsubject do not provide much guidance. Compare State Farm,\\n538 U.S. at 425 (noting that “few awards exceeding a single-\\ndigit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages …\\nwill satisfy due process”), with Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 (suggest-\\n\\f18 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\ning that a punitive award four times larger than the compen-\\nsatory award “might be close to the line … of constitutional\\nimpropriety”) (quotation marks omitted). Our job is to\\n“police a range, not a point.” Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging,\\nInc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n The punitive award is approximately six times the com-\\npensatory award. We’ve upheld similar ratios in the past.\\nSee, e.g., Gracia, 842 F.3d at 1025 (approving a 5:1 ratio);\\nNeuros Co. v. KTurbo, Inc., 698 F.3d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 2012)\\n(affirming a 5:1 ratio while opining that the award was still\\n“too small”). We’ve even upheld higher ratios. See, e.g.,\\nMathias, 347 F.3d at 676–78 (affirming a 37:1 ratio); Lampley v.\\nOnyx Acceptance Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 485–86 (7th Cir. 2003)\\n(finding a 9:1 ratio acceptable).\\n To be sure, many of these cases involved much smaller\\ncompensatory awards, which is a relevant factor. See State\\nFarm, 538 U.S. at 425 (noting that when “compensatory\\ndamages are substantial,” then a “lesser ratio” can be justi-\\nfied under the Constitution). But the truly egregious nature\\nof Taylor’s conduct supports the size of this punitive award\\neven with the significant compensatory award. The sheer\\nmaliciousness of the tort is extreme. And the public humilia-\\ntion of this assault, combined with Taylor’s post-assault\\ninsults and threats, warrant a substantial punitive award.\\n The final guidepost—the difference between the award\\nauthorized by the jury and the penalties imposed in compa-\\nrable cases—doesn’t change our conclusion. Taylor’s entire\\nargument on this point comprises only a few sentences, so\\nagain we could find a waiver. But even if the punitive award\\nis higher than those in comparable cases, this guidepost\\ngenerally deserves less weight than the other two. Kemp v.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 19\\n\\nAT&T Co., 393 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Willow\\nInn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 238 (3d Cir.\\n2005) (“[W]e are reluctant to overturn the punitive damages\\naward on [the] basis [of the third guidepost] alone.”). The\\npunitive award raises no constitutional concerns.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4671,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670633,"string":"4,670,633"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Priscilla Rainey v. Jayceon Taylor"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-17"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2990"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\nPRISCILLA RAINEY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJAYCEON T. TAYLOR,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 6844 — Gary Feinerman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 25, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 17, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Rapper Jayceon Taylor, better known\\nas “The Game,” starred in a VH1 television show called She’s\\nGot Game, an imitation of the long-running reality dating\\nseries The Bachelor. While filming in Chicago in 2015, Taylor\\ntook contestant Priscilla Rainey on an off-camera date at a\\nsuburban sports bar. There Taylor sexually assaulted her by\\nrepeatedly lifting her skirt, grabbing her bare buttocks and\\n\\f2 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nvagina, and “juggling” her breasts in front of a large crowd\\nof onlookers.\\n Rainey sued Taylor for sexual battery. Taylor did not take\\nthe litigation seriously. He evaded process, trolled Rainey on\\nsocial media, dodged a settlement conference, and did not\\nbother to show up at trial. His attorney asked for a continu-\\nance, but the judge denied that request, dismissing Taylor’s\\nproffered excuse as an elaborate ruse. The judge instructed\\nthe jurors that they could infer from Taylor’s absence that his\\ntestimony would have been unfavorable to him. The jury\\nreturned a verdict for Rainey, awarding $1.13 million in\\ncompensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.\\n Taylor moved for a new trial, challenging the denial of a\\ncontinuance, the missing-witness instruction, and the gen-\\neral weight of the evidence. Alternatively, he sought a\\nremittitur of damages. The judge denied the motions. Taylor\\nappeals, reprising the arguments in his posttrial motions and\\nadding a claim of evidentiary error.\\n We affirm. District judges have wide discretion to man-\\nage their proceedings and resolve evidentiary issues, and the\\nrulings here lie well within that discretion. Taylor has only\\nhimself to blame for the missing-witness instruction, which\\nwas plainly justified. The verdict is well supported by the\\nevidence, and we see no reason to disturb the jury’s deter-\\nmination of damages. The compensatory award is not\\nexcessive under Illinois law, and the punitive award sur-\\nvives constitutional scrutiny.\\n I. Background\\n Jayceon Taylor—a/k/a “The Game”—is an internationally\\nknown, Grammy-nominated rap artist. For a brief time, he\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 3\\n\\nwas also a minor reality-show star. Marrying the Game ran on\\nVH1 from 2012–2014 and chronicled the collapse of his\\nengagement to his longtime girlfriend and mother of his\\nchildren. When that show ended, his celebrity friends helped\\nhim create another VH1 reality show called She’s Got Game,\\nwhich featured a competition among women who might be\\na match for him.\\n Priscilla Rainey, a realtor and entrepreneur from Florida,\\nwas a contestant on She’s Got Game. In May 2015, while the\\nshow was filming in Chicago, Rainey and Taylor went on an\\noff-camera date in apparent violation of the competition\\nrules. Taylor took Rainey to a suburban sports bar, and at\\none point during the evening, they were on an elevated\\nstage in full view of club patrons. With a stage light shining\\non them, Taylor lifted Rainey’s skirt and grabbed her bare\\nbuttocks and vagina. She tried to break away, but he did it\\nagain—this time lifting her rear end up and exposing her\\nintimate parts to the gawking crowd. As Rainey struggled to\\npush him away and lower her skirt, he grabbed her bare\\nbuttocks and vagina a third time. He also grabbed and\\n“juggled” her breasts for the entertainment of the onlookers.\\n Three days later Rainey confronted Taylor about the as-\\nsault. The two were on the show’s tour bus with other cast\\nmembers, and a film crew caught the entire exchange on\\ncamera. The video begins with another contestant announc-\\ning that Rainey had a secret date with Taylor (that’s cheat-\\ning, as we said) and returned to the hotel visibly upset.\\nRainey responded that she told the crew about it but no one\\nelse. Taylor then reminded her that he had instructed her not\\nto mention it to anybody—and “don’t mention it means\\ndon’t mention it.” A heated argument ensued. Rainey re-\\n\\f4 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\npeatedly tried to tell him that she had a “problem” with\\nwhat had happened and was “bothered” by it. Taylor angri-\\nly commanded her to keep quiet: “What you can do is be a\\nwoman and shut up, like you can shut up right now.” She\\ndid not shut up. Instead, she described the assault in graphic\\ndetail. After an expletive-laden exchange, Taylor ordered her\\nto “[g]et off this bus before you get your ass strangled” and\\nthreatened to “choke [her] ass up.”\\n In August 2015, just before the show’s debut, Rainey\\nsued Taylor for sexual battery in federal court in Chicago.\\nTaylor repeatedly evaded service and otherwise tried to\\nobstruct and delay the litigation. Five process servers across\\nthree states made multiple attempts to serve him with the\\ncomplaint and summons. One process server alone made\\n41 unsuccessful attempts to serve Taylor at his California\\nhome. The district judge authorized alternative service. In\\nthe meantime, the suit was widely reported in the press and\\ngenerated lots of chatter on social media.\\n Taylor did not answer or otherwise plead, so on\\nFebruary 1, 2016, the judge entered a default under\\nRule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ten days\\nlater Florida attorney Andrew Williams appeared for Taylor\\nand moved to quash service and set aside the default. The\\njudge denied the motion to quash but set aside the default\\nand scheduled trial for November 14, 2016. A magistrate\\njudge set a settlement conference for June 16 and ordered\\nRainey and Taylor to appear in person. On June 2 Taylor\\nmoved to reschedule the settlement conference, feigning\\nconcern for his safety based on Chicago’s gun-violence\\nproblem:\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 5\\n\\n This past Memorial Day Weekend sadly almost\\n 70 people were shot in the city of Chicago. Due\\n to high volume of violence and likelihood of\\n reprisals due to such violence the Defendant\\n has grave concerns for his safety and for those\\n who assist him during his travels due to his ce-\\n lebrity status.\\nThe magistrate judge canceled the settlement conference for\\nother reasons. It was never rescheduled.\\n Taylor’s dilatory conduct didn’t stop there. In July he\\nmoved to transfer the case to either the Central District of\\nCalifornia or the Southern District of Florida. The judge\\ndenied the motion. In September he moved to continue the\\ntrial. The judge denied that motion as well. In October he\\nagain moved for a continuance, which the judge likewise\\ndenied. Meanwhile, Taylor railed against the lawsuit on\\nsocial media, insulting Rainey in exceedingly vulgar terms.\\n Jury selection commenced as scheduled on Monday,\\nNovember 14. Taylor did not show up. Williams, his attor-\\nney, assured the court that his client would be present the\\nnext day. When trial resumed on Tuesday, Taylor was again\\nabsent. Williams asked for a continuance, saying that he had\\nlearned on Monday night that Taylor had an emergency\\ndental procedure that day. He produced a note from a\\nCalifornia dental clinic and invited the judge to call to\\nconfirm this excuse. The judge made the call, and an endo-\\ndontist explained that Taylor had “basically more or less a\\nroot canal procedure, two of them” on Monday. It was not\\nclear from either the note or the call whether the dental\\nproblem was a longstanding one or a sudden onset. The\\nendodontist explained that he was not Taylor’s regular\\n\\f6 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\ndentist and did not know his history; rather, Taylor had\\ncalled his emergency line at about 6 p.m. on Sunday even-\\ning.\\n Rainey’s counsel responded by submitting several\\nscreenshots from Taylor’s Snapchat account. The photos\\ndepicted Taylor smoking something in a dark room under\\npink neon lights at 2:44 a.m. on Monday, November 14. As\\nthe judge described the images, it looked as if Taylor was\\n“out partying” in the middle of the night just a few hours\\nafter he placed a call to an “emergency dental hotline” and a\\nfew hours before he was due in court in Chicago. The judge\\ndenied the continuance motion, stating that Taylor’s actions\\nwere “indicative of somebody who had no intention of\\nappearing” at trial.\\n On Wednesday Taylor again did not appear. Williams\\nrenewed his continuance motion and offered copies of\\nairline and hotel reservations as evidence of Taylor’s intent\\nto attend trial. The judge noted that the flight times—leaving\\nLos Angeles on Monday at 11:25 p.m., arriving in Chicago at\\n5:12 a.m. on Tuesday; and leaving Chicago on Wednesday at\\n7:50 p.m.—didn’t align with the expected week-long trial\\nschedule. And the lone hotel room listed on the reservation\\ncouldn’t accommodate Taylor and the three people traveling\\nwith him. The judge again denied the continuance motion,\\nconcluding that Taylor’s “dental emergency” excuse was a\\n“ruse.” Trial continued through Friday. Taylor never showed\\nup.\\n Among other evidence, Rainey offered her own testimo-\\nny about the sexual assault and its aftermath; the video of\\nthe tour-bus confrontation; and documentary and other\\nevidence of damages, including testimony from a colleague\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 7\\n\\nwho corroborated the emotional pain she suffered and the\\nlingering effects of the assault on her personal and profes-\\nsional life. Williams put on a brief defense for his missing\\nclient, including calling a witness who testified from\\nCalifornia by videoconference. Tellingly, he did not ask the\\ncourt’s permission for Taylor to testify by videoconference.\\n When both sides rested on Friday, Williams renewed the\\ncontinuance motion, citing the same grounds as before. He\\ndid not submit an affidavit from Taylor or a dental profes-\\nsional to substantiate his claim that the dental procedure was\\nan emergency. The judge again denied the motion.\\n In light of Taylor’s absence, the judge gave the following\\njury instruction: “Defendant Jayceon Terrell Taylor was\\nmentioned at trial but did not testify in person in court. You\\nmay, but are not required to, assume that Mr. Taylor’s\\ntestimony would have been unfavorable to Mr. Taylor.” The\\njury returned a verdict for Rainey, awarding $1.13 million in\\ncompensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.\\n Taylor moved for a new trial on several grounds. He\\nagain attacked the denial of a continuance and the related\\nmissing-witness instruction. He also argued that the jury’s\\nverdict was against the weight of the evidence. Alternatively,\\nhe sought a remittitur of damages. The judge denied the\\nmotions and entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.\\n II. Discussion\\n Taylor challenges three of the judge’s rulings during trial:\\n(1) the denial of a continuance; (2) the decision to give the\\nmissing-witness instruction; and (3) the admission of the\\nvideo of the tour-bus confrontation. He also repeats his\\nposttrial claim that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of\\n\\f8 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nthe evidence. Alternatively, he argues that the compensatory\\nand punitive awards are excessive and should be vacated or\\nreduced.\\nA. Refusal to Reschedule the Trial\\n Taylor’s first argument is a challenge to the denial of his\\nseveral continuance motions. We review continuance rulings\\nunder the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Research\\nSys. Corp. v. IPSOS Publicité, 276 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n“The decision concerning whether to grant a continuance is\\nleft to the broad discretion of the district court,” id. (quota-\\ntion marks omitted), and “[t]he occasions for intervention\\nare rare,” United States v. Winbush, 580 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir.\\n2009) (quotation marks omitted).\\n The judge was well within his discretion to refuse to\\ngrant a continuance. Taylor’s claim that he had a dental\\nemergency on Sunday was not substantiated by reliable\\nevidence and was hard to take seriously given Taylor’s\\nevasive litigation conduct and the Snapchat photos. A good-\\nfaith litigant would have notified his counsel immediately if\\na true emergency prevented his appearance at trial. Yet\\nWilliams did not learn about Taylor’s dental procedure until\\nMonday night. And he submitted no affidavit from Taylor or\\na dental professional to substantiate the claimed emergency.\\nWhen Taylor was still a no-show by mid-week, Williams\\nproduced airline and hotel reservations in a last-ditch effort\\nto show that his client intended to attend the trial. But the\\ndates did not match the trial schedule, and the lone room\\nreservation was obviously insufficient to accommodate\\neveryone in Taylor’s travel entourage.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 9\\n\\n The Snapchat posts, moreover, gave the judge good rea-\\nson to doubt that Taylor’s dental issue was a true emergen-\\ncy. The screenshots showed Taylor smoking something\\nunder pink neon lights in the middle of the night just a few\\nhours after he called a dental emergency hotline and a few\\nhours before he was due in court in Chicago. Add to this mix\\nTaylor’s evasion of service and other dilatory conduct\\nduring the litigation, and the judge was quite understanda-\\nbly unconvinced.\\n Taylor insists that the note from the dentist’s office and\\nthe judge’s phone call to the endodontist should have been\\nenough to win a continuance. But the judge was justified in\\ntreating this information with skepticism. It remained un-\\nclear whether Taylor’s dental issue was a previously known\\ncondition or a sudden-onset emergency—a material fact in\\nevaluating whether this was a good-faith excuse for skipping\\ntrial or just a ruse. Taylor also argues that the judge gave too\\nmuch weight to the Snapchat posts. He objects that the\\nscreenshots are not clear enough to establish that he is in fact\\nthe person in the photos. And he tries to create doubt by\\nnoting that his staff can also post to his Snapchat account.\\nBut it’s not our role to reweigh the evidence. The judge\\ncarefully considered the entire record and made a reasonable\\njudgment that Taylor was unjustifiably absent. We find no\\nerror.\\nB. Missing-Witness Instruction\\n Relatedly, Taylor challenges the missing-witness instruc-\\ntion. This argument is woefully undeveloped; no legal\\nauthority is cited. We could call that a waiver, see Lewis v.\\nMills, 677 F.3d 324, 332 (7th Cir. 2012), but the argument also\\nclearly fails on the merits. District judges have broad discre-\\n\\f10 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\ntion to decide whether to give a missing-witness instruction.\\nHoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2004).\\nWe’ve said the instruction is appropriate if the proponent\\nestablishes that “the missing witness was peculiarly in the\\npower of the other party to produce.” Oxman v. WLS-TV,\\n12 F.3d 652, 661 (7th Cir. 1993). If “the witness is physically\\navailable only to the opponent,” the instruction is warrant-\\ned. Id.\\n The judge used our pattern missing-witness instruction.\\nSee FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH\\nCIRCUIT § 1.19 (2005 rev.). Though it’s framed for use in a\\ncase involving a missing nonparty witness, the instruction\\ncertainly fits this situation. Taylor was in complete control of\\nhis own appearance at trial. His choice to stay away for the\\nduration of the trial carried consequences, one of which was\\nthe likelihood that the judge would give a missing-witness\\ninstruction. The judge was on solid ground in giving this\\ninstruction.\\nC. Video of the Tour-Bus Confrontation\\n Over Taylor’s objection, the judge admitted the video of\\nthe tour-bus confrontation between Rainey and Taylor.1\\nTaylor renews his objection on appeal, arguing that the\\nvideo was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal\\nRules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting the\\ndistrict court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative\\nvalue is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair\\nprejudice”). We give special deference to the judge’s applica-\\n\\n1 Though we use the singular “video,” we note for completeness that it\\nwas actually a combination of three recordings, each of which captured\\nthe tour-bus confrontation from a different angle.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 11\\n\\ntion of Rule 403’s balancing test; we will reverse only if “no\\nreasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial\\ncourt.” Davies v. Benbenek, 836 F.3d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 2016)\\n(quotation marks omitted).\\n Taylor doesn’t come close to clearing this high bar. The\\nvideo had obvious probative value on the key question\\nbefore the jury: whether to credit Rainey’s testimony that\\nTaylor sexually assaulted her. Taylor’s reaction when she\\nconfronted him is telling. He angrily ordered her to “shut\\nup” just as she was on the brink of divulging what hap-\\npened during the unauthorized private date. When she\\nfinally spilled the details of the assault, there is no denial;\\ninstead, Taylor erupted in a torrent of profanities, ordered\\nher off the bus, and threatened to “strangle” and “choke”\\nher. This conduct reflects consciousness of guilt.\\n The video was also relevant as impeachment evidence.\\nThough Taylor did not appear at trial, Rainey played parts\\nof his recorded deposition testimony for the jury, including a\\npassage in which he denied that Rainey confronted him\\nabout the assault on the tour bus. The video exposes this\\ndeposition testimony as false.\\n Finally, as the judge aptly noted, the video helped the ju-\\nry to evaluate the parties’ body language and credibility\\nsoon after the assault: “The plaintiff’s and the defendant’s\\ninteractions after … the incident … can be probative for the\\njury in deciding who is telling the truth, what they say to\\none another, how they react, their facial expressions.” We\\nagree with the judge’s assessment that this video evidence\\nhad substantial probative value.\\n\\f12 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\n And the judge appropriately balanced the probative val-\\nue against the risk of unfair prejudice. Taylor complains that\\nthe jury saw a “scuffle” featuring pervasive foul language.\\nBut the recording captured both parties using profanity and\\nengaging in a scuffle. Taylor also suggests that the jury\\nmight have been distracted or misled by the slang he used\\nduring the confrontation. But he does not say how his\\nlanguage might have been misinterpreted. Like the district\\njudge, we see little risk that the video could have induced\\nthe jury to decide this case on an improper basis. United\\nStates v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700, 713 (7th Cir. 2009).\\nD. Weight of the Evidence\\n Taylor next asks us to order a new trial because the jury’s\\nverdict is against the weight of the evidence. Once again, our\\nreview is deferential; we will reverse the judge’s denial of a\\nnew trial only if we find an abuse of discretion. Clarett v.\\nRoberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). “A new trial should\\nbe granted only when the record shows that the jury’s\\nverdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the\\nverdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks\\nour conscience.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).\\n This verdict is neither conscience-shocking nor unjust.\\nQuite the contrary. Rainey’s testimony about the sexual\\nassault went largely unimpeached. A security guard for the\\nVH1 show provided some corroboration, testifying that he\\nencountered Rainey crying in the hotel hallway soon after\\nher return from the sports bar. We’ve already described the\\nstrong probative value of the tour-bus confrontation video.\\nAnd the missing-witness instruction permitted the jury to\\ndraw an adverse inference from Taylor’s nonappearance.\\nThe jury’s liability finding is well supported by the evidence.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 13\\n\\nE. Compensatory Damages\\n Next up is Taylor’s claim that the compensatory damages\\nare excessive. We review the judge’s denial of a remittitur\\nfor abuse of discretion. See Gracia v. SigmaTron Int’l, Inc.,\\n842 F.3d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 2016). In rejecting Taylor’s\\nargument, the judge noted some confusion in our caselaw\\nabout the applicable standard for reviewing a jury’s com-\\npensatory award in cases involving state-law claims. He’s\\nright; we haven’t always been clear about whether state or\\nfederal law controls. Compare Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co.,\\n444 F.3d 593, 611 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying state law), with\\nJutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(suggesting in dicta that the federal standard applies); see\\nalso Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 2008)\\n(same). We take this opportunity to clarify.\\n The Supreme Court has held that state-law standards for\\nevaluating a jury’s compensatory award are substantive, not\\nprocedural, for purposes of Erie analysis. Gasperini v. Ctr. for\\nHumanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996). Accordingly, when\\na federal jury awards compensatory damages in a state-law\\nclaim, state law determines whether that award is excessive.\\nSmart Mktg. Grp. v. Publ’ns. Int’l Ltd., 624 F.3d 824, 832 (7th\\nCir. 2010); accord 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.\\nMILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4511 (3d ed.\\n2016).\\n So Illinois law controls. The main difference between the\\nIllinois and federal standards is that the latter considers\\nwhether the compensatory award is “roughly comparable to\\nawards made in similar cases,” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care\\nCtr., 610 F.3d 434, 446 (7th Cir. 2010), while “the clear weight\\nof Illinois authority … reject[s] the ‘comparison’ concept,”\\n\\f14 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nTierney v. Cmty. Mem’l Gen. Hosp., 645 N.E.2d 284, 289 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1994); accord Richardson v. Chapman, 676 N.E.2d 621,\\n628 (Ill. 1997). Under Illinois law it’s neither necessary nor\\nappropriate to evaluate a jury’s compensatory award against\\nawards in similar cases; a comparative analysis is not part of\\nthe state framework. Rather, remittitur is appropriate “only\\nwhen a jury’s award falls outside the range of fair and\\nreasonable compensation, appears to be the result of passion\\nor prejudice, or is so large that it shocks the judicial con-\\nscience.” Klingelhoets v. Charlton-Perrin, 983 N.E.2d 1095,\\n1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). Conversely, remittitur “should not\\nbe ordered if the award falls within the flexible range of\\nconclusions which can reasonably be supported by the\\nfacts.” Id. at 1113–14 (quotation marks omitted).\\n The jury’s $1.13 million award represents a fair and rea-\\nsonable compensation for this intentional tort; it also finds\\nadequate support in the facts established at trial. 2 The jury\\nheard extensive testimony from Rainey about the severe\\nemotional distress she experienced and her subsequent\\ntreatment for anxiety, nightmares, and depression. She also\\nexplained how Taylor’s aggressive response when confront-\\ned on the tour bus made her feel “violated, degraded, [and]\\nattacked” all over again. Her business partner testified that\\nthe assault took a serious toll on Rainey’s personal and\\nprofessional life. And the jury was given documentary\\nevidence in the form of her medical history and therapy\\n\\n\\n2 The award is the sum of seven individual compensatory awards: $6,100\\nfor past medical expenses; $24,000 for future medical expenses; $500,000\\nfor future loss of normal life; $100,000 for past pain and suffering;\\n$200,000 for future pain and suffering; $100,000 for past emotional\\ndistress; and $200,000 for future emotional distress.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 15\\n\\nbills. We owe “a decent respect for the collective wisdom of\\nthe jury,” Mejia v. Cook County, 650 F.3d 631, 633 n.1 (7th Cir.\\n2011) (quotation marks omitted), and there’s more than\\nenough here to support its assessment of compensatory\\ndamages.\\n Taylor challenges the compensatory award in three ways.\\nFirst, he claims it lacks sufficient evidentiary support be-\\ncause none of Rainey’s treating physicians or therapists\\ntestified at trial. But Illinois doesn’t require expert testimony\\nto establish damages of this kind. See, e.g., Thornton v.\\nGarcini, 928 N.E.2d 804, 809 (Ill. 2010) (“The absence of\\nmedical testimony does not preclude recovery for emotional\\ndistress.”); Rainey v. City of Salem, 568 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1991) (explaining that expert testimony is not\\nnecessary to prove future medical expenses). Next, Taylor\\ncriticizes Rainey’s testimony as “logically insufficient to\\nsupport her battery claims and damages sought.” This is just\\na rehash of his argument against liability. And finally, Taylor\\nasserts that the award is out of line with awards made in\\nsimilar cases. But as we said, Illinois law rejects the use of\\ncomparisons.\\nF. Punitive Damages\\n Lastly, Taylor claims that the punitive award of $6 mil-\\nlion violates the Due Process Clause. We review this ques-\\ntion of law de novo. Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747,\\n756 (7th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has established three\\n“guideposts” for testing an award of punitive damages for\\ncompliance with due process: (1) the reprehensibility of the\\ndefendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual\\nharm suffered and the punitive award; and (3) the difference\\nbetween the award authorized by the jury and the penalties\\n\\f16 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nimposed in comparable cases. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.\\nGore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). Our evaluation of these factors\\nfavors affirming this award.\\n The first factor—the reprehensibility of the defendant’s\\nconduct—is the most important. Id. We consider whether\\n the harm caused was physical as opposed to\\n economic; the tortious conduct evinced an in-\\n difference to or a reckless disregard of the\\n health or safety of others; the target of the con-\\n duct had financial vulnerability; the conduct\\n involved repeated actions or was an isolated\\n incident; and the harm was the result of inten-\\n tional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere acci-\\n dent.\\nState Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419\\n(2003). We presume that Rainey was made whole by the\\ncompensatory award, so punitive damages are justified only\\nif Taylor’s culpability “is so reprehensible as to warrant the\\nimposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or\\ndeterrence.” Id.\\n That standard is clearly satisfied here. Taylor’s conduct\\nwas deeply reprehensible. He lifted Rainey’s skirt, grabbed\\nher bare buttocks and vagina, and exposed these most\\nintimate of her body parts to a large crowd—not once but\\nthree times. He also “juggled” her breasts as if to entertain\\nthe onlookers. This was a particularly degrading act of\\nsexual objectification. The conduct satisfies several of the\\nvariables identified in State Farm: (1) it was an intentional\\ninfliction of physical harm; (2) it demonstrated a reckless\\ndisregard for Rainey’s health and safety; and (3) Taylor\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 17\\n\\ncontinued to grope and expose Rainey’s most intimate body\\nparts even after she protested, so his misconduct was both\\nrepetitious and malicious. In short, Taylor knew Rainey “was\\nsuffering but continued to abuse” her. See Estate of Moreland,\\n395 F.3d at 757 (observing that the “prolonged nature” of an\\nassault “compounded” the plaintiff’s suffering and “exacer-\\nbate[d] the reprehensibility of [the defendants’] behavior”).\\n That Taylor’s cruelty continued after the assault com-\\npounded Rainey’s pain and humiliation. We’ve already\\ndescribed his aggressive response when she confronted him\\non the tour bus. But that’s not all. Taylor also launched a\\nseries of vile public attacks against Rainey on social media.\\nFor instance, after she filed this suit, Taylor viciously insult-\\ned her in a public Instagram post. Depicting himself as a\\nfighter wearing boxing gloves, Taylor called Rainey a\\n“thirsty Gatorade mascot of a transvestite”; accused her of\\nhaving “a history of a lot of other ‘Tranny Panty’ activity”;\\nand claimed that she sued him because she was eliminated\\nfrom the She’s Got Game competition. (There’s more, but we\\nsee no need to repeat Taylor’s most vulgar insults.) The\\nInstagram post concludes with this: “See you in court Mister\\nRainey.” On these facts it’s abundantly clear that Taylor’s\\nconduct warranted further sanction.\\n Moving to the second guidepost, the ratio between the\\ncompensatory and punitive damages is not unreasonable.\\nThe Supreme Court has declined to set a fixed ratio to limit\\npunitive damages; indeed, the Court’s observations on this\\nsubject do not provide much guidance. Compare State Farm,\\n538 U.S. at 425 (noting that “few awards exceeding a single-\\ndigit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages …\\nwill satisfy due process”), with Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 (suggest-\\n\\f18 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\ning that a punitive award four times larger than the compen-\\nsatory award “might be close to the line … of constitutional\\nimpropriety”) (quotation marks omitted). Our job is to\\n“police a range, not a point.” Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging,\\nInc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n The punitive award is approximately six times the com-\\npensatory award. We’ve upheld similar ratios in the past.\\nSee, e.g., Gracia, 842 F.3d at 1025 (approving a 5:1 ratio);\\nNeuros Co. v. KTurbo, Inc., 698 F.3d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 2012)\\n(affirming a 5:1 ratio while opining that the award was still\\n“too small”). We’ve even upheld higher ratios. See, e.g.,\\nMathias, 347 F.3d at 676–78 (affirming a 37:1 ratio); Lampley v.\\nOnyx Acceptance Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 485–86 (7th Cir. 2003)\\n(finding a 9:1 ratio acceptable).\\n To be sure, many of these cases involved much smaller\\ncompensatory awards, which is a relevant factor. See State\\nFarm, 538 U.S. at 425 (noting that when “compensatory\\ndamages are substantial,” then a “lesser ratio” can be justi-\\nfied under the Constitution). But the truly egregious nature\\nof Taylor’s conduct supports the size of this punitive award\\neven with the significant compensatory award. The sheer\\nmaliciousness of the tort is extreme. And the public humilia-\\ntion of this assault, combined with Taylor’s post-assault\\ninsults and threats, warrant a substantial punitive award.\\n The final guidepost—the difference between the award\\nauthorized by the jury and the penalties imposed in compa-\\nrable cases—doesn’t change our conclusion. Taylor’s entire\\nargument on this point comprises only a few sentences, so\\nagain we could find a waiver. But even if the punitive award\\nis higher than those in comparable cases, this guidepost\\ngenerally deserves less weight than the other two. Kemp v.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 19\\n\\nAT&T Co., 393 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Willow\\nInn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 238 (3d Cir.\\n2005) (“[W]e are reluctant to overturn the punitive damages\\naward on [the] basis [of the third guidepost] alone.”). The\\npunitive award raises no constitutional concerns.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4447886/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670633/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Priscilla Rainey v. Jayceon Taylor\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-17\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\nPRISCILLA RAINEY,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nJAYCEON T. TAYLOR,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15 C 6844 — Gary Feinerman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 25, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 17, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit\nJudges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Rapper Jayceon Taylor, better known\nas “The Game,” starred in a VH1 television show called She’s\nGot Game, an imitation of the long-running reality dating\nseries The Bachelor. While filming in Chicago in 2015, Taylor\ntook contestant Priscilla Rainey on an off-camera date at a\nsuburban sports bar. There Taylor sexually assaulted her by\nrepeatedly lifting her skirt, grabbing her bare buttocks and\n\f2 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\nvagina, and “juggling” her breasts in front of a large crowd\nof onlookers.\n Rainey sued Taylor for sexual battery. Taylor did not take\nthe litigation seriously. He evaded process, trolled Rainey on\nsocial media, dodged a settlement conference, and did not\nbother to show up at trial. His attorney asked for a continu-\nance, but the judge denied that request, dismissing Taylor’s\nproffered excuse as an elaborate ruse. The judge instructed\nthe jurors that they could infer from Taylor’s absence that his\ntestimony would have been unfavorable to him. The jury\nreturned a verdict for Rainey, awarding $1.13 million in\ncompensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.\n Taylor moved for a new trial, challenging the denial of a\ncontinuance, the missing-witness instruction, and the gen-\neral weight of the evidence. Alternatively, he sought a\nremittitur of damages. The judge denied the motions. Taylor\nappeals, reprising the arguments in his posttrial motions and\nadding a claim of evidentiary error.\n We affirm. District judges have wide discretion to man-\nage their proceedings and resolve evidentiary issues, and the\nrulings here lie well within that discretion. Taylor has only\nhimself to blame for the missing-witness instruction, which\nwas plainly justified. The verdict is well supported by the\nevidence, and we see no reason to disturb the jury’s deter-\nmination of damages. The compensatory award is not\nexcessive under Illinois law, and the punitive award sur-\nvives constitutional scrutiny.\n I. Background\n Jayceon Taylor—a/k/a “The Game”—is an internationally\nknown, Grammy-nominated rap artist. For a brief time, he\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 3\n\nwas also a minor reality-show star. Marrying the Game ran on\nVH1 from 2012–2014 and chronicled the collapse of his\nengagement to his longtime girlfriend and mother of his\nchildren. When that show ended, his celebrity friends helped\nhim create another VH1 reality show called She’s Got Game,\nwhich featured a competition among women who might be\na match for him.\n Priscilla Rainey, a realtor and entrepreneur from Florida,\nwas a contestant on She’s Got Game. In May 2015, while the\nshow was filming in Chicago, Rainey and Taylor went on an\noff-camera date in apparent violation of the competition\nrules. Taylor took Rainey to a suburban sports bar, and at\none point during the evening, they were on an elevated\nstage in full view of club patrons. With a stage light shining\non them, Taylor lifted Rainey’s skirt and grabbed her bare\nbuttocks and vagina. She tried to break away, but he did it\nagain—this time lifting her rear end up and exposing her\nintimate parts to the gawking crowd. As Rainey struggled to\npush him away and lower her skirt, he grabbed her bare\nbuttocks and vagina a third time. He also grabbed and\n“juggled” her breasts for the entertainment of the onlookers.\n Three days later Rainey confronted Taylor about the as-\nsault. The two were on the show’s tour bus with other cast\nmembers, and a film crew caught the entire exchange on\ncamera. The video begins with another contestant announc-\ning that Rainey had a secret date with Taylor (that’s cheat-\ning, as we said) and returned to the hotel visibly upset.\nRainey responded that she told the crew about it but no one\nelse. Taylor then reminded her that he had instructed her not\nto mention it to anybody—and “don’t mention it means\ndon’t mention it.” A heated argument ensued. Rainey re-\n\f4 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\npeatedly tried to tell him that she had a “problem” with\nwhat had happened and was “bothered” by it. Taylor angri-\nly commanded her to keep quiet: “What you can do is be a\nwoman and shut up, like you can shut up right now.” She\ndid not shut up. Instead, she described the assault in graphic\ndetail. After an expletive-laden exchange, Taylor ordered her\nto “[g]et off this bus before you get your ass strangled” and\nthreatened to “choke [her] ass up.”\n In August 2015, just before the show’s debut, Rainey\nsued Taylor for sexual battery in federal court in Chicago.\nTaylor repeatedly evaded service and otherwise tried to\nobstruct and delay the litigation. Five process servers across\nthree states made multiple attempts to serve him with the\ncomplaint and summons. One process server alone made\n41 unsuccessful attempts to serve Taylor at his California\nhome. The district judge authorized alternative service. In\nthe meantime, the suit was widely reported in the press and\ngenerated lots of chatter on social media.\n Taylor did not answer or otherwise plead, so on\nFebruary 1, 2016, the judge entered a default under\nRule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ten days\nlater Florida attorney Andrew Williams appeared for Taylor\nand moved to quash service and set aside the default. The\njudge denied the motion to quash but set aside the default\nand scheduled trial for November 14, 2016. A magistrate\njudge set a settlement conference for June 16 and ordered\nRainey and Taylor to appear in person. On June 2 Taylor\nmoved to reschedule the settlement conference, feigning\nconcern for his safety based on Chicago’s gun-violence\nproblem:\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 5\n\n This past Memorial Day Weekend sadly almost\n 70 people were shot in the city of Chicago. Due\n to high volume of violence and likelihood of\n reprisals due to such violence the Defendant\n has grave concerns for his safety and for those\n who assist him during his travels due to his ce-\n lebrity status.\nThe magistrate judge canceled the settlement conference for\nother reasons. It was never rescheduled.\n Taylor’s dilatory conduct didn’t stop there. In July he\nmoved to transfer the case to either the Central District of\nCalifornia or the Southern District of Florida. The judge\ndenied the motion. In September he moved to continue the\ntrial. The judge denied that motion as well. In October he\nagain moved for a continuance, which the judge likewise\ndenied. Meanwhile, Taylor railed against the lawsuit on\nsocial media, insulting Rainey in exceedingly vulgar terms.\n Jury selection commenced as scheduled on Monday,\nNovember 14. Taylor did not show up. Williams, his attor-\nney, assured the court that his client would be present the\nnext day. When trial resumed on Tuesday, Taylor was again\nabsent. Williams asked for a continuance, saying that he had\nlearned on Monday night that Taylor had an emergency\ndental procedure that day. He produced a note from a\nCalifornia dental clinic and invited the judge to call to\nconfirm this excuse. The judge made the call, and an endo-\ndontist explained that Taylor had “basically more or less a\nroot canal procedure, two of them” on Monday. It was not\nclear from either the note or the call whether the dental\nproblem was a longstanding one or a sudden onset. The\nendodontist explained that he was not Taylor’s regular\n\f6 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\ndentist and did not know his history; rather, Taylor had\ncalled his emergency line at about 6 p.m. on Sunday even-\ning.\n Rainey’s counsel responded by submitting several\nscreenshots from Taylor’s Snapchat account. The photos\ndepicted Taylor smoking something in a dark room under\npink neon lights at 2:44 a.m. on Monday, November 14. As\nthe judge described the images, it looked as if Taylor was\n“out partying” in the middle of the night just a few hours\nafter he placed a call to an “emergency dental hotline” and a\nfew hours before he was due in court in Chicago. The judge\ndenied the continuance motion, stating that Taylor’s actions\nwere “indicative of somebody who had no intention of\nappearing” at trial.\n On Wednesday Taylor again did not appear. Williams\nrenewed his continuance motion and offered copies of\nairline and hotel reservations as evidence of Taylor’s intent\nto attend trial. The judge noted that the flight times—leaving\nLos Angeles on Monday at 11:25 p.m., arriving in Chicago at\n5:12 a.m. on Tuesday; and leaving Chicago on Wednesday at\n7:50 p.m.—didn’t align with the expected week-long trial\nschedule. And the lone hotel room listed on the reservation\ncouldn’t accommodate Taylor and the three people traveling\nwith him. The judge again denied the continuance motion,\nconcluding that Taylor’s “dental emergency” excuse was a\n“ruse.” Trial continued through Friday. Taylor never showed\nup.\n Among other evidence, Rainey offered her own testimo-\nny about the sexual assault and its aftermath; the video of\nthe tour-bus confrontation; and documentary and other\nevidence of damages, including testimony from a colleague\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 7\n\nwho corroborated the emotional pain she suffered and the\nlingering effects of the assault on her personal and profes-\nsional life. Williams put on a brief defense for his missing\nclient, including calling a witness who testified from\nCalifornia by videoconference. Tellingly, he did not ask the\ncourt’s permission for Taylor to testify by videoconference.\n When both sides rested on Friday, Williams renewed the\ncontinuance motion, citing the same grounds as before. He\ndid not submit an affidavit from Taylor or a dental profes-\nsional to substantiate his claim that the dental procedure was\nan emergency. The judge again denied the motion.\n In light of Taylor’s absence, the judge gave the following\njury instruction: “Defendant Jayceon Terrell Taylor was\nmentioned at trial but did not testify in person in court. You\nmay, but are not required to, assume that Mr. Taylor’s\ntestimony would have been unfavorable to Mr. Taylor.” The\njury returned a verdict for Rainey, awarding $1.13 million in\ncompensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.\n Taylor moved for a new trial on several grounds. He\nagain attacked the denial of a continuance and the related\nmissing-witness instruction. He also argued that the jury’s\nverdict was against the weight of the evidence. Alternatively,\nhe sought a remittitur of damages. The judge denied the\nmotions and entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.\n II. Discussion\n Taylor challenges three of the judge’s rulings during trial:\n(1) the denial of a continuance; (2) the decision to give the\nmissing-witness instruction; and (3) the admission of the\nvideo of the tour-bus confrontation. He also repeats his\nposttrial claim that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of\n\f8 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\nthe evidence. Alternatively, he argues that the compensatory\nand punitive awards are excessive and should be vacated or\nreduced.\nA. Refusal to Reschedule the Trial\n Taylor’s first argument is a challenge to the denial of his\nseveral continuance motions. We review continuance rulings\nunder the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Research\nSys. Corp. v. IPSOS Publicité, 276 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2002).\n“The decision concerning whether to grant a continuance is\nleft to the broad discretion of the district court,” id. (quota-\ntion marks omitted), and “[t]he occasions for intervention\nare rare,” United States v. Winbush, 580 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir.\n2009) (quotation marks omitted).\n The judge was well within his discretion to refuse to\ngrant a continuance. Taylor’s claim that he had a dental\nemergency on Sunday was not substantiated by reliable\nevidence and was hard to take seriously given Taylor’s\nevasive litigation conduct and the Snapchat photos. A good-\nfaith litigant would have notified his counsel immediately if\na true emergency prevented his appearance at trial. Yet\nWilliams did not learn about Taylor’s dental procedure until\nMonday night. And he submitted no affidavit from Taylor or\na dental professional to substantiate the claimed emergency.\nWhen Taylor was still a no-show by mid-week, Williams\nproduced airline and hotel reservations in a last-ditch effort\nto show that his client intended to attend the trial. But the\ndates did not match the trial schedule, and the lone room\nreservation was obviously insufficient to accommodate\neveryone in Taylor’s travel entourage.\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 9\n\n The Snapchat posts, moreover, gave the judge good rea-\nson to doubt that Taylor’s dental issue was a true emergen-\ncy. The screenshots showed Taylor smoking something\nunder pink neon lights in the middle of the night just a few\nhours after he called a dental emergency hotline and a few\nhours before he was due in court in Chicago. Add to this mix\nTaylor’s evasion of service and other dilatory conduct\nduring the litigation, and the judge was quite understanda-\nbly unconvinced.\n Taylor insists that the note from the dentist’s office and\nthe judge’s phone call to the endodontist should have been\nenough to win a continuance. But the judge was justified in\ntreating this information with skepticism. It remained un-\nclear whether Taylor’s dental issue was a previously known\ncondition or a sudden-onset emergency—a material fact in\nevaluating whether this was a good-faith excuse for skipping\ntrial or just a ruse. Taylor also argues that the judge gave too\nmuch weight to the Snapchat posts. He objects that the\nscreenshots are not clear enough to establish that he is in fact\nthe person in the photos. And he tries to create doubt by\nnoting that his staff can also post to his Snapchat account.\nBut it’s not our role to reweigh the evidence. The judge\ncarefully considered the entire record and made a reasonable\njudgment that Taylor was unjustifiably absent. We find no\nerror.\nB. Missing-Witness Instruction\n Relatedly, Taylor challenges the missing-witness instruc-\ntion. This argument is woefully undeveloped; no legal\nauthority is cited. We could call that a waiver, see Lewis v.\nMills, 677 F.3d 324, 332 (7th Cir. 2012), but the argument also\nclearly fails on the merits. District judges have broad discre-\n\f10 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\ntion to decide whether to give a missing-witness instruction.\nHoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2004).\nWe’ve said the instruction is appropriate if the proponent\nestablishes that “the missing witness was peculiarly in the\npower of the other party to produce.” Oxman v. WLS-TV,\n12 F.3d 652, 661 (7th Cir. 1993). If “the witness is physically\navailable only to the opponent,” the instruction is warrant-\ned. Id.\n The judge used our pattern missing-witness instruction.\nSee FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH\nCIRCUIT § 1.19 (2005 rev.). Though it’s framed for use in a\ncase involving a missing nonparty witness, the instruction\ncertainly fits this situation. Taylor was in complete control of\nhis own appearance at trial. His choice to stay away for the\nduration of the trial carried consequences, one of which was\nthe likelihood that the judge would give a missing-witness\ninstruction. The judge was on solid ground in giving this\ninstruction.\nC. Video of the Tour-Bus Confrontation\n Over Taylor’s objection, the judge admitted the video of\nthe tour-bus confrontation between Rainey and Taylor.1\nTaylor renews his objection on appeal, arguing that the\nvideo was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal\nRules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting the\ndistrict court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative\nvalue is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair\nprejudice”). We give special deference to the judge’s applica-\n\n1 Though we use the singular “video,” we note for completeness that it\nwas actually a combination of three recordings, each of which captured\nthe tour-bus confrontation from a different angle.\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 11\n\ntion of Rule 403’s balancing test; we will reverse only if “no\nreasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial\ncourt.” Davies v. Benbenek, 836 F.3d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 2016)\n(quotation marks omitted).\n Taylor doesn’t come close to clearing this high bar. The\nvideo had obvious probative value on the key question\nbefore the jury: whether to credit Rainey’s testimony that\nTaylor sexually assaulted her. Taylor’s reaction when she\nconfronted him is telling. He angrily ordered her to “shut\nup” just as she was on the brink of divulging what hap-\npened during the unauthorized private date. When she\nfinally spilled the details of the assault, there is no denial;\ninstead, Taylor erupted in a torrent of profanities, ordered\nher off the bus, and threatened to “strangle” and “choke”\nher. This conduct reflects consciousness of guilt.\n The video was also relevant as impeachment evidence.\nThough Taylor did not appear at trial, Rainey played parts\nof his recorded deposition testimony for the jury, including a\npassage in which he denied that Rainey confronted him\nabout the assault on the tour bus. The video exposes this\ndeposition testimony as false.\n Finally, as the judge aptly noted, the video helped the ju-\nry to evaluate the parties’ body language and credibility\nsoon after the assault: “The plaintiff’s and the defendant’s\ninteractions after … the incident … can be probative for the\njury in deciding who is telling the truth, what they say to\none another, how they react, their facial expressions.” We\nagree with the judge’s assessment that this video evidence\nhad substantial probative value.\n\f12 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\n And the judge appropriately balanced the probative val-\nue against the risk of unfair prejudice. Taylor complains that\nthe jury saw a “scuffle” featuring pervasive foul language.\nBut the recording captured both parties using profanity and\nengaging in a scuffle. Taylor also suggests that the jury\nmight have been distracted or misled by the slang he used\nduring the confrontation. But he does not say how his\nlanguage might have been misinterpreted. Like the district\njudge, we see little risk that the video could have induced\nthe jury to decide this case on an improper basis. United\nStates v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700, 713 (7th Cir. 2009).\nD. Weight of the Evidence\n Taylor next asks us to order a new trial because the jury’s\nverdict is against the weight of the evidence. Once again, our\nreview is deferential; we will reverse the judge’s denial of a\nnew trial only if we find an abuse of discretion. Clarett v.\nRoberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). “A new trial should\nbe granted only when the record shows that the jury’s\nverdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the\nverdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks\nour conscience.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).\n This verdict is neither conscience-shocking nor unjust.\nQuite the contrary. Rainey’s testimony about the sexual\nassault went largely unimpeached. A security guard for the\nVH1 show provided some corroboration, testifying that he\nencountered Rainey crying in the hotel hallway soon after\nher return from the sports bar. We’ve already described the\nstrong probative value of the tour-bus confrontation video.\nAnd the missing-witness instruction permitted the jury to\ndraw an adverse inference from Taylor’s nonappearance.\nThe jury’s liability finding is well supported by the evidence.\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 13\n\nE. Compensatory Damages\n Next up is Taylor’s claim that the compensatory damages\nare excessive. We review the judge’s denial of a remittitur\nfor abuse of discretion. See Gracia v. SigmaTron Int’l, Inc.,\n842 F.3d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 2016). In rejecting Taylor’s\nargument, the judge noted some confusion in our caselaw\nabout the applicable standard for reviewing a jury’s com-\npensatory award in cases involving state-law claims. He’s\nright; we haven’t always been clear about whether state or\nfederal law controls. Compare Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co.,\n444 F.3d 593, 611 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying state law), with\nJutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001)\n(suggesting in dicta that the federal standard applies); see\nalso Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 2008)\n(same). We take this opportunity to clarify.\n The Supreme Court has held that state-law standards for\nevaluating a jury’s compensatory award are substantive, not\nprocedural, for purposes of Erie analysis. Gasperini v. Ctr. for\nHumanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996). Accordingly, when\na federal jury awards compensatory damages in a state-law\nclaim, state law determines whether that award is excessive.\nSmart Mktg. Grp. v. Publ’ns. Int’l Ltd., 624 F.3d 824, 832 (7th\nCir. 2010); accord 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.\nMILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4511 (3d ed.\n2016).\n So Illinois law controls. The main difference between the\nIllinois and federal standards is that the latter considers\nwhether the compensatory award is “roughly comparable to\nawards made in similar cases,” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care\nCtr., 610 F.3d 434, 446 (7th Cir. 2010), while “the clear weight\nof Illinois authority … reject[s] the ‘comparison’ concept,”\n\f14 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\nTierney v. Cmty. Mem’l Gen. Hosp., 645 N.E.2d 284, 289 (Ill.\nApp. Ct. 1994); accord Richardson v. Chapman, 676 N.E.2d 621,\n628 (Ill. 1997). Under Illinois law it’s neither necessary nor\nappropriate to evaluate a jury’s compensatory award against\nawards in similar cases; a comparative analysis is not part of\nthe state framework. Rather, remittitur is appropriate “only\nwhen a jury’s award falls outside the range of fair and\nreasonable compensation, appears to be the result of passion\nor prejudice, or is so large that it shocks the judicial con-\nscience.” Klingelhoets v. Charlton-Perrin, 983 N.E.2d 1095,\n1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). Conversely, remittitur “should not\nbe ordered if the award falls within the flexible range of\nconclusions which can reasonably be supported by the\nfacts.” Id. at 1113–14 (quotation marks omitted).\n The jury’s $1.13 million award represents a fair and rea-\nsonable compensation for this intentional tort; it also finds\nadequate support in the facts established at trial. 2 The jury\nheard extensive testimony from Rainey about the severe\nemotional distress she experienced and her subsequent\ntreatment for anxiety, nightmares, and depression. She also\nexplained how Taylor’s aggressive response when confront-\ned on the tour bus made her feel “violated, degraded, [and]\nattacked” all over again. Her business partner testified that\nthe assault took a serious toll on Rainey’s personal and\nprofessional life. And the jury was given documentary\nevidence in the form of her medical history and therapy\n\n\n2 The award is the sum of seven individual compensatory awards: $6,100\nfor past medical expenses; $24,000 for future medical expenses; $500,000\nfor future loss of normal life; $100,000 for past pain and suffering;\n$200,000 for future pain and suffering; $100,000 for past emotional\ndistress; and $200,000 for future emotional distress.\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 15\n\nbills. We owe “a decent respect for the collective wisdom of\nthe jury,” Mejia v. Cook County, 650 F.3d 631, 633 n.1 (7th Cir.\n2011) (quotation marks omitted), and there’s more than\nenough here to support its assessment of compensatory\ndamages.\n Taylor challenges the compensatory award in three ways.\nFirst, he claims it lacks sufficient evidentiary support be-\ncause none of Rainey’s treating physicians or therapists\ntestified at trial. But Illinois doesn’t require expert testimony\nto establish damages of this kind. See, e.g., Thornton v.\nGarcini, 928 N.E.2d 804, 809 (Ill. 2010) (“The absence of\nmedical testimony does not preclude recovery for emotional\ndistress.”); Rainey v. City of Salem, 568 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill.\nApp. Ct. 1991) (explaining that expert testimony is not\nnecessary to prove future medical expenses). Next, Taylor\ncriticizes Rainey’s testimony as “logically insufficient to\nsupport her battery claims and damages sought.” This is just\na rehash of his argument against liability. And finally, Taylor\nasserts that the award is out of line with awards made in\nsimilar cases. But as we said, Illinois law rejects the use of\ncomparisons.\nF. Punitive Damages\n Lastly, Taylor claims that the punitive award of $6 mil-\nlion violates the Due Process Clause. We review this ques-\ntion of law de novo. Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747,\n756 (7th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has established three\n“guideposts” for testing an award of punitive damages for\ncompliance with due process: (1) the reprehensibility of the\ndefendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual\nharm suffered and the punitive award; and (3) the difference\nbetween the award authorized by the jury and the penalties\n\f16 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\nimposed in comparable cases. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.\nGore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). Our evaluation of these factors\nfavors affirming this award.\n The first factor—the reprehensibility of the defendant’s\nconduct—is the most important. Id. We consider whether\n the harm caused was physical as opposed to\n economic; the tortious conduct evinced an in-\n difference to or a reckless disregard of the\n health or safety of others; the target of the con-\n duct had financial vulnerability; the conduct\n involved repeated actions or was an isolated\n incident; and the harm was the result of inten-\n tional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere acci-\n dent.\nState Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419\n(2003). We presume that Rainey was made whole by the\ncompensatory award, so punitive damages are justified only\nif Taylor’s culpability “is so reprehensible as to warrant the\nimposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or\ndeterrence.” Id.\n That standard is clearly satisfied here. Taylor’s conduct\nwas deeply reprehensible. He lifted Rainey’s skirt, grabbed\nher bare buttocks and vagina, and exposed these most\nintimate of her body parts to a large crowd—not once but\nthree times. He also “juggled” her breasts as if to entertain\nthe onlookers. This was a particularly degrading act of\nsexual objectification. The conduct satisfies several of the\nvariables identified in State Farm: (1) it was an intentional\ninfliction of physical harm; (2) it demonstrated a reckless\ndisregard for Rainey’s health and safety; and (3) Taylor\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 17\n\ncontinued to grope and expose Rainey’s most intimate body\nparts even after she protested, so his misconduct was both\nrepetitious and malicious. In short, Taylor knew Rainey “was\nsuffering but continued to abuse” her. See Estate of Moreland,\n395 F.3d at 757 (observing that the “prolonged nature” of an\nassault “compounded” the plaintiff’s suffering and “exacer-\nbate[d] the reprehensibility of [the defendants’] behavior”).\n That Taylor’s cruelty continued after the assault com-\npounded Rainey’s pain and humiliation. We’ve already\ndescribed his aggressive response when she confronted him\non the tour bus. But that’s not all. Taylor also launched a\nseries of vile public attacks against Rainey on social media.\nFor instance, after she filed this suit, Taylor viciously insult-\ned her in a public Instagram post. Depicting himself as a\nfighter wearing boxing gloves, Taylor called Rainey a\n“thirsty Gatorade mascot of a transvestite”; accused her of\nhaving “a history of a lot of other ‘Tranny Panty’ activity”;\nand claimed that she sued him because she was eliminated\nfrom the She’s Got Game competition. (There’s more, but we\nsee no need to repeat Taylor’s most vulgar insults.) The\nInstagram post concludes with this: “See you in court Mister\nRainey.” On these facts it’s abundantly clear that Taylor’s\nconduct warranted further sanction.\n Moving to the second guidepost, the ratio between the\ncompensatory and punitive damages is not unreasonable.\nThe Supreme Court has declined to set a fixed ratio to limit\npunitive damages; indeed, the Court’s observations on this\nsubject do not provide much guidance. Compare State Farm,\n538 U.S. at 425 (noting that “few awards exceeding a single-\ndigit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages …\nwill satisfy due process”), with Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 (suggest-\n\f18 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\n\ning that a punitive award four times larger than the compen-\nsatory award “might be close to the line … of constitutional\nimpropriety”) (quotation marks omitted). Our job is to\n“police a range, not a point.” Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging,\nInc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).\n The punitive award is approximately six times the com-\npensatory award. We’ve upheld similar ratios in the past.\nSee, e.g., Gracia, 842 F.3d at 1025 (approving a 5:1 ratio);\nNeuros Co. v. KTurbo, Inc., 698 F.3d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 2012)\n(affirming a 5:1 ratio while opining that the award was still\n“too small”). We’ve even upheld higher ratios. See, e.g.,\nMathias, 347 F.3d at 676–78 (affirming a 37:1 ratio); Lampley v.\nOnyx Acceptance Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 485–86 (7th Cir. 2003)\n(finding a 9:1 ratio acceptable).\n To be sure, many of these cases involved much smaller\ncompensatory awards, which is a relevant factor. See State\nFarm, 538 U.S. at 425 (noting that when “compensatory\ndamages are substantial,” then a “lesser ratio” can be justi-\nfied under the Constitution). But the truly egregious nature\nof Taylor’s conduct supports the size of this punitive award\neven with the significant compensatory award. The sheer\nmaliciousness of the tort is extreme. And the public humilia-\ntion of this assault, combined with Taylor’s post-assault\ninsults and threats, warrant a substantial punitive award.\n The final guidepost—the difference between the award\nauthorized by the jury and the penalties imposed in compa-\nrable cases—doesn’t change our conclusion. Taylor’s entire\nargument on this point comprises only a few sentences, so\nagain we could find a waiver. But even if the punitive award\nis higher than those in comparable cases, this guidepost\ngenerally deserves less weight than the other two. Kemp v.\n\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 19\n\nAT&T Co., 393 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Willow\nInn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 238 (3d Cir.\n2005) (“[W]e are reluctant to overturn the punitive damages\naward on [the] basis [of the third guidepost] alone.”). The\npunitive award raises no constitutional concerns.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Priscilla Rainey v. Jayceon Taylor\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-17\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\nPRISCILLA RAINEY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJAYCEON T. TAYLOR,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 6844 — Gary Feinerman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 25, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 17, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Rapper Jayceon Taylor, better known\\nas “The Game,” starred in a VH1 television show called She’s\\nGot Game, an imitation of the long-running reality dating\\nseries The Bachelor. While filming in Chicago in 2015, Taylor\\ntook contestant Priscilla Rainey on an off-camera date at a\\nsuburban sports bar. There Taylor sexually assaulted her by\\nrepeatedly lifting her skirt, grabbing her bare buttocks and\\n\\f2 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nvagina, and “juggling” her breasts in front of a large crowd\\nof onlookers.\\n Rainey sued Taylor for sexual battery. Taylor did not take\\nthe litigation seriously. He evaded process, trolled Rainey on\\nsocial media, dodged a settlement conference, and did not\\nbother to show up at trial. His attorney asked for a continu-\\nance, but the judge denied that request, dismissing Taylor’s\\nproffered excuse as an elaborate ruse. The judge instructed\\nthe jurors that they could infer from Taylor’s absence that his\\ntestimony would have been unfavorable to him. The jury\\nreturned a verdict for Rainey, awarding $1.13 million in\\ncompensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.\\n Taylor moved for a new trial, challenging the denial of a\\ncontinuance, the missing-witness instruction, and the gen-\\neral weight of the evidence. Alternatively, he sought a\\nremittitur of damages. The judge denied the motions. Taylor\\nappeals, reprising the arguments in his posttrial motions and\\nadding a claim of evidentiary error.\\n We affirm. District judges have wide discretion to man-\\nage their proceedings and resolve evidentiary issues, and the\\nrulings here lie well within that discretion. Taylor has only\\nhimself to blame for the missing-witness instruction, which\\nwas plainly justified. The verdict is well supported by the\\nevidence, and we see no reason to disturb the jury’s deter-\\nmination of damages. The compensatory award is not\\nexcessive under Illinois law, and the punitive award sur-\\nvives constitutional scrutiny.\\n I. Background\\n Jayceon Taylor—a/k/a “The Game”—is an internationally\\nknown, Grammy-nominated rap artist. For a brief time, he\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 3\\n\\nwas also a minor reality-show star. Marrying the Game ran on\\nVH1 from 2012–2014 and chronicled the collapse of his\\nengagement to his longtime girlfriend and mother of his\\nchildren. When that show ended, his celebrity friends helped\\nhim create another VH1 reality show called She’s Got Game,\\nwhich featured a competition among women who might be\\na match for him.\\n Priscilla Rainey, a realtor and entrepreneur from Florida,\\nwas a contestant on She’s Got Game. In May 2015, while the\\nshow was filming in Chicago, Rainey and Taylor went on an\\noff-camera date in apparent violation of the competition\\nrules. Taylor took Rainey to a suburban sports bar, and at\\none point during the evening, they were on an elevated\\nstage in full view of club patrons. With a stage light shining\\non them, Taylor lifted Rainey’s skirt and grabbed her bare\\nbuttocks and vagina. She tried to break away, but he did it\\nagain—this time lifting her rear end up and exposing her\\nintimate parts to the gawking crowd. As Rainey struggled to\\npush him away and lower her skirt, he grabbed her bare\\nbuttocks and vagina a third time. He also grabbed and\\n“juggled” her breasts for the entertainment of the onlookers.\\n Three days later Rainey confronted Taylor about the as-\\nsault. The two were on the show’s tour bus with other cast\\nmembers, and a film crew caught the entire exchange on\\ncamera. The video begins with another contestant announc-\\ning that Rainey had a secret date with Taylor (that’s cheat-\\ning, as we said) and returned to the hotel visibly upset.\\nRainey responded that she told the crew about it but no one\\nelse. Taylor then reminded her that he had instructed her not\\nto mention it to anybody—and “don’t mention it means\\ndon’t mention it.” A heated argument ensued. Rainey re-\\n\\f4 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\npeatedly tried to tell him that she had a “problem” with\\nwhat had happened and was “bothered” by it. Taylor angri-\\nly commanded her to keep quiet: “What you can do is be a\\nwoman and shut up, like you can shut up right now.” She\\ndid not shut up. Instead, she described the assault in graphic\\ndetail. After an expletive-laden exchange, Taylor ordered her\\nto “[g]et off this bus before you get your ass strangled” and\\nthreatened to “choke [her] ass up.”\\n In August 2015, just before the show’s debut, Rainey\\nsued Taylor for sexual battery in federal court in Chicago.\\nTaylor repeatedly evaded service and otherwise tried to\\nobstruct and delay the litigation. Five process servers across\\nthree states made multiple attempts to serve him with the\\ncomplaint and summons. One process server alone made\\n41 unsuccessful attempts to serve Taylor at his California\\nhome. The district judge authorized alternative service. In\\nthe meantime, the suit was widely reported in the press and\\ngenerated lots of chatter on social media.\\n Taylor did not answer or otherwise plead, so on\\nFebruary 1, 2016, the judge entered a default under\\nRule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ten days\\nlater Florida attorney Andrew Williams appeared for Taylor\\nand moved to quash service and set aside the default. The\\njudge denied the motion to quash but set aside the default\\nand scheduled trial for November 14, 2016. A magistrate\\njudge set a settlement conference for June 16 and ordered\\nRainey and Taylor to appear in person. On June 2 Taylor\\nmoved to reschedule the settlement conference, feigning\\nconcern for his safety based on Chicago’s gun-violence\\nproblem:\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 5\\n\\n This past Memorial Day Weekend sadly almost\\n 70 people were shot in the city of Chicago. Due\\n to high volume of violence and likelihood of\\n reprisals due to such violence the Defendant\\n has grave concerns for his safety and for those\\n who assist him during his travels due to his ce-\\n lebrity status.\\nThe magistrate judge canceled the settlement conference for\\nother reasons. It was never rescheduled.\\n Taylor’s dilatory conduct didn’t stop there. In July he\\nmoved to transfer the case to either the Central District of\\nCalifornia or the Southern District of Florida. The judge\\ndenied the motion. In September he moved to continue the\\ntrial. The judge denied that motion as well. In October he\\nagain moved for a continuance, which the judge likewise\\ndenied. Meanwhile, Taylor railed against the lawsuit on\\nsocial media, insulting Rainey in exceedingly vulgar terms.\\n Jury selection commenced as scheduled on Monday,\\nNovember 14. Taylor did not show up. Williams, his attor-\\nney, assured the court that his client would be present the\\nnext day. When trial resumed on Tuesday, Taylor was again\\nabsent. Williams asked for a continuance, saying that he had\\nlearned on Monday night that Taylor had an emergency\\ndental procedure that day. He produced a note from a\\nCalifornia dental clinic and invited the judge to call to\\nconfirm this excuse. The judge made the call, and an endo-\\ndontist explained that Taylor had “basically more or less a\\nroot canal procedure, two of them” on Monday. It was not\\nclear from either the note or the call whether the dental\\nproblem was a longstanding one or a sudden onset. The\\nendodontist explained that he was not Taylor’s regular\\n\\f6 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\ndentist and did not know his history; rather, Taylor had\\ncalled his emergency line at about 6 p.m. on Sunday even-\\ning.\\n Rainey’s counsel responded by submitting several\\nscreenshots from Taylor’s Snapchat account. The photos\\ndepicted Taylor smoking something in a dark room under\\npink neon lights at 2:44 a.m. on Monday, November 14. As\\nthe judge described the images, it looked as if Taylor was\\n“out partying” in the middle of the night just a few hours\\nafter he placed a call to an “emergency dental hotline” and a\\nfew hours before he was due in court in Chicago. The judge\\ndenied the continuance motion, stating that Taylor’s actions\\nwere “indicative of somebody who had no intention of\\nappearing” at trial.\\n On Wednesday Taylor again did not appear. Williams\\nrenewed his continuance motion and offered copies of\\nairline and hotel reservations as evidence of Taylor’s intent\\nto attend trial. The judge noted that the flight times—leaving\\nLos Angeles on Monday at 11:25 p.m., arriving in Chicago at\\n5:12 a.m. on Tuesday; and leaving Chicago on Wednesday at\\n7:50 p.m.—didn’t align with the expected week-long trial\\nschedule. And the lone hotel room listed on the reservation\\ncouldn’t accommodate Taylor and the three people traveling\\nwith him. The judge again denied the continuance motion,\\nconcluding that Taylor’s “dental emergency” excuse was a\\n“ruse.” Trial continued through Friday. Taylor never showed\\nup.\\n Among other evidence, Rainey offered her own testimo-\\nny about the sexual assault and its aftermath; the video of\\nthe tour-bus confrontation; and documentary and other\\nevidence of damages, including testimony from a colleague\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 7\\n\\nwho corroborated the emotional pain she suffered and the\\nlingering effects of the assault on her personal and profes-\\nsional life. Williams put on a brief defense for his missing\\nclient, including calling a witness who testified from\\nCalifornia by videoconference. Tellingly, he did not ask the\\ncourt’s permission for Taylor to testify by videoconference.\\n When both sides rested on Friday, Williams renewed the\\ncontinuance motion, citing the same grounds as before. He\\ndid not submit an affidavit from Taylor or a dental profes-\\nsional to substantiate his claim that the dental procedure was\\nan emergency. The judge again denied the motion.\\n In light of Taylor’s absence, the judge gave the following\\njury instruction: “Defendant Jayceon Terrell Taylor was\\nmentioned at trial but did not testify in person in court. You\\nmay, but are not required to, assume that Mr. Taylor’s\\ntestimony would have been unfavorable to Mr. Taylor.” The\\njury returned a verdict for Rainey, awarding $1.13 million in\\ncompensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.\\n Taylor moved for a new trial on several grounds. He\\nagain attacked the denial of a continuance and the related\\nmissing-witness instruction. He also argued that the jury’s\\nverdict was against the weight of the evidence. Alternatively,\\nhe sought a remittitur of damages. The judge denied the\\nmotions and entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.\\n II. Discussion\\n Taylor challenges three of the judge’s rulings during trial:\\n(1) the denial of a continuance; (2) the decision to give the\\nmissing-witness instruction; and (3) the admission of the\\nvideo of the tour-bus confrontation. He also repeats his\\nposttrial claim that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of\\n\\f8 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nthe evidence. Alternatively, he argues that the compensatory\\nand punitive awards are excessive and should be vacated or\\nreduced.\\nA. Refusal to Reschedule the Trial\\n Taylor’s first argument is a challenge to the denial of his\\nseveral continuance motions. We review continuance rulings\\nunder the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Research\\nSys. Corp. v. IPSOS Publicité, 276 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n“The decision concerning whether to grant a continuance is\\nleft to the broad discretion of the district court,” id. (quota-\\ntion marks omitted), and “[t]he occasions for intervention\\nare rare,” United States v. Winbush, 580 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir.\\n2009) (quotation marks omitted).\\n The judge was well within his discretion to refuse to\\ngrant a continuance. Taylor’s claim that he had a dental\\nemergency on Sunday was not substantiated by reliable\\nevidence and was hard to take seriously given Taylor’s\\nevasive litigation conduct and the Snapchat photos. A good-\\nfaith litigant would have notified his counsel immediately if\\na true emergency prevented his appearance at trial. Yet\\nWilliams did not learn about Taylor’s dental procedure until\\nMonday night. And he submitted no affidavit from Taylor or\\na dental professional to substantiate the claimed emergency.\\nWhen Taylor was still a no-show by mid-week, Williams\\nproduced airline and hotel reservations in a last-ditch effort\\nto show that his client intended to attend the trial. But the\\ndates did not match the trial schedule, and the lone room\\nreservation was obviously insufficient to accommodate\\neveryone in Taylor’s travel entourage.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 9\\n\\n The Snapchat posts, moreover, gave the judge good rea-\\nson to doubt that Taylor’s dental issue was a true emergen-\\ncy. The screenshots showed Taylor smoking something\\nunder pink neon lights in the middle of the night just a few\\nhours after he called a dental emergency hotline and a few\\nhours before he was due in court in Chicago. Add to this mix\\nTaylor’s evasion of service and other dilatory conduct\\nduring the litigation, and the judge was quite understanda-\\nbly unconvinced.\\n Taylor insists that the note from the dentist’s office and\\nthe judge’s phone call to the endodontist should have been\\nenough to win a continuance. But the judge was justified in\\ntreating this information with skepticism. It remained un-\\nclear whether Taylor’s dental issue was a previously known\\ncondition or a sudden-onset emergency—a material fact in\\nevaluating whether this was a good-faith excuse for skipping\\ntrial or just a ruse. Taylor also argues that the judge gave too\\nmuch weight to the Snapchat posts. He objects that the\\nscreenshots are not clear enough to establish that he is in fact\\nthe person in the photos. And he tries to create doubt by\\nnoting that his staff can also post to his Snapchat account.\\nBut it’s not our role to reweigh the evidence. The judge\\ncarefully considered the entire record and made a reasonable\\njudgment that Taylor was unjustifiably absent. We find no\\nerror.\\nB. Missing-Witness Instruction\\n Relatedly, Taylor challenges the missing-witness instruc-\\ntion. This argument is woefully undeveloped; no legal\\nauthority is cited. We could call that a waiver, see Lewis v.\\nMills, 677 F.3d 324, 332 (7th Cir. 2012), but the argument also\\nclearly fails on the merits. District judges have broad discre-\\n\\f10 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\ntion to decide whether to give a missing-witness instruction.\\nHoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2004).\\nWe’ve said the instruction is appropriate if the proponent\\nestablishes that “the missing witness was peculiarly in the\\npower of the other party to produce.” Oxman v. WLS-TV,\\n12 F.3d 652, 661 (7th Cir. 1993). If “the witness is physically\\navailable only to the opponent,” the instruction is warrant-\\ned. Id.\\n The judge used our pattern missing-witness instruction.\\nSee FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH\\nCIRCUIT § 1.19 (2005 rev.). Though it’s framed for use in a\\ncase involving a missing nonparty witness, the instruction\\ncertainly fits this situation. Taylor was in complete control of\\nhis own appearance at trial. His choice to stay away for the\\nduration of the trial carried consequences, one of which was\\nthe likelihood that the judge would give a missing-witness\\ninstruction. The judge was on solid ground in giving this\\ninstruction.\\nC. Video of the Tour-Bus Confrontation\\n Over Taylor’s objection, the judge admitted the video of\\nthe tour-bus confrontation between Rainey and Taylor.1\\nTaylor renews his objection on appeal, arguing that the\\nvideo was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal\\nRules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting the\\ndistrict court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative\\nvalue is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair\\nprejudice”). We give special deference to the judge’s applica-\\n\\n1 Though we use the singular “video,” we note for completeness that it\\nwas actually a combination of three recordings, each of which captured\\nthe tour-bus confrontation from a different angle.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 11\\n\\ntion of Rule 403’s balancing test; we will reverse only if “no\\nreasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial\\ncourt.” Davies v. Benbenek, 836 F.3d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 2016)\\n(quotation marks omitted).\\n Taylor doesn’t come close to clearing this high bar. The\\nvideo had obvious probative value on the key question\\nbefore the jury: whether to credit Rainey’s testimony that\\nTaylor sexually assaulted her. Taylor’s reaction when she\\nconfronted him is telling. He angrily ordered her to “shut\\nup” just as she was on the brink of divulging what hap-\\npened during the unauthorized private date. When she\\nfinally spilled the details of the assault, there is no denial;\\ninstead, Taylor erupted in a torrent of profanities, ordered\\nher off the bus, and threatened to “strangle” and “choke”\\nher. This conduct reflects consciousness of guilt.\\n The video was also relevant as impeachment evidence.\\nThough Taylor did not appear at trial, Rainey played parts\\nof his recorded deposition testimony for the jury, including a\\npassage in which he denied that Rainey confronted him\\nabout the assault on the tour bus. The video exposes this\\ndeposition testimony as false.\\n Finally, as the judge aptly noted, the video helped the ju-\\nry to evaluate the parties’ body language and credibility\\nsoon after the assault: “The plaintiff’s and the defendant’s\\ninteractions after … the incident … can be probative for the\\njury in deciding who is telling the truth, what they say to\\none another, how they react, their facial expressions.” We\\nagree with the judge’s assessment that this video evidence\\nhad substantial probative value.\\n\\f12 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\n And the judge appropriately balanced the probative val-\\nue against the risk of unfair prejudice. Taylor complains that\\nthe jury saw a “scuffle” featuring pervasive foul language.\\nBut the recording captured both parties using profanity and\\nengaging in a scuffle. Taylor also suggests that the jury\\nmight have been distracted or misled by the slang he used\\nduring the confrontation. But he does not say how his\\nlanguage might have been misinterpreted. Like the district\\njudge, we see little risk that the video could have induced\\nthe jury to decide this case on an improper basis. United\\nStates v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700, 713 (7th Cir. 2009).\\nD. Weight of the Evidence\\n Taylor next asks us to order a new trial because the jury’s\\nverdict is against the weight of the evidence. Once again, our\\nreview is deferential; we will reverse the judge’s denial of a\\nnew trial only if we find an abuse of discretion. Clarett v.\\nRoberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). “A new trial should\\nbe granted only when the record shows that the jury’s\\nverdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the\\nverdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks\\nour conscience.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).\\n This verdict is neither conscience-shocking nor unjust.\\nQuite the contrary. Rainey’s testimony about the sexual\\nassault went largely unimpeached. A security guard for the\\nVH1 show provided some corroboration, testifying that he\\nencountered Rainey crying in the hotel hallway soon after\\nher return from the sports bar. We’ve already described the\\nstrong probative value of the tour-bus confrontation video.\\nAnd the missing-witness instruction permitted the jury to\\ndraw an adverse inference from Taylor’s nonappearance.\\nThe jury’s liability finding is well supported by the evidence.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 13\\n\\nE. Compensatory Damages\\n Next up is Taylor’s claim that the compensatory damages\\nare excessive. We review the judge’s denial of a remittitur\\nfor abuse of discretion. See Gracia v. SigmaTron Int’l, Inc.,\\n842 F.3d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 2016). In rejecting Taylor’s\\nargument, the judge noted some confusion in our caselaw\\nabout the applicable standard for reviewing a jury’s com-\\npensatory award in cases involving state-law claims. He’s\\nright; we haven’t always been clear about whether state or\\nfederal law controls. Compare Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co.,\\n444 F.3d 593, 611 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying state law), with\\nJutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(suggesting in dicta that the federal standard applies); see\\nalso Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 2008)\\n(same). We take this opportunity to clarify.\\n The Supreme Court has held that state-law standards for\\nevaluating a jury’s compensatory award are substantive, not\\nprocedural, for purposes of Erie analysis. Gasperini v. Ctr. for\\nHumanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996). Accordingly, when\\na federal jury awards compensatory damages in a state-law\\nclaim, state law determines whether that award is excessive.\\nSmart Mktg. Grp. v. Publ’ns. Int’l Ltd., 624 F.3d 824, 832 (7th\\nCir. 2010); accord 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.\\nMILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4511 (3d ed.\\n2016).\\n So Illinois law controls. The main difference between the\\nIllinois and federal standards is that the latter considers\\nwhether the compensatory award is “roughly comparable to\\nawards made in similar cases,” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care\\nCtr., 610 F.3d 434, 446 (7th Cir. 2010), while “the clear weight\\nof Illinois authority … reject[s] the ‘comparison’ concept,”\\n\\f14 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nTierney v. Cmty. Mem’l Gen. Hosp., 645 N.E.2d 284, 289 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1994); accord Richardson v. Chapman, 676 N.E.2d 621,\\n628 (Ill. 1997). Under Illinois law it’s neither necessary nor\\nappropriate to evaluate a jury’s compensatory award against\\nawards in similar cases; a comparative analysis is not part of\\nthe state framework. Rather, remittitur is appropriate “only\\nwhen a jury’s award falls outside the range of fair and\\nreasonable compensation, appears to be the result of passion\\nor prejudice, or is so large that it shocks the judicial con-\\nscience.” Klingelhoets v. Charlton-Perrin, 983 N.E.2d 1095,\\n1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). Conversely, remittitur “should not\\nbe ordered if the award falls within the flexible range of\\nconclusions which can reasonably be supported by the\\nfacts.” Id. at 1113–14 (quotation marks omitted).\\n The jury’s $1.13 million award represents a fair and rea-\\nsonable compensation for this intentional tort; it also finds\\nadequate support in the facts established at trial. 2 The jury\\nheard extensive testimony from Rainey about the severe\\nemotional distress she experienced and her subsequent\\ntreatment for anxiety, nightmares, and depression. She also\\nexplained how Taylor’s aggressive response when confront-\\ned on the tour bus made her feel “violated, degraded, [and]\\nattacked” all over again. Her business partner testified that\\nthe assault took a serious toll on Rainey’s personal and\\nprofessional life. And the jury was given documentary\\nevidence in the form of her medical history and therapy\\n\\n\\n2 The award is the sum of seven individual compensatory awards: $6,100\\nfor past medical expenses; $24,000 for future medical expenses; $500,000\\nfor future loss of normal life; $100,000 for past pain and suffering;\\n$200,000 for future pain and suffering; $100,000 for past emotional\\ndistress; and $200,000 for future emotional distress.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 15\\n\\nbills. We owe “a decent respect for the collective wisdom of\\nthe jury,” Mejia v. Cook County, 650 F.3d 631, 633 n.1 (7th Cir.\\n2011) (quotation marks omitted), and there’s more than\\nenough here to support its assessment of compensatory\\ndamages.\\n Taylor challenges the compensatory award in three ways.\\nFirst, he claims it lacks sufficient evidentiary support be-\\ncause none of Rainey’s treating physicians or therapists\\ntestified at trial. But Illinois doesn’t require expert testimony\\nto establish damages of this kind. See, e.g., Thornton v.\\nGarcini, 928 N.E.2d 804, 809 (Ill. 2010) (“The absence of\\nmedical testimony does not preclude recovery for emotional\\ndistress.”); Rainey v. City of Salem, 568 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1991) (explaining that expert testimony is not\\nnecessary to prove future medical expenses). Next, Taylor\\ncriticizes Rainey’s testimony as “logically insufficient to\\nsupport her battery claims and damages sought.” This is just\\na rehash of his argument against liability. And finally, Taylor\\nasserts that the award is out of line with awards made in\\nsimilar cases. But as we said, Illinois law rejects the use of\\ncomparisons.\\nF. Punitive Damages\\n Lastly, Taylor claims that the punitive award of $6 mil-\\nlion violates the Due Process Clause. We review this ques-\\ntion of law de novo. Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747,\\n756 (7th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has established three\\n“guideposts” for testing an award of punitive damages for\\ncompliance with due process: (1) the reprehensibility of the\\ndefendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual\\nharm suffered and the punitive award; and (3) the difference\\nbetween the award authorized by the jury and the penalties\\n\\f16 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\nimposed in comparable cases. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.\\nGore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). Our evaluation of these factors\\nfavors affirming this award.\\n The first factor—the reprehensibility of the defendant’s\\nconduct—is the most important. Id. We consider whether\\n the harm caused was physical as opposed to\\n economic; the tortious conduct evinced an in-\\n difference to or a reckless disregard of the\\n health or safety of others; the target of the con-\\n duct had financial vulnerability; the conduct\\n involved repeated actions or was an isolated\\n incident; and the harm was the result of inten-\\n tional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere acci-\\n dent.\\nState Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419\\n(2003). We presume that Rainey was made whole by the\\ncompensatory award, so punitive damages are justified only\\nif Taylor’s culpability “is so reprehensible as to warrant the\\nimposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or\\ndeterrence.” Id.\\n That standard is clearly satisfied here. Taylor’s conduct\\nwas deeply reprehensible. He lifted Rainey’s skirt, grabbed\\nher bare buttocks and vagina, and exposed these most\\nintimate of her body parts to a large crowd—not once but\\nthree times. He also “juggled” her breasts as if to entertain\\nthe onlookers. This was a particularly degrading act of\\nsexual objectification. The conduct satisfies several of the\\nvariables identified in State Farm: (1) it was an intentional\\ninfliction of physical harm; (2) it demonstrated a reckless\\ndisregard for Rainey’s health and safety; and (3) Taylor\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 17\\n\\ncontinued to grope and expose Rainey’s most intimate body\\nparts even after she protested, so his misconduct was both\\nrepetitious and malicious. In short, Taylor knew Rainey “was\\nsuffering but continued to abuse” her. See Estate of Moreland,\\n395 F.3d at 757 (observing that the “prolonged nature” of an\\nassault “compounded” the plaintiff’s suffering and “exacer-\\nbate[d] the reprehensibility of [the defendants’] behavior”).\\n That Taylor’s cruelty continued after the assault com-\\npounded Rainey’s pain and humiliation. We’ve already\\ndescribed his aggressive response when she confronted him\\non the tour bus. But that’s not all. Taylor also launched a\\nseries of vile public attacks against Rainey on social media.\\nFor instance, after she filed this suit, Taylor viciously insult-\\ned her in a public Instagram post. Depicting himself as a\\nfighter wearing boxing gloves, Taylor called Rainey a\\n“thirsty Gatorade mascot of a transvestite”; accused her of\\nhaving “a history of a lot of other ‘Tranny Panty’ activity”;\\nand claimed that she sued him because she was eliminated\\nfrom the She’s Got Game competition. (There’s more, but we\\nsee no need to repeat Taylor’s most vulgar insults.) The\\nInstagram post concludes with this: “See you in court Mister\\nRainey.” On these facts it’s abundantly clear that Taylor’s\\nconduct warranted further sanction.\\n Moving to the second guidepost, the ratio between the\\ncompensatory and punitive damages is not unreasonable.\\nThe Supreme Court has declined to set a fixed ratio to limit\\npunitive damages; indeed, the Court’s observations on this\\nsubject do not provide much guidance. Compare State Farm,\\n538 U.S. at 425 (noting that “few awards exceeding a single-\\ndigit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages …\\nwill satisfy due process”), with Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 (suggest-\\n\\f18 Nos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\\n\\ning that a punitive award four times larger than the compen-\\nsatory award “might be close to the line … of constitutional\\nimpropriety”) (quotation marks omitted). Our job is to\\n“police a range, not a point.” Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging,\\nInc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n The punitive award is approximately six times the com-\\npensatory award. We’ve upheld similar ratios in the past.\\nSee, e.g., Gracia, 842 F.3d at 1025 (approving a 5:1 ratio);\\nNeuros Co. v. KTurbo, Inc., 698 F.3d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 2012)\\n(affirming a 5:1 ratio while opining that the award was still\\n“too small”). We’ve even upheld higher ratios. See, e.g.,\\nMathias, 347 F.3d at 676–78 (affirming a 37:1 ratio); Lampley v.\\nOnyx Acceptance Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 485–86 (7th Cir. 2003)\\n(finding a 9:1 ratio acceptable).\\n To be sure, many of these cases involved much smaller\\ncompensatory awards, which is a relevant factor. See State\\nFarm, 538 U.S. at 425 (noting that when “compensatory\\ndamages are substantial,” then a “lesser ratio” can be justi-\\nfied under the Constitution). But the truly egregious nature\\nof Taylor’s conduct supports the size of this punitive award\\neven with the significant compensatory award. The sheer\\nmaliciousness of the tort is extreme. And the public humilia-\\ntion of this assault, combined with Taylor’s post-assault\\ninsults and threats, warrant a substantial punitive award.\\n The final guidepost—the difference between the award\\nauthorized by the jury and the penalties imposed in compa-\\nrable cases—doesn’t change our conclusion. Taylor’s entire\\nargument on this point comprises only a few sentences, so\\nagain we could find a waiver. But even if the punitive award\\nis higher than those in comparable cases, this guidepost\\ngenerally deserves less weight than the other two. Kemp v.\\n\\fNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990 19\\n\\nAT&T Co., 393 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Willow\\nInn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 238 (3d Cir.\\n2005) (“[W]e are reluctant to overturn the punitive damages\\naward on [the] basis [of the third guidepost] alone.”). The\\npunitive award raises no constitutional concerns.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4672,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670788,"string":"4,670,788"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. David Holly"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1216"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1216\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDAVID HOLLY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00485-1 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Unreasonable seizures violate the\\nFourth Amendment while voluntary encounters with the po-\\nlice do not. This case implicates the dividing line. A police of-\\nficer rushed to approach David Holly in Chicago’s Altgeld\\nGardens Housing Complex and asked if he had a gun. Holly\\nanswered yes, which resulted in his arrest and subsequent\\nconviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Holly\\nlater moved to suppress the gun, contending that the officer’s\\n\\f2 No. 19-1216\\n\\napproach and questioning constituted an impermissible sei-\\nzure. The district court denied that motion after finding that\\nHolly consented to the encounter. We agree and affirm. In the\\ntotality of circumstances, Holly’s interaction with police fell\\non the voluntary side of the line.\\n I\\n A\\n On December 31, 2015, Officers Robert Caulfield and Jo-\\nseph Byrne of the Chicago Police Department were patrolling\\nthe Altgeld Gardens Housing Complex, a public housing pro-\\nject in the city’s far south side. The officers were in uniform\\nand on patrol as part of a CPD effort to increase police visibil-\\nity in anticipation of celebratory gunfire to usher in the new\\nyear. They drove an unmarked black Ford, which Officer\\nByrne later testified locals recognized as a police car. While\\nsitting in the car, Officers Byrne and Caulfield saw David\\nHolly walking on a sidewalk inside a courtyard of the com-\\nplex.\\n The parties dispute what happened next, but all agree that\\nthe police approached Holly in the courtyard and asked him\\nif he had a gun. Holly immediately said yes. The police then\\nconfiscated the gun and arrested him. A grand jury later in-\\ndicted Holly for possessing a firearm following a prior felony\\nconviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to\\nsuppress the gun, arguing that his encounter with the police\\nwas an impermissible seizure. He also moved to dismiss the\\nindictment, contending that the police’s failure to preserve\\nvideo footage of his arrest and activity leading to it violated\\nhis due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\\n(1963). The district court held a hearing on both issues and\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 3\\n\\nheard competing testimony from Holly and the police. It then\\ndenied Holly’s motions.\\n The testimony from the hearing frames the issues on ap-\\npeal. The officers testified that they had entered a parking lot\\nin Altgeld Gardens to get a better view of the interior court-\\nyard, which Officer Byrne considered a high-crime area based\\non arrests he had made there before. Around 4:00 p.m., Officer\\nByrne saw Holly walking on a sidewalk toward the police car.\\nOfficer Byrne said that as Holly neared the car, he made eye\\ncontact with the officers, formed a surprised and anxious\\nlook, and then turned sharply and walked swiftly in another\\ndirection, ultimately making his way behind a building and\\nout of the officers’ sight. Both officers testified that Officer\\nCaulfield then jogged after Holly and found him inside the\\ncourtyard, standing outside an apartment door and ringing\\nthe doorbell. (An occupant later told the officers she did not\\nknow Holly.)\\n Officer Caulfield said that he identified himself as police\\nand asked Holly a single question: Do you have drugs or a\\ngun? Yes, Holly replied, he had a gun in his pocket. Officer\\nCaulfield took the gun and from there turned Holly toward a\\nwall to arrest him. By then Officer Byrne had reached the\\napartment and assisted Officer Caulfield by handcuffing\\nHolly. Both officers testified that at no point did they draw\\ntheir own guns or touch Holly before placing him under ar-\\nrest. A third officer, Raul Casales, responded to a backup call\\nand met Officers Caulfield and Byrne about 15 to 20 seconds\\nafter Holly’s arrest. Officer Casales testified that he had\\ndrawn his gun but never pointed it at Holly.\\n Holly offered a starkly different account. He testified that\\nhe never saw the police car or made eye contact with any\\n\\f4 No. 19-1216\\n\\nofficer before being stopped and handcuffed. Holly instead\\nstated that he was ringing a friend’s doorbell when he saw\\nOfficer Caulfield run around the corner and approach him\\nwith his gun drawn. According to Holly, Officer Caulfield\\nthen demanded that he put his hands up, grabbed him, and\\ntold him he was being stopped because there were burglaries\\nin the neighborhood. Holly added that he did not feel free to\\nleave because he had lived in the neighborhood for decades\\nand knew the police stops there to be aggressive. Holly also\\ndiverged from the officers’ accounts regarding the sequence\\nof events surrounding his arrest. He insisted that Officer Caul-\\nfield patted him down, found a bulge, and only then asked if\\nhe had a gun. By the time Officer Byrne arrived, Holly contin-\\nued, Officer Caulfield had confiscated the gun and put his\\nown gun away.\\n After considering the competing testimony, the district\\ncourt credited the officers’ testimony. The district court ex-\\nplained that the accounts of Officers Caulfield, Byrne, and\\nCasales were consistent with each other. The district court\\nnoted that the officers’ testimony made more sense than\\nHolly’s, observing in particular that the police do not typi-\\ncally draw their weapons on an unarmed offender or at close\\nrange. By contrast, the district court found Holly less credible\\ngiven his criminal history and the fact that he had offered\\nthree shifting explanations for why he had a gun. Having\\ncredited the officers’ accounts, the district court then con-\\ncluded that Holly’s encounter with the police was consensual\\nand denied his motion to suppress.\\n B\\n The district court also heard testimony about Holly’s sec-\\nond claim on appeal—that he was denied due process when\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 5\\n\\nthe police failed to preserve a video taken near his arrest. On\\nthis score, the facts are straightforward and unfortunate.\\n Immediately after Holly’s arrest, Detective Peter Scatena\\nand Officers Byrne and Caulfield reviewed a video from the\\nonly nearby camera that captured what transpired. Detective\\nScatena then called Carlos Mackie, an analyst with the Chi-\\ncago Housing Authority, to request a copy of the video. When\\nMackie did not answer, Detective Scatena left a voicemail\\n(consistent with CPD protocol). What Detective Scatena did\\nnot know was that Mackie was on military leave and out of\\nthe office for an extended period. He never heard back from\\nMackie, followed up on the voicemail, or sought the video\\nsome other way. And because CHA cameras automatically re-\\nwrite footage after 15 to 30 days, the video taken near Holly’s\\narrest was eventually overwritten and thus no longer availa-\\nble.\\n The district court heard conflicting testimony of what the\\nvideo revealed before it was overwritten. For his part, Detec-\\ntive Scatena testified that the footage showed Holly in the\\ncourtyard walking at a hurried pace with two CPD officers\\nfollowing “side by side” in the same direction. (Recall that Of-\\nficers Byrne and Caulfield had testified that Officer Caulfield\\npursued Holly ahead of Officer Byrne.) Detective Scatena also\\nstated that the video did not show Holly after he was hand-\\ncuffed. By contrast, Officer Byrne testified that the video only\\ndepicted Officer Caulfield standing near Holly after he was\\nhandcuffed—not the events leading up to the arrest.\\n While these accounts differed, the district court found the\\ninconsistencies minor and understandable given the passage\\nof time and the number of arrests that the police make in the\\nordinary course. The district court underscored that no one\\n\\f6 No. 19-1216\\n\\nwho watched the video (before it was overwritten) testified\\nthat it depicted Holly’s arrest. Because Holly had not estab-\\nlished that the video was potentially exculpatory or that the\\npolice acted in bad faith by failing to preserve it, the court de-\\nnied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of a due\\nprocess violation.\\n The ensuing bench trial resulted in Holly’s conviction of\\nunlawful gun possession. The district court then sentenced\\nHolly to 90 months’ imprisonment and imposed 36 months’\\nsupervised release.\\n II\\n A\\n Not every police encounter implicates the Fourth Amend-\\nment. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)). A sei-\\nzure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes\\nplace if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would\\nnot feel free to leave. Id. A consensual encounter, on the other\\nhand, takes place if a reasonable person would feel free to ig-\\nnore the police and go about his business. Id.\\n In determining whether an encounter is consensual, we\\nconsider several factors:\\n where the interaction took place, including\\n whether it was in public;\\n how many police officers were present;\\n the extent to which the police presence was\\n threatening;\\n whether the officers made any show of\\n weapons or physical force;\\n the officers’ language and tone;\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 7\\n\\n whether the police suggested the defendant\\n was suspected of crime; and\\n whether officers told the defendant he was\\n free to leave.\\nSee id. These factors “are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.”\\nUnited States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\\nUnited States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).\\n B\\n We agree with the district court that Holly’s encounter\\nwith the police was voluntary. It is undisputed that the police\\nspoke to Holly in public and never stopped him, redirected\\nhis route, or otherwise obstructed his walking on the sidewalk\\nor through the courtyard. Officer Caulfield approached Holly\\nand put a question to him—do you have drugs or a gun?—\\nthat he immediately chose to answer. See Florida v. Royer, 460\\nU.S. 491, 497 (1983) (explaining that the police do not violate\\nthe Fourth Amendment by merely approaching a person in\\npublic and asking him questions); see also Shields, 789 F.3d at\\n743–44.\\n The district court’s other findings, which Holly has not\\nshown are clearly erroneous, support its conclusion that the\\nencounter was consensual. The district court reasonably cred-\\nited the officers’ accounts over Holly’s. It found Holly’s testi-\\nmony strained and implausible: he was a four-time convicted\\nfelon, had an incentive to lie to escape punishment, and in the\\ncourse of proceedings, offered three inconsistent explanations\\nfor why he had a gun. By contrast, the district court found that\\nthe officers had no incentive at the time of the incident to en-\\ngage in misconduct (as they likely believed everything was\\nbeing captured on camera) and no incentive to lie in their\\n\\f8 No. 19-1216\\n\\ntestimony after the fact. Considering each party’s position\\nand taking stock of their comparative credibility, the district\\ncourt was on solid footing in crediting the officers’ version of\\nevents. See United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir.\\n2007) (emphasizing that a district court’s determination of\\nwitness credibility “can virtually never be clear error”).\\n Against this backdrop, the district court concluded that\\nHolly’s encounter with the police was voluntary. It found that\\nOfficer Caulfield was alone when he jogged after Holly and\\nmade no show of force—he did not pull a gun, touch Holly,\\nor tell him to put his hands up. Rather, upon catching up with\\nHolly, Officer Caulfield promptly asked a direct question—\\ndo you have drugs or a gun?—and instantly received an\\nequally direct answer—yes. The question was not advanced\\nin a coercive tone or with an accompanying threat. Given\\nthese circumstances, a reasonable person in Holly’s shoes\\nwould have felt free to leave. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439;\\nUnited States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2006)\\n(holding that an encounter was consensual where three offic-\\ners approached a defendant in public and did not show weap-\\nons, touch him, or use a tone or language that would have\\ncommunicated to the defendant that he was seized).\\n Holly disagrees. He sees this case on all fours with our de-\\ncision in United States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2015).\\nThere Dontray Smith was walking alone at night when two\\narmed and uniformed police officers waited for him to enter\\nan alley. Id. at 684. The officers then rode their bicycles past\\nSmith into the alley and made a U-turn to face him, obstruct-\\ning his path forward. Id. at 685. From there one officer stepped\\noff his bike, approached Smith with his hand on his gun, and\\n“posed a single, accusatory question to Smith: ‘Are you in\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 9\\n\\npossession of any guns, knives, weapons, or anything ille-\\ngal?’” Id. Considering the location, the threatening presence\\nof multiple officers, the aggressive nature of the questioning,\\nand the fact that the police blocked Smith’s path, we con-\\ncluded that the encounter constituted a seizure. Id.\\n Holly is right that in both cases the police were in uniform,\\napproached the defendant, and asked about a gun. But the\\nsimilarities end there. The district court found that a single\\nofficer spoke with Holly in an open courtyard in the after-\\nnoon. Unlike the police in Smith, Officer Caulfield did not\\nblock Holly’s path or draw his weapon, and the tone of his\\nquestion did not compel an answer.\\n No doubt that line-drawing in this area of law is difficult\\nand requires a careful parsing of exactly what took place be-\\ntween the police and the accused. But “[i]t is well established\\nthat a seizure does not occur merely because a police officer\\napproaches an individual and asks him or her questions.” Id.\\nat 684. The district court proceeded carefully by holding a\\nhearing, considering the competing testimony, assessing\\ncredibility, and ultimately finding that Officer Caulfield ap-\\nproached Holly and asked him a question—nothing more.\\nUnder these circumstances, Holly’s encounter with the police\\nwas voluntary.\\n III\\n Holly also renews his argument in the name of Brady v.\\nMaryland that the police violated his due process rights by\\nfailing to preserve CHA video footage of the arrest and events\\nleading to it. We start from a different legal marker. The\\nproper framework for evaluating Holly’s claim comes not\\nfrom Brady, but rather from Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51\\n\\f10 No. 19-1216\\n\\n(1988). While Brady requires that the government disclose ev-\\nidence materially favorable to the defendant “irrespective of\\nthe good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” see 373 U.S. at\\n87, Holly’s claim is that the police failed to preserve only po-\\ntentially exculpatory evidence.\\n Under Youngblood, the police’s failure to preserve poten-\\ntially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due pro-\\ncess unless the defendant can show that the police acted in\\nbad faith. See 488 U.S. at 58. That standard requires proof of\\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence\\nand turns on an official’s subjective knowledge that the evi-\\ndence had exculpatory value. See United States v. Cherry, 920\\nF.3d 1126, 1140 (7th Cir. 2019). In addition to bad faith, the\\ndefendant must show that the exculpatory nature of the evi-\\ndence was apparent before its destruction and that he could\\nnot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See id.\\n Holly has not made these necessary showings. Detective\\nScatena made a clear effort to preserve the video: he left a\\nvoicemail requesting the video from the CHA and did so in\\naccordance with CPD policy. Detective Scatena did not know\\nthat the analyst he contacted was on military leave. His failure\\nto follow up may have been negligent, but it does not prove\\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress the video. And mere\\nnegligence by police does not amount to a constitutional vio-\\nlation. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.\\n Nor has Holly shown that the lost video had apparent ex-\\nculpatory value. Detective Scatena and Officers Byrne and\\nCaulfield each testified that the video did not show the actual\\narrest. Their testimony was consistent on this score, leading\\nthe district court to find that the video did not show the initial\\nencounter between Holly and the police and thus that any\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 11\\n\\nfootage “was neither exculpatory nor inculpatory.” On these\\nfacts, the district court correctly concluded that the police did\\nnot violate Holly’s due process rights under Youngblood.\\n To be sure, the failure of the police to preserve the video is\\nunfortunate. Mistakes happen, though, and that is all we can\\nsay occurred here. But in closing it does seem prudent to offer\\nthe limited observation that CPD would do well to revisit its\\npreservation protocol—all to protect the interests of CPD it-\\nself, citizens, and those like Holly who find themselves\\ncharged with crime.\\n Seeing no violation of Holly’s rights here, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448041/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670788/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. David Holly\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1216\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nDAVID HOLLY,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:16-cr-00485-1 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Unreasonable seizures violate the\nFourth Amendment while voluntary encounters with the po-\nlice do not. This case implicates the dividing line. A police of-\nficer rushed to approach David Holly in Chicago’s Altgeld\nGardens Housing Complex and asked if he had a gun. Holly\nanswered yes, which resulted in his arrest and subsequent\nconviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Holly\nlater moved to suppress the gun, contending that the officer’s\n\f2 No. 19-1216\n\napproach and questioning constituted an impermissible sei-\nzure. The district court denied that motion after finding that\nHolly consented to the encounter. We agree and affirm. In the\ntotality of circumstances, Holly’s interaction with police fell\non the voluntary side of the line.\n I\n A\n On December 31, 2015, Officers Robert Caulfield and Jo-\nseph Byrne of the Chicago Police Department were patrolling\nthe Altgeld Gardens Housing Complex, a public housing pro-\nject in the city’s far south side. The officers were in uniform\nand on patrol as part of a CPD effort to increase police visibil-\nity in anticipation of celebratory gunfire to usher in the new\nyear. They drove an unmarked black Ford, which Officer\nByrne later testified locals recognized as a police car. While\nsitting in the car, Officers Byrne and Caulfield saw David\nHolly walking on a sidewalk inside a courtyard of the com-\nplex.\n The parties dispute what happened next, but all agree that\nthe police approached Holly in the courtyard and asked him\nif he had a gun. Holly immediately said yes. The police then\nconfiscated the gun and arrested him. A grand jury later in-\ndicted Holly for possessing a firearm following a prior felony\nconviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to\nsuppress the gun, arguing that his encounter with the police\nwas an impermissible seizure. He also moved to dismiss the\nindictment, contending that the police’s failure to preserve\nvideo footage of his arrest and activity leading to it violated\nhis due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\n(1963). The district court held a hearing on both issues and\n\fNo. 19-1216 3\n\nheard competing testimony from Holly and the police. It then\ndenied Holly’s motions.\n The testimony from the hearing frames the issues on ap-\npeal. The officers testified that they had entered a parking lot\nin Altgeld Gardens to get a better view of the interior court-\nyard, which Officer Byrne considered a high-crime area based\non arrests he had made there before. Around 4:00 p.m., Officer\nByrne saw Holly walking on a sidewalk toward the police car.\nOfficer Byrne said that as Holly neared the car, he made eye\ncontact with the officers, formed a surprised and anxious\nlook, and then turned sharply and walked swiftly in another\ndirection, ultimately making his way behind a building and\nout of the officers’ sight. Both officers testified that Officer\nCaulfield then jogged after Holly and found him inside the\ncourtyard, standing outside an apartment door and ringing\nthe doorbell. (An occupant later told the officers she did not\nknow Holly.)\n Officer Caulfield said that he identified himself as police\nand asked Holly a single question: Do you have drugs or a\ngun? Yes, Holly replied, he had a gun in his pocket. Officer\nCaulfield took the gun and from there turned Holly toward a\nwall to arrest him. By then Officer Byrne had reached the\napartment and assisted Officer Caulfield by handcuffing\nHolly. Both officers testified that at no point did they draw\ntheir own guns or touch Holly before placing him under ar-\nrest. A third officer, Raul Casales, responded to a backup call\nand met Officers Caulfield and Byrne about 15 to 20 seconds\nafter Holly’s arrest. Officer Casales testified that he had\ndrawn his gun but never pointed it at Holly.\n Holly offered a starkly different account. He testified that\nhe never saw the police car or made eye contact with any\n\f4 No. 19-1216\n\nofficer before being stopped and handcuffed. Holly instead\nstated that he was ringing a friend’s doorbell when he saw\nOfficer Caulfield run around the corner and approach him\nwith his gun drawn. According to Holly, Officer Caulfield\nthen demanded that he put his hands up, grabbed him, and\ntold him he was being stopped because there were burglaries\nin the neighborhood. Holly added that he did not feel free to\nleave because he had lived in the neighborhood for decades\nand knew the police stops there to be aggressive. Holly also\ndiverged from the officers’ accounts regarding the sequence\nof events surrounding his arrest. He insisted that Officer Caul-\nfield patted him down, found a bulge, and only then asked if\nhe had a gun. By the time Officer Byrne arrived, Holly contin-\nued, Officer Caulfield had confiscated the gun and put his\nown gun away.\n After considering the competing testimony, the district\ncourt credited the officers’ testimony. The district court ex-\nplained that the accounts of Officers Caulfield, Byrne, and\nCasales were consistent with each other. The district court\nnoted that the officers’ testimony made more sense than\nHolly’s, observing in particular that the police do not typi-\ncally draw their weapons on an unarmed offender or at close\nrange. By contrast, the district court found Holly less credible\ngiven his criminal history and the fact that he had offered\nthree shifting explanations for why he had a gun. Having\ncredited the officers’ accounts, the district court then con-\ncluded that Holly’s encounter with the police was consensual\nand denied his motion to suppress.\n B\n The district court also heard testimony about Holly’s sec-\nond claim on appeal—that he was denied due process when\n\fNo. 19-1216 5\n\nthe police failed to preserve a video taken near his arrest. On\nthis score, the facts are straightforward and unfortunate.\n Immediately after Holly’s arrest, Detective Peter Scatena\nand Officers Byrne and Caulfield reviewed a video from the\nonly nearby camera that captured what transpired. Detective\nScatena then called Carlos Mackie, an analyst with the Chi-\ncago Housing Authority, to request a copy of the video. When\nMackie did not answer, Detective Scatena left a voicemail\n(consistent with CPD protocol). What Detective Scatena did\nnot know was that Mackie was on military leave and out of\nthe office for an extended period. He never heard back from\nMackie, followed up on the voicemail, or sought the video\nsome other way. And because CHA cameras automatically re-\nwrite footage after 15 to 30 days, the video taken near Holly’s\narrest was eventually overwritten and thus no longer availa-\nble.\n The district court heard conflicting testimony of what the\nvideo revealed before it was overwritten. For his part, Detec-\ntive Scatena testified that the footage showed Holly in the\ncourtyard walking at a hurried pace with two CPD officers\nfollowing “side by side” in the same direction. (Recall that Of-\nficers Byrne and Caulfield had testified that Officer Caulfield\npursued Holly ahead of Officer Byrne.) Detective Scatena also\nstated that the video did not show Holly after he was hand-\ncuffed. By contrast, Officer Byrne testified that the video only\ndepicted Officer Caulfield standing near Holly after he was\nhandcuffed—not the events leading up to the arrest.\n While these accounts differed, the district court found the\ninconsistencies minor and understandable given the passage\nof time and the number of arrests that the police make in the\nordinary course. The district court underscored that no one\n\f6 No. 19-1216\n\nwho watched the video (before it was overwritten) testified\nthat it depicted Holly’s arrest. Because Holly had not estab-\nlished that the video was potentially exculpatory or that the\npolice acted in bad faith by failing to preserve it, the court de-\nnied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of a due\nprocess violation.\n The ensuing bench trial resulted in Holly’s conviction of\nunlawful gun possession. The district court then sentenced\nHolly to 90 months’ imprisonment and imposed 36 months’\nsupervised release.\n II\n A\n Not every police encounter implicates the Fourth Amend-\nment. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.\n2015) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)). A sei-\nzure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes\nplace if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would\nnot feel free to leave. Id. A consensual encounter, on the other\nhand, takes place if a reasonable person would feel free to ig-\nnore the police and go about his business. Id.\n In determining whether an encounter is consensual, we\nconsider several factors:\n where the interaction took place, including\n whether it was in public;\n how many police officers were present;\n the extent to which the police presence was\n threatening;\n whether the officers made any show of\n weapons or physical force;\n the officers’ language and tone;\n\fNo. 19-1216 7\n\n whether the police suggested the defendant\n was suspected of crime; and\n whether officers told the defendant he was\n free to leave.\nSee id. These factors “are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.”\nUnited States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\nUnited States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).\n B\n We agree with the district court that Holly’s encounter\nwith the police was voluntary. It is undisputed that the police\nspoke to Holly in public and never stopped him, redirected\nhis route, or otherwise obstructed his walking on the sidewalk\nor through the courtyard. Officer Caulfield approached Holly\nand put a question to him—do you have drugs or a gun?—\nthat he immediately chose to answer. See Florida v. Royer, 460\nU.S. 491, 497 (1983) (explaining that the police do not violate\nthe Fourth Amendment by merely approaching a person in\npublic and asking him questions); see also Shields, 789 F.3d at\n743–44.\n The district court’s other findings, which Holly has not\nshown are clearly erroneous, support its conclusion that the\nencounter was consensual. The district court reasonably cred-\nited the officers’ accounts over Holly’s. It found Holly’s testi-\nmony strained and implausible: he was a four-time convicted\nfelon, had an incentive to lie to escape punishment, and in the\ncourse of proceedings, offered three inconsistent explanations\nfor why he had a gun. By contrast, the district court found that\nthe officers had no incentive at the time of the incident to en-\ngage in misconduct (as they likely believed everything was\nbeing captured on camera) and no incentive to lie in their\n\f8 No. 19-1216\n\ntestimony after the fact. Considering each party’s position\nand taking stock of their comparative credibility, the district\ncourt was on solid footing in crediting the officers’ version of\nevents. See United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir.\n2007) (emphasizing that a district court’s determination of\nwitness credibility “can virtually never be clear error”).\n Against this backdrop, the district court concluded that\nHolly’s encounter with the police was voluntary. It found that\nOfficer Caulfield was alone when he jogged after Holly and\nmade no show of force—he did not pull a gun, touch Holly,\nor tell him to put his hands up. Rather, upon catching up with\nHolly, Officer Caulfield promptly asked a direct question—\ndo you have drugs or a gun?—and instantly received an\nequally direct answer—yes. The question was not advanced\nin a coercive tone or with an accompanying threat. Given\nthese circumstances, a reasonable person in Holly’s shoes\nwould have felt free to leave. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439;\nUnited States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2006)\n(holding that an encounter was consensual where three offic-\ners approached a defendant in public and did not show weap-\nons, touch him, or use a tone or language that would have\ncommunicated to the defendant that he was seized).\n Holly disagrees. He sees this case on all fours with our de-\ncision in United States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2015).\nThere Dontray Smith was walking alone at night when two\narmed and uniformed police officers waited for him to enter\nan alley. Id. at 684. The officers then rode their bicycles past\nSmith into the alley and made a U-turn to face him, obstruct-\ning his path forward. Id. at 685. From there one officer stepped\noff his bike, approached Smith with his hand on his gun, and\n“posed a single, accusatory question to Smith: ‘Are you in\n\fNo. 19-1216 9\n\npossession of any guns, knives, weapons, or anything ille-\ngal?’” Id. Considering the location, the threatening presence\nof multiple officers, the aggressive nature of the questioning,\nand the fact that the police blocked Smith’s path, we con-\ncluded that the encounter constituted a seizure. Id.\n Holly is right that in both cases the police were in uniform,\napproached the defendant, and asked about a gun. But the\nsimilarities end there. The district court found that a single\nofficer spoke with Holly in an open courtyard in the after-\nnoon. Unlike the police in Smith, Officer Caulfield did not\nblock Holly’s path or draw his weapon, and the tone of his\nquestion did not compel an answer.\n No doubt that line-drawing in this area of law is difficult\nand requires a careful parsing of exactly what took place be-\ntween the police and the accused. But “[i]t is well established\nthat a seizure does not occur merely because a police officer\napproaches an individual and asks him or her questions.” Id.\nat 684. The district court proceeded carefully by holding a\nhearing, considering the competing testimony, assessing\ncredibility, and ultimately finding that Officer Caulfield ap-\nproached Holly and asked him a question—nothing more.\nUnder these circumstances, Holly’s encounter with the police\nwas voluntary.\n III\n Holly also renews his argument in the name of Brady v.\nMaryland that the police violated his due process rights by\nfailing to preserve CHA video footage of the arrest and events\nleading to it. We start from a different legal marker. The\nproper framework for evaluating Holly’s claim comes not\nfrom Brady, but rather from Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51\n\f10 No. 19-1216\n\n(1988). While Brady requires that the government disclose ev-\nidence materially favorable to the defendant “irrespective of\nthe good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” see 373 U.S. at\n87, Holly’s claim is that the police failed to preserve only po-\ntentially exculpatory evidence.\n Under Youngblood, the police’s failure to preserve poten-\ntially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due pro-\ncess unless the defendant can show that the police acted in\nbad faith. See 488 U.S. at 58. That standard requires proof of\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence\nand turns on an official’s subjective knowledge that the evi-\ndence had exculpatory value. See United States v. Cherry, 920\nF.3d 1126, 1140 (7th Cir. 2019). In addition to bad faith, the\ndefendant must show that the exculpatory nature of the evi-\ndence was apparent before its destruction and that he could\nnot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See id.\n Holly has not made these necessary showings. Detective\nScatena made a clear effort to preserve the video: he left a\nvoicemail requesting the video from the CHA and did so in\naccordance with CPD policy. Detective Scatena did not know\nthat the analyst he contacted was on military leave. His failure\nto follow up may have been negligent, but it does not prove\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress the video. And mere\nnegligence by police does not amount to a constitutional vio-\nlation. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.\n Nor has Holly shown that the lost video had apparent ex-\nculpatory value. Detective Scatena and Officers Byrne and\nCaulfield each testified that the video did not show the actual\narrest. Their testimony was consistent on this score, leading\nthe district court to find that the video did not show the initial\nencounter between Holly and the police and thus that any\n\fNo. 19-1216 11\n\nfootage “was neither exculpatory nor inculpatory.” On these\nfacts, the district court correctly concluded that the police did\nnot violate Holly’s due process rights under Youngblood.\n To be sure, the failure of the police to preserve the video is\nunfortunate. Mistakes happen, though, and that is all we can\nsay occurred here. But in closing it does seem prudent to offer\nthe limited observation that CPD would do well to revisit its\npreservation protocol—all to protect the interests of CPD it-\nself, citizens, and those like Holly who find themselves\ncharged with crime.\n Seeing no violation of Holly’s rights here, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. David Holly\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1216\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDAVID HOLLY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00485-1 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Unreasonable seizures violate the\\nFourth Amendment while voluntary encounters with the po-\\nlice do not. This case implicates the dividing line. A police of-\\nficer rushed to approach David Holly in Chicago’s Altgeld\\nGardens Housing Complex and asked if he had a gun. Holly\\nanswered yes, which resulted in his arrest and subsequent\\nconviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Holly\\nlater moved to suppress the gun, contending that the officer’s\\n\\f2 No. 19-1216\\n\\napproach and questioning constituted an impermissible sei-\\nzure. The district court denied that motion after finding that\\nHolly consented to the encounter. We agree and affirm. In the\\ntotality of circumstances, Holly’s interaction with police fell\\non the voluntary side of the line.\\n I\\n A\\n On December 31, 2015, Officers Robert Caulfield and Jo-\\nseph Byrne of the Chicago Police Department were patrolling\\nthe Altgeld Gardens Housing Complex, a public housing pro-\\nject in the city’s far south side. The officers were in uniform\\nand on patrol as part of a CPD effort to increase police visibil-\\nity in anticipation of celebratory gunfire to usher in the new\\nyear. They drove an unmarked black Ford, which Officer\\nByrne later testified locals recognized as a police car. While\\nsitting in the car, Officers Byrne and Caulfield saw David\\nHolly walking on a sidewalk inside a courtyard of the com-\\nplex.\\n The parties dispute what happened next, but all agree that\\nthe police approached Holly in the courtyard and asked him\\nif he had a gun. Holly immediately said yes. The police then\\nconfiscated the gun and arrested him. A grand jury later in-\\ndicted Holly for possessing a firearm following a prior felony\\nconviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to\\nsuppress the gun, arguing that his encounter with the police\\nwas an impermissible seizure. He also moved to dismiss the\\nindictment, contending that the police’s failure to preserve\\nvideo footage of his arrest and activity leading to it violated\\nhis due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\\n(1963). The district court held a hearing on both issues and\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 3\\n\\nheard competing testimony from Holly and the police. It then\\ndenied Holly’s motions.\\n The testimony from the hearing frames the issues on ap-\\npeal. The officers testified that they had entered a parking lot\\nin Altgeld Gardens to get a better view of the interior court-\\nyard, which Officer Byrne considered a high-crime area based\\non arrests he had made there before. Around 4:00 p.m., Officer\\nByrne saw Holly walking on a sidewalk toward the police car.\\nOfficer Byrne said that as Holly neared the car, he made eye\\ncontact with the officers, formed a surprised and anxious\\nlook, and then turned sharply and walked swiftly in another\\ndirection, ultimately making his way behind a building and\\nout of the officers’ sight. Both officers testified that Officer\\nCaulfield then jogged after Holly and found him inside the\\ncourtyard, standing outside an apartment door and ringing\\nthe doorbell. (An occupant later told the officers she did not\\nknow Holly.)\\n Officer Caulfield said that he identified himself as police\\nand asked Holly a single question: Do you have drugs or a\\ngun? Yes, Holly replied, he had a gun in his pocket. Officer\\nCaulfield took the gun and from there turned Holly toward a\\nwall to arrest him. By then Officer Byrne had reached the\\napartment and assisted Officer Caulfield by handcuffing\\nHolly. Both officers testified that at no point did they draw\\ntheir own guns or touch Holly before placing him under ar-\\nrest. A third officer, Raul Casales, responded to a backup call\\nand met Officers Caulfield and Byrne about 15 to 20 seconds\\nafter Holly’s arrest. Officer Casales testified that he had\\ndrawn his gun but never pointed it at Holly.\\n Holly offered a starkly different account. He testified that\\nhe never saw the police car or made eye contact with any\\n\\f4 No. 19-1216\\n\\nofficer before being stopped and handcuffed. Holly instead\\nstated that he was ringing a friend’s doorbell when he saw\\nOfficer Caulfield run around the corner and approach him\\nwith his gun drawn. According to Holly, Officer Caulfield\\nthen demanded that he put his hands up, grabbed him, and\\ntold him he was being stopped because there were burglaries\\nin the neighborhood. Holly added that he did not feel free to\\nleave because he had lived in the neighborhood for decades\\nand knew the police stops there to be aggressive. Holly also\\ndiverged from the officers’ accounts regarding the sequence\\nof events surrounding his arrest. He insisted that Officer Caul-\\nfield patted him down, found a bulge, and only then asked if\\nhe had a gun. By the time Officer Byrne arrived, Holly contin-\\nued, Officer Caulfield had confiscated the gun and put his\\nown gun away.\\n After considering the competing testimony, the district\\ncourt credited the officers’ testimony. The district court ex-\\nplained that the accounts of Officers Caulfield, Byrne, and\\nCasales were consistent with each other. The district court\\nnoted that the officers’ testimony made more sense than\\nHolly’s, observing in particular that the police do not typi-\\ncally draw their weapons on an unarmed offender or at close\\nrange. By contrast, the district court found Holly less credible\\ngiven his criminal history and the fact that he had offered\\nthree shifting explanations for why he had a gun. Having\\ncredited the officers’ accounts, the district court then con-\\ncluded that Holly’s encounter with the police was consensual\\nand denied his motion to suppress.\\n B\\n The district court also heard testimony about Holly’s sec-\\nond claim on appeal—that he was denied due process when\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 5\\n\\nthe police failed to preserve a video taken near his arrest. On\\nthis score, the facts are straightforward and unfortunate.\\n Immediately after Holly’s arrest, Detective Peter Scatena\\nand Officers Byrne and Caulfield reviewed a video from the\\nonly nearby camera that captured what transpired. Detective\\nScatena then called Carlos Mackie, an analyst with the Chi-\\ncago Housing Authority, to request a copy of the video. When\\nMackie did not answer, Detective Scatena left a voicemail\\n(consistent with CPD protocol). What Detective Scatena did\\nnot know was that Mackie was on military leave and out of\\nthe office for an extended period. He never heard back from\\nMackie, followed up on the voicemail, or sought the video\\nsome other way. And because CHA cameras automatically re-\\nwrite footage after 15 to 30 days, the video taken near Holly’s\\narrest was eventually overwritten and thus no longer availa-\\nble.\\n The district court heard conflicting testimony of what the\\nvideo revealed before it was overwritten. For his part, Detec-\\ntive Scatena testified that the footage showed Holly in the\\ncourtyard walking at a hurried pace with two CPD officers\\nfollowing “side by side” in the same direction. (Recall that Of-\\nficers Byrne and Caulfield had testified that Officer Caulfield\\npursued Holly ahead of Officer Byrne.) Detective Scatena also\\nstated that the video did not show Holly after he was hand-\\ncuffed. By contrast, Officer Byrne testified that the video only\\ndepicted Officer Caulfield standing near Holly after he was\\nhandcuffed—not the events leading up to the arrest.\\n While these accounts differed, the district court found the\\ninconsistencies minor and understandable given the passage\\nof time and the number of arrests that the police make in the\\nordinary course. The district court underscored that no one\\n\\f6 No. 19-1216\\n\\nwho watched the video (before it was overwritten) testified\\nthat it depicted Holly’s arrest. Because Holly had not estab-\\nlished that the video was potentially exculpatory or that the\\npolice acted in bad faith by failing to preserve it, the court de-\\nnied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of a due\\nprocess violation.\\n The ensuing bench trial resulted in Holly’s conviction of\\nunlawful gun possession. The district court then sentenced\\nHolly to 90 months’ imprisonment and imposed 36 months’\\nsupervised release.\\n II\\n A\\n Not every police encounter implicates the Fourth Amend-\\nment. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)). A sei-\\nzure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes\\nplace if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would\\nnot feel free to leave. Id. A consensual encounter, on the other\\nhand, takes place if a reasonable person would feel free to ig-\\nnore the police and go about his business. Id.\\n In determining whether an encounter is consensual, we\\nconsider several factors:\\n where the interaction took place, including\\n whether it was in public;\\n how many police officers were present;\\n the extent to which the police presence was\\n threatening;\\n whether the officers made any show of\\n weapons or physical force;\\n the officers’ language and tone;\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 7\\n\\n whether the police suggested the defendant\\n was suspected of crime; and\\n whether officers told the defendant he was\\n free to leave.\\nSee id. These factors “are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.”\\nUnited States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\\nUnited States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).\\n B\\n We agree with the district court that Holly’s encounter\\nwith the police was voluntary. It is undisputed that the police\\nspoke to Holly in public and never stopped him, redirected\\nhis route, or otherwise obstructed his walking on the sidewalk\\nor through the courtyard. Officer Caulfield approached Holly\\nand put a question to him—do you have drugs or a gun?—\\nthat he immediately chose to answer. See Florida v. Royer, 460\\nU.S. 491, 497 (1983) (explaining that the police do not violate\\nthe Fourth Amendment by merely approaching a person in\\npublic and asking him questions); see also Shields, 789 F.3d at\\n743–44.\\n The district court’s other findings, which Holly has not\\nshown are clearly erroneous, support its conclusion that the\\nencounter was consensual. The district court reasonably cred-\\nited the officers’ accounts over Holly’s. It found Holly’s testi-\\nmony strained and implausible: he was a four-time convicted\\nfelon, had an incentive to lie to escape punishment, and in the\\ncourse of proceedings, offered three inconsistent explanations\\nfor why he had a gun. By contrast, the district court found that\\nthe officers had no incentive at the time of the incident to en-\\ngage in misconduct (as they likely believed everything was\\nbeing captured on camera) and no incentive to lie in their\\n\\f8 No. 19-1216\\n\\ntestimony after the fact. Considering each party’s position\\nand taking stock of their comparative credibility, the district\\ncourt was on solid footing in crediting the officers’ version of\\nevents. See United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir.\\n2007) (emphasizing that a district court’s determination of\\nwitness credibility “can virtually never be clear error”).\\n Against this backdrop, the district court concluded that\\nHolly’s encounter with the police was voluntary. It found that\\nOfficer Caulfield was alone when he jogged after Holly and\\nmade no show of force—he did not pull a gun, touch Holly,\\nor tell him to put his hands up. Rather, upon catching up with\\nHolly, Officer Caulfield promptly asked a direct question—\\ndo you have drugs or a gun?—and instantly received an\\nequally direct answer—yes. The question was not advanced\\nin a coercive tone or with an accompanying threat. Given\\nthese circumstances, a reasonable person in Holly’s shoes\\nwould have felt free to leave. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439;\\nUnited States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2006)\\n(holding that an encounter was consensual where three offic-\\ners approached a defendant in public and did not show weap-\\nons, touch him, or use a tone or language that would have\\ncommunicated to the defendant that he was seized).\\n Holly disagrees. He sees this case on all fours with our de-\\ncision in United States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2015).\\nThere Dontray Smith was walking alone at night when two\\narmed and uniformed police officers waited for him to enter\\nan alley. Id. at 684. The officers then rode their bicycles past\\nSmith into the alley and made a U-turn to face him, obstruct-\\ning his path forward. Id. at 685. From there one officer stepped\\noff his bike, approached Smith with his hand on his gun, and\\n“posed a single, accusatory question to Smith: ‘Are you in\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 9\\n\\npossession of any guns, knives, weapons, or anything ille-\\ngal?’” Id. Considering the location, the threatening presence\\nof multiple officers, the aggressive nature of the questioning,\\nand the fact that the police blocked Smith’s path, we con-\\ncluded that the encounter constituted a seizure. Id.\\n Holly is right that in both cases the police were in uniform,\\napproached the defendant, and asked about a gun. But the\\nsimilarities end there. The district court found that a single\\nofficer spoke with Holly in an open courtyard in the after-\\nnoon. Unlike the police in Smith, Officer Caulfield did not\\nblock Holly’s path or draw his weapon, and the tone of his\\nquestion did not compel an answer.\\n No doubt that line-drawing in this area of law is difficult\\nand requires a careful parsing of exactly what took place be-\\ntween the police and the accused. But “[i]t is well established\\nthat a seizure does not occur merely because a police officer\\napproaches an individual and asks him or her questions.” Id.\\nat 684. The district court proceeded carefully by holding a\\nhearing, considering the competing testimony, assessing\\ncredibility, and ultimately finding that Officer Caulfield ap-\\nproached Holly and asked him a question—nothing more.\\nUnder these circumstances, Holly’s encounter with the police\\nwas voluntary.\\n III\\n Holly also renews his argument in the name of Brady v.\\nMaryland that the police violated his due process rights by\\nfailing to preserve CHA video footage of the arrest and events\\nleading to it. We start from a different legal marker. The\\nproper framework for evaluating Holly’s claim comes not\\nfrom Brady, but rather from Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51\\n\\f10 No. 19-1216\\n\\n(1988). While Brady requires that the government disclose ev-\\nidence materially favorable to the defendant “irrespective of\\nthe good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” see 373 U.S. at\\n87, Holly’s claim is that the police failed to preserve only po-\\ntentially exculpatory evidence.\\n Under Youngblood, the police’s failure to preserve poten-\\ntially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due pro-\\ncess unless the defendant can show that the police acted in\\nbad faith. See 488 U.S. at 58. That standard requires proof of\\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence\\nand turns on an official’s subjective knowledge that the evi-\\ndence had exculpatory value. See United States v. Cherry, 920\\nF.3d 1126, 1140 (7th Cir. 2019). In addition to bad faith, the\\ndefendant must show that the exculpatory nature of the evi-\\ndence was apparent before its destruction and that he could\\nnot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See id.\\n Holly has not made these necessary showings. Detective\\nScatena made a clear effort to preserve the video: he left a\\nvoicemail requesting the video from the CHA and did so in\\naccordance with CPD policy. Detective Scatena did not know\\nthat the analyst he contacted was on military leave. His failure\\nto follow up may have been negligent, but it does not prove\\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress the video. And mere\\nnegligence by police does not amount to a constitutional vio-\\nlation. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.\\n Nor has Holly shown that the lost video had apparent ex-\\nculpatory value. Detective Scatena and Officers Byrne and\\nCaulfield each testified that the video did not show the actual\\narrest. Their testimony was consistent on this score, leading\\nthe district court to find that the video did not show the initial\\nencounter between Holly and the police and thus that any\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 11\\n\\nfootage “was neither exculpatory nor inculpatory.” On these\\nfacts, the district court correctly concluded that the police did\\nnot violate Holly’s due process rights under Youngblood.\\n To be sure, the failure of the police to preserve the video is\\nunfortunate. Mistakes happen, though, and that is all we can\\nsay occurred here. But in closing it does seem prudent to offer\\nthe limited observation that CPD would do well to revisit its\\npreservation protocol—all to protect the interests of CPD it-\\nself, citizens, and those like Holly who find themselves\\ncharged with crime.\\n Seeing no violation of Holly’s rights here, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4673,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670789,"string":"4,670,789"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Lisa Ulrey v. William Reichhart"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1221"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before SYKES, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1221\\nLISA ULREY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM REICHHART and\\nSCHOOL BOARD OF MANCHESTER COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:16-cv-257-JD — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Lisa Ulrey served as the\\nassistant principal of the Manchester Junior-Senior High\\nSchool until November 4, 2014, when she resigned during a\\nmeeting with William Reichhart, the school district’s superin-\\ntendent. Ulrey brings two claims in this suit under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983 against Reichhart and the school board. First, she\\nclaims that Reichhart violated her rights under the First\\n\\f2 No. 19-1221\\n\\nAmendment by retaliating against her for her speech about a\\nstudent discipline issue. Second, she contends that the de-\\nfendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by coerc-\\ning her to resign, depriving her of her property interest in her\\njob without due process of law. The district court granted\\nsummary judgment to the defendants on both claims. We af-\\nfirm. Undisputed facts show that Ulrey spoke about the dis-\\ncipline issue in her capacity as an employee, so the First\\nAmendment did not protect her speech. Ulrey also failed to\\npresent evidence sufficient to support a finding that her res-\\nignation was involuntary.\\nI. Claim for First Amendment Retaliation\\n Citizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by\\naccepting public employment, but legal doctrine in this field\\ntries to maintain a careful balance between the interests of the\\nemployee as a citizen and the interests of the employer-gov-\\nernment in serving the public. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 231\\n(2014), citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568\\n(1968). The First Amendment claim here arises from a disa-\\ngreement between plaintiff Ulrey and defendant Reichhart\\nconcerning student discipline. Because we review a grant of\\nsummary judgment against Ulrey, we recount facts in the\\nlight reasonably most favorable to her. See Healy v. City of Chi-\\ncago, 450 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n In August 2014, Superintendent Reichhart granted an\\nadult student permission to possess cigarettes (though not to\\nsmoke them) on school grounds. Ulrey learned of that deci-\\nsion and disagreed with it. Without approaching Reichhart\\nfirst, Ulrey called the president of the school board, Sally\\nKrouse. Krouse in turn emailed Reichhart to express her con-\\ncern about his decision. Reichhart then rebuked Ulrey for\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 3\\n\\ngoing over his head, threatening to reprimand her formally if\\nshe did not apologize. She did apologize. She claims in this\\nlawsuit, however, that Reichhart forced her to resign three\\nmonths later to retaliate against her for her call to Krouse.\\n In maintaining the critical balance under the Pickering and\\nLane line of cases, the threshold question in a public em-\\nployee’s First Amendment retaliation suit is whether the em-\\nployee’s speech was constitutionally protected. E.g., Swetlik v.\\nCrawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013). If Ulrey’s call to\\nKrouse had been protected speech, then we would need to\\ndecide whether Ulrey presented evidence that her call moti-\\nvated Reichhart to inflict on her deprivations likely to deter\\nspeech. Id.\\n We do not need to reach those issues, however, because\\nUlrey’s speech was unprotected as a matter of law. See Con-\\nnick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983) (noting that the “in-\\nquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not\\nfact”). Ulrey’s claim fails at this first step. The undisputed\\nfacts show that she spoke to Krouse as an employee, not a pri-\\nvate citizen. “In order for a public employee to raise a success-\\nful First Amendment claim for her employer’s restriction of\\nher speech, the speech must be in her capacity as a private\\ncitizen and not as an employee.” McArdle v. Peoria School Dist.\\nNo. 150, 705 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2013). The test for distin-\\nguishing private speech from employee speech is whether the\\nemployees speak “pursuant to their official duties.” Spiegla v.\\nHull, 481 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Garcetti v. Ce-\\nballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).\\n Ulrey argues that reporting the superintendent’s alleged\\nmisconduct or violation of district policy on tobacco fell out-\\nside her official duties. Since the Supreme Court decided\\n\\f4 No. 19-1221\\n\\nGarcetti, however, we have repeatedly rejected such claims for\\na whistleblower carve-out from the category of unprotected\\nemployee speech. In Garcetti, the employee wrote a memoran-\\ndum detailing governmental misconduct. The Supreme Court\\nheld that his speech was unprotected because the memoran-\\ndum “was written pursuant to [his] official duties.” 547 U.S.\\nat 421. Garcetti suggested that “legislative enactments” such\\nas “whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes,” rather\\nthan the First Amendment, ought to protect employees\\nobliged to report official misconduct as part of their job. Id. at\\n425.\\n Shortly after Garcetti was decided, we applied it to a case\\nlike Ulrey’s. In Spiegla, a prison guard stationed at the main\\ngate reported her supervisor for letting a vehicle pass without\\nthe required search for contraband. See 481 F.3d at 962–63. We\\nheld that the guard “spoke as an employee, not a citizen, be-\\ncause ensuring compliance with prison security policy was\\npart of what she was employed to do.” Id. at 966. The fact that\\nher statements “highlighted potential misconduct by prison\\nofficers” did not affect the analysis under Garcetti. Id. at 967.\\n As the district court recognized, we have applied this rea-\\nsoning in many different employment contexts. See, e.g., Ku-\\nbiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016) (police\\nofficer reporting misconduct of co-worker); McArdle, 705 F.3d\\nat 753 (school principal reporting misconduct of district aca-\\ndemic officer); Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.\\n2008) (professor reporting misconduct of dean); Vose v.\\nKliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007) (police supervisor re-\\nporting misconduct of detectives); see also Ulrey v. Reichhart,\\n2018 WL 6435652, at *4–6 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2018).\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 5\\n\\n This line of decisions—which Ulrey failed to acknowledge\\nor address in the district court and on appeal, even after the\\ndistrict court relied upon them—required summary judg-\\nment for defendants. Even if Superintendent Reichhart vio-\\nlated school district policy by making an exception allowing\\nan adult student to possess cigarettes when he attended\\nschool, Ulrey’s speech fell within her official duties. Her writ-\\nten job description included duties to “coordinate and admin-\\nister student attendance and discipline policies,” just as the\\nguard in Spiegla was paid to monitor vehicles coming into the\\nprison. Ulrey’s complaint to the school board president fell\\nwithin the scope of her job and was unprotected employee\\nspeech, not protected citizen speech.\\n The two cases that Ulrey relies on do not help her position.\\nIn both Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014), and Chrzanowski v.\\nBianchi, 725 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013), the plaintiffs’ speech was\\nprotected because they spoke as citizens, in non-employee ca-\\npacities, not because they reported misconduct. In Lane, the\\nSupreme Court held that sworn testimony given under sub-\\npoena in a criminal trial was citizen speech even though the\\nplaintiff was testifying against a former co-worker about mis-\\nconduct in their office. 573 U.S. at 239. Similarly, in\\nChrzanowski, we held that a prosecutor who testified against\\nhis supervisor before a grand jury and at trial spoke as a citi-\\nzen. 725 F.3d at 739–40. These cases turned on the speech’s\\ncontext, not its content. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 240 (“The critical\\nquestion under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself\\nordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not\\nwhether it merely concerns those duties.”); see also Swetlik,\\n738 F.3d at 826 (observing that employee’s statements in po-\\nlice union meetings and grievances reporting police chief’s\\nmisconduct submitted by plaintiff in his capacity as a union\\n\\f6 No. 19-1221\\n\\nmember were not employee speech). Ulrey’s call to the school\\nboard president was not comparable to sworn testimony be-\\nfore a court or grand jury.\\n Ulrey raises one other point that, she argues, creates a dis-\\npute of material fact to preclude summary judgment. The\\nadult student whom Reichhart had allowed to possess ciga-\\nrettes attended a special program called “Squire Academy”—\\nnamed for the school mascot—that operated somewhat inde-\\npendently from the high school. Accepting Ulrey’s allegations\\nas true, her authority to enforce the student handbook did not\\nextend to Squire Academy students. Ulrey argues that her\\nspeech to Krouse thus fell outside her duties as assistant prin-\\ncipal.\\n We disagree. This administrative division cannot bear the\\nweight Ulrey places on it. Squire Academy occupied the same\\nbuilding complex as the high school, and Ulrey states that she\\nhad “administrative responsibility” over the “physical class-\\nroom” in which it met. Explaining her decision to call Krouse,\\nUlrey testified that “students should not be allowed to have\\ntobacco on school property for any reason” because it was\\n“against the student handbook.” She also confirmed that she\\nwas “angry because of [her] role in enforcing the handbook.”\\nSquire Academy disciplinary decisions bore closely on\\nUlrey’s duties even if she lacked total control over them, and\\nwe do not parse the precise scope of employees’ duties as\\nfinely as Ulrey argues. See, e.g., Vose, 506 F.3d at 571 (holding\\nthat police officer’s report of misconduct in a separate unit of\\nthe police department was employee speech). The district\\ncourt correctly granted summary judgment on the First\\nAmendment claim.\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 7\\n\\nII. Claim for Denial of Due Process\\n Ulrey’s due-process claim stems from her resignation on\\nNovember 4, 2014, three months after her call to the school\\nboard president. When a public employee has a property in-\\nterest in his or her continued employment, typically shown\\nby proving that the employee may be fired only for good\\ncause, the state may not terminate the employment without\\ndue process of law. E.g., Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679,\\n681 (7th Cir. 2003); see generally Cleveland Board of Education\\nv. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Board of Regents v. Roth,\\n408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Reichhart and the School Board agree\\nthat Ulrey had a protected interest in continued employment.\\nIndiana gives public school teachers and administrators stat-\\nutory protections that spell out the details of procedures used\\nto vindicate this due process right. See Ind. Code § 20-28-7.5-\\n1 et seq. (2014) (teachers); Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2 (2014) (prin-\\ncipals and assistant principals). 1\\n If Reichhart had tried to fire Ulrey, these procedural pro-\\ntections would have been available to her. She did not invoke\\nthese procedural protections because she resigned. The gen-\\neral rule is that an employee who resigns—voluntarily relin-\\nquishing her interest in continued employment—may not\\ncomplain of a lack of due process. See Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d\\n447, 453 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of due-process\\nclaim by employee who resigned). There are narrow excep-\\ntions, however. In Palka we identified two types of\\n\\n 1 Principals and assistant principals like Ulrey work under the regular\\nteacher’s contract. See Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2(1). Indiana substantially re-\\nvised the grounds and procedures for cancelling teacher contracts in 2011,\\nbut those amendments are not relevant here. See Elliott v. Bd. of School\\nTrustees of Madison Consol. Schools, 876 F.3d 926, 928–30 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\f8 No. 19-1221\\n\\n“involuntary resignation” that amount to termination: con-\\nstructive discharge and coerced resignation. “Constructive\\ndischarge” is akin to a hostile work environment claim and\\nmay occur “when an employer makes employment so un-\\nbearable that an employee resigns.” Id.; see Pennsylvania State\\nPolice v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2004) (explaining com-\\nparison to hostile work environment). Coerced resignation,\\non the other hand, is “characterized by the presence of a Hob-\\nson’s choice in which the employee must resign or suffer se-\\nvere consequences, such as facing criminal charges.” Palka,\\n623 F.3d at 453.\\n These two types of involuntary resignation are closely re-\\nlated. See Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1405–06 (7th Cir.\\n1988). The primary distinction may be temporal: Whereas\\nconstructive discharge results when an employee must en-\\ndure intolerable working conditions over some period of\\ntime, a specific threat or misrepresentation concerning future\\nharm can provoke a coerced resignation. See Graehling v. Vil-\\nlage of Lombard, 58 F.3d 295, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1995) (likening\\ncoerced resignation to signing a resignation letter at gun-\\npoint).\\n Before considering whether Ulrey can avoid summary\\njudgment under either theory, we summarize the events that\\nled up to Ulrey’s resignation on November 4, 2014. Where\\nthere are disputes, we credit Ulrey’s account because we are\\nreviewing a grant of summary judgment against her. The\\nproblems apparently began with faulty processing of teach-\\ning licenses at nearby Manchester University, where Ulrey\\nhad studied for her most recent license renewal. In an October\\n28 email, Reichhart notified all district teachers of potential\\nerrors on such licenses and stressed the serious nature of\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 9\\n\\nlicensing defects. Later that morning, Ulrey logged on to a\\nstate website to check her own license. She discovered a prob-\\nlem and promptly notified her superiors, including Reichhart.\\nThe error related to Ulrey’s eligibility to hold an administra-\\ntive license, which she needed to serve as an assistant princi-\\npal.\\n That same day, Reichhart called the state Department of\\nEducation with Ulrey present. A state official told them that\\nthe error could be resolved. The next morning, the official con-\\ntacted Ulrey to ask permission to remove false entries, and she\\npromptly agreed. Yet Reichhart’s concerns were not as-\\nsuaged; he emailed Ulrey on October 31 because he could not\\nfind her corrected license online. That same day, he met in his\\noffice with Ulrey and two others: Nancy Alspaugh, the high\\nschool principal, and Scott Bumgardner, the business man-\\nager. In the meeting, Reichhart berated Ulrey for the error and\\nimplied that he did not believe it had been an honest mistake.\\n Tensions came to a head on November 4, when Reichhart\\nagain called a meeting with Ulrey, Alspaugh, and Bumgard-\\nner. Reichhart stated that he could not “get past” the licensing\\nsituation. According to her testimony, Ulrey was “baffled”\\nand “asked him if he was asking for my resignation.” Reich-\\nhart replied that he was. He then handed her a letter of resig-\\nnation he had already prepared for her. Ulrey signed the letter\\nduring the meeting. That same night, the school board ap-\\nproved Ulrey’s resignation on its consent agenda.\\n Ulrey argues that these facts present a genuine dispute as\\nto whether her resignation was coerced. Ulrey does not com-\\nmit herself to either legal test for involuntary resignation; ra-\\nther, she asks us to consider what she describes as a “reason-\\nable person” standard, arguing that a trier of fact must always\\n\\f10 No. 19-1221\\n\\ndetermine the voluntariness of a resignation. Yet, as summa-\\nrized above, the tests for constructive discharge and coerced\\nresignation do not ask generically whether a reasonable em-\\nployee would perceive a “free choice.” Ulrey needed to pro-\\nduce evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rule in her\\nfavor under one of the established formulas for involuntary\\nresignation. For due-process purposes, there is a critical dif-\\nference between a resignation and a discharge, and that dif-\\nference must be protected by insisting that the exceptions for\\nconstructive discharges and coerced resignations be kept nar-\\nrow. The test is not whether the employee who resigned was\\nhappy about resigning or even whether the employer asked\\nfor the resignation.\\n Taking the exceptions in turn, Ulrey’s case is not a good fit\\nfor constructive discharge. She claims that she felt coerced to\\nresign in a specific meeting with her supervisor, not that her\\nconditions of employment became intolerable over time. A\\nconstructive discharge can result from a hostile work environ-\\nment only if the environment is “even more egregious than\\nthat needed for a hostile work environment.” Thompson v. Me-\\nmorial Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nUlrey has not presented evidence of conditions even ap-\\nproaching that high standard. 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Constructive discharge can sometimes refer to a situation where “an\\n\\nemployer acts in a manner so as to have communicated to a reasonable\\nemployee that she will be terminated.” Wright v. Illinois Dep’t of Children &\\nFamily Servs., 798 F.3d 513, 527 (7th Cir. 2015). But only at-will employees\\ncan show constructive discharge under this approach. Employees who en-\\njoy due-process protections cannot assume that the start of termination\\nproceedings will result in termination. See Cigan v. Chippewa Falls School\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 11\\n\\n Ulrey’s theory also falls well short of creating a genuine\\ndispute of material fact under a coerced resignation theory.\\nThe most a jury could infer is that Reichhart threatened to fire\\nUlrey because of the licensing errors. Reichhart, for instance,\\nadmits that he told Ulrey it was in her “best interest” to resign.\\nBut the possibility of eventual termination, without more,\\ncannot render a resignation involuntary; otherwise, a due\\nprocess violation would result whenever a public employee\\nresigned rather than asserting his or her (usually extensive)\\nprocedural rights. See Palka, 623 F.3d at 453 (“That Palka de-\\ncided to resign rather than risk an unfavorable Merit Board\\ndecision does not make his resignation involuntary.”).\\n In contrast, the rare, legally viable claims of coerced resig-\\nnation have typically involved threats beyond termination,\\nsuch as criminal prosecution or physical harm. See, e.g., Be-\\nnuzzi v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 119 F. Supp. 3d\\n917, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (denying motion for summary judg-\\nment where jury could find that plaintiff retired in response\\nto threat of criminal prosecution); Lynd v. Bristol Kendall Fire\\nProtection Dist., 2012 WL 3069391, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2012)\\n(denying motion to dismiss; plaintiff alleged he resigned in\\nresponse to threats to harm his family). We have also held that\\na material misrepresentation that induces resignation can\\nconstitute coercion. See Spreen v. Brey, 961 F.2d 109, 112–13\\n(7th Cir. 1992) (affirming denial of summary judgment for em-\\nployer on due-process claim where employee said she was\\nthreatened with loss of vested pension benefits if she did not\\nresign and were instead fired); cf. Covington v. Dep’t of Health\\n& Human Services, 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (federal\\n\\nDist., 388 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The only way to know how matters\\nwill turn out is to let the process run its course.”).\\n\\f12 No. 19-1221\\n\\nretirement considered involuntary if employee relies on mis-\\ninformation, whether error is intentional, negligent, or inno-\\ncent); Scharf v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed.\\nCir. 1983) (same). Here, Ulrey offered to resign because Reich-\\nhart’s “vibes” and “physical demeanor” communicated his\\ndesire to fire her. That simply is not enough to treat defend-\\nants as if they had denied plaintiff the extensive procedural\\nprotections available to her if she had wanted to contest a pos-\\nsible termination.\\n The judgment of the district court is\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448042/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670789/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Lisa Ulrey v. William Reichhart\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1221\nLISA ULREY,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nWILLIAM REICHHART and\nSCHOOL BOARD OF MANCHESTER COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\n No. 3:16-cv-257-JD — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before SYKES, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Lisa Ulrey served as the\nassistant principal of the Manchester Junior-Senior High\nSchool until November 4, 2014, when she resigned during a\nmeeting with William Reichhart, the school district’s superin-\ntendent. Ulrey brings two claims in this suit under 42 U.S.C.\n§ 1983 against Reichhart and the school board. First, she\nclaims that Reichhart violated her rights under the First\n\f2 No. 19-1221\n\nAmendment by retaliating against her for her speech about a\nstudent discipline issue. Second, she contends that the de-\nfendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by coerc-\ning her to resign, depriving her of her property interest in her\njob without due process of law. The district court granted\nsummary judgment to the defendants on both claims. We af-\nfirm. Undisputed facts show that Ulrey spoke about the dis-\ncipline issue in her capacity as an employee, so the First\nAmendment did not protect her speech. Ulrey also failed to\npresent evidence sufficient to support a finding that her res-\nignation was involuntary.\nI. Claim for First Amendment Retaliation\n Citizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by\naccepting public employment, but legal doctrine in this field\ntries to maintain a careful balance between the interests of the\nemployee as a citizen and the interests of the employer-gov-\nernment in serving the public. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 231\n(2014), citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568\n(1968). The First Amendment claim here arises from a disa-\ngreement between plaintiff Ulrey and defendant Reichhart\nconcerning student discipline. Because we review a grant of\nsummary judgment against Ulrey, we recount facts in the\nlight reasonably most favorable to her. See Healy v. City of Chi-\ncago, 450 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 2006).\n In August 2014, Superintendent Reichhart granted an\nadult student permission to possess cigarettes (though not to\nsmoke them) on school grounds. Ulrey learned of that deci-\nsion and disagreed with it. Without approaching Reichhart\nfirst, Ulrey called the president of the school board, Sally\nKrouse. Krouse in turn emailed Reichhart to express her con-\ncern about his decision. Reichhart then rebuked Ulrey for\n\fNo. 19-1221 3\n\ngoing over his head, threatening to reprimand her formally if\nshe did not apologize. She did apologize. She claims in this\nlawsuit, however, that Reichhart forced her to resign three\nmonths later to retaliate against her for her call to Krouse.\n In maintaining the critical balance under the Pickering and\nLane line of cases, the threshold question in a public em-\nployee’s First Amendment retaliation suit is whether the em-\nployee’s speech was constitutionally protected. E.g., Swetlik v.\nCrawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013). If Ulrey’s call to\nKrouse had been protected speech, then we would need to\ndecide whether Ulrey presented evidence that her call moti-\nvated Reichhart to inflict on her deprivations likely to deter\nspeech. Id.\n We do not need to reach those issues, however, because\nUlrey’s speech was unprotected as a matter of law. See Con-\nnick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983) (noting that the “in-\nquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not\nfact”). Ulrey’s claim fails at this first step. The undisputed\nfacts show that she spoke to Krouse as an employee, not a pri-\nvate citizen. “In order for a public employee to raise a success-\nful First Amendment claim for her employer’s restriction of\nher speech, the speech must be in her capacity as a private\ncitizen and not as an employee.” McArdle v. Peoria School Dist.\nNo. 150, 705 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2013). The test for distin-\nguishing private speech from employee speech is whether the\nemployees speak “pursuant to their official duties.” Spiegla v.\nHull, 481 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Garcetti v. Ce-\nballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).\n Ulrey argues that reporting the superintendent’s alleged\nmisconduct or violation of district policy on tobacco fell out-\nside her official duties. Since the Supreme Court decided\n\f4 No. 19-1221\n\nGarcetti, however, we have repeatedly rejected such claims for\na whistleblower carve-out from the category of unprotected\nemployee speech. In Garcetti, the employee wrote a memoran-\ndum detailing governmental misconduct. The Supreme Court\nheld that his speech was unprotected because the memoran-\ndum “was written pursuant to [his] official duties.” 547 U.S.\nat 421. Garcetti suggested that “legislative enactments” such\nas “whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes,” rather\nthan the First Amendment, ought to protect employees\nobliged to report official misconduct as part of their job. Id. at\n425.\n Shortly after Garcetti was decided, we applied it to a case\nlike Ulrey’s. In Spiegla, a prison guard stationed at the main\ngate reported her supervisor for letting a vehicle pass without\nthe required search for contraband. See 481 F.3d at 962–63. We\nheld that the guard “spoke as an employee, not a citizen, be-\ncause ensuring compliance with prison security policy was\npart of what she was employed to do.” Id. at 966. The fact that\nher statements “highlighted potential misconduct by prison\nofficers” did not affect the analysis under Garcetti. Id. at 967.\n As the district court recognized, we have applied this rea-\nsoning in many different employment contexts. See, e.g., Ku-\nbiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016) (police\nofficer reporting misconduct of co-worker); McArdle, 705 F.3d\nat 753 (school principal reporting misconduct of district aca-\ndemic officer); Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.\n2008) (professor reporting misconduct of dean); Vose v.\nKliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007) (police supervisor re-\nporting misconduct of detectives); see also Ulrey v. Reichhart,\n2018 WL 6435652, at *4–6 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2018).\n\fNo. 19-1221 5\n\n This line of decisions—which Ulrey failed to acknowledge\nor address in the district court and on appeal, even after the\ndistrict court relied upon them—required summary judg-\nment for defendants. Even if Superintendent Reichhart vio-\nlated school district policy by making an exception allowing\nan adult student to possess cigarettes when he attended\nschool, Ulrey’s speech fell within her official duties. Her writ-\nten job description included duties to “coordinate and admin-\nister student attendance and discipline policies,” just as the\nguard in Spiegla was paid to monitor vehicles coming into the\nprison. Ulrey’s complaint to the school board president fell\nwithin the scope of her job and was unprotected employee\nspeech, not protected citizen speech.\n The two cases that Ulrey relies on do not help her position.\nIn both Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014), and Chrzanowski v.\nBianchi, 725 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013), the plaintiffs’ speech was\nprotected because they spoke as citizens, in non-employee ca-\npacities, not because they reported misconduct. In Lane, the\nSupreme Court held that sworn testimony given under sub-\npoena in a criminal trial was citizen speech even though the\nplaintiff was testifying against a former co-worker about mis-\nconduct in their office. 573 U.S. at 239. Similarly, in\nChrzanowski, we held that a prosecutor who testified against\nhis supervisor before a grand jury and at trial spoke as a citi-\nzen. 725 F.3d at 739–40. These cases turned on the speech’s\ncontext, not its content. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 240 (“The critical\nquestion under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself\nordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not\nwhether it merely concerns those duties.”); see also Swetlik,\n738 F.3d at 826 (observing that employee’s statements in po-\nlice union meetings and grievances reporting police chief’s\nmisconduct submitted by plaintiff in his capacity as a union\n\f6 No. 19-1221\n\nmember were not employee speech). Ulrey’s call to the school\nboard president was not comparable to sworn testimony be-\nfore a court or grand jury.\n Ulrey raises one other point that, she argues, creates a dis-\npute of material fact to preclude summary judgment. The\nadult student whom Reichhart had allowed to possess ciga-\nrettes attended a special program called “Squire Academy”—\nnamed for the school mascot—that operated somewhat inde-\npendently from the high school. Accepting Ulrey’s allegations\nas true, her authority to enforce the student handbook did not\nextend to Squire Academy students. Ulrey argues that her\nspeech to Krouse thus fell outside her duties as assistant prin-\ncipal.\n We disagree. This administrative division cannot bear the\nweight Ulrey places on it. Squire Academy occupied the same\nbuilding complex as the high school, and Ulrey states that she\nhad “administrative responsibility” over the “physical class-\nroom” in which it met. Explaining her decision to call Krouse,\nUlrey testified that “students should not be allowed to have\ntobacco on school property for any reason” because it was\n“against the student handbook.” She also confirmed that she\nwas “angry because of [her] role in enforcing the handbook.”\nSquire Academy disciplinary decisions bore closely on\nUlrey’s duties even if she lacked total control over them, and\nwe do not parse the precise scope of employees’ duties as\nfinely as Ulrey argues. See, e.g., Vose, 506 F.3d at 571 (holding\nthat police officer’s report of misconduct in a separate unit of\nthe police department was employee speech). The district\ncourt correctly granted summary judgment on the First\nAmendment claim.\n\fNo. 19-1221 7\n\nII. Claim for Denial of Due Process\n Ulrey’s due-process claim stems from her resignation on\nNovember 4, 2014, three months after her call to the school\nboard president. When a public employee has a property in-\nterest in his or her continued employment, typically shown\nby proving that the employee may be fired only for good\ncause, the state may not terminate the employment without\ndue process of law. E.g., Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679,\n681 (7th Cir. 2003); see generally Cleveland Board of Education\nv. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Board of Regents v. Roth,\n408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Reichhart and the School Board agree\nthat Ulrey had a protected interest in continued employment.\nIndiana gives public school teachers and administrators stat-\nutory protections that spell out the details of procedures used\nto vindicate this due process right. See Ind. Code § 20-28-7.5-\n1 et seq. (2014) (teachers); Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2 (2014) (prin-\ncipals and assistant principals). 1\n If Reichhart had tried to fire Ulrey, these procedural pro-\ntections would have been available to her. She did not invoke\nthese procedural protections because she resigned. The gen-\neral rule is that an employee who resigns—voluntarily relin-\nquishing her interest in continued employment—may not\ncomplain of a lack of due process. See Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d\n447, 453 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of due-process\nclaim by employee who resigned). There are narrow excep-\ntions, however. In Palka we identified two types of\n\n 1 Principals and assistant principals like Ulrey work under the regular\nteacher’s contract. See Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2(1). Indiana substantially re-\nvised the grounds and procedures for cancelling teacher contracts in 2011,\nbut those amendments are not relevant here. See Elliott v. Bd. of School\nTrustees of Madison Consol. Schools, 876 F.3d 926, 928–30 (7th Cir. 2017).\n\f8 No. 19-1221\n\n“involuntary resignation” that amount to termination: con-\nstructive discharge and coerced resignation. “Constructive\ndischarge” is akin to a hostile work environment claim and\nmay occur “when an employer makes employment so un-\nbearable that an employee resigns.” Id.; see Pennsylvania State\nPolice v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2004) (explaining com-\nparison to hostile work environment). Coerced resignation,\non the other hand, is “characterized by the presence of a Hob-\nson’s choice in which the employee must resign or suffer se-\nvere consequences, such as facing criminal charges.” Palka,\n623 F.3d at 453.\n These two types of involuntary resignation are closely re-\nlated. See Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1405–06 (7th Cir.\n1988). The primary distinction may be temporal: Whereas\nconstructive discharge results when an employee must en-\ndure intolerable working conditions over some period of\ntime, a specific threat or misrepresentation concerning future\nharm can provoke a coerced resignation. See Graehling v. Vil-\nlage of Lombard, 58 F.3d 295, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1995) (likening\ncoerced resignation to signing a resignation letter at gun-\npoint).\n Before considering whether Ulrey can avoid summary\njudgment under either theory, we summarize the events that\nled up to Ulrey’s resignation on November 4, 2014. Where\nthere are disputes, we credit Ulrey’s account because we are\nreviewing a grant of summary judgment against her. The\nproblems apparently began with faulty processing of teach-\ning licenses at nearby Manchester University, where Ulrey\nhad studied for her most recent license renewal. In an October\n28 email, Reichhart notified all district teachers of potential\nerrors on such licenses and stressed the serious nature of\n\fNo. 19-1221 9\n\nlicensing defects. Later that morning, Ulrey logged on to a\nstate website to check her own license. She discovered a prob-\nlem and promptly notified her superiors, including Reichhart.\nThe error related to Ulrey’s eligibility to hold an administra-\ntive license, which she needed to serve as an assistant princi-\npal.\n That same day, Reichhart called the state Department of\nEducation with Ulrey present. A state official told them that\nthe error could be resolved. The next morning, the official con-\ntacted Ulrey to ask permission to remove false entries, and she\npromptly agreed. Yet Reichhart’s concerns were not as-\nsuaged; he emailed Ulrey on October 31 because he could not\nfind her corrected license online. That same day, he met in his\noffice with Ulrey and two others: Nancy Alspaugh, the high\nschool principal, and Scott Bumgardner, the business man-\nager. In the meeting, Reichhart berated Ulrey for the error and\nimplied that he did not believe it had been an honest mistake.\n Tensions came to a head on November 4, when Reichhart\nagain called a meeting with Ulrey, Alspaugh, and Bumgard-\nner. Reichhart stated that he could not “get past” the licensing\nsituation. According to her testimony, Ulrey was “baffled”\nand “asked him if he was asking for my resignation.” Reich-\nhart replied that he was. He then handed her a letter of resig-\nnation he had already prepared for her. Ulrey signed the letter\nduring the meeting. That same night, the school board ap-\nproved Ulrey’s resignation on its consent agenda.\n Ulrey argues that these facts present a genuine dispute as\nto whether her resignation was coerced. Ulrey does not com-\nmit herself to either legal test for involuntary resignation; ra-\nther, she asks us to consider what she describes as a “reason-\nable person” standard, arguing that a trier of fact must always\n\f10 No. 19-1221\n\ndetermine the voluntariness of a resignation. Yet, as summa-\nrized above, the tests for constructive discharge and coerced\nresignation do not ask generically whether a reasonable em-\nployee would perceive a “free choice.” Ulrey needed to pro-\nduce evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rule in her\nfavor under one of the established formulas for involuntary\nresignation. For due-process purposes, there is a critical dif-\nference between a resignation and a discharge, and that dif-\nference must be protected by insisting that the exceptions for\nconstructive discharges and coerced resignations be kept nar-\nrow. The test is not whether the employee who resigned was\nhappy about resigning or even whether the employer asked\nfor the resignation.\n Taking the exceptions in turn, Ulrey’s case is not a good fit\nfor constructive discharge. She claims that she felt coerced to\nresign in a specific meeting with her supervisor, not that her\nconditions of employment became intolerable over time. A\nconstructive discharge can result from a hostile work environ-\nment only if the environment is “even more egregious than\nthat needed for a hostile work environment.” Thompson v. Me-\nmorial Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 2010).\nUlrey has not presented evidence of conditions even ap-\nproaching that high standard. 2\n\n\n\n\n 2 Constructive discharge can sometimes refer to a situation where “an\n\nemployer acts in a manner so as to have communicated to a reasonable\nemployee that she will be terminated.” Wright v. Illinois Dep’t of Children &\nFamily Servs., 798 F.3d 513, 527 (7th Cir. 2015). But only at-will employees\ncan show constructive discharge under this approach. Employees who en-\njoy due-process protections cannot assume that the start of termination\nproceedings will result in termination. See Cigan v. Chippewa Falls School\n\fNo. 19-1221 11\n\n Ulrey’s theory also falls well short of creating a genuine\ndispute of material fact under a coerced resignation theory.\nThe most a jury could infer is that Reichhart threatened to fire\nUlrey because of the licensing errors. Reichhart, for instance,\nadmits that he told Ulrey it was in her “best interest” to resign.\nBut the possibility of eventual termination, without more,\ncannot render a resignation involuntary; otherwise, a due\nprocess violation would result whenever a public employee\nresigned rather than asserting his or her (usually extensive)\nprocedural rights. See Palka, 623 F.3d at 453 (“That Palka de-\ncided to resign rather than risk an unfavorable Merit Board\ndecision does not make his resignation involuntary.”).\n In contrast, the rare, legally viable claims of coerced resig-\nnation have typically involved threats beyond termination,\nsuch as criminal prosecution or physical harm. See, e.g., Be-\nnuzzi v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 119 F. Supp. 3d\n917, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (denying motion for summary judg-\nment where jury could find that plaintiff retired in response\nto threat of criminal prosecution); Lynd v. Bristol Kendall Fire\nProtection Dist., 2012 WL 3069391, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2012)\n(denying motion to dismiss; plaintiff alleged he resigned in\nresponse to threats to harm his family). We have also held that\na material misrepresentation that induces resignation can\nconstitute coercion. See Spreen v. Brey, 961 F.2d 109, 112–13\n(7th Cir. 1992) (affirming denial of summary judgment for em-\nployer on due-process claim where employee said she was\nthreatened with loss of vested pension benefits if she did not\nresign and were instead fired); cf. Covington v. Dep’t of Health\n& Human Services, 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (federal\n\nDist., 388 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The only way to know how matters\nwill turn out is to let the process run its course.”).\n\f12 No. 19-1221\n\nretirement considered involuntary if employee relies on mis-\ninformation, whether error is intentional, negligent, or inno-\ncent); Scharf v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed.\nCir. 1983) (same). Here, Ulrey offered to resign because Reich-\nhart’s “vibes” and “physical demeanor” communicated his\ndesire to fire her. That simply is not enough to treat defend-\nants as if they had denied plaintiff the extensive procedural\nprotections available to her if she had wanted to contest a pos-\nsible termination.\n The judgment of the district court is\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Lisa Ulrey v. William Reichhart\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1221\\nLISA ULREY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM REICHHART and\\nSCHOOL BOARD OF MANCHESTER COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:16-cv-257-JD — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Lisa Ulrey served as the\\nassistant principal of the Manchester Junior-Senior High\\nSchool until November 4, 2014, when she resigned during a\\nmeeting with William Reichhart, the school district’s superin-\\ntendent. Ulrey brings two claims in this suit under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983 against Reichhart and the school board. First, she\\nclaims that Reichhart violated her rights under the First\\n\\f2 No. 19-1221\\n\\nAmendment by retaliating against her for her speech about a\\nstudent discipline issue. Second, she contends that the de-\\nfendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by coerc-\\ning her to resign, depriving her of her property interest in her\\njob without due process of law. The district court granted\\nsummary judgment to the defendants on both claims. We af-\\nfirm. Undisputed facts show that Ulrey spoke about the dis-\\ncipline issue in her capacity as an employee, so the First\\nAmendment did not protect her speech. Ulrey also failed to\\npresent evidence sufficient to support a finding that her res-\\nignation was involuntary.\\nI. Claim for First Amendment Retaliation\\n Citizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by\\naccepting public employment, but legal doctrine in this field\\ntries to maintain a careful balance between the interests of the\\nemployee as a citizen and the interests of the employer-gov-\\nernment in serving the public. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 231\\n(2014), citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568\\n(1968). The First Amendment claim here arises from a disa-\\ngreement between plaintiff Ulrey and defendant Reichhart\\nconcerning student discipline. Because we review a grant of\\nsummary judgment against Ulrey, we recount facts in the\\nlight reasonably most favorable to her. See Healy v. City of Chi-\\ncago, 450 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n In August 2014, Superintendent Reichhart granted an\\nadult student permission to possess cigarettes (though not to\\nsmoke them) on school grounds. Ulrey learned of that deci-\\nsion and disagreed with it. Without approaching Reichhart\\nfirst, Ulrey called the president of the school board, Sally\\nKrouse. Krouse in turn emailed Reichhart to express her con-\\ncern about his decision. Reichhart then rebuked Ulrey for\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 3\\n\\ngoing over his head, threatening to reprimand her formally if\\nshe did not apologize. She did apologize. She claims in this\\nlawsuit, however, that Reichhart forced her to resign three\\nmonths later to retaliate against her for her call to Krouse.\\n In maintaining the critical balance under the Pickering and\\nLane line of cases, the threshold question in a public em-\\nployee’s First Amendment retaliation suit is whether the em-\\nployee’s speech was constitutionally protected. E.g., Swetlik v.\\nCrawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013). If Ulrey’s call to\\nKrouse had been protected speech, then we would need to\\ndecide whether Ulrey presented evidence that her call moti-\\nvated Reichhart to inflict on her deprivations likely to deter\\nspeech. Id.\\n We do not need to reach those issues, however, because\\nUlrey’s speech was unprotected as a matter of law. See Con-\\nnick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983) (noting that the “in-\\nquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not\\nfact”). Ulrey’s claim fails at this first step. The undisputed\\nfacts show that she spoke to Krouse as an employee, not a pri-\\nvate citizen. “In order for a public employee to raise a success-\\nful First Amendment claim for her employer’s restriction of\\nher speech, the speech must be in her capacity as a private\\ncitizen and not as an employee.” McArdle v. Peoria School Dist.\\nNo. 150, 705 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2013). The test for distin-\\nguishing private speech from employee speech is whether the\\nemployees speak “pursuant to their official duties.” Spiegla v.\\nHull, 481 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Garcetti v. Ce-\\nballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).\\n Ulrey argues that reporting the superintendent’s alleged\\nmisconduct or violation of district policy on tobacco fell out-\\nside her official duties. Since the Supreme Court decided\\n\\f4 No. 19-1221\\n\\nGarcetti, however, we have repeatedly rejected such claims for\\na whistleblower carve-out from the category of unprotected\\nemployee speech. In Garcetti, the employee wrote a memoran-\\ndum detailing governmental misconduct. The Supreme Court\\nheld that his speech was unprotected because the memoran-\\ndum “was written pursuant to [his] official duties.” 547 U.S.\\nat 421. Garcetti suggested that “legislative enactments” such\\nas “whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes,” rather\\nthan the First Amendment, ought to protect employees\\nobliged to report official misconduct as part of their job. Id. at\\n425.\\n Shortly after Garcetti was decided, we applied it to a case\\nlike Ulrey’s. In Spiegla, a prison guard stationed at the main\\ngate reported her supervisor for letting a vehicle pass without\\nthe required search for contraband. See 481 F.3d at 962–63. We\\nheld that the guard “spoke as an employee, not a citizen, be-\\ncause ensuring compliance with prison security policy was\\npart of what she was employed to do.” Id. at 966. The fact that\\nher statements “highlighted potential misconduct by prison\\nofficers” did not affect the analysis under Garcetti. Id. at 967.\\n As the district court recognized, we have applied this rea-\\nsoning in many different employment contexts. See, e.g., Ku-\\nbiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016) (police\\nofficer reporting misconduct of co-worker); McArdle, 705 F.3d\\nat 753 (school principal reporting misconduct of district aca-\\ndemic officer); Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.\\n2008) (professor reporting misconduct of dean); Vose v.\\nKliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007) (police supervisor re-\\nporting misconduct of detectives); see also Ulrey v. Reichhart,\\n2018 WL 6435652, at *4–6 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2018).\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 5\\n\\n This line of decisions—which Ulrey failed to acknowledge\\nor address in the district court and on appeal, even after the\\ndistrict court relied upon them—required summary judg-\\nment for defendants. Even if Superintendent Reichhart vio-\\nlated school district policy by making an exception allowing\\nan adult student to possess cigarettes when he attended\\nschool, Ulrey’s speech fell within her official duties. Her writ-\\nten job description included duties to “coordinate and admin-\\nister student attendance and discipline policies,” just as the\\nguard in Spiegla was paid to monitor vehicles coming into the\\nprison. Ulrey’s complaint to the school board president fell\\nwithin the scope of her job and was unprotected employee\\nspeech, not protected citizen speech.\\n The two cases that Ulrey relies on do not help her position.\\nIn both Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014), and Chrzanowski v.\\nBianchi, 725 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013), the plaintiffs’ speech was\\nprotected because they spoke as citizens, in non-employee ca-\\npacities, not because they reported misconduct. In Lane, the\\nSupreme Court held that sworn testimony given under sub-\\npoena in a criminal trial was citizen speech even though the\\nplaintiff was testifying against a former co-worker about mis-\\nconduct in their office. 573 U.S. at 239. Similarly, in\\nChrzanowski, we held that a prosecutor who testified against\\nhis supervisor before a grand jury and at trial spoke as a citi-\\nzen. 725 F.3d at 739–40. These cases turned on the speech’s\\ncontext, not its content. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 240 (“The critical\\nquestion under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself\\nordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not\\nwhether it merely concerns those duties.”); see also Swetlik,\\n738 F.3d at 826 (observing that employee’s statements in po-\\nlice union meetings and grievances reporting police chief’s\\nmisconduct submitted by plaintiff in his capacity as a union\\n\\f6 No. 19-1221\\n\\nmember were not employee speech). Ulrey’s call to the school\\nboard president was not comparable to sworn testimony be-\\nfore a court or grand jury.\\n Ulrey raises one other point that, she argues, creates a dis-\\npute of material fact to preclude summary judgment. The\\nadult student whom Reichhart had allowed to possess ciga-\\nrettes attended a special program called “Squire Academy”—\\nnamed for the school mascot—that operated somewhat inde-\\npendently from the high school. Accepting Ulrey’s allegations\\nas true, her authority to enforce the student handbook did not\\nextend to Squire Academy students. Ulrey argues that her\\nspeech to Krouse thus fell outside her duties as assistant prin-\\ncipal.\\n We disagree. This administrative division cannot bear the\\nweight Ulrey places on it. Squire Academy occupied the same\\nbuilding complex as the high school, and Ulrey states that she\\nhad “administrative responsibility” over the “physical class-\\nroom” in which it met. Explaining her decision to call Krouse,\\nUlrey testified that “students should not be allowed to have\\ntobacco on school property for any reason” because it was\\n“against the student handbook.” She also confirmed that she\\nwas “angry because of [her] role in enforcing the handbook.”\\nSquire Academy disciplinary decisions bore closely on\\nUlrey’s duties even if she lacked total control over them, and\\nwe do not parse the precise scope of employees’ duties as\\nfinely as Ulrey argues. See, e.g., Vose, 506 F.3d at 571 (holding\\nthat police officer’s report of misconduct in a separate unit of\\nthe police department was employee speech). The district\\ncourt correctly granted summary judgment on the First\\nAmendment claim.\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 7\\n\\nII. Claim for Denial of Due Process\\n Ulrey’s due-process claim stems from her resignation on\\nNovember 4, 2014, three months after her call to the school\\nboard president. When a public employee has a property in-\\nterest in his or her continued employment, typically shown\\nby proving that the employee may be fired only for good\\ncause, the state may not terminate the employment without\\ndue process of law. E.g., Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679,\\n681 (7th Cir. 2003); see generally Cleveland Board of Education\\nv. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Board of Regents v. Roth,\\n408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Reichhart and the School Board agree\\nthat Ulrey had a protected interest in continued employment.\\nIndiana gives public school teachers and administrators stat-\\nutory protections that spell out the details of procedures used\\nto vindicate this due process right. See Ind. Code § 20-28-7.5-\\n1 et seq. (2014) (teachers); Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2 (2014) (prin-\\ncipals and assistant principals). 1\\n If Reichhart had tried to fire Ulrey, these procedural pro-\\ntections would have been available to her. She did not invoke\\nthese procedural protections because she resigned. The gen-\\neral rule is that an employee who resigns—voluntarily relin-\\nquishing her interest in continued employment—may not\\ncomplain of a lack of due process. See Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d\\n447, 453 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of due-process\\nclaim by employee who resigned). There are narrow excep-\\ntions, however. In Palka we identified two types of\\n\\n 1 Principals and assistant principals like Ulrey work under the regular\\nteacher’s contract. See Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2(1). Indiana substantially re-\\nvised the grounds and procedures for cancelling teacher contracts in 2011,\\nbut those amendments are not relevant here. See Elliott v. Bd. of School\\nTrustees of Madison Consol. Schools, 876 F.3d 926, 928–30 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\f8 No. 19-1221\\n\\n“involuntary resignation” that amount to termination: con-\\nstructive discharge and coerced resignation. “Constructive\\ndischarge” is akin to a hostile work environment claim and\\nmay occur “when an employer makes employment so un-\\nbearable that an employee resigns.” Id.; see Pennsylvania State\\nPolice v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2004) (explaining com-\\nparison to hostile work environment). Coerced resignation,\\non the other hand, is “characterized by the presence of a Hob-\\nson’s choice in which the employee must resign or suffer se-\\nvere consequences, such as facing criminal charges.” Palka,\\n623 F.3d at 453.\\n These two types of involuntary resignation are closely re-\\nlated. See Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1405–06 (7th Cir.\\n1988). The primary distinction may be temporal: Whereas\\nconstructive discharge results when an employee must en-\\ndure intolerable working conditions over some period of\\ntime, a specific threat or misrepresentation concerning future\\nharm can provoke a coerced resignation. See Graehling v. Vil-\\nlage of Lombard, 58 F.3d 295, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1995) (likening\\ncoerced resignation to signing a resignation letter at gun-\\npoint).\\n Before considering whether Ulrey can avoid summary\\njudgment under either theory, we summarize the events that\\nled up to Ulrey’s resignation on November 4, 2014. Where\\nthere are disputes, we credit Ulrey’s account because we are\\nreviewing a grant of summary judgment against her. The\\nproblems apparently began with faulty processing of teach-\\ning licenses at nearby Manchester University, where Ulrey\\nhad studied for her most recent license renewal. In an October\\n28 email, Reichhart notified all district teachers of potential\\nerrors on such licenses and stressed the serious nature of\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 9\\n\\nlicensing defects. Later that morning, Ulrey logged on to a\\nstate website to check her own license. She discovered a prob-\\nlem and promptly notified her superiors, including Reichhart.\\nThe error related to Ulrey’s eligibility to hold an administra-\\ntive license, which she needed to serve as an assistant princi-\\npal.\\n That same day, Reichhart called the state Department of\\nEducation with Ulrey present. A state official told them that\\nthe error could be resolved. The next morning, the official con-\\ntacted Ulrey to ask permission to remove false entries, and she\\npromptly agreed. Yet Reichhart’s concerns were not as-\\nsuaged; he emailed Ulrey on October 31 because he could not\\nfind her corrected license online. That same day, he met in his\\noffice with Ulrey and two others: Nancy Alspaugh, the high\\nschool principal, and Scott Bumgardner, the business man-\\nager. In the meeting, Reichhart berated Ulrey for the error and\\nimplied that he did not believe it had been an honest mistake.\\n Tensions came to a head on November 4, when Reichhart\\nagain called a meeting with Ulrey, Alspaugh, and Bumgard-\\nner. Reichhart stated that he could not “get past” the licensing\\nsituation. According to her testimony, Ulrey was “baffled”\\nand “asked him if he was asking for my resignation.” Reich-\\nhart replied that he was. He then handed her a letter of resig-\\nnation he had already prepared for her. Ulrey signed the letter\\nduring the meeting. That same night, the school board ap-\\nproved Ulrey’s resignation on its consent agenda.\\n Ulrey argues that these facts present a genuine dispute as\\nto whether her resignation was coerced. Ulrey does not com-\\nmit herself to either legal test for involuntary resignation; ra-\\nther, she asks us to consider what she describes as a “reason-\\nable person” standard, arguing that a trier of fact must always\\n\\f10 No. 19-1221\\n\\ndetermine the voluntariness of a resignation. Yet, as summa-\\nrized above, the tests for constructive discharge and coerced\\nresignation do not ask generically whether a reasonable em-\\nployee would perceive a “free choice.” Ulrey needed to pro-\\nduce evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rule in her\\nfavor under one of the established formulas for involuntary\\nresignation. For due-process purposes, there is a critical dif-\\nference between a resignation and a discharge, and that dif-\\nference must be protected by insisting that the exceptions for\\nconstructive discharges and coerced resignations be kept nar-\\nrow. The test is not whether the employee who resigned was\\nhappy about resigning or even whether the employer asked\\nfor the resignation.\\n Taking the exceptions in turn, Ulrey’s case is not a good fit\\nfor constructive discharge. She claims that she felt coerced to\\nresign in a specific meeting with her supervisor, not that her\\nconditions of employment became intolerable over time. A\\nconstructive discharge can result from a hostile work environ-\\nment only if the environment is “even more egregious than\\nthat needed for a hostile work environment.” Thompson v. Me-\\nmorial Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nUlrey has not presented evidence of conditions even ap-\\nproaching that high standard. 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Constructive discharge can sometimes refer to a situation where “an\\n\\nemployer acts in a manner so as to have communicated to a reasonable\\nemployee that she will be terminated.” Wright v. Illinois Dep’t of Children &\\nFamily Servs., 798 F.3d 513, 527 (7th Cir. 2015). But only at-will employees\\ncan show constructive discharge under this approach. Employees who en-\\njoy due-process protections cannot assume that the start of termination\\nproceedings will result in termination. See Cigan v. Chippewa Falls School\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 11\\n\\n Ulrey’s theory also falls well short of creating a genuine\\ndispute of material fact under a coerced resignation theory.\\nThe most a jury could infer is that Reichhart threatened to fire\\nUlrey because of the licensing errors. Reichhart, for instance,\\nadmits that he told Ulrey it was in her “best interest” to resign.\\nBut the possibility of eventual termination, without more,\\ncannot render a resignation involuntary; otherwise, a due\\nprocess violation would result whenever a public employee\\nresigned rather than asserting his or her (usually extensive)\\nprocedural rights. See Palka, 623 F.3d at 453 (“That Palka de-\\ncided to resign rather than risk an unfavorable Merit Board\\ndecision does not make his resignation involuntary.”).\\n In contrast, the rare, legally viable claims of coerced resig-\\nnation have typically involved threats beyond termination,\\nsuch as criminal prosecution or physical harm. See, e.g., Be-\\nnuzzi v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 119 F. Supp. 3d\\n917, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (denying motion for summary judg-\\nment where jury could find that plaintiff retired in response\\nto threat of criminal prosecution); Lynd v. Bristol Kendall Fire\\nProtection Dist., 2012 WL 3069391, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2012)\\n(denying motion to dismiss; plaintiff alleged he resigned in\\nresponse to threats to harm his family). We have also held that\\na material misrepresentation that induces resignation can\\nconstitute coercion. See Spreen v. Brey, 961 F.2d 109, 112–13\\n(7th Cir. 1992) (affirming denial of summary judgment for em-\\nployer on due-process claim where employee said she was\\nthreatened with loss of vested pension benefits if she did not\\nresign and were instead fired); cf. Covington v. Dep’t of Health\\n& Human Services, 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (federal\\n\\nDist., 388 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The only way to know how matters\\nwill turn out is to let the process run its course.”).\\n\\f12 No. 19-1221\\n\\nretirement considered involuntary if employee relies on mis-\\ninformation, whether error is intentional, negligent, or inno-\\ncent); Scharf v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed.\\nCir. 1983) (same). Here, Ulrey offered to resign because Reich-\\nhart’s “vibes” and “physical demeanor” communicated his\\ndesire to fire her. That simply is not enough to treat defend-\\nants as if they had denied plaintiff the extensive procedural\\nprotections available to her if she had wanted to contest a pos-\\nsible termination.\\n The judgment of the district court is\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4674,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670790,"string":"4,670,790"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Gai Levy v. Marion County Sheriff"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1424"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1424\\nGAI LEVY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nMARION COUNTY SHERIFF, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 17-cv-03090 — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Gai Levy brought\\nthis lawsuit against defendants-appellees, the Marion County\\nSheriff and the Consolidated City of Indianapolis and Marion\\nCounty (collectively, “defendants”), alleging constitutional\\nviolations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawfully detaining\\nhim. Levy contends that on two separate occasions defend-\\nants violated orders from a trial court to release him from cus-\\ntody. In particular, he asserts that the policies and practices\\n\\f2 No. 19-1424\\n\\ndefendants used to communicate with the courts about indi-\\nvidual defendants led to his prolonged detention. Defendants\\nmoved for summary judgment on Levy’s § 1983 claims. The\\ndistrict court granted their motion. We affirm.\\n I. Background\\n Before diving into the specifics of this case, it is helpful to\\nunderstand how the Marion County Sheriff’s Office receives\\ninformation from the Marion County Superior Courts and\\nhow the Sheriff’s Office then executes those court orders. The\\ncourts and the Sheriff use two different systems for their case\\nmanagement needs. The courts’ system is called Odyssey and\\nthe Sheriff’s is called Offender Management System (OMS).\\nBoth systems use event codes to indicate a court’s order, but\\nintegration between the two systems since their adoption in\\n2014 has proven challenging, given the systems’ difficulty\\ncommunicating with each other. To remedy this problem, the\\nInformation Services Agency for the Consolidated City of In-\\ndianapolis and Marion County developed a special data ex-\\nchange system to ensure the transfer of data from the courts\\nto the Sheriff’s Office.\\n This solution was imperfect. For example, when a court\\nordered a detainee released subject to placement at Marion\\nCounty Community Corrections (MCCC), the court could en-\\nter an “ORC” code (the “Self-Report code”), which directed\\nthe Sheriff to release the detainee from custody so he could\\nself-report to MCCC on his own. Alternatively, the court\\ncould enter an “SBDOA” code (the “Direct Transfer code”),\\nwhich instructed the Sheriff to maintain the detainee in cus-\\ntody until he could be directly transported to MCCC for pro-\\ncessing and release. After the Sheriff received either a Self-Re-\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 3\\n\\nport or Direct Transfer code, it placed the detainee in the “re-\\nlease workflow.” The release workflow was a process\\nwhereby the Sheriff’s Office automatically generated a list of\\ndetainees for whom the court had entered release codes. After\\nthat, the Sheriff’s inmate records staff reviewed the list to ver-\\nify that each detainee was eligible to be released immediately\\nor transferred for release. Once they completed the verifica-\\ntion process, the inmate records staff removed the detainee\\nfrom the release workflow.\\n Because the release workflow could not automatically\\nprocess updated release orders, problems arose when the\\ncourts modified an order as to a detainee who had already\\ncleared the process. The Sheriff’s Office knew of this flaw and\\nhad reached an agreement with the courts to have court staff\\ncontact the Sheriff’s inmate records staff any time there was a\\nsubsequent order in the same case to ensure that the Sheriff’s\\nOffice was operating with the most current information. It is\\nundisputed that if court staff did not notify the Sheriff’s Office\\nabout such updates or modifications, the Sheriff would pro-\\ncess a detainee based on the original release order it received.\\n With that context in mind, we turn our focus to Levy’s\\ncase. The Sheriff’s Office took custody of Levy after his arrest\\non an outstanding warrant on February 29, 2016. The parties\\nagree that Levy remained in the Sheriff’s custody until March\\n3, 2016, when it transferred him to MCCC. (MCCC released\\nLevy later that same day.) Beyond that basic timeline, though,\\nthe parties disagree about when the Sheriff’s Office received\\nan order from the court to release Levy.\\n\\f4 No. 19-1424\\n\\n According to Levy, the judge at his first court appearance\\nordered him released on his own recognizance, and because\\nthe Sheriff’s Office did not immediately release him after that\\norder, Levy argues that the Sheriff unlawfully detained him.\\nTo support his version of events, Levy points to this screen-\\nshot of his case file in OMS, which he contends shows that\\nofficer Roberto Juan Rodrigues entered “Order To Release\\nFrom Custody” as the “Court Event” on February 29, 2016, at\\n23:50:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n The Sheriff’s Office, however, asserts that the judge or-\\ndered that the Sheriff keep Levy in custody until he could be\\ntransferred directly to MCCC; it was not until Levy’s second\\ncourt appearance on March 2, 2016, that a different judge or-\\ndered Levy to self-report to MCCC. By that time, the Sheriff\\nasserts, the inmate records staff had already finished pro-\\ncessing Levy through its release workflow. It is undisputed\\nthat no one at the court called or emailed the Sheriff’s Office\\nabout the second order, and therefore, that the Sheriff never\\nreceived notice of the second order. Ultimately, the Sheriff’s\\nOffice processed Levy and kept him in custody until March 3,\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 5\\n\\n2016. To support their version of the timeline, defendants di-\\nrect our attention to the certified copy of the Case Summary\\nin Levy’s case, which shows that the court entered a Direct\\nTransfer code on March 1, 2016, but later entered a Self-Report\\ncode on March 2, 2016:\\n\\f6 No. 19-1424\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Levy consequently alleged claims against defendants for\\nunreasonable seizure and detention under the Fourth\\nAmendment and deprivation of liberty without due process\\nunder the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Levy insists\\nthat the Sheriff’s Office “instituted and maintained unreason-\\nable policies and practices that resulted in its keeping [him]\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 7\\n\\ndetained … after [he] had been ordered released by the Court\\nand/or after legal authority for [his] detention had ceased.”\\n Defendants moved for summary judgment on October 4,\\n2018, and they moved to exclude the testimony of Levy’s ex-\\npert on December 10, 2018. The district court granted both\\nmotions on February 11, 2019.1 Regarding the motion for sum-\\nmary judgment, the district court first held that Levy’s Four-\\nteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim could not pro-\\nceed because “the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process\\nClause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial detention.”\\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019) (first\\nciting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017); then\\nciting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018)).\\n As to whether Levy had raised any genuine disputes of\\nmaterial fact for a jury to resolve on his Fourth Amendment\\nclaim, the court first explained that it understood Levy to be\\nchallenging two policies or practices: (1) the use of Odyssey\\nand OMS to transmit release codes from the Marion County\\nSuperior Courts to the Sheriff’s Office (the “Transmittal Pol-\\nicy”);2 and (2) the practice of requiring court staff to contact\\nthe Sheriff when a release order had been modified (the\\n“Change Notification Policy”). Because the court found it was\\nundisputed that the Sheriff’s Office did not receive notice of\\nthe Self-Report code before it released Levy, the court held the\\nSheriff’s use of the Transmittal Policy alone could not have\\n\\n\\n 1 Levy does not appeal the district court’s decision to exclude his ex-\\npert.\\n 2 Although the district court did not explicitly say as much, we assume\\n\\nthat the Transmittal Policy also includes the Sheriff’s adoption and use of\\nthe release workflow.\\n\\f8 No. 19-1424\\n\\ncaused Levy’s harm. In considering the Change Notification\\nPolicy, the court considered four different time frames:\\n 1. The time between Levy’s arrest and the entry of a\\n code on March 1, 2016 at 12:25 AM after his first\\n court appearance.\\n 2. The time between the entry of the first code and the\\n entry of the second code on March 2, 2016 at 2:15\\n PM after his second court appearance.\\n\\n 3. The time between the entry of the second code and\\n his transfer to MCCC on March 3, 2016 at 1:35 PM.\\n 4. The time between his transfer to MCCC and his re-\\n lease from MCCC on March 3, 2016 at 7:30 PM.\\n The court emphasized that Levy did not challenge the\\nSheriff’s authority to detain him during the first or fourth time\\nperiods; rather, Levy’s complaint concerned the second and\\nthird time periods alone. In considering the second time pe-\\nriod, the court reasoned that because Levy did not produce\\nany evidence to contradict the Case Summary, which showed\\nthat the court had ordered Levy released “Upon Satisfaction\\nof Bond, Party Held For Other Agency” and listed “commu-\\nnity corrections” at the first court appearance, it followed that\\nthe Sheriff had the legal authority to detain Levy during that\\ntime period and thus his detention did not violate the Fourth\\nAmendment.\\n Turning to the third time period, the court noted that de-\\nfendants acknowledged that the failure of the Change Notifi-\\ncation Policy caused Levy’s detention during this time period,\\nbut the court underscored that because Levy did not produce\\nevidence of other individuals being over-detained for the\\nsame reasons, Levy could not establish that defendants had\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 9\\n\\nadopted a policy or practice of deliberate indifference; there-\\nfore, this time period could not serve as the basis of his claim\\neither.\\n Levy now appeals.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary\\njudgment de novo, interpreting all facts and drawing all rea-\\nsonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. O’Brien\\nv. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2018). “Summary\\njudgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of\\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-\\nter of law.” Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Summary judg-\\nment is inappropriate “if the evidence is such that a reasona-\\nble jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” An-\\nderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may\\naffirm the entry of summary judgment on any ground sup-\\nported in the record, so long as the moving party adequately\\npresented the issue in the district court and the non-moving\\nparty had an opportunity to contest it. O’Brien, 900 F.3d at 928.\\n A. Dispute of Material Fact\\n One of the issues Levy raises on appeal is the district\\ncourt’s finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that the\\nSheriff received a Self-Report code after his first court appear-\\nance. Levy focuses on the evidence he submitted to the district\\ncourt, namely a screenshot of his case file in OMS, which he\\nargues shows that officer Roberto Juan Rodrigues entered\\n“Order To Release From Custody” as the “Court Event” on\\n\\f10 No. 19-1424\\n\\nFebruary 29, 2016, at 23:50.3 Levy contends that the district\\ncourt dismissed his characterization of the screenshot in favor\\nof the explanation given by the Sheriff’s Chief Information Of-\\nficer, Derek Peterson, in his affidavit. Peterson asserted that\\nthe screenshot did not show what code the court entered at\\nLevy’s first court appearance, but that the certified copy of the\\nCase Summary did contain that information, and that record\\nshowed an entry of “Upon Satisfaction of Bond, Party Held\\nfor Other Agency” on March 1, 2016, which would have\\nprompted a Direct Transfer code, not a Self-Report code.\\n By favoring Peterson’s interpretation of the OMS screen-\\nshot over Levy’s, the court, in Levy’s view, made an imper-\\nmissible credibility determination. Levy maintains that, in\\nany event, the certified Case Summary does not conclusively\\nrefute his argument about an initial Self-Report code because\\nit incorrectly states that Levy’s arrest was on March 1, 2016;\\naccordingly, a jury could reasonably infer from that discrep-\\nancy that the Case Summary is neither infallible nor disposi-\\ntive as to the court’s order regarding Levy’s first appearance.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Levy’s lawyer attached the screenshot to a declaration filed in oppo-\\n\\nsition to the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, defend-\\nants make several admissibility challenges to Levy’s reliance on the OMS\\nscreenshot. But by raising those issues for the first time on appeal, defend-\\nants have forfeited those arguments. See Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 231\\nF.3d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[H]er attack on the admissibility of the\\naffidavit is waived because she failed to raise it in the district court.”); see\\nalso Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, Inc., 658 F.3d 760, 770 (7th Cir.\\n2011) (“To preserve an evidentiary objection for appeal, a party must make\\na ‘timely objection or motion to strike … stating the specific ground of ob-\\njection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.’” (quot-\\ning Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1))).\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 11\\n\\n Defendants respond by highlighting that Levy has not\\npresented any evidence to controvert Peterson’s testimony\\nabout the meaning of the OMS screenshot.4 Consequently, de-\\nfendants insist that there is no dispute of fact as to the central\\nquestion in this case—whether the court actually ordered the\\nSheriff to release Levy to self-report to the MCCC after his\\nfirst court appearance. According to defendants, there is no\\ndispute that the OMS screenshot does not support Levy’s ar-\\ngument that the Sheriff’s Office received an order to immedi-\\nately release Levy to self-report to the MCCC after his first\\ncourt appearance. And because the Case Summary supports\\ndefendants’ contention that the Sheriff received an order to\\nhold Levy at the MCCC after his first court appearance, de-\\nfendants urge us to affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n If the issue on appeal were simply one of dueling docu-\\nments and the district court had picked defendants’ asserted\\nfacts over Levy’s, that act would constitute reversible error.\\nHere, however, there are no such dueling documents. Both\\nthe OMS screenshot and the Case Summary contain many\\ndates and codes. The OMS screenshot lists “Order To Release\\nFrom Custody” next to the field “Court Event,” but there are\\nalso dates listed: the field “Notification Made On” has\\n“03/01/2016” listed, the field “Effective Date” has\\n“02/29/2016” listed, and the field “Date/Time Added” has\\n“02/29/2016 23:50” listed. To make matters more confusing,\\n\\n\\n 4 Levy had attempted to present an expert witness, Alison Shine, who\\n\\nwould have asserted that a judge ordered Levy to self-report at his first\\ncourt appearance on March 1, and that the Sheriff’s Office had to have\\nbeen aware of that order through the court’s use of Odyssey and OMS.\\nThe district court, however, excluded Shine’s testimony (as noted above)\\nand Levy does not challenge that ruling on appeal.\\n\\f12 No. 19-1424\\n\\nthe screenshot also lists dates that accurately describe events\\nthat occurred after Levy’s first court appearance. For example,\\nthe field “Discharge Date” has “03/03/2016” listed, and at the\\nbottom of the page, there is a table that displays “$500 cash”\\nas a “Note” on the date of “03/01/2016 00:25.”\\n Consequently, it would be unreasonable to infer that this\\nscreenshot only depicts information at the time the court had\\nentered a code after the first court appearance. Similarly, it\\nwould be unreasonable to infer from the presence of a Self-\\nReport code amidst this range of dates that the court entered\\na Self-Report code after the first court appearance. Moreover,\\nin his affidavit, Peterson made the uncontroverted assertion\\nthat the OMS screenshot cannot be interpreted to show what\\ncode the court entered at Levy’s first appearance. This testi-\\nmony and evidence is enough to affirm the district court’s de-\\ncision that there was no dispute of material fact as to whether\\nthe court entered a Self-Report code after Levy’s first court\\nappearance. With that factual issue resolved, we move on to\\nwhether the district court properly entered summary judg-\\nment for defendants on the Monell claim.\\n B. Monell Liability\\n Plaintiffs like Levy may sue municipalities under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983 when their actions violate the Constitution. See gener-\\nally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.\\n658 (1978). To prevail on a Monell claim, plaintiffs must iden-\\ntify an action taken by the municipality, the requisite degree\\nof culpability, and a causal link between the municipality’s\\naction and the deprivation of federal rights. Bd. of the Cty.\\nCommissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997). A munic-\\nipality “acts” through its written policies, widespread prac-\\ntices or customs, and the acts of a final decisionmaker. Id. A\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 13\\n\\nmunicipality has the requisite degree of culpability if it acts\\nwith deliberate indifference to the known or obvious conse-\\nquences of its action. Id. at 407.\\n The Sheriff’s Office does not dispute that it created a sys-\\ntem with the Marion County Superior Courts to process in-\\nmates for release utilizing Odyssey, OMS, and the release\\nworkflow, which included an agreement that if a court modi-\\nfied a release order, court staff would contact the Sheriff’s in-\\nmate records staff to notify them of the change. Likewise, the\\nSheriff does not challenge the district court’s decision to ana-\\nlyze this system as a policy or practice under Monell.\\n That said, it is critical to specify the exact policy or practice\\nat issue here to properly conduct our analysis. As noted\\nabove, the district court discussed Monell as if there were two\\npolices in this case—the “Transmittal Policy” and the\\n“Change Notification Policy”—when determining whether\\nthe Sheriff’s Office had acted with deliberate indifference.\\nLevy argues that the two must be treated as one policy for the\\npurposes of this appeal, and defendants appear to concede\\nthe same.\\n A review of the record supports this conclusion. The evi-\\ndence suggests that the Sheriff’s Office adopted the Change\\nNotification Policy to ensure that it received notice of subse-\\nquent orders that may have been otherwise overlooked by the\\nexisting Transmittal Policy. Thus, the issue on appeal is\\nwhether Levy can establish that the Sheriff’s adoption and use\\nof this modified Transmittal Policy constituted deliberate indif-\\nference to a substantial risk of detainees’ over-detention and\\nwhether that policy’s adoption caused his own over-deten-\\ntion.\\n\\f14 No. 19-1424\\n\\n For the reasons explained below, we conclude that absent\\nevidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known\\nthat the modified Transmittal Policy would fail, or failed so\\noften that it would obviously result in detainees’ over-deten-\\ntion, Levy cannot to show that defendants acted with deliber-\\nate indifference.\\n Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, Levy posits that\\nto establish deliberate indifference, he is not required to show\\n“other instances” where the failure to follow the Change No-\\ntification Policy caused prolonged detentions. This is so, he\\nexplains, because he challenges a “decision to adopt [a] par-\\nticular course of action [ ] properly made by that govern-\\nment’s authorized decisionmakers,” and that is a sufficient\\nbasis to find municipal liability under § 1983. Pembaur v. City\\nof Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).\\n Levy believes that he has shown the Sheriff’s Office took\\nsuch a course of action here because he presented (1) evidence\\nthat the Sheriff selected OMS without properly vetting the\\nsoftware or considering its consequences; (2) evidence that\\nthe Sheriff used OMS despite multiple Marion County judges\\nraising concerns about delayed releases and a group of those\\njudges endorsing an entirely different software package;\\n(3) evidence that the inmate records staff previously failed to\\ntimely process release orders entered by courts into Odyssey\\nand received through OMS; (4) evidence of integration issues\\nfrom the time of OMS’s implementation; and (5) evidence that\\nrelease information cannot be properly transmitted between\\nOdyssey and OMS.\\n Defendants reject much of this evidence as “unproven al-\\nlegations” that there were over-detention problems arising\\nfrom different scenarios having nothing to do with the inmate\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 15\\n\\nrelease policy developed between the courts and the Sheriff’s\\nOffice.5 Likewise, defendants believe the district court got it\\nright when it cited City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle to support its\\nconclusion that Levy needed evidence of other instances of\\nthe relevant policy causing constitutional violations. 471 U.S.\\n808, 823–24 (1985).\\n As an initial matter, we have explained that the “more\\nproof” that Tuttle describes is necessary to establish that\\n“there is a true municipal policy at issue, not a random event.”\\nCalhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005); see also\\nThomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2010) (“We do not adopt any bright-line rules defining a\\n‘widespread custom or practice.’ … But the plaintiff must\\ndemonstrate that there is a policy at issue rather than a ran-\\ndom event.” (citations omitted)).\\n In this case, however, there is no concern that a policy is\\nnot at play. In fact, the Sheriff’s Office acknowledged in its\\nappellate brief that it “does not challenge the district court’s\\ndecision to analyze this release process as a policy or practice\\nunder Monell.” Moreover, the record supports Levy’s narra-\\ntive that by continuing to use the Transmittal Policy without\\nany modification, defendants persistently pursued a course of\\naction of selecting and continuing to use a case management\\nsystem despite many concerns from stakeholders, numerous\\nintegration issues, and an inability to process updated release\\n\\n 5 Levy is a putative class member in another case pending in the\\nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Driver, et\\nal. v. The Marion County Sheriff, Case No. 1:14-cv-2076, in which the plain-\\ntiffs challenge the Sheriff’s purported policies and practices of holding de-\\ntainees for up to seventy-two hours. He submitted experts’ depositions\\nand other documents from that litigation to support his claim in this case.\\n\\f16 No. 19-1424\\n\\norders from the courts. Thus, if Levy’s detention had occurred\\nprior to the Sheriff’s adoption of the Change Notification Pol-\\nicy, and he therefore challenged the use of the Transmittal\\nPolicy prior to the Change Notification Policy, then there may\\nhave been a question for the jury as to deliberate indifference.\\n But Levy’s detention occurred after the Sheriff’s Office\\ntook steps to address the purported problems with the Trans-\\nmittal Policy. Thus, as in Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564\\n(7th Cir. 1998), we are faced with the question of whether a\\nprison’s use of a system with significant weaknesses can be\\nconsidered deliberately indifferent, even after the prison has\\ntaken affirmative steps to address those weaknesses.\\n In Armstrong, a pretrial detainee asserted that the “will\\ncall” policy at the Allen County (Indiana) jail was constitu-\\ntionally inadequate because “it display[ed] indifference to the\\nrights of those arrested with a civil warrant to a prompt ap-\\npearance before a court.” Id. at 577. Specifically, the evidence\\nshowed that once the jail put detainees on the will call list, it\\ntook absolutely no action to ensure that they were given a\\ncourt date and that they were not over-detained. Id. at 577–78.\\nAlthough we explicitly noted that “the will call system in\\nplace at the time of Armstrong’s arrest and detention …\\nseem[ed] to amount to a policy of deliberate indifference,” id.\\nat 579, we decided the claim failed because “the jail had a\\nbackup plan—of sorts, at least—it accepted formal written\\ncomplaints from the detainees.” Id. The existence of this fail-\\nsafe “show[ed] an awareness on the part of jail officials that a\\ndanger exist[ed] and an attempt to avert an injury from that\\ndanger.” Id. Indeed, the “procedure saved the will call system\\nfrom being deliberately indifferent.” Id. at 579.\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 17\\n\\n The logic of Armstrong applies with equal force here.\\nGiven the concerns regarding the Sheriff’s ability to receive\\nand act upon court orders processed through OMS, the Sher-\\niff’s Office created backup plans to address the limitations of\\nits systems. First, it developed the release workflow process\\nas part of the Transmittal Policy to ensure that the courts’ or-\\nders were properly handled and effected. Second, and most\\nimportantly, the Sheriff’s Office developed the Change Noti-\\nfication Policy, a modification of the release workflow process\\nthat required court officials to call or email the Sheriff with\\nany modifications to prior court orders.\\n As in Armstrong, these actions “show[ed] an awareness on\\nthe part of jail officials that a danger exist[ed] and an attempt\\nto avert an injury from that danger.” Consequently, without\\nevidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known\\nthat these safeguards would fail, or failed so often that they\\nwould obviously result in over-detentions, we cannot con-\\nclude that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the\\nrisk of detainees’ over-detention. Levy’s singular experience\\ndoes not support a finding to the contrary.6\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Because the district court appropriately held that Levy did not pre-\\nsent sufficient evidence to show deliberate indifference, we need not ad-\\ndress the Sheriff’s argument regarding causation.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448043/\", \"author_raw\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670790/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Gai Levy v. Marion County Sheriff\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1424\nGAI LEVY,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nMARION COUNTY SHERIFF, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\n No. 17-cv-03090 — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Gai Levy brought\nthis lawsuit against defendants-appellees, the Marion County\nSheriff and the Consolidated City of Indianapolis and Marion\nCounty (collectively, “defendants”), alleging constitutional\nviolations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawfully detaining\nhim. Levy contends that on two separate occasions defend-\nants violated orders from a trial court to release him from cus-\ntody. In particular, he asserts that the policies and practices\n\f2 No. 19-1424\n\ndefendants used to communicate with the courts about indi-\nvidual defendants led to his prolonged detention. Defendants\nmoved for summary judgment on Levy’s § 1983 claims. The\ndistrict court granted their motion. We affirm.\n I. Background\n Before diving into the specifics of this case, it is helpful to\nunderstand how the Marion County Sheriff’s Office receives\ninformation from the Marion County Superior Courts and\nhow the Sheriff’s Office then executes those court orders. The\ncourts and the Sheriff use two different systems for their case\nmanagement needs. The courts’ system is called Odyssey and\nthe Sheriff’s is called Offender Management System (OMS).\nBoth systems use event codes to indicate a court’s order, but\nintegration between the two systems since their adoption in\n2014 has proven challenging, given the systems’ difficulty\ncommunicating with each other. To remedy this problem, the\nInformation Services Agency for the Consolidated City of In-\ndianapolis and Marion County developed a special data ex-\nchange system to ensure the transfer of data from the courts\nto the Sheriff’s Office.\n This solution was imperfect. For example, when a court\nordered a detainee released subject to placement at Marion\nCounty Community Corrections (MCCC), the court could en-\nter an “ORC” code (the “Self-Report code”), which directed\nthe Sheriff to release the detainee from custody so he could\nself-report to MCCC on his own. Alternatively, the court\ncould enter an “SBDOA” code (the “Direct Transfer code”),\nwhich instructed the Sheriff to maintain the detainee in cus-\ntody until he could be directly transported to MCCC for pro-\ncessing and release. After the Sheriff received either a Self-Re-\n\fNo. 19-1424 3\n\nport or Direct Transfer code, it placed the detainee in the “re-\nlease workflow.” The release workflow was a process\nwhereby the Sheriff’s Office automatically generated a list of\ndetainees for whom the court had entered release codes. After\nthat, the Sheriff’s inmate records staff reviewed the list to ver-\nify that each detainee was eligible to be released immediately\nor transferred for release. Once they completed the verifica-\ntion process, the inmate records staff removed the detainee\nfrom the release workflow.\n Because the release workflow could not automatically\nprocess updated release orders, problems arose when the\ncourts modified an order as to a detainee who had already\ncleared the process. The Sheriff’s Office knew of this flaw and\nhad reached an agreement with the courts to have court staff\ncontact the Sheriff’s inmate records staff any time there was a\nsubsequent order in the same case to ensure that the Sheriff’s\nOffice was operating with the most current information. It is\nundisputed that if court staff did not notify the Sheriff’s Office\nabout such updates or modifications, the Sheriff would pro-\ncess a detainee based on the original release order it received.\n With that context in mind, we turn our focus to Levy’s\ncase. The Sheriff’s Office took custody of Levy after his arrest\non an outstanding warrant on February 29, 2016. The parties\nagree that Levy remained in the Sheriff’s custody until March\n3, 2016, when it transferred him to MCCC. (MCCC released\nLevy later that same day.) Beyond that basic timeline, though,\nthe parties disagree about when the Sheriff’s Office received\nan order from the court to release Levy.\n\f4 No. 19-1424\n\n According to Levy, the judge at his first court appearance\nordered him released on his own recognizance, and because\nthe Sheriff’s Office did not immediately release him after that\norder, Levy argues that the Sheriff unlawfully detained him.\nTo support his version of events, Levy points to this screen-\nshot of his case file in OMS, which he contends shows that\nofficer Roberto Juan Rodrigues entered “Order To Release\nFrom Custody” as the “Court Event” on February 29, 2016, at\n23:50:\n\n\n\n\n The Sheriff’s Office, however, asserts that the judge or-\ndered that the Sheriff keep Levy in custody until he could be\ntransferred directly to MCCC; it was not until Levy’s second\ncourt appearance on March 2, 2016, that a different judge or-\ndered Levy to self-report to MCCC. By that time, the Sheriff\nasserts, the inmate records staff had already finished pro-\ncessing Levy through its release workflow. It is undisputed\nthat no one at the court called or emailed the Sheriff’s Office\nabout the second order, and therefore, that the Sheriff never\nreceived notice of the second order. Ultimately, the Sheriff’s\nOffice processed Levy and kept him in custody until March 3,\n\fNo. 19-1424 5\n\n2016. To support their version of the timeline, defendants di-\nrect our attention to the certified copy of the Case Summary\nin Levy’s case, which shows that the court entered a Direct\nTransfer code on March 1, 2016, but later entered a Self-Report\ncode on March 2, 2016:\n\f6 No. 19-1424\n\n\n\n\n Levy consequently alleged claims against defendants for\nunreasonable seizure and detention under the Fourth\nAmendment and deprivation of liberty without due process\nunder the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Levy insists\nthat the Sheriff’s Office “instituted and maintained unreason-\nable policies and practices that resulted in its keeping [him]\n\fNo. 19-1424 7\n\ndetained … after [he] had been ordered released by the Court\nand/or after legal authority for [his] detention had ceased.”\n Defendants moved for summary judgment on October 4,\n2018, and they moved to exclude the testimony of Levy’s ex-\npert on December 10, 2018. The district court granted both\nmotions on February 11, 2019.1 Regarding the motion for sum-\nmary judgment, the district court first held that Levy’s Four-\nteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim could not pro-\nceed because “the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process\nClause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial detention.”\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019) (first\nciting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017); then\nciting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018)).\n As to whether Levy had raised any genuine disputes of\nmaterial fact for a jury to resolve on his Fourth Amendment\nclaim, the court first explained that it understood Levy to be\nchallenging two policies or practices: (1) the use of Odyssey\nand OMS to transmit release codes from the Marion County\nSuperior Courts to the Sheriff’s Office (the “Transmittal Pol-\nicy”);2 and (2) the practice of requiring court staff to contact\nthe Sheriff when a release order had been modified (the\n“Change Notification Policy”). Because the court found it was\nundisputed that the Sheriff’s Office did not receive notice of\nthe Self-Report code before it released Levy, the court held the\nSheriff’s use of the Transmittal Policy alone could not have\n\n\n 1 Levy does not appeal the district court’s decision to exclude his ex-\npert.\n 2 Although the district court did not explicitly say as much, we assume\n\nthat the Transmittal Policy also includes the Sheriff’s adoption and use of\nthe release workflow.\n\f8 No. 19-1424\n\ncaused Levy’s harm. In considering the Change Notification\nPolicy, the court considered four different time frames:\n 1. The time between Levy’s arrest and the entry of a\n code on March 1, 2016 at 12:25 AM after his first\n court appearance.\n 2. The time between the entry of the first code and the\n entry of the second code on March 2, 2016 at 2:15\n PM after his second court appearance.\n\n 3. The time between the entry of the second code and\n his transfer to MCCC on March 3, 2016 at 1:35 PM.\n 4. The time between his transfer to MCCC and his re-\n lease from MCCC on March 3, 2016 at 7:30 PM.\n The court emphasized that Levy did not challenge the\nSheriff’s authority to detain him during the first or fourth time\nperiods; rather, Levy’s complaint concerned the second and\nthird time periods alone. In considering the second time pe-\nriod, the court reasoned that because Levy did not produce\nany evidence to contradict the Case Summary, which showed\nthat the court had ordered Levy released “Upon Satisfaction\nof Bond, Party Held For Other Agency” and listed “commu-\nnity corrections” at the first court appearance, it followed that\nthe Sheriff had the legal authority to detain Levy during that\ntime period and thus his detention did not violate the Fourth\nAmendment.\n Turning to the third time period, the court noted that de-\nfendants acknowledged that the failure of the Change Notifi-\ncation Policy caused Levy’s detention during this time period,\nbut the court underscored that because Levy did not produce\nevidence of other individuals being over-detained for the\nsame reasons, Levy could not establish that defendants had\n\fNo. 19-1424 9\n\nadopted a policy or practice of deliberate indifference; there-\nfore, this time period could not serve as the basis of his claim\neither.\n Levy now appeals.\n II. Discussion\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary\njudgment de novo, interpreting all facts and drawing all rea-\nsonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. O’Brien\nv. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2018). “Summary\njudgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-\nter of law.” Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673\n(7th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Summary judg-\nment is inappropriate “if the evidence is such that a reasona-\nble jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” An-\nderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may\naffirm the entry of summary judgment on any ground sup-\nported in the record, so long as the moving party adequately\npresented the issue in the district court and the non-moving\nparty had an opportunity to contest it. O’Brien, 900 F.3d at 928.\n A. Dispute of Material Fact\n One of the issues Levy raises on appeal is the district\ncourt’s finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that the\nSheriff received a Self-Report code after his first court appear-\nance. Levy focuses on the evidence he submitted to the district\ncourt, namely a screenshot of his case file in OMS, which he\nargues shows that officer Roberto Juan Rodrigues entered\n“Order To Release From Custody” as the “Court Event” on\n\f10 No. 19-1424\n\nFebruary 29, 2016, at 23:50.3 Levy contends that the district\ncourt dismissed his characterization of the screenshot in favor\nof the explanation given by the Sheriff’s Chief Information Of-\nficer, Derek Peterson, in his affidavit. Peterson asserted that\nthe screenshot did not show what code the court entered at\nLevy’s first court appearance, but that the certified copy of the\nCase Summary did contain that information, and that record\nshowed an entry of “Upon Satisfaction of Bond, Party Held\nfor Other Agency” on March 1, 2016, which would have\nprompted a Direct Transfer code, not a Self-Report code.\n By favoring Peterson’s interpretation of the OMS screen-\nshot over Levy’s, the court, in Levy’s view, made an imper-\nmissible credibility determination. Levy maintains that, in\nany event, the certified Case Summary does not conclusively\nrefute his argument about an initial Self-Report code because\nit incorrectly states that Levy’s arrest was on March 1, 2016;\naccordingly, a jury could reasonably infer from that discrep-\nancy that the Case Summary is neither infallible nor disposi-\ntive as to the court’s order regarding Levy’s first appearance.\n\n\n\n 3 Levy’s lawyer attached the screenshot to a declaration filed in oppo-\n\nsition to the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, defend-\nants make several admissibility challenges to Levy’s reliance on the OMS\nscreenshot. But by raising those issues for the first time on appeal, defend-\nants have forfeited those arguments. See Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 231\nF.3d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[H]er attack on the admissibility of the\naffidavit is waived because she failed to raise it in the district court.”); see\nalso Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, Inc., 658 F.3d 760, 770 (7th Cir.\n2011) (“To preserve an evidentiary objection for appeal, a party must make\na ‘timely objection or motion to strike … stating the specific ground of ob-\njection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.’” (quot-\ning Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1))).\n\fNo. 19-1424 11\n\n Defendants respond by highlighting that Levy has not\npresented any evidence to controvert Peterson’s testimony\nabout the meaning of the OMS screenshot.4 Consequently, de-\nfendants insist that there is no dispute of fact as to the central\nquestion in this case—whether the court actually ordered the\nSheriff to release Levy to self-report to the MCCC after his\nfirst court appearance. According to defendants, there is no\ndispute that the OMS screenshot does not support Levy’s ar-\ngument that the Sheriff’s Office received an order to immedi-\nately release Levy to self-report to the MCCC after his first\ncourt appearance. And because the Case Summary supports\ndefendants’ contention that the Sheriff received an order to\nhold Levy at the MCCC after his first court appearance, de-\nfendants urge us to affirm the district court’s judgment.\n If the issue on appeal were simply one of dueling docu-\nments and the district court had picked defendants’ asserted\nfacts over Levy’s, that act would constitute reversible error.\nHere, however, there are no such dueling documents. Both\nthe OMS screenshot and the Case Summary contain many\ndates and codes. The OMS screenshot lists “Order To Release\nFrom Custody” next to the field “Court Event,” but there are\nalso dates listed: the field “Notification Made On” has\n“03/01/2016” listed, the field “Effective Date” has\n“02/29/2016” listed, and the field “Date/Time Added” has\n“02/29/2016 23:50” listed. To make matters more confusing,\n\n\n 4 Levy had attempted to present an expert witness, Alison Shine, who\n\nwould have asserted that a judge ordered Levy to self-report at his first\ncourt appearance on March 1, and that the Sheriff’s Office had to have\nbeen aware of that order through the court’s use of Odyssey and OMS.\nThe district court, however, excluded Shine’s testimony (as noted above)\nand Levy does not challenge that ruling on appeal.\n\f12 No. 19-1424\n\nthe screenshot also lists dates that accurately describe events\nthat occurred after Levy’s first court appearance. For example,\nthe field “Discharge Date” has “03/03/2016” listed, and at the\nbottom of the page, there is a table that displays “$500 cash”\nas a “Note” on the date of “03/01/2016 00:25.”\n Consequently, it would be unreasonable to infer that this\nscreenshot only depicts information at the time the court had\nentered a code after the first court appearance. Similarly, it\nwould be unreasonable to infer from the presence of a Self-\nReport code amidst this range of dates that the court entered\na Self-Report code after the first court appearance. Moreover,\nin his affidavit, Peterson made the uncontroverted assertion\nthat the OMS screenshot cannot be interpreted to show what\ncode the court entered at Levy’s first appearance. This testi-\nmony and evidence is enough to affirm the district court’s de-\ncision that there was no dispute of material fact as to whether\nthe court entered a Self-Report code after Levy’s first court\nappearance. With that factual issue resolved, we move on to\nwhether the district court properly entered summary judg-\nment for defendants on the Monell claim.\n B. Monell Liability\n Plaintiffs like Levy may sue municipalities under 42 U.S.C.\n§ 1983 when their actions violate the Constitution. See gener-\nally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.\n658 (1978). To prevail on a Monell claim, plaintiffs must iden-\ntify an action taken by the municipality, the requisite degree\nof culpability, and a causal link between the municipality’s\naction and the deprivation of federal rights. Bd. of the Cty.\nCommissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997). A munic-\nipality “acts” through its written policies, widespread prac-\ntices or customs, and the acts of a final decisionmaker. Id. A\n\fNo. 19-1424 13\n\nmunicipality has the requisite degree of culpability if it acts\nwith deliberate indifference to the known or obvious conse-\nquences of its action. Id. at 407.\n The Sheriff’s Office does not dispute that it created a sys-\ntem with the Marion County Superior Courts to process in-\nmates for release utilizing Odyssey, OMS, and the release\nworkflow, which included an agreement that if a court modi-\nfied a release order, court staff would contact the Sheriff’s in-\nmate records staff to notify them of the change. Likewise, the\nSheriff does not challenge the district court’s decision to ana-\nlyze this system as a policy or practice under Monell.\n That said, it is critical to specify the exact policy or practice\nat issue here to properly conduct our analysis. As noted\nabove, the district court discussed Monell as if there were two\npolices in this case—the “Transmittal Policy” and the\n“Change Notification Policy”—when determining whether\nthe Sheriff’s Office had acted with deliberate indifference.\nLevy argues that the two must be treated as one policy for the\npurposes of this appeal, and defendants appear to concede\nthe same.\n A review of the record supports this conclusion. The evi-\ndence suggests that the Sheriff’s Office adopted the Change\nNotification Policy to ensure that it received notice of subse-\nquent orders that may have been otherwise overlooked by the\nexisting Transmittal Policy. Thus, the issue on appeal is\nwhether Levy can establish that the Sheriff’s adoption and use\nof this modified Transmittal Policy constituted deliberate indif-\nference to a substantial risk of detainees’ over-detention and\nwhether that policy’s adoption caused his own over-deten-\ntion.\n\f14 No. 19-1424\n\n For the reasons explained below, we conclude that absent\nevidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known\nthat the modified Transmittal Policy would fail, or failed so\noften that it would obviously result in detainees’ over-deten-\ntion, Levy cannot to show that defendants acted with deliber-\nate indifference.\n Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, Levy posits that\nto establish deliberate indifference, he is not required to show\n“other instances” where the failure to follow the Change No-\ntification Policy caused prolonged detentions. This is so, he\nexplains, because he challenges a “decision to adopt [a] par-\nticular course of action [ ] properly made by that govern-\nment’s authorized decisionmakers,” and that is a sufficient\nbasis to find municipal liability under § 1983. Pembaur v. City\nof Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).\n Levy believes that he has shown the Sheriff’s Office took\nsuch a course of action here because he presented (1) evidence\nthat the Sheriff selected OMS without properly vetting the\nsoftware or considering its consequences; (2) evidence that\nthe Sheriff used OMS despite multiple Marion County judges\nraising concerns about delayed releases and a group of those\njudges endorsing an entirely different software package;\n(3) evidence that the inmate records staff previously failed to\ntimely process release orders entered by courts into Odyssey\nand received through OMS; (4) evidence of integration issues\nfrom the time of OMS’s implementation; and (5) evidence that\nrelease information cannot be properly transmitted between\nOdyssey and OMS.\n Defendants reject much of this evidence as “unproven al-\nlegations” that there were over-detention problems arising\nfrom different scenarios having nothing to do with the inmate\n\fNo. 19-1424 15\n\nrelease policy developed between the courts and the Sheriff’s\nOffice.5 Likewise, defendants believe the district court got it\nright when it cited City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle to support its\nconclusion that Levy needed evidence of other instances of\nthe relevant policy causing constitutional violations. 471 U.S.\n808, 823–24 (1985).\n As an initial matter, we have explained that the “more\nproof” that Tuttle describes is necessary to establish that\n“there is a true municipal policy at issue, not a random event.”\nCalhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005); see also\nThomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\n2010) (“We do not adopt any bright-line rules defining a\n‘widespread custom or practice.’ … But the plaintiff must\ndemonstrate that there is a policy at issue rather than a ran-\ndom event.” (citations omitted)).\n In this case, however, there is no concern that a policy is\nnot at play. In fact, the Sheriff’s Office acknowledged in its\nappellate brief that it “does not challenge the district court’s\ndecision to analyze this release process as a policy or practice\nunder Monell.” Moreover, the record supports Levy’s narra-\ntive that by continuing to use the Transmittal Policy without\nany modification, defendants persistently pursued a course of\naction of selecting and continuing to use a case management\nsystem despite many concerns from stakeholders, numerous\nintegration issues, and an inability to process updated release\n\n 5 Levy is a putative class member in another case pending in the\nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Driver, et\nal. v. The Marion County Sheriff, Case No. 1:14-cv-2076, in which the plain-\ntiffs challenge the Sheriff’s purported policies and practices of holding de-\ntainees for up to seventy-two hours. He submitted experts’ depositions\nand other documents from that litigation to support his claim in this case.\n\f16 No. 19-1424\n\norders from the courts. Thus, if Levy’s detention had occurred\nprior to the Sheriff’s adoption of the Change Notification Pol-\nicy, and he therefore challenged the use of the Transmittal\nPolicy prior to the Change Notification Policy, then there may\nhave been a question for the jury as to deliberate indifference.\n But Levy’s detention occurred after the Sheriff’s Office\ntook steps to address the purported problems with the Trans-\nmittal Policy. Thus, as in Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564\n(7th Cir. 1998), we are faced with the question of whether a\nprison’s use of a system with significant weaknesses can be\nconsidered deliberately indifferent, even after the prison has\ntaken affirmative steps to address those weaknesses.\n In Armstrong, a pretrial detainee asserted that the “will\ncall” policy at the Allen County (Indiana) jail was constitu-\ntionally inadequate because “it display[ed] indifference to the\nrights of those arrested with a civil warrant to a prompt ap-\npearance before a court.” Id. at 577. Specifically, the evidence\nshowed that once the jail put detainees on the will call list, it\ntook absolutely no action to ensure that they were given a\ncourt date and that they were not over-detained. Id. at 577–78.\nAlthough we explicitly noted that “the will call system in\nplace at the time of Armstrong’s arrest and detention …\nseem[ed] to amount to a policy of deliberate indifference,” id.\nat 579, we decided the claim failed because “the jail had a\nbackup plan—of sorts, at least—it accepted formal written\ncomplaints from the detainees.” Id. The existence of this fail-\nsafe “show[ed] an awareness on the part of jail officials that a\ndanger exist[ed] and an attempt to avert an injury from that\ndanger.” Id. Indeed, the “procedure saved the will call system\nfrom being deliberately indifferent.” Id. at 579.\n\fNo. 19-1424 17\n\n The logic of Armstrong applies with equal force here.\nGiven the concerns regarding the Sheriff’s ability to receive\nand act upon court orders processed through OMS, the Sher-\niff’s Office created backup plans to address the limitations of\nits systems. First, it developed the release workflow process\nas part of the Transmittal Policy to ensure that the courts’ or-\nders were properly handled and effected. Second, and most\nimportantly, the Sheriff’s Office developed the Change Noti-\nfication Policy, a modification of the release workflow process\nthat required court officials to call or email the Sheriff with\nany modifications to prior court orders.\n As in Armstrong, these actions “show[ed] an awareness on\nthe part of jail officials that a danger exist[ed] and an attempt\nto avert an injury from that danger.” Consequently, without\nevidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known\nthat these safeguards would fail, or failed so often that they\nwould obviously result in over-detentions, we cannot con-\nclude that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the\nrisk of detainees’ over-detention. Levy’s singular experience\ndoes not support a finding to the contrary.6\n III. Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\ndistrict court.\n\n\n\n\n 6 Because the district court appropriately held that Levy did not pre-\nsent sufficient evidence to show deliberate indifference, we need not ad-\ndress the Sheriff’s argument regarding causation.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Gai Levy v. Marion County Sheriff\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1424\\nGAI LEVY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nMARION COUNTY SHERIFF, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 17-cv-03090 — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Gai Levy brought\\nthis lawsuit against defendants-appellees, the Marion County\\nSheriff and the Consolidated City of Indianapolis and Marion\\nCounty (collectively, “defendants”), alleging constitutional\\nviolations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawfully detaining\\nhim. Levy contends that on two separate occasions defend-\\nants violated orders from a trial court to release him from cus-\\ntody. In particular, he asserts that the policies and practices\\n\\f2 No. 19-1424\\n\\ndefendants used to communicate with the courts about indi-\\nvidual defendants led to his prolonged detention. Defendants\\nmoved for summary judgment on Levy’s § 1983 claims. The\\ndistrict court granted their motion. We affirm.\\n I. Background\\n Before diving into the specifics of this case, it is helpful to\\nunderstand how the Marion County Sheriff’s Office receives\\ninformation from the Marion County Superior Courts and\\nhow the Sheriff’s Office then executes those court orders. The\\ncourts and the Sheriff use two different systems for their case\\nmanagement needs. The courts’ system is called Odyssey and\\nthe Sheriff’s is called Offender Management System (OMS).\\nBoth systems use event codes to indicate a court’s order, but\\nintegration between the two systems since their adoption in\\n2014 has proven challenging, given the systems’ difficulty\\ncommunicating with each other. To remedy this problem, the\\nInformation Services Agency for the Consolidated City of In-\\ndianapolis and Marion County developed a special data ex-\\nchange system to ensure the transfer of data from the courts\\nto the Sheriff’s Office.\\n This solution was imperfect. For example, when a court\\nordered a detainee released subject to placement at Marion\\nCounty Community Corrections (MCCC), the court could en-\\nter an “ORC” code (the “Self-Report code”), which directed\\nthe Sheriff to release the detainee from custody so he could\\nself-report to MCCC on his own. Alternatively, the court\\ncould enter an “SBDOA” code (the “Direct Transfer code”),\\nwhich instructed the Sheriff to maintain the detainee in cus-\\ntody until he could be directly transported to MCCC for pro-\\ncessing and release. After the Sheriff received either a Self-Re-\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 3\\n\\nport or Direct Transfer code, it placed the detainee in the “re-\\nlease workflow.” The release workflow was a process\\nwhereby the Sheriff’s Office automatically generated a list of\\ndetainees for whom the court had entered release codes. After\\nthat, the Sheriff’s inmate records staff reviewed the list to ver-\\nify that each detainee was eligible to be released immediately\\nor transferred for release. Once they completed the verifica-\\ntion process, the inmate records staff removed the detainee\\nfrom the release workflow.\\n Because the release workflow could not automatically\\nprocess updated release orders, problems arose when the\\ncourts modified an order as to a detainee who had already\\ncleared the process. The Sheriff’s Office knew of this flaw and\\nhad reached an agreement with the courts to have court staff\\ncontact the Sheriff’s inmate records staff any time there was a\\nsubsequent order in the same case to ensure that the Sheriff’s\\nOffice was operating with the most current information. It is\\nundisputed that if court staff did not notify the Sheriff’s Office\\nabout such updates or modifications, the Sheriff would pro-\\ncess a detainee based on the original release order it received.\\n With that context in mind, we turn our focus to Levy’s\\ncase. The Sheriff’s Office took custody of Levy after his arrest\\non an outstanding warrant on February 29, 2016. The parties\\nagree that Levy remained in the Sheriff’s custody until March\\n3, 2016, when it transferred him to MCCC. (MCCC released\\nLevy later that same day.) Beyond that basic timeline, though,\\nthe parties disagree about when the Sheriff’s Office received\\nan order from the court to release Levy.\\n\\f4 No. 19-1424\\n\\n According to Levy, the judge at his first court appearance\\nordered him released on his own recognizance, and because\\nthe Sheriff’s Office did not immediately release him after that\\norder, Levy argues that the Sheriff unlawfully detained him.\\nTo support his version of events, Levy points to this screen-\\nshot of his case file in OMS, which he contends shows that\\nofficer Roberto Juan Rodrigues entered “Order To Release\\nFrom Custody” as the “Court Event” on February 29, 2016, at\\n23:50:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n The Sheriff’s Office, however, asserts that the judge or-\\ndered that the Sheriff keep Levy in custody until he could be\\ntransferred directly to MCCC; it was not until Levy’s second\\ncourt appearance on March 2, 2016, that a different judge or-\\ndered Levy to self-report to MCCC. By that time, the Sheriff\\nasserts, the inmate records staff had already finished pro-\\ncessing Levy through its release workflow. It is undisputed\\nthat no one at the court called or emailed the Sheriff’s Office\\nabout the second order, and therefore, that the Sheriff never\\nreceived notice of the second order. Ultimately, the Sheriff’s\\nOffice processed Levy and kept him in custody until March 3,\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 5\\n\\n2016. To support their version of the timeline, defendants di-\\nrect our attention to the certified copy of the Case Summary\\nin Levy’s case, which shows that the court entered a Direct\\nTransfer code on March 1, 2016, but later entered a Self-Report\\ncode on March 2, 2016:\\n\\f6 No. 19-1424\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Levy consequently alleged claims against defendants for\\nunreasonable seizure and detention under the Fourth\\nAmendment and deprivation of liberty without due process\\nunder the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Levy insists\\nthat the Sheriff’s Office “instituted and maintained unreason-\\nable policies and practices that resulted in its keeping [him]\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 7\\n\\ndetained … after [he] had been ordered released by the Court\\nand/or after legal authority for [his] detention had ceased.”\\n Defendants moved for summary judgment on October 4,\\n2018, and they moved to exclude the testimony of Levy’s ex-\\npert on December 10, 2018. The district court granted both\\nmotions on February 11, 2019.1 Regarding the motion for sum-\\nmary judgment, the district court first held that Levy’s Four-\\nteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim could not pro-\\nceed because “the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process\\nClause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial detention.”\\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019) (first\\nciting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017); then\\nciting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018)).\\n As to whether Levy had raised any genuine disputes of\\nmaterial fact for a jury to resolve on his Fourth Amendment\\nclaim, the court first explained that it understood Levy to be\\nchallenging two policies or practices: (1) the use of Odyssey\\nand OMS to transmit release codes from the Marion County\\nSuperior Courts to the Sheriff’s Office (the “Transmittal Pol-\\nicy”);2 and (2) the practice of requiring court staff to contact\\nthe Sheriff when a release order had been modified (the\\n“Change Notification Policy”). Because the court found it was\\nundisputed that the Sheriff’s Office did not receive notice of\\nthe Self-Report code before it released Levy, the court held the\\nSheriff’s use of the Transmittal Policy alone could not have\\n\\n\\n 1 Levy does not appeal the district court’s decision to exclude his ex-\\npert.\\n 2 Although the district court did not explicitly say as much, we assume\\n\\nthat the Transmittal Policy also includes the Sheriff’s adoption and use of\\nthe release workflow.\\n\\f8 No. 19-1424\\n\\ncaused Levy’s harm. In considering the Change Notification\\nPolicy, the court considered four different time frames:\\n 1. The time between Levy’s arrest and the entry of a\\n code on March 1, 2016 at 12:25 AM after his first\\n court appearance.\\n 2. The time between the entry of the first code and the\\n entry of the second code on March 2, 2016 at 2:15\\n PM after his second court appearance.\\n\\n 3. The time between the entry of the second code and\\n his transfer to MCCC on March 3, 2016 at 1:35 PM.\\n 4. The time between his transfer to MCCC and his re-\\n lease from MCCC on March 3, 2016 at 7:30 PM.\\n The court emphasized that Levy did not challenge the\\nSheriff’s authority to detain him during the first or fourth time\\nperiods; rather, Levy’s complaint concerned the second and\\nthird time periods alone. In considering the second time pe-\\nriod, the court reasoned that because Levy did not produce\\nany evidence to contradict the Case Summary, which showed\\nthat the court had ordered Levy released “Upon Satisfaction\\nof Bond, Party Held For Other Agency” and listed “commu-\\nnity corrections” at the first court appearance, it followed that\\nthe Sheriff had the legal authority to detain Levy during that\\ntime period and thus his detention did not violate the Fourth\\nAmendment.\\n Turning to the third time period, the court noted that de-\\nfendants acknowledged that the failure of the Change Notifi-\\ncation Policy caused Levy’s detention during this time period,\\nbut the court underscored that because Levy did not produce\\nevidence of other individuals being over-detained for the\\nsame reasons, Levy could not establish that defendants had\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 9\\n\\nadopted a policy or practice of deliberate indifference; there-\\nfore, this time period could not serve as the basis of his claim\\neither.\\n Levy now appeals.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary\\njudgment de novo, interpreting all facts and drawing all rea-\\nsonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. O’Brien\\nv. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2018). “Summary\\njudgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of\\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-\\nter of law.” Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Summary judg-\\nment is inappropriate “if the evidence is such that a reasona-\\nble jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” An-\\nderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may\\naffirm the entry of summary judgment on any ground sup-\\nported in the record, so long as the moving party adequately\\npresented the issue in the district court and the non-moving\\nparty had an opportunity to contest it. O’Brien, 900 F.3d at 928.\\n A. Dispute of Material Fact\\n One of the issues Levy raises on appeal is the district\\ncourt’s finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that the\\nSheriff received a Self-Report code after his first court appear-\\nance. Levy focuses on the evidence he submitted to the district\\ncourt, namely a screenshot of his case file in OMS, which he\\nargues shows that officer Roberto Juan Rodrigues entered\\n“Order To Release From Custody” as the “Court Event” on\\n\\f10 No. 19-1424\\n\\nFebruary 29, 2016, at 23:50.3 Levy contends that the district\\ncourt dismissed his characterization of the screenshot in favor\\nof the explanation given by the Sheriff’s Chief Information Of-\\nficer, Derek Peterson, in his affidavit. Peterson asserted that\\nthe screenshot did not show what code the court entered at\\nLevy’s first court appearance, but that the certified copy of the\\nCase Summary did contain that information, and that record\\nshowed an entry of “Upon Satisfaction of Bond, Party Held\\nfor Other Agency” on March 1, 2016, which would have\\nprompted a Direct Transfer code, not a Self-Report code.\\n By favoring Peterson’s interpretation of the OMS screen-\\nshot over Levy’s, the court, in Levy’s view, made an imper-\\nmissible credibility determination. Levy maintains that, in\\nany event, the certified Case Summary does not conclusively\\nrefute his argument about an initial Self-Report code because\\nit incorrectly states that Levy’s arrest was on March 1, 2016;\\naccordingly, a jury could reasonably infer from that discrep-\\nancy that the Case Summary is neither infallible nor disposi-\\ntive as to the court’s order regarding Levy’s first appearance.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Levy’s lawyer attached the screenshot to a declaration filed in oppo-\\n\\nsition to the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, defend-\\nants make several admissibility challenges to Levy’s reliance on the OMS\\nscreenshot. But by raising those issues for the first time on appeal, defend-\\nants have forfeited those arguments. See Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 231\\nF.3d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[H]er attack on the admissibility of the\\naffidavit is waived because she failed to raise it in the district court.”); see\\nalso Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, Inc., 658 F.3d 760, 770 (7th Cir.\\n2011) (“To preserve an evidentiary objection for appeal, a party must make\\na ‘timely objection or motion to strike … stating the specific ground of ob-\\njection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.’” (quot-\\ning Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1))).\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 11\\n\\n Defendants respond by highlighting that Levy has not\\npresented any evidence to controvert Peterson’s testimony\\nabout the meaning of the OMS screenshot.4 Consequently, de-\\nfendants insist that there is no dispute of fact as to the central\\nquestion in this case—whether the court actually ordered the\\nSheriff to release Levy to self-report to the MCCC after his\\nfirst court appearance. According to defendants, there is no\\ndispute that the OMS screenshot does not support Levy’s ar-\\ngument that the Sheriff’s Office received an order to immedi-\\nately release Levy to self-report to the MCCC after his first\\ncourt appearance. And because the Case Summary supports\\ndefendants’ contention that the Sheriff received an order to\\nhold Levy at the MCCC after his first court appearance, de-\\nfendants urge us to affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n If the issue on appeal were simply one of dueling docu-\\nments and the district court had picked defendants’ asserted\\nfacts over Levy’s, that act would constitute reversible error.\\nHere, however, there are no such dueling documents. Both\\nthe OMS screenshot and the Case Summary contain many\\ndates and codes. The OMS screenshot lists “Order To Release\\nFrom Custody” next to the field “Court Event,” but there are\\nalso dates listed: the field “Notification Made On” has\\n“03/01/2016” listed, the field “Effective Date” has\\n“02/29/2016” listed, and the field “Date/Time Added” has\\n“02/29/2016 23:50” listed. To make matters more confusing,\\n\\n\\n 4 Levy had attempted to present an expert witness, Alison Shine, who\\n\\nwould have asserted that a judge ordered Levy to self-report at his first\\ncourt appearance on March 1, and that the Sheriff’s Office had to have\\nbeen aware of that order through the court’s use of Odyssey and OMS.\\nThe district court, however, excluded Shine’s testimony (as noted above)\\nand Levy does not challenge that ruling on appeal.\\n\\f12 No. 19-1424\\n\\nthe screenshot also lists dates that accurately describe events\\nthat occurred after Levy’s first court appearance. For example,\\nthe field “Discharge Date” has “03/03/2016” listed, and at the\\nbottom of the page, there is a table that displays “$500 cash”\\nas a “Note” on the date of “03/01/2016 00:25.”\\n Consequently, it would be unreasonable to infer that this\\nscreenshot only depicts information at the time the court had\\nentered a code after the first court appearance. Similarly, it\\nwould be unreasonable to infer from the presence of a Self-\\nReport code amidst this range of dates that the court entered\\na Self-Report code after the first court appearance. Moreover,\\nin his affidavit, Peterson made the uncontroverted assertion\\nthat the OMS screenshot cannot be interpreted to show what\\ncode the court entered at Levy’s first appearance. This testi-\\nmony and evidence is enough to affirm the district court’s de-\\ncision that there was no dispute of material fact as to whether\\nthe court entered a Self-Report code after Levy’s first court\\nappearance. With that factual issue resolved, we move on to\\nwhether the district court properly entered summary judg-\\nment for defendants on the Monell claim.\\n B. Monell Liability\\n Plaintiffs like Levy may sue municipalities under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983 when their actions violate the Constitution. See gener-\\nally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.\\n658 (1978). To prevail on a Monell claim, plaintiffs must iden-\\ntify an action taken by the municipality, the requisite degree\\nof culpability, and a causal link between the municipality’s\\naction and the deprivation of federal rights. Bd. of the Cty.\\nCommissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997). A munic-\\nipality “acts” through its written policies, widespread prac-\\ntices or customs, and the acts of a final decisionmaker. Id. A\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 13\\n\\nmunicipality has the requisite degree of culpability if it acts\\nwith deliberate indifference to the known or obvious conse-\\nquences of its action. Id. at 407.\\n The Sheriff’s Office does not dispute that it created a sys-\\ntem with the Marion County Superior Courts to process in-\\nmates for release utilizing Odyssey, OMS, and the release\\nworkflow, which included an agreement that if a court modi-\\nfied a release order, court staff would contact the Sheriff’s in-\\nmate records staff to notify them of the change. Likewise, the\\nSheriff does not challenge the district court’s decision to ana-\\nlyze this system as a policy or practice under Monell.\\n That said, it is critical to specify the exact policy or practice\\nat issue here to properly conduct our analysis. As noted\\nabove, the district court discussed Monell as if there were two\\npolices in this case—the “Transmittal Policy” and the\\n“Change Notification Policy”—when determining whether\\nthe Sheriff’s Office had acted with deliberate indifference.\\nLevy argues that the two must be treated as one policy for the\\npurposes of this appeal, and defendants appear to concede\\nthe same.\\n A review of the record supports this conclusion. The evi-\\ndence suggests that the Sheriff’s Office adopted the Change\\nNotification Policy to ensure that it received notice of subse-\\nquent orders that may have been otherwise overlooked by the\\nexisting Transmittal Policy. Thus, the issue on appeal is\\nwhether Levy can establish that the Sheriff’s adoption and use\\nof this modified Transmittal Policy constituted deliberate indif-\\nference to a substantial risk of detainees’ over-detention and\\nwhether that policy’s adoption caused his own over-deten-\\ntion.\\n\\f14 No. 19-1424\\n\\n For the reasons explained below, we conclude that absent\\nevidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known\\nthat the modified Transmittal Policy would fail, or failed so\\noften that it would obviously result in detainees’ over-deten-\\ntion, Levy cannot to show that defendants acted with deliber-\\nate indifference.\\n Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, Levy posits that\\nto establish deliberate indifference, he is not required to show\\n“other instances” where the failure to follow the Change No-\\ntification Policy caused prolonged detentions. This is so, he\\nexplains, because he challenges a “decision to adopt [a] par-\\nticular course of action [ ] properly made by that govern-\\nment’s authorized decisionmakers,” and that is a sufficient\\nbasis to find municipal liability under § 1983. Pembaur v. City\\nof Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).\\n Levy believes that he has shown the Sheriff’s Office took\\nsuch a course of action here because he presented (1) evidence\\nthat the Sheriff selected OMS without properly vetting the\\nsoftware or considering its consequences; (2) evidence that\\nthe Sheriff used OMS despite multiple Marion County judges\\nraising concerns about delayed releases and a group of those\\njudges endorsing an entirely different software package;\\n(3) evidence that the inmate records staff previously failed to\\ntimely process release orders entered by courts into Odyssey\\nand received through OMS; (4) evidence of integration issues\\nfrom the time of OMS’s implementation; and (5) evidence that\\nrelease information cannot be properly transmitted between\\nOdyssey and OMS.\\n Defendants reject much of this evidence as “unproven al-\\nlegations” that there were over-detention problems arising\\nfrom different scenarios having nothing to do with the inmate\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 15\\n\\nrelease policy developed between the courts and the Sheriff’s\\nOffice.5 Likewise, defendants believe the district court got it\\nright when it cited City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle to support its\\nconclusion that Levy needed evidence of other instances of\\nthe relevant policy causing constitutional violations. 471 U.S.\\n808, 823–24 (1985).\\n As an initial matter, we have explained that the “more\\nproof” that Tuttle describes is necessary to establish that\\n“there is a true municipal policy at issue, not a random event.”\\nCalhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005); see also\\nThomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2010) (“We do not adopt any bright-line rules defining a\\n‘widespread custom or practice.’ … But the plaintiff must\\ndemonstrate that there is a policy at issue rather than a ran-\\ndom event.” (citations omitted)).\\n In this case, however, there is no concern that a policy is\\nnot at play. In fact, the Sheriff’s Office acknowledged in its\\nappellate brief that it “does not challenge the district court’s\\ndecision to analyze this release process as a policy or practice\\nunder Monell.” Moreover, the record supports Levy’s narra-\\ntive that by continuing to use the Transmittal Policy without\\nany modification, defendants persistently pursued a course of\\naction of selecting and continuing to use a case management\\nsystem despite many concerns from stakeholders, numerous\\nintegration issues, and an inability to process updated release\\n\\n 5 Levy is a putative class member in another case pending in the\\nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Driver, et\\nal. v. The Marion County Sheriff, Case No. 1:14-cv-2076, in which the plain-\\ntiffs challenge the Sheriff’s purported policies and practices of holding de-\\ntainees for up to seventy-two hours. He submitted experts’ depositions\\nand other documents from that litigation to support his claim in this case.\\n\\f16 No. 19-1424\\n\\norders from the courts. Thus, if Levy’s detention had occurred\\nprior to the Sheriff’s adoption of the Change Notification Pol-\\nicy, and he therefore challenged the use of the Transmittal\\nPolicy prior to the Change Notification Policy, then there may\\nhave been a question for the jury as to deliberate indifference.\\n But Levy’s detention occurred after the Sheriff’s Office\\ntook steps to address the purported problems with the Trans-\\nmittal Policy. Thus, as in Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564\\n(7th Cir. 1998), we are faced with the question of whether a\\nprison’s use of a system with significant weaknesses can be\\nconsidered deliberately indifferent, even after the prison has\\ntaken affirmative steps to address those weaknesses.\\n In Armstrong, a pretrial detainee asserted that the “will\\ncall” policy at the Allen County (Indiana) jail was constitu-\\ntionally inadequate because “it display[ed] indifference to the\\nrights of those arrested with a civil warrant to a prompt ap-\\npearance before a court.” Id. at 577. Specifically, the evidence\\nshowed that once the jail put detainees on the will call list, it\\ntook absolutely no action to ensure that they were given a\\ncourt date and that they were not over-detained. Id. at 577–78.\\nAlthough we explicitly noted that “the will call system in\\nplace at the time of Armstrong’s arrest and detention …\\nseem[ed] to amount to a policy of deliberate indifference,” id.\\nat 579, we decided the claim failed because “the jail had a\\nbackup plan—of sorts, at least—it accepted formal written\\ncomplaints from the detainees.” Id. The existence of this fail-\\nsafe “show[ed] an awareness on the part of jail officials that a\\ndanger exist[ed] and an attempt to avert an injury from that\\ndanger.” Id. Indeed, the “procedure saved the will call system\\nfrom being deliberately indifferent.” Id. at 579.\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 17\\n\\n The logic of Armstrong applies with equal force here.\\nGiven the concerns regarding the Sheriff’s ability to receive\\nand act upon court orders processed through OMS, the Sher-\\niff’s Office created backup plans to address the limitations of\\nits systems. First, it developed the release workflow process\\nas part of the Transmittal Policy to ensure that the courts’ or-\\nders were properly handled and effected. Second, and most\\nimportantly, the Sheriff’s Office developed the Change Noti-\\nfication Policy, a modification of the release workflow process\\nthat required court officials to call or email the Sheriff with\\nany modifications to prior court orders.\\n As in Armstrong, these actions “show[ed] an awareness on\\nthe part of jail officials that a danger exist[ed] and an attempt\\nto avert an injury from that danger.” Consequently, without\\nevidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known\\nthat these safeguards would fail, or failed so often that they\\nwould obviously result in over-detentions, we cannot con-\\nclude that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the\\nrisk of detainees’ over-detention. Levy’s singular experience\\ndoes not support a finding to the contrary.6\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Because the district court appropriately held that Levy did not pre-\\nsent sufficient evidence to show deliberate indifference, we need not ad-\\ndress the Sheriff’s argument regarding causation.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4675,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670825,"string":"4,670,825"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. David Holly"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1216"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1216\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDAVID HOLLY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00485-1 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Unreasonable seizures violate the\\nFourth Amendment while voluntary encounters with the po-\\nlice do not. This case implicates the dividing line. A police of-\\nficer rushed to approach David Holly in Chicago’s Altgeld\\nGardens Housing Complex and asked if he had a gun. Holly\\nanswered yes, which resulted in his arrest and subsequent\\nconviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Holly\\nlater moved to suppress the gun, contending that the officer’s\\n\\f2 No. 19-1216\\n\\napproach and questioning constituted an impermissible sei-\\nzure. The district court denied that motion after finding that\\nHolly consented to the encounter. We agree and affirm. In the\\ntotality of circumstances, Holly’s interaction with police fell\\non the voluntary side of the line.\\n I\\n A\\n On December 31, 2015, Officers Robert Caulfield and Jo-\\nseph Byrne of the Chicago Police Department were patrolling\\nthe Altgeld Gardens Housing Complex, a public housing pro-\\nject in the city’s far south side. The officers were in uniform\\nand on patrol as part of a CPD effort to increase police visibil-\\nity in anticipation of celebratory gunfire to usher in the new\\nyear. They drove an unmarked black Ford, which Officer\\nByrne later testified locals recognized as a police car. While\\nsitting in the car, Officers Byrne and Caulfield saw David\\nHolly walking on a sidewalk inside a courtyard of the com-\\nplex.\\n The parties dispute what happened next, but all agree that\\nthe police approached Holly in the courtyard and asked him\\nif he had a gun. Holly immediately said yes. The police then\\nconfiscated the gun and arrested him. A grand jury later in-\\ndicted Holly for possessing a firearm following a prior felony\\nconviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to\\nsuppress the gun, arguing that his encounter with the police\\nwas an impermissible seizure. He also moved to dismiss the\\nindictment, contending that the police’s failure to preserve\\nvideo footage of his arrest and activity leading to it violated\\nhis due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\\n(1963). The district court held a hearing on both issues and\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 3\\n\\nheard competing testimony from Holly and the police. It then\\ndenied Holly’s motions.\\n The testimony from the hearing frames the issues on ap-\\npeal. The officers testified that they had entered a parking lot\\nin Altgeld Gardens to get a better view of the interior court-\\nyard, which Officer Byrne considered a high-crime area based\\non arrests he had made there before. Around 4:00 p.m., Officer\\nByrne saw Holly walking on a sidewalk toward the police car.\\nOfficer Byrne said that as Holly neared the car, he made eye\\ncontact with the officers, formed a surprised and anxious\\nlook, and then turned sharply and walked swiftly in another\\ndirection, ultimately making his way behind a building and\\nout of the officers’ sight. Both officers testified that Officer\\nCaulfield then jogged after Holly and found him inside the\\ncourtyard, standing outside an apartment door and ringing\\nthe doorbell. (An occupant later told the officers she did not\\nknow Holly.)\\n Officer Caulfield said that he identified himself as police\\nand asked Holly a single question: Do you have drugs or a\\ngun? Yes, Holly replied, he had a gun in his pocket. Officer\\nCaulfield took the gun and from there turned Holly toward a\\nwall to arrest him. By then Officer Byrne had reached the\\napartment and assisted Officer Caulfield by handcuffing\\nHolly. Both officers testified that at no point did they draw\\ntheir own guns or touch Holly before placing him under ar-\\nrest. A third officer, Raul Casales, responded to a backup call\\nand met Officers Caulfield and Byrne about 15 to 20 seconds\\nafter Holly’s arrest. Officer Casales testified that he had\\ndrawn his gun but never pointed it at Holly.\\n Holly offered a starkly different account. He testified that\\nhe never saw the police car or made eye contact with any\\n\\f4 No. 19-1216\\n\\nofficer before being stopped and handcuffed. Holly instead\\nstated that he was ringing a friend’s doorbell when he saw\\nOfficer Caulfield run around the corner and approach him\\nwith his gun drawn. According to Holly, Officer Caulfield\\nthen demanded that he put his hands up, grabbed him, and\\ntold him he was being stopped because there were burglaries\\nin the neighborhood. Holly added that he did not feel free to\\nleave because he had lived in the neighborhood for decades\\nand knew the police stops there to be aggressive. Holly also\\ndiverged from the officers’ accounts regarding the sequence\\nof events surrounding his arrest. He insisted that Officer Caul-\\nfield patted him down, found a bulge, and only then asked if\\nhe had a gun. By the time Officer Byrne arrived, Holly contin-\\nued, Officer Caulfield had confiscated the gun and put his\\nown gun away.\\n After considering the competing testimony, the district\\ncourt credited the officers’ testimony. The district court ex-\\nplained that the accounts of Officers Caulfield, Byrne, and\\nCasales were consistent with each other. The district court\\nnoted that the officers’ testimony made more sense than\\nHolly’s, observing in particular that the police do not typi-\\ncally draw their weapons on an unarmed offender or at close\\nrange. By contrast, the district court found Holly less credible\\ngiven his criminal history and the fact that he had offered\\nthree shifting explanations for why he had a gun. Having\\ncredited the officers’ accounts, the district court then con-\\ncluded that Holly’s encounter with the police was consensual\\nand denied his motion to suppress.\\n B\\n The district court also heard testimony about Holly’s sec-\\nond claim on appeal—that he was denied due process when\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 5\\n\\nthe police failed to preserve a video taken near his arrest. On\\nthis score, the facts are straightforward and unfortunate.\\n Immediately after Holly’s arrest, Detective Peter Scatena\\nand Officers Byrne and Caulfield reviewed a video from the\\nonly nearby camera that captured what transpired. Detective\\nScatena then called Carlos Mackie, an analyst with the Chi-\\ncago Housing Authority, to request a copy of the video. When\\nMackie did not answer, Detective Scatena left a voicemail\\n(consistent with CPD protocol). What Detective Scatena did\\nnot know was that Mackie was on military leave and out of\\nthe office for an extended period. He never heard back from\\nMackie, followed up on the voicemail, or sought the video\\nsome other way. And because CHA cameras automatically re-\\nwrite footage after 15 to 30 days, the video taken near Holly’s\\narrest was eventually overwritten and thus no longer availa-\\nble.\\n The district court heard conflicting testimony of what the\\nvideo revealed before it was overwritten. For his part, Detec-\\ntive Scatena testified that the footage showed Holly in the\\ncourtyard walking at a hurried pace with two CPD officers\\nfollowing “side by side” in the same direction. (Recall that Of-\\nficers Byrne and Caulfield had testified that Officer Caulfield\\npursued Holly ahead of Officer Byrne.) Detective Scatena also\\nstated that the video did not show Holly after he was hand-\\ncuffed. By contrast, Officer Byrne testified that the video only\\ndepicted Officer Caulfield standing near Holly after he was\\nhandcuffed—not the events leading up to the arrest.\\n While these accounts differed, the district court found the\\ninconsistencies minor and understandable given the passage\\nof time and the number of arrests that the police make in the\\nordinary course. The district court underscored that no one\\n\\f6 No. 19-1216\\n\\nwho watched the video (before it was overwritten) testified\\nthat it depicted Holly’s arrest. Because Holly had not estab-\\nlished that the video was potentially exculpatory or that the\\npolice acted in bad faith by failing to preserve it, the court de-\\nnied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of a due\\nprocess violation.\\n The ensuing bench trial resulted in Holly’s conviction of\\nunlawful gun possession. The district court then sentenced\\nHolly to 90 months’ imprisonment and imposed 36 months’\\nsupervised release.\\n II\\n A\\n Not every police encounter implicates the Fourth Amend-\\nment. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)). A sei-\\nzure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes\\nplace if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would\\nnot feel free to leave. Id. A consensual encounter, on the other\\nhand, takes place if a reasonable person would feel free to ig-\\nnore the police and go about his business. Id.\\n In determining whether an encounter is consensual, we\\nconsider several factors:\\n where the interaction took place, including\\n whether it was in public;\\n how many police officers were present;\\n the extent to which the police presence was\\n threatening;\\n whether the officers made any show of\\n weapons or physical force;\\n the officers’ language and tone;\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 7\\n\\n whether the police suggested the defendant\\n was suspected of crime; and\\n whether officers told the defendant he was\\n free to leave.\\nSee id. These factors “are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.”\\nUnited States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\\nUnited States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).\\n B\\n We agree with the district court that Holly’s encounter\\nwith the police was voluntary. It is undisputed that the police\\nspoke to Holly in public and never stopped him, redirected\\nhis route, or otherwise obstructed his walking on the sidewalk\\nor through the courtyard. Officer Caulfield approached Holly\\nand put a question to him—do you have drugs or a gun?—\\nthat he immediately chose to answer. See Florida v. Royer, 460\\nU.S. 491, 497 (1983) (explaining that the police do not violate\\nthe Fourth Amendment by merely approaching a person in\\npublic and asking him questions); see also Shields, 789 F.3d at\\n743–44.\\n The district court’s other findings, which Holly has not\\nshown are clearly erroneous, support its conclusion that the\\nencounter was consensual. The district court reasonably cred-\\nited the officers’ accounts over Holly’s. It found Holly’s testi-\\nmony strained and implausible: he was a four-time convicted\\nfelon, had an incentive to lie to escape punishment, and in the\\ncourse of proceedings, offered three inconsistent explanations\\nfor why he had a gun. By contrast, the district court found that\\nthe officers had no incentive at the time of the incident to en-\\ngage in misconduct (as they likely believed everything was\\nbeing captured on camera) and no incentive to lie in their\\n\\f8 No. 19-1216\\n\\ntestimony after the fact. Considering each party’s position\\nand taking stock of their comparative credibility, the district\\ncourt was on solid footing in crediting the officers’ version of\\nevents. See United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir.\\n2007) (emphasizing that a district court’s determination of\\nwitness credibility “can virtually never be clear error”).\\n Against this backdrop, the district court concluded that\\nHolly’s encounter with the police was voluntary. It found that\\nOfficer Caulfield was alone when he jogged after Holly and\\nmade no show of force—he did not pull a gun, touch Holly,\\nor tell him to put his hands up. Rather, upon catching up with\\nHolly, Officer Caulfield promptly asked a direct question—\\ndo you have drugs or a gun?—and instantly received an\\nequally direct answer—yes. The question was not advanced\\nin a coercive tone or with an accompanying threat. Given\\nthese circumstances, a reasonable person in Holly’s shoes\\nwould have felt free to leave. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439;\\nUnited States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2006)\\n(holding that an encounter was consensual where three offic-\\ners approached a defendant in public and did not show weap-\\nons, touch him, or use a tone or language that would have\\ncommunicated to the defendant that he was seized).\\n Holly disagrees. He sees this case on all fours with our de-\\ncision in United States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2015).\\nThere Dontray Smith was walking alone at night when two\\narmed and uniformed police officers waited for him to enter\\nan alley. Id. at 684. The officers then rode their bicycles past\\nSmith into the alley and made a U-turn to face him, obstruct-\\ning his path forward. Id. at 685. From there one officer stepped\\noff his bike, approached Smith with his hand on his gun, and\\n“posed a single, accusatory question to Smith: ‘Are you in\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 9\\n\\npossession of any guns, knives, weapons, or anything ille-\\ngal?’” Id. Considering the location, the threatening presence\\nof multiple officers, the aggressive nature of the questioning,\\nand the fact that the police blocked Smith’s path, we con-\\ncluded that the encounter constituted a seizure. Id.\\n Holly is right that in both cases the police were in uniform,\\napproached the defendant, and asked about a gun. But the\\nsimilarities end there. The district court found that a single\\nofficer spoke with Holly in an open courtyard in the after-\\nnoon. Unlike the police in Smith, Officer Caulfield did not\\nblock Holly’s path or draw his weapon, and the tone of his\\nquestion did not compel an answer.\\n No doubt that line-drawing in this area of law is difficult\\nand requires a careful parsing of exactly what took place be-\\ntween the police and the accused. But “[i]t is well established\\nthat a seizure does not occur merely because a police officer\\napproaches an individual and asks him or her questions.” Id.\\nat 684. The district court proceeded carefully by holding a\\nhearing, considering the competing testimony, assessing\\ncredibility, and ultimately finding that Officer Caulfield ap-\\nproached Holly and asked him a question—nothing more.\\nUnder these circumstances, Holly’s encounter with the police\\nwas voluntary.\\n III\\n Holly also renews his argument in the name of Brady v.\\nMaryland that the police violated his due process rights by\\nfailing to preserve CHA video footage of the arrest and events\\nleading to it. We start from a different legal marker. The\\nproper framework for evaluating Holly’s claim comes not\\nfrom Brady, but rather from Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51\\n\\f10 No. 19-1216\\n\\n(1988). While Brady requires that the government disclose ev-\\nidence materially favorable to the defendant “irrespective of\\nthe good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” see 373 U.S. at\\n87, Holly’s claim is that the police failed to preserve only po-\\ntentially exculpatory evidence.\\n Under Youngblood, the police’s failure to preserve poten-\\ntially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due pro-\\ncess unless the defendant can show that the police acted in\\nbad faith. See 488 U.S. at 58. That standard requires proof of\\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence\\nand turns on an official’s subjective knowledge that the evi-\\ndence had exculpatory value. See United States v. Cherry, 920\\nF.3d 1126, 1140 (7th Cir. 2019). In addition to bad faith, the\\ndefendant must show that the exculpatory nature of the evi-\\ndence was apparent before its destruction and that he could\\nnot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See id.\\n Holly has not made these necessary showings. Detective\\nScatena made a clear effort to preserve the video: he left a\\nvoicemail requesting the video from the CHA and did so in\\naccordance with CPD policy. Detective Scatena did not know\\nthat the analyst he contacted was on military leave. His failure\\nto follow up may have been negligent, but it does not prove\\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress the video. And mere\\nnegligence by police does not amount to a constitutional vio-\\nlation. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.\\n Nor has Holly shown that the lost video had apparent ex-\\nculpatory value. Detective Scatena and Officers Byrne and\\nCaulfield each testified that the video did not show the actual\\narrest. Their testimony was consistent on this score, leading\\nthe district court to find that the video did not show the initial\\nencounter between Holly and the police and thus that any\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 11\\n\\nfootage “was neither exculpatory nor inculpatory.” On these\\nfacts, the district court correctly concluded that the police did\\nnot violate Holly’s due process rights under Youngblood.\\n To be sure, the failure of the police to preserve the video is\\nunfortunate. Mistakes happen, though, and that is all we can\\nsay occurred here. But in closing it does seem prudent to offer\\nthe limited observation that CPD would do well to revisit its\\npreservation protocol—all to protect the interests of CPD it-\\nself, citizens, and those like Holly who find themselves\\ncharged with crime.\\n Seeing no violation of Holly’s rights here, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448078/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670825/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. David Holly\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1216\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nDAVID HOLLY,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:16-cr-00485-1 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Unreasonable seizures violate the\nFourth Amendment while voluntary encounters with the po-\nlice do not. This case implicates the dividing line. A police of-\nficer rushed to approach David Holly in Chicago’s Altgeld\nGardens Housing Complex and asked if he had a gun. Holly\nanswered yes, which resulted in his arrest and subsequent\nconviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Holly\nlater moved to suppress the gun, contending that the officer’s\n\f2 No. 19-1216\n\napproach and questioning constituted an impermissible sei-\nzure. The district court denied that motion after finding that\nHolly consented to the encounter. We agree and affirm. In the\ntotality of circumstances, Holly’s interaction with police fell\non the voluntary side of the line.\n I\n A\n On December 31, 2015, Officers Robert Caulfield and Jo-\nseph Byrne of the Chicago Police Department were patrolling\nthe Altgeld Gardens Housing Complex, a public housing pro-\nject in the city’s far south side. The officers were in uniform\nand on patrol as part of a CPD effort to increase police visibil-\nity in anticipation of celebratory gunfire to usher in the new\nyear. They drove an unmarked black Ford, which Officer\nByrne later testified locals recognized as a police car. While\nsitting in the car, Officers Byrne and Caulfield saw David\nHolly walking on a sidewalk inside a courtyard of the com-\nplex.\n The parties dispute what happened next, but all agree that\nthe police approached Holly in the courtyard and asked him\nif he had a gun. Holly immediately said yes. The police then\nconfiscated the gun and arrested him. A grand jury later in-\ndicted Holly for possessing a firearm following a prior felony\nconviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to\nsuppress the gun, arguing that his encounter with the police\nwas an impermissible seizure. He also moved to dismiss the\nindictment, contending that the police’s failure to preserve\nvideo footage of his arrest and activity leading to it violated\nhis due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\n(1963). The district court held a hearing on both issues and\n\fNo. 19-1216 3\n\nheard competing testimony from Holly and the police. It then\ndenied Holly’s motions.\n The testimony from the hearing frames the issues on ap-\npeal. The officers testified that they had entered a parking lot\nin Altgeld Gardens to get a better view of the interior court-\nyard, which Officer Byrne considered a high-crime area based\non arrests he had made there before. Around 4:00 p.m., Officer\nByrne saw Holly walking on a sidewalk toward the police car.\nOfficer Byrne said that as Holly neared the car, he made eye\ncontact with the officers, formed a surprised and anxious\nlook, and then turned sharply and walked swiftly in another\ndirection, ultimately making his way behind a building and\nout of the officers’ sight. Both officers testified that Officer\nCaulfield then jogged after Holly and found him inside the\ncourtyard, standing outside an apartment door and ringing\nthe doorbell. (An occupant later told the officers she did not\nknow Holly.)\n Officer Caulfield said that he identified himself as police\nand asked Holly a single question: Do you have drugs or a\ngun? Yes, Holly replied, he had a gun in his pocket. Officer\nCaulfield took the gun and from there turned Holly toward a\nwall to arrest him. By then Officer Byrne had reached the\napartment and assisted Officer Caulfield by handcuffing\nHolly. Both officers testified that at no point did they draw\ntheir own guns or touch Holly before placing him under ar-\nrest. A third officer, Raul Casales, responded to a backup call\nand met Officers Caulfield and Byrne about 15 to 20 seconds\nafter Holly’s arrest. Officer Casales testified that he had\ndrawn his gun but never pointed it at Holly.\n Holly offered a starkly different account. He testified that\nhe never saw the police car or made eye contact with any\n\f4 No. 19-1216\n\nofficer before being stopped and handcuffed. Holly instead\nstated that he was ringing a friend’s doorbell when he saw\nOfficer Caulfield run around the corner and approach him\nwith his gun drawn. According to Holly, Officer Caulfield\nthen demanded that he put his hands up, grabbed him, and\ntold him he was being stopped because there were burglaries\nin the neighborhood. Holly added that he did not feel free to\nleave because he had lived in the neighborhood for decades\nand knew the police stops there to be aggressive. Holly also\ndiverged from the officers’ accounts regarding the sequence\nof events surrounding his arrest. He insisted that Officer Caul-\nfield patted him down, found a bulge, and only then asked if\nhe had a gun. By the time Officer Byrne arrived, Holly contin-\nued, Officer Caulfield had confiscated the gun and put his\nown gun away.\n After considering the competing testimony, the district\ncourt credited the officers’ testimony. The district court ex-\nplained that the accounts of Officers Caulfield, Byrne, and\nCasales were consistent with each other. The district court\nnoted that the officers’ testimony made more sense than\nHolly’s, observing in particular that the police do not typi-\ncally draw their weapons on an unarmed offender or at close\nrange. By contrast, the district court found Holly less credible\ngiven his criminal history and the fact that he had offered\nthree shifting explanations for why he had a gun. Having\ncredited the officers’ accounts, the district court then con-\ncluded that Holly’s encounter with the police was consensual\nand denied his motion to suppress.\n B\n The district court also heard testimony about Holly’s sec-\nond claim on appeal—that he was denied due process when\n\fNo. 19-1216 5\n\nthe police failed to preserve a video taken near his arrest. On\nthis score, the facts are straightforward and unfortunate.\n Immediately after Holly’s arrest, Detective Peter Scatena\nand Officers Byrne and Caulfield reviewed a video from the\nonly nearby camera that captured what transpired. Detective\nScatena then called Carlos Mackie, an analyst with the Chi-\ncago Housing Authority, to request a copy of the video. When\nMackie did not answer, Detective Scatena left a voicemail\n(consistent with CPD protocol). What Detective Scatena did\nnot know was that Mackie was on military leave and out of\nthe office for an extended period. He never heard back from\nMackie, followed up on the voicemail, or sought the video\nsome other way. And because CHA cameras automatically re-\nwrite footage after 15 to 30 days, the video taken near Holly’s\narrest was eventually overwritten and thus no longer availa-\nble.\n The district court heard conflicting testimony of what the\nvideo revealed before it was overwritten. For his part, Detec-\ntive Scatena testified that the footage showed Holly in the\ncourtyard walking at a hurried pace with two CPD officers\nfollowing “side by side” in the same direction. (Recall that Of-\nficers Byrne and Caulfield had testified that Officer Caulfield\npursued Holly ahead of Officer Byrne.) Detective Scatena also\nstated that the video did not show Holly after he was hand-\ncuffed. By contrast, Officer Byrne testified that the video only\ndepicted Officer Caulfield standing near Holly after he was\nhandcuffed—not the events leading up to the arrest.\n While these accounts differed, the district court found the\ninconsistencies minor and understandable given the passage\nof time and the number of arrests that the police make in the\nordinary course. The district court underscored that no one\n\f6 No. 19-1216\n\nwho watched the video (before it was overwritten) testified\nthat it depicted Holly’s arrest. Because Holly had not estab-\nlished that the video was potentially exculpatory or that the\npolice acted in bad faith by failing to preserve it, the court de-\nnied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of a due\nprocess violation.\n The ensuing bench trial resulted in Holly’s conviction of\nunlawful gun possession. The district court then sentenced\nHolly to 90 months’ imprisonment and imposed 36 months’\nsupervised release.\n II\n A\n Not every police encounter implicates the Fourth Amend-\nment. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.\n2015) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)). A sei-\nzure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes\nplace if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would\nnot feel free to leave. Id. A consensual encounter, on the other\nhand, takes place if a reasonable person would feel free to ig-\nnore the police and go about his business. Id.\n In determining whether an encounter is consensual, we\nconsider several factors:\n where the interaction took place, including\n whether it was in public;\n how many police officers were present;\n the extent to which the police presence was\n threatening;\n whether the officers made any show of\n weapons or physical force;\n the officers’ language and tone;\n\fNo. 19-1216 7\n\n whether the police suggested the defendant\n was suspected of crime; and\n whether officers told the defendant he was\n free to leave.\nSee id. These factors “are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.”\nUnited States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\nUnited States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).\n B\n We agree with the district court that Holly’s encounter\nwith the police was voluntary. It is undisputed that the police\nspoke to Holly in public and never stopped him, redirected\nhis route, or otherwise obstructed his walking on the sidewalk\nor through the courtyard. Officer Caulfield approached Holly\nand put a question to him—do you have drugs or a gun?—\nthat he immediately chose to answer. See Florida v. Royer, 460\nU.S. 491, 497 (1983) (explaining that the police do not violate\nthe Fourth Amendment by merely approaching a person in\npublic and asking him questions); see also Shields, 789 F.3d at\n743–44.\n The district court’s other findings, which Holly has not\nshown are clearly erroneous, support its conclusion that the\nencounter was consensual. The district court reasonably cred-\nited the officers’ accounts over Holly’s. It found Holly’s testi-\nmony strained and implausible: he was a four-time convicted\nfelon, had an incentive to lie to escape punishment, and in the\ncourse of proceedings, offered three inconsistent explanations\nfor why he had a gun. By contrast, the district court found that\nthe officers had no incentive at the time of the incident to en-\ngage in misconduct (as they likely believed everything was\nbeing captured on camera) and no incentive to lie in their\n\f8 No. 19-1216\n\ntestimony after the fact. Considering each party’s position\nand taking stock of their comparative credibility, the district\ncourt was on solid footing in crediting the officers’ version of\nevents. See United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir.\n2007) (emphasizing that a district court’s determination of\nwitness credibility “can virtually never be clear error”).\n Against this backdrop, the district court concluded that\nHolly’s encounter with the police was voluntary. It found that\nOfficer Caulfield was alone when he jogged after Holly and\nmade no show of force—he did not pull a gun, touch Holly,\nor tell him to put his hands up. Rather, upon catching up with\nHolly, Officer Caulfield promptly asked a direct question—\ndo you have drugs or a gun?—and instantly received an\nequally direct answer—yes. The question was not advanced\nin a coercive tone or with an accompanying threat. Given\nthese circumstances, a reasonable person in Holly’s shoes\nwould have felt free to leave. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439;\nUnited States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2006)\n(holding that an encounter was consensual where three offic-\ners approached a defendant in public and did not show weap-\nons, touch him, or use a tone or language that would have\ncommunicated to the defendant that he was seized).\n Holly disagrees. He sees this case on all fours with our de-\ncision in United States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2015).\nThere Dontray Smith was walking alone at night when two\narmed and uniformed police officers waited for him to enter\nan alley. Id. at 684. The officers then rode their bicycles past\nSmith into the alley and made a U-turn to face him, obstruct-\ning his path forward. Id. at 685. From there one officer stepped\noff his bike, approached Smith with his hand on his gun, and\n“posed a single, accusatory question to Smith: ‘Are you in\n\fNo. 19-1216 9\n\npossession of any guns, knives, weapons, or anything ille-\ngal?’” Id. Considering the location, the threatening presence\nof multiple officers, the aggressive nature of the questioning,\nand the fact that the police blocked Smith’s path, we con-\ncluded that the encounter constituted a seizure. Id.\n Holly is right that in both cases the police were in uniform,\napproached the defendant, and asked about a gun. But the\nsimilarities end there. The district court found that a single\nofficer spoke with Holly in an open courtyard in the after-\nnoon. Unlike the police in Smith, Officer Caulfield did not\nblock Holly’s path or draw his weapon, and the tone of his\nquestion did not compel an answer.\n No doubt that line-drawing in this area of law is difficult\nand requires a careful parsing of exactly what took place be-\ntween the police and the accused. But “[i]t is well established\nthat a seizure does not occur merely because a police officer\napproaches an individual and asks him or her questions.” Id.\nat 684. The district court proceeded carefully by holding a\nhearing, considering the competing testimony, assessing\ncredibility, and ultimately finding that Officer Caulfield ap-\nproached Holly and asked him a question—nothing more.\nUnder these circumstances, Holly’s encounter with the police\nwas voluntary.\n III\n Holly also renews his argument in the name of Brady v.\nMaryland that the police violated his due process rights by\nfailing to preserve CHA video footage of the arrest and events\nleading to it. We start from a different legal marker. The\nproper framework for evaluating Holly’s claim comes not\nfrom Brady, but rather from Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51\n\f10 No. 19-1216\n\n(1988). While Brady requires that the government disclose ev-\nidence materially favorable to the defendant “irrespective of\nthe good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” see 373 U.S. at\n87, Holly’s claim is that the police failed to preserve only po-\ntentially exculpatory evidence.\n Under Youngblood, the police’s failure to preserve poten-\ntially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due pro-\ncess unless the defendant can show that the police acted in\nbad faith. See 488 U.S. at 58. That standard requires proof of\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence\nand turns on an official’s subjective knowledge that the evi-\ndence had exculpatory value. See United States v. Cherry, 920\nF.3d 1126, 1140 (7th Cir. 2019). In addition to bad faith, the\ndefendant must show that the exculpatory nature of the evi-\ndence was apparent before its destruction and that he could\nnot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See id.\n Holly has not made these necessary showings. Detective\nScatena made a clear effort to preserve the video: he left a\nvoicemail requesting the video from the CHA and did so in\naccordance with CPD policy. Detective Scatena did not know\nthat the analyst he contacted was on military leave. His failure\nto follow up may have been negligent, but it does not prove\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress the video. And mere\nnegligence by police does not amount to a constitutional vio-\nlation. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.\n Nor has Holly shown that the lost video had apparent ex-\nculpatory value. Detective Scatena and Officers Byrne and\nCaulfield each testified that the video did not show the actual\narrest. Their testimony was consistent on this score, leading\nthe district court to find that the video did not show the initial\nencounter between Holly and the police and thus that any\n\fNo. 19-1216 11\n\nfootage “was neither exculpatory nor inculpatory.” On these\nfacts, the district court correctly concluded that the police did\nnot violate Holly’s due process rights under Youngblood.\n To be sure, the failure of the police to preserve the video is\nunfortunate. Mistakes happen, though, and that is all we can\nsay occurred here. But in closing it does seem prudent to offer\nthe limited observation that CPD would do well to revisit its\npreservation protocol—all to protect the interests of CPD it-\nself, citizens, and those like Holly who find themselves\ncharged with crime.\n Seeing no violation of Holly’s rights here, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. David Holly\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1216\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDAVID HOLLY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00485-1 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Unreasonable seizures violate the\\nFourth Amendment while voluntary encounters with the po-\\nlice do not. This case implicates the dividing line. A police of-\\nficer rushed to approach David Holly in Chicago’s Altgeld\\nGardens Housing Complex and asked if he had a gun. Holly\\nanswered yes, which resulted in his arrest and subsequent\\nconviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Holly\\nlater moved to suppress the gun, contending that the officer’s\\n\\f2 No. 19-1216\\n\\napproach and questioning constituted an impermissible sei-\\nzure. The district court denied that motion after finding that\\nHolly consented to the encounter. We agree and affirm. In the\\ntotality of circumstances, Holly’s interaction with police fell\\non the voluntary side of the line.\\n I\\n A\\n On December 31, 2015, Officers Robert Caulfield and Jo-\\nseph Byrne of the Chicago Police Department were patrolling\\nthe Altgeld Gardens Housing Complex, a public housing pro-\\nject in the city’s far south side. The officers were in uniform\\nand on patrol as part of a CPD effort to increase police visibil-\\nity in anticipation of celebratory gunfire to usher in the new\\nyear. They drove an unmarked black Ford, which Officer\\nByrne later testified locals recognized as a police car. While\\nsitting in the car, Officers Byrne and Caulfield saw David\\nHolly walking on a sidewalk inside a courtyard of the com-\\nplex.\\n The parties dispute what happened next, but all agree that\\nthe police approached Holly in the courtyard and asked him\\nif he had a gun. Holly immediately said yes. The police then\\nconfiscated the gun and arrested him. A grand jury later in-\\ndicted Holly for possessing a firearm following a prior felony\\nconviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to\\nsuppress the gun, arguing that his encounter with the police\\nwas an impermissible seizure. He also moved to dismiss the\\nindictment, contending that the police’s failure to preserve\\nvideo footage of his arrest and activity leading to it violated\\nhis due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\\n(1963). The district court held a hearing on both issues and\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 3\\n\\nheard competing testimony from Holly and the police. It then\\ndenied Holly’s motions.\\n The testimony from the hearing frames the issues on ap-\\npeal. The officers testified that they had entered a parking lot\\nin Altgeld Gardens to get a better view of the interior court-\\nyard, which Officer Byrne considered a high-crime area based\\non arrests he had made there before. Around 4:00 p.m., Officer\\nByrne saw Holly walking on a sidewalk toward the police car.\\nOfficer Byrne said that as Holly neared the car, he made eye\\ncontact with the officers, formed a surprised and anxious\\nlook, and then turned sharply and walked swiftly in another\\ndirection, ultimately making his way behind a building and\\nout of the officers’ sight. Both officers testified that Officer\\nCaulfield then jogged after Holly and found him inside the\\ncourtyard, standing outside an apartment door and ringing\\nthe doorbell. (An occupant later told the officers she did not\\nknow Holly.)\\n Officer Caulfield said that he identified himself as police\\nand asked Holly a single question: Do you have drugs or a\\ngun? Yes, Holly replied, he had a gun in his pocket. Officer\\nCaulfield took the gun and from there turned Holly toward a\\nwall to arrest him. By then Officer Byrne had reached the\\napartment and assisted Officer Caulfield by handcuffing\\nHolly. Both officers testified that at no point did they draw\\ntheir own guns or touch Holly before placing him under ar-\\nrest. A third officer, Raul Casales, responded to a backup call\\nand met Officers Caulfield and Byrne about 15 to 20 seconds\\nafter Holly’s arrest. Officer Casales testified that he had\\ndrawn his gun but never pointed it at Holly.\\n Holly offered a starkly different account. He testified that\\nhe never saw the police car or made eye contact with any\\n\\f4 No. 19-1216\\n\\nofficer before being stopped and handcuffed. Holly instead\\nstated that he was ringing a friend’s doorbell when he saw\\nOfficer Caulfield run around the corner and approach him\\nwith his gun drawn. According to Holly, Officer Caulfield\\nthen demanded that he put his hands up, grabbed him, and\\ntold him he was being stopped because there were burglaries\\nin the neighborhood. Holly added that he did not feel free to\\nleave because he had lived in the neighborhood for decades\\nand knew the police stops there to be aggressive. Holly also\\ndiverged from the officers’ accounts regarding the sequence\\nof events surrounding his arrest. He insisted that Officer Caul-\\nfield patted him down, found a bulge, and only then asked if\\nhe had a gun. By the time Officer Byrne arrived, Holly contin-\\nued, Officer Caulfield had confiscated the gun and put his\\nown gun away.\\n After considering the competing testimony, the district\\ncourt credited the officers’ testimony. The district court ex-\\nplained that the accounts of Officers Caulfield, Byrne, and\\nCasales were consistent with each other. The district court\\nnoted that the officers’ testimony made more sense than\\nHolly’s, observing in particular that the police do not typi-\\ncally draw their weapons on an unarmed offender or at close\\nrange. By contrast, the district court found Holly less credible\\ngiven his criminal history and the fact that he had offered\\nthree shifting explanations for why he had a gun. Having\\ncredited the officers’ accounts, the district court then con-\\ncluded that Holly’s encounter with the police was consensual\\nand denied his motion to suppress.\\n B\\n The district court also heard testimony about Holly’s sec-\\nond claim on appeal—that he was denied due process when\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 5\\n\\nthe police failed to preserve a video taken near his arrest. On\\nthis score, the facts are straightforward and unfortunate.\\n Immediately after Holly’s arrest, Detective Peter Scatena\\nand Officers Byrne and Caulfield reviewed a video from the\\nonly nearby camera that captured what transpired. Detective\\nScatena then called Carlos Mackie, an analyst with the Chi-\\ncago Housing Authority, to request a copy of the video. When\\nMackie did not answer, Detective Scatena left a voicemail\\n(consistent with CPD protocol). What Detective Scatena did\\nnot know was that Mackie was on military leave and out of\\nthe office for an extended period. He never heard back from\\nMackie, followed up on the voicemail, or sought the video\\nsome other way. And because CHA cameras automatically re-\\nwrite footage after 15 to 30 days, the video taken near Holly’s\\narrest was eventually overwritten and thus no longer availa-\\nble.\\n The district court heard conflicting testimony of what the\\nvideo revealed before it was overwritten. For his part, Detec-\\ntive Scatena testified that the footage showed Holly in the\\ncourtyard walking at a hurried pace with two CPD officers\\nfollowing “side by side” in the same direction. (Recall that Of-\\nficers Byrne and Caulfield had testified that Officer Caulfield\\npursued Holly ahead of Officer Byrne.) Detective Scatena also\\nstated that the video did not show Holly after he was hand-\\ncuffed. By contrast, Officer Byrne testified that the video only\\ndepicted Officer Caulfield standing near Holly after he was\\nhandcuffed—not the events leading up to the arrest.\\n While these accounts differed, the district court found the\\ninconsistencies minor and understandable given the passage\\nof time and the number of arrests that the police make in the\\nordinary course. The district court underscored that no one\\n\\f6 No. 19-1216\\n\\nwho watched the video (before it was overwritten) testified\\nthat it depicted Holly’s arrest. Because Holly had not estab-\\nlished that the video was potentially exculpatory or that the\\npolice acted in bad faith by failing to preserve it, the court de-\\nnied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of a due\\nprocess violation.\\n The ensuing bench trial resulted in Holly’s conviction of\\nunlawful gun possession. The district court then sentenced\\nHolly to 90 months’ imprisonment and imposed 36 months’\\nsupervised release.\\n II\\n A\\n Not every police encounter implicates the Fourth Amend-\\nment. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)). A sei-\\nzure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes\\nplace if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would\\nnot feel free to leave. Id. A consensual encounter, on the other\\nhand, takes place if a reasonable person would feel free to ig-\\nnore the police and go about his business. Id.\\n In determining whether an encounter is consensual, we\\nconsider several factors:\\n where the interaction took place, including\\n whether it was in public;\\n how many police officers were present;\\n the extent to which the police presence was\\n threatening;\\n whether the officers made any show of\\n weapons or physical force;\\n the officers’ language and tone;\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 7\\n\\n whether the police suggested the defendant\\n was suspected of crime; and\\n whether officers told the defendant he was\\n free to leave.\\nSee id. These factors “are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.”\\nUnited States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\\nUnited States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).\\n B\\n We agree with the district court that Holly’s encounter\\nwith the police was voluntary. It is undisputed that the police\\nspoke to Holly in public and never stopped him, redirected\\nhis route, or otherwise obstructed his walking on the sidewalk\\nor through the courtyard. Officer Caulfield approached Holly\\nand put a question to him—do you have drugs or a gun?—\\nthat he immediately chose to answer. See Florida v. Royer, 460\\nU.S. 491, 497 (1983) (explaining that the police do not violate\\nthe Fourth Amendment by merely approaching a person in\\npublic and asking him questions); see also Shields, 789 F.3d at\\n743–44.\\n The district court’s other findings, which Holly has not\\nshown are clearly erroneous, support its conclusion that the\\nencounter was consensual. The district court reasonably cred-\\nited the officers’ accounts over Holly’s. It found Holly’s testi-\\nmony strained and implausible: he was a four-time convicted\\nfelon, had an incentive to lie to escape punishment, and in the\\ncourse of proceedings, offered three inconsistent explanations\\nfor why he had a gun. By contrast, the district court found that\\nthe officers had no incentive at the time of the incident to en-\\ngage in misconduct (as they likely believed everything was\\nbeing captured on camera) and no incentive to lie in their\\n\\f8 No. 19-1216\\n\\ntestimony after the fact. Considering each party’s position\\nand taking stock of their comparative credibility, the district\\ncourt was on solid footing in crediting the officers’ version of\\nevents. See United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir.\\n2007) (emphasizing that a district court’s determination of\\nwitness credibility “can virtually never be clear error”).\\n Against this backdrop, the district court concluded that\\nHolly’s encounter with the police was voluntary. It found that\\nOfficer Caulfield was alone when he jogged after Holly and\\nmade no show of force—he did not pull a gun, touch Holly,\\nor tell him to put his hands up. Rather, upon catching up with\\nHolly, Officer Caulfield promptly asked a direct question—\\ndo you have drugs or a gun?—and instantly received an\\nequally direct answer—yes. The question was not advanced\\nin a coercive tone or with an accompanying threat. Given\\nthese circumstances, a reasonable person in Holly’s shoes\\nwould have felt free to leave. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439;\\nUnited States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2006)\\n(holding that an encounter was consensual where three offic-\\ners approached a defendant in public and did not show weap-\\nons, touch him, or use a tone or language that would have\\ncommunicated to the defendant that he was seized).\\n Holly disagrees. He sees this case on all fours with our de-\\ncision in United States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2015).\\nThere Dontray Smith was walking alone at night when two\\narmed and uniformed police officers waited for him to enter\\nan alley. Id. at 684. The officers then rode their bicycles past\\nSmith into the alley and made a U-turn to face him, obstruct-\\ning his path forward. Id. at 685. From there one officer stepped\\noff his bike, approached Smith with his hand on his gun, and\\n“posed a single, accusatory question to Smith: ‘Are you in\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 9\\n\\npossession of any guns, knives, weapons, or anything ille-\\ngal?’” Id. Considering the location, the threatening presence\\nof multiple officers, the aggressive nature of the questioning,\\nand the fact that the police blocked Smith’s path, we con-\\ncluded that the encounter constituted a seizure. Id.\\n Holly is right that in both cases the police were in uniform,\\napproached the defendant, and asked about a gun. But the\\nsimilarities end there. The district court found that a single\\nofficer spoke with Holly in an open courtyard in the after-\\nnoon. Unlike the police in Smith, Officer Caulfield did not\\nblock Holly’s path or draw his weapon, and the tone of his\\nquestion did not compel an answer.\\n No doubt that line-drawing in this area of law is difficult\\nand requires a careful parsing of exactly what took place be-\\ntween the police and the accused. But “[i]t is well established\\nthat a seizure does not occur merely because a police officer\\napproaches an individual and asks him or her questions.” Id.\\nat 684. The district court proceeded carefully by holding a\\nhearing, considering the competing testimony, assessing\\ncredibility, and ultimately finding that Officer Caulfield ap-\\nproached Holly and asked him a question—nothing more.\\nUnder these circumstances, Holly’s encounter with the police\\nwas voluntary.\\n III\\n Holly also renews his argument in the name of Brady v.\\nMaryland that the police violated his due process rights by\\nfailing to preserve CHA video footage of the arrest and events\\nleading to it. We start from a different legal marker. The\\nproper framework for evaluating Holly’s claim comes not\\nfrom Brady, but rather from Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51\\n\\f10 No. 19-1216\\n\\n(1988). While Brady requires that the government disclose ev-\\nidence materially favorable to the defendant “irrespective of\\nthe good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” see 373 U.S. at\\n87, Holly’s claim is that the police failed to preserve only po-\\ntentially exculpatory evidence.\\n Under Youngblood, the police’s failure to preserve poten-\\ntially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due pro-\\ncess unless the defendant can show that the police acted in\\nbad faith. See 488 U.S. at 58. That standard requires proof of\\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence\\nand turns on an official’s subjective knowledge that the evi-\\ndence had exculpatory value. See United States v. Cherry, 920\\nF.3d 1126, 1140 (7th Cir. 2019). In addition to bad faith, the\\ndefendant must show that the exculpatory nature of the evi-\\ndence was apparent before its destruction and that he could\\nnot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See id.\\n Holly has not made these necessary showings. Detective\\nScatena made a clear effort to preserve the video: he left a\\nvoicemail requesting the video from the CHA and did so in\\naccordance with CPD policy. Detective Scatena did not know\\nthat the analyst he contacted was on military leave. His failure\\nto follow up may have been negligent, but it does not prove\\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress the video. And mere\\nnegligence by police does not amount to a constitutional vio-\\nlation. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.\\n Nor has Holly shown that the lost video had apparent ex-\\nculpatory value. Detective Scatena and Officers Byrne and\\nCaulfield each testified that the video did not show the actual\\narrest. Their testimony was consistent on this score, leading\\nthe district court to find that the video did not show the initial\\nencounter between Holly and the police and thus that any\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 11\\n\\nfootage “was neither exculpatory nor inculpatory.” On these\\nfacts, the district court correctly concluded that the police did\\nnot violate Holly’s due process rights under Youngblood.\\n To be sure, the failure of the police to preserve the video is\\nunfortunate. Mistakes happen, though, and that is all we can\\nsay occurred here. But in closing it does seem prudent to offer\\nthe limited observation that CPD would do well to revisit its\\npreservation protocol—all to protect the interests of CPD it-\\nself, citizens, and those like Holly who find themselves\\ncharged with crime.\\n Seeing no violation of Holly’s rights here, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4676,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670826,"string":"4,670,826"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-2782"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\nMILLERCOORS LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 19-cv-218-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 —\\n INTERIM ORDER OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n PER CURIAM. On May 24, 2019, the district court entered\\nan opinion that concludes with language that the judge be-\\nlieved would serve as a preliminary injunction. MillerCoors\\nfiled an appeal, which has been docketed as No. 19-2200. But\\nthe district court did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n\\n2 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n65(d)(1)(C), which requires every injunction to be set forth\\nwithout referring to any other document. See, e.g., Chicago v.\\nSessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc), slip\\nop. 3 (Rule 65 “requires a separate document setting forth\\nthe terms of such an injunction”); Auto Driveaway Franchise\\nSystems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670,\\n676 (7th Cir. 2019); BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Capital\\nPremium Financing, Inc., 912 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.\\n2019); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 527 (7th\\nCir. 1988); Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 886,\\n514 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975).\\n In supplemental jurisdictional memoranda filed at our\\nrequest after oral argument, both sides acknowledged that\\nthe district court failed to comply with Rule 65(d). Neither\\nside asked us to depart from the decisions we have cited.\\n On September 4, 2019, while appeal No. 19-2200 was\\npending, the district court entered another opinion stating\\nthat it was “modifying” the decision of May 24. The district\\ncourt did not follow the procedure specified by Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 62.1 for modifying an order that is before the court of ap-\\npeals, nor did it discuss the rule that only one court at a time\\nhas jurisdiction over “those aspects of the case involved in\\nthe appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459\\nU.S. 56, 58 (1982). And as with the May 24 opinion, the dis-\\ntrict court did not comply with Rule 65(d). Nor did the judge\\nmodify the injunction as a condition of a stay or bond pend-\\ning appeal, as Rule 62(d) permits. (It provides: “While an\\nappeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judg-\\nment that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, dissolves, or\\nrefuses to dissolve or modify an injunction, the court may\\nsuspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 3\\n\\nbond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.”\\nThe authority to make changes linked to bonds or otherwise\\nsecure the enjoined party’s rights differs from a blanket\\ngrant of permission to impose new obligations, and substan-\\ntially alter the issues, while appeals are pending.) Anheuser-\\nBusch’s appeal from the September 4 order has been docket-\\ned as No. 19-2713.\\n On September 6, 2019, the district court modified the\\nmodification of September 4. Once again it did not discuss\\nits jurisdiction to do so, did not rely on Rule 62(d), did not\\nfollow the procedure specified by Rule 62.1, and did not\\ncomply with Rule 65(d). Anheuser-Busch’s appeal from the\\norder of September 6 has been docketed as No. 19-2782.\\n Although the district court’s intent to afford enforceable\\nequitable relief is sufficiently clear to provide appellate ju-\\nrisdiction despite the noncompliance with Rule 65(d),\\nsee Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Operating Engineers Union,\\n824 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2016), enforcing that Rule is suffi-\\nciently important that we order a limited remand with in-\\nstructions to enter the injunction on a document separate\\nfrom the opinions.\\n In the process, the district court may be able to avoid the\\npotential jurisdictional problems that its modifications of the\\ninitial order have created. (We call them modifications even\\nthough the order of September 4 does not change any lan-\\nguage of the May 24 decision. It seems more like a second\\npreliminary injunction, although the judge called it a modifi-\\ncation. The September 6 order, by contrast, explicitly modi-\\nfies the September 4 order.) While we recognize that a dis-\\ntrict court is in the best position to address urgent issues and\\nchanges in circumstance related to a preliminary injunction,\\n\\n4 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nthe court must nonetheless comply with the procedures for\\ndoing so in order to avoid creating potential complications\\non review. A single injunction complying with Rule 65(d)\\nwould be subject to appeal—and, as there has not yet been\\neven one injunction that satisfies Rule 65(d), the consolidated\\ninjunction could be treated as the initial order, allowing both\\nsides to appeal without any potential obstacle in the\\nGriggs doctrine or Rule 62.1, or any need for us to consider\\nthe disagreement among the circuits about the extent to\\nwhich preliminary injunctions are subject to modification by\\na district judge while an appeal is pending. Compare Ortho\\nPharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir.\\n1989), with Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817,\\n820 (5th Cir. 1989).\\n If the district court wants to make still further changes, in\\nlight of discovery in the ongoing litigation, it is free to do\\nso—though the judge also is free to enter an injunction con-\\nsolidating all decisions made to date but leaving all else to\\nthe permanent-injunction phase. We leave this decision in\\nthe capable hands of the district court.\\n Once the district court has complied with this limited\\nremand, both sides should file new notices of appeal and\\npropose a schedule for new briefs. The briefs already filed\\nconcerning the May 24 order may be incorporated by refer-\\nence, but we have yet to receive briefs concerning the Sep-\\ntember 4 and 6 orders. All aspects of the case must be fully\\nbriefed before this court will proceed to decision.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 5\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448079/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}, {\"author\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent\\nfrom the remand order. We do not need to remand this appeal\\nfrom the district court’s preliminary injunction of May 24,\\n2019. It is briefed, argued, and ready to be decided on the\\nmerits. Judge Conley complied with all of the formal\\nrequirements for issuing an injunction. With respect, contrary\\nto my colleagues’ views, Rule 65(d)(1) simply does not\\ncontain the “separate-document” requirement that is the basis\\nfor the majority’s remand. The majority offers here no textual\\nor other defense for dicta in prior cases asserting such a\\nrequirement. Never before have we put any teeth behind this\\ngroundless and trivial “requirement.” This is a case where\\ntext and pragmatics point in the same direction. We need not\\nremand for formalistic compliance with an imagined and\\nnon-jurisdictional rule that no party has raised. In addition,\\non the more consequential issue here, the district court had\\njurisdiction to issue its two September orders on BudLight’s\\npackaging.\\n I address in Part I the Rule 65(d) issue and in Part II the\\nissues posed by the district court’s separate injunction on\\npackaging and its emergency order relaxing that injunction at\\nAnheuser-Busch’s request.\\nI. A Separate Document?\\n The formal requirements of Rule 65(d)(1)—those actually\\nincluded in the text of the rule—are vital when a district judge\\nexercises one of the most awesome powers of the office: issu-\\ning a preliminary injunction that is enforceable by contempt\\nsanctions. Here are the textual requirements:\\n (1) Contents. Every order granting an injunction\\n and every restraining order must:\\n\\n6 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n (A) state the reasons why it issued;\\n (B) state its terms specifically; and\\n (C) describe in reasonable detail—and not by refer-\\n ring to the complaint or other document—the act or\\n acts restrained or required.\\n Compliance with these requirements ensures that a party\\nwho is restrained by a preliminary injunction knows clearly\\nwhat conduct is being restrained and why. Oral orders can be\\nvague and easily misunderstood. Incorporating other\\ndocuments can lead to uncertainty. Failing to state clearly the\\nreasons for the injunction may lead to hasty, sometimes too-\\ncasual analysis.\\n In this case, the preliminary injunction is in a document\\ntitled “Opinion and Order,” which sets forth a detailed and\\nthoughtful analysis of the facts and the law. Under the head-\\ning “Order” on page 49, the document spells out what is pro-\\nhibited:\\n IT IS ORDERED that:\\n 1) Plaintiff MillerCoors, LLCʹs motion for pre-\\n liminary injunction (dkt. #8) is GRANTED IN\\n PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows. De-\\n fendant Anheuser Busch is PRELIMINARILY\\n ENJOINED from using the following language\\n within ten (10) days of this order in its commer-\\n cials, print advertising and social media:\\n • Bud Light contains “100% less corn syrup”;\\n • Bud Light in direct reference to “no corn\\n syrup” without any reference to “brewed with,”\\n “made with” or “uses”;\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 7\\n\\n • Miller Lite and/or Coors Light and “corn\\n syrup” without including any reference to\\n “brewed with,” “made with” or “uses”; and\\n • Describing “corn syrup” as an ingredient “in”\\n the finished product.\\nMillerCoors, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 385 F. Supp. 3d 730,\\n760 (W.D. Wis. 2019). This approach was not unusual; district\\njudges issue such orders often, combining the opinion and the\\norder, ordinarily without objection from the parties or this\\ncourt as to the form. See, e.g., Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 602\\nF.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming injunction in same doc-\\nument as reasons for issuing it: “The injunction is sufficiently\\nprecise and self-contained, and we require nothing more to\\ncomply with Rule 65.”); Russian Media Group, LLC v. Cable\\nAmerica, Inc., 2009 WL 440957, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2009)\\n(combining findings of fact, conclusions of law, and specific\\nterms of preliminary injunction in one document), aff’d, 598\\nF.3d 302 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The order at the end of the combined “Opinion and Or-\\nder” complied with all of the express requirements of Rule\\n65(d)(1). It served all the purposes of that rule. No party has\\nobjected to its form. When the panel questioned this form in\\noral argument, counsel for Anheuser-Busch confirmed that\\nhis client understood that it was being enjoined and under-\\nstood what was required. It also understood that it could ap-\\npeal if it wanted to. The order may or may not turn out to be\\nsound on the merits, but there is no formal problem with it,\\nnothing that affects appellate jurisdiction, and nothing that\\njustifies a remand for the district judge to copy the text from\\npage 49 and paste it into a new, separate document.\\n\\n8 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n The majority, however, asserts that Rule 65(d) requires\\nevery injunction to be set forth on a separate document that\\ndoes not refer to any other document. With respect, that re-\\nquirement does not appear in Rule 65(d). The requirement\\ndoes appear as dicta in a number of our cases dating back to\\n1988, but as explained below, those cases required us to ad-\\ndress other, genuine problems in the preliminary injunctions.\\nUntil now, we have never attached any real consequences to\\na failure to comply only with this imagined, non-textual re-\\nquirement. Rather than attach new consequences now\\nthrough this remand, we should retreat from our earlier dicta.\\n A good place to start is BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v.\\nCapital Premium Financing, Inc., 912 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.\\n2019), where we identified several critical problems in a pre-\\nliminary injunction: the injunction left important issues unre-\\nsolved; it used ambiguous language and seemed to incorpo-\\nrate another document; and it required no bond. We also said\\nthis regarding a separate document:\\n Third, the district court failed to enter an injunc-\\n tion as a separate document under Fed. R. Civ.\\n P. 65(d)(1)(C). Language in an opinion does not\\n comply with Rule 65(d). See Gunn v. University\\n Committee to End the War, 399 U.S. 383 (1970).\\n Neither side reminded the district court of the\\n need to enter an injunction.\\nId. As noted, Rule 65(d)(1)(C) contains no such requirement.\\nMy colleagues and I agree, of course, that language in an\\nopinion that stops short of an explicit order does not amount\\nto an enforceable order. Here, however, the language of the\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 9\\n\\norder was clear here, and Gunn is not on point for a “separate-\\ndocument” requirement.1\\n In BankDirect, we recognized that the district court had is-\\nsued a written order that it expected the defendant to obey.\\nThat was enough to give us appellate jurisdiction—draining\\nof any force the suggestion in the opinion that “no injunction”\\nhad been entered. Failure to comply with the textual require-\\nments of Rule 65(d) does not defeat appellate jurisdiction, lest\\nthe enjoined party be unable to obtain appellate review with\\nthe threat of contempt sanctions hanging over her head. E.g.,\\nAbbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2321 (2018); Advent Electronics,\\nInc. v. Buckman, 112 F.3d 267, 273 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding ap-\\npellate jurisdiction over appeal from preliminary injunction\\nthat merely incorporated terms of another document). By con-\\ntrast, when there is genuinely no injunction at all, there is no\\nappellate jurisdiction. E.g., Bates v. Johnson, 901 F.2d 1424,\\n1428 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Because the state is not under an en-\\nforceable constraint, there is nothing before us on appeal.”).\\nWe vacated the injunction in BankDirect—but not because of\\nthe formal problems we identified. We vacated because the\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 In Gunn, a three-judge district court had issued an opinion saying\\nthat a statute was unconstitutional. Regarding relief, the opinion said:\\n“The Plaintiffs herein are entitled to their declaratory judgment to that ef-\\nfect, and to injunctive relief against the enforcement of [the statute] as now\\nworded, insofar as it may affect rights guaranteed under the First Amend-\\nment.” 399 U.S. at 386. No language in the district court’s opinion could\\nbe understood as enjoining any particular defendant from doing anything\\nin particular, as required under Rule 65. No wonder, then, that the Su-\\npreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1253 because the district court “has issued neither an injunction nor an\\norder granting or denying one.” 399 U.S. at 390.\\n\\n10 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\ninjunction should have expired, according to its rationale,\\nmonths before the appeal was even argued. 912 F.3d at 1059.\\n In Auto Driveaway Franchise Systems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway\\nRichmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2019), we repeated, with\\nvery careful wording, the separate-document point from\\nBankDirect: “We interpret Rule 65(d)(1)(C) to require that an in-\\njunction must be embodied in a standalone separate docu-\\nment.” Id. at 676 (emphasis added), citing 912 F.3d at 1057.\\nThe district court in Auto Driveaway issued one document. It\\nstarted with eight pages of legal analysis and ended with a\\npreliminary injunction with specific terms. Our opinion did\\nnot question the “separate-document” dicta from BankDirect,\\nbut we declined to attach any consequences to failure to com-\\nply. We found that the absence of a separate document did\\nnot affect appellate jurisdiction. 928 F.3d at 676–79. The order\\nhad the practical effect of an injunction and satisfied all of the\\ntextual requirements of Rule 65(d). Id. at 678. We therefore\\nsaid there was no need to remand the case to cure the lack of\\na separate document, and we proceeded to the merits. Id. at\\n679. We should do the same here.2\\n The “separate-document” requirement in this circuit\\nstems from language in Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d\\n525 (7th Cir. 1988), where the district court had failed to com-\\nply with the Rules’ express and important requirements. The\\n\\n\\n\\n 2My colleagues and I agree that failure to comply with the express\\nformal requirements of Rule 58 and 65 can cause all sorts of avoidable and\\nexpensive procedural snarls. That has been shown in scores or hundreds\\nof our cases in recent decades. I too can be a Rule 58 “hawk.” My objection\\nhere is to enforcement of a non-textual requirement that serves no appar-\\nent purpose beyond the textual requirements.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 11\\n\\ndistrict court had issued an opinion that was intended to re-\\nsolve the case entirely. It ended:\\n It is therefore ordered, that summary judgment\\n is granted in favor of the plaintiff. The court fur-\\n ther orders that the preliminary injunction now\\n in effect against defendant be made permanent,\\n subject to the following conditions: defendant is\\n permanently enjoined from determining any vi-\\n olations, or assessing any penalties or fines, or\\n issuing a conditional license, to plaintiff, for any\\n matter arising out of the matters listed in the\\n Proof of Service dated November 14, 1986.\\n863 F.2d at 526. That was bad enough, but the court’s separate\\nfinal judgment was not even consistent with that opinion. The\\njudgment said: “IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the\\ndefendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Plain-\\ntiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the pre-\\nliminary injunction previously entered against defendant is\\nhereby made permanent.” Id. Complicating matters further,\\nthere was no actual preliminary injunction; there had been\\nonly an initial temporary restraining order that had been ex-\\ntended by consent of the parties.\\n “This is a mess,” we wrote. 863 F.2d at 527. There were\\nclear problems under both Rule 65 and Rule 58. No document\\nspelled out the requirements of an injunction without refer-\\nence to another document, and the actual judgment conflicted\\nwith the opinion. Regarding a separate document, we wrote:\\n A judicial opinion is not itself an order to act or\\n desist; it is a statement of reasons supporting\\n the judgment. The command comes in the\\n\\n12 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n separate document entered under Fed. R. Civ.\\n P. 58, which alone is enforceable. There must be\\n a separate document, with a self-contained\\n statement of what the court directs be done. So\\n if the opinion contains language awarding de-\\n claratory relief, but the judgment does not, the\\n opinion has been reduced to dictum; only the\\n judgment need be obeyed.\\nId. at 527. All of that is clearly correct as far as it went, applied\\nto the final judgment that was subject to the explicit separate-\\ndocument requirement of Rule 58. Our opinion does not sup-\\nport extending such a requirement to interlocutory orders,\\nmuch less to preliminary injunctions under Rule 65(d), which\\ndoes not contain it.3\\n The strongest effort to offer a textual basis for a “separate-\\ndocument” requirement for preliminary injunctions is in Beu-\\nkema’s Petroleum Co. v. Admiral Petroleum Co., 613 F.2d 626 (6th\\nCir. 1979). That case was an appeal from a district court’s\\nopinion saying that “A preliminary injunction will be is-\\nsued”—but none ever was. Id. at 628. Although the parties\\n\\n 3The majority also cites our en banc but non-precedential order va-\\ncating the grant of en banc review in the sanctuary-city case, Chicago v.\\nSessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc), where the order\\nsaid that Rule 65 “requires a separate document setting forth the terms of\\nsuch an injunction.” We were talking there about a permanent injunction,\\nwhich is ordinarily a final judgment subject to Rule 58’s explicit separate-\\ndocument requirement. The problem we faced in the August 10, 2018 or-\\nder was that the district judge had said he intended to issue a permanent\\ninjunction but had not yet done it. He quickly did so, and on August 30,\\n2018, we dismissed as moot the appeal of the superseded preliminary in-\\njunction. That situation was much like that in Beukema’s Petroleum, dis-\\ncussed next.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 13\\n\\nhad treated that opinion as a preliminary injunction, the Sixth\\nCircuit remanded the case for issuance of the order promised\\nin the opinion.\\n Beukema’s Petroleum relied not on Rule 65(d) but on Rule\\n54(a), which provides: “‘Judgment’ as used in these rules in-\\ncludes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A\\njudgment should not include recitals of pleadings, a master’s\\nreport, or a record of prior proceedings.” Beukema’s Petroleum\\nrelied on this provision to extend the separate-document re-\\nquirement of Rule 58 to a preliminary injunction. 613 F.2d at\\n627 & n.1.\\n The result in Beukema’s Petroleum was correct since the\\npromised (or threatened) preliminary injunction had never\\nbeen issued. But its Rule 54 rationale does not hold up—and\\npoints toward an unworkable rule—when extended accord-\\ning to its logic to every order subject to interlocutory appeal.4\\n The universe of nonfinal appealable orders is not small. Its\\nexact bounds cannot always be determined in advance by a\\ndistrict court. The majority’s rule would seem to require high-\\nchurch, Rule 58-compliant separate documents, not only for\\ngrants of preliminary injunctions but also, for example, for\\n\\n\\n 4 Beukema’s Petroleum also cited, as the majority does here, Chief Freight\\n\\nLines Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 886, 514 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975),\\nwhere the district court had made an oral statement purporting to grant a\\npreliminary injunction but had not issued any written order doing so. See\\nalso Furr’s Cafeterias, Inc. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 505, 506–07 (5th Cir. 1978) (re-\\nmanding where district court held hearing on motion for preliminary in-\\njunction and issued an order enjoining the NLRB from holding certain\\nhearings and declaring “This is a final order and judgment.”). Both of\\nthese cases presented conflicts between a district judge’s different pro-\\nnouncements. There is no such conflict here.\\n\\n14 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nany order denying or “refusing to … modify” a preliminary\\ninjunction, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), any mine-run Rule 12(b)(6)\\nor Rule 56 order denying qualified immunity, see Mitchell v.\\nForsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985), and every other collateral or-\\nder subject to interlocutory appeal.\\n Are we ready to start remanding appeals from orders\\ndenying motions for preliminary injunctions for entry of a\\ndocument, separate from an opinion explaining the judge’s\\nreasons? I hope not. Such omissions have heretofore escaped\\nour every notice. See, e.g., HH-Indianapolis LLC v. Consol. City\\nof Indianapolis/Marion Cty., 265 F. Supp. 3d 873, 892 (S.D. Ind.\\n2017) (denying injunction with phrase “so ordered” at end of\\nopinion), aff’d, 889 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 2018). The drafters of the\\nfederal rules knew better than to insist on such formalisms.\\nSee Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 advisory committee’s note to 2002\\namendment (“The new all-purpose definition of the entry of\\njudgment must be applied with common sense … .”); see also\\nFed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(B) (“failure to set forth a judgment or\\norder on a separate document … does not affect the validity\\nof an appeal from that judgment or order.”).\\n The majority’s “separate-document” addition to Rule\\n65(d) does not solve any problem not addressed by the ex-\\npress formal requirements in the rule. It does, however, raise\\nsome new problems. Neither the majority here nor any other\\nopinion endorsing a “separate-document” requirement for\\npreliminary injunctions explains how a district court is sup-\\nposed to comply with both this non-textual requirement and\\nthe important, explicit requirement in Rule 65(d)(1)(A) that\\nthe preliminary injunction “state the reasons why it issued.”\\n If we extend the separate-document requirement of Rule\\n58 to preliminary injunctions, what should a district judge do\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 15\\n\\nwith our repeated instructions that a Rule 58 final judgment\\nshould not contain legal reasoning? See, e.g., TDK Electronics\\nCorp. v. Draiman, 321 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2003); American\\nNat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Secretary, 946 F.2d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir.\\n1991), citing Reytblatt v. Denton, 812 F.2d 1042, 1044 (7th Cir.\\n1987); In re Behrens, 900 F.2d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Pahule,\\n849 F.2d 1056, 1058 (7th Cir. 1988); Foremost Sales Promotions,\\nInc. v. Director, 812 F.2d 1044, 1045 (7th Cir. 1987). Perhaps the\\njudge could say, of course, that “in accord with a separate\\nopinion,” the following parties are enjoined from the follow-\\ning conduct. But those two separate documents, an opinion\\nand an injunction, are not a noticeable improvement on the\\ncombined “Opinion and Order” here.\\n More troubling is the majority’s silence about the legal\\nconsequences of a district judge’s failure to comply with this\\nnon-textual requirement. The majority and I agree we have\\nappellate jurisdiction in No. 19-2200. See Auto Driveaway, 928\\nF.3d at 676–79. But is a decision in the form used here—\\ncombining findings of fact, conclusions of law, and specific\\nterms of a preliminary injunction—valid and enforceable with\\ncontempt sanctions? Or is the enjoined party free to disregard\\nit with impunity? Is the majority implying that Anheuser-\\nBusch may start running the enjoined advertisements\\ntomorrow? I hope not, for institutional reasons, but I cannot\\ntell from the majority’s order.\\n On a related note, even a violation of the textual separate-\\ndocument requirement in Rule 58 is waivable. Bankers Trust\\nCo. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978). I hope the same is true for\\nthis non-textual requirement of a separate document, but the\\nmajority does not say. It remands, after all, on a point that it\\ndoes not seem to treat as jurisdictional, yet a point that was\\n\\n16 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nnot raised by either party. If this supposed violation is not\\nwaivable, we are inviting a new flock of appeals over point-\\nless formalism, or some high-stakes contempt cases. Cf.\\nWalker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (affirming\\ncriminal contempt convictions where demonstrators had vio-\\nlated temporary restraining order that was substantively un-\\nconstitutional). And if the court’s orders were enforceable by\\ncontempt here despite the majority’s finding of a formal error,\\nwhat is the point of this remand?5\\n\\n 5 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the parties did not acknowledge\\n\\nin oral argument that the district court “failed to comply with Rule 65(d).”\\nThis was a non-jurisdictional issue that surprised—even mystified—\\nhighly capable counsel on both sides. Counsel agreed only that there was\\nno document satisfying the majority’s (imagined) requirement. The sup-\\nplemental briefs by both sides did not devote energy to arguing about the\\nsupposed requirement, but neither contended that a remand is needed on\\nthis basis. They presumably just want a ruling on the merits. Still, Mil-\\nlerCoors made this point diplomatically at page 13, note 2:\\n MillerCoors respectfully notes some tension between this\\n Court’s interpretation of Rule 65(d), which requires the\\n injunction to stand on its own in a separate document en-\\n tered as a judgment under Rule 58, and the text of Rule\\n 65(d), which requires that an injunction “state the reasons\\n why it issued.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(A). Combined with\\n Rule 65(d)(1)(C)’s prohibition on incorporation by refer-\\n ence, this would seem to require that a stand-alone in-\\n junction restate any judicial reasoning that might other-\\n wise be set forth in a separate opinion, resulting in an in-\\n junction that looks very much like the district court’s May\\n 24 Opinion and Order. That is, if the district court’s May\\n 24 Opinion and Order were simply retitled “Judgment,”\\n it would appear to comply with Rule 65(d) in all other re-\\n spects.\\nExactly.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 17\\n\\n In this case, the district court’s preliminary injunction of\\nMay 24, 2019 was clear, unmistakable, and appealable. It com-\\nplied with all the terms of Rule 65(d)(1). Until this case, we\\nhave used the “separate-document” language in cases that\\naddressed real problems under Rule 65. That language has\\nbeen harmless until now. Here, however, the majority finds\\nthat “enforcing the Rule is sufficiently important that we or-\\nder a limited remand with instructions to enter the injunction\\non a document separate from the opinions.” With all due re-\\nspect, that importance is not evident to me, especially if the\\nproblem can be solved by having the district judge copy the\\ntext of his injunction of May 24 and paste it into a separate\\ndocument. In the Supreme Court’s words, “Wheels [will] spin\\nfor no practical purpose.” Bankers Trust Co., 435 U.S. at 385. If,\\non the other hand, the majority means that the district court’s\\norders here have never been enforceable for want of a sepa-\\nrate document (even though we have appellate jurisdiction),\\nthen we are inviting needless litigation in the future over this\\nunjustified formalism.\\nII. The September Orders\\n This case is actually a little more complicated because of\\nthe orders the district court issued on September 4 and Sep-\\ntember 6 granting MillerCoors some preliminary injunctive\\nrelief concerning the packaging for BudLight. The district\\ncourt had jurisdiction to issue its September 4 order first\\ngranting relief on packaging. That order did not really “mod-\\nify” the May 24 injunction but was separate in content,\\nproviding additional relief.\\n The district court also had jurisdiction to issue its Septem-\\nber 6 modification of the September 4 injunction. It was per-\\nmissible under Rule 62(d), and it did not undermine the\\n\\n18 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nintegrity of the pending appeals. In a rare case where a district\\njudge acts so as to undermine the integrity of a pending ap-\\npeal, Rule 62(g) makes clear that a court of appeals has suffi-\\ncient power to deal with the problem. We should treat these\\nmodification issues as case-management problems for the dis-\\ntrict court and for us, not as issues of jurisdiction.\\n The general rule, of course, is that only one court can have\\njurisdiction over a case at the same time. E.g., Griggs v. Provi-\\ndent Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Cases with\\npreliminary injunctions can complicate matters, though. Even\\nafter a notice of appeal for a preliminary injunction has been\\nfiled, the district court retains jurisdiction over other aspects\\nof the case. The boundaries between what has been appealed\\nand what remains before the district court may not be sharp.\\nIn this case, when the district court issued its May 24 injunc-\\ntion addressing the more urgent issue of the corn-syrup ad-\\nvertising campaign, the district court simply did not address\\nMillerCoors’ request for packaging relief. That topic had not\\nbeen presented fully to the court at the time of the preliminary\\ninjunction hearing, so the court invited additional briefing. In\\nSeptember the court issued the new injunction.\\n If the September 4 packaging order is treated as “modify-\\ning” the May 24 order, as the judge wrote, Rule 62(d) author-\\nized it. But the September 4 order is better understood as just\\na separate injunction. Nothing would have stopped Mil-\\nlerCoors from filing a new motion for a preliminary injunc-\\ntion on May 25, or stopped the district court from ruling on\\nsuch a motion. There was no overlap between the relief or-\\ndered on May 24 and the relief sought on packaging. See Ad-\\nams v. City of Chicago, 135 F.3d 1150, 1153–54 (7th Cir. 1998)\\n(no jurisdictional bar to consideration of new motion for\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 19\\n\\npreliminary injunction while appeal from first injunction is\\npending). There was no need for MillerCoors to have gone\\nthrough separate formalities of filing a new motion for a new\\npreliminary injunction. Id. (construing compliance with Cir-\\ncuit Rule 57 pragmatically as equivalent to new motion for\\nnew preliminary injunction).\\n The September 6 order modifying the September 4\\npackaging order poses a more controversial problem, but the\\nanswer should not be difficult. On September 5, Anheuser-\\nBusch filed an emergency motion to vacate, modify, or stay\\nthe September 4 order. Dkt. 107. Also on September 5,\\nAnheuser-Busch filed its notice of appeal for the September 4\\norder. Dkt. 110. On September 6, the district judge granted in\\npart the emergency motion to modify.\\n It made good sense for the district judge to address the\\nemergency motion immediately. Exercising equitable judg-\\nment, the judge sensibly intended for the September 4 pack-\\naging order to give Anheuser-Busch a brief but reasonable\\ntime to change its packaging and to avoid throwing away cur-\\nrent inventory. The emergency motion persuaded the judge\\nthat, because Anheuser-Busch had used up its existing stock\\nof packaging more quickly than expected, the September 4 or-\\nder would not allow time for a smooth transition. It had in-\\nstead put Anheuser-Busch immediately in violation, without\\nan opportunity to comply. The judge therefore delayed by\\ntwo months the effective date of the packaging order.\\n Given the urgency of that issue and the district judge’s fa-\\nmiliarity with the case, he was much better positioned than a\\nmotions panel of this court, entirely new to the case, would\\nhave been to address the problem immediately. In fast-\\n\\n20 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nmoving litigation over injunctive relief, no one should be too\\nsurprised when circumstances change quickly.\\n There is (or should be) no legal obstacle to such urgent and\\npragmatic modifications of a preliminary injunction pending\\nan appeal. The broad language of Rule 62(d) allows it: “While\\nan appeal is pending from an interlocutory order … that\\ngrants … an injunction, the court may suspend, modify, re-\\nstore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms\\nthat secure the opposing party’s rights.” Rule 62(d) is not lim-\\nited to modifications tied to stays or bonds pending appeal.\\nRule 62(d) also fits together with Federal Rule of Appellate\\nProcedure 8(a)(1), which provides in relevant part: “A party\\nmust ordinarily move first in the district court for the follow-\\ning relief: … (C) an order suspending, modifying, restoring,\\nor granting an injunction while an appeal is pending.” See\\nalso Eli Lilly and Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 384 (7th\\nCir. 2018) (district court was authorized to modify injunction\\nin response to issues raised in appellant’s opening brief; district\\ncourt’s modifications aided the appeal by “resolving technical\\nobjections or clarifying imprecise wording”), citing Dixon v.\\nEdwards, 290 F.3d 699, 709 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002) (district court\\nretained jurisdiction to proceed as to matters “in aid of the\\nappeal”). It would surely be odd for a district court to respond\\nto a motion prompted by Appellate Rule 8(a)(1) by saying, “I\\ndon’t have jurisdiction anymore.”\\n Despite these textual provisions in the rules authorizing\\nthe district court’s actions here, some circuits have added a\\nnon-textual gloss to these rules, saying that the district court’s\\npower over its own injunctions pending appeal is limited to\\nacts designed to “preserve the status quo.” See generally 16\\nWright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3921.2.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 21\\n\\nWright and Miller show in detail why this line of cases should\\nbe questioned. Compare Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace\\nWorkers v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 847 F.2d 1014, 1018 (2d Cir.\\n1988) (repeating “status quo” gloss), and Ideal Toy Corp. v.\\nSayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623, 625 (2d Cir. 1962) (adopting\\n“status quo” gloss); with id. at 628 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“The\\nrule [now Rule 62(d)] is clear and unequivocal; I see no justi-\\nfication whatever for the novel and restrictive gloss now\\nplaced upon it by my brothers.”), and Ortho Pharmaceutical\\nCorp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir. 1989) (district\\ncourt had jurisdiction to enter order modifying injunction on\\nappeal not only to preserve status quo but also to “preserve\\nintegrity of the appeal”).\\n The non-textual “status quo” gloss has both metaphysical\\nand pragmatic foundations. The metaphysical is the principle\\nthat only one court at a time may exercise jurisdiction over a\\ncase or portion of a case. Yet American federalism split the in-\\ndivisible atom of sovereignty with a workable but sometimes\\ncomplicated sharing of sovereignty. Similarly, federal courts\\ncan manage a little concurrent jurisdiction between trial and\\nappellate courts when there are good reasons—and express\\ntextual authorization—to do so.6\\n The pragmatic foundation for the “status quo” gloss is a\\nconcern that a district judge could use her power under Rule\\n62(d) to interfere with an appeal, forcing the court of appeals\\nand appellant to aim at a moving target. I agree with Wright\\n\\n 6 The majority implicitly criticizes the district court for not using the\\nprocedure in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 for modifying an order\\nthat is before the court of appeals. The majority’s point begs the jurisdic-\\ntional question, however. By its terms, Rule 62.1(a) applies only when the\\ndistrict court “lacks authority” to grant relief.\\n\\n22 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nand Miller that this danger “seems more abstract than real.”\\n§ 3921.2 at 69. In the rare case where a district judge seems to\\nbe interfering with an appeal, Rule 62(g) makes clear that the\\ncourt of appeals retains ample power to take charge.\\n As with the Rule 65(d) issue, the parties are not confused\\nabout their rights and obligations. The better course here is to\\nrecognize that we are dealing with equitable powers and fast-\\nmoving litigation. We and the district court are capable of\\nmanaging the case and the multiple appeals in practical and\\nlegally permissible ways. We should not remand now. We\\nshould promptly address the merits of MillerCoors’ appeal of\\nthe May 24 order (No. 19-2200), and we should order expe-\\ndited briefing and argument on the merits of the Anheuser-\\nBusch appeals from the September orders (Nos. 19-2713 & 19-\\n2782).\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448079/\", \"author_raw\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670826/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\nMILLERCOORS LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 19-cv-218-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 —\n INTERIM ORDER OCTOBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n PER CURIAM. On May 24, 2019, the district court entered\nan opinion that concludes with language that the judge be-\nlieved would serve as a preliminary injunction. MillerCoors\nfiled an appeal, which has been docketed as No. 19-2200. But\nthe district court did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.\n\n2 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\n\n65(d)(1)(C), which requires every injunction to be set forth\nwithout referring to any other document. See, e.g., Chicago v.\nSessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc), slip\nop. 3 (Rule 65 “requires a separate document setting forth\nthe terms of such an injunction”); Auto Driveaway Franchise\nSystems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670,\n676 (7th Cir. 2019); BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Capital\nPremium Financing, Inc., 912 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.\n2019); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 527 (7th\nCir. 1988); Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 886,\n514 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975).\n In supplemental jurisdictional memoranda filed at our\nrequest after oral argument, both sides acknowledged that\nthe district court failed to comply with Rule 65(d). Neither\nside asked us to depart from the decisions we have cited.\n On September 4, 2019, while appeal No. 19-2200 was\npending, the district court entered another opinion stating\nthat it was “modifying” the decision of May 24. The district\ncourt did not follow the procedure specified by Fed. R. Civ.\nP. 62.1 for modifying an order that is before the court of ap-\npeals, nor did it discuss the rule that only one court at a time\nhas jurisdiction over “those aspects of the case involved in\nthe appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459\nU.S. 56, 58 (1982). And as with the May 24 opinion, the dis-\ntrict court did not comply with Rule 65(d). Nor did the judge\nmodify the injunction as a condition of a stay or bond pend-\ning appeal, as Rule 62(d) permits. (It provides: “While an\nappeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judg-\nment that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, dissolves, or\nrefuses to dissolve or modify an injunction, the court may\nsuspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for\n\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 3\n\nbond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.”\nThe authority to make changes linked to bonds or otherwise\nsecure the enjoined party’s rights differs from a blanket\ngrant of permission to impose new obligations, and substan-\ntially alter the issues, while appeals are pending.) Anheuser-\nBusch’s appeal from the September 4 order has been docket-\ned as No. 19-2713.\n On September 6, 2019, the district court modified the\nmodification of September 4. Once again it did not discuss\nits jurisdiction to do so, did not rely on Rule 62(d), did not\nfollow the procedure specified by Rule 62.1, and did not\ncomply with Rule 65(d). Anheuser-Busch’s appeal from the\norder of September 6 has been docketed as No. 19-2782.\n Although the district court’s intent to afford enforceable\nequitable relief is sufficiently clear to provide appellate ju-\nrisdiction despite the noncompliance with Rule 65(d),\nsee Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Operating Engineers Union,\n824 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2016), enforcing that Rule is suffi-\nciently important that we order a limited remand with in-\nstructions to enter the injunction on a document separate\nfrom the opinions.\n In the process, the district court may be able to avoid the\npotential jurisdictional problems that its modifications of the\ninitial order have created. (We call them modifications even\nthough the order of September 4 does not change any lan-\nguage of the May 24 decision. It seems more like a second\npreliminary injunction, although the judge called it a modifi-\ncation. The September 6 order, by contrast, explicitly modi-\nfies the September 4 order.) While we recognize that a dis-\ntrict court is in the best position to address urgent issues and\nchanges in circumstance related to a preliminary injunction,\n\n4 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\n\nthe court must nonetheless comply with the procedures for\ndoing so in order to avoid creating potential complications\non review. A single injunction complying with Rule 65(d)\nwould be subject to appeal—and, as there has not yet been\neven one injunction that satisfies Rule 65(d), the consolidated\ninjunction could be treated as the initial order, allowing both\nsides to appeal without any potential obstacle in the\nGriggs doctrine or Rule 62.1, or any need for us to consider\nthe disagreement among the circuits about the extent to\nwhich preliminary injunctions are subject to modification by\na district judge while an appeal is pending. Compare Ortho\nPharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir.\n1989), with Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817,\n820 (5th Cir. 1989).\n If the district court wants to make still further changes, in\nlight of discovery in the ongoing litigation, it is free to do\nso—though the judge also is free to enter an injunction con-\nsolidating all decisions made to date but leaving all else to\nthe permanent-injunction phase. We leave this decision in\nthe capable hands of the district court.\n Once the district court has complied with this limited\nremand, both sides should file new notices of appeal and\npropose a schedule for new briefs. The briefs already filed\nconcerning the May 24 order may be incorporated by refer-\nence, but we have yet to receive briefs concerning the Sep-\ntember 4 and 6 orders. All aspects of the case must be fully\nbriefed before this court will proceed to decision.\n\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 5\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\nMILLERCOORS LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 19-cv-218-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 —\\n INTERIM ORDER OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n PER CURIAM. On May 24, 2019, the district court entered\\nan opinion that concludes with language that the judge be-\\nlieved would serve as a preliminary injunction. MillerCoors\\nfiled an appeal, which has been docketed as No. 19-2200. But\\nthe district court did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n\\n2 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n65(d)(1)(C), which requires every injunction to be set forth\\nwithout referring to any other document. See, e.g., Chicago v.\\nSessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc), slip\\nop. 3 (Rule 65 “requires a separate document setting forth\\nthe terms of such an injunction”); Auto Driveaway Franchise\\nSystems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670,\\n676 (7th Cir. 2019); BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Capital\\nPremium Financing, Inc., 912 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.\\n2019); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 527 (7th\\nCir. 1988); Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 886,\\n514 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975).\\n In supplemental jurisdictional memoranda filed at our\\nrequest after oral argument, both sides acknowledged that\\nthe district court failed to comply with Rule 65(d). Neither\\nside asked us to depart from the decisions we have cited.\\n On September 4, 2019, while appeal No. 19-2200 was\\npending, the district court entered another opinion stating\\nthat it was “modifying” the decision of May 24. The district\\ncourt did not follow the procedure specified by Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 62.1 for modifying an order that is before the court of ap-\\npeals, nor did it discuss the rule that only one court at a time\\nhas jurisdiction over “those aspects of the case involved in\\nthe appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459\\nU.S. 56, 58 (1982). And as with the May 24 opinion, the dis-\\ntrict court did not comply with Rule 65(d). Nor did the judge\\nmodify the injunction as a condition of a stay or bond pend-\\ning appeal, as Rule 62(d) permits. (It provides: “While an\\nappeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judg-\\nment that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, dissolves, or\\nrefuses to dissolve or modify an injunction, the court may\\nsuspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 3\\n\\nbond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.”\\nThe authority to make changes linked to bonds or otherwise\\nsecure the enjoined party’s rights differs from a blanket\\ngrant of permission to impose new obligations, and substan-\\ntially alter the issues, while appeals are pending.) Anheuser-\\nBusch’s appeal from the September 4 order has been docket-\\ned as No. 19-2713.\\n On September 6, 2019, the district court modified the\\nmodification of September 4. Once again it did not discuss\\nits jurisdiction to do so, did not rely on Rule 62(d), did not\\nfollow the procedure specified by Rule 62.1, and did not\\ncomply with Rule 65(d). Anheuser-Busch’s appeal from the\\norder of September 6 has been docketed as No. 19-2782.\\n Although the district court’s intent to afford enforceable\\nequitable relief is sufficiently clear to provide appellate ju-\\nrisdiction despite the noncompliance with Rule 65(d),\\nsee Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Operating Engineers Union,\\n824 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2016), enforcing that Rule is suffi-\\nciently important that we order a limited remand with in-\\nstructions to enter the injunction on a document separate\\nfrom the opinions.\\n In the process, the district court may be able to avoid the\\npotential jurisdictional problems that its modifications of the\\ninitial order have created. (We call them modifications even\\nthough the order of September 4 does not change any lan-\\nguage of the May 24 decision. It seems more like a second\\npreliminary injunction, although the judge called it a modifi-\\ncation. The September 6 order, by contrast, explicitly modi-\\nfies the September 4 order.) While we recognize that a dis-\\ntrict court is in the best position to address urgent issues and\\nchanges in circumstance related to a preliminary injunction,\\n\\n4 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nthe court must nonetheless comply with the procedures for\\ndoing so in order to avoid creating potential complications\\non review. A single injunction complying with Rule 65(d)\\nwould be subject to appeal—and, as there has not yet been\\neven one injunction that satisfies Rule 65(d), the consolidated\\ninjunction could be treated as the initial order, allowing both\\nsides to appeal without any potential obstacle in the\\nGriggs doctrine or Rule 62.1, or any need for us to consider\\nthe disagreement among the circuits about the extent to\\nwhich preliminary injunctions are subject to modification by\\na district judge while an appeal is pending. Compare Ortho\\nPharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir.\\n1989), with Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817,\\n820 (5th Cir. 1989).\\n If the district court wants to make still further changes, in\\nlight of discovery in the ongoing litigation, it is free to do\\nso—though the judge also is free to enter an injunction con-\\nsolidating all decisions made to date but leaving all else to\\nthe permanent-injunction phase. We leave this decision in\\nthe capable hands of the district court.\\n Once the district court has complied with this limited\\nremand, both sides should file new notices of appeal and\\npropose a schedule for new briefs. The briefs already filed\\nconcerning the May 24 order may be incorporated by refer-\\nence, but we have yet to receive briefs concerning the Sep-\\ntember 4 and 6 orders. All aspects of the case must be fully\\nbriefed before this court will proceed to decision.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 5\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4677,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670827,"string":"4,670,827"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Lisa Ulrey v. William Reichhart"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1221"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before SYKES, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1221\\nLISA ULREY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM REICHHART and\\nSCHOOL BOARD OF MANCHESTER COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:16-cv-257-JD — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Lisa Ulrey served as the\\nassistant principal of the Manchester Junior-Senior High\\nSchool until November 4, 2014, when she resigned during a\\nmeeting with William Reichhart, the school district’s superin-\\ntendent. Ulrey brings two claims in this suit under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983 against Reichhart and the school board. First, she\\nclaims that Reichhart violated her rights under the First\\n\\f2 No. 19-1221\\n\\nAmendment by retaliating against her for her speech about a\\nstudent discipline issue. Second, she contends that the de-\\nfendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by coerc-\\ning her to resign, depriving her of her property interest in her\\njob without due process of law. The district court granted\\nsummary judgment to the defendants on both claims. We af-\\nfirm. Undisputed facts show that Ulrey spoke about the dis-\\ncipline issue in her capacity as an employee, so the First\\nAmendment did not protect her speech. Ulrey also failed to\\npresent evidence sufficient to support a finding that her res-\\nignation was involuntary.\\nI. Claim for First Amendment Retaliation\\n Citizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by\\naccepting public employment, but legal doctrine in this field\\ntries to maintain a careful balance between the interests of the\\nemployee as a citizen and the interests of the employer-gov-\\nernment in serving the public. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 231\\n(2014), citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568\\n(1968). The First Amendment claim here arises from a disa-\\ngreement between plaintiff Ulrey and defendant Reichhart\\nconcerning student discipline. Because we review a grant of\\nsummary judgment against Ulrey, we recount facts in the\\nlight reasonably most favorable to her. See Healy v. City of Chi-\\ncago, 450 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n In August 2014, Superintendent Reichhart granted an\\nadult student permission to possess cigarettes (though not to\\nsmoke them) on school grounds. Ulrey learned of that deci-\\nsion and disagreed with it. Without approaching Reichhart\\nfirst, Ulrey called the president of the school board, Sally\\nKrouse. Krouse in turn emailed Reichhart to express her con-\\ncern about his decision. Reichhart then rebuked Ulrey for\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 3\\n\\ngoing over his head, threatening to reprimand her formally if\\nshe did not apologize. She did apologize. She claims in this\\nlawsuit, however, that Reichhart forced her to resign three\\nmonths later to retaliate against her for her call to Krouse.\\n In maintaining the critical balance under the Pickering and\\nLane line of cases, the threshold question in a public em-\\nployee’s First Amendment retaliation suit is whether the em-\\nployee’s speech was constitutionally protected. E.g., Swetlik v.\\nCrawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013). If Ulrey’s call to\\nKrouse had been protected speech, then we would need to\\ndecide whether Ulrey presented evidence that her call moti-\\nvated Reichhart to inflict on her deprivations likely to deter\\nspeech. Id.\\n We do not need to reach those issues, however, because\\nUlrey’s speech was unprotected as a matter of law. See Con-\\nnick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983) (noting that the “in-\\nquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not\\nfact”). Ulrey’s claim fails at this first step. The undisputed\\nfacts show that she spoke to Krouse as an employee, not a pri-\\nvate citizen. “In order for a public employee to raise a success-\\nful First Amendment claim for her employer’s restriction of\\nher speech, the speech must be in her capacity as a private\\ncitizen and not as an employee.” McArdle v. Peoria School Dist.\\nNo. 150, 705 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2013). The test for distin-\\nguishing private speech from employee speech is whether the\\nemployees speak “pursuant to their official duties.” Spiegla v.\\nHull, 481 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Garcetti v. Ce-\\nballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).\\n Ulrey argues that reporting the superintendent’s alleged\\nmisconduct or violation of district policy on tobacco fell out-\\nside her official duties. Since the Supreme Court decided\\n\\f4 No. 19-1221\\n\\nGarcetti, however, we have repeatedly rejected such claims for\\na whistleblower carve-out from the category of unprotected\\nemployee speech. In Garcetti, the employee wrote a memoran-\\ndum detailing governmental misconduct. The Supreme Court\\nheld that his speech was unprotected because the memoran-\\ndum “was written pursuant to [his] official duties.” 547 U.S.\\nat 421. Garcetti suggested that “legislative enactments” such\\nas “whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes,” rather\\nthan the First Amendment, ought to protect employees\\nobliged to report official misconduct as part of their job. Id. at\\n425.\\n Shortly after Garcetti was decided, we applied it to a case\\nlike Ulrey’s. In Spiegla, a prison guard stationed at the main\\ngate reported her supervisor for letting a vehicle pass without\\nthe required search for contraband. See 481 F.3d at 962–63. We\\nheld that the guard “spoke as an employee, not a citizen, be-\\ncause ensuring compliance with prison security policy was\\npart of what she was employed to do.” Id. at 966. The fact that\\nher statements “highlighted potential misconduct by prison\\nofficers” did not affect the analysis under Garcetti. Id. at 967.\\n As the district court recognized, we have applied this rea-\\nsoning in many different employment contexts. See, e.g., Ku-\\nbiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016) (police\\nofficer reporting misconduct of co-worker); McArdle, 705 F.3d\\nat 753 (school principal reporting misconduct of district aca-\\ndemic officer); Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.\\n2008) (professor reporting misconduct of dean); Vose v.\\nKliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007) (police supervisor re-\\nporting misconduct of detectives); see also Ulrey v. Reichhart,\\n2018 WL 6435652, at *4–6 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2018).\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 5\\n\\n This line of decisions—which Ulrey failed to acknowledge\\nor address in the district court and on appeal, even after the\\ndistrict court relied upon them—required summary judg-\\nment for defendants. Even if Superintendent Reichhart vio-\\nlated school district policy by making an exception allowing\\nan adult student to possess cigarettes when he attended\\nschool, Ulrey’s speech fell within her official duties. Her writ-\\nten job description included duties to “coordinate and admin-\\nister student attendance and discipline policies,” just as the\\nguard in Spiegla was paid to monitor vehicles coming into the\\nprison. Ulrey’s complaint to the school board president fell\\nwithin the scope of her job and was unprotected employee\\nspeech, not protected citizen speech.\\n The two cases that Ulrey relies on do not help her position.\\nIn both Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014), and Chrzanowski v.\\nBianchi, 725 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013), the plaintiffs’ speech was\\nprotected because they spoke as citizens, in non-employee ca-\\npacities, not because they reported misconduct. In Lane, the\\nSupreme Court held that sworn testimony given under sub-\\npoena in a criminal trial was citizen speech even though the\\nplaintiff was testifying against a former co-worker about mis-\\nconduct in their office. 573 U.S. at 239. Similarly, in\\nChrzanowski, we held that a prosecutor who testified against\\nhis supervisor before a grand jury and at trial spoke as a citi-\\nzen. 725 F.3d at 739–40. These cases turned on the speech’s\\ncontext, not its content. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 240 (“The critical\\nquestion under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself\\nordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not\\nwhether it merely concerns those duties.”); see also Swetlik,\\n738 F.3d at 826 (observing that employee’s statements in po-\\nlice union meetings and grievances reporting police chief’s\\nmisconduct submitted by plaintiff in his capacity as a union\\n\\f6 No. 19-1221\\n\\nmember were not employee speech). Ulrey’s call to the school\\nboard president was not comparable to sworn testimony be-\\nfore a court or grand jury.\\n Ulrey raises one other point that, she argues, creates a dis-\\npute of material fact to preclude summary judgment. The\\nadult student whom Reichhart had allowed to possess ciga-\\nrettes attended a special program called “Squire Academy”—\\nnamed for the school mascot—that operated somewhat inde-\\npendently from the high school. Accepting Ulrey’s allegations\\nas true, her authority to enforce the student handbook did not\\nextend to Squire Academy students. Ulrey argues that her\\nspeech to Krouse thus fell outside her duties as assistant prin-\\ncipal.\\n We disagree. This administrative division cannot bear the\\nweight Ulrey places on it. Squire Academy occupied the same\\nbuilding complex as the high school, and Ulrey states that she\\nhad “administrative responsibility” over the “physical class-\\nroom” in which it met. Explaining her decision to call Krouse,\\nUlrey testified that “students should not be allowed to have\\ntobacco on school property for any reason” because it was\\n“against the student handbook.” She also confirmed that she\\nwas “angry because of [her] role in enforcing the handbook.”\\nSquire Academy disciplinary decisions bore closely on\\nUlrey’s duties even if she lacked total control over them, and\\nwe do not parse the precise scope of employees’ duties as\\nfinely as Ulrey argues. See, e.g., Vose, 506 F.3d at 571 (holding\\nthat police officer’s report of misconduct in a separate unit of\\nthe police department was employee speech). The district\\ncourt correctly granted summary judgment on the First\\nAmendment claim.\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 7\\n\\nII. Claim for Denial of Due Process\\n Ulrey’s due-process claim stems from her resignation on\\nNovember 4, 2014, three months after her call to the school\\nboard president. When a public employee has a property in-\\nterest in his or her continued employment, typically shown\\nby proving that the employee may be fired only for good\\ncause, the state may not terminate the employment without\\ndue process of law. E.g., Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679,\\n681 (7th Cir. 2003); see generally Cleveland Board of Education\\nv. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Board of Regents v. Roth,\\n408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Reichhart and the School Board agree\\nthat Ulrey had a protected interest in continued employment.\\nIndiana gives public school teachers and administrators stat-\\nutory protections that spell out the details of procedures used\\nto vindicate this due process right. See Ind. Code § 20-28-7.5-\\n1 et seq. (2014) (teachers); Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2 (2014) (prin-\\ncipals and assistant principals). 1\\n If Reichhart had tried to fire Ulrey, these procedural pro-\\ntections would have been available to her. She did not invoke\\nthese procedural protections because she resigned. The gen-\\neral rule is that an employee who resigns—voluntarily relin-\\nquishing her interest in continued employment—may not\\ncomplain of a lack of due process. See Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d\\n447, 453 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of due-process\\nclaim by employee who resigned). There are narrow excep-\\ntions, however. In Palka we identified two types of\\n\\n 1 Principals and assistant principals like Ulrey work under the regular\\nteacher’s contract. See Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2(1). Indiana substantially re-\\nvised the grounds and procedures for cancelling teacher contracts in 2011,\\nbut those amendments are not relevant here. See Elliott v. Bd. of School\\nTrustees of Madison Consol. Schools, 876 F.3d 926, 928–30 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\f8 No. 19-1221\\n\\n“involuntary resignation” that amount to termination: con-\\nstructive discharge and coerced resignation. “Constructive\\ndischarge” is akin to a hostile work environment claim and\\nmay occur “when an employer makes employment so un-\\nbearable that an employee resigns.” Id.; see Pennsylvania State\\nPolice v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2004) (explaining com-\\nparison to hostile work environment). Coerced resignation,\\non the other hand, is “characterized by the presence of a Hob-\\nson’s choice in which the employee must resign or suffer se-\\nvere consequences, such as facing criminal charges.” Palka,\\n623 F.3d at 453.\\n These two types of involuntary resignation are closely re-\\nlated. See Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1405–06 (7th Cir.\\n1988). The primary distinction may be temporal: Whereas\\nconstructive discharge results when an employee must en-\\ndure intolerable working conditions over some period of\\ntime, a specific threat or misrepresentation concerning future\\nharm can provoke a coerced resignation. See Graehling v. Vil-\\nlage of Lombard, 58 F.3d 295, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1995) (likening\\ncoerced resignation to signing a resignation letter at gun-\\npoint).\\n Before considering whether Ulrey can avoid summary\\njudgment under either theory, we summarize the events that\\nled up to Ulrey’s resignation on November 4, 2014. Where\\nthere are disputes, we credit Ulrey’s account because we are\\nreviewing a grant of summary judgment against her. The\\nproblems apparently began with faulty processing of teach-\\ning licenses at nearby Manchester University, where Ulrey\\nhad studied for her most recent license renewal. In an October\\n28 email, Reichhart notified all district teachers of potential\\nerrors on such licenses and stressed the serious nature of\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 9\\n\\nlicensing defects. Later that morning, Ulrey logged on to a\\nstate website to check her own license. She discovered a prob-\\nlem and promptly notified her superiors, including Reichhart.\\nThe error related to Ulrey’s eligibility to hold an administra-\\ntive license, which she needed to serve as an assistant princi-\\npal.\\n That same day, Reichhart called the state Department of\\nEducation with Ulrey present. A state official told them that\\nthe error could be resolved. The next morning, the official con-\\ntacted Ulrey to ask permission to remove false entries, and she\\npromptly agreed. Yet Reichhart’s concerns were not as-\\nsuaged; he emailed Ulrey on October 31 because he could not\\nfind her corrected license online. That same day, he met in his\\noffice with Ulrey and two others: Nancy Alspaugh, the high\\nschool principal, and Scott Bumgardner, the business man-\\nager. In the meeting, Reichhart berated Ulrey for the error and\\nimplied that he did not believe it had been an honest mistake.\\n Tensions came to a head on November 4, when Reichhart\\nagain called a meeting with Ulrey, Alspaugh, and Bumgard-\\nner. Reichhart stated that he could not “get past” the licensing\\nsituation. According to her testimony, Ulrey was “baffled”\\nand “asked him if he was asking for my resignation.” Reich-\\nhart replied that he was. He then handed her a letter of resig-\\nnation he had already prepared for her. Ulrey signed the letter\\nduring the meeting. That same night, the school board ap-\\nproved Ulrey’s resignation on its consent agenda.\\n Ulrey argues that these facts present a genuine dispute as\\nto whether her resignation was coerced. Ulrey does not com-\\nmit herself to either legal test for involuntary resignation; ra-\\nther, she asks us to consider what she describes as a “reason-\\nable person” standard, arguing that a trier of fact must always\\n\\f10 No. 19-1221\\n\\ndetermine the voluntariness of a resignation. Yet, as summa-\\nrized above, the tests for constructive discharge and coerced\\nresignation do not ask generically whether a reasonable em-\\nployee would perceive a “free choice.” Ulrey needed to pro-\\nduce evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rule in her\\nfavor under one of the established formulas for involuntary\\nresignation. For due-process purposes, there is a critical dif-\\nference between a resignation and a discharge, and that dif-\\nference must be protected by insisting that the exceptions for\\nconstructive discharges and coerced resignations be kept nar-\\nrow. The test is not whether the employee who resigned was\\nhappy about resigning or even whether the employer asked\\nfor the resignation.\\n Taking the exceptions in turn, Ulrey’s case is not a good fit\\nfor constructive discharge. She claims that she felt coerced to\\nresign in a specific meeting with her supervisor, not that her\\nconditions of employment became intolerable over time. A\\nconstructive discharge can result from a hostile work environ-\\nment only if the environment is “even more egregious than\\nthat needed for a hostile work environment.” Thompson v. Me-\\nmorial Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nUlrey has not presented evidence of conditions even ap-\\nproaching that high standard. 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Constructive discharge can sometimes refer to a situation where “an\\n\\nemployer acts in a manner so as to have communicated to a reasonable\\nemployee that she will be terminated.” Wright v. Illinois Dep’t of Children &\\nFamily Servs., 798 F.3d 513, 527 (7th Cir. 2015). But only at-will employees\\ncan show constructive discharge under this approach. Employees who en-\\njoy due-process protections cannot assume that the start of termination\\nproceedings will result in termination. See Cigan v. Chippewa Falls School\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 11\\n\\n Ulrey’s theory also falls well short of creating a genuine\\ndispute of material fact under a coerced resignation theory.\\nThe most a jury could infer is that Reichhart threatened to fire\\nUlrey because of the licensing errors. Reichhart, for instance,\\nadmits that he told Ulrey it was in her “best interest” to resign.\\nBut the possibility of eventual termination, without more,\\ncannot render a resignation involuntary; otherwise, a due\\nprocess violation would result whenever a public employee\\nresigned rather than asserting his or her (usually extensive)\\nprocedural rights. See Palka, 623 F.3d at 453 (“That Palka de-\\ncided to resign rather than risk an unfavorable Merit Board\\ndecision does not make his resignation involuntary.”).\\n In contrast, the rare, legally viable claims of coerced resig-\\nnation have typically involved threats beyond termination,\\nsuch as criminal prosecution or physical harm. See, e.g., Be-\\nnuzzi v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 119 F. Supp. 3d\\n917, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (denying motion for summary judg-\\nment where jury could find that plaintiff retired in response\\nto threat of criminal prosecution); Lynd v. Bristol Kendall Fire\\nProtection Dist., 2012 WL 3069391, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2012)\\n(denying motion to dismiss; plaintiff alleged he resigned in\\nresponse to threats to harm his family). We have also held that\\na material misrepresentation that induces resignation can\\nconstitute coercion. See Spreen v. Brey, 961 F.2d 109, 112–13\\n(7th Cir. 1992) (affirming denial of summary judgment for em-\\nployer on due-process claim where employee said she was\\nthreatened with loss of vested pension benefits if she did not\\nresign and were instead fired); cf. Covington v. Dep’t of Health\\n& Human Services, 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (federal\\n\\nDist., 388 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The only way to know how matters\\nwill turn out is to let the process run its course.”).\\n\\f12 No. 19-1221\\n\\nretirement considered involuntary if employee relies on mis-\\ninformation, whether error is intentional, negligent, or inno-\\ncent); Scharf v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed.\\nCir. 1983) (same). Here, Ulrey offered to resign because Reich-\\nhart’s “vibes” and “physical demeanor” communicated his\\ndesire to fire her. That simply is not enough to treat defend-\\nants as if they had denied plaintiff the extensive procedural\\nprotections available to her if she had wanted to contest a pos-\\nsible termination.\\n The judgment of the district court is\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448080/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670827/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Lisa Ulrey v. William Reichhart\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1221\nLISA ULREY,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nWILLIAM REICHHART and\nSCHOOL BOARD OF MANCHESTER COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\n No. 3:16-cv-257-JD — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before SYKES, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Lisa Ulrey served as the\nassistant principal of the Manchester Junior-Senior High\nSchool until November 4, 2014, when she resigned during a\nmeeting with William Reichhart, the school district’s superin-\ntendent. Ulrey brings two claims in this suit under 42 U.S.C.\n§ 1983 against Reichhart and the school board. First, she\nclaims that Reichhart violated her rights under the First\n\f2 No. 19-1221\n\nAmendment by retaliating against her for her speech about a\nstudent discipline issue. Second, she contends that the de-\nfendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by coerc-\ning her to resign, depriving her of her property interest in her\njob without due process of law. The district court granted\nsummary judgment to the defendants on both claims. We af-\nfirm. Undisputed facts show that Ulrey spoke about the dis-\ncipline issue in her capacity as an employee, so the First\nAmendment did not protect her speech. Ulrey also failed to\npresent evidence sufficient to support a finding that her res-\nignation was involuntary.\nI. Claim for First Amendment Retaliation\n Citizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by\naccepting public employment, but legal doctrine in this field\ntries to maintain a careful balance between the interests of the\nemployee as a citizen and the interests of the employer-gov-\nernment in serving the public. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 231\n(2014), citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568\n(1968). The First Amendment claim here arises from a disa-\ngreement between plaintiff Ulrey and defendant Reichhart\nconcerning student discipline. Because we review a grant of\nsummary judgment against Ulrey, we recount facts in the\nlight reasonably most favorable to her. See Healy v. City of Chi-\ncago, 450 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 2006).\n In August 2014, Superintendent Reichhart granted an\nadult student permission to possess cigarettes (though not to\nsmoke them) on school grounds. Ulrey learned of that deci-\nsion and disagreed with it. Without approaching Reichhart\nfirst, Ulrey called the president of the school board, Sally\nKrouse. Krouse in turn emailed Reichhart to express her con-\ncern about his decision. Reichhart then rebuked Ulrey for\n\fNo. 19-1221 3\n\ngoing over his head, threatening to reprimand her formally if\nshe did not apologize. She did apologize. She claims in this\nlawsuit, however, that Reichhart forced her to resign three\nmonths later to retaliate against her for her call to Krouse.\n In maintaining the critical balance under the Pickering and\nLane line of cases, the threshold question in a public em-\nployee’s First Amendment retaliation suit is whether the em-\nployee’s speech was constitutionally protected. E.g., Swetlik v.\nCrawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013). If Ulrey’s call to\nKrouse had been protected speech, then we would need to\ndecide whether Ulrey presented evidence that her call moti-\nvated Reichhart to inflict on her deprivations likely to deter\nspeech. Id.\n We do not need to reach those issues, however, because\nUlrey’s speech was unprotected as a matter of law. See Con-\nnick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983) (noting that the “in-\nquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not\nfact”). Ulrey’s claim fails at this first step. The undisputed\nfacts show that she spoke to Krouse as an employee, not a pri-\nvate citizen. “In order for a public employee to raise a success-\nful First Amendment claim for her employer’s restriction of\nher speech, the speech must be in her capacity as a private\ncitizen and not as an employee.” McArdle v. Peoria School Dist.\nNo. 150, 705 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2013). The test for distin-\nguishing private speech from employee speech is whether the\nemployees speak “pursuant to their official duties.” Spiegla v.\nHull, 481 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Garcetti v. Ce-\nballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).\n Ulrey argues that reporting the superintendent’s alleged\nmisconduct or violation of district policy on tobacco fell out-\nside her official duties. Since the Supreme Court decided\n\f4 No. 19-1221\n\nGarcetti, however, we have repeatedly rejected such claims for\na whistleblower carve-out from the category of unprotected\nemployee speech. In Garcetti, the employee wrote a memoran-\ndum detailing governmental misconduct. The Supreme Court\nheld that his speech was unprotected because the memoran-\ndum “was written pursuant to [his] official duties.” 547 U.S.\nat 421. Garcetti suggested that “legislative enactments” such\nas “whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes,” rather\nthan the First Amendment, ought to protect employees\nobliged to report official misconduct as part of their job. Id. at\n425.\n Shortly after Garcetti was decided, we applied it to a case\nlike Ulrey’s. In Spiegla, a prison guard stationed at the main\ngate reported her supervisor for letting a vehicle pass without\nthe required search for contraband. See 481 F.3d at 962–63. We\nheld that the guard “spoke as an employee, not a citizen, be-\ncause ensuring compliance with prison security policy was\npart of what she was employed to do.” Id. at 966. The fact that\nher statements “highlighted potential misconduct by prison\nofficers” did not affect the analysis under Garcetti. Id. at 967.\n As the district court recognized, we have applied this rea-\nsoning in many different employment contexts. See, e.g., Ku-\nbiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016) (police\nofficer reporting misconduct of co-worker); McArdle, 705 F.3d\nat 753 (school principal reporting misconduct of district aca-\ndemic officer); Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.\n2008) (professor reporting misconduct of dean); Vose v.\nKliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007) (police supervisor re-\nporting misconduct of detectives); see also Ulrey v. Reichhart,\n2018 WL 6435652, at *4–6 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2018).\n\fNo. 19-1221 5\n\n This line of decisions—which Ulrey failed to acknowledge\nor address in the district court and on appeal, even after the\ndistrict court relied upon them—required summary judg-\nment for defendants. Even if Superintendent Reichhart vio-\nlated school district policy by making an exception allowing\nan adult student to possess cigarettes when he attended\nschool, Ulrey’s speech fell within her official duties. Her writ-\nten job description included duties to “coordinate and admin-\nister student attendance and discipline policies,” just as the\nguard in Spiegla was paid to monitor vehicles coming into the\nprison. Ulrey’s complaint to the school board president fell\nwithin the scope of her job and was unprotected employee\nspeech, not protected citizen speech.\n The two cases that Ulrey relies on do not help her position.\nIn both Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014), and Chrzanowski v.\nBianchi, 725 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013), the plaintiffs’ speech was\nprotected because they spoke as citizens, in non-employee ca-\npacities, not because they reported misconduct. In Lane, the\nSupreme Court held that sworn testimony given under sub-\npoena in a criminal trial was citizen speech even though the\nplaintiff was testifying against a former co-worker about mis-\nconduct in their office. 573 U.S. at 239. Similarly, in\nChrzanowski, we held that a prosecutor who testified against\nhis supervisor before a grand jury and at trial spoke as a citi-\nzen. 725 F.3d at 739–40. These cases turned on the speech’s\ncontext, not its content. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 240 (“The critical\nquestion under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself\nordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not\nwhether it merely concerns those duties.”); see also Swetlik,\n738 F.3d at 826 (observing that employee’s statements in po-\nlice union meetings and grievances reporting police chief’s\nmisconduct submitted by plaintiff in his capacity as a union\n\f6 No. 19-1221\n\nmember were not employee speech). Ulrey’s call to the school\nboard president was not comparable to sworn testimony be-\nfore a court or grand jury.\n Ulrey raises one other point that, she argues, creates a dis-\npute of material fact to preclude summary judgment. The\nadult student whom Reichhart had allowed to possess ciga-\nrettes attended a special program called “Squire Academy”—\nnamed for the school mascot—that operated somewhat inde-\npendently from the high school. Accepting Ulrey’s allegations\nas true, her authority to enforce the student handbook did not\nextend to Squire Academy students. Ulrey argues that her\nspeech to Krouse thus fell outside her duties as assistant prin-\ncipal.\n We disagree. This administrative division cannot bear the\nweight Ulrey places on it. Squire Academy occupied the same\nbuilding complex as the high school, and Ulrey states that she\nhad “administrative responsibility” over the “physical class-\nroom” in which it met. Explaining her decision to call Krouse,\nUlrey testified that “students should not be allowed to have\ntobacco on school property for any reason” because it was\n“against the student handbook.” She also confirmed that she\nwas “angry because of [her] role in enforcing the handbook.”\nSquire Academy disciplinary decisions bore closely on\nUlrey’s duties even if she lacked total control over them, and\nwe do not parse the precise scope of employees’ duties as\nfinely as Ulrey argues. See, e.g., Vose, 506 F.3d at 571 (holding\nthat police officer’s report of misconduct in a separate unit of\nthe police department was employee speech). The district\ncourt correctly granted summary judgment on the First\nAmendment claim.\n\fNo. 19-1221 7\n\nII. Claim for Denial of Due Process\n Ulrey’s due-process claim stems from her resignation on\nNovember 4, 2014, three months after her call to the school\nboard president. When a public employee has a property in-\nterest in his or her continued employment, typically shown\nby proving that the employee may be fired only for good\ncause, the state may not terminate the employment without\ndue process of law. E.g., Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679,\n681 (7th Cir. 2003); see generally Cleveland Board of Education\nv. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Board of Regents v. Roth,\n408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Reichhart and the School Board agree\nthat Ulrey had a protected interest in continued employment.\nIndiana gives public school teachers and administrators stat-\nutory protections that spell out the details of procedures used\nto vindicate this due process right. See Ind. Code § 20-28-7.5-\n1 et seq. (2014) (teachers); Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2 (2014) (prin-\ncipals and assistant principals). 1\n If Reichhart had tried to fire Ulrey, these procedural pro-\ntections would have been available to her. She did not invoke\nthese procedural protections because she resigned. The gen-\neral rule is that an employee who resigns—voluntarily relin-\nquishing her interest in continued employment—may not\ncomplain of a lack of due process. See Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d\n447, 453 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of due-process\nclaim by employee who resigned). There are narrow excep-\ntions, however. In Palka we identified two types of\n\n 1 Principals and assistant principals like Ulrey work under the regular\nteacher’s contract. See Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2(1). Indiana substantially re-\nvised the grounds and procedures for cancelling teacher contracts in 2011,\nbut those amendments are not relevant here. See Elliott v. Bd. of School\nTrustees of Madison Consol. Schools, 876 F.3d 926, 928–30 (7th Cir. 2017).\n\f8 No. 19-1221\n\n“involuntary resignation” that amount to termination: con-\nstructive discharge and coerced resignation. “Constructive\ndischarge” is akin to a hostile work environment claim and\nmay occur “when an employer makes employment so un-\nbearable that an employee resigns.” Id.; see Pennsylvania State\nPolice v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2004) (explaining com-\nparison to hostile work environment). Coerced resignation,\non the other hand, is “characterized by the presence of a Hob-\nson’s choice in which the employee must resign or suffer se-\nvere consequences, such as facing criminal charges.” Palka,\n623 F.3d at 453.\n These two types of involuntary resignation are closely re-\nlated. See Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1405–06 (7th Cir.\n1988). The primary distinction may be temporal: Whereas\nconstructive discharge results when an employee must en-\ndure intolerable working conditions over some period of\ntime, a specific threat or misrepresentation concerning future\nharm can provoke a coerced resignation. See Graehling v. Vil-\nlage of Lombard, 58 F.3d 295, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1995) (likening\ncoerced resignation to signing a resignation letter at gun-\npoint).\n Before considering whether Ulrey can avoid summary\njudgment under either theory, we summarize the events that\nled up to Ulrey’s resignation on November 4, 2014. Where\nthere are disputes, we credit Ulrey’s account because we are\nreviewing a grant of summary judgment against her. The\nproblems apparently began with faulty processing of teach-\ning licenses at nearby Manchester University, where Ulrey\nhad studied for her most recent license renewal. In an October\n28 email, Reichhart notified all district teachers of potential\nerrors on such licenses and stressed the serious nature of\n\fNo. 19-1221 9\n\nlicensing defects. Later that morning, Ulrey logged on to a\nstate website to check her own license. She discovered a prob-\nlem and promptly notified her superiors, including Reichhart.\nThe error related to Ulrey’s eligibility to hold an administra-\ntive license, which she needed to serve as an assistant princi-\npal.\n That same day, Reichhart called the state Department of\nEducation with Ulrey present. A state official told them that\nthe error could be resolved. The next morning, the official con-\ntacted Ulrey to ask permission to remove false entries, and she\npromptly agreed. Yet Reichhart’s concerns were not as-\nsuaged; he emailed Ulrey on October 31 because he could not\nfind her corrected license online. That same day, he met in his\noffice with Ulrey and two others: Nancy Alspaugh, the high\nschool principal, and Scott Bumgardner, the business man-\nager. In the meeting, Reichhart berated Ulrey for the error and\nimplied that he did not believe it had been an honest mistake.\n Tensions came to a head on November 4, when Reichhart\nagain called a meeting with Ulrey, Alspaugh, and Bumgard-\nner. Reichhart stated that he could not “get past” the licensing\nsituation. According to her testimony, Ulrey was “baffled”\nand “asked him if he was asking for my resignation.” Reich-\nhart replied that he was. He then handed her a letter of resig-\nnation he had already prepared for her. Ulrey signed the letter\nduring the meeting. That same night, the school board ap-\nproved Ulrey’s resignation on its consent agenda.\n Ulrey argues that these facts present a genuine dispute as\nto whether her resignation was coerced. Ulrey does not com-\nmit herself to either legal test for involuntary resignation; ra-\nther, she asks us to consider what she describes as a “reason-\nable person” standard, arguing that a trier of fact must always\n\f10 No. 19-1221\n\ndetermine the voluntariness of a resignation. Yet, as summa-\nrized above, the tests for constructive discharge and coerced\nresignation do not ask generically whether a reasonable em-\nployee would perceive a “free choice.” Ulrey needed to pro-\nduce evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rule in her\nfavor under one of the established formulas for involuntary\nresignation. For due-process purposes, there is a critical dif-\nference between a resignation and a discharge, and that dif-\nference must be protected by insisting that the exceptions for\nconstructive discharges and coerced resignations be kept nar-\nrow. The test is not whether the employee who resigned was\nhappy about resigning or even whether the employer asked\nfor the resignation.\n Taking the exceptions in turn, Ulrey’s case is not a good fit\nfor constructive discharge. She claims that she felt coerced to\nresign in a specific meeting with her supervisor, not that her\nconditions of employment became intolerable over time. A\nconstructive discharge can result from a hostile work environ-\nment only if the environment is “even more egregious than\nthat needed for a hostile work environment.” Thompson v. Me-\nmorial Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 2010).\nUlrey has not presented evidence of conditions even ap-\nproaching that high standard. 2\n\n\n\n\n 2 Constructive discharge can sometimes refer to a situation where “an\n\nemployer acts in a manner so as to have communicated to a reasonable\nemployee that she will be terminated.” Wright v. Illinois Dep’t of Children &\nFamily Servs., 798 F.3d 513, 527 (7th Cir. 2015). But only at-will employees\ncan show constructive discharge under this approach. Employees who en-\njoy due-process protections cannot assume that the start of termination\nproceedings will result in termination. See Cigan v. Chippewa Falls School\n\fNo. 19-1221 11\n\n Ulrey’s theory also falls well short of creating a genuine\ndispute of material fact under a coerced resignation theory.\nThe most a jury could infer is that Reichhart threatened to fire\nUlrey because of the licensing errors. Reichhart, for instance,\nadmits that he told Ulrey it was in her “best interest” to resign.\nBut the possibility of eventual termination, without more,\ncannot render a resignation involuntary; otherwise, a due\nprocess violation would result whenever a public employee\nresigned rather than asserting his or her (usually extensive)\nprocedural rights. See Palka, 623 F.3d at 453 (“That Palka de-\ncided to resign rather than risk an unfavorable Merit Board\ndecision does not make his resignation involuntary.”).\n In contrast, the rare, legally viable claims of coerced resig-\nnation have typically involved threats beyond termination,\nsuch as criminal prosecution or physical harm. See, e.g., Be-\nnuzzi v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 119 F. Supp. 3d\n917, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (denying motion for summary judg-\nment where jury could find that plaintiff retired in response\nto threat of criminal prosecution); Lynd v. Bristol Kendall Fire\nProtection Dist., 2012 WL 3069391, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2012)\n(denying motion to dismiss; plaintiff alleged he resigned in\nresponse to threats to harm his family). We have also held that\na material misrepresentation that induces resignation can\nconstitute coercion. See Spreen v. Brey, 961 F.2d 109, 112–13\n(7th Cir. 1992) (affirming denial of summary judgment for em-\nployer on due-process claim where employee said she was\nthreatened with loss of vested pension benefits if she did not\nresign and were instead fired); cf. Covington v. Dep’t of Health\n& Human Services, 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (federal\n\nDist., 388 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The only way to know how matters\nwill turn out is to let the process run its course.”).\n\f12 No. 19-1221\n\nretirement considered involuntary if employee relies on mis-\ninformation, whether error is intentional, negligent, or inno-\ncent); Scharf v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed.\nCir. 1983) (same). Here, Ulrey offered to resign because Reich-\nhart’s “vibes” and “physical demeanor” communicated his\ndesire to fire her. That simply is not enough to treat defend-\nants as if they had denied plaintiff the extensive procedural\nprotections available to her if she had wanted to contest a pos-\nsible termination.\n The judgment of the district court is\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Lisa Ulrey v. William Reichhart\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1221\\nLISA ULREY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM REICHHART and\\nSCHOOL BOARD OF MANCHESTER COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:16-cv-257-JD — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Lisa Ulrey served as the\\nassistant principal of the Manchester Junior-Senior High\\nSchool until November 4, 2014, when she resigned during a\\nmeeting with William Reichhart, the school district’s superin-\\ntendent. Ulrey brings two claims in this suit under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983 against Reichhart and the school board. First, she\\nclaims that Reichhart violated her rights under the First\\n\\f2 No. 19-1221\\n\\nAmendment by retaliating against her for her speech about a\\nstudent discipline issue. Second, she contends that the de-\\nfendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by coerc-\\ning her to resign, depriving her of her property interest in her\\njob without due process of law. The district court granted\\nsummary judgment to the defendants on both claims. We af-\\nfirm. Undisputed facts show that Ulrey spoke about the dis-\\ncipline issue in her capacity as an employee, so the First\\nAmendment did not protect her speech. Ulrey also failed to\\npresent evidence sufficient to support a finding that her res-\\nignation was involuntary.\\nI. Claim for First Amendment Retaliation\\n Citizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by\\naccepting public employment, but legal doctrine in this field\\ntries to maintain a careful balance between the interests of the\\nemployee as a citizen and the interests of the employer-gov-\\nernment in serving the public. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 231\\n(2014), citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568\\n(1968). The First Amendment claim here arises from a disa-\\ngreement between plaintiff Ulrey and defendant Reichhart\\nconcerning student discipline. Because we review a grant of\\nsummary judgment against Ulrey, we recount facts in the\\nlight reasonably most favorable to her. See Healy v. City of Chi-\\ncago, 450 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n In August 2014, Superintendent Reichhart granted an\\nadult student permission to possess cigarettes (though not to\\nsmoke them) on school grounds. Ulrey learned of that deci-\\nsion and disagreed with it. Without approaching Reichhart\\nfirst, Ulrey called the president of the school board, Sally\\nKrouse. Krouse in turn emailed Reichhart to express her con-\\ncern about his decision. Reichhart then rebuked Ulrey for\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 3\\n\\ngoing over his head, threatening to reprimand her formally if\\nshe did not apologize. She did apologize. She claims in this\\nlawsuit, however, that Reichhart forced her to resign three\\nmonths later to retaliate against her for her call to Krouse.\\n In maintaining the critical balance under the Pickering and\\nLane line of cases, the threshold question in a public em-\\nployee’s First Amendment retaliation suit is whether the em-\\nployee’s speech was constitutionally protected. E.g., Swetlik v.\\nCrawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013). If Ulrey’s call to\\nKrouse had been protected speech, then we would need to\\ndecide whether Ulrey presented evidence that her call moti-\\nvated Reichhart to inflict on her deprivations likely to deter\\nspeech. Id.\\n We do not need to reach those issues, however, because\\nUlrey’s speech was unprotected as a matter of law. See Con-\\nnick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983) (noting that the “in-\\nquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not\\nfact”). Ulrey’s claim fails at this first step. The undisputed\\nfacts show that she spoke to Krouse as an employee, not a pri-\\nvate citizen. “In order for a public employee to raise a success-\\nful First Amendment claim for her employer’s restriction of\\nher speech, the speech must be in her capacity as a private\\ncitizen and not as an employee.” McArdle v. Peoria School Dist.\\nNo. 150, 705 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2013). The test for distin-\\nguishing private speech from employee speech is whether the\\nemployees speak “pursuant to their official duties.” Spiegla v.\\nHull, 481 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Garcetti v. Ce-\\nballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).\\n Ulrey argues that reporting the superintendent’s alleged\\nmisconduct or violation of district policy on tobacco fell out-\\nside her official duties. Since the Supreme Court decided\\n\\f4 No. 19-1221\\n\\nGarcetti, however, we have repeatedly rejected such claims for\\na whistleblower carve-out from the category of unprotected\\nemployee speech. In Garcetti, the employee wrote a memoran-\\ndum detailing governmental misconduct. The Supreme Court\\nheld that his speech was unprotected because the memoran-\\ndum “was written pursuant to [his] official duties.” 547 U.S.\\nat 421. Garcetti suggested that “legislative enactments” such\\nas “whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes,” rather\\nthan the First Amendment, ought to protect employees\\nobliged to report official misconduct as part of their job. Id. at\\n425.\\n Shortly after Garcetti was decided, we applied it to a case\\nlike Ulrey’s. In Spiegla, a prison guard stationed at the main\\ngate reported her supervisor for letting a vehicle pass without\\nthe required search for contraband. See 481 F.3d at 962–63. We\\nheld that the guard “spoke as an employee, not a citizen, be-\\ncause ensuring compliance with prison security policy was\\npart of what she was employed to do.” Id. at 966. The fact that\\nher statements “highlighted potential misconduct by prison\\nofficers” did not affect the analysis under Garcetti. Id. at 967.\\n As the district court recognized, we have applied this rea-\\nsoning in many different employment contexts. See, e.g., Ku-\\nbiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016) (police\\nofficer reporting misconduct of co-worker); McArdle, 705 F.3d\\nat 753 (school principal reporting misconduct of district aca-\\ndemic officer); Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.\\n2008) (professor reporting misconduct of dean); Vose v.\\nKliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007) (police supervisor re-\\nporting misconduct of detectives); see also Ulrey v. Reichhart,\\n2018 WL 6435652, at *4–6 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2018).\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 5\\n\\n This line of decisions—which Ulrey failed to acknowledge\\nor address in the district court and on appeal, even after the\\ndistrict court relied upon them—required summary judg-\\nment for defendants. Even if Superintendent Reichhart vio-\\nlated school district policy by making an exception allowing\\nan adult student to possess cigarettes when he attended\\nschool, Ulrey’s speech fell within her official duties. Her writ-\\nten job description included duties to “coordinate and admin-\\nister student attendance and discipline policies,” just as the\\nguard in Spiegla was paid to monitor vehicles coming into the\\nprison. Ulrey’s complaint to the school board president fell\\nwithin the scope of her job and was unprotected employee\\nspeech, not protected citizen speech.\\n The two cases that Ulrey relies on do not help her position.\\nIn both Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014), and Chrzanowski v.\\nBianchi, 725 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013), the plaintiffs’ speech was\\nprotected because they spoke as citizens, in non-employee ca-\\npacities, not because they reported misconduct. In Lane, the\\nSupreme Court held that sworn testimony given under sub-\\npoena in a criminal trial was citizen speech even though the\\nplaintiff was testifying against a former co-worker about mis-\\nconduct in their office. 573 U.S. at 239. Similarly, in\\nChrzanowski, we held that a prosecutor who testified against\\nhis supervisor before a grand jury and at trial spoke as a citi-\\nzen. 725 F.3d at 739–40. These cases turned on the speech’s\\ncontext, not its content. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 240 (“The critical\\nquestion under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself\\nordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not\\nwhether it merely concerns those duties.”); see also Swetlik,\\n738 F.3d at 826 (observing that employee’s statements in po-\\nlice union meetings and grievances reporting police chief’s\\nmisconduct submitted by plaintiff in his capacity as a union\\n\\f6 No. 19-1221\\n\\nmember were not employee speech). Ulrey’s call to the school\\nboard president was not comparable to sworn testimony be-\\nfore a court or grand jury.\\n Ulrey raises one other point that, she argues, creates a dis-\\npute of material fact to preclude summary judgment. The\\nadult student whom Reichhart had allowed to possess ciga-\\nrettes attended a special program called “Squire Academy”—\\nnamed for the school mascot—that operated somewhat inde-\\npendently from the high school. Accepting Ulrey’s allegations\\nas true, her authority to enforce the student handbook did not\\nextend to Squire Academy students. Ulrey argues that her\\nspeech to Krouse thus fell outside her duties as assistant prin-\\ncipal.\\n We disagree. This administrative division cannot bear the\\nweight Ulrey places on it. Squire Academy occupied the same\\nbuilding complex as the high school, and Ulrey states that she\\nhad “administrative responsibility” over the “physical class-\\nroom” in which it met. Explaining her decision to call Krouse,\\nUlrey testified that “students should not be allowed to have\\ntobacco on school property for any reason” because it was\\n“against the student handbook.” She also confirmed that she\\nwas “angry because of [her] role in enforcing the handbook.”\\nSquire Academy disciplinary decisions bore closely on\\nUlrey’s duties even if she lacked total control over them, and\\nwe do not parse the precise scope of employees’ duties as\\nfinely as Ulrey argues. See, e.g., Vose, 506 F.3d at 571 (holding\\nthat police officer’s report of misconduct in a separate unit of\\nthe police department was employee speech). The district\\ncourt correctly granted summary judgment on the First\\nAmendment claim.\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 7\\n\\nII. Claim for Denial of Due Process\\n Ulrey’s due-process claim stems from her resignation on\\nNovember 4, 2014, three months after her call to the school\\nboard president. When a public employee has a property in-\\nterest in his or her continued employment, typically shown\\nby proving that the employee may be fired only for good\\ncause, the state may not terminate the employment without\\ndue process of law. E.g., Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679,\\n681 (7th Cir. 2003); see generally Cleveland Board of Education\\nv. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Board of Regents v. Roth,\\n408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Reichhart and the School Board agree\\nthat Ulrey had a protected interest in continued employment.\\nIndiana gives public school teachers and administrators stat-\\nutory protections that spell out the details of procedures used\\nto vindicate this due process right. See Ind. Code § 20-28-7.5-\\n1 et seq. (2014) (teachers); Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2 (2014) (prin-\\ncipals and assistant principals). 1\\n If Reichhart had tried to fire Ulrey, these procedural pro-\\ntections would have been available to her. She did not invoke\\nthese procedural protections because she resigned. The gen-\\neral rule is that an employee who resigns—voluntarily relin-\\nquishing her interest in continued employment—may not\\ncomplain of a lack of due process. See Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d\\n447, 453 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of due-process\\nclaim by employee who resigned). There are narrow excep-\\ntions, however. In Palka we identified two types of\\n\\n 1 Principals and assistant principals like Ulrey work under the regular\\nteacher’s contract. See Ind. Code § 20-28-8-2(1). Indiana substantially re-\\nvised the grounds and procedures for cancelling teacher contracts in 2011,\\nbut those amendments are not relevant here. See Elliott v. Bd. of School\\nTrustees of Madison Consol. Schools, 876 F.3d 926, 928–30 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\f8 No. 19-1221\\n\\n“involuntary resignation” that amount to termination: con-\\nstructive discharge and coerced resignation. “Constructive\\ndischarge” is akin to a hostile work environment claim and\\nmay occur “when an employer makes employment so un-\\nbearable that an employee resigns.” Id.; see Pennsylvania State\\nPolice v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2004) (explaining com-\\nparison to hostile work environment). Coerced resignation,\\non the other hand, is “characterized by the presence of a Hob-\\nson’s choice in which the employee must resign or suffer se-\\nvere consequences, such as facing criminal charges.” Palka,\\n623 F.3d at 453.\\n These two types of involuntary resignation are closely re-\\nlated. See Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1405–06 (7th Cir.\\n1988). The primary distinction may be temporal: Whereas\\nconstructive discharge results when an employee must en-\\ndure intolerable working conditions over some period of\\ntime, a specific threat or misrepresentation concerning future\\nharm can provoke a coerced resignation. See Graehling v. Vil-\\nlage of Lombard, 58 F.3d 295, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1995) (likening\\ncoerced resignation to signing a resignation letter at gun-\\npoint).\\n Before considering whether Ulrey can avoid summary\\njudgment under either theory, we summarize the events that\\nled up to Ulrey’s resignation on November 4, 2014. Where\\nthere are disputes, we credit Ulrey’s account because we are\\nreviewing a grant of summary judgment against her. The\\nproblems apparently began with faulty processing of teach-\\ning licenses at nearby Manchester University, where Ulrey\\nhad studied for her most recent license renewal. In an October\\n28 email, Reichhart notified all district teachers of potential\\nerrors on such licenses and stressed the serious nature of\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 9\\n\\nlicensing defects. Later that morning, Ulrey logged on to a\\nstate website to check her own license. She discovered a prob-\\nlem and promptly notified her superiors, including Reichhart.\\nThe error related to Ulrey’s eligibility to hold an administra-\\ntive license, which she needed to serve as an assistant princi-\\npal.\\n That same day, Reichhart called the state Department of\\nEducation with Ulrey present. A state official told them that\\nthe error could be resolved. The next morning, the official con-\\ntacted Ulrey to ask permission to remove false entries, and she\\npromptly agreed. Yet Reichhart’s concerns were not as-\\nsuaged; he emailed Ulrey on October 31 because he could not\\nfind her corrected license online. That same day, he met in his\\noffice with Ulrey and two others: Nancy Alspaugh, the high\\nschool principal, and Scott Bumgardner, the business man-\\nager. In the meeting, Reichhart berated Ulrey for the error and\\nimplied that he did not believe it had been an honest mistake.\\n Tensions came to a head on November 4, when Reichhart\\nagain called a meeting with Ulrey, Alspaugh, and Bumgard-\\nner. Reichhart stated that he could not “get past” the licensing\\nsituation. According to her testimony, Ulrey was “baffled”\\nand “asked him if he was asking for my resignation.” Reich-\\nhart replied that he was. He then handed her a letter of resig-\\nnation he had already prepared for her. Ulrey signed the letter\\nduring the meeting. That same night, the school board ap-\\nproved Ulrey’s resignation on its consent agenda.\\n Ulrey argues that these facts present a genuine dispute as\\nto whether her resignation was coerced. Ulrey does not com-\\nmit herself to either legal test for involuntary resignation; ra-\\nther, she asks us to consider what she describes as a “reason-\\nable person” standard, arguing that a trier of fact must always\\n\\f10 No. 19-1221\\n\\ndetermine the voluntariness of a resignation. Yet, as summa-\\nrized above, the tests for constructive discharge and coerced\\nresignation do not ask generically whether a reasonable em-\\nployee would perceive a “free choice.” Ulrey needed to pro-\\nduce evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rule in her\\nfavor under one of the established formulas for involuntary\\nresignation. For due-process purposes, there is a critical dif-\\nference between a resignation and a discharge, and that dif-\\nference must be protected by insisting that the exceptions for\\nconstructive discharges and coerced resignations be kept nar-\\nrow. The test is not whether the employee who resigned was\\nhappy about resigning or even whether the employer asked\\nfor the resignation.\\n Taking the exceptions in turn, Ulrey’s case is not a good fit\\nfor constructive discharge. She claims that she felt coerced to\\nresign in a specific meeting with her supervisor, not that her\\nconditions of employment became intolerable over time. A\\nconstructive discharge can result from a hostile work environ-\\nment only if the environment is “even more egregious than\\nthat needed for a hostile work environment.” Thompson v. Me-\\nmorial Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nUlrey has not presented evidence of conditions even ap-\\nproaching that high standard. 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Constructive discharge can sometimes refer to a situation where “an\\n\\nemployer acts in a manner so as to have communicated to a reasonable\\nemployee that she will be terminated.” Wright v. Illinois Dep’t of Children &\\nFamily Servs., 798 F.3d 513, 527 (7th Cir. 2015). But only at-will employees\\ncan show constructive discharge under this approach. Employees who en-\\njoy due-process protections cannot assume that the start of termination\\nproceedings will result in termination. See Cigan v. Chippewa Falls School\\n\\fNo. 19-1221 11\\n\\n Ulrey’s theory also falls well short of creating a genuine\\ndispute of material fact under a coerced resignation theory.\\nThe most a jury could infer is that Reichhart threatened to fire\\nUlrey because of the licensing errors. Reichhart, for instance,\\nadmits that he told Ulrey it was in her “best interest” to resign.\\nBut the possibility of eventual termination, without more,\\ncannot render a resignation involuntary; otherwise, a due\\nprocess violation would result whenever a public employee\\nresigned rather than asserting his or her (usually extensive)\\nprocedural rights. See Palka, 623 F.3d at 453 (“That Palka de-\\ncided to resign rather than risk an unfavorable Merit Board\\ndecision does not make his resignation involuntary.”).\\n In contrast, the rare, legally viable claims of coerced resig-\\nnation have typically involved threats beyond termination,\\nsuch as criminal prosecution or physical harm. See, e.g., Be-\\nnuzzi v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 119 F. Supp. 3d\\n917, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (denying motion for summary judg-\\nment where jury could find that plaintiff retired in response\\nto threat of criminal prosecution); Lynd v. Bristol Kendall Fire\\nProtection Dist., 2012 WL 3069391, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2012)\\n(denying motion to dismiss; plaintiff alleged he resigned in\\nresponse to threats to harm his family). We have also held that\\na material misrepresentation that induces resignation can\\nconstitute coercion. See Spreen v. Brey, 961 F.2d 109, 112–13\\n(7th Cir. 1992) (affirming denial of summary judgment for em-\\nployer on due-process claim where employee said she was\\nthreatened with loss of vested pension benefits if she did not\\nresign and were instead fired); cf. Covington v. Dep’t of Health\\n& Human Services, 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (federal\\n\\nDist., 388 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The only way to know how matters\\nwill turn out is to let the process run its course.”).\\n\\f12 No. 19-1221\\n\\nretirement considered involuntary if employee relies on mis-\\ninformation, whether error is intentional, negligent, or inno-\\ncent); Scharf v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed.\\nCir. 1983) (same). Here, Ulrey offered to resign because Reich-\\nhart’s “vibes” and “physical demeanor” communicated his\\ndesire to fire her. That simply is not enough to treat defend-\\nants as if they had denied plaintiff the extensive procedural\\nprotections available to her if she had wanted to contest a pos-\\nsible termination.\\n The judgment of the district court is\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4678,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670828,"string":"4,670,828"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Gai Levy v. Marion County Sheriff"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1424"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1424\\nGAI LEVY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nMARION COUNTY SHERIFF, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 17-cv-03090 — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Gai Levy brought\\nthis lawsuit against defendants-appellees, the Marion County\\nSheriff and the Consolidated City of Indianapolis and Marion\\nCounty (collectively, “defendants”), alleging constitutional\\nviolations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawfully detaining\\nhim. Levy contends that on two separate occasions defend-\\nants violated orders from a trial court to release him from cus-\\ntody. In particular, he asserts that the policies and practices\\n\\f2 No. 19-1424\\n\\ndefendants used to communicate with the courts about indi-\\nvidual defendants led to his prolonged detention. Defendants\\nmoved for summary judgment on Levy’s § 1983 claims. The\\ndistrict court granted their motion. We affirm.\\n I. Background\\n Before diving into the specifics of this case, it is helpful to\\nunderstand how the Marion County Sheriff’s Office receives\\ninformation from the Marion County Superior Courts and\\nhow the Sheriff’s Office then executes those court orders. The\\ncourts and the Sheriff use two different systems for their case\\nmanagement needs. The courts’ system is called Odyssey and\\nthe Sheriff’s is called Offender Management System (OMS).\\nBoth systems use event codes to indicate a court’s order, but\\nintegration between the two systems since their adoption in\\n2014 has proven challenging, given the systems’ difficulty\\ncommunicating with each other. To remedy this problem, the\\nInformation Services Agency for the Consolidated City of In-\\ndianapolis and Marion County developed a special data ex-\\nchange system to ensure the transfer of data from the courts\\nto the Sheriff’s Office.\\n This solution was imperfect. For example, when a court\\nordered a detainee released subject to placement at Marion\\nCounty Community Corrections (MCCC), the court could en-\\nter an “ORC” code (the “Self-Report code”), which directed\\nthe Sheriff to release the detainee from custody so he could\\nself-report to MCCC on his own. Alternatively, the court\\ncould enter an “SBDOA” code (the “Direct Transfer code”),\\nwhich instructed the Sheriff to maintain the detainee in cus-\\ntody until he could be directly transported to MCCC for pro-\\ncessing and release. After the Sheriff received either a Self-Re-\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 3\\n\\nport or Direct Transfer code, it placed the detainee in the “re-\\nlease workflow.” The release workflow was a process\\nwhereby the Sheriff’s Office automatically generated a list of\\ndetainees for whom the court had entered release codes. After\\nthat, the Sheriff’s inmate records staff reviewed the list to ver-\\nify that each detainee was eligible to be released immediately\\nor transferred for release. Once they completed the verifica-\\ntion process, the inmate records staff removed the detainee\\nfrom the release workflow.\\n Because the release workflow could not automatically\\nprocess updated release orders, problems arose when the\\ncourts modified an order as to a detainee who had already\\ncleared the process. The Sheriff’s Office knew of this flaw and\\nhad reached an agreement with the courts to have court staff\\ncontact the Sheriff’s inmate records staff any time there was a\\nsubsequent order in the same case to ensure that the Sheriff’s\\nOffice was operating with the most current information. It is\\nundisputed that if court staff did not notify the Sheriff’s Office\\nabout such updates or modifications, the Sheriff would pro-\\ncess a detainee based on the original release order it received.\\n With that context in mind, we turn our focus to Levy’s\\ncase. The Sheriff’s Office took custody of Levy after his arrest\\non an outstanding warrant on February 29, 2016. The parties\\nagree that Levy remained in the Sheriff’s custody until March\\n3, 2016, when it transferred him to MCCC. (MCCC released\\nLevy later that same day.) Beyond that basic timeline, though,\\nthe parties disagree about when the Sheriff’s Office received\\nan order from the court to release Levy.\\n\\f4 No. 19-1424\\n\\n According to Levy, the judge at his first court appearance\\nordered him released on his own recognizance, and because\\nthe Sheriff’s Office did not immediately release him after that\\norder, Levy argues that the Sheriff unlawfully detained him.\\nTo support his version of events, Levy points to this screen-\\nshot of his case file in OMS, which he contends shows that\\nofficer Roberto Juan Rodrigues entered “Order To Release\\nFrom Custody” as the “Court Event” on February 29, 2016, at\\n23:50:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n The Sheriff’s Office, however, asserts that the judge or-\\ndered that the Sheriff keep Levy in custody until he could be\\ntransferred directly to MCCC; it was not until Levy’s second\\ncourt appearance on March 2, 2016, that a different judge or-\\ndered Levy to self-report to MCCC. By that time, the Sheriff\\nasserts, the inmate records staff had already finished pro-\\ncessing Levy through its release workflow. It is undisputed\\nthat no one at the court called or emailed the Sheriff’s Office\\nabout the second order, and therefore, that the Sheriff never\\nreceived notice of the second order. Ultimately, the Sheriff’s\\nOffice processed Levy and kept him in custody until March 3,\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 5\\n\\n2016. To support their version of the timeline, defendants di-\\nrect our attention to the certified copy of the Case Summary\\nin Levy’s case, which shows that the court entered a Direct\\nTransfer code on March 1, 2016, but later entered a Self-Report\\ncode on March 2, 2016:\\n\\f6 No. 19-1424\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Levy consequently alleged claims against defendants for\\nunreasonable seizure and detention under the Fourth\\nAmendment and deprivation of liberty without due process\\nunder the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Levy insists\\nthat the Sheriff’s Office “instituted and maintained unreason-\\nable policies and practices that resulted in its keeping [him]\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 7\\n\\ndetained … after [he] had been ordered released by the Court\\nand/or after legal authority for [his] detention had ceased.”\\n Defendants moved for summary judgment on October 4,\\n2018, and they moved to exclude the testimony of Levy’s ex-\\npert on December 10, 2018. The district court granted both\\nmotions on February 11, 2019.1 Regarding the motion for sum-\\nmary judgment, the district court first held that Levy’s Four-\\nteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim could not pro-\\nceed because “the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process\\nClause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial detention.”\\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019) (first\\nciting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017); then\\nciting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018)).\\n As to whether Levy had raised any genuine disputes of\\nmaterial fact for a jury to resolve on his Fourth Amendment\\nclaim, the court first explained that it understood Levy to be\\nchallenging two policies or practices: (1) the use of Odyssey\\nand OMS to transmit release codes from the Marion County\\nSuperior Courts to the Sheriff’s Office (the “Transmittal Pol-\\nicy”);2 and (2) the practice of requiring court staff to contact\\nthe Sheriff when a release order had been modified (the\\n“Change Notification Policy”). Because the court found it was\\nundisputed that the Sheriff’s Office did not receive notice of\\nthe Self-Report code before it released Levy, the court held the\\nSheriff’s use of the Transmittal Policy alone could not have\\n\\n\\n 1 Levy does not appeal the district court’s decision to exclude his ex-\\npert.\\n 2 Although the district court did not explicitly say as much, we assume\\n\\nthat the Transmittal Policy also includes the Sheriff’s adoption and use of\\nthe release workflow.\\n\\f8 No. 19-1424\\n\\ncaused Levy’s harm. In considering the Change Notification\\nPolicy, the court considered four different time frames:\\n 1. The time between Levy’s arrest and the entry of a\\n code on March 1, 2016 at 12:25 AM after his first\\n court appearance.\\n 2. The time between the entry of the first code and the\\n entry of the second code on March 2, 2016 at 2:15\\n PM after his second court appearance.\\n\\n 3. The time between the entry of the second code and\\n his transfer to MCCC on March 3, 2016 at 1:35 PM.\\n 4. The time between his transfer to MCCC and his re-\\n lease from MCCC on March 3, 2016 at 7:30 PM.\\n The court emphasized that Levy did not challenge the\\nSheriff’s authority to detain him during the first or fourth time\\nperiods; rather, Levy’s complaint concerned the second and\\nthird time periods alone. In considering the second time pe-\\nriod, the court reasoned that because Levy did not produce\\nany evidence to contradict the Case Summary, which showed\\nthat the court had ordered Levy released “Upon Satisfaction\\nof Bond, Party Held For Other Agency” and listed “commu-\\nnity corrections” at the first court appearance, it followed that\\nthe Sheriff had the legal authority to detain Levy during that\\ntime period and thus his detention did not violate the Fourth\\nAmendment.\\n Turning to the third time period, the court noted that de-\\nfendants acknowledged that the failure of the Change Notifi-\\ncation Policy caused Levy’s detention during this time period,\\nbut the court underscored that because Levy did not produce\\nevidence of other individuals being over-detained for the\\nsame reasons, Levy could not establish that defendants had\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 9\\n\\nadopted a policy or practice of deliberate indifference; there-\\nfore, this time period could not serve as the basis of his claim\\neither.\\n Levy now appeals.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary\\njudgment de novo, interpreting all facts and drawing all rea-\\nsonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. O’Brien\\nv. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2018). “Summary\\njudgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of\\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-\\nter of law.” Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Summary judg-\\nment is inappropriate “if the evidence is such that a reasona-\\nble jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” An-\\nderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may\\naffirm the entry of summary judgment on any ground sup-\\nported in the record, so long as the moving party adequately\\npresented the issue in the district court and the non-moving\\nparty had an opportunity to contest it. O’Brien, 900 F.3d at 928.\\n A. Dispute of Material Fact\\n One of the issues Levy raises on appeal is the district\\ncourt’s finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that the\\nSheriff received a Self-Report code after his first court appear-\\nance. Levy focuses on the evidence he submitted to the district\\ncourt, namely a screenshot of his case file in OMS, which he\\nargues shows that officer Roberto Juan Rodrigues entered\\n“Order To Release From Custody” as the “Court Event” on\\n\\f10 No. 19-1424\\n\\nFebruary 29, 2016, at 23:50.3 Levy contends that the district\\ncourt dismissed his characterization of the screenshot in favor\\nof the explanation given by the Sheriff’s Chief Information Of-\\nficer, Derek Peterson, in his affidavit. Peterson asserted that\\nthe screenshot did not show what code the court entered at\\nLevy’s first court appearance, but that the certified copy of the\\nCase Summary did contain that information, and that record\\nshowed an entry of “Upon Satisfaction of Bond, Party Held\\nfor Other Agency” on March 1, 2016, which would have\\nprompted a Direct Transfer code, not a Self-Report code.\\n By favoring Peterson’s interpretation of the OMS screen-\\nshot over Levy’s, the court, in Levy’s view, made an imper-\\nmissible credibility determination. Levy maintains that, in\\nany event, the certified Case Summary does not conclusively\\nrefute his argument about an initial Self-Report code because\\nit incorrectly states that Levy’s arrest was on March 1, 2016;\\naccordingly, a jury could reasonably infer from that discrep-\\nancy that the Case Summary is neither infallible nor disposi-\\ntive as to the court’s order regarding Levy’s first appearance.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Levy’s lawyer attached the screenshot to a declaration filed in oppo-\\n\\nsition to the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, defend-\\nants make several admissibility challenges to Levy’s reliance on the OMS\\nscreenshot. But by raising those issues for the first time on appeal, defend-\\nants have forfeited those arguments. See Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 231\\nF.3d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[H]er attack on the admissibility of the\\naffidavit is waived because she failed to raise it in the district court.”); see\\nalso Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, Inc., 658 F.3d 760, 770 (7th Cir.\\n2011) (“To preserve an evidentiary objection for appeal, a party must make\\na ‘timely objection or motion to strike … stating the specific ground of ob-\\njection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.’” (quot-\\ning Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1))).\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 11\\n\\n Defendants respond by highlighting that Levy has not\\npresented any evidence to controvert Peterson’s testimony\\nabout the meaning of the OMS screenshot.4 Consequently, de-\\nfendants insist that there is no dispute of fact as to the central\\nquestion in this case—whether the court actually ordered the\\nSheriff to release Levy to self-report to the MCCC after his\\nfirst court appearance. According to defendants, there is no\\ndispute that the OMS screenshot does not support Levy’s ar-\\ngument that the Sheriff’s Office received an order to immedi-\\nately release Levy to self-report to the MCCC after his first\\ncourt appearance. And because the Case Summary supports\\ndefendants’ contention that the Sheriff received an order to\\nhold Levy at the MCCC after his first court appearance, de-\\nfendants urge us to affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n If the issue on appeal were simply one of dueling docu-\\nments and the district court had picked defendants’ asserted\\nfacts over Levy’s, that act would constitute reversible error.\\nHere, however, there are no such dueling documents. Both\\nthe OMS screenshot and the Case Summary contain many\\ndates and codes. The OMS screenshot lists “Order To Release\\nFrom Custody” next to the field “Court Event,” but there are\\nalso dates listed: the field “Notification Made On” has\\n“03/01/2016” listed, the field “Effective Date” has\\n“02/29/2016” listed, and the field “Date/Time Added” has\\n“02/29/2016 23:50” listed. To make matters more confusing,\\n\\n\\n 4 Levy had attempted to present an expert witness, Alison Shine, who\\n\\nwould have asserted that a judge ordered Levy to self-report at his first\\ncourt appearance on March 1, and that the Sheriff’s Office had to have\\nbeen aware of that order through the court’s use of Odyssey and OMS.\\nThe district court, however, excluded Shine’s testimony (as noted above)\\nand Levy does not challenge that ruling on appeal.\\n\\f12 No. 19-1424\\n\\nthe screenshot also lists dates that accurately describe events\\nthat occurred after Levy’s first court appearance. For example,\\nthe field “Discharge Date” has “03/03/2016” listed, and at the\\nbottom of the page, there is a table that displays “$500 cash”\\nas a “Note” on the date of “03/01/2016 00:25.”\\n Consequently, it would be unreasonable to infer that this\\nscreenshot only depicts information at the time the court had\\nentered a code after the first court appearance. Similarly, it\\nwould be unreasonable to infer from the presence of a Self-\\nReport code amidst this range of dates that the court entered\\na Self-Report code after the first court appearance. Moreover,\\nin his affidavit, Peterson made the uncontroverted assertion\\nthat the OMS screenshot cannot be interpreted to show what\\ncode the court entered at Levy’s first appearance. This testi-\\nmony and evidence is enough to affirm the district court’s de-\\ncision that there was no dispute of material fact as to whether\\nthe court entered a Self-Report code after Levy’s first court\\nappearance. With that factual issue resolved, we move on to\\nwhether the district court properly entered summary judg-\\nment for defendants on the Monell claim.\\n B. Monell Liability\\n Plaintiffs like Levy may sue municipalities under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983 when their actions violate the Constitution. See gener-\\nally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.\\n658 (1978). To prevail on a Monell claim, plaintiffs must iden-\\ntify an action taken by the municipality, the requisite degree\\nof culpability, and a causal link between the municipality’s\\naction and the deprivation of federal rights. Bd. of the Cty.\\nCommissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997). A munic-\\nipality “acts” through its written policies, widespread prac-\\ntices or customs, and the acts of a final decisionmaker. Id. A\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 13\\n\\nmunicipality has the requisite degree of culpability if it acts\\nwith deliberate indifference to the known or obvious conse-\\nquences of its action. Id. at 407.\\n The Sheriff’s Office does not dispute that it created a sys-\\ntem with the Marion County Superior Courts to process in-\\nmates for release utilizing Odyssey, OMS, and the release\\nworkflow, which included an agreement that if a court modi-\\nfied a release order, court staff would contact the Sheriff’s in-\\nmate records staff to notify them of the change. Likewise, the\\nSheriff does not challenge the district court’s decision to ana-\\nlyze this system as a policy or practice under Monell.\\n That said, it is critical to specify the exact policy or practice\\nat issue here to properly conduct our analysis. As noted\\nabove, the district court discussed Monell as if there were two\\npolices in this case—the “Transmittal Policy” and the\\n“Change Notification Policy”—when determining whether\\nthe Sheriff’s Office had acted with deliberate indifference.\\nLevy argues that the two must be treated as one policy for the\\npurposes of this appeal, and defendants appear to concede\\nthe same.\\n A review of the record supports this conclusion. The evi-\\ndence suggests that the Sheriff’s Office adopted the Change\\nNotification Policy to ensure that it received notice of subse-\\nquent orders that may have been otherwise overlooked by the\\nexisting Transmittal Policy. Thus, the issue on appeal is\\nwhether Levy can establish that the Sheriff’s adoption and use\\nof this modified Transmittal Policy constituted deliberate indif-\\nference to a substantial risk of detainees’ over-detention and\\nwhether that policy’s adoption caused his own over-deten-\\ntion.\\n\\f14 No. 19-1424\\n\\n For the reasons explained below, we conclude that absent\\nevidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known\\nthat the modified Transmittal Policy would fail, or failed so\\noften that it would obviously result in detainees’ over-deten-\\ntion, Levy cannot to show that defendants acted with deliber-\\nate indifference.\\n Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, Levy posits that\\nto establish deliberate indifference, he is not required to show\\n“other instances” where the failure to follow the Change No-\\ntification Policy caused prolonged detentions. This is so, he\\nexplains, because he challenges a “decision to adopt [a] par-\\nticular course of action [ ] properly made by that govern-\\nment’s authorized decisionmakers,” and that is a sufficient\\nbasis to find municipal liability under § 1983. Pembaur v. City\\nof Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).\\n Levy believes that he has shown the Sheriff’s Office took\\nsuch a course of action here because he presented (1) evidence\\nthat the Sheriff selected OMS without properly vetting the\\nsoftware or considering its consequences; (2) evidence that\\nthe Sheriff used OMS despite multiple Marion County judges\\nraising concerns about delayed releases and a group of those\\njudges endorsing an entirely different software package;\\n(3) evidence that the inmate records staff previously failed to\\ntimely process release orders entered by courts into Odyssey\\nand received through OMS; (4) evidence of integration issues\\nfrom the time of OMS’s implementation; and (5) evidence that\\nrelease information cannot be properly transmitted between\\nOdyssey and OMS.\\n Defendants reject much of this evidence as “unproven al-\\nlegations” that there were over-detention problems arising\\nfrom different scenarios having nothing to do with the inmate\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 15\\n\\nrelease policy developed between the courts and the Sheriff’s\\nOffice.5 Likewise, defendants believe the district court got it\\nright when it cited City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle to support its\\nconclusion that Levy needed evidence of other instances of\\nthe relevant policy causing constitutional violations. 471 U.S.\\n808, 823–24 (1985).\\n As an initial matter, we have explained that the “more\\nproof” that Tuttle describes is necessary to establish that\\n“there is a true municipal policy at issue, not a random event.”\\nCalhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005); see also\\nThomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2010) (“We do not adopt any bright-line rules defining a\\n‘widespread custom or practice.’ … But the plaintiff must\\ndemonstrate that there is a policy at issue rather than a ran-\\ndom event.” (citations omitted)).\\n In this case, however, there is no concern that a policy is\\nnot at play. In fact, the Sheriff’s Office acknowledged in its\\nappellate brief that it “does not challenge the district court’s\\ndecision to analyze this release process as a policy or practice\\nunder Monell.” Moreover, the record supports Levy’s narra-\\ntive that by continuing to use the Transmittal Policy without\\nany modification, defendants persistently pursued a course of\\naction of selecting and continuing to use a case management\\nsystem despite many concerns from stakeholders, numerous\\nintegration issues, and an inability to process updated release\\n\\n 5 Levy is a putative class member in another case pending in the\\nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Driver, et\\nal. v. The Marion County Sheriff, Case No. 1:14-cv-2076, in which the plain-\\ntiffs challenge the Sheriff’s purported policies and practices of holding de-\\ntainees for up to seventy-two hours. He submitted experts’ depositions\\nand other documents from that litigation to support his claim in this case.\\n\\f16 No. 19-1424\\n\\norders from the courts. Thus, if Levy’s detention had occurred\\nprior to the Sheriff’s adoption of the Change Notification Pol-\\nicy, and he therefore challenged the use of the Transmittal\\nPolicy prior to the Change Notification Policy, then there may\\nhave been a question for the jury as to deliberate indifference.\\n But Levy’s detention occurred after the Sheriff’s Office\\ntook steps to address the purported problems with the Trans-\\nmittal Policy. Thus, as in Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564\\n(7th Cir. 1998), we are faced with the question of whether a\\nprison’s use of a system with significant weaknesses can be\\nconsidered deliberately indifferent, even after the prison has\\ntaken affirmative steps to address those weaknesses.\\n In Armstrong, a pretrial detainee asserted that the “will\\ncall” policy at the Allen County (Indiana) jail was constitu-\\ntionally inadequate because “it display[ed] indifference to the\\nrights of those arrested with a civil warrant to a prompt ap-\\npearance before a court.” Id. at 577. Specifically, the evidence\\nshowed that once the jail put detainees on the will call list, it\\ntook absolutely no action to ensure that they were given a\\ncourt date and that they were not over-detained. Id. at 577–78.\\nAlthough we explicitly noted that “the will call system in\\nplace at the time of Armstrong’s arrest and detention …\\nseem[ed] to amount to a policy of deliberate indifference,” id.\\nat 579, we decided the claim failed because “the jail had a\\nbackup plan—of sorts, at least—it accepted formal written\\ncomplaints from the detainees.” Id. The existence of this fail-\\nsafe “show[ed] an awareness on the part of jail officials that a\\ndanger exist[ed] and an attempt to avert an injury from that\\ndanger.” Id. Indeed, the “procedure saved the will call system\\nfrom being deliberately indifferent.” Id. at 579.\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 17\\n\\n The logic of Armstrong applies with equal force here.\\nGiven the concerns regarding the Sheriff’s ability to receive\\nand act upon court orders processed through OMS, the Sher-\\niff’s Office created backup plans to address the limitations of\\nits systems. First, it developed the release workflow process\\nas part of the Transmittal Policy to ensure that the courts’ or-\\nders were properly handled and effected. Second, and most\\nimportantly, the Sheriff’s Office developed the Change Noti-\\nfication Policy, a modification of the release workflow process\\nthat required court officials to call or email the Sheriff with\\nany modifications to prior court orders.\\n As in Armstrong, these actions “show[ed] an awareness on\\nthe part of jail officials that a danger exist[ed] and an attempt\\nto avert an injury from that danger.” Consequently, without\\nevidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known\\nthat these safeguards would fail, or failed so often that they\\nwould obviously result in over-detentions, we cannot con-\\nclude that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the\\nrisk of detainees’ over-detention. Levy’s singular experience\\ndoes not support a finding to the contrary.6\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Because the district court appropriately held that Levy did not pre-\\nsent sufficient evidence to show deliberate indifference, we need not ad-\\ndress the Sheriff’s argument regarding causation.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448081/\", \"author_raw\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670828/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Gai Levy v. Marion County Sheriff\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1424\nGAI LEVY,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nMARION COUNTY SHERIFF, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\n No. 17-cv-03090 — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Gai Levy brought\nthis lawsuit against defendants-appellees, the Marion County\nSheriff and the Consolidated City of Indianapolis and Marion\nCounty (collectively, “defendants”), alleging constitutional\nviolations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawfully detaining\nhim. Levy contends that on two separate occasions defend-\nants violated orders from a trial court to release him from cus-\ntody. In particular, he asserts that the policies and practices\n\f2 No. 19-1424\n\ndefendants used to communicate with the courts about indi-\nvidual defendants led to his prolonged detention. Defendants\nmoved for summary judgment on Levy’s § 1983 claims. The\ndistrict court granted their motion. We affirm.\n I. Background\n Before diving into the specifics of this case, it is helpful to\nunderstand how the Marion County Sheriff’s Office receives\ninformation from the Marion County Superior Courts and\nhow the Sheriff’s Office then executes those court orders. The\ncourts and the Sheriff use two different systems for their case\nmanagement needs. The courts’ system is called Odyssey and\nthe Sheriff’s is called Offender Management System (OMS).\nBoth systems use event codes to indicate a court’s order, but\nintegration between the two systems since their adoption in\n2014 has proven challenging, given the systems’ difficulty\ncommunicating with each other. To remedy this problem, the\nInformation Services Agency for the Consolidated City of In-\ndianapolis and Marion County developed a special data ex-\nchange system to ensure the transfer of data from the courts\nto the Sheriff’s Office.\n This solution was imperfect. For example, when a court\nordered a detainee released subject to placement at Marion\nCounty Community Corrections (MCCC), the court could en-\nter an “ORC” code (the “Self-Report code”), which directed\nthe Sheriff to release the detainee from custody so he could\nself-report to MCCC on his own. Alternatively, the court\ncould enter an “SBDOA” code (the “Direct Transfer code”),\nwhich instructed the Sheriff to maintain the detainee in cus-\ntody until he could be directly transported to MCCC for pro-\ncessing and release. After the Sheriff received either a Self-Re-\n\fNo. 19-1424 3\n\nport or Direct Transfer code, it placed the detainee in the “re-\nlease workflow.” The release workflow was a process\nwhereby the Sheriff’s Office automatically generated a list of\ndetainees for whom the court had entered release codes. After\nthat, the Sheriff’s inmate records staff reviewed the list to ver-\nify that each detainee was eligible to be released immediately\nor transferred for release. Once they completed the verifica-\ntion process, the inmate records staff removed the detainee\nfrom the release workflow.\n Because the release workflow could not automatically\nprocess updated release orders, problems arose when the\ncourts modified an order as to a detainee who had already\ncleared the process. The Sheriff’s Office knew of this flaw and\nhad reached an agreement with the courts to have court staff\ncontact the Sheriff’s inmate records staff any time there was a\nsubsequent order in the same case to ensure that the Sheriff’s\nOffice was operating with the most current information. It is\nundisputed that if court staff did not notify the Sheriff’s Office\nabout such updates or modifications, the Sheriff would pro-\ncess a detainee based on the original release order it received.\n With that context in mind, we turn our focus to Levy’s\ncase. The Sheriff’s Office took custody of Levy after his arrest\non an outstanding warrant on February 29, 2016. The parties\nagree that Levy remained in the Sheriff’s custody until March\n3, 2016, when it transferred him to MCCC. (MCCC released\nLevy later that same day.) Beyond that basic timeline, though,\nthe parties disagree about when the Sheriff’s Office received\nan order from the court to release Levy.\n\f4 No. 19-1424\n\n According to Levy, the judge at his first court appearance\nordered him released on his own recognizance, and because\nthe Sheriff’s Office did not immediately release him after that\norder, Levy argues that the Sheriff unlawfully detained him.\nTo support his version of events, Levy points to this screen-\nshot of his case file in OMS, which he contends shows that\nofficer Roberto Juan Rodrigues entered “Order To Release\nFrom Custody” as the “Court Event” on February 29, 2016, at\n23:50:\n\n\n\n\n The Sheriff’s Office, however, asserts that the judge or-\ndered that the Sheriff keep Levy in custody until he could be\ntransferred directly to MCCC; it was not until Levy’s second\ncourt appearance on March 2, 2016, that a different judge or-\ndered Levy to self-report to MCCC. By that time, the Sheriff\nasserts, the inmate records staff had already finished pro-\ncessing Levy through its release workflow. It is undisputed\nthat no one at the court called or emailed the Sheriff’s Office\nabout the second order, and therefore, that the Sheriff never\nreceived notice of the second order. Ultimately, the Sheriff’s\nOffice processed Levy and kept him in custody until March 3,\n\fNo. 19-1424 5\n\n2016. To support their version of the timeline, defendants di-\nrect our attention to the certified copy of the Case Summary\nin Levy’s case, which shows that the court entered a Direct\nTransfer code on March 1, 2016, but later entered a Self-Report\ncode on March 2, 2016:\n\f6 No. 19-1424\n\n\n\n\n Levy consequently alleged claims against defendants for\nunreasonable seizure and detention under the Fourth\nAmendment and deprivation of liberty without due process\nunder the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Levy insists\nthat the Sheriff’s Office “instituted and maintained unreason-\nable policies and practices that resulted in its keeping [him]\n\fNo. 19-1424 7\n\ndetained … after [he] had been ordered released by the Court\nand/or after legal authority for [his] detention had ceased.”\n Defendants moved for summary judgment on October 4,\n2018, and they moved to exclude the testimony of Levy’s ex-\npert on December 10, 2018. The district court granted both\nmotions on February 11, 2019.1 Regarding the motion for sum-\nmary judgment, the district court first held that Levy’s Four-\nteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim could not pro-\nceed because “the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process\nClause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial detention.”\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019) (first\nciting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017); then\nciting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018)).\n As to whether Levy had raised any genuine disputes of\nmaterial fact for a jury to resolve on his Fourth Amendment\nclaim, the court first explained that it understood Levy to be\nchallenging two policies or practices: (1) the use of Odyssey\nand OMS to transmit release codes from the Marion County\nSuperior Courts to the Sheriff’s Office (the “Transmittal Pol-\nicy”);2 and (2) the practice of requiring court staff to contact\nthe Sheriff when a release order had been modified (the\n“Change Notification Policy”). Because the court found it was\nundisputed that the Sheriff’s Office did not receive notice of\nthe Self-Report code before it released Levy, the court held the\nSheriff’s use of the Transmittal Policy alone could not have\n\n\n 1 Levy does not appeal the district court’s decision to exclude his ex-\npert.\n 2 Although the district court did not explicitly say as much, we assume\n\nthat the Transmittal Policy also includes the Sheriff’s adoption and use of\nthe release workflow.\n\f8 No. 19-1424\n\ncaused Levy’s harm. In considering the Change Notification\nPolicy, the court considered four different time frames:\n 1. The time between Levy’s arrest and the entry of a\n code on March 1, 2016 at 12:25 AM after his first\n court appearance.\n 2. The time between the entry of the first code and the\n entry of the second code on March 2, 2016 at 2:15\n PM after his second court appearance.\n\n 3. The time between the entry of the second code and\n his transfer to MCCC on March 3, 2016 at 1:35 PM.\n 4. The time between his transfer to MCCC and his re-\n lease from MCCC on March 3, 2016 at 7:30 PM.\n The court emphasized that Levy did not challenge the\nSheriff’s authority to detain him during the first or fourth time\nperiods; rather, Levy’s complaint concerned the second and\nthird time periods alone. In considering the second time pe-\nriod, the court reasoned that because Levy did not produce\nany evidence to contradict the Case Summary, which showed\nthat the court had ordered Levy released “Upon Satisfaction\nof Bond, Party Held For Other Agency” and listed “commu-\nnity corrections” at the first court appearance, it followed that\nthe Sheriff had the legal authority to detain Levy during that\ntime period and thus his detention did not violate the Fourth\nAmendment.\n Turning to the third time period, the court noted that de-\nfendants acknowledged that the failure of the Change Notifi-\ncation Policy caused Levy’s detention during this time period,\nbut the court underscored that because Levy did not produce\nevidence of other individuals being over-detained for the\nsame reasons, Levy could not establish that defendants had\n\fNo. 19-1424 9\n\nadopted a policy or practice of deliberate indifference; there-\nfore, this time period could not serve as the basis of his claim\neither.\n Levy now appeals.\n II. Discussion\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary\njudgment de novo, interpreting all facts and drawing all rea-\nsonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. O’Brien\nv. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2018). “Summary\njudgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-\nter of law.” Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673\n(7th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Summary judg-\nment is inappropriate “if the evidence is such that a reasona-\nble jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” An-\nderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may\naffirm the entry of summary judgment on any ground sup-\nported in the record, so long as the moving party adequately\npresented the issue in the district court and the non-moving\nparty had an opportunity to contest it. O’Brien, 900 F.3d at 928.\n A. Dispute of Material Fact\n One of the issues Levy raises on appeal is the district\ncourt’s finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that the\nSheriff received a Self-Report code after his first court appear-\nance. Levy focuses on the evidence he submitted to the district\ncourt, namely a screenshot of his case file in OMS, which he\nargues shows that officer Roberto Juan Rodrigues entered\n“Order To Release From Custody” as the “Court Event” on\n\f10 No. 19-1424\n\nFebruary 29, 2016, at 23:50.3 Levy contends that the district\ncourt dismissed his characterization of the screenshot in favor\nof the explanation given by the Sheriff’s Chief Information Of-\nficer, Derek Peterson, in his affidavit. Peterson asserted that\nthe screenshot did not show what code the court entered at\nLevy’s first court appearance, but that the certified copy of the\nCase Summary did contain that information, and that record\nshowed an entry of “Upon Satisfaction of Bond, Party Held\nfor Other Agency” on March 1, 2016, which would have\nprompted a Direct Transfer code, not a Self-Report code.\n By favoring Peterson’s interpretation of the OMS screen-\nshot over Levy’s, the court, in Levy’s view, made an imper-\nmissible credibility determination. Levy maintains that, in\nany event, the certified Case Summary does not conclusively\nrefute his argument about an initial Self-Report code because\nit incorrectly states that Levy’s arrest was on March 1, 2016;\naccordingly, a jury could reasonably infer from that discrep-\nancy that the Case Summary is neither infallible nor disposi-\ntive as to the court’s order regarding Levy’s first appearance.\n\n\n\n 3 Levy’s lawyer attached the screenshot to a declaration filed in oppo-\n\nsition to the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, defend-\nants make several admissibility challenges to Levy’s reliance on the OMS\nscreenshot. But by raising those issues for the first time on appeal, defend-\nants have forfeited those arguments. See Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 231\nF.3d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[H]er attack on the admissibility of the\naffidavit is waived because she failed to raise it in the district court.”); see\nalso Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, Inc., 658 F.3d 760, 770 (7th Cir.\n2011) (“To preserve an evidentiary objection for appeal, a party must make\na ‘timely objection or motion to strike … stating the specific ground of ob-\njection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.’” (quot-\ning Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1))).\n\fNo. 19-1424 11\n\n Defendants respond by highlighting that Levy has not\npresented any evidence to controvert Peterson’s testimony\nabout the meaning of the OMS screenshot.4 Consequently, de-\nfendants insist that there is no dispute of fact as to the central\nquestion in this case—whether the court actually ordered the\nSheriff to release Levy to self-report to the MCCC after his\nfirst court appearance. According to defendants, there is no\ndispute that the OMS screenshot does not support Levy’s ar-\ngument that the Sheriff’s Office received an order to immedi-\nately release Levy to self-report to the MCCC after his first\ncourt appearance. And because the Case Summary supports\ndefendants’ contention that the Sheriff received an order to\nhold Levy at the MCCC after his first court appearance, de-\nfendants urge us to affirm the district court’s judgment.\n If the issue on appeal were simply one of dueling docu-\nments and the district court had picked defendants’ asserted\nfacts over Levy’s, that act would constitute reversible error.\nHere, however, there are no such dueling documents. Both\nthe OMS screenshot and the Case Summary contain many\ndates and codes. The OMS screenshot lists “Order To Release\nFrom Custody” next to the field “Court Event,” but there are\nalso dates listed: the field “Notification Made On” has\n“03/01/2016” listed, the field “Effective Date” has\n“02/29/2016” listed, and the field “Date/Time Added” has\n“02/29/2016 23:50” listed. To make matters more confusing,\n\n\n 4 Levy had attempted to present an expert witness, Alison Shine, who\n\nwould have asserted that a judge ordered Levy to self-report at his first\ncourt appearance on March 1, and that the Sheriff’s Office had to have\nbeen aware of that order through the court’s use of Odyssey and OMS.\nThe district court, however, excluded Shine’s testimony (as noted above)\nand Levy does not challenge that ruling on appeal.\n\f12 No. 19-1424\n\nthe screenshot also lists dates that accurately describe events\nthat occurred after Levy’s first court appearance. For example,\nthe field “Discharge Date” has “03/03/2016” listed, and at the\nbottom of the page, there is a table that displays “$500 cash”\nas a “Note” on the date of “03/01/2016 00:25.”\n Consequently, it would be unreasonable to infer that this\nscreenshot only depicts information at the time the court had\nentered a code after the first court appearance. Similarly, it\nwould be unreasonable to infer from the presence of a Self-\nReport code amidst this range of dates that the court entered\na Self-Report code after the first court appearance. Moreover,\nin his affidavit, Peterson made the uncontroverted assertion\nthat the OMS screenshot cannot be interpreted to show what\ncode the court entered at Levy’s first appearance. This testi-\nmony and evidence is enough to affirm the district court’s de-\ncision that there was no dispute of material fact as to whether\nthe court entered a Self-Report code after Levy’s first court\nappearance. With that factual issue resolved, we move on to\nwhether the district court properly entered summary judg-\nment for defendants on the Monell claim.\n B. Monell Liability\n Plaintiffs like Levy may sue municipalities under 42 U.S.C.\n§ 1983 when their actions violate the Constitution. See gener-\nally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.\n658 (1978). To prevail on a Monell claim, plaintiffs must iden-\ntify an action taken by the municipality, the requisite degree\nof culpability, and a causal link between the municipality’s\naction and the deprivation of federal rights. Bd. of the Cty.\nCommissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997). A munic-\nipality “acts” through its written policies, widespread prac-\ntices or customs, and the acts of a final decisionmaker. Id. A\n\fNo. 19-1424 13\n\nmunicipality has the requisite degree of culpability if it acts\nwith deliberate indifference to the known or obvious conse-\nquences of its action. Id. at 407.\n The Sheriff’s Office does not dispute that it created a sys-\ntem with the Marion County Superior Courts to process in-\nmates for release utilizing Odyssey, OMS, and the release\nworkflow, which included an agreement that if a court modi-\nfied a release order, court staff would contact the Sheriff’s in-\nmate records staff to notify them of the change. Likewise, the\nSheriff does not challenge the district court’s decision to ana-\nlyze this system as a policy or practice under Monell.\n That said, it is critical to specify the exact policy or practice\nat issue here to properly conduct our analysis. As noted\nabove, the district court discussed Monell as if there were two\npolices in this case—the “Transmittal Policy” and the\n“Change Notification Policy”—when determining whether\nthe Sheriff’s Office had acted with deliberate indifference.\nLevy argues that the two must be treated as one policy for the\npurposes of this appeal, and defendants appear to concede\nthe same.\n A review of the record supports this conclusion. The evi-\ndence suggests that the Sheriff’s Office adopted the Change\nNotification Policy to ensure that it received notice of subse-\nquent orders that may have been otherwise overlooked by the\nexisting Transmittal Policy. Thus, the issue on appeal is\nwhether Levy can establish that the Sheriff’s adoption and use\nof this modified Transmittal Policy constituted deliberate indif-\nference to a substantial risk of detainees’ over-detention and\nwhether that policy’s adoption caused his own over-deten-\ntion.\n\f14 No. 19-1424\n\n For the reasons explained below, we conclude that absent\nevidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known\nthat the modified Transmittal Policy would fail, or failed so\noften that it would obviously result in detainees’ over-deten-\ntion, Levy cannot to show that defendants acted with deliber-\nate indifference.\n Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, Levy posits that\nto establish deliberate indifference, he is not required to show\n“other instances” where the failure to follow the Change No-\ntification Policy caused prolonged detentions. This is so, he\nexplains, because he challenges a “decision to adopt [a] par-\nticular course of action [ ] properly made by that govern-\nment’s authorized decisionmakers,” and that is a sufficient\nbasis to find municipal liability under § 1983. Pembaur v. City\nof Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).\n Levy believes that he has shown the Sheriff’s Office took\nsuch a course of action here because he presented (1) evidence\nthat the Sheriff selected OMS without properly vetting the\nsoftware or considering its consequences; (2) evidence that\nthe Sheriff used OMS despite multiple Marion County judges\nraising concerns about delayed releases and a group of those\njudges endorsing an entirely different software package;\n(3) evidence that the inmate records staff previously failed to\ntimely process release orders entered by courts into Odyssey\nand received through OMS; (4) evidence of integration issues\nfrom the time of OMS’s implementation; and (5) evidence that\nrelease information cannot be properly transmitted between\nOdyssey and OMS.\n Defendants reject much of this evidence as “unproven al-\nlegations” that there were over-detention problems arising\nfrom different scenarios having nothing to do with the inmate\n\fNo. 19-1424 15\n\nrelease policy developed between the courts and the Sheriff’s\nOffice.5 Likewise, defendants believe the district court got it\nright when it cited City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle to support its\nconclusion that Levy needed evidence of other instances of\nthe relevant policy causing constitutional violations. 471 U.S.\n808, 823–24 (1985).\n As an initial matter, we have explained that the “more\nproof” that Tuttle describes is necessary to establish that\n“there is a true municipal policy at issue, not a random event.”\nCalhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005); see also\nThomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\n2010) (“We do not adopt any bright-line rules defining a\n‘widespread custom or practice.’ … But the plaintiff must\ndemonstrate that there is a policy at issue rather than a ran-\ndom event.” (citations omitted)).\n In this case, however, there is no concern that a policy is\nnot at play. In fact, the Sheriff’s Office acknowledged in its\nappellate brief that it “does not challenge the district court’s\ndecision to analyze this release process as a policy or practice\nunder Monell.” Moreover, the record supports Levy’s narra-\ntive that by continuing to use the Transmittal Policy without\nany modification, defendants persistently pursued a course of\naction of selecting and continuing to use a case management\nsystem despite many concerns from stakeholders, numerous\nintegration issues, and an inability to process updated release\n\n 5 Levy is a putative class member in another case pending in the\nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Driver, et\nal. v. The Marion County Sheriff, Case No. 1:14-cv-2076, in which the plain-\ntiffs challenge the Sheriff’s purported policies and practices of holding de-\ntainees for up to seventy-two hours. He submitted experts’ depositions\nand other documents from that litigation to support his claim in this case.\n\f16 No. 19-1424\n\norders from the courts. Thus, if Levy’s detention had occurred\nprior to the Sheriff’s adoption of the Change Notification Pol-\nicy, and he therefore challenged the use of the Transmittal\nPolicy prior to the Change Notification Policy, then there may\nhave been a question for the jury as to deliberate indifference.\n But Levy’s detention occurred after the Sheriff’s Office\ntook steps to address the purported problems with the Trans-\nmittal Policy. Thus, as in Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564\n(7th Cir. 1998), we are faced with the question of whether a\nprison’s use of a system with significant weaknesses can be\nconsidered deliberately indifferent, even after the prison has\ntaken affirmative steps to address those weaknesses.\n In Armstrong, a pretrial detainee asserted that the “will\ncall” policy at the Allen County (Indiana) jail was constitu-\ntionally inadequate because “it display[ed] indifference to the\nrights of those arrested with a civil warrant to a prompt ap-\npearance before a court.” Id. at 577. Specifically, the evidence\nshowed that once the jail put detainees on the will call list, it\ntook absolutely no action to ensure that they were given a\ncourt date and that they were not over-detained. Id. at 577–78.\nAlthough we explicitly noted that “the will call system in\nplace at the time of Armstrong’s arrest and detention …\nseem[ed] to amount to a policy of deliberate indifference,” id.\nat 579, we decided the claim failed because “the jail had a\nbackup plan—of sorts, at least—it accepted formal written\ncomplaints from the detainees.” Id. The existence of this fail-\nsafe “show[ed] an awareness on the part of jail officials that a\ndanger exist[ed] and an attempt to avert an injury from that\ndanger.” Id. Indeed, the “procedure saved the will call system\nfrom being deliberately indifferent.” Id. at 579.\n\fNo. 19-1424 17\n\n The logic of Armstrong applies with equal force here.\nGiven the concerns regarding the Sheriff’s ability to receive\nand act upon court orders processed through OMS, the Sher-\niff’s Office created backup plans to address the limitations of\nits systems. First, it developed the release workflow process\nas part of the Transmittal Policy to ensure that the courts’ or-\nders were properly handled and effected. Second, and most\nimportantly, the Sheriff’s Office developed the Change Noti-\nfication Policy, a modification of the release workflow process\nthat required court officials to call or email the Sheriff with\nany modifications to prior court orders.\n As in Armstrong, these actions “show[ed] an awareness on\nthe part of jail officials that a danger exist[ed] and an attempt\nto avert an injury from that danger.” Consequently, without\nevidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known\nthat these safeguards would fail, or failed so often that they\nwould obviously result in over-detentions, we cannot con-\nclude that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the\nrisk of detainees’ over-detention. Levy’s singular experience\ndoes not support a finding to the contrary.6\n III. Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\ndistrict court.\n\n\n\n\n 6 Because the district court appropriately held that Levy did not pre-\nsent sufficient evidence to show deliberate indifference, we need not ad-\ndress the Sheriff’s argument regarding causation.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Gai Levy v. Marion County Sheriff\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1424\\nGAI LEVY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nMARION COUNTY SHERIFF, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 17-cv-03090 — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Gai Levy brought\\nthis lawsuit against defendants-appellees, the Marion County\\nSheriff and the Consolidated City of Indianapolis and Marion\\nCounty (collectively, “defendants”), alleging constitutional\\nviolations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawfully detaining\\nhim. Levy contends that on two separate occasions defend-\\nants violated orders from a trial court to release him from cus-\\ntody. In particular, he asserts that the policies and practices\\n\\f2 No. 19-1424\\n\\ndefendants used to communicate with the courts about indi-\\nvidual defendants led to his prolonged detention. Defendants\\nmoved for summary judgment on Levy’s § 1983 claims. The\\ndistrict court granted their motion. We affirm.\\n I. Background\\n Before diving into the specifics of this case, it is helpful to\\nunderstand how the Marion County Sheriff’s Office receives\\ninformation from the Marion County Superior Courts and\\nhow the Sheriff’s Office then executes those court orders. The\\ncourts and the Sheriff use two different systems for their case\\nmanagement needs. The courts’ system is called Odyssey and\\nthe Sheriff’s is called Offender Management System (OMS).\\nBoth systems use event codes to indicate a court’s order, but\\nintegration between the two systems since their adoption in\\n2014 has proven challenging, given the systems’ difficulty\\ncommunicating with each other. To remedy this problem, the\\nInformation Services Agency for the Consolidated City of In-\\ndianapolis and Marion County developed a special data ex-\\nchange system to ensure the transfer of data from the courts\\nto the Sheriff’s Office.\\n This solution was imperfect. For example, when a court\\nordered a detainee released subject to placement at Marion\\nCounty Community Corrections (MCCC), the court could en-\\nter an “ORC” code (the “Self-Report code”), which directed\\nthe Sheriff to release the detainee from custody so he could\\nself-report to MCCC on his own. Alternatively, the court\\ncould enter an “SBDOA” code (the “Direct Transfer code”),\\nwhich instructed the Sheriff to maintain the detainee in cus-\\ntody until he could be directly transported to MCCC for pro-\\ncessing and release. After the Sheriff received either a Self-Re-\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 3\\n\\nport or Direct Transfer code, it placed the detainee in the “re-\\nlease workflow.” The release workflow was a process\\nwhereby the Sheriff’s Office automatically generated a list of\\ndetainees for whom the court had entered release codes. After\\nthat, the Sheriff’s inmate records staff reviewed the list to ver-\\nify that each detainee was eligible to be released immediately\\nor transferred for release. Once they completed the verifica-\\ntion process, the inmate records staff removed the detainee\\nfrom the release workflow.\\n Because the release workflow could not automatically\\nprocess updated release orders, problems arose when the\\ncourts modified an order as to a detainee who had already\\ncleared the process. The Sheriff’s Office knew of this flaw and\\nhad reached an agreement with the courts to have court staff\\ncontact the Sheriff’s inmate records staff any time there was a\\nsubsequent order in the same case to ensure that the Sheriff’s\\nOffice was operating with the most current information. It is\\nundisputed that if court staff did not notify the Sheriff’s Office\\nabout such updates or modifications, the Sheriff would pro-\\ncess a detainee based on the original release order it received.\\n With that context in mind, we turn our focus to Levy’s\\ncase. The Sheriff’s Office took custody of Levy after his arrest\\non an outstanding warrant on February 29, 2016. The parties\\nagree that Levy remained in the Sheriff’s custody until March\\n3, 2016, when it transferred him to MCCC. (MCCC released\\nLevy later that same day.) Beyond that basic timeline, though,\\nthe parties disagree about when the Sheriff’s Office received\\nan order from the court to release Levy.\\n\\f4 No. 19-1424\\n\\n According to Levy, the judge at his first court appearance\\nordered him released on his own recognizance, and because\\nthe Sheriff’s Office did not immediately release him after that\\norder, Levy argues that the Sheriff unlawfully detained him.\\nTo support his version of events, Levy points to this screen-\\nshot of his case file in OMS, which he contends shows that\\nofficer Roberto Juan Rodrigues entered “Order To Release\\nFrom Custody” as the “Court Event” on February 29, 2016, at\\n23:50:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n The Sheriff’s Office, however, asserts that the judge or-\\ndered that the Sheriff keep Levy in custody until he could be\\ntransferred directly to MCCC; it was not until Levy’s second\\ncourt appearance on March 2, 2016, that a different judge or-\\ndered Levy to self-report to MCCC. By that time, the Sheriff\\nasserts, the inmate records staff had already finished pro-\\ncessing Levy through its release workflow. It is undisputed\\nthat no one at the court called or emailed the Sheriff’s Office\\nabout the second order, and therefore, that the Sheriff never\\nreceived notice of the second order. Ultimately, the Sheriff’s\\nOffice processed Levy and kept him in custody until March 3,\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 5\\n\\n2016. To support their version of the timeline, defendants di-\\nrect our attention to the certified copy of the Case Summary\\nin Levy’s case, which shows that the court entered a Direct\\nTransfer code on March 1, 2016, but later entered a Self-Report\\ncode on March 2, 2016:\\n\\f6 No. 19-1424\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Levy consequently alleged claims against defendants for\\nunreasonable seizure and detention under the Fourth\\nAmendment and deprivation of liberty without due process\\nunder the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Levy insists\\nthat the Sheriff’s Office “instituted and maintained unreason-\\nable policies and practices that resulted in its keeping [him]\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 7\\n\\ndetained … after [he] had been ordered released by the Court\\nand/or after legal authority for [his] detention had ceased.”\\n Defendants moved for summary judgment on October 4,\\n2018, and they moved to exclude the testimony of Levy’s ex-\\npert on December 10, 2018. The district court granted both\\nmotions on February 11, 2019.1 Regarding the motion for sum-\\nmary judgment, the district court first held that Levy’s Four-\\nteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim could not pro-\\nceed because “the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process\\nClause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial detention.”\\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019) (first\\nciting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017); then\\nciting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018)).\\n As to whether Levy had raised any genuine disputes of\\nmaterial fact for a jury to resolve on his Fourth Amendment\\nclaim, the court first explained that it understood Levy to be\\nchallenging two policies or practices: (1) the use of Odyssey\\nand OMS to transmit release codes from the Marion County\\nSuperior Courts to the Sheriff’s Office (the “Transmittal Pol-\\nicy”);2 and (2) the practice of requiring court staff to contact\\nthe Sheriff when a release order had been modified (the\\n“Change Notification Policy”). Because the court found it was\\nundisputed that the Sheriff’s Office did not receive notice of\\nthe Self-Report code before it released Levy, the court held the\\nSheriff’s use of the Transmittal Policy alone could not have\\n\\n\\n 1 Levy does not appeal the district court’s decision to exclude his ex-\\npert.\\n 2 Although the district court did not explicitly say as much, we assume\\n\\nthat the Transmittal Policy also includes the Sheriff’s adoption and use of\\nthe release workflow.\\n\\f8 No. 19-1424\\n\\ncaused Levy’s harm. In considering the Change Notification\\nPolicy, the court considered four different time frames:\\n 1. The time between Levy’s arrest and the entry of a\\n code on March 1, 2016 at 12:25 AM after his first\\n court appearance.\\n 2. The time between the entry of the first code and the\\n entry of the second code on March 2, 2016 at 2:15\\n PM after his second court appearance.\\n\\n 3. The time between the entry of the second code and\\n his transfer to MCCC on March 3, 2016 at 1:35 PM.\\n 4. The time between his transfer to MCCC and his re-\\n lease from MCCC on March 3, 2016 at 7:30 PM.\\n The court emphasized that Levy did not challenge the\\nSheriff’s authority to detain him during the first or fourth time\\nperiods; rather, Levy’s complaint concerned the second and\\nthird time periods alone. In considering the second time pe-\\nriod, the court reasoned that because Levy did not produce\\nany evidence to contradict the Case Summary, which showed\\nthat the court had ordered Levy released “Upon Satisfaction\\nof Bond, Party Held For Other Agency” and listed “commu-\\nnity corrections” at the first court appearance, it followed that\\nthe Sheriff had the legal authority to detain Levy during that\\ntime period and thus his detention did not violate the Fourth\\nAmendment.\\n Turning to the third time period, the court noted that de-\\nfendants acknowledged that the failure of the Change Notifi-\\ncation Policy caused Levy’s detention during this time period,\\nbut the court underscored that because Levy did not produce\\nevidence of other individuals being over-detained for the\\nsame reasons, Levy could not establish that defendants had\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 9\\n\\nadopted a policy or practice of deliberate indifference; there-\\nfore, this time period could not serve as the basis of his claim\\neither.\\n Levy now appeals.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary\\njudgment de novo, interpreting all facts and drawing all rea-\\nsonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. O’Brien\\nv. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2018). “Summary\\njudgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of\\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-\\nter of law.” Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Summary judg-\\nment is inappropriate “if the evidence is such that a reasona-\\nble jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” An-\\nderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may\\naffirm the entry of summary judgment on any ground sup-\\nported in the record, so long as the moving party adequately\\npresented the issue in the district court and the non-moving\\nparty had an opportunity to contest it. O’Brien, 900 F.3d at 928.\\n A. Dispute of Material Fact\\n One of the issues Levy raises on appeal is the district\\ncourt’s finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that the\\nSheriff received a Self-Report code after his first court appear-\\nance. Levy focuses on the evidence he submitted to the district\\ncourt, namely a screenshot of his case file in OMS, which he\\nargues shows that officer Roberto Juan Rodrigues entered\\n“Order To Release From Custody” as the “Court Event” on\\n\\f10 No. 19-1424\\n\\nFebruary 29, 2016, at 23:50.3 Levy contends that the district\\ncourt dismissed his characterization of the screenshot in favor\\nof the explanation given by the Sheriff’s Chief Information Of-\\nficer, Derek Peterson, in his affidavit. Peterson asserted that\\nthe screenshot did not show what code the court entered at\\nLevy’s first court appearance, but that the certified copy of the\\nCase Summary did contain that information, and that record\\nshowed an entry of “Upon Satisfaction of Bond, Party Held\\nfor Other Agency” on March 1, 2016, which would have\\nprompted a Direct Transfer code, not a Self-Report code.\\n By favoring Peterson’s interpretation of the OMS screen-\\nshot over Levy’s, the court, in Levy’s view, made an imper-\\nmissible credibility determination. Levy maintains that, in\\nany event, the certified Case Summary does not conclusively\\nrefute his argument about an initial Self-Report code because\\nit incorrectly states that Levy’s arrest was on March 1, 2016;\\naccordingly, a jury could reasonably infer from that discrep-\\nancy that the Case Summary is neither infallible nor disposi-\\ntive as to the court’s order regarding Levy’s first appearance.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Levy’s lawyer attached the screenshot to a declaration filed in oppo-\\n\\nsition to the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, defend-\\nants make several admissibility challenges to Levy’s reliance on the OMS\\nscreenshot. But by raising those issues for the first time on appeal, defend-\\nants have forfeited those arguments. See Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 231\\nF.3d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[H]er attack on the admissibility of the\\naffidavit is waived because she failed to raise it in the district court.”); see\\nalso Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, Inc., 658 F.3d 760, 770 (7th Cir.\\n2011) (“To preserve an evidentiary objection for appeal, a party must make\\na ‘timely objection or motion to strike … stating the specific ground of ob-\\njection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.’” (quot-\\ning Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1))).\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 11\\n\\n Defendants respond by highlighting that Levy has not\\npresented any evidence to controvert Peterson’s testimony\\nabout the meaning of the OMS screenshot.4 Consequently, de-\\nfendants insist that there is no dispute of fact as to the central\\nquestion in this case—whether the court actually ordered the\\nSheriff to release Levy to self-report to the MCCC after his\\nfirst court appearance. According to defendants, there is no\\ndispute that the OMS screenshot does not support Levy’s ar-\\ngument that the Sheriff’s Office received an order to immedi-\\nately release Levy to self-report to the MCCC after his first\\ncourt appearance. And because the Case Summary supports\\ndefendants’ contention that the Sheriff received an order to\\nhold Levy at the MCCC after his first court appearance, de-\\nfendants urge us to affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n If the issue on appeal were simply one of dueling docu-\\nments and the district court had picked defendants’ asserted\\nfacts over Levy’s, that act would constitute reversible error.\\nHere, however, there are no such dueling documents. Both\\nthe OMS screenshot and the Case Summary contain many\\ndates and codes. The OMS screenshot lists “Order To Release\\nFrom Custody” next to the field “Court Event,” but there are\\nalso dates listed: the field “Notification Made On” has\\n“03/01/2016” listed, the field “Effective Date” has\\n“02/29/2016” listed, and the field “Date/Time Added” has\\n“02/29/2016 23:50” listed. To make matters more confusing,\\n\\n\\n 4 Levy had attempted to present an expert witness, Alison Shine, who\\n\\nwould have asserted that a judge ordered Levy to self-report at his first\\ncourt appearance on March 1, and that the Sheriff’s Office had to have\\nbeen aware of that order through the court’s use of Odyssey and OMS.\\nThe district court, however, excluded Shine’s testimony (as noted above)\\nand Levy does not challenge that ruling on appeal.\\n\\f12 No. 19-1424\\n\\nthe screenshot also lists dates that accurately describe events\\nthat occurred after Levy’s first court appearance. For example,\\nthe field “Discharge Date” has “03/03/2016” listed, and at the\\nbottom of the page, there is a table that displays “$500 cash”\\nas a “Note” on the date of “03/01/2016 00:25.”\\n Consequently, it would be unreasonable to infer that this\\nscreenshot only depicts information at the time the court had\\nentered a code after the first court appearance. Similarly, it\\nwould be unreasonable to infer from the presence of a Self-\\nReport code amidst this range of dates that the court entered\\na Self-Report code after the first court appearance. Moreover,\\nin his affidavit, Peterson made the uncontroverted assertion\\nthat the OMS screenshot cannot be interpreted to show what\\ncode the court entered at Levy’s first appearance. This testi-\\nmony and evidence is enough to affirm the district court’s de-\\ncision that there was no dispute of material fact as to whether\\nthe court entered a Self-Report code after Levy’s first court\\nappearance. With that factual issue resolved, we move on to\\nwhether the district court properly entered summary judg-\\nment for defendants on the Monell claim.\\n B. Monell Liability\\n Plaintiffs like Levy may sue municipalities under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983 when their actions violate the Constitution. See gener-\\nally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.\\n658 (1978). To prevail on a Monell claim, plaintiffs must iden-\\ntify an action taken by the municipality, the requisite degree\\nof culpability, and a causal link between the municipality’s\\naction and the deprivation of federal rights. Bd. of the Cty.\\nCommissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997). A munic-\\nipality “acts” through its written policies, widespread prac-\\ntices or customs, and the acts of a final decisionmaker. Id. A\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 13\\n\\nmunicipality has the requisite degree of culpability if it acts\\nwith deliberate indifference to the known or obvious conse-\\nquences of its action. Id. at 407.\\n The Sheriff’s Office does not dispute that it created a sys-\\ntem with the Marion County Superior Courts to process in-\\nmates for release utilizing Odyssey, OMS, and the release\\nworkflow, which included an agreement that if a court modi-\\nfied a release order, court staff would contact the Sheriff’s in-\\nmate records staff to notify them of the change. Likewise, the\\nSheriff does not challenge the district court’s decision to ana-\\nlyze this system as a policy or practice under Monell.\\n That said, it is critical to specify the exact policy or practice\\nat issue here to properly conduct our analysis. As noted\\nabove, the district court discussed Monell as if there were two\\npolices in this case—the “Transmittal Policy” and the\\n“Change Notification Policy”—when determining whether\\nthe Sheriff’s Office had acted with deliberate indifference.\\nLevy argues that the two must be treated as one policy for the\\npurposes of this appeal, and defendants appear to concede\\nthe same.\\n A review of the record supports this conclusion. The evi-\\ndence suggests that the Sheriff’s Office adopted the Change\\nNotification Policy to ensure that it received notice of subse-\\nquent orders that may have been otherwise overlooked by the\\nexisting Transmittal Policy. Thus, the issue on appeal is\\nwhether Levy can establish that the Sheriff’s adoption and use\\nof this modified Transmittal Policy constituted deliberate indif-\\nference to a substantial risk of detainees’ over-detention and\\nwhether that policy’s adoption caused his own over-deten-\\ntion.\\n\\f14 No. 19-1424\\n\\n For the reasons explained below, we conclude that absent\\nevidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known\\nthat the modified Transmittal Policy would fail, or failed so\\noften that it would obviously result in detainees’ over-deten-\\ntion, Levy cannot to show that defendants acted with deliber-\\nate indifference.\\n Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, Levy posits that\\nto establish deliberate indifference, he is not required to show\\n“other instances” where the failure to follow the Change No-\\ntification Policy caused prolonged detentions. This is so, he\\nexplains, because he challenges a “decision to adopt [a] par-\\nticular course of action [ ] properly made by that govern-\\nment’s authorized decisionmakers,” and that is a sufficient\\nbasis to find municipal liability under § 1983. Pembaur v. City\\nof Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).\\n Levy believes that he has shown the Sheriff’s Office took\\nsuch a course of action here because he presented (1) evidence\\nthat the Sheriff selected OMS without properly vetting the\\nsoftware or considering its consequences; (2) evidence that\\nthe Sheriff used OMS despite multiple Marion County judges\\nraising concerns about delayed releases and a group of those\\njudges endorsing an entirely different software package;\\n(3) evidence that the inmate records staff previously failed to\\ntimely process release orders entered by courts into Odyssey\\nand received through OMS; (4) evidence of integration issues\\nfrom the time of OMS’s implementation; and (5) evidence that\\nrelease information cannot be properly transmitted between\\nOdyssey and OMS.\\n Defendants reject much of this evidence as “unproven al-\\nlegations” that there were over-detention problems arising\\nfrom different scenarios having nothing to do with the inmate\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 15\\n\\nrelease policy developed between the courts and the Sheriff’s\\nOffice.5 Likewise, defendants believe the district court got it\\nright when it cited City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle to support its\\nconclusion that Levy needed evidence of other instances of\\nthe relevant policy causing constitutional violations. 471 U.S.\\n808, 823–24 (1985).\\n As an initial matter, we have explained that the “more\\nproof” that Tuttle describes is necessary to establish that\\n“there is a true municipal policy at issue, not a random event.”\\nCalhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005); see also\\nThomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2010) (“We do not adopt any bright-line rules defining a\\n‘widespread custom or practice.’ … But the plaintiff must\\ndemonstrate that there is a policy at issue rather than a ran-\\ndom event.” (citations omitted)).\\n In this case, however, there is no concern that a policy is\\nnot at play. In fact, the Sheriff’s Office acknowledged in its\\nappellate brief that it “does not challenge the district court’s\\ndecision to analyze this release process as a policy or practice\\nunder Monell.” Moreover, the record supports Levy’s narra-\\ntive that by continuing to use the Transmittal Policy without\\nany modification, defendants persistently pursued a course of\\naction of selecting and continuing to use a case management\\nsystem despite many concerns from stakeholders, numerous\\nintegration issues, and an inability to process updated release\\n\\n 5 Levy is a putative class member in another case pending in the\\nUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Driver, et\\nal. v. The Marion County Sheriff, Case No. 1:14-cv-2076, in which the plain-\\ntiffs challenge the Sheriff’s purported policies and practices of holding de-\\ntainees for up to seventy-two hours. He submitted experts’ depositions\\nand other documents from that litigation to support his claim in this case.\\n\\f16 No. 19-1424\\n\\norders from the courts. Thus, if Levy’s detention had occurred\\nprior to the Sheriff’s adoption of the Change Notification Pol-\\nicy, and he therefore challenged the use of the Transmittal\\nPolicy prior to the Change Notification Policy, then there may\\nhave been a question for the jury as to deliberate indifference.\\n But Levy’s detention occurred after the Sheriff’s Office\\ntook steps to address the purported problems with the Trans-\\nmittal Policy. Thus, as in Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564\\n(7th Cir. 1998), we are faced with the question of whether a\\nprison’s use of a system with significant weaknesses can be\\nconsidered deliberately indifferent, even after the prison has\\ntaken affirmative steps to address those weaknesses.\\n In Armstrong, a pretrial detainee asserted that the “will\\ncall” policy at the Allen County (Indiana) jail was constitu-\\ntionally inadequate because “it display[ed] indifference to the\\nrights of those arrested with a civil warrant to a prompt ap-\\npearance before a court.” Id. at 577. Specifically, the evidence\\nshowed that once the jail put detainees on the will call list, it\\ntook absolutely no action to ensure that they were given a\\ncourt date and that they were not over-detained. Id. at 577–78.\\nAlthough we explicitly noted that “the will call system in\\nplace at the time of Armstrong’s arrest and detention …\\nseem[ed] to amount to a policy of deliberate indifference,” id.\\nat 579, we decided the claim failed because “the jail had a\\nbackup plan—of sorts, at least—it accepted formal written\\ncomplaints from the detainees.” Id. The existence of this fail-\\nsafe “show[ed] an awareness on the part of jail officials that a\\ndanger exist[ed] and an attempt to avert an injury from that\\ndanger.” Id. Indeed, the “procedure saved the will call system\\nfrom being deliberately indifferent.” Id. at 579.\\n\\fNo. 19-1424 17\\n\\n The logic of Armstrong applies with equal force here.\\nGiven the concerns regarding the Sheriff’s ability to receive\\nand act upon court orders processed through OMS, the Sher-\\niff’s Office created backup plans to address the limitations of\\nits systems. First, it developed the release workflow process\\nas part of the Transmittal Policy to ensure that the courts’ or-\\nders were properly handled and effected. Second, and most\\nimportantly, the Sheriff’s Office developed the Change Noti-\\nfication Policy, a modification of the release workflow process\\nthat required court officials to call or email the Sheriff with\\nany modifications to prior court orders.\\n As in Armstrong, these actions “show[ed] an awareness on\\nthe part of jail officials that a danger exist[ed] and an attempt\\nto avert an injury from that danger.” Consequently, without\\nevidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known\\nthat these safeguards would fail, or failed so often that they\\nwould obviously result in over-detentions, we cannot con-\\nclude that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the\\nrisk of detainees’ over-detention. Levy’s singular experience\\ndoes not support a finding to the contrary.6\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Because the district court appropriately held that Levy did not pre-\\nsent sufficient evidence to show deliberate indifference, we need not ad-\\ndress the Sheriff’s argument regarding causation.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4679,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670860,"string":"4,670,860"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. David Holly"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1216"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1216\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDAVID HOLLY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00485-1 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Unreasonable seizures violate the\\nFourth Amendment while voluntary encounters with the po-\\nlice do not. This case implicates the dividing line. A police of-\\nficer rushed to approach David Holly in Chicago’s Altgeld\\nGardens Housing Complex and asked if he had a gun. Holly\\nanswered yes, which resulted in his arrest and subsequent\\nconviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Holly\\nlater moved to suppress the gun, contending that the officer’s\\n\\f2 No. 19-1216\\n\\napproach and questioning constituted an impermissible sei-\\nzure. The district court denied that motion after finding that\\nHolly consented to the encounter. We agree and affirm. In the\\ntotality of circumstances, Holly’s interaction with police fell\\non the voluntary side of the line.\\n I\\n A\\n On December 31, 2015, Officers Robert Caulfield and Jo-\\nseph Byrne of the Chicago Police Department were patrolling\\nthe Altgeld Gardens Housing Complex, a public housing pro-\\nject in the city’s far south side. The officers were in uniform\\nand on patrol as part of a CPD effort to increase police visibil-\\nity in anticipation of celebratory gunfire to usher in the new\\nyear. They drove an unmarked black Ford, which Officer\\nByrne later testified locals recognized as a police car. While\\nsitting in the car, Officers Byrne and Caulfield saw David\\nHolly walking on a sidewalk inside a courtyard of the com-\\nplex.\\n The parties dispute what happened next, but all agree that\\nthe police approached Holly in the courtyard and asked him\\nif he had a gun. Holly immediately said yes. The police then\\nconfiscated the gun and arrested him. A grand jury later in-\\ndicted Holly for possessing a firearm following a prior felony\\nconviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to\\nsuppress the gun, arguing that his encounter with the police\\nwas an impermissible seizure. He also moved to dismiss the\\nindictment, contending that the police’s failure to preserve\\nvideo footage of his arrest and activity leading to it violated\\nhis due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\\n(1963). The district court held a hearing on both issues and\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 3\\n\\nheard competing testimony from Holly and the police. It then\\ndenied Holly’s motions.\\n The testimony from the hearing frames the issues on ap-\\npeal. The officers testified that they had entered a parking lot\\nin Altgeld Gardens to get a better view of the interior court-\\nyard, which Officer Byrne considered a high-crime area based\\non arrests he had made there before. Around 4:00 p.m., Officer\\nByrne saw Holly walking on a sidewalk toward the police car.\\nOfficer Byrne said that as Holly neared the car, he made eye\\ncontact with the officers, formed a surprised and anxious\\nlook, and then turned sharply and walked swiftly in another\\ndirection, ultimately making his way behind a building and\\nout of the officers’ sight. Both officers testified that Officer\\nCaulfield then jogged after Holly and found him inside the\\ncourtyard, standing outside an apartment door and ringing\\nthe doorbell. (An occupant later told the officers she did not\\nknow Holly.)\\n Officer Caulfield said that he identified himself as police\\nand asked Holly a single question: Do you have drugs or a\\ngun? Yes, Holly replied, he had a gun in his pocket. Officer\\nCaulfield took the gun and from there turned Holly toward a\\nwall to arrest him. By then Officer Byrne had reached the\\napartment and assisted Officer Caulfield by handcuffing\\nHolly. Both officers testified that at no point did they draw\\ntheir own guns or touch Holly before placing him under ar-\\nrest. A third officer, Raul Casales, responded to a backup call\\nand met Officers Caulfield and Byrne about 15 to 20 seconds\\nafter Holly’s arrest. Officer Casales testified that he had\\ndrawn his gun but never pointed it at Holly.\\n Holly offered a starkly different account. He testified that\\nhe never saw the police car or made eye contact with any\\n\\f4 No. 19-1216\\n\\nofficer before being stopped and handcuffed. Holly instead\\nstated that he was ringing a friend’s doorbell when he saw\\nOfficer Caulfield run around the corner and approach him\\nwith his gun drawn. According to Holly, Officer Caulfield\\nthen demanded that he put his hands up, grabbed him, and\\ntold him he was being stopped because there were burglaries\\nin the neighborhood. Holly added that he did not feel free to\\nleave because he had lived in the neighborhood for decades\\nand knew the police stops there to be aggressive. Holly also\\ndiverged from the officers’ accounts regarding the sequence\\nof events surrounding his arrest. He insisted that Officer Caul-\\nfield patted him down, found a bulge, and only then asked if\\nhe had a gun. By the time Officer Byrne arrived, Holly contin-\\nued, Officer Caulfield had confiscated the gun and put his\\nown gun away.\\n After considering the competing testimony, the district\\ncourt credited the officers’ testimony. The district court ex-\\nplained that the accounts of Officers Caulfield, Byrne, and\\nCasales were consistent with each other. The district court\\nnoted that the officers’ testimony made more sense than\\nHolly’s, observing in particular that the police do not typi-\\ncally draw their weapons on an unarmed offender or at close\\nrange. By contrast, the district court found Holly less credible\\ngiven his criminal history and the fact that he had offered\\nthree shifting explanations for why he had a gun. Having\\ncredited the officers’ accounts, the district court then con-\\ncluded that Holly’s encounter with the police was consensual\\nand denied his motion to suppress.\\n B\\n The district court also heard testimony about Holly’s sec-\\nond claim on appeal—that he was denied due process when\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 5\\n\\nthe police failed to preserve a video taken near his arrest. On\\nthis score, the facts are straightforward and unfortunate.\\n Immediately after Holly’s arrest, Detective Peter Scatena\\nand Officers Byrne and Caulfield reviewed a video from the\\nonly nearby camera that captured what transpired. Detective\\nScatena then called Carlos Mackie, an analyst with the Chi-\\ncago Housing Authority, to request a copy of the video. When\\nMackie did not answer, Detective Scatena left a voicemail\\n(consistent with CPD protocol). What Detective Scatena did\\nnot know was that Mackie was on military leave and out of\\nthe office for an extended period. He never heard back from\\nMackie, followed up on the voicemail, or sought the video\\nsome other way. And because CHA cameras automatically re-\\nwrite footage after 15 to 30 days, the video taken near Holly’s\\narrest was eventually overwritten and thus no longer availa-\\nble.\\n The district court heard conflicting testimony of what the\\nvideo revealed before it was overwritten. For his part, Detec-\\ntive Scatena testified that the footage showed Holly in the\\ncourtyard walking at a hurried pace with two CPD officers\\nfollowing “side by side” in the same direction. (Recall that Of-\\nficers Byrne and Caulfield had testified that Officer Caulfield\\npursued Holly ahead of Officer Byrne.) Detective Scatena also\\nstated that the video did not show Holly after he was hand-\\ncuffed. By contrast, Officer Byrne testified that the video only\\ndepicted Officer Caulfield standing near Holly after he was\\nhandcuffed—not the events leading up to the arrest.\\n While these accounts differed, the district court found the\\ninconsistencies minor and understandable given the passage\\nof time and the number of arrests that the police make in the\\nordinary course. The district court underscored that no one\\n\\f6 No. 19-1216\\n\\nwho watched the video (before it was overwritten) testified\\nthat it depicted Holly’s arrest. Because Holly had not estab-\\nlished that the video was potentially exculpatory or that the\\npolice acted in bad faith by failing to preserve it, the court de-\\nnied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of a due\\nprocess violation.\\n The ensuing bench trial resulted in Holly’s conviction of\\nunlawful gun possession. The district court then sentenced\\nHolly to 90 months’ imprisonment and imposed 36 months’\\nsupervised release.\\n II\\n A\\n Not every police encounter implicates the Fourth Amend-\\nment. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)). A sei-\\nzure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes\\nplace if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would\\nnot feel free to leave. Id. A consensual encounter, on the other\\nhand, takes place if a reasonable person would feel free to ig-\\nnore the police and go about his business. Id.\\n In determining whether an encounter is consensual, we\\nconsider several factors:\\n where the interaction took place, including\\n whether it was in public;\\n how many police officers were present;\\n the extent to which the police presence was\\n threatening;\\n whether the officers made any show of\\n weapons or physical force;\\n the officers’ language and tone;\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 7\\n\\n whether the police suggested the defendant\\n was suspected of crime; and\\n whether officers told the defendant he was\\n free to leave.\\nSee id. These factors “are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.”\\nUnited States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\\nUnited States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).\\n B\\n We agree with the district court that Holly’s encounter\\nwith the police was voluntary. It is undisputed that the police\\nspoke to Holly in public and never stopped him, redirected\\nhis route, or otherwise obstructed his walking on the sidewalk\\nor through the courtyard. Officer Caulfield approached Holly\\nand put a question to him—do you have drugs or a gun?—\\nthat he immediately chose to answer. See Florida v. Royer, 460\\nU.S. 491, 497 (1983) (explaining that the police do not violate\\nthe Fourth Amendment by merely approaching a person in\\npublic and asking him questions); see also Shields, 789 F.3d at\\n743–44.\\n The district court’s other findings, which Holly has not\\nshown are clearly erroneous, support its conclusion that the\\nencounter was consensual. The district court reasonably cred-\\nited the officers’ accounts over Holly’s. It found Holly’s testi-\\nmony strained and implausible: he was a four-time convicted\\nfelon, had an incentive to lie to escape punishment, and in the\\ncourse of proceedings, offered three inconsistent explanations\\nfor why he had a gun. By contrast, the district court found that\\nthe officers had no incentive at the time of the incident to en-\\ngage in misconduct (as they likely believed everything was\\nbeing captured on camera) and no incentive to lie in their\\n\\f8 No. 19-1216\\n\\ntestimony after the fact. Considering each party’s position\\nand taking stock of their comparative credibility, the district\\ncourt was on solid footing in crediting the officers’ version of\\nevents. See United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir.\\n2007) (emphasizing that a district court’s determination of\\nwitness credibility “can virtually never be clear error”).\\n Against this backdrop, the district court concluded that\\nHolly’s encounter with the police was voluntary. It found that\\nOfficer Caulfield was alone when he jogged after Holly and\\nmade no show of force—he did not pull a gun, touch Holly,\\nor tell him to put his hands up. Rather, upon catching up with\\nHolly, Officer Caulfield promptly asked a direct question—\\ndo you have drugs or a gun?—and instantly received an\\nequally direct answer—yes. The question was not advanced\\nin a coercive tone or with an accompanying threat. Given\\nthese circumstances, a reasonable person in Holly’s shoes\\nwould have felt free to leave. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439;\\nUnited States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2006)\\n(holding that an encounter was consensual where three offic-\\ners approached a defendant in public and did not show weap-\\nons, touch him, or use a tone or language that would have\\ncommunicated to the defendant that he was seized).\\n Holly disagrees. He sees this case on all fours with our de-\\ncision in United States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2015).\\nThere Dontray Smith was walking alone at night when two\\narmed and uniformed police officers waited for him to enter\\nan alley. Id. at 684. The officers then rode their bicycles past\\nSmith into the alley and made a U-turn to face him, obstruct-\\ning his path forward. Id. at 685. From there one officer stepped\\noff his bike, approached Smith with his hand on his gun, and\\n“posed a single, accusatory question to Smith: ‘Are you in\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 9\\n\\npossession of any guns, knives, weapons, or anything ille-\\ngal?’” Id. Considering the location, the threatening presence\\nof multiple officers, the aggressive nature of the questioning,\\nand the fact that the police blocked Smith’s path, we con-\\ncluded that the encounter constituted a seizure. Id.\\n Holly is right that in both cases the police were in uniform,\\napproached the defendant, and asked about a gun. But the\\nsimilarities end there. The district court found that a single\\nofficer spoke with Holly in an open courtyard in the after-\\nnoon. Unlike the police in Smith, Officer Caulfield did not\\nblock Holly’s path or draw his weapon, and the tone of his\\nquestion did not compel an answer.\\n No doubt that line-drawing in this area of law is difficult\\nand requires a careful parsing of exactly what took place be-\\ntween the police and the accused. But “[i]t is well established\\nthat a seizure does not occur merely because a police officer\\napproaches an individual and asks him or her questions.” Id.\\nat 684. The district court proceeded carefully by holding a\\nhearing, considering the competing testimony, assessing\\ncredibility, and ultimately finding that Officer Caulfield ap-\\nproached Holly and asked him a question—nothing more.\\nUnder these circumstances, Holly’s encounter with the police\\nwas voluntary.\\n III\\n Holly also renews his argument in the name of Brady v.\\nMaryland that the police violated his due process rights by\\nfailing to preserve CHA video footage of the arrest and events\\nleading to it. We start from a different legal marker. The\\nproper framework for evaluating Holly’s claim comes not\\nfrom Brady, but rather from Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51\\n\\f10 No. 19-1216\\n\\n(1988). While Brady requires that the government disclose ev-\\nidence materially favorable to the defendant “irrespective of\\nthe good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” see 373 U.S. at\\n87, Holly’s claim is that the police failed to preserve only po-\\ntentially exculpatory evidence.\\n Under Youngblood, the police’s failure to preserve poten-\\ntially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due pro-\\ncess unless the defendant can show that the police acted in\\nbad faith. See 488 U.S. at 58. That standard requires proof of\\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence\\nand turns on an official’s subjective knowledge that the evi-\\ndence had exculpatory value. See United States v. Cherry, 920\\nF.3d 1126, 1140 (7th Cir. 2019). In addition to bad faith, the\\ndefendant must show that the exculpatory nature of the evi-\\ndence was apparent before its destruction and that he could\\nnot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See id.\\n Holly has not made these necessary showings. Detective\\nScatena made a clear effort to preserve the video: he left a\\nvoicemail requesting the video from the CHA and did so in\\naccordance with CPD policy. Detective Scatena did not know\\nthat the analyst he contacted was on military leave. His failure\\nto follow up may have been negligent, but it does not prove\\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress the video. And mere\\nnegligence by police does not amount to a constitutional vio-\\nlation. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.\\n Nor has Holly shown that the lost video had apparent ex-\\nculpatory value. Detective Scatena and Officers Byrne and\\nCaulfield each testified that the video did not show the actual\\narrest. Their testimony was consistent on this score, leading\\nthe district court to find that the video did not show the initial\\nencounter between Holly and the police and thus that any\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 11\\n\\nfootage “was neither exculpatory nor inculpatory.” On these\\nfacts, the district court correctly concluded that the police did\\nnot violate Holly’s due process rights under Youngblood.\\n To be sure, the failure of the police to preserve the video is\\nunfortunate. Mistakes happen, though, and that is all we can\\nsay occurred here. But in closing it does seem prudent to offer\\nthe limited observation that CPD would do well to revisit its\\npreservation protocol—all to protect the interests of CPD it-\\nself, citizens, and those like Holly who find themselves\\ncharged with crime.\\n Seeing no violation of Holly’s rights here, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448113/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670860/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. David Holly\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1216\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nDAVID HOLLY,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:16-cr-00485-1 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Unreasonable seizures violate the\nFourth Amendment while voluntary encounters with the po-\nlice do not. This case implicates the dividing line. A police of-\nficer rushed to approach David Holly in Chicago’s Altgeld\nGardens Housing Complex and asked if he had a gun. Holly\nanswered yes, which resulted in his arrest and subsequent\nconviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Holly\nlater moved to suppress the gun, contending that the officer’s\n\f2 No. 19-1216\n\napproach and questioning constituted an impermissible sei-\nzure. The district court denied that motion after finding that\nHolly consented to the encounter. We agree and affirm. In the\ntotality of circumstances, Holly’s interaction with police fell\non the voluntary side of the line.\n I\n A\n On December 31, 2015, Officers Robert Caulfield and Jo-\nseph Byrne of the Chicago Police Department were patrolling\nthe Altgeld Gardens Housing Complex, a public housing pro-\nject in the city’s far south side. The officers were in uniform\nand on patrol as part of a CPD effort to increase police visibil-\nity in anticipation of celebratory gunfire to usher in the new\nyear. They drove an unmarked black Ford, which Officer\nByrne later testified locals recognized as a police car. While\nsitting in the car, Officers Byrne and Caulfield saw David\nHolly walking on a sidewalk inside a courtyard of the com-\nplex.\n The parties dispute what happened next, but all agree that\nthe police approached Holly in the courtyard and asked him\nif he had a gun. Holly immediately said yes. The police then\nconfiscated the gun and arrested him. A grand jury later in-\ndicted Holly for possessing a firearm following a prior felony\nconviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to\nsuppress the gun, arguing that his encounter with the police\nwas an impermissible seizure. He also moved to dismiss the\nindictment, contending that the police’s failure to preserve\nvideo footage of his arrest and activity leading to it violated\nhis due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\n(1963). The district court held a hearing on both issues and\n\fNo. 19-1216 3\n\nheard competing testimony from Holly and the police. It then\ndenied Holly’s motions.\n The testimony from the hearing frames the issues on ap-\npeal. The officers testified that they had entered a parking lot\nin Altgeld Gardens to get a better view of the interior court-\nyard, which Officer Byrne considered a high-crime area based\non arrests he had made there before. Around 4:00 p.m., Officer\nByrne saw Holly walking on a sidewalk toward the police car.\nOfficer Byrne said that as Holly neared the car, he made eye\ncontact with the officers, formed a surprised and anxious\nlook, and then turned sharply and walked swiftly in another\ndirection, ultimately making his way behind a building and\nout of the officers’ sight. Both officers testified that Officer\nCaulfield then jogged after Holly and found him inside the\ncourtyard, standing outside an apartment door and ringing\nthe doorbell. (An occupant later told the officers she did not\nknow Holly.)\n Officer Caulfield said that he identified himself as police\nand asked Holly a single question: Do you have drugs or a\ngun? Yes, Holly replied, he had a gun in his pocket. Officer\nCaulfield took the gun and from there turned Holly toward a\nwall to arrest him. By then Officer Byrne had reached the\napartment and assisted Officer Caulfield by handcuffing\nHolly. Both officers testified that at no point did they draw\ntheir own guns or touch Holly before placing him under ar-\nrest. A third officer, Raul Casales, responded to a backup call\nand met Officers Caulfield and Byrne about 15 to 20 seconds\nafter Holly’s arrest. Officer Casales testified that he had\ndrawn his gun but never pointed it at Holly.\n Holly offered a starkly different account. He testified that\nhe never saw the police car or made eye contact with any\n\f4 No. 19-1216\n\nofficer before being stopped and handcuffed. Holly instead\nstated that he was ringing a friend’s doorbell when he saw\nOfficer Caulfield run around the corner and approach him\nwith his gun drawn. According to Holly, Officer Caulfield\nthen demanded that he put his hands up, grabbed him, and\ntold him he was being stopped because there were burglaries\nin the neighborhood. Holly added that he did not feel free to\nleave because he had lived in the neighborhood for decades\nand knew the police stops there to be aggressive. Holly also\ndiverged from the officers’ accounts regarding the sequence\nof events surrounding his arrest. He insisted that Officer Caul-\nfield patted him down, found a bulge, and only then asked if\nhe had a gun. By the time Officer Byrne arrived, Holly contin-\nued, Officer Caulfield had confiscated the gun and put his\nown gun away.\n After considering the competing testimony, the district\ncourt credited the officers’ testimony. The district court ex-\nplained that the accounts of Officers Caulfield, Byrne, and\nCasales were consistent with each other. The district court\nnoted that the officers’ testimony made more sense than\nHolly’s, observing in particular that the police do not typi-\ncally draw their weapons on an unarmed offender or at close\nrange. By contrast, the district court found Holly less credible\ngiven his criminal history and the fact that he had offered\nthree shifting explanations for why he had a gun. Having\ncredited the officers’ accounts, the district court then con-\ncluded that Holly’s encounter with the police was consensual\nand denied his motion to suppress.\n B\n The district court also heard testimony about Holly’s sec-\nond claim on appeal—that he was denied due process when\n\fNo. 19-1216 5\n\nthe police failed to preserve a video taken near his arrest. On\nthis score, the facts are straightforward and unfortunate.\n Immediately after Holly’s arrest, Detective Peter Scatena\nand Officers Byrne and Caulfield reviewed a video from the\nonly nearby camera that captured what transpired. Detective\nScatena then called Carlos Mackie, an analyst with the Chi-\ncago Housing Authority, to request a copy of the video. When\nMackie did not answer, Detective Scatena left a voicemail\n(consistent with CPD protocol). What Detective Scatena did\nnot know was that Mackie was on military leave and out of\nthe office for an extended period. He never heard back from\nMackie, followed up on the voicemail, or sought the video\nsome other way. And because CHA cameras automatically re-\nwrite footage after 15 to 30 days, the video taken near Holly’s\narrest was eventually overwritten and thus no longer availa-\nble.\n The district court heard conflicting testimony of what the\nvideo revealed before it was overwritten. For his part, Detec-\ntive Scatena testified that the footage showed Holly in the\ncourtyard walking at a hurried pace with two CPD officers\nfollowing “side by side” in the same direction. (Recall that Of-\nficers Byrne and Caulfield had testified that Officer Caulfield\npursued Holly ahead of Officer Byrne.) Detective Scatena also\nstated that the video did not show Holly after he was hand-\ncuffed. By contrast, Officer Byrne testified that the video only\ndepicted Officer Caulfield standing near Holly after he was\nhandcuffed—not the events leading up to the arrest.\n While these accounts differed, the district court found the\ninconsistencies minor and understandable given the passage\nof time and the number of arrests that the police make in the\nordinary course. The district court underscored that no one\n\f6 No. 19-1216\n\nwho watched the video (before it was overwritten) testified\nthat it depicted Holly’s arrest. Because Holly had not estab-\nlished that the video was potentially exculpatory or that the\npolice acted in bad faith by failing to preserve it, the court de-\nnied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of a due\nprocess violation.\n The ensuing bench trial resulted in Holly’s conviction of\nunlawful gun possession. The district court then sentenced\nHolly to 90 months’ imprisonment and imposed 36 months’\nsupervised release.\n II\n A\n Not every police encounter implicates the Fourth Amend-\nment. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.\n2015) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)). A sei-\nzure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes\nplace if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would\nnot feel free to leave. Id. A consensual encounter, on the other\nhand, takes place if a reasonable person would feel free to ig-\nnore the police and go about his business. Id.\n In determining whether an encounter is consensual, we\nconsider several factors:\n where the interaction took place, including\n whether it was in public;\n how many police officers were present;\n the extent to which the police presence was\n threatening;\n whether the officers made any show of\n weapons or physical force;\n the officers’ language and tone;\n\fNo. 19-1216 7\n\n whether the police suggested the defendant\n was suspected of crime; and\n whether officers told the defendant he was\n free to leave.\nSee id. These factors “are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.”\nUnited States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\nUnited States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).\n B\n We agree with the district court that Holly’s encounter\nwith the police was voluntary. It is undisputed that the police\nspoke to Holly in public and never stopped him, redirected\nhis route, or otherwise obstructed his walking on the sidewalk\nor through the courtyard. Officer Caulfield approached Holly\nand put a question to him—do you have drugs or a gun?—\nthat he immediately chose to answer. See Florida v. Royer, 460\nU.S. 491, 497 (1983) (explaining that the police do not violate\nthe Fourth Amendment by merely approaching a person in\npublic and asking him questions); see also Shields, 789 F.3d at\n743–44.\n The district court’s other findings, which Holly has not\nshown are clearly erroneous, support its conclusion that the\nencounter was consensual. The district court reasonably cred-\nited the officers’ accounts over Holly’s. It found Holly’s testi-\nmony strained and implausible: he was a four-time convicted\nfelon, had an incentive to lie to escape punishment, and in the\ncourse of proceedings, offered three inconsistent explanations\nfor why he had a gun. By contrast, the district court found that\nthe officers had no incentive at the time of the incident to en-\ngage in misconduct (as they likely believed everything was\nbeing captured on camera) and no incentive to lie in their\n\f8 No. 19-1216\n\ntestimony after the fact. Considering each party’s position\nand taking stock of their comparative credibility, the district\ncourt was on solid footing in crediting the officers’ version of\nevents. See United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir.\n2007) (emphasizing that a district court’s determination of\nwitness credibility “can virtually never be clear error”).\n Against this backdrop, the district court concluded that\nHolly’s encounter with the police was voluntary. It found that\nOfficer Caulfield was alone when he jogged after Holly and\nmade no show of force—he did not pull a gun, touch Holly,\nor tell him to put his hands up. Rather, upon catching up with\nHolly, Officer Caulfield promptly asked a direct question—\ndo you have drugs or a gun?—and instantly received an\nequally direct answer—yes. The question was not advanced\nin a coercive tone or with an accompanying threat. Given\nthese circumstances, a reasonable person in Holly’s shoes\nwould have felt free to leave. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439;\nUnited States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2006)\n(holding that an encounter was consensual where three offic-\ners approached a defendant in public and did not show weap-\nons, touch him, or use a tone or language that would have\ncommunicated to the defendant that he was seized).\n Holly disagrees. He sees this case on all fours with our de-\ncision in United States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2015).\nThere Dontray Smith was walking alone at night when two\narmed and uniformed police officers waited for him to enter\nan alley. Id. at 684. The officers then rode their bicycles past\nSmith into the alley and made a U-turn to face him, obstruct-\ning his path forward. Id. at 685. From there one officer stepped\noff his bike, approached Smith with his hand on his gun, and\n“posed a single, accusatory question to Smith: ‘Are you in\n\fNo. 19-1216 9\n\npossession of any guns, knives, weapons, or anything ille-\ngal?’” Id. Considering the location, the threatening presence\nof multiple officers, the aggressive nature of the questioning,\nand the fact that the police blocked Smith’s path, we con-\ncluded that the encounter constituted a seizure. Id.\n Holly is right that in both cases the police were in uniform,\napproached the defendant, and asked about a gun. But the\nsimilarities end there. The district court found that a single\nofficer spoke with Holly in an open courtyard in the after-\nnoon. Unlike the police in Smith, Officer Caulfield did not\nblock Holly’s path or draw his weapon, and the tone of his\nquestion did not compel an answer.\n No doubt that line-drawing in this area of law is difficult\nand requires a careful parsing of exactly what took place be-\ntween the police and the accused. But “[i]t is well established\nthat a seizure does not occur merely because a police officer\napproaches an individual and asks him or her questions.” Id.\nat 684. The district court proceeded carefully by holding a\nhearing, considering the competing testimony, assessing\ncredibility, and ultimately finding that Officer Caulfield ap-\nproached Holly and asked him a question—nothing more.\nUnder these circumstances, Holly’s encounter with the police\nwas voluntary.\n III\n Holly also renews his argument in the name of Brady v.\nMaryland that the police violated his due process rights by\nfailing to preserve CHA video footage of the arrest and events\nleading to it. We start from a different legal marker. The\nproper framework for evaluating Holly’s claim comes not\nfrom Brady, but rather from Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51\n\f10 No. 19-1216\n\n(1988). While Brady requires that the government disclose ev-\nidence materially favorable to the defendant “irrespective of\nthe good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” see 373 U.S. at\n87, Holly’s claim is that the police failed to preserve only po-\ntentially exculpatory evidence.\n Under Youngblood, the police’s failure to preserve poten-\ntially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due pro-\ncess unless the defendant can show that the police acted in\nbad faith. See 488 U.S. at 58. That standard requires proof of\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence\nand turns on an official’s subjective knowledge that the evi-\ndence had exculpatory value. See United States v. Cherry, 920\nF.3d 1126, 1140 (7th Cir. 2019). In addition to bad faith, the\ndefendant must show that the exculpatory nature of the evi-\ndence was apparent before its destruction and that he could\nnot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See id.\n Holly has not made these necessary showings. Detective\nScatena made a clear effort to preserve the video: he left a\nvoicemail requesting the video from the CHA and did so in\naccordance with CPD policy. Detective Scatena did not know\nthat the analyst he contacted was on military leave. His failure\nto follow up may have been negligent, but it does not prove\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress the video. And mere\nnegligence by police does not amount to a constitutional vio-\nlation. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.\n Nor has Holly shown that the lost video had apparent ex-\nculpatory value. Detective Scatena and Officers Byrne and\nCaulfield each testified that the video did not show the actual\narrest. Their testimony was consistent on this score, leading\nthe district court to find that the video did not show the initial\nencounter between Holly and the police and thus that any\n\fNo. 19-1216 11\n\nfootage “was neither exculpatory nor inculpatory.” On these\nfacts, the district court correctly concluded that the police did\nnot violate Holly’s due process rights under Youngblood.\n To be sure, the failure of the police to preserve the video is\nunfortunate. Mistakes happen, though, and that is all we can\nsay occurred here. But in closing it does seem prudent to offer\nthe limited observation that CPD would do well to revisit its\npreservation protocol—all to protect the interests of CPD it-\nself, citizens, and those like Holly who find themselves\ncharged with crime.\n Seeing no violation of Holly’s rights here, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. David Holly\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1216\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDAVID HOLLY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00485-1 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Unreasonable seizures violate the\\nFourth Amendment while voluntary encounters with the po-\\nlice do not. This case implicates the dividing line. A police of-\\nficer rushed to approach David Holly in Chicago’s Altgeld\\nGardens Housing Complex and asked if he had a gun. Holly\\nanswered yes, which resulted in his arrest and subsequent\\nconviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Holly\\nlater moved to suppress the gun, contending that the officer’s\\n\\f2 No. 19-1216\\n\\napproach and questioning constituted an impermissible sei-\\nzure. The district court denied that motion after finding that\\nHolly consented to the encounter. We agree and affirm. In the\\ntotality of circumstances, Holly’s interaction with police fell\\non the voluntary side of the line.\\n I\\n A\\n On December 31, 2015, Officers Robert Caulfield and Jo-\\nseph Byrne of the Chicago Police Department were patrolling\\nthe Altgeld Gardens Housing Complex, a public housing pro-\\nject in the city’s far south side. The officers were in uniform\\nand on patrol as part of a CPD effort to increase police visibil-\\nity in anticipation of celebratory gunfire to usher in the new\\nyear. They drove an unmarked black Ford, which Officer\\nByrne later testified locals recognized as a police car. While\\nsitting in the car, Officers Byrne and Caulfield saw David\\nHolly walking on a sidewalk inside a courtyard of the com-\\nplex.\\n The parties dispute what happened next, but all agree that\\nthe police approached Holly in the courtyard and asked him\\nif he had a gun. Holly immediately said yes. The police then\\nconfiscated the gun and arrested him. A grand jury later in-\\ndicted Holly for possessing a firearm following a prior felony\\nconviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to\\nsuppress the gun, arguing that his encounter with the police\\nwas an impermissible seizure. He also moved to dismiss the\\nindictment, contending that the police’s failure to preserve\\nvideo footage of his arrest and activity leading to it violated\\nhis due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\\n(1963). The district court held a hearing on both issues and\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 3\\n\\nheard competing testimony from Holly and the police. It then\\ndenied Holly’s motions.\\n The testimony from the hearing frames the issues on ap-\\npeal. The officers testified that they had entered a parking lot\\nin Altgeld Gardens to get a better view of the interior court-\\nyard, which Officer Byrne considered a high-crime area based\\non arrests he had made there before. Around 4:00 p.m., Officer\\nByrne saw Holly walking on a sidewalk toward the police car.\\nOfficer Byrne said that as Holly neared the car, he made eye\\ncontact with the officers, formed a surprised and anxious\\nlook, and then turned sharply and walked swiftly in another\\ndirection, ultimately making his way behind a building and\\nout of the officers’ sight. Both officers testified that Officer\\nCaulfield then jogged after Holly and found him inside the\\ncourtyard, standing outside an apartment door and ringing\\nthe doorbell. (An occupant later told the officers she did not\\nknow Holly.)\\n Officer Caulfield said that he identified himself as police\\nand asked Holly a single question: Do you have drugs or a\\ngun? Yes, Holly replied, he had a gun in his pocket. Officer\\nCaulfield took the gun and from there turned Holly toward a\\nwall to arrest him. By then Officer Byrne had reached the\\napartment and assisted Officer Caulfield by handcuffing\\nHolly. Both officers testified that at no point did they draw\\ntheir own guns or touch Holly before placing him under ar-\\nrest. A third officer, Raul Casales, responded to a backup call\\nand met Officers Caulfield and Byrne about 15 to 20 seconds\\nafter Holly’s arrest. Officer Casales testified that he had\\ndrawn his gun but never pointed it at Holly.\\n Holly offered a starkly different account. He testified that\\nhe never saw the police car or made eye contact with any\\n\\f4 No. 19-1216\\n\\nofficer before being stopped and handcuffed. Holly instead\\nstated that he was ringing a friend’s doorbell when he saw\\nOfficer Caulfield run around the corner and approach him\\nwith his gun drawn. According to Holly, Officer Caulfield\\nthen demanded that he put his hands up, grabbed him, and\\ntold him he was being stopped because there were burglaries\\nin the neighborhood. Holly added that he did not feel free to\\nleave because he had lived in the neighborhood for decades\\nand knew the police stops there to be aggressive. Holly also\\ndiverged from the officers’ accounts regarding the sequence\\nof events surrounding his arrest. He insisted that Officer Caul-\\nfield patted him down, found a bulge, and only then asked if\\nhe had a gun. By the time Officer Byrne arrived, Holly contin-\\nued, Officer Caulfield had confiscated the gun and put his\\nown gun away.\\n After considering the competing testimony, the district\\ncourt credited the officers’ testimony. The district court ex-\\nplained that the accounts of Officers Caulfield, Byrne, and\\nCasales were consistent with each other. The district court\\nnoted that the officers’ testimony made more sense than\\nHolly’s, observing in particular that the police do not typi-\\ncally draw their weapons on an unarmed offender or at close\\nrange. By contrast, the district court found Holly less credible\\ngiven his criminal history and the fact that he had offered\\nthree shifting explanations for why he had a gun. Having\\ncredited the officers’ accounts, the district court then con-\\ncluded that Holly’s encounter with the police was consensual\\nand denied his motion to suppress.\\n B\\n The district court also heard testimony about Holly’s sec-\\nond claim on appeal—that he was denied due process when\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 5\\n\\nthe police failed to preserve a video taken near his arrest. On\\nthis score, the facts are straightforward and unfortunate.\\n Immediately after Holly’s arrest, Detective Peter Scatena\\nand Officers Byrne and Caulfield reviewed a video from the\\nonly nearby camera that captured what transpired. Detective\\nScatena then called Carlos Mackie, an analyst with the Chi-\\ncago Housing Authority, to request a copy of the video. When\\nMackie did not answer, Detective Scatena left a voicemail\\n(consistent with CPD protocol). What Detective Scatena did\\nnot know was that Mackie was on military leave and out of\\nthe office for an extended period. He never heard back from\\nMackie, followed up on the voicemail, or sought the video\\nsome other way. And because CHA cameras automatically re-\\nwrite footage after 15 to 30 days, the video taken near Holly’s\\narrest was eventually overwritten and thus no longer availa-\\nble.\\n The district court heard conflicting testimony of what the\\nvideo revealed before it was overwritten. For his part, Detec-\\ntive Scatena testified that the footage showed Holly in the\\ncourtyard walking at a hurried pace with two CPD officers\\nfollowing “side by side” in the same direction. (Recall that Of-\\nficers Byrne and Caulfield had testified that Officer Caulfield\\npursued Holly ahead of Officer Byrne.) Detective Scatena also\\nstated that the video did not show Holly after he was hand-\\ncuffed. By contrast, Officer Byrne testified that the video only\\ndepicted Officer Caulfield standing near Holly after he was\\nhandcuffed—not the events leading up to the arrest.\\n While these accounts differed, the district court found the\\ninconsistencies minor and understandable given the passage\\nof time and the number of arrests that the police make in the\\nordinary course. The district court underscored that no one\\n\\f6 No. 19-1216\\n\\nwho watched the video (before it was overwritten) testified\\nthat it depicted Holly’s arrest. Because Holly had not estab-\\nlished that the video was potentially exculpatory or that the\\npolice acted in bad faith by failing to preserve it, the court de-\\nnied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of a due\\nprocess violation.\\n The ensuing bench trial resulted in Holly’s conviction of\\nunlawful gun possession. The district court then sentenced\\nHolly to 90 months’ imprisonment and imposed 36 months’\\nsupervised release.\\n II\\n A\\n Not every police encounter implicates the Fourth Amend-\\nment. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)). A sei-\\nzure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes\\nplace if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would\\nnot feel free to leave. Id. A consensual encounter, on the other\\nhand, takes place if a reasonable person would feel free to ig-\\nnore the police and go about his business. Id.\\n In determining whether an encounter is consensual, we\\nconsider several factors:\\n where the interaction took place, including\\n whether it was in public;\\n how many police officers were present;\\n the extent to which the police presence was\\n threatening;\\n whether the officers made any show of\\n weapons or physical force;\\n the officers’ language and tone;\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 7\\n\\n whether the police suggested the defendant\\n was suspected of crime; and\\n whether officers told the defendant he was\\n free to leave.\\nSee id. These factors “are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.”\\nUnited States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\\nUnited States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).\\n B\\n We agree with the district court that Holly’s encounter\\nwith the police was voluntary. It is undisputed that the police\\nspoke to Holly in public and never stopped him, redirected\\nhis route, or otherwise obstructed his walking on the sidewalk\\nor through the courtyard. Officer Caulfield approached Holly\\nand put a question to him—do you have drugs or a gun?—\\nthat he immediately chose to answer. See Florida v. Royer, 460\\nU.S. 491, 497 (1983) (explaining that the police do not violate\\nthe Fourth Amendment by merely approaching a person in\\npublic and asking him questions); see also Shields, 789 F.3d at\\n743–44.\\n The district court’s other findings, which Holly has not\\nshown are clearly erroneous, support its conclusion that the\\nencounter was consensual. The district court reasonably cred-\\nited the officers’ accounts over Holly’s. It found Holly’s testi-\\nmony strained and implausible: he was a four-time convicted\\nfelon, had an incentive to lie to escape punishment, and in the\\ncourse of proceedings, offered three inconsistent explanations\\nfor why he had a gun. By contrast, the district court found that\\nthe officers had no incentive at the time of the incident to en-\\ngage in misconduct (as they likely believed everything was\\nbeing captured on camera) and no incentive to lie in their\\n\\f8 No. 19-1216\\n\\ntestimony after the fact. Considering each party’s position\\nand taking stock of their comparative credibility, the district\\ncourt was on solid footing in crediting the officers’ version of\\nevents. See United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir.\\n2007) (emphasizing that a district court’s determination of\\nwitness credibility “can virtually never be clear error”).\\n Against this backdrop, the district court concluded that\\nHolly’s encounter with the police was voluntary. It found that\\nOfficer Caulfield was alone when he jogged after Holly and\\nmade no show of force—he did not pull a gun, touch Holly,\\nor tell him to put his hands up. Rather, upon catching up with\\nHolly, Officer Caulfield promptly asked a direct question—\\ndo you have drugs or a gun?—and instantly received an\\nequally direct answer—yes. The question was not advanced\\nin a coercive tone or with an accompanying threat. Given\\nthese circumstances, a reasonable person in Holly’s shoes\\nwould have felt free to leave. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439;\\nUnited States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2006)\\n(holding that an encounter was consensual where three offic-\\ners approached a defendant in public and did not show weap-\\nons, touch him, or use a tone or language that would have\\ncommunicated to the defendant that he was seized).\\n Holly disagrees. He sees this case on all fours with our de-\\ncision in United States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2015).\\nThere Dontray Smith was walking alone at night when two\\narmed and uniformed police officers waited for him to enter\\nan alley. Id. at 684. The officers then rode their bicycles past\\nSmith into the alley and made a U-turn to face him, obstruct-\\ning his path forward. Id. at 685. From there one officer stepped\\noff his bike, approached Smith with his hand on his gun, and\\n“posed a single, accusatory question to Smith: ‘Are you in\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 9\\n\\npossession of any guns, knives, weapons, or anything ille-\\ngal?’” Id. Considering the location, the threatening presence\\nof multiple officers, the aggressive nature of the questioning,\\nand the fact that the police blocked Smith’s path, we con-\\ncluded that the encounter constituted a seizure. Id.\\n Holly is right that in both cases the police were in uniform,\\napproached the defendant, and asked about a gun. But the\\nsimilarities end there. The district court found that a single\\nofficer spoke with Holly in an open courtyard in the after-\\nnoon. Unlike the police in Smith, Officer Caulfield did not\\nblock Holly’s path or draw his weapon, and the tone of his\\nquestion did not compel an answer.\\n No doubt that line-drawing in this area of law is difficult\\nand requires a careful parsing of exactly what took place be-\\ntween the police and the accused. But “[i]t is well established\\nthat a seizure does not occur merely because a police officer\\napproaches an individual and asks him or her questions.” Id.\\nat 684. The district court proceeded carefully by holding a\\nhearing, considering the competing testimony, assessing\\ncredibility, and ultimately finding that Officer Caulfield ap-\\nproached Holly and asked him a question—nothing more.\\nUnder these circumstances, Holly’s encounter with the police\\nwas voluntary.\\n III\\n Holly also renews his argument in the name of Brady v.\\nMaryland that the police violated his due process rights by\\nfailing to preserve CHA video footage of the arrest and events\\nleading to it. We start from a different legal marker. The\\nproper framework for evaluating Holly’s claim comes not\\nfrom Brady, but rather from Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51\\n\\f10 No. 19-1216\\n\\n(1988). While Brady requires that the government disclose ev-\\nidence materially favorable to the defendant “irrespective of\\nthe good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” see 373 U.S. at\\n87, Holly’s claim is that the police failed to preserve only po-\\ntentially exculpatory evidence.\\n Under Youngblood, the police’s failure to preserve poten-\\ntially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due pro-\\ncess unless the defendant can show that the police acted in\\nbad faith. See 488 U.S. at 58. That standard requires proof of\\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence\\nand turns on an official’s subjective knowledge that the evi-\\ndence had exculpatory value. See United States v. Cherry, 920\\nF.3d 1126, 1140 (7th Cir. 2019). In addition to bad faith, the\\ndefendant must show that the exculpatory nature of the evi-\\ndence was apparent before its destruction and that he could\\nnot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See id.\\n Holly has not made these necessary showings. Detective\\nScatena made a clear effort to preserve the video: he left a\\nvoicemail requesting the video from the CHA and did so in\\naccordance with CPD policy. Detective Scatena did not know\\nthat the analyst he contacted was on military leave. His failure\\nto follow up may have been negligent, but it does not prove\\nanimus or a conscious effort to suppress the video. And mere\\nnegligence by police does not amount to a constitutional vio-\\nlation. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.\\n Nor has Holly shown that the lost video had apparent ex-\\nculpatory value. Detective Scatena and Officers Byrne and\\nCaulfield each testified that the video did not show the actual\\narrest. Their testimony was consistent on this score, leading\\nthe district court to find that the video did not show the initial\\nencounter between Holly and the police and thus that any\\n\\fNo. 19-1216 11\\n\\nfootage “was neither exculpatory nor inculpatory.” On these\\nfacts, the district court correctly concluded that the police did\\nnot violate Holly’s due process rights under Youngblood.\\n To be sure, the failure of the police to preserve the video is\\nunfortunate. Mistakes happen, though, and that is all we can\\nsay occurred here. But in closing it does seem prudent to offer\\nthe limited observation that CPD would do well to revisit its\\npreservation protocol—all to protect the interests of CPD it-\\nself, citizens, and those like Holly who find themselves\\ncharged with crime.\\n Seeing no violation of Holly’s rights here, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4680,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670861,"string":"4,670,861"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-2782"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\nMILLERCOORS LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 19-cv-218-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 —\\n INTERIM ORDER OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n PER CURIAM. On May 24, 2019, the district court entered\\nan opinion that concludes with language that the judge be-\\nlieved would serve as a preliminary injunction. MillerCoors\\nfiled an appeal, which has been docketed as No. 19-2200. But\\nthe district court did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n\\n2 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n65(d)(1)(C), which requires every injunction to be set forth\\nwithout referring to any other document. See, e.g., Chicago v.\\nSessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc), slip\\nop. 3 (Rule 65 “requires a separate document setting forth\\nthe terms of such an injunction”); Auto Driveaway Franchise\\nSystems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670,\\n676 (7th Cir. 2019); BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Capital\\nPremium Financing, Inc., 912 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.\\n2019); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 527 (7th\\nCir. 1988); Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 886,\\n514 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975).\\n In supplemental jurisdictional memoranda filed at our\\nrequest after oral argument, both sides acknowledged that\\nthe district court failed to comply with Rule 65(d). Neither\\nside asked us to depart from the decisions we have cited.\\n On September 4, 2019, while appeal No. 19-2200 was\\npending, the district court entered another opinion stating\\nthat it was “modifying” the decision of May 24. The district\\ncourt did not follow the procedure specified by Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 62.1 for modifying an order that is before the court of ap-\\npeals, nor did it discuss the rule that only one court at a time\\nhas jurisdiction over “those aspects of the case involved in\\nthe appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459\\nU.S. 56, 58 (1982). And as with the May 24 opinion, the dis-\\ntrict court did not comply with Rule 65(d). Nor did the judge\\nmodify the injunction as a condition of a stay or bond pend-\\ning appeal, as Rule 62(d) permits. (It provides: “While an\\nappeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judg-\\nment that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, dissolves, or\\nrefuses to dissolve or modify an injunction, the court may\\nsuspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 3\\n\\nbond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.”\\nThe authority to make changes linked to bonds or otherwise\\nsecure the enjoined party’s rights differs from a blanket\\ngrant of permission to impose new obligations, and substan-\\ntially alter the issues, while appeals are pending.) Anheuser-\\nBusch’s appeal from the September 4 order has been docket-\\ned as No. 19-2713.\\n On September 6, 2019, the district court modified the\\nmodification of September 4. Once again it did not discuss\\nits jurisdiction to do so, did not rely on Rule 62(d), did not\\nfollow the procedure specified by Rule 62.1, and did not\\ncomply with Rule 65(d). Anheuser-Busch’s appeal from the\\norder of September 6 has been docketed as No. 19-2782.\\n Although the district court’s intent to afford enforceable\\nequitable relief is sufficiently clear to provide appellate ju-\\nrisdiction despite the noncompliance with Rule 65(d),\\nsee Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Operating Engineers Union,\\n824 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2016), enforcing that Rule is suffi-\\nciently important that we order a limited remand with in-\\nstructions to enter the injunction on a document separate\\nfrom the opinions.\\n In the process, the district court may be able to avoid the\\npotential jurisdictional problems that its modifications of the\\ninitial order have created. (We call them modifications even\\nthough the order of September 4 does not change any lan-\\nguage of the May 24 decision. It seems more like a second\\npreliminary injunction, although the judge called it a modifi-\\ncation. The September 6 order, by contrast, explicitly modi-\\nfies the September 4 order.) While we recognize that a dis-\\ntrict court is in the best position to address urgent issues and\\nchanges in circumstance related to a preliminary injunction,\\n\\n4 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nthe court must nonetheless comply with the procedures for\\ndoing so in order to avoid creating potential complications\\non review. A single injunction complying with Rule 65(d)\\nwould be subject to appeal—and, as there has not yet been\\neven one injunction that satisfies Rule 65(d), the consolidated\\ninjunction could be treated as the initial order, allowing both\\nsides to appeal without any potential obstacle in the\\nGriggs doctrine or Rule 62.1, or any need for us to consider\\nthe disagreement among the circuits about the extent to\\nwhich preliminary injunctions are subject to modification by\\na district judge while an appeal is pending. Compare Ortho\\nPharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir.\\n1989), with Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817,\\n820 (5th Cir. 1989).\\n If the district court wants to make still further changes, in\\nlight of discovery in the ongoing litigation, it is free to do\\nso—though the judge also is free to enter an injunction con-\\nsolidating all decisions made to date but leaving all else to\\nthe permanent-injunction phase. We leave this decision in\\nthe capable hands of the district court.\\n Once the district court has complied with this limited\\nremand, both sides should file new notices of appeal and\\npropose a schedule for new briefs. The briefs already filed\\nconcerning the May 24 order may be incorporated by refer-\\nence, but we have yet to receive briefs concerning the Sep-\\ntember 4 and 6 orders. All aspects of the case must be fully\\nbriefed before this court will proceed to decision.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 5\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448114/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}, {\"author\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent\\nfrom the remand order. We do not need to remand this appeal\\nfrom the district court’s preliminary injunction of May 24,\\n2019. It is briefed, argued, and ready to be decided on the\\nmerits. Judge Conley complied with all of the formal\\nrequirements for issuing an injunction. With respect, contrary\\nto my colleagues’ views, Rule 65(d)(1) simply does not\\ncontain the “separate-document” requirement that is the basis\\nfor the majority’s remand. The majority offers here no textual\\nor other defense for dicta in prior cases asserting such a\\nrequirement. Never before have we put any teeth behind this\\ngroundless and trivial “requirement.” This is a case where\\ntext and pragmatics point in the same direction. We need not\\nremand for formalistic compliance with an imagined and\\nnon-jurisdictional rule that no party has raised. In addition,\\non the more consequential issue here, the district court had\\njurisdiction to issue its two September orders on BudLight’s\\npackaging.\\n I address in Part I the Rule 65(d) issue and in Part II the\\nissues posed by the district court’s separate injunction on\\npackaging and its emergency order relaxing that injunction at\\nAnheuser-Busch’s request.\\nI. A Separate Document?\\n The formal requirements of Rule 65(d)(1)—those actually\\nincluded in the text of the rule—are vital when a district judge\\nexercises one of the most awesome powers of the office: issu-\\ning a preliminary injunction that is enforceable by contempt\\nsanctions. Here are the textual requirements:\\n (1) Contents. Every order granting an injunction\\n and every restraining order must:\\n\\n6 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n (A) state the reasons why it issued;\\n (B) state its terms specifically; and\\n (C) describe in reasonable detail—and not by refer-\\n ring to the complaint or other document—the act or\\n acts restrained or required.\\n Compliance with these requirements ensures that a party\\nwho is restrained by a preliminary injunction knows clearly\\nwhat conduct is being restrained and why. Oral orders can be\\nvague and easily misunderstood. Incorporating other\\ndocuments can lead to uncertainty. Failing to state clearly the\\nreasons for the injunction may lead to hasty, sometimes too-\\ncasual analysis.\\n In this case, the preliminary injunction is in a document\\ntitled “Opinion and Order,” which sets forth a detailed and\\nthoughtful analysis of the facts and the law. Under the head-\\ning “Order” on page 49, the document spells out what is pro-\\nhibited:\\n IT IS ORDERED that:\\n 1) Plaintiff MillerCoors, LLCʹs motion for pre-\\n liminary injunction (dkt. #8) is GRANTED IN\\n PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows. De-\\n fendant Anheuser Busch is PRELIMINARILY\\n ENJOINED from using the following language\\n within ten (10) days of this order in its commer-\\n cials, print advertising and social media:\\n • Bud Light contains “100% less corn syrup”;\\n • Bud Light in direct reference to “no corn\\n syrup” without any reference to “brewed with,”\\n “made with” or “uses”;\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 7\\n\\n • Miller Lite and/or Coors Light and “corn\\n syrup” without including any reference to\\n “brewed with,” “made with” or “uses”; and\\n • Describing “corn syrup” as an ingredient “in”\\n the finished product.\\nMillerCoors, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 385 F. Supp. 3d 730,\\n760 (W.D. Wis. 2019). This approach was not unusual; district\\njudges issue such orders often, combining the opinion and the\\norder, ordinarily without objection from the parties or this\\ncourt as to the form. See, e.g., Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 602\\nF.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming injunction in same doc-\\nument as reasons for issuing it: “The injunction is sufficiently\\nprecise and self-contained, and we require nothing more to\\ncomply with Rule 65.”); Russian Media Group, LLC v. Cable\\nAmerica, Inc., 2009 WL 440957, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2009)\\n(combining findings of fact, conclusions of law, and specific\\nterms of preliminary injunction in one document), aff’d, 598\\nF.3d 302 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The order at the end of the combined “Opinion and Or-\\nder” complied with all of the express requirements of Rule\\n65(d)(1). It served all the purposes of that rule. No party has\\nobjected to its form. When the panel questioned this form in\\noral argument, counsel for Anheuser-Busch confirmed that\\nhis client understood that it was being enjoined and under-\\nstood what was required. It also understood that it could ap-\\npeal if it wanted to. The order may or may not turn out to be\\nsound on the merits, but there is no formal problem with it,\\nnothing that affects appellate jurisdiction, and nothing that\\njustifies a remand for the district judge to copy the text from\\npage 49 and paste it into a new, separate document.\\n\\n8 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n The majority, however, asserts that Rule 65(d) requires\\nevery injunction to be set forth on a separate document that\\ndoes not refer to any other document. With respect, that re-\\nquirement does not appear in Rule 65(d). The requirement\\ndoes appear as dicta in a number of our cases dating back to\\n1988, but as explained below, those cases required us to ad-\\ndress other, genuine problems in the preliminary injunctions.\\nUntil now, we have never attached any real consequences to\\na failure to comply only with this imagined, non-textual re-\\nquirement. Rather than attach new consequences now\\nthrough this remand, we should retreat from our earlier dicta.\\n A good place to start is BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v.\\nCapital Premium Financing, Inc., 912 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.\\n2019), where we identified several critical problems in a pre-\\nliminary injunction: the injunction left important issues unre-\\nsolved; it used ambiguous language and seemed to incorpo-\\nrate another document; and it required no bond. We also said\\nthis regarding a separate document:\\n Third, the district court failed to enter an injunc-\\n tion as a separate document under Fed. R. Civ.\\n P. 65(d)(1)(C). Language in an opinion does not\\n comply with Rule 65(d). See Gunn v. University\\n Committee to End the War, 399 U.S. 383 (1970).\\n Neither side reminded the district court of the\\n need to enter an injunction.\\nId. As noted, Rule 65(d)(1)(C) contains no such requirement.\\nMy colleagues and I agree, of course, that language in an\\nopinion that stops short of an explicit order does not amount\\nto an enforceable order. Here, however, the language of the\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 9\\n\\norder was clear here, and Gunn is not on point for a “separate-\\ndocument” requirement.1\\n In BankDirect, we recognized that the district court had is-\\nsued a written order that it expected the defendant to obey.\\nThat was enough to give us appellate jurisdiction—draining\\nof any force the suggestion in the opinion that “no injunction”\\nhad been entered. Failure to comply with the textual require-\\nments of Rule 65(d) does not defeat appellate jurisdiction, lest\\nthe enjoined party be unable to obtain appellate review with\\nthe threat of contempt sanctions hanging over her head. E.g.,\\nAbbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2321 (2018); Advent Electronics,\\nInc. v. Buckman, 112 F.3d 267, 273 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding ap-\\npellate jurisdiction over appeal from preliminary injunction\\nthat merely incorporated terms of another document). By con-\\ntrast, when there is genuinely no injunction at all, there is no\\nappellate jurisdiction. E.g., Bates v. Johnson, 901 F.2d 1424,\\n1428 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Because the state is not under an en-\\nforceable constraint, there is nothing before us on appeal.”).\\nWe vacated the injunction in BankDirect—but not because of\\nthe formal problems we identified. We vacated because the\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 In Gunn, a three-judge district court had issued an opinion saying\\nthat a statute was unconstitutional. Regarding relief, the opinion said:\\n“The Plaintiffs herein are entitled to their declaratory judgment to that ef-\\nfect, and to injunctive relief against the enforcement of [the statute] as now\\nworded, insofar as it may affect rights guaranteed under the First Amend-\\nment.” 399 U.S. at 386. No language in the district court’s opinion could\\nbe understood as enjoining any particular defendant from doing anything\\nin particular, as required under Rule 65. No wonder, then, that the Su-\\npreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1253 because the district court “has issued neither an injunction nor an\\norder granting or denying one.” 399 U.S. at 390.\\n\\n10 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\ninjunction should have expired, according to its rationale,\\nmonths before the appeal was even argued. 912 F.3d at 1059.\\n In Auto Driveaway Franchise Systems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway\\nRichmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2019), we repeated, with\\nvery careful wording, the separate-document point from\\nBankDirect: “We interpret Rule 65(d)(1)(C) to require that an in-\\njunction must be embodied in a standalone separate docu-\\nment.” Id. at 676 (emphasis added), citing 912 F.3d at 1057.\\nThe district court in Auto Driveaway issued one document. It\\nstarted with eight pages of legal analysis and ended with a\\npreliminary injunction with specific terms. Our opinion did\\nnot question the “separate-document” dicta from BankDirect,\\nbut we declined to attach any consequences to failure to com-\\nply. We found that the absence of a separate document did\\nnot affect appellate jurisdiction. 928 F.3d at 676–79. The order\\nhad the practical effect of an injunction and satisfied all of the\\ntextual requirements of Rule 65(d). Id. at 678. We therefore\\nsaid there was no need to remand the case to cure the lack of\\na separate document, and we proceeded to the merits. Id. at\\n679. We should do the same here.2\\n The “separate-document” requirement in this circuit\\nstems from language in Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d\\n525 (7th Cir. 1988), where the district court had failed to com-\\nply with the Rules’ express and important requirements. The\\n\\n\\n\\n 2My colleagues and I agree that failure to comply with the express\\nformal requirements of Rule 58 and 65 can cause all sorts of avoidable and\\nexpensive procedural snarls. That has been shown in scores or hundreds\\nof our cases in recent decades. I too can be a Rule 58 “hawk.” My objection\\nhere is to enforcement of a non-textual requirement that serves no appar-\\nent purpose beyond the textual requirements.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 11\\n\\ndistrict court had issued an opinion that was intended to re-\\nsolve the case entirely. It ended:\\n It is therefore ordered, that summary judgment\\n is granted in favor of the plaintiff. The court fur-\\n ther orders that the preliminary injunction now\\n in effect against defendant be made permanent,\\n subject to the following conditions: defendant is\\n permanently enjoined from determining any vi-\\n olations, or assessing any penalties or fines, or\\n issuing a conditional license, to plaintiff, for any\\n matter arising out of the matters listed in the\\n Proof of Service dated November 14, 1986.\\n863 F.2d at 526. That was bad enough, but the court’s separate\\nfinal judgment was not even consistent with that opinion. The\\njudgment said: “IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the\\ndefendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Plain-\\ntiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the pre-\\nliminary injunction previously entered against defendant is\\nhereby made permanent.” Id. Complicating matters further,\\nthere was no actual preliminary injunction; there had been\\nonly an initial temporary restraining order that had been ex-\\ntended by consent of the parties.\\n “This is a mess,” we wrote. 863 F.2d at 527. There were\\nclear problems under both Rule 65 and Rule 58. No document\\nspelled out the requirements of an injunction without refer-\\nence to another document, and the actual judgment conflicted\\nwith the opinion. Regarding a separate document, we wrote:\\n A judicial opinion is not itself an order to act or\\n desist; it is a statement of reasons supporting\\n the judgment. The command comes in the\\n\\n12 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n separate document entered under Fed. R. Civ.\\n P. 58, which alone is enforceable. There must be\\n a separate document, with a self-contained\\n statement of what the court directs be done. So\\n if the opinion contains language awarding de-\\n claratory relief, but the judgment does not, the\\n opinion has been reduced to dictum; only the\\n judgment need be obeyed.\\nId. at 527. All of that is clearly correct as far as it went, applied\\nto the final judgment that was subject to the explicit separate-\\ndocument requirement of Rule 58. Our opinion does not sup-\\nport extending such a requirement to interlocutory orders,\\nmuch less to preliminary injunctions under Rule 65(d), which\\ndoes not contain it.3\\n The strongest effort to offer a textual basis for a “separate-\\ndocument” requirement for preliminary injunctions is in Beu-\\nkema’s Petroleum Co. v. Admiral Petroleum Co., 613 F.2d 626 (6th\\nCir. 1979). That case was an appeal from a district court’s\\nopinion saying that “A preliminary injunction will be is-\\nsued”—but none ever was. Id. at 628. Although the parties\\n\\n 3The majority also cites our en banc but non-precedential order va-\\ncating the grant of en banc review in the sanctuary-city case, Chicago v.\\nSessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc), where the order\\nsaid that Rule 65 “requires a separate document setting forth the terms of\\nsuch an injunction.” We were talking there about a permanent injunction,\\nwhich is ordinarily a final judgment subject to Rule 58’s explicit separate-\\ndocument requirement. The problem we faced in the August 10, 2018 or-\\nder was that the district judge had said he intended to issue a permanent\\ninjunction but had not yet done it. He quickly did so, and on August 30,\\n2018, we dismissed as moot the appeal of the superseded preliminary in-\\njunction. That situation was much like that in Beukema’s Petroleum, dis-\\ncussed next.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 13\\n\\nhad treated that opinion as a preliminary injunction, the Sixth\\nCircuit remanded the case for issuance of the order promised\\nin the opinion.\\n Beukema’s Petroleum relied not on Rule 65(d) but on Rule\\n54(a), which provides: “‘Judgment’ as used in these rules in-\\ncludes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A\\njudgment should not include recitals of pleadings, a master’s\\nreport, or a record of prior proceedings.” Beukema’s Petroleum\\nrelied on this provision to extend the separate-document re-\\nquirement of Rule 58 to a preliminary injunction. 613 F.2d at\\n627 & n.1.\\n The result in Beukema’s Petroleum was correct since the\\npromised (or threatened) preliminary injunction had never\\nbeen issued. But its Rule 54 rationale does not hold up—and\\npoints toward an unworkable rule—when extended accord-\\ning to its logic to every order subject to interlocutory appeal.4\\n The universe of nonfinal appealable orders is not small. Its\\nexact bounds cannot always be determined in advance by a\\ndistrict court. The majority’s rule would seem to require high-\\nchurch, Rule 58-compliant separate documents, not only for\\ngrants of preliminary injunctions but also, for example, for\\n\\n\\n 4 Beukema’s Petroleum also cited, as the majority does here, Chief Freight\\n\\nLines Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 886, 514 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975),\\nwhere the district court had made an oral statement purporting to grant a\\npreliminary injunction but had not issued any written order doing so. See\\nalso Furr’s Cafeterias, Inc. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 505, 506–07 (5th Cir. 1978) (re-\\nmanding where district court held hearing on motion for preliminary in-\\njunction and issued an order enjoining the NLRB from holding certain\\nhearings and declaring “This is a final order and judgment.”). Both of\\nthese cases presented conflicts between a district judge’s different pro-\\nnouncements. There is no such conflict here.\\n\\n14 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nany order denying or “refusing to … modify” a preliminary\\ninjunction, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), any mine-run Rule 12(b)(6)\\nor Rule 56 order denying qualified immunity, see Mitchell v.\\nForsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985), and every other collateral or-\\nder subject to interlocutory appeal.\\n Are we ready to start remanding appeals from orders\\ndenying motions for preliminary injunctions for entry of a\\ndocument, separate from an opinion explaining the judge’s\\nreasons? I hope not. Such omissions have heretofore escaped\\nour every notice. See, e.g., HH-Indianapolis LLC v. Consol. City\\nof Indianapolis/Marion Cty., 265 F. Supp. 3d 873, 892 (S.D. Ind.\\n2017) (denying injunction with phrase “so ordered” at end of\\nopinion), aff’d, 889 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 2018). The drafters of the\\nfederal rules knew better than to insist on such formalisms.\\nSee Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 advisory committee’s note to 2002\\namendment (“The new all-purpose definition of the entry of\\njudgment must be applied with common sense … .”); see also\\nFed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(B) (“failure to set forth a judgment or\\norder on a separate document … does not affect the validity\\nof an appeal from that judgment or order.”).\\n The majority’s “separate-document” addition to Rule\\n65(d) does not solve any problem not addressed by the ex-\\npress formal requirements in the rule. It does, however, raise\\nsome new problems. Neither the majority here nor any other\\nopinion endorsing a “separate-document” requirement for\\npreliminary injunctions explains how a district court is sup-\\nposed to comply with both this non-textual requirement and\\nthe important, explicit requirement in Rule 65(d)(1)(A) that\\nthe preliminary injunction “state the reasons why it issued.”\\n If we extend the separate-document requirement of Rule\\n58 to preliminary injunctions, what should a district judge do\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 15\\n\\nwith our repeated instructions that a Rule 58 final judgment\\nshould not contain legal reasoning? See, e.g., TDK Electronics\\nCorp. v. Draiman, 321 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2003); American\\nNat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Secretary, 946 F.2d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir.\\n1991), citing Reytblatt v. Denton, 812 F.2d 1042, 1044 (7th Cir.\\n1987); In re Behrens, 900 F.2d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Pahule,\\n849 F.2d 1056, 1058 (7th Cir. 1988); Foremost Sales Promotions,\\nInc. v. Director, 812 F.2d 1044, 1045 (7th Cir. 1987). Perhaps the\\njudge could say, of course, that “in accord with a separate\\nopinion,” the following parties are enjoined from the follow-\\ning conduct. But those two separate documents, an opinion\\nand an injunction, are not a noticeable improvement on the\\ncombined “Opinion and Order” here.\\n More troubling is the majority’s silence about the legal\\nconsequences of a district judge’s failure to comply with this\\nnon-textual requirement. The majority and I agree we have\\nappellate jurisdiction in No. 19-2200. See Auto Driveaway, 928\\nF.3d at 676–79. But is a decision in the form used here—\\ncombining findings of fact, conclusions of law, and specific\\nterms of a preliminary injunction—valid and enforceable with\\ncontempt sanctions? Or is the enjoined party free to disregard\\nit with impunity? Is the majority implying that Anheuser-\\nBusch may start running the enjoined advertisements\\ntomorrow? I hope not, for institutional reasons, but I cannot\\ntell from the majority’s order.\\n On a related note, even a violation of the textual separate-\\ndocument requirement in Rule 58 is waivable. Bankers Trust\\nCo. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978). I hope the same is true for\\nthis non-textual requirement of a separate document, but the\\nmajority does not say. It remands, after all, on a point that it\\ndoes not seem to treat as jurisdictional, yet a point that was\\n\\n16 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nnot raised by either party. If this supposed violation is not\\nwaivable, we are inviting a new flock of appeals over point-\\nless formalism, or some high-stakes contempt cases. Cf.\\nWalker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (affirming\\ncriminal contempt convictions where demonstrators had vio-\\nlated temporary restraining order that was substantively un-\\nconstitutional). And if the court’s orders were enforceable by\\ncontempt here despite the majority’s finding of a formal error,\\nwhat is the point of this remand?5\\n\\n 5 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the parties did not acknowledge\\n\\nin oral argument that the district court “failed to comply with Rule 65(d).”\\nThis was a non-jurisdictional issue that surprised—even mystified—\\nhighly capable counsel on both sides. Counsel agreed only that there was\\nno document satisfying the majority’s (imagined) requirement. The sup-\\nplemental briefs by both sides did not devote energy to arguing about the\\nsupposed requirement, but neither contended that a remand is needed on\\nthis basis. They presumably just want a ruling on the merits. Still, Mil-\\nlerCoors made this point diplomatically at page 13, note 2:\\n MillerCoors respectfully notes some tension between this\\n Court’s interpretation of Rule 65(d), which requires the\\n injunction to stand on its own in a separate document en-\\n tered as a judgment under Rule 58, and the text of Rule\\n 65(d), which requires that an injunction “state the reasons\\n why it issued.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(A). Combined with\\n Rule 65(d)(1)(C)’s prohibition on incorporation by refer-\\n ence, this would seem to require that a stand-alone in-\\n junction restate any judicial reasoning that might other-\\n wise be set forth in a separate opinion, resulting in an in-\\n junction that looks very much like the district court’s May\\n 24 Opinion and Order. That is, if the district court’s May\\n 24 Opinion and Order were simply retitled “Judgment,”\\n it would appear to comply with Rule 65(d) in all other re-\\n spects.\\nExactly.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 17\\n\\n In this case, the district court’s preliminary injunction of\\nMay 24, 2019 was clear, unmistakable, and appealable. It com-\\nplied with all the terms of Rule 65(d)(1). Until this case, we\\nhave used the “separate-document” language in cases that\\naddressed real problems under Rule 65. That language has\\nbeen harmless until now. Here, however, the majority finds\\nthat “enforcing the Rule is sufficiently important that we or-\\nder a limited remand with instructions to enter the injunction\\non a document separate from the opinions.” With all due re-\\nspect, that importance is not evident to me, especially if the\\nproblem can be solved by having the district judge copy the\\ntext of his injunction of May 24 and paste it into a separate\\ndocument. In the Supreme Court’s words, “Wheels [will] spin\\nfor no practical purpose.” Bankers Trust Co., 435 U.S. at 385. If,\\non the other hand, the majority means that the district court’s\\norders here have never been enforceable for want of a sepa-\\nrate document (even though we have appellate jurisdiction),\\nthen we are inviting needless litigation in the future over this\\nunjustified formalism.\\nII. The September Orders\\n This case is actually a little more complicated because of\\nthe orders the district court issued on September 4 and Sep-\\ntember 6 granting MillerCoors some preliminary injunctive\\nrelief concerning the packaging for BudLight. The district\\ncourt had jurisdiction to issue its September 4 order first\\ngranting relief on packaging. That order did not really “mod-\\nify” the May 24 injunction but was separate in content,\\nproviding additional relief.\\n The district court also had jurisdiction to issue its Septem-\\nber 6 modification of the September 4 injunction. It was per-\\nmissible under Rule 62(d), and it did not undermine the\\n\\n18 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nintegrity of the pending appeals. In a rare case where a district\\njudge acts so as to undermine the integrity of a pending ap-\\npeal, Rule 62(g) makes clear that a court of appeals has suffi-\\ncient power to deal with the problem. We should treat these\\nmodification issues as case-management problems for the dis-\\ntrict court and for us, not as issues of jurisdiction.\\n The general rule, of course, is that only one court can have\\njurisdiction over a case at the same time. E.g., Griggs v. Provi-\\ndent Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Cases with\\npreliminary injunctions can complicate matters, though. Even\\nafter a notice of appeal for a preliminary injunction has been\\nfiled, the district court retains jurisdiction over other aspects\\nof the case. The boundaries between what has been appealed\\nand what remains before the district court may not be sharp.\\nIn this case, when the district court issued its May 24 injunc-\\ntion addressing the more urgent issue of the corn-syrup ad-\\nvertising campaign, the district court simply did not address\\nMillerCoors’ request for packaging relief. That topic had not\\nbeen presented fully to the court at the time of the preliminary\\ninjunction hearing, so the court invited additional briefing. In\\nSeptember the court issued the new injunction.\\n If the September 4 packaging order is treated as “modify-\\ning” the May 24 order, as the judge wrote, Rule 62(d) author-\\nized it. But the September 4 order is better understood as just\\na separate injunction. Nothing would have stopped Mil-\\nlerCoors from filing a new motion for a preliminary injunc-\\ntion on May 25, or stopped the district court from ruling on\\nsuch a motion. There was no overlap between the relief or-\\ndered on May 24 and the relief sought on packaging. See Ad-\\nams v. City of Chicago, 135 F.3d 1150, 1153–54 (7th Cir. 1998)\\n(no jurisdictional bar to consideration of new motion for\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 19\\n\\npreliminary injunction while appeal from first injunction is\\npending). There was no need for MillerCoors to have gone\\nthrough separate formalities of filing a new motion for a new\\npreliminary injunction. Id. (construing compliance with Cir-\\ncuit Rule 57 pragmatically as equivalent to new motion for\\nnew preliminary injunction).\\n The September 6 order modifying the September 4\\npackaging order poses a more controversial problem, but the\\nanswer should not be difficult. On September 5, Anheuser-\\nBusch filed an emergency motion to vacate, modify, or stay\\nthe September 4 order. Dkt. 107. Also on September 5,\\nAnheuser-Busch filed its notice of appeal for the September 4\\norder. Dkt. 110. On September 6, the district judge granted in\\npart the emergency motion to modify.\\n It made good sense for the district judge to address the\\nemergency motion immediately. Exercising equitable judg-\\nment, the judge sensibly intended for the September 4 pack-\\naging order to give Anheuser-Busch a brief but reasonable\\ntime to change its packaging and to avoid throwing away cur-\\nrent inventory. The emergency motion persuaded the judge\\nthat, because Anheuser-Busch had used up its existing stock\\nof packaging more quickly than expected, the September 4 or-\\nder would not allow time for a smooth transition. It had in-\\nstead put Anheuser-Busch immediately in violation, without\\nan opportunity to comply. The judge therefore delayed by\\ntwo months the effective date of the packaging order.\\n Given the urgency of that issue and the district judge’s fa-\\nmiliarity with the case, he was much better positioned than a\\nmotions panel of this court, entirely new to the case, would\\nhave been to address the problem immediately. In fast-\\n\\n20 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nmoving litigation over injunctive relief, no one should be too\\nsurprised when circumstances change quickly.\\n There is (or should be) no legal obstacle to such urgent and\\npragmatic modifications of a preliminary injunction pending\\nan appeal. The broad language of Rule 62(d) allows it: “While\\nan appeal is pending from an interlocutory order … that\\ngrants … an injunction, the court may suspend, modify, re-\\nstore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms\\nthat secure the opposing party’s rights.” Rule 62(d) is not lim-\\nited to modifications tied to stays or bonds pending appeal.\\nRule 62(d) also fits together with Federal Rule of Appellate\\nProcedure 8(a)(1), which provides in relevant part: “A party\\nmust ordinarily move first in the district court for the follow-\\ning relief: … (C) an order suspending, modifying, restoring,\\nor granting an injunction while an appeal is pending.” See\\nalso Eli Lilly and Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 384 (7th\\nCir. 2018) (district court was authorized to modify injunction\\nin response to issues raised in appellant’s opening brief; district\\ncourt’s modifications aided the appeal by “resolving technical\\nobjections or clarifying imprecise wording”), citing Dixon v.\\nEdwards, 290 F.3d 699, 709 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002) (district court\\nretained jurisdiction to proceed as to matters “in aid of the\\nappeal”). It would surely be odd for a district court to respond\\nto a motion prompted by Appellate Rule 8(a)(1) by saying, “I\\ndon’t have jurisdiction anymore.”\\n Despite these textual provisions in the rules authorizing\\nthe district court’s actions here, some circuits have added a\\nnon-textual gloss to these rules, saying that the district court’s\\npower over its own injunctions pending appeal is limited to\\nacts designed to “preserve the status quo.” See generally 16\\nWright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3921.2.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 21\\n\\nWright and Miller show in detail why this line of cases should\\nbe questioned. Compare Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace\\nWorkers v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 847 F.2d 1014, 1018 (2d Cir.\\n1988) (repeating “status quo” gloss), and Ideal Toy Corp. v.\\nSayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623, 625 (2d Cir. 1962) (adopting\\n“status quo” gloss); with id. at 628 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“The\\nrule [now Rule 62(d)] is clear and unequivocal; I see no justi-\\nfication whatever for the novel and restrictive gloss now\\nplaced upon it by my brothers.”), and Ortho Pharmaceutical\\nCorp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir. 1989) (district\\ncourt had jurisdiction to enter order modifying injunction on\\nappeal not only to preserve status quo but also to “preserve\\nintegrity of the appeal”).\\n The non-textual “status quo” gloss has both metaphysical\\nand pragmatic foundations. The metaphysical is the principle\\nthat only one court at a time may exercise jurisdiction over a\\ncase or portion of a case. Yet American federalism split the in-\\ndivisible atom of sovereignty with a workable but sometimes\\ncomplicated sharing of sovereignty. Similarly, federal courts\\ncan manage a little concurrent jurisdiction between trial and\\nappellate courts when there are good reasons—and express\\ntextual authorization—to do so.6\\n The pragmatic foundation for the “status quo” gloss is a\\nconcern that a district judge could use her power under Rule\\n62(d) to interfere with an appeal, forcing the court of appeals\\nand appellant to aim at a moving target. I agree with Wright\\n\\n 6 The majority implicitly criticizes the district court for not using the\\nprocedure in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 for modifying an order\\nthat is before the court of appeals. The majority’s point begs the jurisdic-\\ntional question, however. By its terms, Rule 62.1(a) applies only when the\\ndistrict court “lacks authority” to grant relief.\\n\\n22 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nand Miller that this danger “seems more abstract than real.”\\n§ 3921.2 at 69. In the rare case where a district judge seems to\\nbe interfering with an appeal, Rule 62(g) makes clear that the\\ncourt of appeals retains ample power to take charge.\\n As with the Rule 65(d) issue, the parties are not confused\\nabout their rights and obligations. The better course here is to\\nrecognize that we are dealing with equitable powers and fast-\\nmoving litigation. We and the district court are capable of\\nmanaging the case and the multiple appeals in practical and\\nlegally permissible ways. We should not remand now. We\\nshould promptly address the merits of MillerCoors’ appeal of\\nthe May 24 order (No. 19-2200), and we should order expe-\\ndited briefing and argument on the merits of the Anheuser-\\nBusch appeals from the September orders (Nos. 19-2713 & 19-\\n2782).\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448114/\", \"author_raw\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670861/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\nMILLERCOORS LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 19-cv-218-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 —\n INTERIM ORDER OCTOBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n PER CURIAM. On May 24, 2019, the district court entered\nan opinion that concludes with language that the judge be-\nlieved would serve as a preliminary injunction. MillerCoors\nfiled an appeal, which has been docketed as No. 19-2200. But\nthe district court did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.\n\n2 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\n\n65(d)(1)(C), which requires every injunction to be set forth\nwithout referring to any other document. See, e.g., Chicago v.\nSessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc), slip\nop. 3 (Rule 65 “requires a separate document setting forth\nthe terms of such an injunction”); Auto Driveaway Franchise\nSystems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670,\n676 (7th Cir. 2019); BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Capital\nPremium Financing, Inc., 912 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.\n2019); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 527 (7th\nCir. 1988); Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 886,\n514 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975).\n In supplemental jurisdictional memoranda filed at our\nrequest after oral argument, both sides acknowledged that\nthe district court failed to comply with Rule 65(d). Neither\nside asked us to depart from the decisions we have cited.\n On September 4, 2019, while appeal No. 19-2200 was\npending, the district court entered another opinion stating\nthat it was “modifying” the decision of May 24. The district\ncourt did not follow the procedure specified by Fed. R. Civ.\nP. 62.1 for modifying an order that is before the court of ap-\npeals, nor did it discuss the rule that only one court at a time\nhas jurisdiction over “those aspects of the case involved in\nthe appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459\nU.S. 56, 58 (1982). And as with the May 24 opinion, the dis-\ntrict court did not comply with Rule 65(d). Nor did the judge\nmodify the injunction as a condition of a stay or bond pend-\ning appeal, as Rule 62(d) permits. (It provides: “While an\nappeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judg-\nment that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, dissolves, or\nrefuses to dissolve or modify an injunction, the court may\nsuspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for\n\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 3\n\nbond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.”\nThe authority to make changes linked to bonds or otherwise\nsecure the enjoined party’s rights differs from a blanket\ngrant of permission to impose new obligations, and substan-\ntially alter the issues, while appeals are pending.) Anheuser-\nBusch’s appeal from the September 4 order has been docket-\ned as No. 19-2713.\n On September 6, 2019, the district court modified the\nmodification of September 4. Once again it did not discuss\nits jurisdiction to do so, did not rely on Rule 62(d), did not\nfollow the procedure specified by Rule 62.1, and did not\ncomply with Rule 65(d). Anheuser-Busch’s appeal from the\norder of September 6 has been docketed as No. 19-2782.\n Although the district court’s intent to afford enforceable\nequitable relief is sufficiently clear to provide appellate ju-\nrisdiction despite the noncompliance with Rule 65(d),\nsee Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Operating Engineers Union,\n824 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2016), enforcing that Rule is suffi-\nciently important that we order a limited remand with in-\nstructions to enter the injunction on a document separate\nfrom the opinions.\n In the process, the district court may be able to avoid the\npotential jurisdictional problems that its modifications of the\ninitial order have created. (We call them modifications even\nthough the order of September 4 does not change any lan-\nguage of the May 24 decision. It seems more like a second\npreliminary injunction, although the judge called it a modifi-\ncation. The September 6 order, by contrast, explicitly modi-\nfies the September 4 order.) While we recognize that a dis-\ntrict court is in the best position to address urgent issues and\nchanges in circumstance related to a preliminary injunction,\n\n4 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\n\nthe court must nonetheless comply with the procedures for\ndoing so in order to avoid creating potential complications\non review. A single injunction complying with Rule 65(d)\nwould be subject to appeal—and, as there has not yet been\neven one injunction that satisfies Rule 65(d), the consolidated\ninjunction could be treated as the initial order, allowing both\nsides to appeal without any potential obstacle in the\nGriggs doctrine or Rule 62.1, or any need for us to consider\nthe disagreement among the circuits about the extent to\nwhich preliminary injunctions are subject to modification by\na district judge while an appeal is pending. Compare Ortho\nPharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir.\n1989), with Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817,\n820 (5th Cir. 1989).\n If the district court wants to make still further changes, in\nlight of discovery in the ongoing litigation, it is free to do\nso—though the judge also is free to enter an injunction con-\nsolidating all decisions made to date but leaving all else to\nthe permanent-injunction phase. We leave this decision in\nthe capable hands of the district court.\n Once the district court has complied with this limited\nremand, both sides should file new notices of appeal and\npropose a schedule for new briefs. The briefs already filed\nconcerning the May 24 order may be incorporated by refer-\nence, but we have yet to receive briefs concerning the Sep-\ntember 4 and 6 orders. All aspects of the case must be fully\nbriefed before this court will proceed to decision.\n\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 5\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\nMILLERCOORS LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 19-cv-218-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 —\\n INTERIM ORDER OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n PER CURIAM. On May 24, 2019, the district court entered\\nan opinion that concludes with language that the judge be-\\nlieved would serve as a preliminary injunction. MillerCoors\\nfiled an appeal, which has been docketed as No. 19-2200. But\\nthe district court did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n\\n2 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n65(d)(1)(C), which requires every injunction to be set forth\\nwithout referring to any other document. See, e.g., Chicago v.\\nSessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc), slip\\nop. 3 (Rule 65 “requires a separate document setting forth\\nthe terms of such an injunction”); Auto Driveaway Franchise\\nSystems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670,\\n676 (7th Cir. 2019); BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Capital\\nPremium Financing, Inc., 912 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.\\n2019); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 527 (7th\\nCir. 1988); Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 886,\\n514 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975).\\n In supplemental jurisdictional memoranda filed at our\\nrequest after oral argument, both sides acknowledged that\\nthe district court failed to comply with Rule 65(d). Neither\\nside asked us to depart from the decisions we have cited.\\n On September 4, 2019, while appeal No. 19-2200 was\\npending, the district court entered another opinion stating\\nthat it was “modifying” the decision of May 24. The district\\ncourt did not follow the procedure specified by Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 62.1 for modifying an order that is before the court of ap-\\npeals, nor did it discuss the rule that only one court at a time\\nhas jurisdiction over “those aspects of the case involved in\\nthe appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459\\nU.S. 56, 58 (1982). And as with the May 24 opinion, the dis-\\ntrict court did not comply with Rule 65(d). Nor did the judge\\nmodify the injunction as a condition of a stay or bond pend-\\ning appeal, as Rule 62(d) permits. (It provides: “While an\\nappeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judg-\\nment that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, dissolves, or\\nrefuses to dissolve or modify an injunction, the court may\\nsuspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 3\\n\\nbond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.”\\nThe authority to make changes linked to bonds or otherwise\\nsecure the enjoined party’s rights differs from a blanket\\ngrant of permission to impose new obligations, and substan-\\ntially alter the issues, while appeals are pending.) Anheuser-\\nBusch’s appeal from the September 4 order has been docket-\\ned as No. 19-2713.\\n On September 6, 2019, the district court modified the\\nmodification of September 4. Once again it did not discuss\\nits jurisdiction to do so, did not rely on Rule 62(d), did not\\nfollow the procedure specified by Rule 62.1, and did not\\ncomply with Rule 65(d). Anheuser-Busch’s appeal from the\\norder of September 6 has been docketed as No. 19-2782.\\n Although the district court’s intent to afford enforceable\\nequitable relief is sufficiently clear to provide appellate ju-\\nrisdiction despite the noncompliance with Rule 65(d),\\nsee Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Operating Engineers Union,\\n824 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2016), enforcing that Rule is suffi-\\nciently important that we order a limited remand with in-\\nstructions to enter the injunction on a document separate\\nfrom the opinions.\\n In the process, the district court may be able to avoid the\\npotential jurisdictional problems that its modifications of the\\ninitial order have created. (We call them modifications even\\nthough the order of September 4 does not change any lan-\\nguage of the May 24 decision. It seems more like a second\\npreliminary injunction, although the judge called it a modifi-\\ncation. The September 6 order, by contrast, explicitly modi-\\nfies the September 4 order.) While we recognize that a dis-\\ntrict court is in the best position to address urgent issues and\\nchanges in circumstance related to a preliminary injunction,\\n\\n4 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nthe court must nonetheless comply with the procedures for\\ndoing so in order to avoid creating potential complications\\non review. A single injunction complying with Rule 65(d)\\nwould be subject to appeal—and, as there has not yet been\\neven one injunction that satisfies Rule 65(d), the consolidated\\ninjunction could be treated as the initial order, allowing both\\nsides to appeal without any potential obstacle in the\\nGriggs doctrine or Rule 62.1, or any need for us to consider\\nthe disagreement among the circuits about the extent to\\nwhich preliminary injunctions are subject to modification by\\na district judge while an appeal is pending. Compare Ortho\\nPharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir.\\n1989), with Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817,\\n820 (5th Cir. 1989).\\n If the district court wants to make still further changes, in\\nlight of discovery in the ongoing litigation, it is free to do\\nso—though the judge also is free to enter an injunction con-\\nsolidating all decisions made to date but leaving all else to\\nthe permanent-injunction phase. We leave this decision in\\nthe capable hands of the district court.\\n Once the district court has complied with this limited\\nremand, both sides should file new notices of appeal and\\npropose a schedule for new briefs. The briefs already filed\\nconcerning the May 24 order may be incorporated by refer-\\nence, but we have yet to receive briefs concerning the Sep-\\ntember 4 and 6 orders. All aspects of the case must be fully\\nbriefed before this court will proceed to decision.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 5\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4681,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4670948,"string":"4,670,948"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-2782"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\nMILLERCOORS LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 19-cv-218-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 —\\n INTERIM ORDER OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n PER CURIAM. On May 24, 2019, the district court entered\\nan opinion that concludes with language that the judge be-\\nlieved would serve as a preliminary injunction. MillerCoors\\nfiled an appeal, which has been docketed as No. 19-2200. But\\nthe district court did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n\\n2 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n65(d)(1)(C), which requires every injunction to be set forth\\nwithout referring to any other document. See, e.g., Chicago v.\\nSessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc), slip\\nop. 3 (Rule 65 “requires a separate document setting forth\\nthe terms of such an injunction”); Auto Driveaway Franchise\\nSystems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670,\\n676 (7th Cir. 2019); BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Capital\\nPremium Financing, Inc., 912 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.\\n2019); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 527 (7th\\nCir. 1988); Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 886,\\n514 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975).\\n In supplemental jurisdictional memoranda filed at our\\nrequest after oral argument, both sides acknowledged that\\nthe district court failed to comply with Rule 65(d). Neither\\nside asked us to depart from the decisions we have cited.\\n On September 4, 2019, while appeal No. 19-2200 was\\npending, the district court entered another opinion stating\\nthat it was “modifying” the decision of May 24. The district\\ncourt did not follow the procedure specified by Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 62.1 for modifying an order that is before the court of ap-\\npeals, nor did it discuss the rule that only one court at a time\\nhas jurisdiction over “those aspects of the case involved in\\nthe appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459\\nU.S. 56, 58 (1982). And as with the May 24 opinion, the dis-\\ntrict court did not comply with Rule 65(d). Nor did the judge\\nmodify the injunction as a condition of a stay or bond pend-\\ning appeal, as Rule 62(d) permits. (It provides: “While an\\nappeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judg-\\nment that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, dissolves, or\\nrefuses to dissolve or modify an injunction, the court may\\nsuspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 3\\n\\nbond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.”\\nThe authority to make changes linked to bonds or otherwise\\nsecure the enjoined party’s rights differs from a blanket\\ngrant of permission to impose new obligations, and substan-\\ntially alter the issues, while appeals are pending.) Anheuser-\\nBusch’s appeal from the September 4 order has been docket-\\ned as No. 19-2713.\\n On September 6, 2019, the district court modified the\\nmodification of September 4. Once again it did not discuss\\nits jurisdiction to do so, did not rely on Rule 62(d), did not\\nfollow the procedure specified by Rule 62.1, and did not\\ncomply with Rule 65(d). Anheuser-Busch’s appeal from the\\norder of September 6 has been docketed as No. 19-2782.\\n Although the district court’s intent to afford enforceable\\nequitable relief is sufficiently clear to provide appellate ju-\\nrisdiction despite the noncompliance with Rule 65(d),\\nsee Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Operating Engineers Union,\\n824 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2016), enforcing that Rule is suffi-\\nciently important that we order a limited remand with in-\\nstructions to enter the injunction on a document separate\\nfrom the opinions.\\n In the process, the district court may be able to avoid the\\npotential jurisdictional problems that its modifications of the\\ninitial order have created. (We call them modifications even\\nthough the order of September 4 does not change any lan-\\nguage of the May 24 decision. It seems more like a second\\npreliminary injunction, although the judge called it a modifi-\\ncation. The September 6 order, by contrast, explicitly modi-\\nfies the September 4 order.) While we recognize that a dis-\\ntrict court is in the best position to address urgent issues and\\nchanges in circumstance related to a preliminary injunction,\\n\\n4 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nthe court must nonetheless comply with the procedures for\\ndoing so in order to avoid creating potential complications\\non review. A single injunction complying with Rule 65(d)\\nwould be subject to appeal—and, as there has not yet been\\neven one injunction that satisfies Rule 65(d), the consolidated\\ninjunction could be treated as the initial order, allowing both\\nsides to appeal without any potential obstacle in the\\nGriggs doctrine or Rule 62.1, or any need for us to consider\\nthe disagreement among the circuits about the extent to\\nwhich preliminary injunctions are subject to modification by\\na district judge while an appeal is pending. Compare Ortho\\nPharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir.\\n1989), with Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817,\\n820 (5th Cir. 1989).\\n If the district court wants to make still further changes, in\\nlight of discovery in the ongoing litigation, it is free to do\\nso—though the judge also is free to enter an injunction con-\\nsolidating all decisions made to date but leaving all else to\\nthe permanent-injunction phase. We leave this decision in\\nthe capable hands of the district court.\\n Once the district court has complied with this limited\\nremand, both sides should file new notices of appeal and\\npropose a schedule for new briefs. The briefs already filed\\nconcerning the May 24 order may be incorporated by refer-\\nence, but we have yet to receive briefs concerning the Sep-\\ntember 4 and 6 orders. All aspects of the case must be fully\\nbriefed before this court will proceed to decision.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 5\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448201/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}, {\"author\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent\\nfrom the remand order. We do not need to remand this appeal\\nfrom the district court’s preliminary injunction of May 24,\\n2019. It is briefed, argued, and ready to be decided on the\\nmerits. Judge Conley complied with all of the formal\\nrequirements for issuing an injunction. With respect, contrary\\nto my colleagues’ views, Rule 65(d)(1) simply does not\\ncontain the “separate-document” requirement that is the basis\\nfor the majority’s remand. The majority offers here no textual\\nor other defense for dicta in prior cases asserting such a\\nrequirement. Never before have we put any teeth behind this\\ngroundless and trivial “requirement.” This is a case where\\ntext and pragmatics point in the same direction. We need not\\nremand for formalistic compliance with an imagined and\\nnon-jurisdictional rule that no party has raised. In addition,\\non the more consequential issue here, the district court had\\njurisdiction to issue its two September orders on BudLight’s\\npackaging.\\n I address in Part I the Rule 65(d) issue and in Part II the\\nissues posed by the district court’s separate injunction on\\npackaging and its emergency order relaxing that injunction at\\nAnheuser-Busch’s request.\\nI. A Separate Document?\\n The formal requirements of Rule 65(d)(1)—those actually\\nincluded in the text of the rule—are vital when a district judge\\nexercises one of the most awesome powers of the office: issu-\\ning a preliminary injunction that is enforceable by contempt\\nsanctions. Here are the textual requirements:\\n (1) Contents. Every order granting an injunction\\n and every restraining order must:\\n\\n6 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n (A) state the reasons why it issued;\\n (B) state its terms specifically; and\\n (C) describe in reasonable detail—and not by refer-\\n ring to the complaint or other document—the act or\\n acts restrained or required.\\n Compliance with these requirements ensures that a party\\nwho is restrained by a preliminary injunction knows clearly\\nwhat conduct is being restrained and why. Oral orders can be\\nvague and easily misunderstood. Incorporating other\\ndocuments can lead to uncertainty. Failing to state clearly the\\nreasons for the injunction may lead to hasty, sometimes too-\\ncasual analysis.\\n In this case, the preliminary injunction is in a document\\ntitled “Opinion and Order,” which sets forth a detailed and\\nthoughtful analysis of the facts and the law. Under the head-\\ning “Order” on page 49, the document spells out what is pro-\\nhibited:\\n IT IS ORDERED that:\\n 1) Plaintiff MillerCoors, LLCʹs motion for pre-\\n liminary injunction (dkt. #8) is GRANTED IN\\n PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows. De-\\n fendant Anheuser Busch is PRELIMINARILY\\n ENJOINED from using the following language\\n within ten (10) days of this order in its commer-\\n cials, print advertising and social media:\\n • Bud Light contains “100% less corn syrup”;\\n • Bud Light in direct reference to “no corn\\n syrup” without any reference to “brewed with,”\\n “made with” or “uses”;\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 7\\n\\n • Miller Lite and/or Coors Light and “corn\\n syrup” without including any reference to\\n “brewed with,” “made with” or “uses”; and\\n • Describing “corn syrup” as an ingredient “in”\\n the finished product.\\nMillerCoors, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 385 F. Supp. 3d 730,\\n760 (W.D. Wis. 2019). This approach was not unusual; district\\njudges issue such orders often, combining the opinion and the\\norder, ordinarily without objection from the parties or this\\ncourt as to the form. See, e.g., Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 602\\nF.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming injunction in same doc-\\nument as reasons for issuing it: “The injunction is sufficiently\\nprecise and self-contained, and we require nothing more to\\ncomply with Rule 65.”); Russian Media Group, LLC v. Cable\\nAmerica, Inc., 2009 WL 440957, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2009)\\n(combining findings of fact, conclusions of law, and specific\\nterms of preliminary injunction in one document), aff’d, 598\\nF.3d 302 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The order at the end of the combined “Opinion and Or-\\nder” complied with all of the express requirements of Rule\\n65(d)(1). It served all the purposes of that rule. No party has\\nobjected to its form. When the panel questioned this form in\\noral argument, counsel for Anheuser-Busch confirmed that\\nhis client understood that it was being enjoined and under-\\nstood what was required. It also understood that it could ap-\\npeal if it wanted to. The order may or may not turn out to be\\nsound on the merits, but there is no formal problem with it,\\nnothing that affects appellate jurisdiction, and nothing that\\njustifies a remand for the district judge to copy the text from\\npage 49 and paste it into a new, separate document.\\n\\n8 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n The majority, however, asserts that Rule 65(d) requires\\nevery injunction to be set forth on a separate document that\\ndoes not refer to any other document. With respect, that re-\\nquirement does not appear in Rule 65(d). The requirement\\ndoes appear as dicta in a number of our cases dating back to\\n1988, but as explained below, those cases required us to ad-\\ndress other, genuine problems in the preliminary injunctions.\\nUntil now, we have never attached any real consequences to\\na failure to comply only with this imagined, non-textual re-\\nquirement. Rather than attach new consequences now\\nthrough this remand, we should retreat from our earlier dicta.\\n A good place to start is BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v.\\nCapital Premium Financing, Inc., 912 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.\\n2019), where we identified several critical problems in a pre-\\nliminary injunction: the injunction left important issues unre-\\nsolved; it used ambiguous language and seemed to incorpo-\\nrate another document; and it required no bond. We also said\\nthis regarding a separate document:\\n Third, the district court failed to enter an injunc-\\n tion as a separate document under Fed. R. Civ.\\n P. 65(d)(1)(C). Language in an opinion does not\\n comply with Rule 65(d). See Gunn v. University\\n Committee to End the War, 399 U.S. 383 (1970).\\n Neither side reminded the district court of the\\n need to enter an injunction.\\nId. As noted, Rule 65(d)(1)(C) contains no such requirement.\\nMy colleagues and I agree, of course, that language in an\\nopinion that stops short of an explicit order does not amount\\nto an enforceable order. Here, however, the language of the\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 9\\n\\norder was clear here, and Gunn is not on point for a “separate-\\ndocument” requirement.1\\n In BankDirect, we recognized that the district court had is-\\nsued a written order that it expected the defendant to obey.\\nThat was enough to give us appellate jurisdiction—draining\\nof any force the suggestion in the opinion that “no injunction”\\nhad been entered. Failure to comply with the textual require-\\nments of Rule 65(d) does not defeat appellate jurisdiction, lest\\nthe enjoined party be unable to obtain appellate review with\\nthe threat of contempt sanctions hanging over her head. E.g.,\\nAbbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2321 (2018); Advent Electronics,\\nInc. v. Buckman, 112 F.3d 267, 273 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding ap-\\npellate jurisdiction over appeal from preliminary injunction\\nthat merely incorporated terms of another document). By con-\\ntrast, when there is genuinely no injunction at all, there is no\\nappellate jurisdiction. E.g., Bates v. Johnson, 901 F.2d 1424,\\n1428 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Because the state is not under an en-\\nforceable constraint, there is nothing before us on appeal.”).\\nWe vacated the injunction in BankDirect—but not because of\\nthe formal problems we identified. We vacated because the\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 In Gunn, a three-judge district court had issued an opinion saying\\nthat a statute was unconstitutional. Regarding relief, the opinion said:\\n“The Plaintiffs herein are entitled to their declaratory judgment to that ef-\\nfect, and to injunctive relief against the enforcement of [the statute] as now\\nworded, insofar as it may affect rights guaranteed under the First Amend-\\nment.” 399 U.S. at 386. No language in the district court’s opinion could\\nbe understood as enjoining any particular defendant from doing anything\\nin particular, as required under Rule 65. No wonder, then, that the Su-\\npreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1253 because the district court “has issued neither an injunction nor an\\norder granting or denying one.” 399 U.S. at 390.\\n\\n10 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\ninjunction should have expired, according to its rationale,\\nmonths before the appeal was even argued. 912 F.3d at 1059.\\n In Auto Driveaway Franchise Systems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway\\nRichmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2019), we repeated, with\\nvery careful wording, the separate-document point from\\nBankDirect: “We interpret Rule 65(d)(1)(C) to require that an in-\\njunction must be embodied in a standalone separate docu-\\nment.” Id. at 676 (emphasis added), citing 912 F.3d at 1057.\\nThe district court in Auto Driveaway issued one document. It\\nstarted with eight pages of legal analysis and ended with a\\npreliminary injunction with specific terms. Our opinion did\\nnot question the “separate-document” dicta from BankDirect,\\nbut we declined to attach any consequences to failure to com-\\nply. We found that the absence of a separate document did\\nnot affect appellate jurisdiction. 928 F.3d at 676–79. The order\\nhad the practical effect of an injunction and satisfied all of the\\ntextual requirements of Rule 65(d). Id. at 678. We therefore\\nsaid there was no need to remand the case to cure the lack of\\na separate document, and we proceeded to the merits. Id. at\\n679. We should do the same here.2\\n The “separate-document” requirement in this circuit\\nstems from language in Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d\\n525 (7th Cir. 1988), where the district court had failed to com-\\nply with the Rules’ express and important requirements. The\\n\\n\\n\\n 2My colleagues and I agree that failure to comply with the express\\nformal requirements of Rule 58 and 65 can cause all sorts of avoidable and\\nexpensive procedural snarls. That has been shown in scores or hundreds\\nof our cases in recent decades. I too can be a Rule 58 “hawk.” My objection\\nhere is to enforcement of a non-textual requirement that serves no appar-\\nent purpose beyond the textual requirements.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 11\\n\\ndistrict court had issued an opinion that was intended to re-\\nsolve the case entirely. It ended:\\n It is therefore ordered, that summary judgment\\n is granted in favor of the plaintiff. The court fur-\\n ther orders that the preliminary injunction now\\n in effect against defendant be made permanent,\\n subject to the following conditions: defendant is\\n permanently enjoined from determining any vi-\\n olations, or assessing any penalties or fines, or\\n issuing a conditional license, to plaintiff, for any\\n matter arising out of the matters listed in the\\n Proof of Service dated November 14, 1986.\\n863 F.2d at 526. That was bad enough, but the court’s separate\\nfinal judgment was not even consistent with that opinion. The\\njudgment said: “IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the\\ndefendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Plain-\\ntiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the pre-\\nliminary injunction previously entered against defendant is\\nhereby made permanent.” Id. Complicating matters further,\\nthere was no actual preliminary injunction; there had been\\nonly an initial temporary restraining order that had been ex-\\ntended by consent of the parties.\\n “This is a mess,” we wrote. 863 F.2d at 527. There were\\nclear problems under both Rule 65 and Rule 58. No document\\nspelled out the requirements of an injunction without refer-\\nence to another document, and the actual judgment conflicted\\nwith the opinion. Regarding a separate document, we wrote:\\n A judicial opinion is not itself an order to act or\\n desist; it is a statement of reasons supporting\\n the judgment. The command comes in the\\n\\n12 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n separate document entered under Fed. R. Civ.\\n P. 58, which alone is enforceable. There must be\\n a separate document, with a self-contained\\n statement of what the court directs be done. So\\n if the opinion contains language awarding de-\\n claratory relief, but the judgment does not, the\\n opinion has been reduced to dictum; only the\\n judgment need be obeyed.\\nId. at 527. All of that is clearly correct as far as it went, applied\\nto the final judgment that was subject to the explicit separate-\\ndocument requirement of Rule 58. Our opinion does not sup-\\nport extending such a requirement to interlocutory orders,\\nmuch less to preliminary injunctions under Rule 65(d), which\\ndoes not contain it.3\\n The strongest effort to offer a textual basis for a “separate-\\ndocument” requirement for preliminary injunctions is in Beu-\\nkema’s Petroleum Co. v. Admiral Petroleum Co., 613 F.2d 626 (6th\\nCir. 1979). That case was an appeal from a district court’s\\nopinion saying that “A preliminary injunction will be is-\\nsued”—but none ever was. Id. at 628. Although the parties\\n\\n 3The majority also cites our en banc but non-precedential order va-\\ncating the grant of en banc review in the sanctuary-city case, Chicago v.\\nSessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc), where the order\\nsaid that Rule 65 “requires a separate document setting forth the terms of\\nsuch an injunction.” We were talking there about a permanent injunction,\\nwhich is ordinarily a final judgment subject to Rule 58’s explicit separate-\\ndocument requirement. The problem we faced in the August 10, 2018 or-\\nder was that the district judge had said he intended to issue a permanent\\ninjunction but had not yet done it. He quickly did so, and on August 30,\\n2018, we dismissed as moot the appeal of the superseded preliminary in-\\njunction. That situation was much like that in Beukema’s Petroleum, dis-\\ncussed next.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 13\\n\\nhad treated that opinion as a preliminary injunction, the Sixth\\nCircuit remanded the case for issuance of the order promised\\nin the opinion.\\n Beukema’s Petroleum relied not on Rule 65(d) but on Rule\\n54(a), which provides: “‘Judgment’ as used in these rules in-\\ncludes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A\\njudgment should not include recitals of pleadings, a master’s\\nreport, or a record of prior proceedings.” Beukema’s Petroleum\\nrelied on this provision to extend the separate-document re-\\nquirement of Rule 58 to a preliminary injunction. 613 F.2d at\\n627 & n.1.\\n The result in Beukema’s Petroleum was correct since the\\npromised (or threatened) preliminary injunction had never\\nbeen issued. But its Rule 54 rationale does not hold up—and\\npoints toward an unworkable rule—when extended accord-\\ning to its logic to every order subject to interlocutory appeal.4\\n The universe of nonfinal appealable orders is not small. Its\\nexact bounds cannot always be determined in advance by a\\ndistrict court. The majority’s rule would seem to require high-\\nchurch, Rule 58-compliant separate documents, not only for\\ngrants of preliminary injunctions but also, for example, for\\n\\n\\n 4 Beukema’s Petroleum also cited, as the majority does here, Chief Freight\\n\\nLines Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 886, 514 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975),\\nwhere the district court had made an oral statement purporting to grant a\\npreliminary injunction but had not issued any written order doing so. See\\nalso Furr’s Cafeterias, Inc. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 505, 506–07 (5th Cir. 1978) (re-\\nmanding where district court held hearing on motion for preliminary in-\\njunction and issued an order enjoining the NLRB from holding certain\\nhearings and declaring “This is a final order and judgment.”). Both of\\nthese cases presented conflicts between a district judge’s different pro-\\nnouncements. There is no such conflict here.\\n\\n14 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nany order denying or “refusing to … modify” a preliminary\\ninjunction, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), any mine-run Rule 12(b)(6)\\nor Rule 56 order denying qualified immunity, see Mitchell v.\\nForsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985), and every other collateral or-\\nder subject to interlocutory appeal.\\n Are we ready to start remanding appeals from orders\\ndenying motions for preliminary injunctions for entry of a\\ndocument, separate from an opinion explaining the judge’s\\nreasons? I hope not. Such omissions have heretofore escaped\\nour every notice. See, e.g., HH-Indianapolis LLC v. Consol. City\\nof Indianapolis/Marion Cty., 265 F. Supp. 3d 873, 892 (S.D. Ind.\\n2017) (denying injunction with phrase “so ordered” at end of\\nopinion), aff’d, 889 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 2018). The drafters of the\\nfederal rules knew better than to insist on such formalisms.\\nSee Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 advisory committee’s note to 2002\\namendment (“The new all-purpose definition of the entry of\\njudgment must be applied with common sense … .”); see also\\nFed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(B) (“failure to set forth a judgment or\\norder on a separate document … does not affect the validity\\nof an appeal from that judgment or order.”).\\n The majority’s “separate-document” addition to Rule\\n65(d) does not solve any problem not addressed by the ex-\\npress formal requirements in the rule. It does, however, raise\\nsome new problems. Neither the majority here nor any other\\nopinion endorsing a “separate-document” requirement for\\npreliminary injunctions explains how a district court is sup-\\nposed to comply with both this non-textual requirement and\\nthe important, explicit requirement in Rule 65(d)(1)(A) that\\nthe preliminary injunction “state the reasons why it issued.”\\n If we extend the separate-document requirement of Rule\\n58 to preliminary injunctions, what should a district judge do\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 15\\n\\nwith our repeated instructions that a Rule 58 final judgment\\nshould not contain legal reasoning? See, e.g., TDK Electronics\\nCorp. v. Draiman, 321 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2003); American\\nNat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Secretary, 946 F.2d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir.\\n1991), citing Reytblatt v. Denton, 812 F.2d 1042, 1044 (7th Cir.\\n1987); In re Behrens, 900 F.2d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Pahule,\\n849 F.2d 1056, 1058 (7th Cir. 1988); Foremost Sales Promotions,\\nInc. v. Director, 812 F.2d 1044, 1045 (7th Cir. 1987). Perhaps the\\njudge could say, of course, that “in accord with a separate\\nopinion,” the following parties are enjoined from the follow-\\ning conduct. But those two separate documents, an opinion\\nand an injunction, are not a noticeable improvement on the\\ncombined “Opinion and Order” here.\\n More troubling is the majority’s silence about the legal\\nconsequences of a district judge’s failure to comply with this\\nnon-textual requirement. The majority and I agree we have\\nappellate jurisdiction in No. 19-2200. See Auto Driveaway, 928\\nF.3d at 676–79. But is a decision in the form used here—\\ncombining findings of fact, conclusions of law, and specific\\nterms of a preliminary injunction—valid and enforceable with\\ncontempt sanctions? Or is the enjoined party free to disregard\\nit with impunity? Is the majority implying that Anheuser-\\nBusch may start running the enjoined advertisements\\ntomorrow? I hope not, for institutional reasons, but I cannot\\ntell from the majority’s order.\\n On a related note, even a violation of the textual separate-\\ndocument requirement in Rule 58 is waivable. Bankers Trust\\nCo. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978). I hope the same is true for\\nthis non-textual requirement of a separate document, but the\\nmajority does not say. It remands, after all, on a point that it\\ndoes not seem to treat as jurisdictional, yet a point that was\\n\\n16 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nnot raised by either party. If this supposed violation is not\\nwaivable, we are inviting a new flock of appeals over point-\\nless formalism, or some high-stakes contempt cases. Cf.\\nWalker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (affirming\\ncriminal contempt convictions where demonstrators had vio-\\nlated temporary restraining order that was substantively un-\\nconstitutional). And if the court’s orders were enforceable by\\ncontempt here despite the majority’s finding of a formal error,\\nwhat is the point of this remand?5\\n\\n 5 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the parties did not acknowledge\\n\\nin oral argument that the district court “failed to comply with Rule 65(d).”\\nThis was a non-jurisdictional issue that surprised—even mystified—\\nhighly capable counsel on both sides. Counsel agreed only that there was\\nno document satisfying the majority’s (imagined) requirement. The sup-\\nplemental briefs by both sides did not devote energy to arguing about the\\nsupposed requirement, but neither contended that a remand is needed on\\nthis basis. They presumably just want a ruling on the merits. Still, Mil-\\nlerCoors made this point diplomatically at page 13, note 2:\\n MillerCoors respectfully notes some tension between this\\n Court’s interpretation of Rule 65(d), which requires the\\n injunction to stand on its own in a separate document en-\\n tered as a judgment under Rule 58, and the text of Rule\\n 65(d), which requires that an injunction “state the reasons\\n why it issued.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(A). Combined with\\n Rule 65(d)(1)(C)’s prohibition on incorporation by refer-\\n ence, this would seem to require that a stand-alone in-\\n junction restate any judicial reasoning that might other-\\n wise be set forth in a separate opinion, resulting in an in-\\n junction that looks very much like the district court’s May\\n 24 Opinion and Order. That is, if the district court’s May\\n 24 Opinion and Order were simply retitled “Judgment,”\\n it would appear to comply with Rule 65(d) in all other re-\\n spects.\\nExactly.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 17\\n\\n In this case, the district court’s preliminary injunction of\\nMay 24, 2019 was clear, unmistakable, and appealable. It com-\\nplied with all the terms of Rule 65(d)(1). Until this case, we\\nhave used the “separate-document” language in cases that\\naddressed real problems under Rule 65. That language has\\nbeen harmless until now. Here, however, the majority finds\\nthat “enforcing the Rule is sufficiently important that we or-\\nder a limited remand with instructions to enter the injunction\\non a document separate from the opinions.” With all due re-\\nspect, that importance is not evident to me, especially if the\\nproblem can be solved by having the district judge copy the\\ntext of his injunction of May 24 and paste it into a separate\\ndocument. In the Supreme Court’s words, “Wheels [will] spin\\nfor no practical purpose.” Bankers Trust Co., 435 U.S. at 385. If,\\non the other hand, the majority means that the district court’s\\norders here have never been enforceable for want of a sepa-\\nrate document (even though we have appellate jurisdiction),\\nthen we are inviting needless litigation in the future over this\\nunjustified formalism.\\nII. The September Orders\\n This case is actually a little more complicated because of\\nthe orders the district court issued on September 4 and Sep-\\ntember 6 granting MillerCoors some preliminary injunctive\\nrelief concerning the packaging for BudLight. The district\\ncourt had jurisdiction to issue its September 4 order first\\ngranting relief on packaging. That order did not really “mod-\\nify” the May 24 injunction but was separate in content,\\nproviding additional relief.\\n The district court also had jurisdiction to issue its Septem-\\nber 6 modification of the September 4 injunction. It was per-\\nmissible under Rule 62(d), and it did not undermine the\\n\\n18 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nintegrity of the pending appeals. In a rare case where a district\\njudge acts so as to undermine the integrity of a pending ap-\\npeal, Rule 62(g) makes clear that a court of appeals has suffi-\\ncient power to deal with the problem. We should treat these\\nmodification issues as case-management problems for the dis-\\ntrict court and for us, not as issues of jurisdiction.\\n The general rule, of course, is that only one court can have\\njurisdiction over a case at the same time. E.g., Griggs v. Provi-\\ndent Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Cases with\\npreliminary injunctions can complicate matters, though. Even\\nafter a notice of appeal for a preliminary injunction has been\\nfiled, the district court retains jurisdiction over other aspects\\nof the case. The boundaries between what has been appealed\\nand what remains before the district court may not be sharp.\\nIn this case, when the district court issued its May 24 injunc-\\ntion addressing the more urgent issue of the corn-syrup ad-\\nvertising campaign, the district court simply did not address\\nMillerCoors’ request for packaging relief. That topic had not\\nbeen presented fully to the court at the time of the preliminary\\ninjunction hearing, so the court invited additional briefing. In\\nSeptember the court issued the new injunction.\\n If the September 4 packaging order is treated as “modify-\\ning” the May 24 order, as the judge wrote, Rule 62(d) author-\\nized it. But the September 4 order is better understood as just\\na separate injunction. Nothing would have stopped Mil-\\nlerCoors from filing a new motion for a preliminary injunc-\\ntion on May 25, or stopped the district court from ruling on\\nsuch a motion. There was no overlap between the relief or-\\ndered on May 24 and the relief sought on packaging. See Ad-\\nams v. City of Chicago, 135 F.3d 1150, 1153–54 (7th Cir. 1998)\\n(no jurisdictional bar to consideration of new motion for\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 19\\n\\npreliminary injunction while appeal from first injunction is\\npending). There was no need for MillerCoors to have gone\\nthrough separate formalities of filing a new motion for a new\\npreliminary injunction. Id. (construing compliance with Cir-\\ncuit Rule 57 pragmatically as equivalent to new motion for\\nnew preliminary injunction).\\n The September 6 order modifying the September 4\\npackaging order poses a more controversial problem, but the\\nanswer should not be difficult. On September 5, Anheuser-\\nBusch filed an emergency motion to vacate, modify, or stay\\nthe September 4 order. Dkt. 107. Also on September 5,\\nAnheuser-Busch filed its notice of appeal for the September 4\\norder. Dkt. 110. On September 6, the district judge granted in\\npart the emergency motion to modify.\\n It made good sense for the district judge to address the\\nemergency motion immediately. Exercising equitable judg-\\nment, the judge sensibly intended for the September 4 pack-\\naging order to give Anheuser-Busch a brief but reasonable\\ntime to change its packaging and to avoid throwing away cur-\\nrent inventory. The emergency motion persuaded the judge\\nthat, because Anheuser-Busch had used up its existing stock\\nof packaging more quickly than expected, the September 4 or-\\nder would not allow time for a smooth transition. It had in-\\nstead put Anheuser-Busch immediately in violation, without\\nan opportunity to comply. The judge therefore delayed by\\ntwo months the effective date of the packaging order.\\n Given the urgency of that issue and the district judge’s fa-\\nmiliarity with the case, he was much better positioned than a\\nmotions panel of this court, entirely new to the case, would\\nhave been to address the problem immediately. In fast-\\n\\n20 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nmoving litigation over injunctive relief, no one should be too\\nsurprised when circumstances change quickly.\\n There is (or should be) no legal obstacle to such urgent and\\npragmatic modifications of a preliminary injunction pending\\nan appeal. The broad language of Rule 62(d) allows it: “While\\nan appeal is pending from an interlocutory order … that\\ngrants … an injunction, the court may suspend, modify, re-\\nstore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms\\nthat secure the opposing party’s rights.” Rule 62(d) is not lim-\\nited to modifications tied to stays or bonds pending appeal.\\nRule 62(d) also fits together with Federal Rule of Appellate\\nProcedure 8(a)(1), which provides in relevant part: “A party\\nmust ordinarily move first in the district court for the follow-\\ning relief: … (C) an order suspending, modifying, restoring,\\nor granting an injunction while an appeal is pending.” See\\nalso Eli Lilly and Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 384 (7th\\nCir. 2018) (district court was authorized to modify injunction\\nin response to issues raised in appellant’s opening brief; district\\ncourt’s modifications aided the appeal by “resolving technical\\nobjections or clarifying imprecise wording”), citing Dixon v.\\nEdwards, 290 F.3d 699, 709 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002) (district court\\nretained jurisdiction to proceed as to matters “in aid of the\\nappeal”). It would surely be odd for a district court to respond\\nto a motion prompted by Appellate Rule 8(a)(1) by saying, “I\\ndon’t have jurisdiction anymore.”\\n Despite these textual provisions in the rules authorizing\\nthe district court’s actions here, some circuits have added a\\nnon-textual gloss to these rules, saying that the district court’s\\npower over its own injunctions pending appeal is limited to\\nacts designed to “preserve the status quo.” See generally 16\\nWright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3921.2.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 21\\n\\nWright and Miller show in detail why this line of cases should\\nbe questioned. Compare Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace\\nWorkers v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 847 F.2d 1014, 1018 (2d Cir.\\n1988) (repeating “status quo” gloss), and Ideal Toy Corp. v.\\nSayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623, 625 (2d Cir. 1962) (adopting\\n“status quo” gloss); with id. at 628 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“The\\nrule [now Rule 62(d)] is clear and unequivocal; I see no justi-\\nfication whatever for the novel and restrictive gloss now\\nplaced upon it by my brothers.”), and Ortho Pharmaceutical\\nCorp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir. 1989) (district\\ncourt had jurisdiction to enter order modifying injunction on\\nappeal not only to preserve status quo but also to “preserve\\nintegrity of the appeal”).\\n The non-textual “status quo” gloss has both metaphysical\\nand pragmatic foundations. The metaphysical is the principle\\nthat only one court at a time may exercise jurisdiction over a\\ncase or portion of a case. Yet American federalism split the in-\\ndivisible atom of sovereignty with a workable but sometimes\\ncomplicated sharing of sovereignty. Similarly, federal courts\\ncan manage a little concurrent jurisdiction between trial and\\nappellate courts when there are good reasons—and express\\ntextual authorization—to do so.6\\n The pragmatic foundation for the “status quo” gloss is a\\nconcern that a district judge could use her power under Rule\\n62(d) to interfere with an appeal, forcing the court of appeals\\nand appellant to aim at a moving target. I agree with Wright\\n\\n 6 The majority implicitly criticizes the district court for not using the\\nprocedure in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 for modifying an order\\nthat is before the court of appeals. The majority’s point begs the jurisdic-\\ntional question, however. By its terms, Rule 62.1(a) applies only when the\\ndistrict court “lacks authority” to grant relief.\\n\\n22 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nand Miller that this danger “seems more abstract than real.”\\n§ 3921.2 at 69. In the rare case where a district judge seems to\\nbe interfering with an appeal, Rule 62(g) makes clear that the\\ncourt of appeals retains ample power to take charge.\\n As with the Rule 65(d) issue, the parties are not confused\\nabout their rights and obligations. The better course here is to\\nrecognize that we are dealing with equitable powers and fast-\\nmoving litigation. We and the district court are capable of\\nmanaging the case and the multiple appeals in practical and\\nlegally permissible ways. We should not remand now. We\\nshould promptly address the merits of MillerCoors’ appeal of\\nthe May 24 order (No. 19-2200), and we should order expe-\\ndited briefing and argument on the merits of the Anheuser-\\nBusch appeals from the September orders (Nos. 19-2713 & 19-\\n2782).\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448201/\", \"author_raw\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670948/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\nMILLERCOORS LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 19-cv-218-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 —\n INTERIM ORDER OCTOBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n PER CURIAM. On May 24, 2019, the district court entered\nan opinion that concludes with language that the judge be-\nlieved would serve as a preliminary injunction. MillerCoors\nfiled an appeal, which has been docketed as No. 19-2200. But\nthe district court did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.\n\n2 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\n\n65(d)(1)(C), which requires every injunction to be set forth\nwithout referring to any other document. See, e.g., Chicago v.\nSessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc), slip\nop. 3 (Rule 65 “requires a separate document setting forth\nthe terms of such an injunction”); Auto Driveaway Franchise\nSystems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670,\n676 (7th Cir. 2019); BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Capital\nPremium Financing, Inc., 912 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.\n2019); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 527 (7th\nCir. 1988); Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 886,\n514 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975).\n In supplemental jurisdictional memoranda filed at our\nrequest after oral argument, both sides acknowledged that\nthe district court failed to comply with Rule 65(d). Neither\nside asked us to depart from the decisions we have cited.\n On September 4, 2019, while appeal No. 19-2200 was\npending, the district court entered another opinion stating\nthat it was “modifying” the decision of May 24. The district\ncourt did not follow the procedure specified by Fed. R. Civ.\nP. 62.1 for modifying an order that is before the court of ap-\npeals, nor did it discuss the rule that only one court at a time\nhas jurisdiction over “those aspects of the case involved in\nthe appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459\nU.S. 56, 58 (1982). And as with the May 24 opinion, the dis-\ntrict court did not comply with Rule 65(d). Nor did the judge\nmodify the injunction as a condition of a stay or bond pend-\ning appeal, as Rule 62(d) permits. (It provides: “While an\nappeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judg-\nment that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, dissolves, or\nrefuses to dissolve or modify an injunction, the court may\nsuspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for\n\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 3\n\nbond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.”\nThe authority to make changes linked to bonds or otherwise\nsecure the enjoined party’s rights differs from a blanket\ngrant of permission to impose new obligations, and substan-\ntially alter the issues, while appeals are pending.) Anheuser-\nBusch’s appeal from the September 4 order has been docket-\ned as No. 19-2713.\n On September 6, 2019, the district court modified the\nmodification of September 4. Once again it did not discuss\nits jurisdiction to do so, did not rely on Rule 62(d), did not\nfollow the procedure specified by Rule 62.1, and did not\ncomply with Rule 65(d). Anheuser-Busch’s appeal from the\norder of September 6 has been docketed as No. 19-2782.\n Although the district court’s intent to afford enforceable\nequitable relief is sufficiently clear to provide appellate ju-\nrisdiction despite the noncompliance with Rule 65(d),\nsee Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Operating Engineers Union,\n824 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2016), enforcing that Rule is suffi-\nciently important that we order a limited remand with in-\nstructions to enter the injunction on a document separate\nfrom the opinions.\n In the process, the district court may be able to avoid the\npotential jurisdictional problems that its modifications of the\ninitial order have created. (We call them modifications even\nthough the order of September 4 does not change any lan-\nguage of the May 24 decision. It seems more like a second\npreliminary injunction, although the judge called it a modifi-\ncation. The September 6 order, by contrast, explicitly modi-\nfies the September 4 order.) While we recognize that a dis-\ntrict court is in the best position to address urgent issues and\nchanges in circumstance related to a preliminary injunction,\n\n4 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\n\nthe court must nonetheless comply with the procedures for\ndoing so in order to avoid creating potential complications\non review. A single injunction complying with Rule 65(d)\nwould be subject to appeal—and, as there has not yet been\neven one injunction that satisfies Rule 65(d), the consolidated\ninjunction could be treated as the initial order, allowing both\nsides to appeal without any potential obstacle in the\nGriggs doctrine or Rule 62.1, or any need for us to consider\nthe disagreement among the circuits about the extent to\nwhich preliminary injunctions are subject to modification by\na district judge while an appeal is pending. Compare Ortho\nPharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir.\n1989), with Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817,\n820 (5th Cir. 1989).\n If the district court wants to make still further changes, in\nlight of discovery in the ongoing litigation, it is free to do\nso—though the judge also is free to enter an injunction con-\nsolidating all decisions made to date but leaving all else to\nthe permanent-injunction phase. We leave this decision in\nthe capable hands of the district court.\n Once the district court has complied with this limited\nremand, both sides should file new notices of appeal and\npropose a schedule for new briefs. The briefs already filed\nconcerning the May 24 order may be incorporated by refer-\nence, but we have yet to receive briefs concerning the Sep-\ntember 4 and 6 orders. All aspects of the case must be fully\nbriefed before this court will proceed to decision.\n\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 5\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\nMILLERCOORS LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 19-cv-218-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019 —\\n INTERIM ORDER OCTOBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n PER CURIAM. On May 24, 2019, the district court entered\\nan opinion that concludes with language that the judge be-\\nlieved would serve as a preliminary injunction. MillerCoors\\nfiled an appeal, which has been docketed as No. 19-2200. But\\nthe district court did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n\\n2 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\n65(d)(1)(C), which requires every injunction to be set forth\\nwithout referring to any other document. See, e.g., Chicago v.\\nSessions, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc), slip\\nop. 3 (Rule 65 “requires a separate document setting forth\\nthe terms of such an injunction”); Auto Driveaway Franchise\\nSystems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670,\\n676 (7th Cir. 2019); BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Capital\\nPremium Financing, Inc., 912 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.\\n2019); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 527 (7th\\nCir. 1988); Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 886,\\n514 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975).\\n In supplemental jurisdictional memoranda filed at our\\nrequest after oral argument, both sides acknowledged that\\nthe district court failed to comply with Rule 65(d). Neither\\nside asked us to depart from the decisions we have cited.\\n On September 4, 2019, while appeal No. 19-2200 was\\npending, the district court entered another opinion stating\\nthat it was “modifying” the decision of May 24. The district\\ncourt did not follow the procedure specified by Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 62.1 for modifying an order that is before the court of ap-\\npeals, nor did it discuss the rule that only one court at a time\\nhas jurisdiction over “those aspects of the case involved in\\nthe appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459\\nU.S. 56, 58 (1982). And as with the May 24 opinion, the dis-\\ntrict court did not comply with Rule 65(d). Nor did the judge\\nmodify the injunction as a condition of a stay or bond pend-\\ning appeal, as Rule 62(d) permits. (It provides: “While an\\nappeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judg-\\nment that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, dissolves, or\\nrefuses to dissolve or modify an injunction, the court may\\nsuspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 3\\n\\nbond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.”\\nThe authority to make changes linked to bonds or otherwise\\nsecure the enjoined party’s rights differs from a blanket\\ngrant of permission to impose new obligations, and substan-\\ntially alter the issues, while appeals are pending.) Anheuser-\\nBusch’s appeal from the September 4 order has been docket-\\ned as No. 19-2713.\\n On September 6, 2019, the district court modified the\\nmodification of September 4. Once again it did not discuss\\nits jurisdiction to do so, did not rely on Rule 62(d), did not\\nfollow the procedure specified by Rule 62.1, and did not\\ncomply with Rule 65(d). Anheuser-Busch’s appeal from the\\norder of September 6 has been docketed as No. 19-2782.\\n Although the district court’s intent to afford enforceable\\nequitable relief is sufficiently clear to provide appellate ju-\\nrisdiction despite the noncompliance with Rule 65(d),\\nsee Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Operating Engineers Union,\\n824 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2016), enforcing that Rule is suffi-\\nciently important that we order a limited remand with in-\\nstructions to enter the injunction on a document separate\\nfrom the opinions.\\n In the process, the district court may be able to avoid the\\npotential jurisdictional problems that its modifications of the\\ninitial order have created. (We call them modifications even\\nthough the order of September 4 does not change any lan-\\nguage of the May 24 decision. It seems more like a second\\npreliminary injunction, although the judge called it a modifi-\\ncation. The September 6 order, by contrast, explicitly modi-\\nfies the September 4 order.) While we recognize that a dis-\\ntrict court is in the best position to address urgent issues and\\nchanges in circumstance related to a preliminary injunction,\\n\\n4 Nos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\\n\\nthe court must nonetheless comply with the procedures for\\ndoing so in order to avoid creating potential complications\\non review. A single injunction complying with Rule 65(d)\\nwould be subject to appeal—and, as there has not yet been\\neven one injunction that satisfies Rule 65(d), the consolidated\\ninjunction could be treated as the initial order, allowing both\\nsides to appeal without any potential obstacle in the\\nGriggs doctrine or Rule 62.1, or any need for us to consider\\nthe disagreement among the circuits about the extent to\\nwhich preliminary injunctions are subject to modification by\\na district judge while an appeal is pending. Compare Ortho\\nPharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir.\\n1989), with Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817,\\n820 (5th Cir. 1989).\\n If the district court wants to make still further changes, in\\nlight of discovery in the ongoing litigation, it is free to do\\nso—though the judge also is free to enter an injunction con-\\nsolidating all decisions made to date but leaving all else to\\nthe permanent-injunction phase. We leave this decision in\\nthe capable hands of the district court.\\n Once the district court has complied with this limited\\nremand, both sides should file new notices of appeal and\\npropose a schedule for new briefs. The briefs already filed\\nconcerning the May 24 order may be incorporated by refer-\\nence, but we have yet to receive briefs concerning the Sep-\\ntember 4 and 6 orders. All aspects of the case must be fully\\nbriefed before this court will proceed to decision.\\n\\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782 5\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4682,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671329,"string":"4,671,329"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Keith Horist v. Sudler & Company"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2150"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2150\\nKEITH HORIST, JOSHUA EYMAN,\\nand LORI EYMAN,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSUDLER AND COMPANY D/B/A\\nSUDLER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT and\\nNEXTLEVEL ASSOCIATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,\\nD/B/A HOMEWISEDOCS.COM,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 8113 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Illinois Condominium Property\\nAct requires an elaborate set of disclosures when a condo-\\nminium unit is resold. The owner must give the prospective\\nbuyer a copy of the condominium declaration and bylaws,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2150\\n\\nthe condominium association’s rules, and an array of other\\ndocuments bearing on the current financial status of the\\nproperty. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/22.1(a). The association’s\\nboard must furnish the required documents within 30 days\\nof the owner’s written request, id. § 605/22.1(b), and it may\\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so, id. § 605/22.1(c). Anoth-\\ner provision of the Act allows the association to retain a\\nperson or firm to manage the condominium property. Id.\\n§ 605/18(a)(5).\\n This lawsuit is a proposed class action against a Chicago\\nproperty-management firm and its third-party vendor, an\\nonline service that assembles a downloadable electronic\\nversion of the required disclosure documents, giving unit\\nowners quick and easy access to the material needed to\\ncomplete a resale transaction. The vendor charges a fee for\\nthis service. The plaintiffs are condominium owners who\\npurchased their disclosure documents from the online\\nvendor and now complain that the fee is excessive in viola-\\ntion of the Condominium Act. They also bring claims under\\nthe Illinois consumer-fraud statute and three common-law\\ntheories: breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and\\ncivil conspiracy. The district court dismissed the suit.\\n We affirm. The relevant provision of the Condominium\\nAct does not provide a private right of action, and we see no\\nbasis in Illinois law to imply one for condominium owners.\\nThe statutory consumer-fraud claim is likewise defective; the\\nIllinois courts have held that charging too much for goods or\\nservices is not, standing alone, an unfair practice under the\\nstatute. The common-law claims also fail. The complaint\\ndoes not plead an actionable breach of fiduciary duty, and\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 3\\n\\nunjust enrichment and conspiracy are not independent\\ncauses of action under Illinois law.\\n I. Background\\n Keith Horist owned a condominium at 400 East Ohio\\nStreet in downtown Chicago and was a member of his\\nbuilding’s condominium association. Joshua and Lori\\nEyman owned a condominium at 1515 South Prairie Avenue,\\nalso in downtown Chicago, and they too were members of\\ntheir condominium association. Both associations retained\\nSudler and Company, d/b/a Sudler Property Management,\\nto manage their day-to-day operations.\\n In 2017 Horist and the Eymans put their units on the\\nmarket and found willing buyers. The Illinois Condominium\\nProperty Act requires that “[i]n the event of any resale of a\\ncondominium unit by a unit owner[,] … such owner shall\\nobtain from the [association’s] Board of Managers and shall\\nmake available to the prospective purchaser, upon demand,”\\na copy of the condominium instruments, the association’s\\nrules, and a host of other documents reflecting the current\\nfinancial status of the property.1 § 605/22.1(a). These are\\n\\n1 Specifically, the unit owner must provide: (1) a copy of the declaration,\\nbylaws, other condominium instruments, and any rules and regulations;\\n(2) a statement of any liens and an account of the unit, including unpaid\\nassessments and charges due; (3) a statement listing any capital expendi-\\ntures anticipated by the association within the next two years; (4) a\\nstatement of the status and amount of any reserves or replacement funds\\nand any portion earmarked for specified projects; (5) a copy of the\\nassociation’s financial statement for the last fiscal year; (6) a statement of\\nthe status of any pending suits or judgments in which the association is a\\nparty; (7) a statement of insurance coverage provided to unit owners;\\n(8) a statement that any improvements or alterations to the unit made by\\nthe seller are in good faith believed to be in compliance with the condo-\\n\\f4 No. 18-2150\\n\\ncommonly referred to as the “disclosure documents.” Sub-\\nsection (b) of the statute says that the association’s “principal\\nofficer” or another “specifically designated” officer “shall\\nfurnish” the required documents to the owner “when re-\\nquested to do so in writing and within 30 days of the re-\\nquest.” § 605/22.1(b). Subsection (c), in turn, provides that\\n“the association or its Board of Managers” may charge the\\nunit owner a “reasonable fee covering the direct out-of-\\npocket cost of providing such information and copying.”\\n§ 605/22.1(c).\\n Sudler, the property manager for the two condominium\\nassociations, contracted with HomeWiseDocs.com, an online\\ndocument service that assembles the required disclosure\\ndocuments in portable document form (“PDF”), giving\\ncondominium owners almost instantaneous electronic access\\nto the material needed to close a resale transaction. 2 Sudler’s\\nwebsite provides a link to HomeWise’s site so owners can\\neasily click through and order a downloadable PDF of their\\ndisclosure documents. But this convenience carries a cost.\\nHomeWise charged Horist $240 for a PDF of his disclosure\\ndocuments. The Eymans paid $365 for a PDF of theirs.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nminium instruments; and (9) a statement of the identity and mailing\\naddress of the association’s principal officer or of any other officer or\\nagents specifically designed to receive notices. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n605/22.1(a)(1)–(9).\\n2 HomeWise is a corporation registered in the State of California under\\nthe name NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., doing business as\\nHomeWiseDocs.com.\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 5\\n\\n Horist and the Eymans sued Sudler and HomeWise in\\nCook County Circuit Court seeking to represent a proposed\\nclass of condominium owners “who were charged by or paid\\na fee to HomeWise” for disclosure documents in connection\\nwith a condominium resale. The complaint raises five claims:\\n(1) a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive\\nBusiness Practices Act; (2) a violation of the Condominium\\nAct; (3) aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty;\\n(4) civil conspiracy; and (5) unjust enrichment. HomeWise\\nremoved the case to federal court under the Class Action\\nFairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Sudler and HomeWise then\\nfiled separate motions to dismiss.\\n The judge granted the motions. Turning first to the claim\\nunder the Condominium Act, the judge held that sec-\\ntion 22.1 provides no private right of action—express or\\nimplied—for unit sellers. He also ruled that the complaint\\ndid not state a viable claim that the PDF fee amounts to an\\nunfair trade practice in violation of the consumer-fraud\\nstatute. The judge construed the three common-law claims\\nas requiring an underlying violation of one of these statutes,\\nso he dismissed them as well and entered final judgment for\\nthe defendants.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a dismissal order de novo, construing the\\ncomplaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and\\naccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ochoa\\nv. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 992, 993 (7th Cir. 2018). To\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint\\n“must plausibly suggest … a right to relief, raising that\\npossibility above a speculative level.” EEOC v. Concentra\\n\\f6 No. 18-2150\\n\\nHealth Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation\\nmarks omitted).\\nA. Condominium Act Claim\\n The Condominium Act claim rests on allegations that\\nHomeWise’s fee for an electronic copy of the required\\ndisclosure documents exceeds the “reasonable fee” that\\ncondominium associations are permitted to charge under\\nsection 22.1(c). We note for starters that the associations are\\nnot defendants; this suit is against the property-management\\nfirm and its third-party online document vendor. Our first\\nquestion, however, is whether the plaintiffs have a right of\\naction to enforce section 22.1. The statute doesn’t provide an\\nexpress private remedy, so the plaintiffs advance an argu-\\nment that a right of action exists by necessary implication.\\n Illinois courts will recognize an implied right of action\\nonly if (1) the plaintiff is within the class of members the\\nstatute was enacted to benefit; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one\\nthe statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of\\naction is consistent with the underlying purpose of the\\nstatute; and (4) inferring a private right of action is necessary\\nto provide an adequate remedy for statutory violations.\\nFisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ill.\\n1999). All four factors must be met before a court will recog-\\nnize an implied remedy. Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v.\\nZurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).\\nNot one of them is satisfied here.\\n Two decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court largely con-\\ntrol the outcome. In Nikolopulos v. Balourdos, the court con-\\ncluded that section 22.1 “was clearly designed to protect\\nprospective purchasers of condominium units.” 614 N.E.2d\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 7\\n\\n412, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added). More specifi-\\ncally, the court held that the statute’s purpose is “to prevent\\nprospective purchasers from buying a unit without being\\nfully informed and satisfied with the financial stability of the\\ncondominium as well as the management, rules[,] and\\nregulations which affect the unit.” Id. The court also deter-\\nmined that implying a right of action for condominium\\npurchasers “is consistent with assuring that a prospective\\npurchaser is fully informed and satisfied before he buys a\\ncondominium unit.” Id. On this reasoning, the court recog-\\nnized an implied right of action for prospective condomini-\\num purchasers to terminate a sales contract “within a\\nreasonable time after being furnished information revealing\\npreviously undisclosed material expenses.” Id. That is, the\\ncourt authorized a condominium purchaser who is injured\\nby a seller’s violation of the section 22.1 disclosure duty to\\nsue for return of his earnest money plus interest. Id. at 418.\\n By its terms, the implied remedy recognized in Nikolopu-\\nlos covered condominium purchasers who discover a seller’s\\nsection 22.1 violation before closing. In D’Attomo v. Baumbeck,\\nthe court extended that holding and recognized an implied\\nright of action for purchasers who discover the violation after\\nclosing. 36 N.E.3d 892, 905–07 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). The court\\nreiterated the two foundational holdings from Nikolopulos:\\n(1) the statute was designed to protect condominium pur-\\nchasers; and (2) an implied remedy for purchasers aggrieved\\nby a seller’s violation of the statute “is consistent with\\nensuring that a prospective purchaser is fully informed and\\nsatisfied with matters affecting the condominium unit.” Id. at\\n907. The court also reasoned that “[t]he disclosure obliga-\\ntions in section 22.1 would be ineffective, as a practical\\nmatter, if an aggrieved purchaser has no remedy against a\\n\\f8 No. 18-2150\\n\\nseller who conceals a requested disclosure until after the\\nclosing.” Id. The court thus recognized an implied remedy\\nfor aggrieved buyers “where the seller is alleged to have\\nconcealed documents requested by the buyer pursuant to\\nsection 22.1, the concealment is not discovered until after the\\nclosing, and the nondisclosure materially affects the buyer’s\\nrights in the condominium unit.” Id.\\n The unmistakable takeaway from these two decisions is\\nthat section 22.1 is designed to protect the interests of con-\\ndominium purchasers, not condominium sellers. That’s\\nenough to defeat the plaintiffs’ argument for an implied\\nright of action. As owner/sellers they are not within the class\\nof persons the statute was designed to protect, nor have they\\nsuffered an injury that the statute was designed to prevent.\\nAnd implying a remedy for condominium sellers is neither\\nconsistent with nor necessary to effectuate the statute’s\\npurpose.\\n The plaintiffs insist that the reasoning of Nikolopulos and\\nD’Attamo is limited to section 22.1(a), which establishes the\\nunit seller’s disclosure obligation to the buyer. The claim\\nhere, in contrast, rests on subsection (c), which allows con-\\ndominium associations to charge a reasonable fee for provid-\\ning copies of the disclosure documents to unit sellers. That\\nthe fee must be “reasonable” shows that unit sellers are\\nwithin the class of persons the statute was designed to\\nprotect. Or so the argument goes.\\n We’re not persuaded. First, neither Nikolopulos nor\\nD’Attomo distinguishes between subsection (a) and subsec-\\ntion (c). Rather, they discuss only “[t]he disclosure require-\\nments imposed by § 22.1.” D’Attomo, 36 N.E.3d at 905.\\nMoreover, as a general rule of interpretation, Illinois courts\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 9\\n\\nread statutes as a whole rather than focusing on isolated\\nsubsections. See Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ill.\\n2004). Reading section 22.1 in this holistic way, subsec-\\ntion (a) of the statute establishes the seller’s duty to disclose\\nan array of important documents to the buyer; subsection (b)\\nrequires condominium associations to furnish the required\\ndocuments to unit owners within 30 days of a written re-\\nquest; and subsection (c) allows associations to charge a\\nreasonable fee for doing so. The statute works as an integrat-\\ned whole for the benefit of prospective condominium pur-\\nchasers, not sellers.\\n Given the manifest statutory purpose of transparency for\\nprospective condominium buyers, we cannot conclude that\\nthe statute was designed to prevent injury to unit sellers. To\\nthe contrary, the statute is plainly designed to protect con-\\ndominium purchasers against fraud (of the concealment\\nvariety) by condominium sellers. Together subsections (b)\\nand (c) implement the disclosure duty in subsection (a) and\\nthus work toward that end. They are not independent\\nentitlements for the benefit of condominium associations\\nand unit sellers.\\n We therefore hold that section 22.1 does not confer an\\nimplied right of action on condominium owners. The judge\\nproperly dismissed the Condominium Act claim.\\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Claim\\n Next up is the claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud\\nand Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n505/1 et seq. The Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s] consum-\\ners … against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and\\nother unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson v.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2150\\n\\nToyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002). To\\nprevail on a claim under the Act, “a plaintiff must plead and\\nprove that the defendant committed a deceptive or unfair act\\nwith the intent that others rely on the deception, that the act\\noccurred in the course of trade or commerce, and that it\\ncaused actual damages.” Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc.,\\n934 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n No deception is alleged here. The plaintiffs argue instead\\nthat the PDF fee is unfair. A trade practice may be deemed\\nunfair if it (1) “offends public policy”; (2) is “immoral,\\nunethical, oppressive or unscrupulous”; or (3) “causes\\nsubstantial injury to consumers.” Id. at 739. It’s not necessary\\nto establish all three criteria. “A practice may be unfair\\nbecause of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or\\nbecause to a lesser extent it meets all three.” Robinson,\\n775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks omitted).\\n This claim fails for several reasons. First, it appears to\\nrest almost entirely on the alleged violation of section 22.1.\\nThat is, the plaintiffs allege that Sudler and HomeWise\\nviolated the Condominium Act and thereby violated Illinois\\npublic policy. As we’ve explained, however, it’s the condo-\\nminium association’s duty to furnish the required disclosure\\ndocuments to unit owners on request; as a corollary, it may\\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so. § 605/22.1(b), (c). And\\nalthough the association may retain a professional manage-\\nment firm to handle the day-to-day operation of the proper-\\nty, it cannot outsource its statutory duties to the property-\\nmanagement company. Henderson v. Lofts at Lake Arlington\\nTowne Condo. Ass’n, 105 N.E.3d 1, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)\\n(holding that an association retains a statutory duty under\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 11\\n\\nthe Condo Act to care for common areas even though it\\nhired a property manager).\\n To be sure, the Condominium Act establishes standards\\nof conduct for property-management firms. See generally\\n765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.7. But this section of the Act\\nexplicitly precludes “a cause of action by a unit owner …\\nagainst a community association manager or the firm of a\\ncommunity association manager,” while preserving “any\\nright of action by a unit owner” against the association’s\\n“board of directors under existing law.” § 605/18.7(g)(1)–(2).\\n Given these headwinds, the plaintiffs try a different tack.\\nThey argue that Sudler and HomeWise can be liable for\\nviolating the Consumer Fraud Act because they acted on\\nbehalf of the condominium associations to breach the associ-\\nations’ duties under section 22.1. This argument distorts\\nbasic agency law; it is essentially “the reverse of vicarious\\nliability.” Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752,\\n766 (7th Cir. 2009). In Illinois, as elsewhere, a court “may not\\nimpute a duty the principal owed to a third party to an agent\\nmerely acting pursuant to duties it, in turn, owed to the\\nprincipal.” Id. (applying Illinois law). Put slightly differently,\\n“[w]hile the acts of an agent may be considered to be acts of\\nthe principal, acts of the principal are never imputed to the\\nagent.” Stein v. Rio Parismina Lodge, 695 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1998) (citation omitted). For an agent to be liable in\\ntort to a third party harmed by the agent’s conduct, the\\nagent must breach an independent duty that he owes to the\\nthird party. Schur, 577 F.3d at 766; see also RESTATEMENT\\n(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).\\n Thus stripped of its Condominium Act premise, the Con-\\nsumer Fraud Act claim rests on nothing more than a generic\\n\\f12 No. 18-2150\\n\\nallegation that HomeWise charged too much for a PDF of the\\ndisclosure documents. But the Illinois courts have held that\\n“charging an unconscionably high price generally is insuffi-\\ncient to establish a claim for unfairness.” Robinson,\\n775 N.E.2d at 961. The judge correctly dismissed this claim.\\nC. Additional Claims\\n We can make short work of the three common-law\\nclaims. Unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action\\nunder Illinois law. Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511,\\n517 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f an unjust enrichment claim rests on\\nthe same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then\\nthe unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related\\nclaim—and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall\\nwith the related claim.”). Neither is civil conspiracy. Indeck\\nN. Am. Power Fund, L.P. v. Norweb PLC, 735 N.E.2d 649, 662\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[A] conspiracy is not an independent\\ntort. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to state an independent\\ncause of action underlying its conspiracy allegations, the\\nclaim for a conspiracy also fails.”).\\n The remaining claim is for breach of fiduciary duty. This\\nclaim is derivative, not direct. That is, the plaintiffs allege\\nthat Sudler and HomeWise “aided and abetted” a breach of\\nfiduciary duty by the condominium associations. It’s true\\nthat the officers and board members of a condominium\\nassociation owe a fiduciary duty to unit owners. 765 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 605/18.4. Part of that duty includes compliance\\nwith the requirements of the Condominium Act. Davis v.\\nDyson, 900 N.E.2d 698, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). But the com-\\nplaint does not allege facts that, if true, could support an\\ninference that the officers or board members of either con-\\ndominium association committed a fiduciary breach. There\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 13\\n\\nis no allegation, for example, that an officer or board mem-\\nber refused to produce the disclosure documents for the\\nplaintiffs upon request or charged them an excessive fee to\\nmake copies. Rather, the complaint alleges only that the\\ncondominium associations retained Sudler to handle day-to-\\nday property management and that Sudler in turn contract-\\ned with HomeWise, an online vendor that assembles the\\nrequired disclosure documents in PDF format for a fee. This\\ncontractual arrangement is not a breach of the board mem-\\nbers’ fiduciary duties. It does not become one even if we\\naccept, as the complaint alleges, that HomeWise’s fee ex-\\nceeded the out-of-pocket cost of making the PDF.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448582/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671329/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Keith Horist v. Sudler & Company\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2150\nKEITH HORIST, JOSHUA EYMAN,\nand LORI EYMAN,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nSUDLER AND COMPANY D/B/A\nSUDLER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT and\nNEXTLEVEL ASSOCIATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,\nD/B/A HOMEWISEDOCS.COM,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 C 8113 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Illinois Condominium Property\nAct requires an elaborate set of disclosures when a condo-\nminium unit is resold. The owner must give the prospective\nbuyer a copy of the condominium declaration and bylaws,\n\f2 No. 18-2150\n\nthe condominium association’s rules, and an array of other\ndocuments bearing on the current financial status of the\nproperty. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/22.1(a). The association’s\nboard must furnish the required documents within 30 days\nof the owner’s written request, id. § 605/22.1(b), and it may\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so, id. § 605/22.1(c). Anoth-\ner provision of the Act allows the association to retain a\nperson or firm to manage the condominium property. Id.\n§ 605/18(a)(5).\n This lawsuit is a proposed class action against a Chicago\nproperty-management firm and its third-party vendor, an\nonline service that assembles a downloadable electronic\nversion of the required disclosure documents, giving unit\nowners quick and easy access to the material needed to\ncomplete a resale transaction. The vendor charges a fee for\nthis service. The plaintiffs are condominium owners who\npurchased their disclosure documents from the online\nvendor and now complain that the fee is excessive in viola-\ntion of the Condominium Act. They also bring claims under\nthe Illinois consumer-fraud statute and three common-law\ntheories: breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and\ncivil conspiracy. The district court dismissed the suit.\n We affirm. The relevant provision of the Condominium\nAct does not provide a private right of action, and we see no\nbasis in Illinois law to imply one for condominium owners.\nThe statutory consumer-fraud claim is likewise defective; the\nIllinois courts have held that charging too much for goods or\nservices is not, standing alone, an unfair practice under the\nstatute. The common-law claims also fail. The complaint\ndoes not plead an actionable breach of fiduciary duty, and\n\fNo. 18-2150 3\n\nunjust enrichment and conspiracy are not independent\ncauses of action under Illinois law.\n I. Background\n Keith Horist owned a condominium at 400 East Ohio\nStreet in downtown Chicago and was a member of his\nbuilding’s condominium association. Joshua and Lori\nEyman owned a condominium at 1515 South Prairie Avenue,\nalso in downtown Chicago, and they too were members of\ntheir condominium association. Both associations retained\nSudler and Company, d/b/a Sudler Property Management,\nto manage their day-to-day operations.\n In 2017 Horist and the Eymans put their units on the\nmarket and found willing buyers. The Illinois Condominium\nProperty Act requires that “[i]n the event of any resale of a\ncondominium unit by a unit owner[,] … such owner shall\nobtain from the [association’s] Board of Managers and shall\nmake available to the prospective purchaser, upon demand,”\na copy of the condominium instruments, the association’s\nrules, and a host of other documents reflecting the current\nfinancial status of the property.1 § 605/22.1(a). These are\n\n1 Specifically, the unit owner must provide: (1) a copy of the declaration,\nbylaws, other condominium instruments, and any rules and regulations;\n(2) a statement of any liens and an account of the unit, including unpaid\nassessments and charges due; (3) a statement listing any capital expendi-\ntures anticipated by the association within the next two years; (4) a\nstatement of the status and amount of any reserves or replacement funds\nand any portion earmarked for specified projects; (5) a copy of the\nassociation’s financial statement for the last fiscal year; (6) a statement of\nthe status of any pending suits or judgments in which the association is a\nparty; (7) a statement of insurance coverage provided to unit owners;\n(8) a statement that any improvements or alterations to the unit made by\nthe seller are in good faith believed to be in compliance with the condo-\n\f4 No. 18-2150\n\ncommonly referred to as the “disclosure documents.” Sub-\nsection (b) of the statute says that the association’s “principal\nofficer” or another “specifically designated” officer “shall\nfurnish” the required documents to the owner “when re-\nquested to do so in writing and within 30 days of the re-\nquest.” § 605/22.1(b). Subsection (c), in turn, provides that\n“the association or its Board of Managers” may charge the\nunit owner a “reasonable fee covering the direct out-of-\npocket cost of providing such information and copying.”\n§ 605/22.1(c).\n Sudler, the property manager for the two condominium\nassociations, contracted with HomeWiseDocs.com, an online\ndocument service that assembles the required disclosure\ndocuments in portable document form (“PDF”), giving\ncondominium owners almost instantaneous electronic access\nto the material needed to close a resale transaction. 2 Sudler’s\nwebsite provides a link to HomeWise’s site so owners can\neasily click through and order a downloadable PDF of their\ndisclosure documents. But this convenience carries a cost.\nHomeWise charged Horist $240 for a PDF of his disclosure\ndocuments. The Eymans paid $365 for a PDF of theirs.\n\n\n\n\nminium instruments; and (9) a statement of the identity and mailing\naddress of the association’s principal officer or of any other officer or\nagents specifically designed to receive notices. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.\n605/22.1(a)(1)–(9).\n2 HomeWise is a corporation registered in the State of California under\nthe name NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., doing business as\nHomeWiseDocs.com.\n\fNo. 18-2150 5\n\n Horist and the Eymans sued Sudler and HomeWise in\nCook County Circuit Court seeking to represent a proposed\nclass of condominium owners “who were charged by or paid\na fee to HomeWise” for disclosure documents in connection\nwith a condominium resale. The complaint raises five claims:\n(1) a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive\nBusiness Practices Act; (2) a violation of the Condominium\nAct; (3) aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty;\n(4) civil conspiracy; and (5) unjust enrichment. HomeWise\nremoved the case to federal court under the Class Action\nFairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Sudler and HomeWise then\nfiled separate motions to dismiss.\n The judge granted the motions. Turning first to the claim\nunder the Condominium Act, the judge held that sec-\ntion 22.1 provides no private right of action—express or\nimplied—for unit sellers. He also ruled that the complaint\ndid not state a viable claim that the PDF fee amounts to an\nunfair trade practice in violation of the consumer-fraud\nstatute. The judge construed the three common-law claims\nas requiring an underlying violation of one of these statutes,\nso he dismissed them as well and entered final judgment for\nthe defendants.\n II. Discussion\n We review a dismissal order de novo, construing the\ncomplaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and\naccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ochoa\nv. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 992, 993 (7th Cir. 2018). To\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint\n“must plausibly suggest … a right to relief, raising that\npossibility above a speculative level.” EEOC v. Concentra\n\f6 No. 18-2150\n\nHealth Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation\nmarks omitted).\nA. Condominium Act Claim\n The Condominium Act claim rests on allegations that\nHomeWise’s fee for an electronic copy of the required\ndisclosure documents exceeds the “reasonable fee” that\ncondominium associations are permitted to charge under\nsection 22.1(c). We note for starters that the associations are\nnot defendants; this suit is against the property-management\nfirm and its third-party online document vendor. Our first\nquestion, however, is whether the plaintiffs have a right of\naction to enforce section 22.1. The statute doesn’t provide an\nexpress private remedy, so the plaintiffs advance an argu-\nment that a right of action exists by necessary implication.\n Illinois courts will recognize an implied right of action\nonly if (1) the plaintiff is within the class of members the\nstatute was enacted to benefit; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one\nthe statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of\naction is consistent with the underlying purpose of the\nstatute; and (4) inferring a private right of action is necessary\nto provide an adequate remedy for statutory violations.\nFisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ill.\n1999). All four factors must be met before a court will recog-\nnize an implied remedy. Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v.\nZurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).\nNot one of them is satisfied here.\n Two decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court largely con-\ntrol the outcome. In Nikolopulos v. Balourdos, the court con-\ncluded that section 22.1 “was clearly designed to protect\nprospective purchasers of condominium units.” 614 N.E.2d\n\fNo. 18-2150 7\n\n412, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added). More specifi-\ncally, the court held that the statute’s purpose is “to prevent\nprospective purchasers from buying a unit without being\nfully informed and satisfied with the financial stability of the\ncondominium as well as the management, rules[,] and\nregulations which affect the unit.” Id. The court also deter-\nmined that implying a right of action for condominium\npurchasers “is consistent with assuring that a prospective\npurchaser is fully informed and satisfied before he buys a\ncondominium unit.” Id. On this reasoning, the court recog-\nnized an implied right of action for prospective condomini-\num purchasers to terminate a sales contract “within a\nreasonable time after being furnished information revealing\npreviously undisclosed material expenses.” Id. That is, the\ncourt authorized a condominium purchaser who is injured\nby a seller’s violation of the section 22.1 disclosure duty to\nsue for return of his earnest money plus interest. Id. at 418.\n By its terms, the implied remedy recognized in Nikolopu-\nlos covered condominium purchasers who discover a seller’s\nsection 22.1 violation before closing. In D’Attomo v. Baumbeck,\nthe court extended that holding and recognized an implied\nright of action for purchasers who discover the violation after\nclosing. 36 N.E.3d 892, 905–07 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). The court\nreiterated the two foundational holdings from Nikolopulos:\n(1) the statute was designed to protect condominium pur-\nchasers; and (2) an implied remedy for purchasers aggrieved\nby a seller’s violation of the statute “is consistent with\nensuring that a prospective purchaser is fully informed and\nsatisfied with matters affecting the condominium unit.” Id. at\n907. The court also reasoned that “[t]he disclosure obliga-\ntions in section 22.1 would be ineffective, as a practical\nmatter, if an aggrieved purchaser has no remedy against a\n\f8 No. 18-2150\n\nseller who conceals a requested disclosure until after the\nclosing.” Id. The court thus recognized an implied remedy\nfor aggrieved buyers “where the seller is alleged to have\nconcealed documents requested by the buyer pursuant to\nsection 22.1, the concealment is not discovered until after the\nclosing, and the nondisclosure materially affects the buyer’s\nrights in the condominium unit.” Id.\n The unmistakable takeaway from these two decisions is\nthat section 22.1 is designed to protect the interests of con-\ndominium purchasers, not condominium sellers. That’s\nenough to defeat the plaintiffs’ argument for an implied\nright of action. As owner/sellers they are not within the class\nof persons the statute was designed to protect, nor have they\nsuffered an injury that the statute was designed to prevent.\nAnd implying a remedy for condominium sellers is neither\nconsistent with nor necessary to effectuate the statute’s\npurpose.\n The plaintiffs insist that the reasoning of Nikolopulos and\nD’Attamo is limited to section 22.1(a), which establishes the\nunit seller’s disclosure obligation to the buyer. The claim\nhere, in contrast, rests on subsection (c), which allows con-\ndominium associations to charge a reasonable fee for provid-\ning copies of the disclosure documents to unit sellers. That\nthe fee must be “reasonable” shows that unit sellers are\nwithin the class of persons the statute was designed to\nprotect. Or so the argument goes.\n We’re not persuaded. First, neither Nikolopulos nor\nD’Attomo distinguishes between subsection (a) and subsec-\ntion (c). Rather, they discuss only “[t]he disclosure require-\nments imposed by § 22.1.” D’Attomo, 36 N.E.3d at 905.\nMoreover, as a general rule of interpretation, Illinois courts\n\fNo. 18-2150 9\n\nread statutes as a whole rather than focusing on isolated\nsubsections. See Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ill.\n2004). Reading section 22.1 in this holistic way, subsec-\ntion (a) of the statute establishes the seller’s duty to disclose\nan array of important documents to the buyer; subsection (b)\nrequires condominium associations to furnish the required\ndocuments to unit owners within 30 days of a written re-\nquest; and subsection (c) allows associations to charge a\nreasonable fee for doing so. The statute works as an integrat-\ned whole for the benefit of prospective condominium pur-\nchasers, not sellers.\n Given the manifest statutory purpose of transparency for\nprospective condominium buyers, we cannot conclude that\nthe statute was designed to prevent injury to unit sellers. To\nthe contrary, the statute is plainly designed to protect con-\ndominium purchasers against fraud (of the concealment\nvariety) by condominium sellers. Together subsections (b)\nand (c) implement the disclosure duty in subsection (a) and\nthus work toward that end. They are not independent\nentitlements for the benefit of condominium associations\nand unit sellers.\n We therefore hold that section 22.1 does not confer an\nimplied right of action on condominium owners. The judge\nproperly dismissed the Condominium Act claim.\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Claim\n Next up is the claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud\nand Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.\n505/1 et seq. The Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s] consum-\ners … against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and\nother unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson v.\n\f10 No. 18-2150\n\nToyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002). To\nprevail on a claim under the Act, “a plaintiff must plead and\nprove that the defendant committed a deceptive or unfair act\nwith the intent that others rely on the deception, that the act\noccurred in the course of trade or commerce, and that it\ncaused actual damages.” Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc.,\n934 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2019).\n No deception is alleged here. The plaintiffs argue instead\nthat the PDF fee is unfair. A trade practice may be deemed\nunfair if it (1) “offends public policy”; (2) is “immoral,\nunethical, oppressive or unscrupulous”; or (3) “causes\nsubstantial injury to consumers.” Id. at 739. It’s not necessary\nto establish all three criteria. “A practice may be unfair\nbecause of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or\nbecause to a lesser extent it meets all three.” Robinson,\n775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks omitted).\n This claim fails for several reasons. First, it appears to\nrest almost entirely on the alleged violation of section 22.1.\nThat is, the plaintiffs allege that Sudler and HomeWise\nviolated the Condominium Act and thereby violated Illinois\npublic policy. As we’ve explained, however, it’s the condo-\nminium association’s duty to furnish the required disclosure\ndocuments to unit owners on request; as a corollary, it may\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so. § 605/22.1(b), (c). And\nalthough the association may retain a professional manage-\nment firm to handle the day-to-day operation of the proper-\nty, it cannot outsource its statutory duties to the property-\nmanagement company. Henderson v. Lofts at Lake Arlington\nTowne Condo. Ass’n, 105 N.E.3d 1, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)\n(holding that an association retains a statutory duty under\n\fNo. 18-2150 11\n\nthe Condo Act to care for common areas even though it\nhired a property manager).\n To be sure, the Condominium Act establishes standards\nof conduct for property-management firms. See generally\n765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.7. But this section of the Act\nexplicitly precludes “a cause of action by a unit owner …\nagainst a community association manager or the firm of a\ncommunity association manager,” while preserving “any\nright of action by a unit owner” against the association’s\n“board of directors under existing law.” § 605/18.7(g)(1)–(2).\n Given these headwinds, the plaintiffs try a different tack.\nThey argue that Sudler and HomeWise can be liable for\nviolating the Consumer Fraud Act because they acted on\nbehalf of the condominium associations to breach the associ-\nations’ duties under section 22.1. This argument distorts\nbasic agency law; it is essentially “the reverse of vicarious\nliability.” Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752,\n766 (7th Cir. 2009). In Illinois, as elsewhere, a court “may not\nimpute a duty the principal owed to a third party to an agent\nmerely acting pursuant to duties it, in turn, owed to the\nprincipal.” Id. (applying Illinois law). Put slightly differently,\n“[w]hile the acts of an agent may be considered to be acts of\nthe principal, acts of the principal are never imputed to the\nagent.” Stein v. Rio Parismina Lodge, 695 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ill.\nApp. Ct. 1998) (citation omitted). For an agent to be liable in\ntort to a third party harmed by the agent’s conduct, the\nagent must breach an independent duty that he owes to the\nthird party. Schur, 577 F.3d at 766; see also RESTATEMENT\n(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).\n Thus stripped of its Condominium Act premise, the Con-\nsumer Fraud Act claim rests on nothing more than a generic\n\f12 No. 18-2150\n\nallegation that HomeWise charged too much for a PDF of the\ndisclosure documents. But the Illinois courts have held that\n“charging an unconscionably high price generally is insuffi-\ncient to establish a claim for unfairness.” Robinson,\n775 N.E.2d at 961. The judge correctly dismissed this claim.\nC. Additional Claims\n We can make short work of the three common-law\nclaims. Unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action\nunder Illinois law. Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511,\n517 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f an unjust enrichment claim rests on\nthe same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then\nthe unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related\nclaim—and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall\nwith the related claim.”). Neither is civil conspiracy. Indeck\nN. Am. Power Fund, L.P. v. Norweb PLC, 735 N.E.2d 649, 662\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[A] conspiracy is not an independent\ntort. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to state an independent\ncause of action underlying its conspiracy allegations, the\nclaim for a conspiracy also fails.”).\n The remaining claim is for breach of fiduciary duty. This\nclaim is derivative, not direct. That is, the plaintiffs allege\nthat Sudler and HomeWise “aided and abetted” a breach of\nfiduciary duty by the condominium associations. It’s true\nthat the officers and board members of a condominium\nassociation owe a fiduciary duty to unit owners. 765 ILL.\nCOMP. STAT. 605/18.4. Part of that duty includes compliance\nwith the requirements of the Condominium Act. Davis v.\nDyson, 900 N.E.2d 698, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). But the com-\nplaint does not allege facts that, if true, could support an\ninference that the officers or board members of either con-\ndominium association committed a fiduciary breach. There\n\fNo. 18-2150 13\n\nis no allegation, for example, that an officer or board mem-\nber refused to produce the disclosure documents for the\nplaintiffs upon request or charged them an excessive fee to\nmake copies. Rather, the complaint alleges only that the\ncondominium associations retained Sudler to handle day-to-\nday property management and that Sudler in turn contract-\ned with HomeWise, an online vendor that assembles the\nrequired disclosure documents in PDF format for a fee. This\ncontractual arrangement is not a breach of the board mem-\nbers’ fiduciary duties. It does not become one even if we\naccept, as the complaint alleges, that HomeWise’s fee ex-\nceeded the out-of-pocket cost of making the PDF.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Keith Horist v. Sudler & Company\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2150\\nKEITH HORIST, JOSHUA EYMAN,\\nand LORI EYMAN,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSUDLER AND COMPANY D/B/A\\nSUDLER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT and\\nNEXTLEVEL ASSOCIATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,\\nD/B/A HOMEWISEDOCS.COM,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 8113 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Illinois Condominium Property\\nAct requires an elaborate set of disclosures when a condo-\\nminium unit is resold. The owner must give the prospective\\nbuyer a copy of the condominium declaration and bylaws,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2150\\n\\nthe condominium association’s rules, and an array of other\\ndocuments bearing on the current financial status of the\\nproperty. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/22.1(a). The association’s\\nboard must furnish the required documents within 30 days\\nof the owner’s written request, id. § 605/22.1(b), and it may\\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so, id. § 605/22.1(c). Anoth-\\ner provision of the Act allows the association to retain a\\nperson or firm to manage the condominium property. Id.\\n§ 605/18(a)(5).\\n This lawsuit is a proposed class action against a Chicago\\nproperty-management firm and its third-party vendor, an\\nonline service that assembles a downloadable electronic\\nversion of the required disclosure documents, giving unit\\nowners quick and easy access to the material needed to\\ncomplete a resale transaction. The vendor charges a fee for\\nthis service. The plaintiffs are condominium owners who\\npurchased their disclosure documents from the online\\nvendor and now complain that the fee is excessive in viola-\\ntion of the Condominium Act. They also bring claims under\\nthe Illinois consumer-fraud statute and three common-law\\ntheories: breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and\\ncivil conspiracy. The district court dismissed the suit.\\n We affirm. The relevant provision of the Condominium\\nAct does not provide a private right of action, and we see no\\nbasis in Illinois law to imply one for condominium owners.\\nThe statutory consumer-fraud claim is likewise defective; the\\nIllinois courts have held that charging too much for goods or\\nservices is not, standing alone, an unfair practice under the\\nstatute. The common-law claims also fail. The complaint\\ndoes not plead an actionable breach of fiduciary duty, and\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 3\\n\\nunjust enrichment and conspiracy are not independent\\ncauses of action under Illinois law.\\n I. Background\\n Keith Horist owned a condominium at 400 East Ohio\\nStreet in downtown Chicago and was a member of his\\nbuilding’s condominium association. Joshua and Lori\\nEyman owned a condominium at 1515 South Prairie Avenue,\\nalso in downtown Chicago, and they too were members of\\ntheir condominium association. Both associations retained\\nSudler and Company, d/b/a Sudler Property Management,\\nto manage their day-to-day operations.\\n In 2017 Horist and the Eymans put their units on the\\nmarket and found willing buyers. The Illinois Condominium\\nProperty Act requires that “[i]n the event of any resale of a\\ncondominium unit by a unit owner[,] … such owner shall\\nobtain from the [association’s] Board of Managers and shall\\nmake available to the prospective purchaser, upon demand,”\\na copy of the condominium instruments, the association’s\\nrules, and a host of other documents reflecting the current\\nfinancial status of the property.1 § 605/22.1(a). These are\\n\\n1 Specifically, the unit owner must provide: (1) a copy of the declaration,\\nbylaws, other condominium instruments, and any rules and regulations;\\n(2) a statement of any liens and an account of the unit, including unpaid\\nassessments and charges due; (3) a statement listing any capital expendi-\\ntures anticipated by the association within the next two years; (4) a\\nstatement of the status and amount of any reserves or replacement funds\\nand any portion earmarked for specified projects; (5) a copy of the\\nassociation’s financial statement for the last fiscal year; (6) a statement of\\nthe status of any pending suits or judgments in which the association is a\\nparty; (7) a statement of insurance coverage provided to unit owners;\\n(8) a statement that any improvements or alterations to the unit made by\\nthe seller are in good faith believed to be in compliance with the condo-\\n\\f4 No. 18-2150\\n\\ncommonly referred to as the “disclosure documents.” Sub-\\nsection (b) of the statute says that the association’s “principal\\nofficer” or another “specifically designated” officer “shall\\nfurnish” the required documents to the owner “when re-\\nquested to do so in writing and within 30 days of the re-\\nquest.” § 605/22.1(b). Subsection (c), in turn, provides that\\n“the association or its Board of Managers” may charge the\\nunit owner a “reasonable fee covering the direct out-of-\\npocket cost of providing such information and copying.”\\n§ 605/22.1(c).\\n Sudler, the property manager for the two condominium\\nassociations, contracted with HomeWiseDocs.com, an online\\ndocument service that assembles the required disclosure\\ndocuments in portable document form (“PDF”), giving\\ncondominium owners almost instantaneous electronic access\\nto the material needed to close a resale transaction. 2 Sudler’s\\nwebsite provides a link to HomeWise’s site so owners can\\neasily click through and order a downloadable PDF of their\\ndisclosure documents. But this convenience carries a cost.\\nHomeWise charged Horist $240 for a PDF of his disclosure\\ndocuments. The Eymans paid $365 for a PDF of theirs.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nminium instruments; and (9) a statement of the identity and mailing\\naddress of the association’s principal officer or of any other officer or\\nagents specifically designed to receive notices. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n605/22.1(a)(1)–(9).\\n2 HomeWise is a corporation registered in the State of California under\\nthe name NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., doing business as\\nHomeWiseDocs.com.\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 5\\n\\n Horist and the Eymans sued Sudler and HomeWise in\\nCook County Circuit Court seeking to represent a proposed\\nclass of condominium owners “who were charged by or paid\\na fee to HomeWise” for disclosure documents in connection\\nwith a condominium resale. The complaint raises five claims:\\n(1) a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive\\nBusiness Practices Act; (2) a violation of the Condominium\\nAct; (3) aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty;\\n(4) civil conspiracy; and (5) unjust enrichment. HomeWise\\nremoved the case to federal court under the Class Action\\nFairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Sudler and HomeWise then\\nfiled separate motions to dismiss.\\n The judge granted the motions. Turning first to the claim\\nunder the Condominium Act, the judge held that sec-\\ntion 22.1 provides no private right of action—express or\\nimplied—for unit sellers. He also ruled that the complaint\\ndid not state a viable claim that the PDF fee amounts to an\\nunfair trade practice in violation of the consumer-fraud\\nstatute. The judge construed the three common-law claims\\nas requiring an underlying violation of one of these statutes,\\nso he dismissed them as well and entered final judgment for\\nthe defendants.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a dismissal order de novo, construing the\\ncomplaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and\\naccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ochoa\\nv. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 992, 993 (7th Cir. 2018). To\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint\\n“must plausibly suggest … a right to relief, raising that\\npossibility above a speculative level.” EEOC v. Concentra\\n\\f6 No. 18-2150\\n\\nHealth Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation\\nmarks omitted).\\nA. Condominium Act Claim\\n The Condominium Act claim rests on allegations that\\nHomeWise’s fee for an electronic copy of the required\\ndisclosure documents exceeds the “reasonable fee” that\\ncondominium associations are permitted to charge under\\nsection 22.1(c). We note for starters that the associations are\\nnot defendants; this suit is against the property-management\\nfirm and its third-party online document vendor. Our first\\nquestion, however, is whether the plaintiffs have a right of\\naction to enforce section 22.1. The statute doesn’t provide an\\nexpress private remedy, so the plaintiffs advance an argu-\\nment that a right of action exists by necessary implication.\\n Illinois courts will recognize an implied right of action\\nonly if (1) the plaintiff is within the class of members the\\nstatute was enacted to benefit; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one\\nthe statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of\\naction is consistent with the underlying purpose of the\\nstatute; and (4) inferring a private right of action is necessary\\nto provide an adequate remedy for statutory violations.\\nFisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ill.\\n1999). All four factors must be met before a court will recog-\\nnize an implied remedy. Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v.\\nZurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).\\nNot one of them is satisfied here.\\n Two decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court largely con-\\ntrol the outcome. In Nikolopulos v. Balourdos, the court con-\\ncluded that section 22.1 “was clearly designed to protect\\nprospective purchasers of condominium units.” 614 N.E.2d\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 7\\n\\n412, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added). More specifi-\\ncally, the court held that the statute’s purpose is “to prevent\\nprospective purchasers from buying a unit without being\\nfully informed and satisfied with the financial stability of the\\ncondominium as well as the management, rules[,] and\\nregulations which affect the unit.” Id. The court also deter-\\nmined that implying a right of action for condominium\\npurchasers “is consistent with assuring that a prospective\\npurchaser is fully informed and satisfied before he buys a\\ncondominium unit.” Id. On this reasoning, the court recog-\\nnized an implied right of action for prospective condomini-\\num purchasers to terminate a sales contract “within a\\nreasonable time after being furnished information revealing\\npreviously undisclosed material expenses.” Id. That is, the\\ncourt authorized a condominium purchaser who is injured\\nby a seller’s violation of the section 22.1 disclosure duty to\\nsue for return of his earnest money plus interest. Id. at 418.\\n By its terms, the implied remedy recognized in Nikolopu-\\nlos covered condominium purchasers who discover a seller’s\\nsection 22.1 violation before closing. In D’Attomo v. Baumbeck,\\nthe court extended that holding and recognized an implied\\nright of action for purchasers who discover the violation after\\nclosing. 36 N.E.3d 892, 905–07 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). The court\\nreiterated the two foundational holdings from Nikolopulos:\\n(1) the statute was designed to protect condominium pur-\\nchasers; and (2) an implied remedy for purchasers aggrieved\\nby a seller’s violation of the statute “is consistent with\\nensuring that a prospective purchaser is fully informed and\\nsatisfied with matters affecting the condominium unit.” Id. at\\n907. The court also reasoned that “[t]he disclosure obliga-\\ntions in section 22.1 would be ineffective, as a practical\\nmatter, if an aggrieved purchaser has no remedy against a\\n\\f8 No. 18-2150\\n\\nseller who conceals a requested disclosure until after the\\nclosing.” Id. The court thus recognized an implied remedy\\nfor aggrieved buyers “where the seller is alleged to have\\nconcealed documents requested by the buyer pursuant to\\nsection 22.1, the concealment is not discovered until after the\\nclosing, and the nondisclosure materially affects the buyer’s\\nrights in the condominium unit.” Id.\\n The unmistakable takeaway from these two decisions is\\nthat section 22.1 is designed to protect the interests of con-\\ndominium purchasers, not condominium sellers. That’s\\nenough to defeat the plaintiffs’ argument for an implied\\nright of action. As owner/sellers they are not within the class\\nof persons the statute was designed to protect, nor have they\\nsuffered an injury that the statute was designed to prevent.\\nAnd implying a remedy for condominium sellers is neither\\nconsistent with nor necessary to effectuate the statute’s\\npurpose.\\n The plaintiffs insist that the reasoning of Nikolopulos and\\nD’Attamo is limited to section 22.1(a), which establishes the\\nunit seller’s disclosure obligation to the buyer. The claim\\nhere, in contrast, rests on subsection (c), which allows con-\\ndominium associations to charge a reasonable fee for provid-\\ning copies of the disclosure documents to unit sellers. That\\nthe fee must be “reasonable” shows that unit sellers are\\nwithin the class of persons the statute was designed to\\nprotect. Or so the argument goes.\\n We’re not persuaded. First, neither Nikolopulos nor\\nD’Attomo distinguishes between subsection (a) and subsec-\\ntion (c). Rather, they discuss only “[t]he disclosure require-\\nments imposed by § 22.1.” D’Attomo, 36 N.E.3d at 905.\\nMoreover, as a general rule of interpretation, Illinois courts\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 9\\n\\nread statutes as a whole rather than focusing on isolated\\nsubsections. See Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ill.\\n2004). Reading section 22.1 in this holistic way, subsec-\\ntion (a) of the statute establishes the seller’s duty to disclose\\nan array of important documents to the buyer; subsection (b)\\nrequires condominium associations to furnish the required\\ndocuments to unit owners within 30 days of a written re-\\nquest; and subsection (c) allows associations to charge a\\nreasonable fee for doing so. The statute works as an integrat-\\ned whole for the benefit of prospective condominium pur-\\nchasers, not sellers.\\n Given the manifest statutory purpose of transparency for\\nprospective condominium buyers, we cannot conclude that\\nthe statute was designed to prevent injury to unit sellers. To\\nthe contrary, the statute is plainly designed to protect con-\\ndominium purchasers against fraud (of the concealment\\nvariety) by condominium sellers. Together subsections (b)\\nand (c) implement the disclosure duty in subsection (a) and\\nthus work toward that end. They are not independent\\nentitlements for the benefit of condominium associations\\nand unit sellers.\\n We therefore hold that section 22.1 does not confer an\\nimplied right of action on condominium owners. The judge\\nproperly dismissed the Condominium Act claim.\\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Claim\\n Next up is the claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud\\nand Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n505/1 et seq. The Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s] consum-\\ners … against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and\\nother unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson v.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2150\\n\\nToyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002). To\\nprevail on a claim under the Act, “a plaintiff must plead and\\nprove that the defendant committed a deceptive or unfair act\\nwith the intent that others rely on the deception, that the act\\noccurred in the course of trade or commerce, and that it\\ncaused actual damages.” Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc.,\\n934 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n No deception is alleged here. The plaintiffs argue instead\\nthat the PDF fee is unfair. A trade practice may be deemed\\nunfair if it (1) “offends public policy”; (2) is “immoral,\\nunethical, oppressive or unscrupulous”; or (3) “causes\\nsubstantial injury to consumers.” Id. at 739. It’s not necessary\\nto establish all three criteria. “A practice may be unfair\\nbecause of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or\\nbecause to a lesser extent it meets all three.” Robinson,\\n775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks omitted).\\n This claim fails for several reasons. First, it appears to\\nrest almost entirely on the alleged violation of section 22.1.\\nThat is, the plaintiffs allege that Sudler and HomeWise\\nviolated the Condominium Act and thereby violated Illinois\\npublic policy. As we’ve explained, however, it’s the condo-\\nminium association’s duty to furnish the required disclosure\\ndocuments to unit owners on request; as a corollary, it may\\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so. § 605/22.1(b), (c). And\\nalthough the association may retain a professional manage-\\nment firm to handle the day-to-day operation of the proper-\\nty, it cannot outsource its statutory duties to the property-\\nmanagement company. Henderson v. Lofts at Lake Arlington\\nTowne Condo. Ass’n, 105 N.E.3d 1, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)\\n(holding that an association retains a statutory duty under\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 11\\n\\nthe Condo Act to care for common areas even though it\\nhired a property manager).\\n To be sure, the Condominium Act establishes standards\\nof conduct for property-management firms. See generally\\n765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.7. But this section of the Act\\nexplicitly precludes “a cause of action by a unit owner …\\nagainst a community association manager or the firm of a\\ncommunity association manager,” while preserving “any\\nright of action by a unit owner” against the association’s\\n“board of directors under existing law.” § 605/18.7(g)(1)–(2).\\n Given these headwinds, the plaintiffs try a different tack.\\nThey argue that Sudler and HomeWise can be liable for\\nviolating the Consumer Fraud Act because they acted on\\nbehalf of the condominium associations to breach the associ-\\nations’ duties under section 22.1. This argument distorts\\nbasic agency law; it is essentially “the reverse of vicarious\\nliability.” Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752,\\n766 (7th Cir. 2009). In Illinois, as elsewhere, a court “may not\\nimpute a duty the principal owed to a third party to an agent\\nmerely acting pursuant to duties it, in turn, owed to the\\nprincipal.” Id. (applying Illinois law). Put slightly differently,\\n“[w]hile the acts of an agent may be considered to be acts of\\nthe principal, acts of the principal are never imputed to the\\nagent.” Stein v. Rio Parismina Lodge, 695 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1998) (citation omitted). For an agent to be liable in\\ntort to a third party harmed by the agent’s conduct, the\\nagent must breach an independent duty that he owes to the\\nthird party. Schur, 577 F.3d at 766; see also RESTATEMENT\\n(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).\\n Thus stripped of its Condominium Act premise, the Con-\\nsumer Fraud Act claim rests on nothing more than a generic\\n\\f12 No. 18-2150\\n\\nallegation that HomeWise charged too much for a PDF of the\\ndisclosure documents. But the Illinois courts have held that\\n“charging an unconscionably high price generally is insuffi-\\ncient to establish a claim for unfairness.” Robinson,\\n775 N.E.2d at 961. The judge correctly dismissed this claim.\\nC. Additional Claims\\n We can make short work of the three common-law\\nclaims. Unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action\\nunder Illinois law. Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511,\\n517 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f an unjust enrichment claim rests on\\nthe same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then\\nthe unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related\\nclaim—and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall\\nwith the related claim.”). Neither is civil conspiracy. Indeck\\nN. Am. Power Fund, L.P. v. Norweb PLC, 735 N.E.2d 649, 662\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[A] conspiracy is not an independent\\ntort. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to state an independent\\ncause of action underlying its conspiracy allegations, the\\nclaim for a conspiracy also fails.”).\\n The remaining claim is for breach of fiduciary duty. This\\nclaim is derivative, not direct. That is, the plaintiffs allege\\nthat Sudler and HomeWise “aided and abetted” a breach of\\nfiduciary duty by the condominium associations. It’s true\\nthat the officers and board members of a condominium\\nassociation owe a fiduciary duty to unit owners. 765 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 605/18.4. Part of that duty includes compliance\\nwith the requirements of the Condominium Act. Davis v.\\nDyson, 900 N.E.2d 698, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). But the com-\\nplaint does not allege facts that, if true, could support an\\ninference that the officers or board members of either con-\\ndominium association committed a fiduciary breach. There\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 13\\n\\nis no allegation, for example, that an officer or board mem-\\nber refused to produce the disclosure documents for the\\nplaintiffs upon request or charged them an excessive fee to\\nmake copies. Rather, the complaint alleges only that the\\ncondominium associations retained Sudler to handle day-to-\\nday property management and that Sudler in turn contract-\\ned with HomeWise, an online vendor that assembles the\\nrequired disclosure documents in PDF format for a fee. This\\ncontractual arrangement is not a breach of the board mem-\\nbers’ fiduciary duties. It does not become one even if we\\naccept, as the complaint alleges, that HomeWise’s fee ex-\\nceeded the out-of-pocket cost of making the PDF.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4683,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671382,"string":"4,671,382"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Keith Horist v. Sudler & Company"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2150"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2150\\nKEITH HORIST, JOSHUA EYMAN,\\nand LORI EYMAN,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSUDLER AND COMPANY D/B/A\\nSUDLER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT and\\nNEXTLEVEL ASSOCIATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,\\nD/B/A HOMEWISEDOCS.COM,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 8113 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Illinois Condominium Property\\nAct requires an elaborate set of disclosures when a condo-\\nminium unit is resold. The owner must give the prospective\\nbuyer a copy of the condominium declaration and bylaws,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2150\\n\\nthe condominium association’s rules, and an array of other\\ndocuments bearing on the current financial status of the\\nproperty. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/22.1(a). The association’s\\nboard must furnish the required documents within 30 days\\nof the owner’s written request, id. § 605/22.1(b), and it may\\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so, id. § 605/22.1(c). Anoth-\\ner provision of the Act allows the association to retain a\\nperson or firm to manage the condominium property. Id.\\n§ 605/18(a)(5).\\n This lawsuit is a proposed class action against a Chicago\\nproperty-management firm and its third-party vendor, an\\nonline service that assembles a downloadable electronic\\nversion of the required disclosure documents, giving unit\\nowners quick and easy access to the material needed to\\ncomplete a resale transaction. The vendor charges a fee for\\nthis service. The plaintiffs are condominium owners who\\npurchased their disclosure documents from the online\\nvendor and now complain that the fee is excessive in viola-\\ntion of the Condominium Act. They also bring claims under\\nthe Illinois consumer-fraud statute and three common-law\\ntheories: breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and\\ncivil conspiracy. The district court dismissed the suit.\\n We affirm. The relevant provision of the Condominium\\nAct does not provide a private right of action, and we see no\\nbasis in Illinois law to imply one for condominium owners.\\nThe statutory consumer-fraud claim is likewise defective; the\\nIllinois courts have held that charging too much for goods or\\nservices is not, standing alone, an unfair practice under the\\nstatute. The common-law claims also fail. The complaint\\ndoes not plead an actionable breach of fiduciary duty, and\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 3\\n\\nunjust enrichment and conspiracy are not independent\\ncauses of action under Illinois law.\\n I. Background\\n Keith Horist owned a condominium at 400 East Ohio\\nStreet in downtown Chicago and was a member of his\\nbuilding’s condominium association. Joshua and Lori\\nEyman owned a condominium at 1515 South Prairie Avenue,\\nalso in downtown Chicago, and they too were members of\\ntheir condominium association. Both associations retained\\nSudler and Company, d/b/a Sudler Property Management,\\nto manage their day-to-day operations.\\n In 2017 Horist and the Eymans put their units on the\\nmarket and found willing buyers. The Illinois Condominium\\nProperty Act requires that “[i]n the event of any resale of a\\ncondominium unit by a unit owner[,] … such owner shall\\nobtain from the [association’s] Board of Managers and shall\\nmake available to the prospective purchaser, upon demand,”\\na copy of the condominium instruments, the association’s\\nrules, and a host of other documents reflecting the current\\nfinancial status of the property.1 § 605/22.1(a). These are\\n\\n1 Specifically, the unit owner must provide: (1) a copy of the declaration,\\nbylaws, other condominium instruments, and any rules and regulations;\\n(2) a statement of any liens and an account of the unit, including unpaid\\nassessments and charges due; (3) a statement listing any capital expendi-\\ntures anticipated by the association within the next two years; (4) a\\nstatement of the status and amount of any reserves or replacement funds\\nand any portion earmarked for specified projects; (5) a copy of the\\nassociation’s financial statement for the last fiscal year; (6) a statement of\\nthe status of any pending suits or judgments in which the association is a\\nparty; (7) a statement of insurance coverage provided to unit owners;\\n(8) a statement that any improvements or alterations to the unit made by\\nthe seller are in good faith believed to be in compliance with the condo-\\n\\f4 No. 18-2150\\n\\ncommonly referred to as the “disclosure documents.” Sub-\\nsection (b) of the statute says that the association’s “principal\\nofficer” or another “specifically designated” officer “shall\\nfurnish” the required documents to the owner “when re-\\nquested to do so in writing and within 30 days of the re-\\nquest.” § 605/22.1(b). Subsection (c), in turn, provides that\\n“the association or its Board of Managers” may charge the\\nunit owner a “reasonable fee covering the direct out-of-\\npocket cost of providing such information and copying.”\\n§ 605/22.1(c).\\n Sudler, the property manager for the two condominium\\nassociations, contracted with HomeWiseDocs.com, an online\\ndocument service that assembles the required disclosure\\ndocuments in portable document form (“PDF”), giving\\ncondominium owners almost instantaneous electronic access\\nto the material needed to close a resale transaction. 2 Sudler’s\\nwebsite provides a link to HomeWise’s site so owners can\\neasily click through and order a downloadable PDF of their\\ndisclosure documents. But this convenience carries a cost.\\nHomeWise charged Horist $240 for a PDF of his disclosure\\ndocuments. The Eymans paid $365 for a PDF of theirs.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nminium instruments; and (9) a statement of the identity and mailing\\naddress of the association’s principal officer or of any other officer or\\nagents specifically designed to receive notices. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n605/22.1(a)(1)–(9).\\n2 HomeWise is a corporation registered in the State of California under\\nthe name NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., doing business as\\nHomeWiseDocs.com.\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 5\\n\\n Horist and the Eymans sued Sudler and HomeWise in\\nCook County Circuit Court seeking to represent a proposed\\nclass of condominium owners “who were charged by or paid\\na fee to HomeWise” for disclosure documents in connection\\nwith a condominium resale. The complaint raises five claims:\\n(1) a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive\\nBusiness Practices Act; (2) a violation of the Condominium\\nAct; (3) aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty;\\n(4) civil conspiracy; and (5) unjust enrichment. HomeWise\\nremoved the case to federal court under the Class Action\\nFairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Sudler and HomeWise then\\nfiled separate motions to dismiss.\\n The judge granted the motions. Turning first to the claim\\nunder the Condominium Act, the judge held that sec-\\ntion 22.1 provides no private right of action—express or\\nimplied—for unit sellers. He also ruled that the complaint\\ndid not state a viable claim that the PDF fee amounts to an\\nunfair trade practice in violation of the consumer-fraud\\nstatute. The judge construed the three common-law claims\\nas requiring an underlying violation of one of these statutes,\\nso he dismissed them as well and entered final judgment for\\nthe defendants.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a dismissal order de novo, construing the\\ncomplaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and\\naccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ochoa\\nv. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 992, 993 (7th Cir. 2018). To\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint\\n“must plausibly suggest … a right to relief, raising that\\npossibility above a speculative level.” EEOC v. Concentra\\n\\f6 No. 18-2150\\n\\nHealth Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation\\nmarks omitted).\\nA. Condominium Act Claim\\n The Condominium Act claim rests on allegations that\\nHomeWise’s fee for an electronic copy of the required\\ndisclosure documents exceeds the “reasonable fee” that\\ncondominium associations are permitted to charge under\\nsection 22.1(c). We note for starters that the associations are\\nnot defendants; this suit is against the property-management\\nfirm and its third-party online document vendor. Our first\\nquestion, however, is whether the plaintiffs have a right of\\naction to enforce section 22.1. The statute doesn’t provide an\\nexpress private remedy, so the plaintiffs advance an argu-\\nment that a right of action exists by necessary implication.\\n Illinois courts will recognize an implied right of action\\nonly if (1) the plaintiff is within the class of members the\\nstatute was enacted to benefit; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one\\nthe statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of\\naction is consistent with the underlying purpose of the\\nstatute; and (4) inferring a private right of action is necessary\\nto provide an adequate remedy for statutory violations.\\nFisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ill.\\n1999). All four factors must be met before a court will recog-\\nnize an implied remedy. Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v.\\nZurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).\\nNot one of them is satisfied here.\\n Two decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court largely con-\\ntrol the outcome. In Nikolopulos v. Balourdos, the court con-\\ncluded that section 22.1 “was clearly designed to protect\\nprospective purchasers of condominium units.” 614 N.E.2d\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 7\\n\\n412, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added). More specifi-\\ncally, the court held that the statute’s purpose is “to prevent\\nprospective purchasers from buying a unit without being\\nfully informed and satisfied with the financial stability of the\\ncondominium as well as the management, rules[,] and\\nregulations which affect the unit.” Id. The court also deter-\\nmined that implying a right of action for condominium\\npurchasers “is consistent with assuring that a prospective\\npurchaser is fully informed and satisfied before he buys a\\ncondominium unit.” Id. On this reasoning, the court recog-\\nnized an implied right of action for prospective condomini-\\num purchasers to terminate a sales contract “within a\\nreasonable time after being furnished information revealing\\npreviously undisclosed material expenses.” Id. That is, the\\ncourt authorized a condominium purchaser who is injured\\nby a seller’s violation of the section 22.1 disclosure duty to\\nsue for return of his earnest money plus interest. Id. at 418.\\n By its terms, the implied remedy recognized in Nikolopu-\\nlos covered condominium purchasers who discover a seller’s\\nsection 22.1 violation before closing. In D’Attomo v. Baumbeck,\\nthe court extended that holding and recognized an implied\\nright of action for purchasers who discover the violation after\\nclosing. 36 N.E.3d 892, 905–07 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). The court\\nreiterated the two foundational holdings from Nikolopulos:\\n(1) the statute was designed to protect condominium pur-\\nchasers; and (2) an implied remedy for purchasers aggrieved\\nby a seller’s violation of the statute “is consistent with\\nensuring that a prospective purchaser is fully informed and\\nsatisfied with matters affecting the condominium unit.” Id. at\\n907. The court also reasoned that “[t]he disclosure obliga-\\ntions in section 22.1 would be ineffective, as a practical\\nmatter, if an aggrieved purchaser has no remedy against a\\n\\f8 No. 18-2150\\n\\nseller who conceals a requested disclosure until after the\\nclosing.” Id. The court thus recognized an implied remedy\\nfor aggrieved buyers “where the seller is alleged to have\\nconcealed documents requested by the buyer pursuant to\\nsection 22.1, the concealment is not discovered until after the\\nclosing, and the nondisclosure materially affects the buyer’s\\nrights in the condominium unit.” Id.\\n The unmistakable takeaway from these two decisions is\\nthat section 22.1 is designed to protect the interests of con-\\ndominium purchasers, not condominium sellers. That’s\\nenough to defeat the plaintiffs’ argument for an implied\\nright of action. As owner/sellers they are not within the class\\nof persons the statute was designed to protect, nor have they\\nsuffered an injury that the statute was designed to prevent.\\nAnd implying a remedy for condominium sellers is neither\\nconsistent with nor necessary to effectuate the statute’s\\npurpose.\\n The plaintiffs insist that the reasoning of Nikolopulos and\\nD’Attamo is limited to section 22.1(a), which establishes the\\nunit seller’s disclosure obligation to the buyer. The claim\\nhere, in contrast, rests on subsection (c), which allows con-\\ndominium associations to charge a reasonable fee for provid-\\ning copies of the disclosure documents to unit sellers. That\\nthe fee must be “reasonable” shows that unit sellers are\\nwithin the class of persons the statute was designed to\\nprotect. Or so the argument goes.\\n We’re not persuaded. First, neither Nikolopulos nor\\nD’Attomo distinguishes between subsection (a) and subsec-\\ntion (c). Rather, they discuss only “[t]he disclosure require-\\nments imposed by § 22.1.” D’Attomo, 36 N.E.3d at 905.\\nMoreover, as a general rule of interpretation, Illinois courts\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 9\\n\\nread statutes as a whole rather than focusing on isolated\\nsubsections. See Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ill.\\n2004). Reading section 22.1 in this holistic way, subsec-\\ntion (a) of the statute establishes the seller’s duty to disclose\\nan array of important documents to the buyer; subsection (b)\\nrequires condominium associations to furnish the required\\ndocuments to unit owners within 30 days of a written re-\\nquest; and subsection (c) allows associations to charge a\\nreasonable fee for doing so. The statute works as an integrat-\\ned whole for the benefit of prospective condominium pur-\\nchasers, not sellers.\\n Given the manifest statutory purpose of transparency for\\nprospective condominium buyers, we cannot conclude that\\nthe statute was designed to prevent injury to unit sellers. To\\nthe contrary, the statute is plainly designed to protect con-\\ndominium purchasers against fraud (of the concealment\\nvariety) by condominium sellers. Together subsections (b)\\nand (c) implement the disclosure duty in subsection (a) and\\nthus work toward that end. They are not independent\\nentitlements for the benefit of condominium associations\\nand unit sellers.\\n We therefore hold that section 22.1 does not confer an\\nimplied right of action on condominium owners. The judge\\nproperly dismissed the Condominium Act claim.\\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Claim\\n Next up is the claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud\\nand Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n505/1 et seq. The Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s] consum-\\ners … against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and\\nother unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson v.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2150\\n\\nToyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002). To\\nprevail on a claim under the Act, “a plaintiff must plead and\\nprove that the defendant committed a deceptive or unfair act\\nwith the intent that others rely on the deception, that the act\\noccurred in the course of trade or commerce, and that it\\ncaused actual damages.” Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc.,\\n934 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n No deception is alleged here. The plaintiffs argue instead\\nthat the PDF fee is unfair. A trade practice may be deemed\\nunfair if it (1) “offends public policy”; (2) is “immoral,\\nunethical, oppressive or unscrupulous”; or (3) “causes\\nsubstantial injury to consumers.” Id. at 739. It’s not necessary\\nto establish all three criteria. “A practice may be unfair\\nbecause of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or\\nbecause to a lesser extent it meets all three.” Robinson,\\n775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks omitted).\\n This claim fails for several reasons. First, it appears to\\nrest almost entirely on the alleged violation of section 22.1.\\nThat is, the plaintiffs allege that Sudler and HomeWise\\nviolated the Condominium Act and thereby violated Illinois\\npublic policy. As we’ve explained, however, it’s the condo-\\nminium association’s duty to furnish the required disclosure\\ndocuments to unit owners on request; as a corollary, it may\\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so. § 605/22.1(b), (c). And\\nalthough the association may retain a professional manage-\\nment firm to handle the day-to-day operation of the proper-\\nty, it cannot outsource its statutory duties to the property-\\nmanagement company. Henderson v. Lofts at Lake Arlington\\nTowne Condo. Ass’n, 105 N.E.3d 1, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)\\n(holding that an association retains a statutory duty under\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 11\\n\\nthe Condo Act to care for common areas even though it\\nhired a property manager).\\n To be sure, the Condominium Act establishes standards\\nof conduct for property-management firms. See generally\\n765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.7. But this section of the Act\\nexplicitly precludes “a cause of action by a unit owner …\\nagainst a community association manager or the firm of a\\ncommunity association manager,” while preserving “any\\nright of action by a unit owner” against the association’s\\n“board of directors under existing law.” § 605/18.7(g)(1)–(2).\\n Given these headwinds, the plaintiffs try a different tack.\\nThey argue that Sudler and HomeWise can be liable for\\nviolating the Consumer Fraud Act because they acted on\\nbehalf of the condominium associations to breach the associ-\\nations’ duties under section 22.1. This argument distorts\\nbasic agency law; it is essentially “the reverse of vicarious\\nliability.” Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752,\\n766 (7th Cir. 2009). In Illinois, as elsewhere, a court “may not\\nimpute a duty the principal owed to a third party to an agent\\nmerely acting pursuant to duties it, in turn, owed to the\\nprincipal.” Id. (applying Illinois law). Put slightly differently,\\n“[w]hile the acts of an agent may be considered to be acts of\\nthe principal, acts of the principal are never imputed to the\\nagent.” Stein v. Rio Parismina Lodge, 695 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1998) (citation omitted). For an agent to be liable in\\ntort to a third party harmed by the agent’s conduct, the\\nagent must breach an independent duty that he owes to the\\nthird party. Schur, 577 F.3d at 766; see also RESTATEMENT\\n(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).\\n Thus stripped of its Condominium Act premise, the Con-\\nsumer Fraud Act claim rests on nothing more than a generic\\n\\f12 No. 18-2150\\n\\nallegation that HomeWise charged too much for a PDF of the\\ndisclosure documents. But the Illinois courts have held that\\n“charging an unconscionably high price generally is insuffi-\\ncient to establish a claim for unfairness.” Robinson,\\n775 N.E.2d at 961. The judge correctly dismissed this claim.\\nC. Additional Claims\\n We can make short work of the three common-law\\nclaims. Unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action\\nunder Illinois law. Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511,\\n517 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f an unjust enrichment claim rests on\\nthe same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then\\nthe unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related\\nclaim—and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall\\nwith the related claim.”). Neither is civil conspiracy. Indeck\\nN. Am. Power Fund, L.P. v. Norweb PLC, 735 N.E.2d 649, 662\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[A] conspiracy is not an independent\\ntort. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to state an independent\\ncause of action underlying its conspiracy allegations, the\\nclaim for a conspiracy also fails.”).\\n The remaining claim is for breach of fiduciary duty. This\\nclaim is derivative, not direct. That is, the plaintiffs allege\\nthat Sudler and HomeWise “aided and abetted” a breach of\\nfiduciary duty by the condominium associations. It’s true\\nthat the officers and board members of a condominium\\nassociation owe a fiduciary duty to unit owners. 765 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 605/18.4. Part of that duty includes compliance\\nwith the requirements of the Condominium Act. Davis v.\\nDyson, 900 N.E.2d 698, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). But the com-\\nplaint does not allege facts that, if true, could support an\\ninference that the officers or board members of either con-\\ndominium association committed a fiduciary breach. There\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 13\\n\\nis no allegation, for example, that an officer or board mem-\\nber refused to produce the disclosure documents for the\\nplaintiffs upon request or charged them an excessive fee to\\nmake copies. Rather, the complaint alleges only that the\\ncondominium associations retained Sudler to handle day-to-\\nday property management and that Sudler in turn contract-\\ned with HomeWise, an online vendor that assembles the\\nrequired disclosure documents in PDF format for a fee. This\\ncontractual arrangement is not a breach of the board mem-\\nbers’ fiduciary duties. It does not become one even if we\\naccept, as the complaint alleges, that HomeWise’s fee ex-\\nceeded the out-of-pocket cost of making the PDF.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448635/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671382/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Keith Horist v. Sudler & Company\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2150\nKEITH HORIST, JOSHUA EYMAN,\nand LORI EYMAN,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nSUDLER AND COMPANY D/B/A\nSUDLER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT and\nNEXTLEVEL ASSOCIATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,\nD/B/A HOMEWISEDOCS.COM,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 C 8113 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Illinois Condominium Property\nAct requires an elaborate set of disclosures when a condo-\nminium unit is resold. The owner must give the prospective\nbuyer a copy of the condominium declaration and bylaws,\n\f2 No. 18-2150\n\nthe condominium association’s rules, and an array of other\ndocuments bearing on the current financial status of the\nproperty. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/22.1(a). The association’s\nboard must furnish the required documents within 30 days\nof the owner’s written request, id. § 605/22.1(b), and it may\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so, id. § 605/22.1(c). Anoth-\ner provision of the Act allows the association to retain a\nperson or firm to manage the condominium property. Id.\n§ 605/18(a)(5).\n This lawsuit is a proposed class action against a Chicago\nproperty-management firm and its third-party vendor, an\nonline service that assembles a downloadable electronic\nversion of the required disclosure documents, giving unit\nowners quick and easy access to the material needed to\ncomplete a resale transaction. The vendor charges a fee for\nthis service. The plaintiffs are condominium owners who\npurchased their disclosure documents from the online\nvendor and now complain that the fee is excessive in viola-\ntion of the Condominium Act. They also bring claims under\nthe Illinois consumer-fraud statute and three common-law\ntheories: breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and\ncivil conspiracy. The district court dismissed the suit.\n We affirm. The relevant provision of the Condominium\nAct does not provide a private right of action, and we see no\nbasis in Illinois law to imply one for condominium owners.\nThe statutory consumer-fraud claim is likewise defective; the\nIllinois courts have held that charging too much for goods or\nservices is not, standing alone, an unfair practice under the\nstatute. The common-law claims also fail. The complaint\ndoes not plead an actionable breach of fiduciary duty, and\n\fNo. 18-2150 3\n\nunjust enrichment and conspiracy are not independent\ncauses of action under Illinois law.\n I. Background\n Keith Horist owned a condominium at 400 East Ohio\nStreet in downtown Chicago and was a member of his\nbuilding’s condominium association. Joshua and Lori\nEyman owned a condominium at 1515 South Prairie Avenue,\nalso in downtown Chicago, and they too were members of\ntheir condominium association. Both associations retained\nSudler and Company, d/b/a Sudler Property Management,\nto manage their day-to-day operations.\n In 2017 Horist and the Eymans put their units on the\nmarket and found willing buyers. The Illinois Condominium\nProperty Act requires that “[i]n the event of any resale of a\ncondominium unit by a unit owner[,] … such owner shall\nobtain from the [association’s] Board of Managers and shall\nmake available to the prospective purchaser, upon demand,”\na copy of the condominium instruments, the association’s\nrules, and a host of other documents reflecting the current\nfinancial status of the property.1 § 605/22.1(a). These are\n\n1 Specifically, the unit owner must provide: (1) a copy of the declaration,\nbylaws, other condominium instruments, and any rules and regulations;\n(2) a statement of any liens and an account of the unit, including unpaid\nassessments and charges due; (3) a statement listing any capital expendi-\ntures anticipated by the association within the next two years; (4) a\nstatement of the status and amount of any reserves or replacement funds\nand any portion earmarked for specified projects; (5) a copy of the\nassociation’s financial statement for the last fiscal year; (6) a statement of\nthe status of any pending suits or judgments in which the association is a\nparty; (7) a statement of insurance coverage provided to unit owners;\n(8) a statement that any improvements or alterations to the unit made by\nthe seller are in good faith believed to be in compliance with the condo-\n\f4 No. 18-2150\n\ncommonly referred to as the “disclosure documents.” Sub-\nsection (b) of the statute says that the association’s “principal\nofficer” or another “specifically designated” officer “shall\nfurnish” the required documents to the owner “when re-\nquested to do so in writing and within 30 days of the re-\nquest.” § 605/22.1(b). Subsection (c), in turn, provides that\n“the association or its Board of Managers” may charge the\nunit owner a “reasonable fee covering the direct out-of-\npocket cost of providing such information and copying.”\n§ 605/22.1(c).\n Sudler, the property manager for the two condominium\nassociations, contracted with HomeWiseDocs.com, an online\ndocument service that assembles the required disclosure\ndocuments in portable document form (“PDF”), giving\ncondominium owners almost instantaneous electronic access\nto the material needed to close a resale transaction. 2 Sudler’s\nwebsite provides a link to HomeWise’s site so owners can\neasily click through and order a downloadable PDF of their\ndisclosure documents. But this convenience carries a cost.\nHomeWise charged Horist $240 for a PDF of his disclosure\ndocuments. The Eymans paid $365 for a PDF of theirs.\n\n\n\n\nminium instruments; and (9) a statement of the identity and mailing\naddress of the association’s principal officer or of any other officer or\nagents specifically designed to receive notices. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.\n605/22.1(a)(1)–(9).\n2 HomeWise is a corporation registered in the State of California under\nthe name NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., doing business as\nHomeWiseDocs.com.\n\fNo. 18-2150 5\n\n Horist and the Eymans sued Sudler and HomeWise in\nCook County Circuit Court seeking to represent a proposed\nclass of condominium owners “who were charged by or paid\na fee to HomeWise” for disclosure documents in connection\nwith a condominium resale. The complaint raises five claims:\n(1) a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive\nBusiness Practices Act; (2) a violation of the Condominium\nAct; (3) aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty;\n(4) civil conspiracy; and (5) unjust enrichment. HomeWise\nremoved the case to federal court under the Class Action\nFairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Sudler and HomeWise then\nfiled separate motions to dismiss.\n The judge granted the motions. Turning first to the claim\nunder the Condominium Act, the judge held that sec-\ntion 22.1 provides no private right of action—express or\nimplied—for unit sellers. He also ruled that the complaint\ndid not state a viable claim that the PDF fee amounts to an\nunfair trade practice in violation of the consumer-fraud\nstatute. The judge construed the three common-law claims\nas requiring an underlying violation of one of these statutes,\nso he dismissed them as well and entered final judgment for\nthe defendants.\n II. Discussion\n We review a dismissal order de novo, construing the\ncomplaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and\naccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ochoa\nv. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 992, 993 (7th Cir. 2018). To\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint\n“must plausibly suggest … a right to relief, raising that\npossibility above a speculative level.” EEOC v. Concentra\n\f6 No. 18-2150\n\nHealth Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation\nmarks omitted).\nA. Condominium Act Claim\n The Condominium Act claim rests on allegations that\nHomeWise’s fee for an electronic copy of the required\ndisclosure documents exceeds the “reasonable fee” that\ncondominium associations are permitted to charge under\nsection 22.1(c). We note for starters that the associations are\nnot defendants; this suit is against the property-management\nfirm and its third-party online document vendor. Our first\nquestion, however, is whether the plaintiffs have a right of\naction to enforce section 22.1. The statute doesn’t provide an\nexpress private remedy, so the plaintiffs advance an argu-\nment that a right of action exists by necessary implication.\n Illinois courts will recognize an implied right of action\nonly if (1) the plaintiff is within the class of members the\nstatute was enacted to benefit; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one\nthe statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of\naction is consistent with the underlying purpose of the\nstatute; and (4) inferring a private right of action is necessary\nto provide an adequate remedy for statutory violations.\nFisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ill.\n1999). All four factors must be met before a court will recog-\nnize an implied remedy. Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v.\nZurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).\nNot one of them is satisfied here.\n Two decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court largely con-\ntrol the outcome. In Nikolopulos v. Balourdos, the court con-\ncluded that section 22.1 “was clearly designed to protect\nprospective purchasers of condominium units.” 614 N.E.2d\n\fNo. 18-2150 7\n\n412, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added). More specifi-\ncally, the court held that the statute’s purpose is “to prevent\nprospective purchasers from buying a unit without being\nfully informed and satisfied with the financial stability of the\ncondominium as well as the management, rules[,] and\nregulations which affect the unit.” Id. The court also deter-\nmined that implying a right of action for condominium\npurchasers “is consistent with assuring that a prospective\npurchaser is fully informed and satisfied before he buys a\ncondominium unit.” Id. On this reasoning, the court recog-\nnized an implied right of action for prospective condomini-\num purchasers to terminate a sales contract “within a\nreasonable time after being furnished information revealing\npreviously undisclosed material expenses.” Id. That is, the\ncourt authorized a condominium purchaser who is injured\nby a seller’s violation of the section 22.1 disclosure duty to\nsue for return of his earnest money plus interest. Id. at 418.\n By its terms, the implied remedy recognized in Nikolopu-\nlos covered condominium purchasers who discover a seller’s\nsection 22.1 violation before closing. In D’Attomo v. Baumbeck,\nthe court extended that holding and recognized an implied\nright of action for purchasers who discover the violation after\nclosing. 36 N.E.3d 892, 905–07 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). The court\nreiterated the two foundational holdings from Nikolopulos:\n(1) the statute was designed to protect condominium pur-\nchasers; and (2) an implied remedy for purchasers aggrieved\nby a seller’s violation of the statute “is consistent with\nensuring that a prospective purchaser is fully informed and\nsatisfied with matters affecting the condominium unit.” Id. at\n907. The court also reasoned that “[t]he disclosure obliga-\ntions in section 22.1 would be ineffective, as a practical\nmatter, if an aggrieved purchaser has no remedy against a\n\f8 No. 18-2150\n\nseller who conceals a requested disclosure until after the\nclosing.” Id. The court thus recognized an implied remedy\nfor aggrieved buyers “where the seller is alleged to have\nconcealed documents requested by the buyer pursuant to\nsection 22.1, the concealment is not discovered until after the\nclosing, and the nondisclosure materially affects the buyer’s\nrights in the condominium unit.” Id.\n The unmistakable takeaway from these two decisions is\nthat section 22.1 is designed to protect the interests of con-\ndominium purchasers, not condominium sellers. That’s\nenough to defeat the plaintiffs’ argument for an implied\nright of action. As owner/sellers they are not within the class\nof persons the statute was designed to protect, nor have they\nsuffered an injury that the statute was designed to prevent.\nAnd implying a remedy for condominium sellers is neither\nconsistent with nor necessary to effectuate the statute’s\npurpose.\n The plaintiffs insist that the reasoning of Nikolopulos and\nD’Attamo is limited to section 22.1(a), which establishes the\nunit seller’s disclosure obligation to the buyer. The claim\nhere, in contrast, rests on subsection (c), which allows con-\ndominium associations to charge a reasonable fee for provid-\ning copies of the disclosure documents to unit sellers. That\nthe fee must be “reasonable” shows that unit sellers are\nwithin the class of persons the statute was designed to\nprotect. Or so the argument goes.\n We’re not persuaded. First, neither Nikolopulos nor\nD’Attomo distinguishes between subsection (a) and subsec-\ntion (c). Rather, they discuss only “[t]he disclosure require-\nments imposed by § 22.1.” D’Attomo, 36 N.E.3d at 905.\nMoreover, as a general rule of interpretation, Illinois courts\n\fNo. 18-2150 9\n\nread statutes as a whole rather than focusing on isolated\nsubsections. See Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ill.\n2004). Reading section 22.1 in this holistic way, subsec-\ntion (a) of the statute establishes the seller’s duty to disclose\nan array of important documents to the buyer; subsection (b)\nrequires condominium associations to furnish the required\ndocuments to unit owners within 30 days of a written re-\nquest; and subsection (c) allows associations to charge a\nreasonable fee for doing so. The statute works as an integrat-\ned whole for the benefit of prospective condominium pur-\nchasers, not sellers.\n Given the manifest statutory purpose of transparency for\nprospective condominium buyers, we cannot conclude that\nthe statute was designed to prevent injury to unit sellers. To\nthe contrary, the statute is plainly designed to protect con-\ndominium purchasers against fraud (of the concealment\nvariety) by condominium sellers. Together subsections (b)\nand (c) implement the disclosure duty in subsection (a) and\nthus work toward that end. They are not independent\nentitlements for the benefit of condominium associations\nand unit sellers.\n We therefore hold that section 22.1 does not confer an\nimplied right of action on condominium owners. The judge\nproperly dismissed the Condominium Act claim.\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Claim\n Next up is the claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud\nand Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.\n505/1 et seq. The Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s] consum-\ners … against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and\nother unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson v.\n\f10 No. 18-2150\n\nToyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002). To\nprevail on a claim under the Act, “a plaintiff must plead and\nprove that the defendant committed a deceptive or unfair act\nwith the intent that others rely on the deception, that the act\noccurred in the course of trade or commerce, and that it\ncaused actual damages.” Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc.,\n934 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2019).\n No deception is alleged here. The plaintiffs argue instead\nthat the PDF fee is unfair. A trade practice may be deemed\nunfair if it (1) “offends public policy”; (2) is “immoral,\nunethical, oppressive or unscrupulous”; or (3) “causes\nsubstantial injury to consumers.” Id. at 739. It’s not necessary\nto establish all three criteria. “A practice may be unfair\nbecause of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or\nbecause to a lesser extent it meets all three.” Robinson,\n775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks omitted).\n This claim fails for several reasons. First, it appears to\nrest almost entirely on the alleged violation of section 22.1.\nThat is, the plaintiffs allege that Sudler and HomeWise\nviolated the Condominium Act and thereby violated Illinois\npublic policy. As we’ve explained, however, it’s the condo-\nminium association’s duty to furnish the required disclosure\ndocuments to unit owners on request; as a corollary, it may\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so. § 605/22.1(b), (c). And\nalthough the association may retain a professional manage-\nment firm to handle the day-to-day operation of the proper-\nty, it cannot outsource its statutory duties to the property-\nmanagement company. Henderson v. Lofts at Lake Arlington\nTowne Condo. Ass’n, 105 N.E.3d 1, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)\n(holding that an association retains a statutory duty under\n\fNo. 18-2150 11\n\nthe Condo Act to care for common areas even though it\nhired a property manager).\n To be sure, the Condominium Act establishes standards\nof conduct for property-management firms. See generally\n765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.7. But this section of the Act\nexplicitly precludes “a cause of action by a unit owner …\nagainst a community association manager or the firm of a\ncommunity association manager,” while preserving “any\nright of action by a unit owner” against the association’s\n“board of directors under existing law.” § 605/18.7(g)(1)–(2).\n Given these headwinds, the plaintiffs try a different tack.\nThey argue that Sudler and HomeWise can be liable for\nviolating the Consumer Fraud Act because they acted on\nbehalf of the condominium associations to breach the associ-\nations’ duties under section 22.1. This argument distorts\nbasic agency law; it is essentially “the reverse of vicarious\nliability.” Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752,\n766 (7th Cir. 2009). In Illinois, as elsewhere, a court “may not\nimpute a duty the principal owed to a third party to an agent\nmerely acting pursuant to duties it, in turn, owed to the\nprincipal.” Id. (applying Illinois law). Put slightly differently,\n“[w]hile the acts of an agent may be considered to be acts of\nthe principal, acts of the principal are never imputed to the\nagent.” Stein v. Rio Parismina Lodge, 695 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ill.\nApp. Ct. 1998) (citation omitted). For an agent to be liable in\ntort to a third party harmed by the agent’s conduct, the\nagent must breach an independent duty that he owes to the\nthird party. Schur, 577 F.3d at 766; see also RESTATEMENT\n(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).\n Thus stripped of its Condominium Act premise, the Con-\nsumer Fraud Act claim rests on nothing more than a generic\n\f12 No. 18-2150\n\nallegation that HomeWise charged too much for a PDF of the\ndisclosure documents. But the Illinois courts have held that\n“charging an unconscionably high price generally is insuffi-\ncient to establish a claim for unfairness.” Robinson,\n775 N.E.2d at 961. The judge correctly dismissed this claim.\nC. Additional Claims\n We can make short work of the three common-law\nclaims. Unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action\nunder Illinois law. Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511,\n517 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f an unjust enrichment claim rests on\nthe same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then\nthe unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related\nclaim—and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall\nwith the related claim.”). Neither is civil conspiracy. Indeck\nN. Am. Power Fund, L.P. v. Norweb PLC, 735 N.E.2d 649, 662\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[A] conspiracy is not an independent\ntort. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to state an independent\ncause of action underlying its conspiracy allegations, the\nclaim for a conspiracy also fails.”).\n The remaining claim is for breach of fiduciary duty. This\nclaim is derivative, not direct. That is, the plaintiffs allege\nthat Sudler and HomeWise “aided and abetted” a breach of\nfiduciary duty by the condominium associations. It’s true\nthat the officers and board members of a condominium\nassociation owe a fiduciary duty to unit owners. 765 ILL.\nCOMP. STAT. 605/18.4. Part of that duty includes compliance\nwith the requirements of the Condominium Act. Davis v.\nDyson, 900 N.E.2d 698, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). But the com-\nplaint does not allege facts that, if true, could support an\ninference that the officers or board members of either con-\ndominium association committed a fiduciary breach. There\n\fNo. 18-2150 13\n\nis no allegation, for example, that an officer or board mem-\nber refused to produce the disclosure documents for the\nplaintiffs upon request or charged them an excessive fee to\nmake copies. Rather, the complaint alleges only that the\ncondominium associations retained Sudler to handle day-to-\nday property management and that Sudler in turn contract-\ned with HomeWise, an online vendor that assembles the\nrequired disclosure documents in PDF format for a fee. This\ncontractual arrangement is not a breach of the board mem-\nbers’ fiduciary duties. It does not become one even if we\naccept, as the complaint alleges, that HomeWise’s fee ex-\nceeded the out-of-pocket cost of making the PDF.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Keith Horist v. Sudler & Company\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2150\\nKEITH HORIST, JOSHUA EYMAN,\\nand LORI EYMAN,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSUDLER AND COMPANY D/B/A\\nSUDLER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT and\\nNEXTLEVEL ASSOCIATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,\\nD/B/A HOMEWISEDOCS.COM,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 8113 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Illinois Condominium Property\\nAct requires an elaborate set of disclosures when a condo-\\nminium unit is resold. The owner must give the prospective\\nbuyer a copy of the condominium declaration and bylaws,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2150\\n\\nthe condominium association’s rules, and an array of other\\ndocuments bearing on the current financial status of the\\nproperty. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/22.1(a). The association’s\\nboard must furnish the required documents within 30 days\\nof the owner’s written request, id. § 605/22.1(b), and it may\\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so, id. § 605/22.1(c). Anoth-\\ner provision of the Act allows the association to retain a\\nperson or firm to manage the condominium property. Id.\\n§ 605/18(a)(5).\\n This lawsuit is a proposed class action against a Chicago\\nproperty-management firm and its third-party vendor, an\\nonline service that assembles a downloadable electronic\\nversion of the required disclosure documents, giving unit\\nowners quick and easy access to the material needed to\\ncomplete a resale transaction. The vendor charges a fee for\\nthis service. The plaintiffs are condominium owners who\\npurchased their disclosure documents from the online\\nvendor and now complain that the fee is excessive in viola-\\ntion of the Condominium Act. They also bring claims under\\nthe Illinois consumer-fraud statute and three common-law\\ntheories: breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and\\ncivil conspiracy. The district court dismissed the suit.\\n We affirm. The relevant provision of the Condominium\\nAct does not provide a private right of action, and we see no\\nbasis in Illinois law to imply one for condominium owners.\\nThe statutory consumer-fraud claim is likewise defective; the\\nIllinois courts have held that charging too much for goods or\\nservices is not, standing alone, an unfair practice under the\\nstatute. The common-law claims also fail. The complaint\\ndoes not plead an actionable breach of fiduciary duty, and\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 3\\n\\nunjust enrichment and conspiracy are not independent\\ncauses of action under Illinois law.\\n I. Background\\n Keith Horist owned a condominium at 400 East Ohio\\nStreet in downtown Chicago and was a member of his\\nbuilding’s condominium association. Joshua and Lori\\nEyman owned a condominium at 1515 South Prairie Avenue,\\nalso in downtown Chicago, and they too were members of\\ntheir condominium association. Both associations retained\\nSudler and Company, d/b/a Sudler Property Management,\\nto manage their day-to-day operations.\\n In 2017 Horist and the Eymans put their units on the\\nmarket and found willing buyers. The Illinois Condominium\\nProperty Act requires that “[i]n the event of any resale of a\\ncondominium unit by a unit owner[,] … such owner shall\\nobtain from the [association’s] Board of Managers and shall\\nmake available to the prospective purchaser, upon demand,”\\na copy of the condominium instruments, the association’s\\nrules, and a host of other documents reflecting the current\\nfinancial status of the property.1 § 605/22.1(a). These are\\n\\n1 Specifically, the unit owner must provide: (1) a copy of the declaration,\\nbylaws, other condominium instruments, and any rules and regulations;\\n(2) a statement of any liens and an account of the unit, including unpaid\\nassessments and charges due; (3) a statement listing any capital expendi-\\ntures anticipated by the association within the next two years; (4) a\\nstatement of the status and amount of any reserves or replacement funds\\nand any portion earmarked for specified projects; (5) a copy of the\\nassociation’s financial statement for the last fiscal year; (6) a statement of\\nthe status of any pending suits or judgments in which the association is a\\nparty; (7) a statement of insurance coverage provided to unit owners;\\n(8) a statement that any improvements or alterations to the unit made by\\nthe seller are in good faith believed to be in compliance with the condo-\\n\\f4 No. 18-2150\\n\\ncommonly referred to as the “disclosure documents.” Sub-\\nsection (b) of the statute says that the association’s “principal\\nofficer” or another “specifically designated” officer “shall\\nfurnish” the required documents to the owner “when re-\\nquested to do so in writing and within 30 days of the re-\\nquest.” § 605/22.1(b). Subsection (c), in turn, provides that\\n“the association or its Board of Managers” may charge the\\nunit owner a “reasonable fee covering the direct out-of-\\npocket cost of providing such information and copying.”\\n§ 605/22.1(c).\\n Sudler, the property manager for the two condominium\\nassociations, contracted with HomeWiseDocs.com, an online\\ndocument service that assembles the required disclosure\\ndocuments in portable document form (“PDF”), giving\\ncondominium owners almost instantaneous electronic access\\nto the material needed to close a resale transaction. 2 Sudler’s\\nwebsite provides a link to HomeWise’s site so owners can\\neasily click through and order a downloadable PDF of their\\ndisclosure documents. But this convenience carries a cost.\\nHomeWise charged Horist $240 for a PDF of his disclosure\\ndocuments. The Eymans paid $365 for a PDF of theirs.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nminium instruments; and (9) a statement of the identity and mailing\\naddress of the association’s principal officer or of any other officer or\\nagents specifically designed to receive notices. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n605/22.1(a)(1)–(9).\\n2 HomeWise is a corporation registered in the State of California under\\nthe name NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., doing business as\\nHomeWiseDocs.com.\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 5\\n\\n Horist and the Eymans sued Sudler and HomeWise in\\nCook County Circuit Court seeking to represent a proposed\\nclass of condominium owners “who were charged by or paid\\na fee to HomeWise” for disclosure documents in connection\\nwith a condominium resale. The complaint raises five claims:\\n(1) a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive\\nBusiness Practices Act; (2) a violation of the Condominium\\nAct; (3) aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty;\\n(4) civil conspiracy; and (5) unjust enrichment. HomeWise\\nremoved the case to federal court under the Class Action\\nFairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Sudler and HomeWise then\\nfiled separate motions to dismiss.\\n The judge granted the motions. Turning first to the claim\\nunder the Condominium Act, the judge held that sec-\\ntion 22.1 provides no private right of action—express or\\nimplied—for unit sellers. He also ruled that the complaint\\ndid not state a viable claim that the PDF fee amounts to an\\nunfair trade practice in violation of the consumer-fraud\\nstatute. The judge construed the three common-law claims\\nas requiring an underlying violation of one of these statutes,\\nso he dismissed them as well and entered final judgment for\\nthe defendants.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a dismissal order de novo, construing the\\ncomplaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and\\naccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ochoa\\nv. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 992, 993 (7th Cir. 2018). To\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint\\n“must plausibly suggest … a right to relief, raising that\\npossibility above a speculative level.” EEOC v. Concentra\\n\\f6 No. 18-2150\\n\\nHealth Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation\\nmarks omitted).\\nA. Condominium Act Claim\\n The Condominium Act claim rests on allegations that\\nHomeWise’s fee for an electronic copy of the required\\ndisclosure documents exceeds the “reasonable fee” that\\ncondominium associations are permitted to charge under\\nsection 22.1(c). We note for starters that the associations are\\nnot defendants; this suit is against the property-management\\nfirm and its third-party online document vendor. Our first\\nquestion, however, is whether the plaintiffs have a right of\\naction to enforce section 22.1. The statute doesn’t provide an\\nexpress private remedy, so the plaintiffs advance an argu-\\nment that a right of action exists by necessary implication.\\n Illinois courts will recognize an implied right of action\\nonly if (1) the plaintiff is within the class of members the\\nstatute was enacted to benefit; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one\\nthe statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of\\naction is consistent with the underlying purpose of the\\nstatute; and (4) inferring a private right of action is necessary\\nto provide an adequate remedy for statutory violations.\\nFisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ill.\\n1999). All four factors must be met before a court will recog-\\nnize an implied remedy. Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v.\\nZurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).\\nNot one of them is satisfied here.\\n Two decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court largely con-\\ntrol the outcome. In Nikolopulos v. Balourdos, the court con-\\ncluded that section 22.1 “was clearly designed to protect\\nprospective purchasers of condominium units.” 614 N.E.2d\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 7\\n\\n412, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added). More specifi-\\ncally, the court held that the statute’s purpose is “to prevent\\nprospective purchasers from buying a unit without being\\nfully informed and satisfied with the financial stability of the\\ncondominium as well as the management, rules[,] and\\nregulations which affect the unit.” Id. The court also deter-\\nmined that implying a right of action for condominium\\npurchasers “is consistent with assuring that a prospective\\npurchaser is fully informed and satisfied before he buys a\\ncondominium unit.” Id. On this reasoning, the court recog-\\nnized an implied right of action for prospective condomini-\\num purchasers to terminate a sales contract “within a\\nreasonable time after being furnished information revealing\\npreviously undisclosed material expenses.” Id. That is, the\\ncourt authorized a condominium purchaser who is injured\\nby a seller’s violation of the section 22.1 disclosure duty to\\nsue for return of his earnest money plus interest. Id. at 418.\\n By its terms, the implied remedy recognized in Nikolopu-\\nlos covered condominium purchasers who discover a seller’s\\nsection 22.1 violation before closing. In D’Attomo v. Baumbeck,\\nthe court extended that holding and recognized an implied\\nright of action for purchasers who discover the violation after\\nclosing. 36 N.E.3d 892, 905–07 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). The court\\nreiterated the two foundational holdings from Nikolopulos:\\n(1) the statute was designed to protect condominium pur-\\nchasers; and (2) an implied remedy for purchasers aggrieved\\nby a seller’s violation of the statute “is consistent with\\nensuring that a prospective purchaser is fully informed and\\nsatisfied with matters affecting the condominium unit.” Id. at\\n907. The court also reasoned that “[t]he disclosure obliga-\\ntions in section 22.1 would be ineffective, as a practical\\nmatter, if an aggrieved purchaser has no remedy against a\\n\\f8 No. 18-2150\\n\\nseller who conceals a requested disclosure until after the\\nclosing.” Id. The court thus recognized an implied remedy\\nfor aggrieved buyers “where the seller is alleged to have\\nconcealed documents requested by the buyer pursuant to\\nsection 22.1, the concealment is not discovered until after the\\nclosing, and the nondisclosure materially affects the buyer’s\\nrights in the condominium unit.” Id.\\n The unmistakable takeaway from these two decisions is\\nthat section 22.1 is designed to protect the interests of con-\\ndominium purchasers, not condominium sellers. That’s\\nenough to defeat the plaintiffs’ argument for an implied\\nright of action. As owner/sellers they are not within the class\\nof persons the statute was designed to protect, nor have they\\nsuffered an injury that the statute was designed to prevent.\\nAnd implying a remedy for condominium sellers is neither\\nconsistent with nor necessary to effectuate the statute’s\\npurpose.\\n The plaintiffs insist that the reasoning of Nikolopulos and\\nD’Attamo is limited to section 22.1(a), which establishes the\\nunit seller’s disclosure obligation to the buyer. The claim\\nhere, in contrast, rests on subsection (c), which allows con-\\ndominium associations to charge a reasonable fee for provid-\\ning copies of the disclosure documents to unit sellers. That\\nthe fee must be “reasonable” shows that unit sellers are\\nwithin the class of persons the statute was designed to\\nprotect. Or so the argument goes.\\n We’re not persuaded. First, neither Nikolopulos nor\\nD’Attomo distinguishes between subsection (a) and subsec-\\ntion (c). Rather, they discuss only “[t]he disclosure require-\\nments imposed by § 22.1.” D’Attomo, 36 N.E.3d at 905.\\nMoreover, as a general rule of interpretation, Illinois courts\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 9\\n\\nread statutes as a whole rather than focusing on isolated\\nsubsections. See Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ill.\\n2004). Reading section 22.1 in this holistic way, subsec-\\ntion (a) of the statute establishes the seller’s duty to disclose\\nan array of important documents to the buyer; subsection (b)\\nrequires condominium associations to furnish the required\\ndocuments to unit owners within 30 days of a written re-\\nquest; and subsection (c) allows associations to charge a\\nreasonable fee for doing so. The statute works as an integrat-\\ned whole for the benefit of prospective condominium pur-\\nchasers, not sellers.\\n Given the manifest statutory purpose of transparency for\\nprospective condominium buyers, we cannot conclude that\\nthe statute was designed to prevent injury to unit sellers. To\\nthe contrary, the statute is plainly designed to protect con-\\ndominium purchasers against fraud (of the concealment\\nvariety) by condominium sellers. Together subsections (b)\\nand (c) implement the disclosure duty in subsection (a) and\\nthus work toward that end. They are not independent\\nentitlements for the benefit of condominium associations\\nand unit sellers.\\n We therefore hold that section 22.1 does not confer an\\nimplied right of action on condominium owners. The judge\\nproperly dismissed the Condominium Act claim.\\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Claim\\n Next up is the claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud\\nand Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n505/1 et seq. The Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s] consum-\\ners … against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and\\nother unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson v.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2150\\n\\nToyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002). To\\nprevail on a claim under the Act, “a plaintiff must plead and\\nprove that the defendant committed a deceptive or unfair act\\nwith the intent that others rely on the deception, that the act\\noccurred in the course of trade or commerce, and that it\\ncaused actual damages.” Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc.,\\n934 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n No deception is alleged here. The plaintiffs argue instead\\nthat the PDF fee is unfair. A trade practice may be deemed\\nunfair if it (1) “offends public policy”; (2) is “immoral,\\nunethical, oppressive or unscrupulous”; or (3) “causes\\nsubstantial injury to consumers.” Id. at 739. It’s not necessary\\nto establish all three criteria. “A practice may be unfair\\nbecause of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or\\nbecause to a lesser extent it meets all three.” Robinson,\\n775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks omitted).\\n This claim fails for several reasons. First, it appears to\\nrest almost entirely on the alleged violation of section 22.1.\\nThat is, the plaintiffs allege that Sudler and HomeWise\\nviolated the Condominium Act and thereby violated Illinois\\npublic policy. As we’ve explained, however, it’s the condo-\\nminium association’s duty to furnish the required disclosure\\ndocuments to unit owners on request; as a corollary, it may\\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so. § 605/22.1(b), (c). And\\nalthough the association may retain a professional manage-\\nment firm to handle the day-to-day operation of the proper-\\nty, it cannot outsource its statutory duties to the property-\\nmanagement company. Henderson v. Lofts at Lake Arlington\\nTowne Condo. Ass’n, 105 N.E.3d 1, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)\\n(holding that an association retains a statutory duty under\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 11\\n\\nthe Condo Act to care for common areas even though it\\nhired a property manager).\\n To be sure, the Condominium Act establishes standards\\nof conduct for property-management firms. See generally\\n765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.7. But this section of the Act\\nexplicitly precludes “a cause of action by a unit owner …\\nagainst a community association manager or the firm of a\\ncommunity association manager,” while preserving “any\\nright of action by a unit owner” against the association’s\\n“board of directors under existing law.” § 605/18.7(g)(1)–(2).\\n Given these headwinds, the plaintiffs try a different tack.\\nThey argue that Sudler and HomeWise can be liable for\\nviolating the Consumer Fraud Act because they acted on\\nbehalf of the condominium associations to breach the associ-\\nations’ duties under section 22.1. This argument distorts\\nbasic agency law; it is essentially “the reverse of vicarious\\nliability.” Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752,\\n766 (7th Cir. 2009). In Illinois, as elsewhere, a court “may not\\nimpute a duty the principal owed to a third party to an agent\\nmerely acting pursuant to duties it, in turn, owed to the\\nprincipal.” Id. (applying Illinois law). Put slightly differently,\\n“[w]hile the acts of an agent may be considered to be acts of\\nthe principal, acts of the principal are never imputed to the\\nagent.” Stein v. Rio Parismina Lodge, 695 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1998) (citation omitted). For an agent to be liable in\\ntort to a third party harmed by the agent’s conduct, the\\nagent must breach an independent duty that he owes to the\\nthird party. Schur, 577 F.3d at 766; see also RESTATEMENT\\n(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).\\n Thus stripped of its Condominium Act premise, the Con-\\nsumer Fraud Act claim rests on nothing more than a generic\\n\\f12 No. 18-2150\\n\\nallegation that HomeWise charged too much for a PDF of the\\ndisclosure documents. But the Illinois courts have held that\\n“charging an unconscionably high price generally is insuffi-\\ncient to establish a claim for unfairness.” Robinson,\\n775 N.E.2d at 961. The judge correctly dismissed this claim.\\nC. Additional Claims\\n We can make short work of the three common-law\\nclaims. Unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action\\nunder Illinois law. Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511,\\n517 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f an unjust enrichment claim rests on\\nthe same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then\\nthe unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related\\nclaim—and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall\\nwith the related claim.”). Neither is civil conspiracy. Indeck\\nN. Am. Power Fund, L.P. v. Norweb PLC, 735 N.E.2d 649, 662\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[A] conspiracy is not an independent\\ntort. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to state an independent\\ncause of action underlying its conspiracy allegations, the\\nclaim for a conspiracy also fails.”).\\n The remaining claim is for breach of fiduciary duty. This\\nclaim is derivative, not direct. That is, the plaintiffs allege\\nthat Sudler and HomeWise “aided and abetted” a breach of\\nfiduciary duty by the condominium associations. It’s true\\nthat the officers and board members of a condominium\\nassociation owe a fiduciary duty to unit owners. 765 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 605/18.4. Part of that duty includes compliance\\nwith the requirements of the Condominium Act. Davis v.\\nDyson, 900 N.E.2d 698, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). But the com-\\nplaint does not allege facts that, if true, could support an\\ninference that the officers or board members of either con-\\ndominium association committed a fiduciary breach. There\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 13\\n\\nis no allegation, for example, that an officer or board mem-\\nber refused to produce the disclosure documents for the\\nplaintiffs upon request or charged them an excessive fee to\\nmake copies. Rather, the complaint alleges only that the\\ncondominium associations retained Sudler to handle day-to-\\nday property management and that Sudler in turn contract-\\ned with HomeWise, an online vendor that assembles the\\nrequired disclosure documents in PDF format for a fee. This\\ncontractual arrangement is not a breach of the board mem-\\nbers’ fiduciary duties. It does not become one even if we\\naccept, as the complaint alleges, that HomeWise’s fee ex-\\nceeded the out-of-pocket cost of making the PDF.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4684,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671411,"string":"4,671,411"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Keith Horist v. Sudler & Company"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2150"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2150\\nKEITH HORIST, JOSHUA EYMAN,\\nand LORI EYMAN,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSUDLER AND COMPANY D/B/A\\nSUDLER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT and\\nNEXTLEVEL ASSOCIATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,\\nD/B/A HOMEWISEDOCS.COM,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 8113 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Illinois Condominium Property\\nAct requires an elaborate set of disclosures when a condo-\\nminium unit is resold. The owner must give the prospective\\nbuyer a copy of the condominium declaration and bylaws,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2150\\n\\nthe condominium association’s rules, and an array of other\\ndocuments bearing on the current financial status of the\\nproperty. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/22.1(a). The association’s\\nboard must furnish the required documents within 30 days\\nof the owner’s written request, id. § 605/22.1(b), and it may\\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so, id. § 605/22.1(c). Anoth-\\ner provision of the Act allows the association to retain a\\nperson or firm to manage the condominium property. Id.\\n§ 605/18(a)(5).\\n This lawsuit is a proposed class action against a Chicago\\nproperty-management firm and its third-party vendor, an\\nonline service that assembles a downloadable electronic\\nversion of the required disclosure documents, giving unit\\nowners quick and easy access to the material needed to\\ncomplete a resale transaction. The vendor charges a fee for\\nthis service. The plaintiffs are condominium owners who\\npurchased their disclosure documents from the online\\nvendor and now complain that the fee is excessive in viola-\\ntion of the Condominium Act. They also bring claims under\\nthe Illinois consumer-fraud statute and three common-law\\ntheories: breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and\\ncivil conspiracy. The district court dismissed the suit.\\n We affirm. The relevant provision of the Condominium\\nAct does not provide a private right of action, and we see no\\nbasis in Illinois law to imply one for condominium owners.\\nThe statutory consumer-fraud claim is likewise defective; the\\nIllinois courts have held that charging too much for goods or\\nservices is not, standing alone, an unfair practice under the\\nstatute. The common-law claims also fail. The complaint\\ndoes not plead an actionable breach of fiduciary duty, and\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 3\\n\\nunjust enrichment and conspiracy are not independent\\ncauses of action under Illinois law.\\n I. Background\\n Keith Horist owned a condominium at 400 East Ohio\\nStreet in downtown Chicago and was a member of his\\nbuilding’s condominium association. Joshua and Lori\\nEyman owned a condominium at 1515 South Prairie Avenue,\\nalso in downtown Chicago, and they too were members of\\ntheir condominium association. Both associations retained\\nSudler and Company, d/b/a Sudler Property Management,\\nto manage their day-to-day operations.\\n In 2017 Horist and the Eymans put their units on the\\nmarket and found willing buyers. The Illinois Condominium\\nProperty Act requires that “[i]n the event of any resale of a\\ncondominium unit by a unit owner[,] … such owner shall\\nobtain from the [association’s] Board of Managers and shall\\nmake available to the prospective purchaser, upon demand,”\\na copy of the condominium instruments, the association’s\\nrules, and a host of other documents reflecting the current\\nfinancial status of the property.1 § 605/22.1(a). These are\\n\\n1 Specifically, the unit owner must provide: (1) a copy of the declaration,\\nbylaws, other condominium instruments, and any rules and regulations;\\n(2) a statement of any liens and an account of the unit, including unpaid\\nassessments and charges due; (3) a statement listing any capital expendi-\\ntures anticipated by the association within the next two years; (4) a\\nstatement of the status and amount of any reserves or replacement funds\\nand any portion earmarked for specified projects; (5) a copy of the\\nassociation’s financial statement for the last fiscal year; (6) a statement of\\nthe status of any pending suits or judgments in which the association is a\\nparty; (7) a statement of insurance coverage provided to unit owners;\\n(8) a statement that any improvements or alterations to the unit made by\\nthe seller are in good faith believed to be in compliance with the condo-\\n\\f4 No. 18-2150\\n\\ncommonly referred to as the “disclosure documents.” Sub-\\nsection (b) of the statute says that the association’s “principal\\nofficer” or another “specifically designated” officer “shall\\nfurnish” the required documents to the owner “when re-\\nquested to do so in writing and within 30 days of the re-\\nquest.” § 605/22.1(b). Subsection (c), in turn, provides that\\n“the association or its Board of Managers” may charge the\\nunit owner a “reasonable fee covering the direct out-of-\\npocket cost of providing such information and copying.”\\n§ 605/22.1(c).\\n Sudler, the property manager for the two condominium\\nassociations, contracted with HomeWiseDocs.com, an online\\ndocument service that assembles the required disclosure\\ndocuments in portable document form (“PDF”), giving\\ncondominium owners almost instantaneous electronic access\\nto the material needed to close a resale transaction. 2 Sudler’s\\nwebsite provides a link to HomeWise’s site so owners can\\neasily click through and order a downloadable PDF of their\\ndisclosure documents. But this convenience carries a cost.\\nHomeWise charged Horist $240 for a PDF of his disclosure\\ndocuments. The Eymans paid $365 for a PDF of theirs.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nminium instruments; and (9) a statement of the identity and mailing\\naddress of the association’s principal officer or of any other officer or\\nagents specifically designed to receive notices. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n605/22.1(a)(1)–(9).\\n2 HomeWise is a corporation registered in the State of California under\\nthe name NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., doing business as\\nHomeWiseDocs.com.\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 5\\n\\n Horist and the Eymans sued Sudler and HomeWise in\\nCook County Circuit Court seeking to represent a proposed\\nclass of condominium owners “who were charged by or paid\\na fee to HomeWise” for disclosure documents in connection\\nwith a condominium resale. The complaint raises five claims:\\n(1) a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive\\nBusiness Practices Act; (2) a violation of the Condominium\\nAct; (3) aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty;\\n(4) civil conspiracy; and (5) unjust enrichment. HomeWise\\nremoved the case to federal court under the Class Action\\nFairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Sudler and HomeWise then\\nfiled separate motions to dismiss.\\n The judge granted the motions. Turning first to the claim\\nunder the Condominium Act, the judge held that sec-\\ntion 22.1 provides no private right of action—express or\\nimplied—for unit sellers. He also ruled that the complaint\\ndid not state a viable claim that the PDF fee amounts to an\\nunfair trade practice in violation of the consumer-fraud\\nstatute. The judge construed the three common-law claims\\nas requiring an underlying violation of one of these statutes,\\nso he dismissed them as well and entered final judgment for\\nthe defendants.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a dismissal order de novo, construing the\\ncomplaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and\\naccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ochoa\\nv. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 992, 993 (7th Cir. 2018). To\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint\\n“must plausibly suggest … a right to relief, raising that\\npossibility above a speculative level.” EEOC v. Concentra\\n\\f6 No. 18-2150\\n\\nHealth Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation\\nmarks omitted).\\nA. Condominium Act Claim\\n The Condominium Act claim rests on allegations that\\nHomeWise’s fee for an electronic copy of the required\\ndisclosure documents exceeds the “reasonable fee” that\\ncondominium associations are permitted to charge under\\nsection 22.1(c). We note for starters that the associations are\\nnot defendants; this suit is against the property-management\\nfirm and its third-party online document vendor. Our first\\nquestion, however, is whether the plaintiffs have a right of\\naction to enforce section 22.1. The statute doesn’t provide an\\nexpress private remedy, so the plaintiffs advance an argu-\\nment that a right of action exists by necessary implication.\\n Illinois courts will recognize an implied right of action\\nonly if (1) the plaintiff is within the class of members the\\nstatute was enacted to benefit; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one\\nthe statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of\\naction is consistent with the underlying purpose of the\\nstatute; and (4) inferring a private right of action is necessary\\nto provide an adequate remedy for statutory violations.\\nFisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ill.\\n1999). All four factors must be met before a court will recog-\\nnize an implied remedy. Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v.\\nZurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).\\nNot one of them is satisfied here.\\n Two decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court largely con-\\ntrol the outcome. In Nikolopulos v. Balourdos, the court con-\\ncluded that section 22.1 “was clearly designed to protect\\nprospective purchasers of condominium units.” 614 N.E.2d\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 7\\n\\n412, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added). More specifi-\\ncally, the court held that the statute’s purpose is “to prevent\\nprospective purchasers from buying a unit without being\\nfully informed and satisfied with the financial stability of the\\ncondominium as well as the management, rules[,] and\\nregulations which affect the unit.” Id. The court also deter-\\nmined that implying a right of action for condominium\\npurchasers “is consistent with assuring that a prospective\\npurchaser is fully informed and satisfied before he buys a\\ncondominium unit.” Id. On this reasoning, the court recog-\\nnized an implied right of action for prospective condomini-\\num purchasers to terminate a sales contract “within a\\nreasonable time after being furnished information revealing\\npreviously undisclosed material expenses.” Id. That is, the\\ncourt authorized a condominium purchaser who is injured\\nby a seller’s violation of the section 22.1 disclosure duty to\\nsue for return of his earnest money plus interest. Id. at 418.\\n By its terms, the implied remedy recognized in Nikolopu-\\nlos covered condominium purchasers who discover a seller’s\\nsection 22.1 violation before closing. In D’Attomo v. Baumbeck,\\nthe court extended that holding and recognized an implied\\nright of action for purchasers who discover the violation after\\nclosing. 36 N.E.3d 892, 905–07 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). The court\\nreiterated the two foundational holdings from Nikolopulos:\\n(1) the statute was designed to protect condominium pur-\\nchasers; and (2) an implied remedy for purchasers aggrieved\\nby a seller’s violation of the statute “is consistent with\\nensuring that a prospective purchaser is fully informed and\\nsatisfied with matters affecting the condominium unit.” Id. at\\n907. The court also reasoned that “[t]he disclosure obliga-\\ntions in section 22.1 would be ineffective, as a practical\\nmatter, if an aggrieved purchaser has no remedy against a\\n\\f8 No. 18-2150\\n\\nseller who conceals a requested disclosure until after the\\nclosing.” Id. The court thus recognized an implied remedy\\nfor aggrieved buyers “where the seller is alleged to have\\nconcealed documents requested by the buyer pursuant to\\nsection 22.1, the concealment is not discovered until after the\\nclosing, and the nondisclosure materially affects the buyer’s\\nrights in the condominium unit.” Id.\\n The unmistakable takeaway from these two decisions is\\nthat section 22.1 is designed to protect the interests of con-\\ndominium purchasers, not condominium sellers. That’s\\nenough to defeat the plaintiffs’ argument for an implied\\nright of action. As owner/sellers they are not within the class\\nof persons the statute was designed to protect, nor have they\\nsuffered an injury that the statute was designed to prevent.\\nAnd implying a remedy for condominium sellers is neither\\nconsistent with nor necessary to effectuate the statute’s\\npurpose.\\n The plaintiffs insist that the reasoning of Nikolopulos and\\nD’Attamo is limited to section 22.1(a), which establishes the\\nunit seller’s disclosure obligation to the buyer. The claim\\nhere, in contrast, rests on subsection (c), which allows con-\\ndominium associations to charge a reasonable fee for provid-\\ning copies of the disclosure documents to unit sellers. That\\nthe fee must be “reasonable” shows that unit sellers are\\nwithin the class of persons the statute was designed to\\nprotect. Or so the argument goes.\\n We’re not persuaded. First, neither Nikolopulos nor\\nD’Attomo distinguishes between subsection (a) and subsec-\\ntion (c). Rather, they discuss only “[t]he disclosure require-\\nments imposed by § 22.1.” D’Attomo, 36 N.E.3d at 905.\\nMoreover, as a general rule of interpretation, Illinois courts\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 9\\n\\nread statutes as a whole rather than focusing on isolated\\nsubsections. See Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ill.\\n2004). Reading section 22.1 in this holistic way, subsec-\\ntion (a) of the statute establishes the seller’s duty to disclose\\nan array of important documents to the buyer; subsection (b)\\nrequires condominium associations to furnish the required\\ndocuments to unit owners within 30 days of a written re-\\nquest; and subsection (c) allows associations to charge a\\nreasonable fee for doing so. The statute works as an integrat-\\ned whole for the benefit of prospective condominium pur-\\nchasers, not sellers.\\n Given the manifest statutory purpose of transparency for\\nprospective condominium buyers, we cannot conclude that\\nthe statute was designed to prevent injury to unit sellers. To\\nthe contrary, the statute is plainly designed to protect con-\\ndominium purchasers against fraud (of the concealment\\nvariety) by condominium sellers. Together subsections (b)\\nand (c) implement the disclosure duty in subsection (a) and\\nthus work toward that end. They are not independent\\nentitlements for the benefit of condominium associations\\nand unit sellers.\\n We therefore hold that section 22.1 does not confer an\\nimplied right of action on condominium owners. The judge\\nproperly dismissed the Condominium Act claim.\\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Claim\\n Next up is the claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud\\nand Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n505/1 et seq. The Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s] consum-\\ners … against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and\\nother unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson v.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2150\\n\\nToyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002). To\\nprevail on a claim under the Act, “a plaintiff must plead and\\nprove that the defendant committed a deceptive or unfair act\\nwith the intent that others rely on the deception, that the act\\noccurred in the course of trade or commerce, and that it\\ncaused actual damages.” Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc.,\\n934 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n No deception is alleged here. The plaintiffs argue instead\\nthat the PDF fee is unfair. A trade practice may be deemed\\nunfair if it (1) “offends public policy”; (2) is “immoral,\\nunethical, oppressive or unscrupulous”; or (3) “causes\\nsubstantial injury to consumers.” Id. at 739. It’s not necessary\\nto establish all three criteria. “A practice may be unfair\\nbecause of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or\\nbecause to a lesser extent it meets all three.” Robinson,\\n775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks omitted).\\n This claim fails for several reasons. First, it appears to\\nrest almost entirely on the alleged violation of section 22.1.\\nThat is, the plaintiffs allege that Sudler and HomeWise\\nviolated the Condominium Act and thereby violated Illinois\\npublic policy. As we’ve explained, however, it’s the condo-\\nminium association’s duty to furnish the required disclosure\\ndocuments to unit owners on request; as a corollary, it may\\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so. § 605/22.1(b), (c). And\\nalthough the association may retain a professional manage-\\nment firm to handle the day-to-day operation of the proper-\\nty, it cannot outsource its statutory duties to the property-\\nmanagement company. Henderson v. Lofts at Lake Arlington\\nTowne Condo. Ass’n, 105 N.E.3d 1, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)\\n(holding that an association retains a statutory duty under\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 11\\n\\nthe Condo Act to care for common areas even though it\\nhired a property manager).\\n To be sure, the Condominium Act establishes standards\\nof conduct for property-management firms. See generally\\n765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.7. But this section of the Act\\nexplicitly precludes “a cause of action by a unit owner …\\nagainst a community association manager or the firm of a\\ncommunity association manager,” while preserving “any\\nright of action by a unit owner” against the association’s\\n“board of directors under existing law.” § 605/18.7(g)(1)–(2).\\n Given these headwinds, the plaintiffs try a different tack.\\nThey argue that Sudler and HomeWise can be liable for\\nviolating the Consumer Fraud Act because they acted on\\nbehalf of the condominium associations to breach the associ-\\nations’ duties under section 22.1. This argument distorts\\nbasic agency law; it is essentially “the reverse of vicarious\\nliability.” Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752,\\n766 (7th Cir. 2009). In Illinois, as elsewhere, a court “may not\\nimpute a duty the principal owed to a third party to an agent\\nmerely acting pursuant to duties it, in turn, owed to the\\nprincipal.” Id. (applying Illinois law). Put slightly differently,\\n“[w]hile the acts of an agent may be considered to be acts of\\nthe principal, acts of the principal are never imputed to the\\nagent.” Stein v. Rio Parismina Lodge, 695 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1998) (citation omitted). For an agent to be liable in\\ntort to a third party harmed by the agent’s conduct, the\\nagent must breach an independent duty that he owes to the\\nthird party. Schur, 577 F.3d at 766; see also RESTATEMENT\\n(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).\\n Thus stripped of its Condominium Act premise, the Con-\\nsumer Fraud Act claim rests on nothing more than a generic\\n\\f12 No. 18-2150\\n\\nallegation that HomeWise charged too much for a PDF of the\\ndisclosure documents. But the Illinois courts have held that\\n“charging an unconscionably high price generally is insuffi-\\ncient to establish a claim for unfairness.” Robinson,\\n775 N.E.2d at 961. The judge correctly dismissed this claim.\\nC. Additional Claims\\n We can make short work of the three common-law\\nclaims. Unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action\\nunder Illinois law. Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511,\\n517 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f an unjust enrichment claim rests on\\nthe same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then\\nthe unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related\\nclaim—and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall\\nwith the related claim.”). Neither is civil conspiracy. Indeck\\nN. Am. Power Fund, L.P. v. Norweb PLC, 735 N.E.2d 649, 662\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[A] conspiracy is not an independent\\ntort. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to state an independent\\ncause of action underlying its conspiracy allegations, the\\nclaim for a conspiracy also fails.”).\\n The remaining claim is for breach of fiduciary duty. This\\nclaim is derivative, not direct. That is, the plaintiffs allege\\nthat Sudler and HomeWise “aided and abetted” a breach of\\nfiduciary duty by the condominium associations. It’s true\\nthat the officers and board members of a condominium\\nassociation owe a fiduciary duty to unit owners. 765 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 605/18.4. Part of that duty includes compliance\\nwith the requirements of the Condominium Act. Davis v.\\nDyson, 900 N.E.2d 698, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). But the com-\\nplaint does not allege facts that, if true, could support an\\ninference that the officers or board members of either con-\\ndominium association committed a fiduciary breach. There\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 13\\n\\nis no allegation, for example, that an officer or board mem-\\nber refused to produce the disclosure documents for the\\nplaintiffs upon request or charged them an excessive fee to\\nmake copies. Rather, the complaint alleges only that the\\ncondominium associations retained Sudler to handle day-to-\\nday property management and that Sudler in turn contract-\\ned with HomeWise, an online vendor that assembles the\\nrequired disclosure documents in PDF format for a fee. This\\ncontractual arrangement is not a breach of the board mem-\\nbers’ fiduciary duties. It does not become one even if we\\naccept, as the complaint alleges, that HomeWise’s fee ex-\\nceeded the out-of-pocket cost of making the PDF.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4448664/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671411/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Keith Horist v. Sudler & Company\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2150\nKEITH HORIST, JOSHUA EYMAN,\nand LORI EYMAN,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nSUDLER AND COMPANY D/B/A\nSUDLER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT and\nNEXTLEVEL ASSOCIATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,\nD/B/A HOMEWISEDOCS.COM,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 C 8113 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Illinois Condominium Property\nAct requires an elaborate set of disclosures when a condo-\nminium unit is resold. The owner must give the prospective\nbuyer a copy of the condominium declaration and bylaws,\n\f2 No. 18-2150\n\nthe condominium association’s rules, and an array of other\ndocuments bearing on the current financial status of the\nproperty. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/22.1(a). The association’s\nboard must furnish the required documents within 30 days\nof the owner’s written request, id. § 605/22.1(b), and it may\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so, id. § 605/22.1(c). Anoth-\ner provision of the Act allows the association to retain a\nperson or firm to manage the condominium property. Id.\n§ 605/18(a)(5).\n This lawsuit is a proposed class action against a Chicago\nproperty-management firm and its third-party vendor, an\nonline service that assembles a downloadable electronic\nversion of the required disclosure documents, giving unit\nowners quick and easy access to the material needed to\ncomplete a resale transaction. The vendor charges a fee for\nthis service. The plaintiffs are condominium owners who\npurchased their disclosure documents from the online\nvendor and now complain that the fee is excessive in viola-\ntion of the Condominium Act. They also bring claims under\nthe Illinois consumer-fraud statute and three common-law\ntheories: breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and\ncivil conspiracy. The district court dismissed the suit.\n We affirm. The relevant provision of the Condominium\nAct does not provide a private right of action, and we see no\nbasis in Illinois law to imply one for condominium owners.\nThe statutory consumer-fraud claim is likewise defective; the\nIllinois courts have held that charging too much for goods or\nservices is not, standing alone, an unfair practice under the\nstatute. The common-law claims also fail. The complaint\ndoes not plead an actionable breach of fiduciary duty, and\n\fNo. 18-2150 3\n\nunjust enrichment and conspiracy are not independent\ncauses of action under Illinois law.\n I. Background\n Keith Horist owned a condominium at 400 East Ohio\nStreet in downtown Chicago and was a member of his\nbuilding’s condominium association. Joshua and Lori\nEyman owned a condominium at 1515 South Prairie Avenue,\nalso in downtown Chicago, and they too were members of\ntheir condominium association. Both associations retained\nSudler and Company, d/b/a Sudler Property Management,\nto manage their day-to-day operations.\n In 2017 Horist and the Eymans put their units on the\nmarket and found willing buyers. The Illinois Condominium\nProperty Act requires that “[i]n the event of any resale of a\ncondominium unit by a unit owner[,] … such owner shall\nobtain from the [association’s] Board of Managers and shall\nmake available to the prospective purchaser, upon demand,”\na copy of the condominium instruments, the association’s\nrules, and a host of other documents reflecting the current\nfinancial status of the property.1 § 605/22.1(a). These are\n\n1 Specifically, the unit owner must provide: (1) a copy of the declaration,\nbylaws, other condominium instruments, and any rules and regulations;\n(2) a statement of any liens and an account of the unit, including unpaid\nassessments and charges due; (3) a statement listing any capital expendi-\ntures anticipated by the association within the next two years; (4) a\nstatement of the status and amount of any reserves or replacement funds\nand any portion earmarked for specified projects; (5) a copy of the\nassociation’s financial statement for the last fiscal year; (6) a statement of\nthe status of any pending suits or judgments in which the association is a\nparty; (7) a statement of insurance coverage provided to unit owners;\n(8) a statement that any improvements or alterations to the unit made by\nthe seller are in good faith believed to be in compliance with the condo-\n\f4 No. 18-2150\n\ncommonly referred to as the “disclosure documents.” Sub-\nsection (b) of the statute says that the association’s “principal\nofficer” or another “specifically designated” officer “shall\nfurnish” the required documents to the owner “when re-\nquested to do so in writing and within 30 days of the re-\nquest.” § 605/22.1(b). Subsection (c), in turn, provides that\n“the association or its Board of Managers” may charge the\nunit owner a “reasonable fee covering the direct out-of-\npocket cost of providing such information and copying.”\n§ 605/22.1(c).\n Sudler, the property manager for the two condominium\nassociations, contracted with HomeWiseDocs.com, an online\ndocument service that assembles the required disclosure\ndocuments in portable document form (“PDF”), giving\ncondominium owners almost instantaneous electronic access\nto the material needed to close a resale transaction. 2 Sudler’s\nwebsite provides a link to HomeWise’s site so owners can\neasily click through and order a downloadable PDF of their\ndisclosure documents. But this convenience carries a cost.\nHomeWise charged Horist $240 for a PDF of his disclosure\ndocuments. The Eymans paid $365 for a PDF of theirs.\n\n\n\n\nminium instruments; and (9) a statement of the identity and mailing\naddress of the association’s principal officer or of any other officer or\nagents specifically designed to receive notices. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.\n605/22.1(a)(1)–(9).\n2 HomeWise is a corporation registered in the State of California under\nthe name NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., doing business as\nHomeWiseDocs.com.\n\fNo. 18-2150 5\n\n Horist and the Eymans sued Sudler and HomeWise in\nCook County Circuit Court seeking to represent a proposed\nclass of condominium owners “who were charged by or paid\na fee to HomeWise” for disclosure documents in connection\nwith a condominium resale. The complaint raises five claims:\n(1) a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive\nBusiness Practices Act; (2) a violation of the Condominium\nAct; (3) aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty;\n(4) civil conspiracy; and (5) unjust enrichment. HomeWise\nremoved the case to federal court under the Class Action\nFairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Sudler and HomeWise then\nfiled separate motions to dismiss.\n The judge granted the motions. Turning first to the claim\nunder the Condominium Act, the judge held that sec-\ntion 22.1 provides no private right of action—express or\nimplied—for unit sellers. He also ruled that the complaint\ndid not state a viable claim that the PDF fee amounts to an\nunfair trade practice in violation of the consumer-fraud\nstatute. The judge construed the three common-law claims\nas requiring an underlying violation of one of these statutes,\nso he dismissed them as well and entered final judgment for\nthe defendants.\n II. Discussion\n We review a dismissal order de novo, construing the\ncomplaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and\naccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ochoa\nv. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 992, 993 (7th Cir. 2018). To\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint\n“must plausibly suggest … a right to relief, raising that\npossibility above a speculative level.” EEOC v. Concentra\n\f6 No. 18-2150\n\nHealth Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation\nmarks omitted).\nA. Condominium Act Claim\n The Condominium Act claim rests on allegations that\nHomeWise’s fee for an electronic copy of the required\ndisclosure documents exceeds the “reasonable fee” that\ncondominium associations are permitted to charge under\nsection 22.1(c). We note for starters that the associations are\nnot defendants; this suit is against the property-management\nfirm and its third-party online document vendor. Our first\nquestion, however, is whether the plaintiffs have a right of\naction to enforce section 22.1. The statute doesn’t provide an\nexpress private remedy, so the plaintiffs advance an argu-\nment that a right of action exists by necessary implication.\n Illinois courts will recognize an implied right of action\nonly if (1) the plaintiff is within the class of members the\nstatute was enacted to benefit; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one\nthe statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of\naction is consistent with the underlying purpose of the\nstatute; and (4) inferring a private right of action is necessary\nto provide an adequate remedy for statutory violations.\nFisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ill.\n1999). All four factors must be met before a court will recog-\nnize an implied remedy. Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v.\nZurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).\nNot one of them is satisfied here.\n Two decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court largely con-\ntrol the outcome. In Nikolopulos v. Balourdos, the court con-\ncluded that section 22.1 “was clearly designed to protect\nprospective purchasers of condominium units.” 614 N.E.2d\n\fNo. 18-2150 7\n\n412, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added). More specifi-\ncally, the court held that the statute’s purpose is “to prevent\nprospective purchasers from buying a unit without being\nfully informed and satisfied with the financial stability of the\ncondominium as well as the management, rules[,] and\nregulations which affect the unit.” Id. The court also deter-\nmined that implying a right of action for condominium\npurchasers “is consistent with assuring that a prospective\npurchaser is fully informed and satisfied before he buys a\ncondominium unit.” Id. On this reasoning, the court recog-\nnized an implied right of action for prospective condomini-\num purchasers to terminate a sales contract “within a\nreasonable time after being furnished information revealing\npreviously undisclosed material expenses.” Id. That is, the\ncourt authorized a condominium purchaser who is injured\nby a seller’s violation of the section 22.1 disclosure duty to\nsue for return of his earnest money plus interest. Id. at 418.\n By its terms, the implied remedy recognized in Nikolopu-\nlos covered condominium purchasers who discover a seller’s\nsection 22.1 violation before closing. In D’Attomo v. Baumbeck,\nthe court extended that holding and recognized an implied\nright of action for purchasers who discover the violation after\nclosing. 36 N.E.3d 892, 905–07 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). The court\nreiterated the two foundational holdings from Nikolopulos:\n(1) the statute was designed to protect condominium pur-\nchasers; and (2) an implied remedy for purchasers aggrieved\nby a seller’s violation of the statute “is consistent with\nensuring that a prospective purchaser is fully informed and\nsatisfied with matters affecting the condominium unit.” Id. at\n907. The court also reasoned that “[t]he disclosure obliga-\ntions in section 22.1 would be ineffective, as a practical\nmatter, if an aggrieved purchaser has no remedy against a\n\f8 No. 18-2150\n\nseller who conceals a requested disclosure until after the\nclosing.” Id. The court thus recognized an implied remedy\nfor aggrieved buyers “where the seller is alleged to have\nconcealed documents requested by the buyer pursuant to\nsection 22.1, the concealment is not discovered until after the\nclosing, and the nondisclosure materially affects the buyer’s\nrights in the condominium unit.” Id.\n The unmistakable takeaway from these two decisions is\nthat section 22.1 is designed to protect the interests of con-\ndominium purchasers, not condominium sellers. That’s\nenough to defeat the plaintiffs’ argument for an implied\nright of action. As owner/sellers they are not within the class\nof persons the statute was designed to protect, nor have they\nsuffered an injury that the statute was designed to prevent.\nAnd implying a remedy for condominium sellers is neither\nconsistent with nor necessary to effectuate the statute’s\npurpose.\n The plaintiffs insist that the reasoning of Nikolopulos and\nD’Attamo is limited to section 22.1(a), which establishes the\nunit seller’s disclosure obligation to the buyer. The claim\nhere, in contrast, rests on subsection (c), which allows con-\ndominium associations to charge a reasonable fee for provid-\ning copies of the disclosure documents to unit sellers. That\nthe fee must be “reasonable” shows that unit sellers are\nwithin the class of persons the statute was designed to\nprotect. Or so the argument goes.\n We’re not persuaded. First, neither Nikolopulos nor\nD’Attomo distinguishes between subsection (a) and subsec-\ntion (c). Rather, they discuss only “[t]he disclosure require-\nments imposed by § 22.1.” D’Attomo, 36 N.E.3d at 905.\nMoreover, as a general rule of interpretation, Illinois courts\n\fNo. 18-2150 9\n\nread statutes as a whole rather than focusing on isolated\nsubsections. See Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ill.\n2004). Reading section 22.1 in this holistic way, subsec-\ntion (a) of the statute establishes the seller’s duty to disclose\nan array of important documents to the buyer; subsection (b)\nrequires condominium associations to furnish the required\ndocuments to unit owners within 30 days of a written re-\nquest; and subsection (c) allows associations to charge a\nreasonable fee for doing so. The statute works as an integrat-\ned whole for the benefit of prospective condominium pur-\nchasers, not sellers.\n Given the manifest statutory purpose of transparency for\nprospective condominium buyers, we cannot conclude that\nthe statute was designed to prevent injury to unit sellers. To\nthe contrary, the statute is plainly designed to protect con-\ndominium purchasers against fraud (of the concealment\nvariety) by condominium sellers. Together subsections (b)\nand (c) implement the disclosure duty in subsection (a) and\nthus work toward that end. They are not independent\nentitlements for the benefit of condominium associations\nand unit sellers.\n We therefore hold that section 22.1 does not confer an\nimplied right of action on condominium owners. The judge\nproperly dismissed the Condominium Act claim.\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Claim\n Next up is the claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud\nand Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.\n505/1 et seq. The Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s] consum-\ners … against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and\nother unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson v.\n\f10 No. 18-2150\n\nToyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002). To\nprevail on a claim under the Act, “a plaintiff must plead and\nprove that the defendant committed a deceptive or unfair act\nwith the intent that others rely on the deception, that the act\noccurred in the course of trade or commerce, and that it\ncaused actual damages.” Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc.,\n934 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2019).\n No deception is alleged here. The plaintiffs argue instead\nthat the PDF fee is unfair. A trade practice may be deemed\nunfair if it (1) “offends public policy”; (2) is “immoral,\nunethical, oppressive or unscrupulous”; or (3) “causes\nsubstantial injury to consumers.” Id. at 739. It’s not necessary\nto establish all three criteria. “A practice may be unfair\nbecause of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or\nbecause to a lesser extent it meets all three.” Robinson,\n775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks omitted).\n This claim fails for several reasons. First, it appears to\nrest almost entirely on the alleged violation of section 22.1.\nThat is, the plaintiffs allege that Sudler and HomeWise\nviolated the Condominium Act and thereby violated Illinois\npublic policy. As we’ve explained, however, it’s the condo-\nminium association’s duty to furnish the required disclosure\ndocuments to unit owners on request; as a corollary, it may\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so. § 605/22.1(b), (c). And\nalthough the association may retain a professional manage-\nment firm to handle the day-to-day operation of the proper-\nty, it cannot outsource its statutory duties to the property-\nmanagement company. Henderson v. Lofts at Lake Arlington\nTowne Condo. Ass’n, 105 N.E.3d 1, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)\n(holding that an association retains a statutory duty under\n\fNo. 18-2150 11\n\nthe Condo Act to care for common areas even though it\nhired a property manager).\n To be sure, the Condominium Act establishes standards\nof conduct for property-management firms. See generally\n765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.7. But this section of the Act\nexplicitly precludes “a cause of action by a unit owner …\nagainst a community association manager or the firm of a\ncommunity association manager,” while preserving “any\nright of action by a unit owner” against the association’s\n“board of directors under existing law.” § 605/18.7(g)(1)–(2).\n Given these headwinds, the plaintiffs try a different tack.\nThey argue that Sudler and HomeWise can be liable for\nviolating the Consumer Fraud Act because they acted on\nbehalf of the condominium associations to breach the associ-\nations’ duties under section 22.1. This argument distorts\nbasic agency law; it is essentially “the reverse of vicarious\nliability.” Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752,\n766 (7th Cir. 2009). In Illinois, as elsewhere, a court “may not\nimpute a duty the principal owed to a third party to an agent\nmerely acting pursuant to duties it, in turn, owed to the\nprincipal.” Id. (applying Illinois law). Put slightly differently,\n“[w]hile the acts of an agent may be considered to be acts of\nthe principal, acts of the principal are never imputed to the\nagent.” Stein v. Rio Parismina Lodge, 695 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ill.\nApp. Ct. 1998) (citation omitted). For an agent to be liable in\ntort to a third party harmed by the agent’s conduct, the\nagent must breach an independent duty that he owes to the\nthird party. Schur, 577 F.3d at 766; see also RESTATEMENT\n(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).\n Thus stripped of its Condominium Act premise, the Con-\nsumer Fraud Act claim rests on nothing more than a generic\n\f12 No. 18-2150\n\nallegation that HomeWise charged too much for a PDF of the\ndisclosure documents. But the Illinois courts have held that\n“charging an unconscionably high price generally is insuffi-\ncient to establish a claim for unfairness.” Robinson,\n775 N.E.2d at 961. The judge correctly dismissed this claim.\nC. Additional Claims\n We can make short work of the three common-law\nclaims. Unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action\nunder Illinois law. Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511,\n517 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f an unjust enrichment claim rests on\nthe same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then\nthe unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related\nclaim—and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall\nwith the related claim.”). Neither is civil conspiracy. Indeck\nN. Am. Power Fund, L.P. v. Norweb PLC, 735 N.E.2d 649, 662\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[A] conspiracy is not an independent\ntort. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to state an independent\ncause of action underlying its conspiracy allegations, the\nclaim for a conspiracy also fails.”).\n The remaining claim is for breach of fiduciary duty. This\nclaim is derivative, not direct. That is, the plaintiffs allege\nthat Sudler and HomeWise “aided and abetted” a breach of\nfiduciary duty by the condominium associations. It’s true\nthat the officers and board members of a condominium\nassociation owe a fiduciary duty to unit owners. 765 ILL.\nCOMP. STAT. 605/18.4. Part of that duty includes compliance\nwith the requirements of the Condominium Act. Davis v.\nDyson, 900 N.E.2d 698, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). But the com-\nplaint does not allege facts that, if true, could support an\ninference that the officers or board members of either con-\ndominium association committed a fiduciary breach. There\n\fNo. 18-2150 13\n\nis no allegation, for example, that an officer or board mem-\nber refused to produce the disclosure documents for the\nplaintiffs upon request or charged them an excessive fee to\nmake copies. Rather, the complaint alleges only that the\ncondominium associations retained Sudler to handle day-to-\nday property management and that Sudler in turn contract-\ned with HomeWise, an online vendor that assembles the\nrequired disclosure documents in PDF format for a fee. This\ncontractual arrangement is not a breach of the board mem-\nbers’ fiduciary duties. It does not become one even if we\naccept, as the complaint alleges, that HomeWise’s fee ex-\nceeded the out-of-pocket cost of making the PDF.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Keith Horist v. Sudler & Company\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2150\\nKEITH HORIST, JOSHUA EYMAN,\\nand LORI EYMAN,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSUDLER AND COMPANY D/B/A\\nSUDLER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT and\\nNEXTLEVEL ASSOCIATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,\\nD/B/A HOMEWISEDOCS.COM,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 8113 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Illinois Condominium Property\\nAct requires an elaborate set of disclosures when a condo-\\nminium unit is resold. The owner must give the prospective\\nbuyer a copy of the condominium declaration and bylaws,\\n\\f2 No. 18-2150\\n\\nthe condominium association’s rules, and an array of other\\ndocuments bearing on the current financial status of the\\nproperty. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/22.1(a). The association’s\\nboard must furnish the required documents within 30 days\\nof the owner’s written request, id. § 605/22.1(b), and it may\\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so, id. § 605/22.1(c). Anoth-\\ner provision of the Act allows the association to retain a\\nperson or firm to manage the condominium property. Id.\\n§ 605/18(a)(5).\\n This lawsuit is a proposed class action against a Chicago\\nproperty-management firm and its third-party vendor, an\\nonline service that assembles a downloadable electronic\\nversion of the required disclosure documents, giving unit\\nowners quick and easy access to the material needed to\\ncomplete a resale transaction. The vendor charges a fee for\\nthis service. The plaintiffs are condominium owners who\\npurchased their disclosure documents from the online\\nvendor and now complain that the fee is excessive in viola-\\ntion of the Condominium Act. They also bring claims under\\nthe Illinois consumer-fraud statute and three common-law\\ntheories: breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and\\ncivil conspiracy. The district court dismissed the suit.\\n We affirm. The relevant provision of the Condominium\\nAct does not provide a private right of action, and we see no\\nbasis in Illinois law to imply one for condominium owners.\\nThe statutory consumer-fraud claim is likewise defective; the\\nIllinois courts have held that charging too much for goods or\\nservices is not, standing alone, an unfair practice under the\\nstatute. The common-law claims also fail. The complaint\\ndoes not plead an actionable breach of fiduciary duty, and\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 3\\n\\nunjust enrichment and conspiracy are not independent\\ncauses of action under Illinois law.\\n I. Background\\n Keith Horist owned a condominium at 400 East Ohio\\nStreet in downtown Chicago and was a member of his\\nbuilding’s condominium association. Joshua and Lori\\nEyman owned a condominium at 1515 South Prairie Avenue,\\nalso in downtown Chicago, and they too were members of\\ntheir condominium association. Both associations retained\\nSudler and Company, d/b/a Sudler Property Management,\\nto manage their day-to-day operations.\\n In 2017 Horist and the Eymans put their units on the\\nmarket and found willing buyers. The Illinois Condominium\\nProperty Act requires that “[i]n the event of any resale of a\\ncondominium unit by a unit owner[,] … such owner shall\\nobtain from the [association’s] Board of Managers and shall\\nmake available to the prospective purchaser, upon demand,”\\na copy of the condominium instruments, the association’s\\nrules, and a host of other documents reflecting the current\\nfinancial status of the property.1 § 605/22.1(a). These are\\n\\n1 Specifically, the unit owner must provide: (1) a copy of the declaration,\\nbylaws, other condominium instruments, and any rules and regulations;\\n(2) a statement of any liens and an account of the unit, including unpaid\\nassessments and charges due; (3) a statement listing any capital expendi-\\ntures anticipated by the association within the next two years; (4) a\\nstatement of the status and amount of any reserves or replacement funds\\nand any portion earmarked for specified projects; (5) a copy of the\\nassociation’s financial statement for the last fiscal year; (6) a statement of\\nthe status of any pending suits or judgments in which the association is a\\nparty; (7) a statement of insurance coverage provided to unit owners;\\n(8) a statement that any improvements or alterations to the unit made by\\nthe seller are in good faith believed to be in compliance with the condo-\\n\\f4 No. 18-2150\\n\\ncommonly referred to as the “disclosure documents.” Sub-\\nsection (b) of the statute says that the association’s “principal\\nofficer” or another “specifically designated” officer “shall\\nfurnish” the required documents to the owner “when re-\\nquested to do so in writing and within 30 days of the re-\\nquest.” § 605/22.1(b). Subsection (c), in turn, provides that\\n“the association or its Board of Managers” may charge the\\nunit owner a “reasonable fee covering the direct out-of-\\npocket cost of providing such information and copying.”\\n§ 605/22.1(c).\\n Sudler, the property manager for the two condominium\\nassociations, contracted with HomeWiseDocs.com, an online\\ndocument service that assembles the required disclosure\\ndocuments in portable document form (“PDF”), giving\\ncondominium owners almost instantaneous electronic access\\nto the material needed to close a resale transaction. 2 Sudler’s\\nwebsite provides a link to HomeWise’s site so owners can\\neasily click through and order a downloadable PDF of their\\ndisclosure documents. But this convenience carries a cost.\\nHomeWise charged Horist $240 for a PDF of his disclosure\\ndocuments. The Eymans paid $365 for a PDF of theirs.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nminium instruments; and (9) a statement of the identity and mailing\\naddress of the association’s principal officer or of any other officer or\\nagents specifically designed to receive notices. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n605/22.1(a)(1)–(9).\\n2 HomeWise is a corporation registered in the State of California under\\nthe name NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., doing business as\\nHomeWiseDocs.com.\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 5\\n\\n Horist and the Eymans sued Sudler and HomeWise in\\nCook County Circuit Court seeking to represent a proposed\\nclass of condominium owners “who were charged by or paid\\na fee to HomeWise” for disclosure documents in connection\\nwith a condominium resale. The complaint raises five claims:\\n(1) a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive\\nBusiness Practices Act; (2) a violation of the Condominium\\nAct; (3) aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty;\\n(4) civil conspiracy; and (5) unjust enrichment. HomeWise\\nremoved the case to federal court under the Class Action\\nFairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Sudler and HomeWise then\\nfiled separate motions to dismiss.\\n The judge granted the motions. Turning first to the claim\\nunder the Condominium Act, the judge held that sec-\\ntion 22.1 provides no private right of action—express or\\nimplied—for unit sellers. He also ruled that the complaint\\ndid not state a viable claim that the PDF fee amounts to an\\nunfair trade practice in violation of the consumer-fraud\\nstatute. The judge construed the three common-law claims\\nas requiring an underlying violation of one of these statutes,\\nso he dismissed them as well and entered final judgment for\\nthe defendants.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a dismissal order de novo, construing the\\ncomplaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and\\naccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ochoa\\nv. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 992, 993 (7th Cir. 2018). To\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint\\n“must plausibly suggest … a right to relief, raising that\\npossibility above a speculative level.” EEOC v. Concentra\\n\\f6 No. 18-2150\\n\\nHealth Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation\\nmarks omitted).\\nA. Condominium Act Claim\\n The Condominium Act claim rests on allegations that\\nHomeWise’s fee for an electronic copy of the required\\ndisclosure documents exceeds the “reasonable fee” that\\ncondominium associations are permitted to charge under\\nsection 22.1(c). We note for starters that the associations are\\nnot defendants; this suit is against the property-management\\nfirm and its third-party online document vendor. Our first\\nquestion, however, is whether the plaintiffs have a right of\\naction to enforce section 22.1. The statute doesn’t provide an\\nexpress private remedy, so the plaintiffs advance an argu-\\nment that a right of action exists by necessary implication.\\n Illinois courts will recognize an implied right of action\\nonly if (1) the plaintiff is within the class of members the\\nstatute was enacted to benefit; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one\\nthe statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of\\naction is consistent with the underlying purpose of the\\nstatute; and (4) inferring a private right of action is necessary\\nto provide an adequate remedy for statutory violations.\\nFisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ill.\\n1999). All four factors must be met before a court will recog-\\nnize an implied remedy. Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC v.\\nZurich Am. Ins. Co., 83 N.E.3d 1027, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).\\nNot one of them is satisfied here.\\n Two decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court largely con-\\ntrol the outcome. In Nikolopulos v. Balourdos, the court con-\\ncluded that section 22.1 “was clearly designed to protect\\nprospective purchasers of condominium units.” 614 N.E.2d\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 7\\n\\n412, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added). More specifi-\\ncally, the court held that the statute’s purpose is “to prevent\\nprospective purchasers from buying a unit without being\\nfully informed and satisfied with the financial stability of the\\ncondominium as well as the management, rules[,] and\\nregulations which affect the unit.” Id. The court also deter-\\nmined that implying a right of action for condominium\\npurchasers “is consistent with assuring that a prospective\\npurchaser is fully informed and satisfied before he buys a\\ncondominium unit.” Id. On this reasoning, the court recog-\\nnized an implied right of action for prospective condomini-\\num purchasers to terminate a sales contract “within a\\nreasonable time after being furnished information revealing\\npreviously undisclosed material expenses.” Id. That is, the\\ncourt authorized a condominium purchaser who is injured\\nby a seller’s violation of the section 22.1 disclosure duty to\\nsue for return of his earnest money plus interest. Id. at 418.\\n By its terms, the implied remedy recognized in Nikolopu-\\nlos covered condominium purchasers who discover a seller’s\\nsection 22.1 violation before closing. In D’Attomo v. Baumbeck,\\nthe court extended that holding and recognized an implied\\nright of action for purchasers who discover the violation after\\nclosing. 36 N.E.3d 892, 905–07 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). The court\\nreiterated the two foundational holdings from Nikolopulos:\\n(1) the statute was designed to protect condominium pur-\\nchasers; and (2) an implied remedy for purchasers aggrieved\\nby a seller’s violation of the statute “is consistent with\\nensuring that a prospective purchaser is fully informed and\\nsatisfied with matters affecting the condominium unit.” Id. at\\n907. The court also reasoned that “[t]he disclosure obliga-\\ntions in section 22.1 would be ineffective, as a practical\\nmatter, if an aggrieved purchaser has no remedy against a\\n\\f8 No. 18-2150\\n\\nseller who conceals a requested disclosure until after the\\nclosing.” Id. The court thus recognized an implied remedy\\nfor aggrieved buyers “where the seller is alleged to have\\nconcealed documents requested by the buyer pursuant to\\nsection 22.1, the concealment is not discovered until after the\\nclosing, and the nondisclosure materially affects the buyer’s\\nrights in the condominium unit.” Id.\\n The unmistakable takeaway from these two decisions is\\nthat section 22.1 is designed to protect the interests of con-\\ndominium purchasers, not condominium sellers. That’s\\nenough to defeat the plaintiffs’ argument for an implied\\nright of action. As owner/sellers they are not within the class\\nof persons the statute was designed to protect, nor have they\\nsuffered an injury that the statute was designed to prevent.\\nAnd implying a remedy for condominium sellers is neither\\nconsistent with nor necessary to effectuate the statute’s\\npurpose.\\n The plaintiffs insist that the reasoning of Nikolopulos and\\nD’Attamo is limited to section 22.1(a), which establishes the\\nunit seller’s disclosure obligation to the buyer. The claim\\nhere, in contrast, rests on subsection (c), which allows con-\\ndominium associations to charge a reasonable fee for provid-\\ning copies of the disclosure documents to unit sellers. That\\nthe fee must be “reasonable” shows that unit sellers are\\nwithin the class of persons the statute was designed to\\nprotect. Or so the argument goes.\\n We’re not persuaded. First, neither Nikolopulos nor\\nD’Attomo distinguishes between subsection (a) and subsec-\\ntion (c). Rather, they discuss only “[t]he disclosure require-\\nments imposed by § 22.1.” D’Attomo, 36 N.E.3d at 905.\\nMoreover, as a general rule of interpretation, Illinois courts\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 9\\n\\nread statutes as a whole rather than focusing on isolated\\nsubsections. See Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ill.\\n2004). Reading section 22.1 in this holistic way, subsec-\\ntion (a) of the statute establishes the seller’s duty to disclose\\nan array of important documents to the buyer; subsection (b)\\nrequires condominium associations to furnish the required\\ndocuments to unit owners within 30 days of a written re-\\nquest; and subsection (c) allows associations to charge a\\nreasonable fee for doing so. The statute works as an integrat-\\ned whole for the benefit of prospective condominium pur-\\nchasers, not sellers.\\n Given the manifest statutory purpose of transparency for\\nprospective condominium buyers, we cannot conclude that\\nthe statute was designed to prevent injury to unit sellers. To\\nthe contrary, the statute is plainly designed to protect con-\\ndominium purchasers against fraud (of the concealment\\nvariety) by condominium sellers. Together subsections (b)\\nand (c) implement the disclosure duty in subsection (a) and\\nthus work toward that end. They are not independent\\nentitlements for the benefit of condominium associations\\nand unit sellers.\\n We therefore hold that section 22.1 does not confer an\\nimplied right of action on condominium owners. The judge\\nproperly dismissed the Condominium Act claim.\\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Claim\\n Next up is the claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud\\nand Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n505/1 et seq. The Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s] consum-\\ners … against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and\\nother unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson v.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2150\\n\\nToyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002). To\\nprevail on a claim under the Act, “a plaintiff must plead and\\nprove that the defendant committed a deceptive or unfair act\\nwith the intent that others rely on the deception, that the act\\noccurred in the course of trade or commerce, and that it\\ncaused actual damages.” Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc.,\\n934 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n No deception is alleged here. The plaintiffs argue instead\\nthat the PDF fee is unfair. A trade practice may be deemed\\nunfair if it (1) “offends public policy”; (2) is “immoral,\\nunethical, oppressive or unscrupulous”; or (3) “causes\\nsubstantial injury to consumers.” Id. at 739. It’s not necessary\\nto establish all three criteria. “A practice may be unfair\\nbecause of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or\\nbecause to a lesser extent it meets all three.” Robinson,\\n775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks omitted).\\n This claim fails for several reasons. First, it appears to\\nrest almost entirely on the alleged violation of section 22.1.\\nThat is, the plaintiffs allege that Sudler and HomeWise\\nviolated the Condominium Act and thereby violated Illinois\\npublic policy. As we’ve explained, however, it’s the condo-\\nminium association’s duty to furnish the required disclosure\\ndocuments to unit owners on request; as a corollary, it may\\ncharge a reasonable fee for doing so. § 605/22.1(b), (c). And\\nalthough the association may retain a professional manage-\\nment firm to handle the day-to-day operation of the proper-\\nty, it cannot outsource its statutory duties to the property-\\nmanagement company. Henderson v. Lofts at Lake Arlington\\nTowne Condo. Ass’n, 105 N.E.3d 1, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)\\n(holding that an association retains a statutory duty under\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 11\\n\\nthe Condo Act to care for common areas even though it\\nhired a property manager).\\n To be sure, the Condominium Act establishes standards\\nof conduct for property-management firms. See generally\\n765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.7. But this section of the Act\\nexplicitly precludes “a cause of action by a unit owner …\\nagainst a community association manager or the firm of a\\ncommunity association manager,” while preserving “any\\nright of action by a unit owner” against the association’s\\n“board of directors under existing law.” § 605/18.7(g)(1)–(2).\\n Given these headwinds, the plaintiffs try a different tack.\\nThey argue that Sudler and HomeWise can be liable for\\nviolating the Consumer Fraud Act because they acted on\\nbehalf of the condominium associations to breach the associ-\\nations’ duties under section 22.1. This argument distorts\\nbasic agency law; it is essentially “the reverse of vicarious\\nliability.” Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752,\\n766 (7th Cir. 2009). In Illinois, as elsewhere, a court “may not\\nimpute a duty the principal owed to a third party to an agent\\nmerely acting pursuant to duties it, in turn, owed to the\\nprincipal.” Id. (applying Illinois law). Put slightly differently,\\n“[w]hile the acts of an agent may be considered to be acts of\\nthe principal, acts of the principal are never imputed to the\\nagent.” Stein v. Rio Parismina Lodge, 695 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1998) (citation omitted). For an agent to be liable in\\ntort to a third party harmed by the agent’s conduct, the\\nagent must breach an independent duty that he owes to the\\nthird party. Schur, 577 F.3d at 766; see also RESTATEMENT\\n(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).\\n Thus stripped of its Condominium Act premise, the Con-\\nsumer Fraud Act claim rests on nothing more than a generic\\n\\f12 No. 18-2150\\n\\nallegation that HomeWise charged too much for a PDF of the\\ndisclosure documents. But the Illinois courts have held that\\n“charging an unconscionably high price generally is insuffi-\\ncient to establish a claim for unfairness.” Robinson,\\n775 N.E.2d at 961. The judge correctly dismissed this claim.\\nC. Additional Claims\\n We can make short work of the three common-law\\nclaims. Unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of action\\nunder Illinois law. Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511,\\n517 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f an unjust enrichment claim rests on\\nthe same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then\\nthe unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related\\nclaim—and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall\\nwith the related claim.”). Neither is civil conspiracy. Indeck\\nN. Am. Power Fund, L.P. v. Norweb PLC, 735 N.E.2d 649, 662\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[A] conspiracy is not an independent\\ntort. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to state an independent\\ncause of action underlying its conspiracy allegations, the\\nclaim for a conspiracy also fails.”).\\n The remaining claim is for breach of fiduciary duty. This\\nclaim is derivative, not direct. That is, the plaintiffs allege\\nthat Sudler and HomeWise “aided and abetted” a breach of\\nfiduciary duty by the condominium associations. It’s true\\nthat the officers and board members of a condominium\\nassociation owe a fiduciary duty to unit owners. 765 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 605/18.4. Part of that duty includes compliance\\nwith the requirements of the Condominium Act. Davis v.\\nDyson, 900 N.E.2d 698, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). But the com-\\nplaint does not allege facts that, if true, could support an\\ninference that the officers or board members of either con-\\ndominium association committed a fiduciary breach. There\\n\\fNo. 18-2150 13\\n\\nis no allegation, for example, that an officer or board mem-\\nber refused to produce the disclosure documents for the\\nplaintiffs upon request or charged them an excessive fee to\\nmake copies. Rather, the complaint alleges only that the\\ncondominium associations retained Sudler to handle day-to-\\nday property management and that Sudler in turn contract-\\ned with HomeWise, an online vendor that assembles the\\nrequired disclosure documents in PDF format for a fee. This\\ncontractual arrangement is not a breach of the board mem-\\nbers’ fiduciary duties. It does not become one even if we\\naccept, as the complaint alleges, that HomeWise’s fee ex-\\nceeded the out-of-pocket cost of making the PDF.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4685,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671506,"string":"4,671,506"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"CFTC v. John Robert Blakey"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-2769"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 19-2769\\nIN THE MATTER OF:\\n COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,\\n Petitioner.\\nKRAFT FOODS GROUP, INC., and MONDELĒZ GLOBAL LLC,\\n Parties in Interest.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States\\n District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 2881 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED OCTOBER 15, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2015 the Commodity Fu-\\ntures Trading Commission filed a civil action against Kraft\\nFoods Group and Mondelēz Global. It was se\\\\led in August\\n2019, and the parties’ bargain, which the judge entered as a\\nconsent decree, includes this provision:\\n Neither party shall make any public statement about this case\\n other than to refer to the terms of this se\\\\lement agreement or\\n public documents filed in this case, except any party may take\\n\\f2 No. 19-2769\\n\\n any lawful position in any legal proceedings, testimony or by\\n court order.\\n\\nShortly after the district court entered its order, the Commis-\\nsion issued a press release announcing the suit’s resolution.\\nTwo Commissioners (Dan Berkovib and Rostin Behnam)\\nfiled statements explaining why they voted in favor of ac-\\ncepting this se\\\\lement.\\n Kraft and Mondelēz asked the district judge to hold the\\nCommission and Commissioners in contempt of court for\\nissuing the press release and concurring statements. The dis-\\ntrict judge set the motion for a hearing and directed Chair-\\nman Heath Tarbert, Commissioners Berkovib and Behnam,\\nthe Commission’s Director of Enforcement, and several of\\nthe Commission’s other employees to appear in court and\\ntestify under oath. The judge stated that he would adminis-\\nter Miranda warnings to these witnesses in preparation for a\\nfinding of criminal contempt and would demand that the\\nwitnesses explain the thinking behind the press release and\\nthe separate statements. Chairman Tarbert and the Commis-\\nsioners protested. After a motion asking the district court to\\nlift the demand for their presence and the threat of criminal\\nsanctions went unaddressed for approximately two weeks,\\nand the date scheduled for the hearing approached, the\\nCommission filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. A mo-\\ntions panel issued a stay pending further order of this court.\\n We also ordered all of the papers to be placed in the pub-\\nlic record. The district judge had directed the parties not to\\nsay anything in public about the upcoming hearing and to\\nkeep all of their legal filings secret, an order that is incon-\\nsistent with the law of this circuit. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v.\\nLeavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567–68 (7th Cir. 2000); Herrnreiter v. Chi-\\n\\fNo. 19-2769 3\\n\\ncago Housing Authority, 281 F.3d 634, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nThose two decisions hold that a confidentiality clause in the\\nlitigants’ agreement does not authorize secret adjudication.\\n We ordered Kraft and Mondelēz to respond to the peti-\\ntion and invited the district judge to do so. See Fed. R. App.\\nP. 21(b)(1), (4). The district judge’s response states, among\\nother things, that he no longer contemplates the possibility\\nof criminal contempt, so that aspect of the controversy has\\ndropped out. Everything we say from now on concerns civil\\ncontempt only.\\n Chairman Tarbert and Commissioners Berkovib and\\nBehnam have moved for leave to intervene. We grant that\\nmotion. Although the Commission is representing their in-\\nterests adequately for the present, the threat of being per-\\nsonally penalized for contempt of court entitles them to be\\nlitigants in their own right, so that they may take such steps\\nas they deem wise to protect their personal interests.\\n Mandamus is a drastic remedy, reserved for urgent\\nneeds, but, for all that, it remains available to a litigant who\\ncan establish a clear right to relief and lacks any other way to\\nprotect his or her rights. See, e.g., Cheney v. United States Dis-\\ntrict Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258\\n(1947).\\n The district court’s order directing the Chairman and two\\nmembers of the Commission, plus members of the staff, to\\nappear for questioning in open court cannot be reviewed on\\nappeal from a final decision. The time taken away from their\\nofficial duties will be lost forever.\\n Cheney holds that mandamus is the appropriate remedy\\nwhen a district court has authorized an inquest into the in-\\n\\f4 No. 19-2769\\n\\nternal deliberations of the Executive Branch’s senior officials.\\nSee also, e.g., In re United States, 398 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2005).\\nThat’s a good description of the order requiring the Chair-\\nman and two Commissioners, appointed by the President on\\nadvice and consent of the Senate, to appear and reveal what\\nlies behind their published words. Many decisions hold that\\nmandamus is appropriate when a district judge inappropri-\\nately compels a ranking federal official to appear personally\\nrather than by counsel. See, e.g., In re United States, 624 F.3d\\n1368, 1372 (11th Cir. 2010); In re Cheney, 544 F.3d 311, 314\\n(D.C. Cir. 2008); In re United States, 197 F.3d 310, 313–14 (8th\\nCir. 1999); In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995); In re\\nUnited States, 985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th Cir. 1993); United States\\nBoard of Parole v. Merhige, 487 F.2d 25, 29 (4th Cir. 1973).\\n The district court’s order requiring the Chairman, Com-\\nmissioners, and members of the staff to appear for question-\\ning might be supportable on two grounds: first, that they po-\\ntentially could be held in contempt; second, that their testi-\\nmony is essential to determine whether the Commission is in\\ncontempt. Neither of these potential justifications suffices.\\n We start with the possibility that the persons compelled\\nto appear may themselves be in contempt. They are not par-\\nties to the agreement and consent decree, so the only basis\\nfor adjudicating them in contempt would be Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n65(d)(2)(B), which says that “the parties’ officers, agents,\\nservants, employees, and a\\\\orneys” are bound by an injunc-\\ntion. But that clause would control only if the Commission\\nhas the authority to bind its members, and it does not.\\n Whenever the Commission issues for official publication any\\n opinion, release, rule, order, interpretation, or other determina-\\n tion on a ma\\\\er, the Commission shall provide that any dissent-\", \"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}, {\"type\": \"concurrence\", \"author\": \"ing\", \"text\": \"ing, concurring, or separate opinion by any Commissioner on\\n\\fNo. 19-2769 5\\n\\n the ma\\\\er be published in full along with the Commission opin-\\n ion, release, rule, order, interpretation, or determination.\\n\\n7 U.S.C. §2(a)(10)(C). In other words, every member of the\\nCommission has a right to publish an explanation of his or\\nher vote.\\n This is a right that the Commission cannot negate. It\\ncould not vote, three to two, to block the two from publish-\\ning their views. So if we understand the consent decree as an\\neffort to silence individual members of the Commission, it is\\nineffectual, for no litigant may accomplish through a consent\\ndecree something it lacks the power to accomplish directly,\\nunless some other statute grants that power—and no one ar-\\ngues that any other statute overrides §2(a)(10)(C). See Dunn\\nv. Carey, 808 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1986); Kasper v. Board of Elec-\\ntion Commissioners, 814 F.2d 332, rehearing denied, 814 F.2d\\n345 (7th Cir. 1987); People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Educa-\\ntion, 961 F.2d 1335, rehearing denied, 964 F.2d 639 (7th Cir.\\n1992); Paige v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 40 (7th Cir. 1996). And be-\\ncause members of federal agencies are entitled to the assis-\\ntance of their staffs, a statute entitling the Commissioners to\\nspeak their minds also means that it would be inappropriate\\nto penalize persons who helped them do it.\\n Now consider the possibility that testimony from the\\nChairman, Commissioners, and staff members is essential to\\ndecide whether the Commission as an institution is in con-\\ntempt. The district judge apparently believed that only evi-\\ndence about a litigant’s thoughts and goals supports an ad-\\njudication in contempt, and who other than the Chairman\\nand Commissioners could provide that evidence? But the\\nSupreme Court has held that disputes about civil contempt\\nmust be resolved objectively. See, e.g., Taggart v. Lorenzen,\\n\\f6 No. 19-2769\\n\\n139 S. Ct. 1795, 1804 (2019). The agreement, consent decree,\\nand press release are wri\\\\en documents; their meaning and\\neffect depends on their four corners. See, e.g., United States v.\\nITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1975). If the Com-\\nmission has done wrong, that is because of what the Com-\\nmission itself said and did, not because of what any of its\\nmembers or employees thought or planned. See, e.g., In re\\nUnited States, 398 F.3d at 618.\\n Judicial review of an agency’s decision is limited to the\\nagency’s official acts and the administrative record in all but\\nthe most extraordinary situations. United States v. Morgan,\\n313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941). One important reason for that rule is\\nthat intra-agency deliberations are covered by multiple\\nprivileges, as Cheney and other decisions explain. Although\\nthese privileges may be overridden for compelling reasons,\\nno such reason has been established or even asserted here.\\n Because the propriety of the Commission’s official deeds\\ndepends on those deeds, plus the administrative record (if\\nany), there is neither need nor justification for testimony by\\nthe Chairman, any Commissioners, or any members of the\\nagency’s staff. We issue a writ of mandamus and direct the\\ndistrict court to withdraw its demand that these persons ap-\\npear in court for questioning. We also direct the district court\\nto desist from any effort to hold the Chairman, Commission-\\ners, and staff members personally in contempt of court, or\\notherwise to look behind the Commission’s public state-\\nments and the administrative record.\\n The Commission has asked us to go further and order the\\ndistrict court to close the contempt proceeding. Kraft and\\nMondelēz contend that four statements in the Commission’s\\npress release violate the consent decree:\\n\\fNo. 19-2769 7\\n\\n • “The $16 million penalty is approximately three\\n times defendants’ alleged gain.\\n • “We are pleased to bring this matter to a successful\\n resolution, which terminates more than four years\\n of litigation.\\n • “The Commission believes that the Consent Order\\n advances our mission of fostering open, transparent,\\n and competitive markets.\\n • “We do not expect the Commission to agree to simi-\\n lar language in the future, except in limited situa-\\n tions where our statutory enforcement mission of\\n preventing market manipulation is substantially\\n advanced by the settlement terms and the public’s\\n right to know about Commission actions is not im-\\n paired.”\\nThe Commission asserts that none of these statements vio-\\nlates the confidentiality clause of the agreement.\\n The argument for mandamus on this subject is weak. If\\nthe district judge ultimately concludes that the Commission\\nis indeed in contempt, its arguments can be vindicated by an\\nappeal in the regular course. We therefore deny the request\\nfor mandamus on this issue. Likewise we deny the Commis-\\nsion’s request that we transfer the district court’s proceed-\\nings to a different judge. The judge who entered the consent\\ndecree is in the best position to decide, as an initial ma\\\\er,\\nwhether its provisions have been violated. The final decision\\nwill be subject to plenary review.\\n The motion to intervene is granted. The petition for\\nmandamus is granted to the extent we indicated above and\\notherwise denied.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671506/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: CFTC v. John Robert Blakey\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 19-2769\nIN THE MATTER OF:\n COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,\n Petitioner.\nKRAFT FOODS GROUP, INC., and MONDELĒZ GLOBAL LLC,\n Parties in Interest.\n ____________________\n\n Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States\n District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15 C 2881 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n SUBMITTED OCTOBER 15, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2015 the Commodity Fu-\ntures Trading Commission filed a civil action against Kraft\nFoods Group and Mondelēz Global. It was se\\led in August\n2019, and the parties’ bargain, which the judge entered as a\nconsent decree, includes this provision:\n Neither party shall make any public statement about this case\n other than to refer to the terms of this se\\lement agreement or\n public documents filed in this case, except any party may take\n\f2 No. 19-2769\n\n any lawful position in any legal proceedings, testimony or by\n court order.\n\nShortly after the district court entered its order, the Commis-\nsion issued a press release announcing the suit’s resolution.\nTwo Commissioners (Dan Berkovib and Rostin Behnam)\nfiled statements explaining why they voted in favor of ac-\ncepting this se\\lement.\n Kraft and Mondelēz asked the district judge to hold the\nCommission and Commissioners in contempt of court for\nissuing the press release and concurring statements. The dis-\ntrict judge set the motion for a hearing and directed Chair-\nman Heath Tarbert, Commissioners Berkovib and Behnam,\nthe Commission’s Director of Enforcement, and several of\nthe Commission’s other employees to appear in court and\ntestify under oath. The judge stated that he would adminis-\nter Miranda warnings to these witnesses in preparation for a\nfinding of criminal contempt and would demand that the\nwitnesses explain the thinking behind the press release and\nthe separate statements. Chairman Tarbert and the Commis-\nsioners protested. After a motion asking the district court to\nlift the demand for their presence and the threat of criminal\nsanctions went unaddressed for approximately two weeks,\nand the date scheduled for the hearing approached, the\nCommission filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. A mo-\ntions panel issued a stay pending further order of this court.\n We also ordered all of the papers to be placed in the pub-\nlic record. The district judge had directed the parties not to\nsay anything in public about the upcoming hearing and to\nkeep all of their legal filings secret, an order that is incon-\nsistent with the law of this circuit. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v.\nLeavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567–68 (7th Cir. 2000); Herrnreiter v. Chi-\n\fNo. 19-2769 3\n\ncago Housing Authority, 281 F.3d 634, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2002).\nThose two decisions hold that a confidentiality clause in the\nlitigants’ agreement does not authorize secret adjudication.\n We ordered Kraft and Mondelēz to respond to the peti-\ntion and invited the district judge to do so. See Fed. R. App.\nP. 21(b)(1), (4). The district judge’s response states, among\nother things, that he no longer contemplates the possibility\nof criminal contempt, so that aspect of the controversy has\ndropped out. Everything we say from now on concerns civil\ncontempt only.\n Chairman Tarbert and Commissioners Berkovib and\nBehnam have moved for leave to intervene. We grant that\nmotion. Although the Commission is representing their in-\nterests adequately for the present, the threat of being per-\nsonally penalized for contempt of court entitles them to be\nlitigants in their own right, so that they may take such steps\nas they deem wise to protect their personal interests.\n Mandamus is a drastic remedy, reserved for urgent\nneeds, but, for all that, it remains available to a litigant who\ncan establish a clear right to relief and lacks any other way to\nprotect his or her rights. See, e.g., Cheney v. United States Dis-\ntrict Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258\n(1947).\n The district court’s order directing the Chairman and two\nmembers of the Commission, plus members of the staff, to\nappear for questioning in open court cannot be reviewed on\nappeal from a final decision. The time taken away from their\nofficial duties will be lost forever.\n Cheney holds that mandamus is the appropriate remedy\nwhen a district court has authorized an inquest into the in-\n\f4 No. 19-2769\n\nternal deliberations of the Executive Branch’s senior officials.\nSee also, e.g., In re United States, 398 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2005).\nThat’s a good description of the order requiring the Chair-\nman and two Commissioners, appointed by the President on\nadvice and consent of the Senate, to appear and reveal what\nlies behind their published words. Many decisions hold that\nmandamus is appropriate when a district judge inappropri-\nately compels a ranking federal official to appear personally\nrather than by counsel. See, e.g., In re United States, 624 F.3d\n1368, 1372 (11th Cir. 2010); In re Cheney, 544 F.3d 311, 314\n(D.C. Cir. 2008); In re United States, 197 F.3d 310, 313–14 (8th\nCir. 1999); In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995); In re\nUnited States, 985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th Cir. 1993); United States\nBoard of Parole v. Merhige, 487 F.2d 25, 29 (4th Cir. 1973).\n The district court’s order requiring the Chairman, Com-\nmissioners, and members of the staff to appear for question-\ning might be supportable on two grounds: first, that they po-\ntentially could be held in contempt; second, that their testi-\nmony is essential to determine whether the Commission is in\ncontempt. Neither of these potential justifications suffices.\n We start with the possibility that the persons compelled\nto appear may themselves be in contempt. They are not par-\nties to the agreement and consent decree, so the only basis\nfor adjudicating them in contempt would be Fed. R. Civ. P.\n65(d)(2)(B), which says that “the parties’ officers, agents,\nservants, employees, and a\\orneys” are bound by an injunc-\ntion. But that clause would control only if the Commission\nhas the authority to bind its members, and it does not.\n Whenever the Commission issues for official publication any\n opinion, release, rule, order, interpretation, or other determina-\n tion on a ma\\er, the Commission shall provide that any dissent-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: CFTC v. John Robert Blakey\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 19-2769\\nIN THE MATTER OF:\\n COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,\\n Petitioner.\\nKRAFT FOODS GROUP, INC., and MONDELĒZ GLOBAL LLC,\\n Parties in Interest.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States\\n District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 2881 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED OCTOBER 15, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2015 the Commodity Fu-\\ntures Trading Commission filed a civil action against Kraft\\nFoods Group and Mondelēz Global. It was se\\\\led in August\\n2019, and the parties’ bargain, which the judge entered as a\\nconsent decree, includes this provision:\\n Neither party shall make any public statement about this case\\n other than to refer to the terms of this se\\\\lement agreement or\\n public documents filed in this case, except any party may take\\n\\f2 No. 19-2769\\n\\n any lawful position in any legal proceedings, testimony or by\\n court order.\\n\\nShortly after the district court entered its order, the Commis-\\nsion issued a press release announcing the suit’s resolution.\\nTwo Commissioners (Dan Berkovib and Rostin Behnam)\\nfiled statements explaining why they voted in favor of ac-\\ncepting this se\\\\lement.\\n Kraft and Mondelēz asked the district judge to hold the\\nCommission and Commissioners in contempt of court for\\nissuing the press release and concurring statements. The dis-\\ntrict judge set the motion for a hearing and directed Chair-\\nman Heath Tarbert, Commissioners Berkovib and Behnam,\\nthe Commission’s Director of Enforcement, and several of\\nthe Commission’s other employees to appear in court and\\ntestify under oath. The judge stated that he would adminis-\\nter Miranda warnings to these witnesses in preparation for a\\nfinding of criminal contempt and would demand that the\\nwitnesses explain the thinking behind the press release and\\nthe separate statements. Chairman Tarbert and the Commis-\\nsioners protested. After a motion asking the district court to\\nlift the demand for their presence and the threat of criminal\\nsanctions went unaddressed for approximately two weeks,\\nand the date scheduled for the hearing approached, the\\nCommission filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. A mo-\\ntions panel issued a stay pending further order of this court.\\n We also ordered all of the papers to be placed in the pub-\\nlic record. The district judge had directed the parties not to\\nsay anything in public about the upcoming hearing and to\\nkeep all of their legal filings secret, an order that is incon-\\nsistent with the law of this circuit. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v.\\nLeavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567–68 (7th Cir. 2000); Herrnreiter v. Chi-\\n\\fNo. 19-2769 3\\n\\ncago Housing Authority, 281 F.3d 634, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nThose two decisions hold that a confidentiality clause in the\\nlitigants’ agreement does not authorize secret adjudication.\\n We ordered Kraft and Mondelēz to respond to the peti-\\ntion and invited the district judge to do so. See Fed. R. App.\\nP. 21(b)(1), (4). The district judge’s response states, among\\nother things, that he no longer contemplates the possibility\\nof criminal contempt, so that aspect of the controversy has\\ndropped out. Everything we say from now on concerns civil\\ncontempt only.\\n Chairman Tarbert and Commissioners Berkovib and\\nBehnam have moved for leave to intervene. We grant that\\nmotion. Although the Commission is representing their in-\\nterests adequately for the present, the threat of being per-\\nsonally penalized for contempt of court entitles them to be\\nlitigants in their own right, so that they may take such steps\\nas they deem wise to protect their personal interests.\\n Mandamus is a drastic remedy, reserved for urgent\\nneeds, but, for all that, it remains available to a litigant who\\ncan establish a clear right to relief and lacks any other way to\\nprotect his or her rights. See, e.g., Cheney v. United States Dis-\\ntrict Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258\\n(1947).\\n The district court’s order directing the Chairman and two\\nmembers of the Commission, plus members of the staff, to\\nappear for questioning in open court cannot be reviewed on\\nappeal from a final decision. The time taken away from their\\nofficial duties will be lost forever.\\n Cheney holds that mandamus is the appropriate remedy\\nwhen a district court has authorized an inquest into the in-\\n\\f4 No. 19-2769\\n\\nternal deliberations of the Executive Branch’s senior officials.\\nSee also, e.g., In re United States, 398 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2005).\\nThat’s a good description of the order requiring the Chair-\\nman and two Commissioners, appointed by the President on\\nadvice and consent of the Senate, to appear and reveal what\\nlies behind their published words. Many decisions hold that\\nmandamus is appropriate when a district judge inappropri-\\nately compels a ranking federal official to appear personally\\nrather than by counsel. See, e.g., In re United States, 624 F.3d\\n1368, 1372 (11th Cir. 2010); In re Cheney, 544 F.3d 311, 314\\n(D.C. Cir. 2008); In re United States, 197 F.3d 310, 313–14 (8th\\nCir. 1999); In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995); In re\\nUnited States, 985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th Cir. 1993); United States\\nBoard of Parole v. Merhige, 487 F.2d 25, 29 (4th Cir. 1973).\\n The district court’s order requiring the Chairman, Com-\\nmissioners, and members of the staff to appear for question-\\ning might be supportable on two grounds: first, that they po-\\ntentially could be held in contempt; second, that their testi-\\nmony is essential to determine whether the Commission is in\\ncontempt. Neither of these potential justifications suffices.\\n We start with the possibility that the persons compelled\\nto appear may themselves be in contempt. They are not par-\\nties to the agreement and consent decree, so the only basis\\nfor adjudicating them in contempt would be Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n65(d)(2)(B), which says that “the parties’ officers, agents,\\nservants, employees, and a\\\\orneys” are bound by an injunc-\\ntion. But that clause would control only if the Commission\\nhas the authority to bind its members, and it does not.\\n Whenever the Commission issues for official publication any\\n opinion, release, rule, order, interpretation, or other determina-\\n tion on a ma\\\\er, the Commission shall provide that any dissent-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4686,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671682,"string":"4,671,682"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"CFTC v. John Robert Blakey"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-2769"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 19-2769\\nIN THE MATTER OF:\\n COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,\\n Petitioner.\\nKRAFT FOODS GROUP, INC., and MONDELĒZ GLOBAL LLC,\\n Parties in Interest.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States\\n District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 2881 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED OCTOBER 15, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2015 the Commodity Fu-\\ntures Trading Commission filed a civil action against Kraft\\nFoods Group and Mondelēz Global. It was se\\\\led in August\\n2019, and the parties’ bargain, which the judge entered as a\\nconsent decree, includes this provision:\\n Neither party shall make any public statement about this case\\n other than to refer to the terms of this se\\\\lement agreement or\\n public documents filed in this case, except any party may take\\n\\f2 No. 19-2769\\n\\n any lawful position in any legal proceedings, testimony or by\\n court order.\\n\\nShortly after the district court entered its order, the Commis-\\nsion issued a press release announcing the suit’s resolution.\\nTwo Commissioners (Dan Berkovib and Rostin Behnam)\\nfiled statements explaining why they voted in favor of ac-\\ncepting this se\\\\lement.\\n Kraft and Mondelēz asked the district judge to hold the\\nCommission and Commissioners in contempt of court for\\nissuing the press release and concurring statements. The dis-\\ntrict judge set the motion for a hearing and directed Chair-\\nman Heath Tarbert, Commissioners Berkovib and Behnam,\\nthe Commission’s Director of Enforcement, and several of\\nthe Commission’s other employees to appear in court and\\ntestify under oath. The judge stated that he would adminis-\\nter Miranda warnings to these witnesses in preparation for a\\nfinding of criminal contempt and would demand that the\\nwitnesses explain the thinking behind the press release and\\nthe separate statements. Chairman Tarbert and the Commis-\\nsioners protested. After a motion asking the district court to\\nlift the demand for their presence and the threat of criminal\\nsanctions went unaddressed for approximately two weeks,\\nand the date scheduled for the hearing approached, the\\nCommission filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. A mo-\\ntions panel issued a stay pending further order of this court.\\n We also ordered all of the papers to be placed in the pub-\\nlic record. The district judge had directed the parties not to\\nsay anything in public about the upcoming hearing and to\\nkeep all of their legal filings secret, an order that is incon-\\nsistent with the law of this circuit. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v.\\nLeavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567–68 (7th Cir. 2000); Herrnreiter v. Chi-\\n\\fNo. 19-2769 3\\n\\ncago Housing Authority, 281 F.3d 634, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nThose two decisions hold that a confidentiality clause in the\\nlitigants’ agreement does not authorize secret adjudication.\\n We ordered Kraft and Mondelēz to respond to the peti-\\ntion and invited the district judge to do so. See Fed. R. App.\\nP. 21(b)(1), (4). The district judge’s response states, among\\nother things, that he no longer contemplates the possibility\\nof criminal contempt, so that aspect of the controversy has\\ndropped out. Everything we say from now on concerns civil\\ncontempt only.\\n Chairman Tarbert and Commissioners Berkovib and\\nBehnam have moved for leave to intervene. We grant that\\nmotion. Although the Commission is representing their in-\\nterests adequately for the present, the threat of being per-\\nsonally penalized for contempt of court entitles them to be\\nlitigants in their own right, so that they may take such steps\\nas they deem wise to protect their personal interests.\\n Mandamus is a drastic remedy, reserved for urgent\\nneeds, but, for all that, it remains available to a litigant who\\ncan establish a clear right to relief and lacks any other way to\\nprotect his or her rights. See, e.g., Cheney v. United States Dis-\\ntrict Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258\\n(1947).\\n The district court’s order directing the Chairman and two\\nmembers of the Commission, plus members of the staff, to\\nappear for questioning in open court cannot be reviewed on\\nappeal from a final decision. The time taken away from their\\nofficial duties will be lost forever.\\n Cheney holds that mandamus is the appropriate remedy\\nwhen a district court has authorized an inquest into the in-\\n\\f4 No. 19-2769\\n\\nternal deliberations of the Executive Branch’s senior officials.\\nSee also, e.g., In re United States, 398 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2005).\\nThat’s a good description of the order requiring the Chair-\\nman and two Commissioners, appointed by the President on\\nadvice and consent of the Senate, to appear and reveal what\\nlies behind their published words. Many decisions hold that\\nmandamus is appropriate when a district judge inappropri-\\nately compels a ranking federal official to appear personally\\nrather than by counsel. See, e.g., In re United States, 624 F.3d\\n1368, 1372 (11th Cir. 2010); In re Cheney, 544 F.3d 311, 314\\n(D.C. Cir. 2008); In re United States, 197 F.3d 310, 313–14 (8th\\nCir. 1999); In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995); In re\\nUnited States, 985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th Cir. 1993); United States\\nBoard of Parole v. Merhige, 487 F.2d 25, 29 (4th Cir. 1973).\\n The district court’s order requiring the Chairman, Com-\\nmissioners, and members of the staff to appear for question-\\ning might be supportable on two grounds: first, that they po-\\ntentially could be held in contempt; second, that their testi-\\nmony is essential to determine whether the Commission is in\\ncontempt. Neither of these potential justifications suffices.\\n We start with the possibility that the persons compelled\\nto appear may themselves be in contempt. They are not par-\\nties to the agreement and consent decree, so the only basis\\nfor adjudicating them in contempt would be Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n65(d)(2)(B), which says that “the parties’ officers, agents,\\nservants, employees, and a\\\\orneys” are bound by an injunc-\\ntion. But that clause would control only if the Commission\\nhas the authority to bind its members, and it does not.\\n Whenever the Commission issues for official publication any\\n opinion, release, rule, order, interpretation, or other determina-\\n tion on a ma\\\\er, the Commission shall provide that any dissent-\", \"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}, {\"type\": \"concurrence\", \"author\": \"ing\", \"text\": \"ing, concurring, or separate opinion by any Commissioner on\\n\\fNo. 19-2769 5\\n\\n the ma\\\\er be published in full along with the Commission opin-\\n ion, release, rule, order, interpretation, or determination.\\n\\n7 U.S.C. §2(a)(10)(C). In other words, every member of the\\nCommission has a right to publish an explanation of his or\\nher vote.\\n This is a right that the Commission cannot negate. It\\ncould not vote, three to two, to block the two from publish-\\ning their views. So if we understand the consent decree as an\\neffort to silence individual members of the Commission, it is\\nineffectual, for no litigant may accomplish through a consent\\ndecree something it lacks the power to accomplish directly,\\nunless some other statute grants that power—and no one ar-\\ngues that any other statute overrides §2(a)(10)(C). See Dunn\\nv. Carey, 808 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1986); Kasper v. Board of Elec-\\ntion Commissioners, 814 F.2d 332, rehearing denied, 814 F.2d\\n345 (7th Cir. 1987); People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Educa-\\ntion, 961 F.2d 1335, rehearing denied, 964 F.2d 639 (7th Cir.\\n1992); Paige v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 40 (7th Cir. 1996). And be-\\ncause members of federal agencies are entitled to the assis-\\ntance of their staffs, a statute entitling the Commissioners to\\nspeak their minds also means that it would be inappropriate\\nto penalize persons who helped them do it.\\n Now consider the possibility that testimony from the\\nChairman, Commissioners, and staff members is essential to\\ndecide whether the Commission as an institution is in con-\\ntempt. The district judge apparently believed that only evi-\\ndence about a litigant’s thoughts and goals supports an ad-\\njudication in contempt, and who other than the Chairman\\nand Commissioners could provide that evidence? But the\\nSupreme Court has held that disputes about civil contempt\\nmust be resolved objectively. See, e.g., Taggart v. Lorenzen,\\n\\f6 No. 19-2769\\n\\n139 S. Ct. 1795, 1804 (2019). The agreement, consent decree,\\nand press release are wri\\\\en documents; their meaning and\\neffect depends on their four corners. See, e.g., United States v.\\nITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1975). If the Com-\\nmission has done wrong, that is because of what the Com-\\nmission itself said and did, not because of what any of its\\nmembers or employees thought or planned. See, e.g., In re\\nUnited States, 398 F.3d at 618.\\n Judicial review of an agency’s decision is limited to the\\nagency’s official acts and the administrative record in all but\\nthe most extraordinary situations. United States v. Morgan,\\n313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941). One important reason for that rule is\\nthat intra-agency deliberations are covered by multiple\\nprivileges, as Cheney and other decisions explain. Although\\nthese privileges may be overridden for compelling reasons,\\nno such reason has been established or even asserted here.\\n Because the propriety of the Commission’s official deeds\\ndepends on those deeds, plus the administrative record (if\\nany), there is neither need nor justification for testimony by\\nthe Chairman, any Commissioners, or any members of the\\nagency’s staff. We issue a writ of mandamus and direct the\\ndistrict court to withdraw its demand that these persons ap-\\npear in court for questioning. We also direct the district court\\nto desist from any effort to hold the Chairman, Commission-\\ners, and staff members personally in contempt of court, or\\notherwise to look behind the Commission’s public state-\\nments and the administrative record.\\n The Commission has asked us to go further and order the\\ndistrict court to close the contempt proceeding. Kraft and\\nMondelēz contend that four statements in the Commission’s\\npress release violate the consent decree:\\n\\fNo. 19-2769 7\\n\\n • “The $16 million penalty is approximately three\\n times defendants’ alleged gain.\\n • “We are pleased to bring this matter to a successful\\n resolution, which terminates more than four years\\n of litigation.\\n • “The Commission believes that the Consent Order\\n advances our mission of fostering open, transparent,\\n and competitive markets.\\n • “We do not expect the Commission to agree to simi-\\n lar language in the future, except in limited situa-\\n tions where our statutory enforcement mission of\\n preventing market manipulation is substantially\\n advanced by the settlement terms and the public’s\\n right to know about Commission actions is not im-\\n paired.”\\nThe Commission asserts that none of these statements vio-\\nlates the confidentiality clause of the agreement.\\n The argument for mandamus on this subject is weak. If\\nthe district judge ultimately concludes that the Commission\\nis indeed in contempt, its arguments can be vindicated by an\\nappeal in the regular course. We therefore deny the request\\nfor mandamus on this issue. Likewise we deny the Commis-\\nsion’s request that we transfer the district court’s proceed-\\nings to a different judge. The judge who entered the consent\\ndecree is in the best position to decide, as an initial ma\\\\er,\\nwhether its provisions have been violated. The final decision\\nwill be subject to plenary review.\\n The motion to intervene is granted. The petition for\\nmandamus is granted to the extent we indicated above and\\notherwise denied.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671682/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: CFTC v. John Robert Blakey\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 19-2769\nIN THE MATTER OF:\n COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,\n Petitioner.\nKRAFT FOODS GROUP, INC., and MONDELĒZ GLOBAL LLC,\n Parties in Interest.\n ____________________\n\n Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States\n District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15 C 2881 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n SUBMITTED OCTOBER 15, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2015 the Commodity Fu-\ntures Trading Commission filed a civil action against Kraft\nFoods Group and Mondelēz Global. It was se\\led in August\n2019, and the parties’ bargain, which the judge entered as a\nconsent decree, includes this provision:\n Neither party shall make any public statement about this case\n other than to refer to the terms of this se\\lement agreement or\n public documents filed in this case, except any party may take\n\f2 No. 19-2769\n\n any lawful position in any legal proceedings, testimony or by\n court order.\n\nShortly after the district court entered its order, the Commis-\nsion issued a press release announcing the suit’s resolution.\nTwo Commissioners (Dan Berkovib and Rostin Behnam)\nfiled statements explaining why they voted in favor of ac-\ncepting this se\\lement.\n Kraft and Mondelēz asked the district judge to hold the\nCommission and Commissioners in contempt of court for\nissuing the press release and concurring statements. The dis-\ntrict judge set the motion for a hearing and directed Chair-\nman Heath Tarbert, Commissioners Berkovib and Behnam,\nthe Commission’s Director of Enforcement, and several of\nthe Commission’s other employees to appear in court and\ntestify under oath. The judge stated that he would adminis-\nter Miranda warnings to these witnesses in preparation for a\nfinding of criminal contempt and would demand that the\nwitnesses explain the thinking behind the press release and\nthe separate statements. Chairman Tarbert and the Commis-\nsioners protested. After a motion asking the district court to\nlift the demand for their presence and the threat of criminal\nsanctions went unaddressed for approximately two weeks,\nand the date scheduled for the hearing approached, the\nCommission filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. A mo-\ntions panel issued a stay pending further order of this court.\n We also ordered all of the papers to be placed in the pub-\nlic record. The district judge had directed the parties not to\nsay anything in public about the upcoming hearing and to\nkeep all of their legal filings secret, an order that is incon-\nsistent with the law of this circuit. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v.\nLeavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567–68 (7th Cir. 2000); Herrnreiter v. Chi-\n\fNo. 19-2769 3\n\ncago Housing Authority, 281 F.3d 634, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2002).\nThose two decisions hold that a confidentiality clause in the\nlitigants’ agreement does not authorize secret adjudication.\n We ordered Kraft and Mondelēz to respond to the peti-\ntion and invited the district judge to do so. See Fed. R. App.\nP. 21(b)(1), (4). The district judge’s response states, among\nother things, that he no longer contemplates the possibility\nof criminal contempt, so that aspect of the controversy has\ndropped out. Everything we say from now on concerns civil\ncontempt only.\n Chairman Tarbert and Commissioners Berkovib and\nBehnam have moved for leave to intervene. We grant that\nmotion. Although the Commission is representing their in-\nterests adequately for the present, the threat of being per-\nsonally penalized for contempt of court entitles them to be\nlitigants in their own right, so that they may take such steps\nas they deem wise to protect their personal interests.\n Mandamus is a drastic remedy, reserved for urgent\nneeds, but, for all that, it remains available to a litigant who\ncan establish a clear right to relief and lacks any other way to\nprotect his or her rights. See, e.g., Cheney v. United States Dis-\ntrict Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258\n(1947).\n The district court’s order directing the Chairman and two\nmembers of the Commission, plus members of the staff, to\nappear for questioning in open court cannot be reviewed on\nappeal from a final decision. The time taken away from their\nofficial duties will be lost forever.\n Cheney holds that mandamus is the appropriate remedy\nwhen a district court has authorized an inquest into the in-\n\f4 No. 19-2769\n\nternal deliberations of the Executive Branch’s senior officials.\nSee also, e.g., In re United States, 398 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2005).\nThat’s a good description of the order requiring the Chair-\nman and two Commissioners, appointed by the President on\nadvice and consent of the Senate, to appear and reveal what\nlies behind their published words. Many decisions hold that\nmandamus is appropriate when a district judge inappropri-\nately compels a ranking federal official to appear personally\nrather than by counsel. See, e.g., In re United States, 624 F.3d\n1368, 1372 (11th Cir. 2010); In re Cheney, 544 F.3d 311, 314\n(D.C. Cir. 2008); In re United States, 197 F.3d 310, 313–14 (8th\nCir. 1999); In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995); In re\nUnited States, 985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th Cir. 1993); United States\nBoard of Parole v. Merhige, 487 F.2d 25, 29 (4th Cir. 1973).\n The district court’s order requiring the Chairman, Com-\nmissioners, and members of the staff to appear for question-\ning might be supportable on two grounds: first, that they po-\ntentially could be held in contempt; second, that their testi-\nmony is essential to determine whether the Commission is in\ncontempt. Neither of these potential justifications suffices.\n We start with the possibility that the persons compelled\nto appear may themselves be in contempt. They are not par-\nties to the agreement and consent decree, so the only basis\nfor adjudicating them in contempt would be Fed. R. Civ. P.\n65(d)(2)(B), which says that “the parties’ officers, agents,\nservants, employees, and a\\orneys” are bound by an injunc-\ntion. But that clause would control only if the Commission\nhas the authority to bind its members, and it does not.\n Whenever the Commission issues for official publication any\n opinion, release, rule, order, interpretation, or other determina-\n tion on a ma\\er, the Commission shall provide that any dissent-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: CFTC v. John Robert Blakey\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 19-2769\\nIN THE MATTER OF:\\n COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,\\n Petitioner.\\nKRAFT FOODS GROUP, INC., and MONDELĒZ GLOBAL LLC,\\n Parties in Interest.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States\\n District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 2881 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED OCTOBER 15, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2015 the Commodity Fu-\\ntures Trading Commission filed a civil action against Kraft\\nFoods Group and Mondelēz Global. It was se\\\\led in August\\n2019, and the parties’ bargain, which the judge entered as a\\nconsent decree, includes this provision:\\n Neither party shall make any public statement about this case\\n other than to refer to the terms of this se\\\\lement agreement or\\n public documents filed in this case, except any party may take\\n\\f2 No. 19-2769\\n\\n any lawful position in any legal proceedings, testimony or by\\n court order.\\n\\nShortly after the district court entered its order, the Commis-\\nsion issued a press release announcing the suit’s resolution.\\nTwo Commissioners (Dan Berkovib and Rostin Behnam)\\nfiled statements explaining why they voted in favor of ac-\\ncepting this se\\\\lement.\\n Kraft and Mondelēz asked the district judge to hold the\\nCommission and Commissioners in contempt of court for\\nissuing the press release and concurring statements. The dis-\\ntrict judge set the motion for a hearing and directed Chair-\\nman Heath Tarbert, Commissioners Berkovib and Behnam,\\nthe Commission’s Director of Enforcement, and several of\\nthe Commission’s other employees to appear in court and\\ntestify under oath. The judge stated that he would adminis-\\nter Miranda warnings to these witnesses in preparation for a\\nfinding of criminal contempt and would demand that the\\nwitnesses explain the thinking behind the press release and\\nthe separate statements. Chairman Tarbert and the Commis-\\nsioners protested. After a motion asking the district court to\\nlift the demand for their presence and the threat of criminal\\nsanctions went unaddressed for approximately two weeks,\\nand the date scheduled for the hearing approached, the\\nCommission filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. A mo-\\ntions panel issued a stay pending further order of this court.\\n We also ordered all of the papers to be placed in the pub-\\nlic record. The district judge had directed the parties not to\\nsay anything in public about the upcoming hearing and to\\nkeep all of their legal filings secret, an order that is incon-\\nsistent with the law of this circuit. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v.\\nLeavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567–68 (7th Cir. 2000); Herrnreiter v. Chi-\\n\\fNo. 19-2769 3\\n\\ncago Housing Authority, 281 F.3d 634, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nThose two decisions hold that a confidentiality clause in the\\nlitigants’ agreement does not authorize secret adjudication.\\n We ordered Kraft and Mondelēz to respond to the peti-\\ntion and invited the district judge to do so. See Fed. R. App.\\nP. 21(b)(1), (4). The district judge’s response states, among\\nother things, that he no longer contemplates the possibility\\nof criminal contempt, so that aspect of the controversy has\\ndropped out. Everything we say from now on concerns civil\\ncontempt only.\\n Chairman Tarbert and Commissioners Berkovib and\\nBehnam have moved for leave to intervene. We grant that\\nmotion. Although the Commission is representing their in-\\nterests adequately for the present, the threat of being per-\\nsonally penalized for contempt of court entitles them to be\\nlitigants in their own right, so that they may take such steps\\nas they deem wise to protect their personal interests.\\n Mandamus is a drastic remedy, reserved for urgent\\nneeds, but, for all that, it remains available to a litigant who\\ncan establish a clear right to relief and lacks any other way to\\nprotect his or her rights. See, e.g., Cheney v. United States Dis-\\ntrict Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258\\n(1947).\\n The district court’s order directing the Chairman and two\\nmembers of the Commission, plus members of the staff, to\\nappear for questioning in open court cannot be reviewed on\\nappeal from a final decision. The time taken away from their\\nofficial duties will be lost forever.\\n Cheney holds that mandamus is the appropriate remedy\\nwhen a district court has authorized an inquest into the in-\\n\\f4 No. 19-2769\\n\\nternal deliberations of the Executive Branch’s senior officials.\\nSee also, e.g., In re United States, 398 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2005).\\nThat’s a good description of the order requiring the Chair-\\nman and two Commissioners, appointed by the President on\\nadvice and consent of the Senate, to appear and reveal what\\nlies behind their published words. Many decisions hold that\\nmandamus is appropriate when a district judge inappropri-\\nately compels a ranking federal official to appear personally\\nrather than by counsel. See, e.g., In re United States, 624 F.3d\\n1368, 1372 (11th Cir. 2010); In re Cheney, 544 F.3d 311, 314\\n(D.C. Cir. 2008); In re United States, 197 F.3d 310, 313–14 (8th\\nCir. 1999); In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995); In re\\nUnited States, 985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th Cir. 1993); United States\\nBoard of Parole v. Merhige, 487 F.2d 25, 29 (4th Cir. 1973).\\n The district court’s order requiring the Chairman, Com-\\nmissioners, and members of the staff to appear for question-\\ning might be supportable on two grounds: first, that they po-\\ntentially could be held in contempt; second, that their testi-\\nmony is essential to determine whether the Commission is in\\ncontempt. Neither of these potential justifications suffices.\\n We start with the possibility that the persons compelled\\nto appear may themselves be in contempt. They are not par-\\nties to the agreement and consent decree, so the only basis\\nfor adjudicating them in contempt would be Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n65(d)(2)(B), which says that “the parties’ officers, agents,\\nservants, employees, and a\\\\orneys” are bound by an injunc-\\ntion. But that clause would control only if the Commission\\nhas the authority to bind its members, and it does not.\\n Whenever the Commission issues for official publication any\\n opinion, release, rule, order, interpretation, or other determina-\\n tion on a ma\\\\er, the Commission shall provide that any dissent-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4687,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671765,"string":"4,671,765"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Anthony Shockey"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1308"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"William Joseph Bauer\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 19-1308\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nANTHONY SHOCKEY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:15-cr-00016-RLM-MGG-1 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Anthony Shockey appeals from the\\ndistrict court’s order revoking his supervised release and\\nimposing a 15-month prison sentence. The district court found\\nthat Shockey not only used methamphetamine but also\\npossessed it, a Grade B violation of one of his supervised-\\nrelease conditions. Shockey challenges this classification.\\n\\f2 No. 19-1308\\n\\nBecause the district court reasonably could infer possession\\nfrom use, we affirm the judgment.\\n While on supervised release for possessing a firearm as a\\nfelon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Shockey tested positive for meth-\\namphetamine, which he later admitted using. Because Shockey\\nviolated the condition that he not use a controlled substance,1\\na probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervision. The\\nofficer prepared a “Summary Report of Violations” charging\\nShockey with a Grade B violation for conduct constituting an\\noffense punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.\\nSee U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).\\n At his revocation hearing, Shockey asked the district court\\nto find that he had merely used methamphetamine, rather than\\npossessed it. (Use is a less serious Grade C that does not\\nmandate revocation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)). His conduct, he\\nargued, violated the requirement of his supervised-release\\ncondition to refrain from using drugs—a violation that is not\\na felony, but instead merely a Grade C violation of “any other\\ncondition of supervision.”\\n The district court rejected Shockey’s argument. It found\\nthat the Guidelines could not be “reasonably read to make this\\na Grade C violation”; the violation had to be “either a Grade A\\nor a Grade B.” The court implicitly accepted the government’s\\nreliance on United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir.\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n Condition 3 stated: “The defendant shall not unlawfully use any controlled\\nsubstance, including marijuana, and shall submit to one drug test within 15\\ndays of the beginning of supervision and at least 2 periodic tests after that\\nfor use of a controlled substance.”\\n\\fNo. 19-1308 3\\n\\n2001), which held that marijuana use supports an inference of\\nmarijuana possession. The district court thus found that\\nShockey had both possessed and used methamphetamine—a\\nGrade B violation that corresponded to a sentencing range of\\n21 to 24 months in prison. The court sentenced him below that\\nrange to 15 months, acknowledging the need for a “significant\\nperiod of incarceration” but recognizing that Shockey had\\nstayed sober for 7 months before using methamphetamine and\\ncommitted no other crimes.\\n On appeal, Shockey maintains that the district court erred\\nin classifying his violation as Grade B without finding that he\\nviolated any law prohibiting possession of a controlled\\nsubstance that was statutorily punishable by more than a year\\nin prison. Although it would have been good practice for the\\ncourt to cite a specific statute, Shockey was entitled only to fair,\\nwritten notice of the alleged conduct underlying his Grade B\\nviolation. See United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)). Here, Shockey was\\nnotified before the hearing by the probation officer in writing\\nthat he was alleged to have violated § 35-48-4-6.1 of the Indiana\\nCode (titled “Possession of methamphetamine”), and that this\\nconstituted a Grade B violation because the offense is punish-\\nable by more than one year in prison. Moreover, in the district\\ncourt Shockey did not dispute that possession of methamphet-\\namine is punishable as such. Because the report plainly\\nidentified the statute that Shockey was alleged to have violated\\nand the district court resolved all issues of fact on the record,\\nno error occurred. See United States v. Tapia, 610 F.3d 505, 513\\n(7th Cir. 2010).\\n\\f4 No. 19-1308\\n\\n Shockey relatedly argues that his use of methamphetamine\\ndid not require a finding that he also possessed methamphet-\\namine. But he misapprehends the district court’s ruling. The\\ncourt did find that he possessed methamphetamine, which in\\nIndiana is punishable by more than a year in prison. See Ind.\\nCode §§ 35-48-4-6.1, 35-50-2-7. The district court reasonably\\ncould infer possession from use. See United States v. Barnes,\\n883 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Trotter,\\n270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001). “Inferring possession of a\\ndrug from the consumption of that drug is just as sensible as\\ninferring, from the statement ‘I ate a hamburger for lunch,’ that\\nthe person possessed the hamburger before wolfing it down.”\\nTrotter, 270 F.3d at 1153.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449018/\", \"author_raw\": \"William Joseph Bauer\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671765/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Anthony Shockey\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 19-1308\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\n\nANTHONY SHOCKEY,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\n No. 3:15-cr-00016-RLM-MGG-1 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.\n\n\n\n ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\n\n\n Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Anthony Shockey appeals from the\ndistrict court’s order revoking his supervised release and\nimposing a 15-month prison sentence. The district court found\nthat Shockey not only used methamphetamine but also\npossessed it, a Grade B violation of one of his supervised-\nrelease conditions. Shockey challenges this classification.\n\f2 No. 19-1308\n\nBecause the district court reasonably could infer possession\nfrom use, we affirm the judgment.\n While on supervised release for possessing a firearm as a\nfelon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Shockey tested positive for meth-\namphetamine, which he later admitted using. Because Shockey\nviolated the condition that he not use a controlled substance,1\na probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervision. The\nofficer prepared a “Summary Report of Violations” charging\nShockey with a Grade B violation for conduct constituting an\noffense punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.\nSee U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).\n At his revocation hearing, Shockey asked the district court\nto find that he had merely used methamphetamine, rather than\npossessed it. (Use is a less serious Grade C that does not\nmandate revocation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)). His conduct, he\nargued, violated the requirement of his supervised-release\ncondition to refrain from using drugs—a violation that is not\na felony, but instead merely a Grade C violation of “any other\ncondition of supervision.”\n The district court rejected Shockey’s argument. It found\nthat the Guidelines could not be “reasonably read to make this\na Grade C violation”; the violation had to be “either a Grade A\nor a Grade B.” The court implicitly accepted the government’s\nreliance on United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir.\n\n\n\n1\n Condition 3 stated: “The defendant shall not unlawfully use any controlled\nsubstance, including marijuana, and shall submit to one drug test within 15\ndays of the beginning of supervision and at least 2 periodic tests after that\nfor use of a controlled substance.”\n\fNo. 19-1308 3\n\n2001), which held that marijuana use supports an inference of\nmarijuana possession. The district court thus found that\nShockey had both possessed and used methamphetamine—a\nGrade B violation that corresponded to a sentencing range of\n21 to 24 months in prison. The court sentenced him below that\nrange to 15 months, acknowledging the need for a “significant\nperiod of incarceration” but recognizing that Shockey had\nstayed sober for 7 months before using methamphetamine and\ncommitted no other crimes.\n On appeal, Shockey maintains that the district court erred\nin classifying his violation as Grade B without finding that he\nviolated any law prohibiting possession of a controlled\nsubstance that was statutorily punishable by more than a year\nin prison. Although it would have been good practice for the\ncourt to cite a specific statute, Shockey was entitled only to fair,\nwritten notice of the alleged conduct underlying his Grade B\nviolation. See United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir.\n2015) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)). Here, Shockey was\nnotified before the hearing by the probation officer in writing\nthat he was alleged to have violated § 35-48-4-6.1 of the Indiana\nCode (titled “Possession of methamphetamine”), and that this\nconstituted a Grade B violation because the offense is punish-\nable by more than one year in prison. Moreover, in the district\ncourt Shockey did not dispute that possession of methamphet-\namine is punishable as such. Because the report plainly\nidentified the statute that Shockey was alleged to have violated\nand the district court resolved all issues of fact on the record,\nno error occurred. See United States v. Tapia, 610 F.3d 505, 513\n(7th Cir. 2010).\n\f4 No. 19-1308\n\n Shockey relatedly argues that his use of methamphetamine\ndid not require a finding that he also possessed methamphet-\namine. But he misapprehends the district court’s ruling. The\ncourt did find that he possessed methamphetamine, which in\nIndiana is punishable by more than a year in prison. See Ind.\nCode §§ 35-48-4-6.1, 35-50-2-7. The district court reasonably\ncould infer possession from use. See United States v. Barnes,\n883 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Trotter,\n270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001). “Inferring possession of a\ndrug from the consumption of that drug is just as sensible as\ninferring, from the statement ‘I ate a hamburger for lunch,’ that\nthe person possessed the hamburger before wolfing it down.”\nTrotter, 270 F.3d at 1153.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Anthony Shockey\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 19-1308\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nANTHONY SHOCKEY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:15-cr-00016-RLM-MGG-1 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Anthony Shockey appeals from the\\ndistrict court’s order revoking his supervised release and\\nimposing a 15-month prison sentence. The district court found\\nthat Shockey not only used methamphetamine but also\\npossessed it, a Grade B violation of one of his supervised-\\nrelease conditions. Shockey challenges this classification.\\n\\f2 No. 19-1308\\n\\nBecause the district court reasonably could infer possession\\nfrom use, we affirm the judgment.\\n While on supervised release for possessing a firearm as a\\nfelon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Shockey tested positive for meth-\\namphetamine, which he later admitted using. Because Shockey\\nviolated the condition that he not use a controlled substance,1\\na probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervision. The\\nofficer prepared a “Summary Report of Violations” charging\\nShockey with a Grade B violation for conduct constituting an\\noffense punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.\\nSee U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).\\n At his revocation hearing, Shockey asked the district court\\nto find that he had merely used methamphetamine, rather than\\npossessed it. (Use is a less serious Grade C that does not\\nmandate revocation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)). His conduct, he\\nargued, violated the requirement of his supervised-release\\ncondition to refrain from using drugs—a violation that is not\\na felony, but instead merely a Grade C violation of “any other\\ncondition of supervision.”\\n The district court rejected Shockey’s argument. It found\\nthat the Guidelines could not be “reasonably read to make this\\na Grade C violation”; the violation had to be “either a Grade A\\nor a Grade B.” The court implicitly accepted the government’s\\nreliance on United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir.\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n Condition 3 stated: “The defendant shall not unlawfully use any controlled\\nsubstance, including marijuana, and shall submit to one drug test within 15\\ndays of the beginning of supervision and at least 2 periodic tests after that\\nfor use of a controlled substance.”\\n\\fNo. 19-1308 3\\n\\n2001), which held that marijuana use supports an inference of\\nmarijuana possession. The district court thus found that\\nShockey had both possessed and used methamphetamine—a\\nGrade B violation that corresponded to a sentencing range of\\n21 to 24 months in prison. The court sentenced him below that\\nrange to 15 months, acknowledging the need for a “significant\\nperiod of incarceration” but recognizing that Shockey had\\nstayed sober for 7 months before using methamphetamine and\\ncommitted no other crimes.\\n On appeal, Shockey maintains that the district court erred\\nin classifying his violation as Grade B without finding that he\\nviolated any law prohibiting possession of a controlled\\nsubstance that was statutorily punishable by more than a year\\nin prison. Although it would have been good practice for the\\ncourt to cite a specific statute, Shockey was entitled only to fair,\\nwritten notice of the alleged conduct underlying his Grade B\\nviolation. See United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)). Here, Shockey was\\nnotified before the hearing by the probation officer in writing\\nthat he was alleged to have violated § 35-48-4-6.1 of the Indiana\\nCode (titled “Possession of methamphetamine”), and that this\\nconstituted a Grade B violation because the offense is punish-\\nable by more than one year in prison. Moreover, in the district\\ncourt Shockey did not dispute that possession of methamphet-\\namine is punishable as such. Because the report plainly\\nidentified the statute that Shockey was alleged to have violated\\nand the district court resolved all issues of fact on the record,\\nno error occurred. See United States v. Tapia, 610 F.3d 505, 513\\n(7th Cir. 2010).\\n\\f4 No. 19-1308\\n\\n Shockey relatedly argues that his use of methamphetamine\\ndid not require a finding that he also possessed methamphet-\\namine. But he misapprehends the district court’s ruling. The\\ncourt did find that he possessed methamphetamine, which in\\nIndiana is punishable by more than a year in prison. See Ind.\\nCode §§ 35-48-4-6.1, 35-50-2-7. The district court reasonably\\ncould infer possession from use. See United States v. Barnes,\\n883 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Trotter,\\n270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001). “Inferring possession of a\\ndrug from the consumption of that drug is just as sensible as\\ninferring, from the statement ‘I ate a hamburger for lunch,’ that\\nthe person possessed the hamburger before wolfing it down.”\\nTrotter, 270 F.3d at 1153.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4688,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671766,"string":"4,671,766"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1747"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19‐1747\\nTYQUAN STEWART,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nPARKVIEW HOSPITAL, et al.,\\n Defendants‐Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\\n No. 1:17‐cv‐346 — Theresa L. Springmann, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED AUGUST 29, 2019* — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Tyquan Stewart sustained serious\\ninjuries upon crashing his car while driving under the\\n\\n*We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the\\nbriefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and\\noral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P.\\n34(a)(2)(C).\\n\\f2 No. 19‐1747\\n\\ninfluence. An emergency room doctor treated Stewart and in\\ndoing so ordered a blood draw, which confirmed that he had\\nbeen drinking. The police requested and received the blood‐\\ntest results from the hospital’s medical staff. Stewart later\\nsued both officers for violating the Fourth Amendment by ob‐\\ntaining his test results without a warrant and the hospital’s\\nmedical staff for violating the Health Insurance Portability\\nand Accountability Act by disclosing the results. The district\\ncourt entered summary judgment for the defendants. We af‐\\nfirm.\\n I\\n Stewart does not remember the time he spent in the hos‐\\npital and indeed says that he was unconscious. His treating\\nphysician, however, said that upon arriving in the emergency\\nroom, Stewart relayed that he had been drinking and lost con‐\\ntrol of his car. He also signed a form consenting to treatment.\\nAs part of determining the proper course of treatment, the\\ndoctor ordered a blood draw.\\n Suspecting that alcohol contributed to the crash, the police\\nasked the medical staff for Stewart’s blood‐test results. An In‐\\ndiana statute requires medical staff who test a person’s blood\\n“for diagnostic purposes” to “disclose the results of the test to\\na law enforcement officer who requests the … results as a part\\nof a criminal investigation” regardless of whether the person\\nhas “consented to or otherwise authorized their release.” Ind.\\nCode § 9‐30‐6‐6(a) (2016). The test results showed that Stewart\\nwas intoxicated, and the nurses shared that information with\\nthe police. The officers then arrested Stewart and Indiana\\nprosecutors later charged him with the state‐law misde‐\\nmeanor of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Stewart\\npleaded guilty.\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 3\\n\\n Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Stewart sued the police officers,\\ndoctor, nurses, and their employers in federal court. He ac‐\\ncused the hospital’s medical staff of violating the Health In‐\\nsurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA, by dis‐\\nclosing medical information (his blood‐test results) to the po‐\\nlice without his consent. He also alleged that the police offic‐\\ners and their employer, the City of Fort Wayne, violated his\\nFourth Amendment rights by obtaining those results without\\na warrant. He added claims under Indiana law for negligence,\\ninfliction of emotional distress, battery, and invasion of pri‐\\nvacy. In granting the defendants’ motions for summary judg‐\\nment, the district court concluded that Stewart’s federal\\nclaims failed as a matter of law, and that he had not brought\\nforth enough evidence to allow a jury to decide any state‐law\\nclaim in his favor.\\n Stewart now appeals.\\n II\\n We begin with Stewart’s statutory claim under HIPAA.\\nThe district court concluded that the statute provides no pri‐\\nvate right of action and accordingly entered judgment for the\\nmedical defendants on that basis. We agree.\\n HIPAA prohibits the disclosure of medical records with‐\\nout the patient’s consent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1 to d–7. But\\nnowhere does the statute expressly create a private right of\\naction to enforce this substantive prohibition. So the question\\nbecomes whether Congress nonetheless intended to allow\\nprivate enforcement and the award of a private remedy.\\nSee Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017).\\n Although we have not addressed the issue in a preceden‐\\ntial decision, all other circuits to have considered the question\\n\\f4 No. 19‐1747\\n\\nhave concluded that HIPAA does not confer individual en‐\\nforcement rights—express or implied. See Acara v. Banks, 470\\nF.3d 569, 570–72 (5th Cir. 2006); Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563,\\n569 (8th Cir. 2010); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 533 (9th\\nCir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th\\nCir. 2010). Those courts have reasoned that Congress, by del‐\\negating enforcement authority to the Secretary of Health and\\nHuman Services, did not intend for HIPAA to include or cre‐\\nate a private remedy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–3, –5. Under the\\nSupreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, Congress’s\\nchoices about enforcement authority have consequences:\\n“The express provision of one method of enforcing a substan‐\\ntive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”\\n532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).\\n HIPAA’s focus on the conduct of those with access to med‐\\nical information—as opposed to the rights of individual pa‐\\ntients—also weighs against finding an implied private right\\nof action. See id. at 289. By prohibiting the disclosure of sensi‐\\ntive information, the statute imposes obligations on medical\\nprofessionals charged with protecting the information with‐\\nout conferring individual privacy rights. See Acara, 470 F.3d\\nat 571 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1, –5, –6, and employ‐\\ning similar reasoning).\\n Seeing no reason to chart a different course, we now hold\\nthat HIPAA confers no private right of action. Medical pro‐\\nfessionals, including those who treated Stewart, are bound by\\nthe statute’s disclosure prohibitions and confidentiality re‐\\nquirements. But Congress left enforcement for violations to\\nthe Department of Health and Human Services, not to private\\nplaintiffs.\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 5\\n\\n III\\n We turn next to Stewart’s Fourth Amendment claim. The\\ndistrict court entered summary judgment for the defendant\\npolice officers on the basis that they were entitled to judgment\\nas a matter of law because they obtained the blood‐test results\\nunder the Indiana statute. The defendants urge us to affirm\\non that basis or on the grounds of qualified immunity. Agree‐\\ning that the district court committed no error, we choose the\\nlatter course.\\n Police officers enjoy immunity from liability for conduct\\nthat “does not violate clearly established statutory or consti‐\\ntutional rights of which a reasonable person would have\\nknown.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting\\nWhite v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)). For the law to be\\nclearly established, it must be “beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al‐\\nKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Qualified immunity, the Su‐\\npreme Court has emphasized, “protects ‘all but the plainly in‐\\ncompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Werner\\nv. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mullenix\\nv. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).\\n Like the district court, we have identified no case law es‐\\ntablishing that an officer’s receipt of blood‐test results from\\nmedical personnel offends the Fourth Amendment. Those\\ncases that do address the question point in the other direction.\\nIn 1966 the Supreme Court recognized that the exigent‐cir‐\\ncumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment permitted\\npolice officers to order a warrantless blood draw from a con‐\\nscious driver involved in an accident. See Schmerber v. Califor‐\\nnia, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59, 766–72 (1966). Earlier this year, the\\nCourt reinforced and extended this same point, holding that,\\ndespite reductions in the time needed to obtain a warrant,\\n\\f6 No. 19‐1747\\n\\nwarrantless blood draws from unconscious drivers involved\\nin car accidents do not offend with the Fourth Amendment.\\nSee Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533–34, 2537–39\\n(2019).\\n Against the backdrop of Schmerber and Mitchell, we cannot\\nsay “beyond any debate” that the police officers’ actions here\\nwere unconstitutional. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Accepting\\nStewart’s account that he was unconscious at the time of the\\nblood draw, the officers had no reason to believe the Fourth\\nAmendment barred the police from seeking the results of a\\nblood test that a doctor ordered for medical purposes from a\\ndriver after a collision. In these circumstances, Stewart cannot\\nestablish that the officers violated a right clearly established\\nunder the Fourth Amendment, and qualified immunity ap‐\\nplies. Id.; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615–18 (1999)\\n(holding that officers’ conduct was reasonable where they fol‐\\nlowed a common police practice and no judicial opinions at\\nthe time prohibited the conduct).\\n Because Stewart makes no argument that the City had an\\nunconstitutional policy, practice, or custom, his claim against\\nthe City for the police officers’ conduct likewise fails. See Mo‐\\nnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978).\\n IV\\n We owe a brief word in closing to the district court’s entry\\nof judgment for the defendants on Stewart’s state‐law claims.\\nWhile purporting to disagree with that ruling, Stewart does\\nnot refer us to any evidence in the summary judgment record\\ncalling the district court’s conclusions into question. He there‐\\nfore has waived any challenge to the court’s rejection of those\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 7\\n\\nclaims. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); CTL ex rel. Trebatoski\\nv. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 527 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449019/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671766/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19‐1747\nTYQUAN STEWART,\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\n v.\n\nPARKVIEW HOSPITAL, et al.,\n Defendants‐Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\n No. 1:17‐cv‐346 — Theresa L. Springmann, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n SUBMITTED AUGUST 29, 2019* — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Tyquan Stewart sustained serious\ninjuries upon crashing his car while driving under the\n\n*We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the\nbriefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and\noral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P.\n34(a)(2)(C).\n\f2 No. 19‐1747\n\ninfluence. An emergency room doctor treated Stewart and in\ndoing so ordered a blood draw, which confirmed that he had\nbeen drinking. The police requested and received the blood‐\ntest results from the hospital’s medical staff. Stewart later\nsued both officers for violating the Fourth Amendment by ob‐\ntaining his test results without a warrant and the hospital’s\nmedical staff for violating the Health Insurance Portability\nand Accountability Act by disclosing the results. The district\ncourt entered summary judgment for the defendants. We af‐\nfirm.\n I\n Stewart does not remember the time he spent in the hos‐\npital and indeed says that he was unconscious. His treating\nphysician, however, said that upon arriving in the emergency\nroom, Stewart relayed that he had been drinking and lost con‐\ntrol of his car. He also signed a form consenting to treatment.\nAs part of determining the proper course of treatment, the\ndoctor ordered a blood draw.\n Suspecting that alcohol contributed to the crash, the police\nasked the medical staff for Stewart’s blood‐test results. An In‐\ndiana statute requires medical staff who test a person’s blood\n“for diagnostic purposes” to “disclose the results of the test to\na law enforcement officer who requests the … results as a part\nof a criminal investigation” regardless of whether the person\nhas “consented to or otherwise authorized their release.” Ind.\nCode § 9‐30‐6‐6(a) (2016). The test results showed that Stewart\nwas intoxicated, and the nurses shared that information with\nthe police. The officers then arrested Stewart and Indiana\nprosecutors later charged him with the state‐law misde‐\nmeanor of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Stewart\npleaded guilty.\n\fNo. 19‐1747 3\n\n Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Stewart sued the police officers,\ndoctor, nurses, and their employers in federal court. He ac‐\ncused the hospital’s medical staff of violating the Health In‐\nsurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA, by dis‐\nclosing medical information (his blood‐test results) to the po‐\nlice without his consent. He also alleged that the police offic‐\ners and their employer, the City of Fort Wayne, violated his\nFourth Amendment rights by obtaining those results without\na warrant. He added claims under Indiana law for negligence,\ninfliction of emotional distress, battery, and invasion of pri‐\nvacy. In granting the defendants’ motions for summary judg‐\nment, the district court concluded that Stewart’s federal\nclaims failed as a matter of law, and that he had not brought\nforth enough evidence to allow a jury to decide any state‐law\nclaim in his favor.\n Stewart now appeals.\n II\n We begin with Stewart’s statutory claim under HIPAA.\nThe district court concluded that the statute provides no pri‐\nvate right of action and accordingly entered judgment for the\nmedical defendants on that basis. We agree.\n HIPAA prohibits the disclosure of medical records with‐\nout the patient’s consent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1 to d–7. But\nnowhere does the statute expressly create a private right of\naction to enforce this substantive prohibition. So the question\nbecomes whether Congress nonetheless intended to allow\nprivate enforcement and the award of a private remedy.\nSee Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017).\n Although we have not addressed the issue in a preceden‐\ntial decision, all other circuits to have considered the question\n\f4 No. 19‐1747\n\nhave concluded that HIPAA does not confer individual en‐\nforcement rights—express or implied. See Acara v. Banks, 470\nF.3d 569, 570–72 (5th Cir. 2006); Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563,\n569 (8th Cir. 2010); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 533 (9th\nCir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th\nCir. 2010). Those courts have reasoned that Congress, by del‐\negating enforcement authority to the Secretary of Health and\nHuman Services, did not intend for HIPAA to include or cre‐\nate a private remedy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–3, –5. Under the\nSupreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, Congress’s\nchoices about enforcement authority have consequences:\n“The express provision of one method of enforcing a substan‐\ntive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”\n532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).\n HIPAA’s focus on the conduct of those with access to med‐\nical information—as opposed to the rights of individual pa‐\ntients—also weighs against finding an implied private right\nof action. See id. at 289. By prohibiting the disclosure of sensi‐\ntive information, the statute imposes obligations on medical\nprofessionals charged with protecting the information with‐\nout conferring individual privacy rights. See Acara, 470 F.3d\nat 571 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1, –5, –6, and employ‐\ning similar reasoning).\n Seeing no reason to chart a different course, we now hold\nthat HIPAA confers no private right of action. Medical pro‐\nfessionals, including those who treated Stewart, are bound by\nthe statute’s disclosure prohibitions and confidentiality re‐\nquirements. But Congress left enforcement for violations to\nthe Department of Health and Human Services, not to private\nplaintiffs.\n\fNo. 19‐1747 5\n\n III\n We turn next to Stewart’s Fourth Amendment claim. The\ndistrict court entered summary judgment for the defendant\npolice officers on the basis that they were entitled to judgment\nas a matter of law because they obtained the blood‐test results\nunder the Indiana statute. The defendants urge us to affirm\non that basis or on the grounds of qualified immunity. Agree‐\ning that the district court committed no error, we choose the\nlatter course.\n Police officers enjoy immunity from liability for conduct\nthat “does not violate clearly established statutory or consti‐\ntutional rights of which a reasonable person would have\nknown.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting\nWhite v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)). For the law to be\nclearly established, it must be “beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al‐\nKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Qualified immunity, the Su‐\npreme Court has emphasized, “protects ‘all but the plainly in‐\ncompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Werner\nv. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mullenix\nv. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).\n Like the district court, we have identified no case law es‐\ntablishing that an officer’s receipt of blood‐test results from\nmedical personnel offends the Fourth Amendment. Those\ncases that do address the question point in the other direction.\nIn 1966 the Supreme Court recognized that the exigent‐cir‐\ncumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment permitted\npolice officers to order a warrantless blood draw from a con‐\nscious driver involved in an accident. See Schmerber v. Califor‐\nnia, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59, 766–72 (1966). Earlier this year, the\nCourt reinforced and extended this same point, holding that,\ndespite reductions in the time needed to obtain a warrant,\n\f6 No. 19‐1747\n\nwarrantless blood draws from unconscious drivers involved\nin car accidents do not offend with the Fourth Amendment.\nSee Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533–34, 2537–39\n(2019).\n Against the backdrop of Schmerber and Mitchell, we cannot\nsay “beyond any debate” that the police officers’ actions here\nwere unconstitutional. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Accepting\nStewart’s account that he was unconscious at the time of the\nblood draw, the officers had no reason to believe the Fourth\nAmendment barred the police from seeking the results of a\nblood test that a doctor ordered for medical purposes from a\ndriver after a collision. In these circumstances, Stewart cannot\nestablish that the officers violated a right clearly established\nunder the Fourth Amendment, and qualified immunity ap‐\nplies. Id.; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615–18 (1999)\n(holding that officers’ conduct was reasonable where they fol‐\nlowed a common police practice and no judicial opinions at\nthe time prohibited the conduct).\n Because Stewart makes no argument that the City had an\nunconstitutional policy, practice, or custom, his claim against\nthe City for the police officers’ conduct likewise fails. See Mo‐\nnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978).\n IV\n We owe a brief word in closing to the district court’s entry\nof judgment for the defendants on Stewart’s state‐law claims.\nWhile purporting to disagree with that ruling, Stewart does\nnot refer us to any evidence in the summary judgment record\ncalling the district court’s conclusions into question. He there‐\nfore has waived any challenge to the court’s rejection of those\n\fNo. 19‐1747 7\n\nclaims. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); CTL ex rel. Trebatoski\nv. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 527 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014).\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19‐1747\\nTYQUAN STEWART,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nPARKVIEW HOSPITAL, et al.,\\n Defendants‐Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\\n No. 1:17‐cv‐346 — Theresa L. Springmann, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED AUGUST 29, 2019* — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Tyquan Stewart sustained serious\\ninjuries upon crashing his car while driving under the\\n\\n*We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the\\nbriefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and\\noral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P.\\n34(a)(2)(C).\\n\\f2 No. 19‐1747\\n\\ninfluence. An emergency room doctor treated Stewart and in\\ndoing so ordered a blood draw, which confirmed that he had\\nbeen drinking. The police requested and received the blood‐\\ntest results from the hospital’s medical staff. Stewart later\\nsued both officers for violating the Fourth Amendment by ob‐\\ntaining his test results without a warrant and the hospital’s\\nmedical staff for violating the Health Insurance Portability\\nand Accountability Act by disclosing the results. The district\\ncourt entered summary judgment for the defendants. We af‐\\nfirm.\\n I\\n Stewart does not remember the time he spent in the hos‐\\npital and indeed says that he was unconscious. His treating\\nphysician, however, said that upon arriving in the emergency\\nroom, Stewart relayed that he had been drinking and lost con‐\\ntrol of his car. He also signed a form consenting to treatment.\\nAs part of determining the proper course of treatment, the\\ndoctor ordered a blood draw.\\n Suspecting that alcohol contributed to the crash, the police\\nasked the medical staff for Stewart’s blood‐test results. An In‐\\ndiana statute requires medical staff who test a person’s blood\\n“for diagnostic purposes” to “disclose the results of the test to\\na law enforcement officer who requests the … results as a part\\nof a criminal investigation” regardless of whether the person\\nhas “consented to or otherwise authorized their release.” Ind.\\nCode § 9‐30‐6‐6(a) (2016). The test results showed that Stewart\\nwas intoxicated, and the nurses shared that information with\\nthe police. The officers then arrested Stewart and Indiana\\nprosecutors later charged him with the state‐law misde‐\\nmeanor of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Stewart\\npleaded guilty.\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 3\\n\\n Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Stewart sued the police officers,\\ndoctor, nurses, and their employers in federal court. He ac‐\\ncused the hospital’s medical staff of violating the Health In‐\\nsurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA, by dis‐\\nclosing medical information (his blood‐test results) to the po‐\\nlice without his consent. He also alleged that the police offic‐\\ners and their employer, the City of Fort Wayne, violated his\\nFourth Amendment rights by obtaining those results without\\na warrant. He added claims under Indiana law for negligence,\\ninfliction of emotional distress, battery, and invasion of pri‐\\nvacy. In granting the defendants’ motions for summary judg‐\\nment, the district court concluded that Stewart’s federal\\nclaims failed as a matter of law, and that he had not brought\\nforth enough evidence to allow a jury to decide any state‐law\\nclaim in his favor.\\n Stewart now appeals.\\n II\\n We begin with Stewart’s statutory claim under HIPAA.\\nThe district court concluded that the statute provides no pri‐\\nvate right of action and accordingly entered judgment for the\\nmedical defendants on that basis. We agree.\\n HIPAA prohibits the disclosure of medical records with‐\\nout the patient’s consent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1 to d–7. But\\nnowhere does the statute expressly create a private right of\\naction to enforce this substantive prohibition. So the question\\nbecomes whether Congress nonetheless intended to allow\\nprivate enforcement and the award of a private remedy.\\nSee Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017).\\n Although we have not addressed the issue in a preceden‐\\ntial decision, all other circuits to have considered the question\\n\\f4 No. 19‐1747\\n\\nhave concluded that HIPAA does not confer individual en‐\\nforcement rights—express or implied. See Acara v. Banks, 470\\nF.3d 569, 570–72 (5th Cir. 2006); Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563,\\n569 (8th Cir. 2010); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 533 (9th\\nCir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th\\nCir. 2010). Those courts have reasoned that Congress, by del‐\\negating enforcement authority to the Secretary of Health and\\nHuman Services, did not intend for HIPAA to include or cre‐\\nate a private remedy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–3, –5. Under the\\nSupreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, Congress’s\\nchoices about enforcement authority have consequences:\\n“The express provision of one method of enforcing a substan‐\\ntive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”\\n532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).\\n HIPAA’s focus on the conduct of those with access to med‐\\nical information—as opposed to the rights of individual pa‐\\ntients—also weighs against finding an implied private right\\nof action. See id. at 289. By prohibiting the disclosure of sensi‐\\ntive information, the statute imposes obligations on medical\\nprofessionals charged with protecting the information with‐\\nout conferring individual privacy rights. See Acara, 470 F.3d\\nat 571 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1, –5, –6, and employ‐\\ning similar reasoning).\\n Seeing no reason to chart a different course, we now hold\\nthat HIPAA confers no private right of action. Medical pro‐\\nfessionals, including those who treated Stewart, are bound by\\nthe statute’s disclosure prohibitions and confidentiality re‐\\nquirements. But Congress left enforcement for violations to\\nthe Department of Health and Human Services, not to private\\nplaintiffs.\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 5\\n\\n III\\n We turn next to Stewart’s Fourth Amendment claim. The\\ndistrict court entered summary judgment for the defendant\\npolice officers on the basis that they were entitled to judgment\\nas a matter of law because they obtained the blood‐test results\\nunder the Indiana statute. The defendants urge us to affirm\\non that basis or on the grounds of qualified immunity. Agree‐\\ning that the district court committed no error, we choose the\\nlatter course.\\n Police officers enjoy immunity from liability for conduct\\nthat “does not violate clearly established statutory or consti‐\\ntutional rights of which a reasonable person would have\\nknown.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting\\nWhite v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)). For the law to be\\nclearly established, it must be “beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al‐\\nKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Qualified immunity, the Su‐\\npreme Court has emphasized, “protects ‘all but the plainly in‐\\ncompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Werner\\nv. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mullenix\\nv. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).\\n Like the district court, we have identified no case law es‐\\ntablishing that an officer’s receipt of blood‐test results from\\nmedical personnel offends the Fourth Amendment. Those\\ncases that do address the question point in the other direction.\\nIn 1966 the Supreme Court recognized that the exigent‐cir‐\\ncumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment permitted\\npolice officers to order a warrantless blood draw from a con‐\\nscious driver involved in an accident. See Schmerber v. Califor‐\\nnia, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59, 766–72 (1966). Earlier this year, the\\nCourt reinforced and extended this same point, holding that,\\ndespite reductions in the time needed to obtain a warrant,\\n\\f6 No. 19‐1747\\n\\nwarrantless blood draws from unconscious drivers involved\\nin car accidents do not offend with the Fourth Amendment.\\nSee Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533–34, 2537–39\\n(2019).\\n Against the backdrop of Schmerber and Mitchell, we cannot\\nsay “beyond any debate” that the police officers’ actions here\\nwere unconstitutional. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Accepting\\nStewart’s account that he was unconscious at the time of the\\nblood draw, the officers had no reason to believe the Fourth\\nAmendment barred the police from seeking the results of a\\nblood test that a doctor ordered for medical purposes from a\\ndriver after a collision. In these circumstances, Stewart cannot\\nestablish that the officers violated a right clearly established\\nunder the Fourth Amendment, and qualified immunity ap‐\\nplies. Id.; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615–18 (1999)\\n(holding that officers’ conduct was reasonable where they fol‐\\nlowed a common police practice and no judicial opinions at\\nthe time prohibited the conduct).\\n Because Stewart makes no argument that the City had an\\nunconstitutional policy, practice, or custom, his claim against\\nthe City for the police officers’ conduct likewise fails. See Mo‐\\nnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978).\\n IV\\n We owe a brief word in closing to the district court’s entry\\nof judgment for the defendants on Stewart’s state‐law claims.\\nWhile purporting to disagree with that ruling, Stewart does\\nnot refer us to any evidence in the summary judgment record\\ncalling the district court’s conclusions into question. He there‐\\nfore has waived any challenge to the court’s rejection of those\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 7\\n\\nclaims. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); CTL ex rel. Trebatoski\\nv. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 527 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4689,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671780,"string":"4,671,780"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Anthony Shockey"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1308"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"William Joseph Bauer\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 19-1308\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nANTHONY SHOCKEY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:15-cr-00016-RLM-MGG-1 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Anthony Shockey appeals from the\\ndistrict court’s order revoking his supervised release and\\nimposing a 15-month prison sentence. The district court found\\nthat Shockey not only used methamphetamine but also\\npossessed it, a Grade B violation of one of his supervised-\\nrelease conditions. Shockey challenges this classification.\\n\\f2 No. 19-1308\\n\\nBecause the district court reasonably could infer possession\\nfrom use, we affirm the judgment.\\n While on supervised release for possessing a firearm as a\\nfelon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Shockey tested positive for meth-\\namphetamine, which he later admitted using. Because Shockey\\nviolated the condition that he not use a controlled substance,1\\na probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervision. The\\nofficer prepared a “Summary Report of Violations” charging\\nShockey with a Grade B violation for conduct constituting an\\noffense punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.\\nSee U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).\\n At his revocation hearing, Shockey asked the district court\\nto find that he had merely used methamphetamine, rather than\\npossessed it. (Use is a less serious Grade C that does not\\nmandate revocation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)). His conduct, he\\nargued, violated the requirement of his supervised-release\\ncondition to refrain from using drugs—a violation that is not\\na felony, but instead merely a Grade C violation of “any other\\ncondition of supervision.”\\n The district court rejected Shockey’s argument. It found\\nthat the Guidelines could not be “reasonably read to make this\\na Grade C violation”; the violation had to be “either a Grade A\\nor a Grade B.” The court implicitly accepted the government’s\\nreliance on United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir.\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n Condition 3 stated: “The defendant shall not unlawfully use any controlled\\nsubstance, including marijuana, and shall submit to one drug test within 15\\ndays of the beginning of supervision and at least 2 periodic tests after that\\nfor use of a controlled substance.”\\n\\fNo. 19-1308 3\\n\\n2001), which held that marijuana use supports an inference of\\nmarijuana possession. The district court thus found that\\nShockey had both possessed and used methamphetamine—a\\nGrade B violation that corresponded to a sentencing range of\\n21 to 24 months in prison. The court sentenced him below that\\nrange to 15 months, acknowledging the need for a “significant\\nperiod of incarceration” but recognizing that Shockey had\\nstayed sober for 7 months before using methamphetamine and\\ncommitted no other crimes.\\n On appeal, Shockey maintains that the district court erred\\nin classifying his violation as Grade B without finding that he\\nviolated any law prohibiting possession of a controlled\\nsubstance that was statutorily punishable by more than a year\\nin prison. Although it would have been good practice for the\\ncourt to cite a specific statute, Shockey was entitled only to fair,\\nwritten notice of the alleged conduct underlying his Grade B\\nviolation. See United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)). Here, Shockey was\\nnotified before the hearing by the probation officer in writing\\nthat he was alleged to have violated § 35-48-4-6.1 of the Indiana\\nCode (titled “Possession of methamphetamine”), and that this\\nconstituted a Grade B violation because the offense is punish-\\nable by more than one year in prison. Moreover, in the district\\ncourt Shockey did not dispute that possession of methamphet-\\namine is punishable as such. Because the report plainly\\nidentified the statute that Shockey was alleged to have violated\\nand the district court resolved all issues of fact on the record,\\nno error occurred. See United States v. Tapia, 610 F.3d 505, 513\\n(7th Cir. 2010).\\n\\f4 No. 19-1308\\n\\n Shockey relatedly argues that his use of methamphetamine\\ndid not require a finding that he also possessed methamphet-\\namine. But he misapprehends the district court’s ruling. The\\ncourt did find that he possessed methamphetamine, which in\\nIndiana is punishable by more than a year in prison. See Ind.\\nCode §§ 35-48-4-6.1, 35-50-2-7. The district court reasonably\\ncould infer possession from use. See United States v. Barnes,\\n883 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Trotter,\\n270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001). “Inferring possession of a\\ndrug from the consumption of that drug is just as sensible as\\ninferring, from the statement ‘I ate a hamburger for lunch,’ that\\nthe person possessed the hamburger before wolfing it down.”\\nTrotter, 270 F.3d at 1153.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449033/\", \"author_raw\": \"William Joseph Bauer\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671780/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Anthony Shockey\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 19-1308\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\n\nANTHONY SHOCKEY,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\n No. 3:15-cr-00016-RLM-MGG-1 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.\n\n\n\n ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\n\n\n Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Anthony Shockey appeals from the\ndistrict court’s order revoking his supervised release and\nimposing a 15-month prison sentence. The district court found\nthat Shockey not only used methamphetamine but also\npossessed it, a Grade B violation of one of his supervised-\nrelease conditions. Shockey challenges this classification.\n\f2 No. 19-1308\n\nBecause the district court reasonably could infer possession\nfrom use, we affirm the judgment.\n While on supervised release for possessing a firearm as a\nfelon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Shockey tested positive for meth-\namphetamine, which he later admitted using. Because Shockey\nviolated the condition that he not use a controlled substance,1\na probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervision. The\nofficer prepared a “Summary Report of Violations” charging\nShockey with a Grade B violation for conduct constituting an\noffense punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.\nSee U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).\n At his revocation hearing, Shockey asked the district court\nto find that he had merely used methamphetamine, rather than\npossessed it. (Use is a less serious Grade C that does not\nmandate revocation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)). His conduct, he\nargued, violated the requirement of his supervised-release\ncondition to refrain from using drugs—a violation that is not\na felony, but instead merely a Grade C violation of “any other\ncondition of supervision.”\n The district court rejected Shockey’s argument. It found\nthat the Guidelines could not be “reasonably read to make this\na Grade C violation”; the violation had to be “either a Grade A\nor a Grade B.” The court implicitly accepted the government’s\nreliance on United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir.\n\n\n\n1\n Condition 3 stated: “The defendant shall not unlawfully use any controlled\nsubstance, including marijuana, and shall submit to one drug test within 15\ndays of the beginning of supervision and at least 2 periodic tests after that\nfor use of a controlled substance.”\n\fNo. 19-1308 3\n\n2001), which held that marijuana use supports an inference of\nmarijuana possession. The district court thus found that\nShockey had both possessed and used methamphetamine—a\nGrade B violation that corresponded to a sentencing range of\n21 to 24 months in prison. The court sentenced him below that\nrange to 15 months, acknowledging the need for a “significant\nperiod of incarceration” but recognizing that Shockey had\nstayed sober for 7 months before using methamphetamine and\ncommitted no other crimes.\n On appeal, Shockey maintains that the district court erred\nin classifying his violation as Grade B without finding that he\nviolated any law prohibiting possession of a controlled\nsubstance that was statutorily punishable by more than a year\nin prison. Although it would have been good practice for the\ncourt to cite a specific statute, Shockey was entitled only to fair,\nwritten notice of the alleged conduct underlying his Grade B\nviolation. See United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir.\n2015) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)). Here, Shockey was\nnotified before the hearing by the probation officer in writing\nthat he was alleged to have violated § 35-48-4-6.1 of the Indiana\nCode (titled “Possession of methamphetamine”), and that this\nconstituted a Grade B violation because the offense is punish-\nable by more than one year in prison. Moreover, in the district\ncourt Shockey did not dispute that possession of methamphet-\namine is punishable as such. Because the report plainly\nidentified the statute that Shockey was alleged to have violated\nand the district court resolved all issues of fact on the record,\nno error occurred. See United States v. Tapia, 610 F.3d 505, 513\n(7th Cir. 2010).\n\f4 No. 19-1308\n\n Shockey relatedly argues that his use of methamphetamine\ndid not require a finding that he also possessed methamphet-\namine. But he misapprehends the district court’s ruling. The\ncourt did find that he possessed methamphetamine, which in\nIndiana is punishable by more than a year in prison. See Ind.\nCode §§ 35-48-4-6.1, 35-50-2-7. The district court reasonably\ncould infer possession from use. See United States v. Barnes,\n883 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Trotter,\n270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001). “Inferring possession of a\ndrug from the consumption of that drug is just as sensible as\ninferring, from the statement ‘I ate a hamburger for lunch,’ that\nthe person possessed the hamburger before wolfing it down.”\nTrotter, 270 F.3d at 1153.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Anthony Shockey\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 19-1308\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nANTHONY SHOCKEY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:15-cr-00016-RLM-MGG-1 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Anthony Shockey appeals from the\\ndistrict court’s order revoking his supervised release and\\nimposing a 15-month prison sentence. The district court found\\nthat Shockey not only used methamphetamine but also\\npossessed it, a Grade B violation of one of his supervised-\\nrelease conditions. Shockey challenges this classification.\\n\\f2 No. 19-1308\\n\\nBecause the district court reasonably could infer possession\\nfrom use, we affirm the judgment.\\n While on supervised release for possessing a firearm as a\\nfelon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Shockey tested positive for meth-\\namphetamine, which he later admitted using. Because Shockey\\nviolated the condition that he not use a controlled substance,1\\na probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervision. The\\nofficer prepared a “Summary Report of Violations” charging\\nShockey with a Grade B violation for conduct constituting an\\noffense punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.\\nSee U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).\\n At his revocation hearing, Shockey asked the district court\\nto find that he had merely used methamphetamine, rather than\\npossessed it. (Use is a less serious Grade C that does not\\nmandate revocation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)). His conduct, he\\nargued, violated the requirement of his supervised-release\\ncondition to refrain from using drugs—a violation that is not\\na felony, but instead merely a Grade C violation of “any other\\ncondition of supervision.”\\n The district court rejected Shockey’s argument. It found\\nthat the Guidelines could not be “reasonably read to make this\\na Grade C violation”; the violation had to be “either a Grade A\\nor a Grade B.” The court implicitly accepted the government’s\\nreliance on United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir.\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n Condition 3 stated: “The defendant shall not unlawfully use any controlled\\nsubstance, including marijuana, and shall submit to one drug test within 15\\ndays of the beginning of supervision and at least 2 periodic tests after that\\nfor use of a controlled substance.”\\n\\fNo. 19-1308 3\\n\\n2001), which held that marijuana use supports an inference of\\nmarijuana possession. The district court thus found that\\nShockey had both possessed and used methamphetamine—a\\nGrade B violation that corresponded to a sentencing range of\\n21 to 24 months in prison. The court sentenced him below that\\nrange to 15 months, acknowledging the need for a “significant\\nperiod of incarceration” but recognizing that Shockey had\\nstayed sober for 7 months before using methamphetamine and\\ncommitted no other crimes.\\n On appeal, Shockey maintains that the district court erred\\nin classifying his violation as Grade B without finding that he\\nviolated any law prohibiting possession of a controlled\\nsubstance that was statutorily punishable by more than a year\\nin prison. Although it would have been good practice for the\\ncourt to cite a specific statute, Shockey was entitled only to fair,\\nwritten notice of the alleged conduct underlying his Grade B\\nviolation. See United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)). Here, Shockey was\\nnotified before the hearing by the probation officer in writing\\nthat he was alleged to have violated § 35-48-4-6.1 of the Indiana\\nCode (titled “Possession of methamphetamine”), and that this\\nconstituted a Grade B violation because the offense is punish-\\nable by more than one year in prison. Moreover, in the district\\ncourt Shockey did not dispute that possession of methamphet-\\namine is punishable as such. Because the report plainly\\nidentified the statute that Shockey was alleged to have violated\\nand the district court resolved all issues of fact on the record,\\nno error occurred. See United States v. Tapia, 610 F.3d 505, 513\\n(7th Cir. 2010).\\n\\f4 No. 19-1308\\n\\n Shockey relatedly argues that his use of methamphetamine\\ndid not require a finding that he also possessed methamphet-\\namine. But he misapprehends the district court’s ruling. The\\ncourt did find that he possessed methamphetamine, which in\\nIndiana is punishable by more than a year in prison. See Ind.\\nCode §§ 35-48-4-6.1, 35-50-2-7. The district court reasonably\\ncould infer possession from use. See United States v. Barnes,\\n883 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Trotter,\\n270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001). “Inferring possession of a\\ndrug from the consumption of that drug is just as sensible as\\ninferring, from the statement ‘I ate a hamburger for lunch,’ that\\nthe person possessed the hamburger before wolfing it down.”\\nTrotter, 270 F.3d at 1153.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4690,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671781,"string":"4,671,781"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1747"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19‐1747\\nTYQUAN STEWART,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nPARKVIEW HOSPITAL, et al.,\\n Defendants‐Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\\n No. 1:17‐cv‐346 — Theresa L. Springmann, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED AUGUST 29, 2019* — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Tyquan Stewart sustained serious\\ninjuries upon crashing his car while driving under the\\n\\n*We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the\\nbriefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and\\noral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P.\\n34(a)(2)(C).\\n\\f2 No. 19‐1747\\n\\ninfluence. An emergency room doctor treated Stewart and in\\ndoing so ordered a blood draw, which confirmed that he had\\nbeen drinking. The police requested and received the blood‐\\ntest results from the hospital’s medical staff. Stewart later\\nsued both officers for violating the Fourth Amendment by ob‐\\ntaining his test results without a warrant and the hospital’s\\nmedical staff for violating the Health Insurance Portability\\nand Accountability Act by disclosing the results. The district\\ncourt entered summary judgment for the defendants. We af‐\\nfirm.\\n I\\n Stewart does not remember the time he spent in the hos‐\\npital and indeed says that he was unconscious. His treating\\nphysician, however, said that upon arriving in the emergency\\nroom, Stewart relayed that he had been drinking and lost con‐\\ntrol of his car. He also signed a form consenting to treatment.\\nAs part of determining the proper course of treatment, the\\ndoctor ordered a blood draw.\\n Suspecting that alcohol contributed to the crash, the police\\nasked the medical staff for Stewart’s blood‐test results. An In‐\\ndiana statute requires medical staff who test a person’s blood\\n“for diagnostic purposes” to “disclose the results of the test to\\na law enforcement officer who requests the … results as a part\\nof a criminal investigation” regardless of whether the person\\nhas “consented to or otherwise authorized their release.” Ind.\\nCode § 9‐30‐6‐6(a) (2016). The test results showed that Stewart\\nwas intoxicated, and the nurses shared that information with\\nthe police. The officers then arrested Stewart and Indiana\\nprosecutors later charged him with the state‐law misde‐\\nmeanor of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Stewart\\npleaded guilty.\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 3\\n\\n Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Stewart sued the police officers,\\ndoctor, nurses, and their employers in federal court. He ac‐\\ncused the hospital’s medical staff of violating the Health In‐\\nsurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA, by dis‐\\nclosing medical information (his blood‐test results) to the po‐\\nlice without his consent. He also alleged that the police offic‐\\ners and their employer, the City of Fort Wayne, violated his\\nFourth Amendment rights by obtaining those results without\\na warrant. He added claims under Indiana law for negligence,\\ninfliction of emotional distress, battery, and invasion of pri‐\\nvacy. In granting the defendants’ motions for summary judg‐\\nment, the district court concluded that Stewart’s federal\\nclaims failed as a matter of law, and that he had not brought\\nforth enough evidence to allow a jury to decide any state‐law\\nclaim in his favor.\\n Stewart now appeals.\\n II\\n We begin with Stewart’s statutory claim under HIPAA.\\nThe district court concluded that the statute provides no pri‐\\nvate right of action and accordingly entered judgment for the\\nmedical defendants on that basis. We agree.\\n HIPAA prohibits the disclosure of medical records with‐\\nout the patient’s consent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1 to d–7. But\\nnowhere does the statute expressly create a private right of\\naction to enforce this substantive prohibition. So the question\\nbecomes whether Congress nonetheless intended to allow\\nprivate enforcement and the award of a private remedy.\\nSee Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017).\\n Although we have not addressed the issue in a preceden‐\\ntial decision, all other circuits to have considered the question\\n\\f4 No. 19‐1747\\n\\nhave concluded that HIPAA does not confer individual en‐\\nforcement rights—express or implied. See Acara v. Banks, 470\\nF.3d 569, 570–72 (5th Cir. 2006); Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563,\\n569 (8th Cir. 2010); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 533 (9th\\nCir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th\\nCir. 2010). Those courts have reasoned that Congress, by del‐\\negating enforcement authority to the Secretary of Health and\\nHuman Services, did not intend for HIPAA to include or cre‐\\nate a private remedy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–3, –5. Under the\\nSupreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, Congress’s\\nchoices about enforcement authority have consequences:\\n“The express provision of one method of enforcing a substan‐\\ntive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”\\n532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).\\n HIPAA’s focus on the conduct of those with access to med‐\\nical information—as opposed to the rights of individual pa‐\\ntients—also weighs against finding an implied private right\\nof action. See id. at 289. By prohibiting the disclosure of sensi‐\\ntive information, the statute imposes obligations on medical\\nprofessionals charged with protecting the information with‐\\nout conferring individual privacy rights. See Acara, 470 F.3d\\nat 571 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1, –5, –6, and employ‐\\ning similar reasoning).\\n Seeing no reason to chart a different course, we now hold\\nthat HIPAA confers no private right of action. Medical pro‐\\nfessionals, including those who treated Stewart, are bound by\\nthe statute’s disclosure prohibitions and confidentiality re‐\\nquirements. But Congress left enforcement for violations to\\nthe Department of Health and Human Services, not to private\\nplaintiffs.\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 5\\n\\n III\\n We turn next to Stewart’s Fourth Amendment claim. The\\ndistrict court entered summary judgment for the defendant\\npolice officers on the basis that they were entitled to judgment\\nas a matter of law because they obtained the blood‐test results\\nunder the Indiana statute. The defendants urge us to affirm\\non that basis or on the grounds of qualified immunity. Agree‐\\ning that the district court committed no error, we choose the\\nlatter course.\\n Police officers enjoy immunity from liability for conduct\\nthat “does not violate clearly established statutory or consti‐\\ntutional rights of which a reasonable person would have\\nknown.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting\\nWhite v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)). For the law to be\\nclearly established, it must be “beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al‐\\nKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Qualified immunity, the Su‐\\npreme Court has emphasized, “protects ‘all but the plainly in‐\\ncompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Werner\\nv. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mullenix\\nv. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).\\n Like the district court, we have identified no case law es‐\\ntablishing that an officer’s receipt of blood‐test results from\\nmedical personnel offends the Fourth Amendment. Those\\ncases that do address the question point in the other direction.\\nIn 1966 the Supreme Court recognized that the exigent‐cir‐\\ncumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment permitted\\npolice officers to order a warrantless blood draw from a con‐\\nscious driver involved in an accident. See Schmerber v. Califor‐\\nnia, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59, 766–72 (1966). Earlier this year, the\\nCourt reinforced and extended this same point, holding that,\\ndespite reductions in the time needed to obtain a warrant,\\n\\f6 No. 19‐1747\\n\\nwarrantless blood draws from unconscious drivers involved\\nin car accidents do not offend with the Fourth Amendment.\\nSee Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533–34, 2537–39\\n(2019).\\n Against the backdrop of Schmerber and Mitchell, we cannot\\nsay “beyond any debate” that the police officers’ actions here\\nwere unconstitutional. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Accepting\\nStewart’s account that he was unconscious at the time of the\\nblood draw, the officers had no reason to believe the Fourth\\nAmendment barred the police from seeking the results of a\\nblood test that a doctor ordered for medical purposes from a\\ndriver after a collision. In these circumstances, Stewart cannot\\nestablish that the officers violated a right clearly established\\nunder the Fourth Amendment, and qualified immunity ap‐\\nplies. Id.; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615–18 (1999)\\n(holding that officers’ conduct was reasonable where they fol‐\\nlowed a common police practice and no judicial opinions at\\nthe time prohibited the conduct).\\n Because Stewart makes no argument that the City had an\\nunconstitutional policy, practice, or custom, his claim against\\nthe City for the police officers’ conduct likewise fails. See Mo‐\\nnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978).\\n IV\\n We owe a brief word in closing to the district court’s entry\\nof judgment for the defendants on Stewart’s state‐law claims.\\nWhile purporting to disagree with that ruling, Stewart does\\nnot refer us to any evidence in the summary judgment record\\ncalling the district court’s conclusions into question. He there‐\\nfore has waived any challenge to the court’s rejection of those\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 7\\n\\nclaims. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); CTL ex rel. Trebatoski\\nv. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 527 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449034/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671781/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19‐1747\nTYQUAN STEWART,\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\n v.\n\nPARKVIEW HOSPITAL, et al.,\n Defendants‐Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\n No. 1:17‐cv‐346 — Theresa L. Springmann, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n SUBMITTED AUGUST 29, 2019* — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Tyquan Stewart sustained serious\ninjuries upon crashing his car while driving under the\n\n*We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the\nbriefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and\noral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P.\n34(a)(2)(C).\n\f2 No. 19‐1747\n\ninfluence. An emergency room doctor treated Stewart and in\ndoing so ordered a blood draw, which confirmed that he had\nbeen drinking. The police requested and received the blood‐\ntest results from the hospital’s medical staff. Stewart later\nsued both officers for violating the Fourth Amendment by ob‐\ntaining his test results without a warrant and the hospital’s\nmedical staff for violating the Health Insurance Portability\nand Accountability Act by disclosing the results. The district\ncourt entered summary judgment for the defendants. We af‐\nfirm.\n I\n Stewart does not remember the time he spent in the hos‐\npital and indeed says that he was unconscious. His treating\nphysician, however, said that upon arriving in the emergency\nroom, Stewart relayed that he had been drinking and lost con‐\ntrol of his car. He also signed a form consenting to treatment.\nAs part of determining the proper course of treatment, the\ndoctor ordered a blood draw.\n Suspecting that alcohol contributed to the crash, the police\nasked the medical staff for Stewart’s blood‐test results. An In‐\ndiana statute requires medical staff who test a person’s blood\n“for diagnostic purposes” to “disclose the results of the test to\na law enforcement officer who requests the … results as a part\nof a criminal investigation” regardless of whether the person\nhas “consented to or otherwise authorized their release.” Ind.\nCode § 9‐30‐6‐6(a) (2016). The test results showed that Stewart\nwas intoxicated, and the nurses shared that information with\nthe police. The officers then arrested Stewart and Indiana\nprosecutors later charged him with the state‐law misde‐\nmeanor of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Stewart\npleaded guilty.\n\fNo. 19‐1747 3\n\n Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Stewart sued the police officers,\ndoctor, nurses, and their employers in federal court. He ac‐\ncused the hospital’s medical staff of violating the Health In‐\nsurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA, by dis‐\nclosing medical information (his blood‐test results) to the po‐\nlice without his consent. He also alleged that the police offic‐\ners and their employer, the City of Fort Wayne, violated his\nFourth Amendment rights by obtaining those results without\na warrant. He added claims under Indiana law for negligence,\ninfliction of emotional distress, battery, and invasion of pri‐\nvacy. In granting the defendants’ motions for summary judg‐\nment, the district court concluded that Stewart’s federal\nclaims failed as a matter of law, and that he had not brought\nforth enough evidence to allow a jury to decide any state‐law\nclaim in his favor.\n Stewart now appeals.\n II\n We begin with Stewart’s statutory claim under HIPAA.\nThe district court concluded that the statute provides no pri‐\nvate right of action and accordingly entered judgment for the\nmedical defendants on that basis. We agree.\n HIPAA prohibits the disclosure of medical records with‐\nout the patient’s consent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1 to d–7. But\nnowhere does the statute expressly create a private right of\naction to enforce this substantive prohibition. So the question\nbecomes whether Congress nonetheless intended to allow\nprivate enforcement and the award of a private remedy.\nSee Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017).\n Although we have not addressed the issue in a preceden‐\ntial decision, all other circuits to have considered the question\n\f4 No. 19‐1747\n\nhave concluded that HIPAA does not confer individual en‐\nforcement rights—express or implied. See Acara v. Banks, 470\nF.3d 569, 570–72 (5th Cir. 2006); Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563,\n569 (8th Cir. 2010); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 533 (9th\nCir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th\nCir. 2010). Those courts have reasoned that Congress, by del‐\negating enforcement authority to the Secretary of Health and\nHuman Services, did not intend for HIPAA to include or cre‐\nate a private remedy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–3, –5. Under the\nSupreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, Congress’s\nchoices about enforcement authority have consequences:\n“The express provision of one method of enforcing a substan‐\ntive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”\n532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).\n HIPAA’s focus on the conduct of those with access to med‐\nical information—as opposed to the rights of individual pa‐\ntients—also weighs against finding an implied private right\nof action. See id. at 289. By prohibiting the disclosure of sensi‐\ntive information, the statute imposes obligations on medical\nprofessionals charged with protecting the information with‐\nout conferring individual privacy rights. See Acara, 470 F.3d\nat 571 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1, –5, –6, and employ‐\ning similar reasoning).\n Seeing no reason to chart a different course, we now hold\nthat HIPAA confers no private right of action. Medical pro‐\nfessionals, including those who treated Stewart, are bound by\nthe statute’s disclosure prohibitions and confidentiality re‐\nquirements. But Congress left enforcement for violations to\nthe Department of Health and Human Services, not to private\nplaintiffs.\n\fNo. 19‐1747 5\n\n III\n We turn next to Stewart’s Fourth Amendment claim. The\ndistrict court entered summary judgment for the defendant\npolice officers on the basis that they were entitled to judgment\nas a matter of law because they obtained the blood‐test results\nunder the Indiana statute. The defendants urge us to affirm\non that basis or on the grounds of qualified immunity. Agree‐\ning that the district court committed no error, we choose the\nlatter course.\n Police officers enjoy immunity from liability for conduct\nthat “does not violate clearly established statutory or consti‐\ntutional rights of which a reasonable person would have\nknown.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting\nWhite v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)). For the law to be\nclearly established, it must be “beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al‐\nKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Qualified immunity, the Su‐\npreme Court has emphasized, “protects ‘all but the plainly in‐\ncompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Werner\nv. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mullenix\nv. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).\n Like the district court, we have identified no case law es‐\ntablishing that an officer’s receipt of blood‐test results from\nmedical personnel offends the Fourth Amendment. Those\ncases that do address the question point in the other direction.\nIn 1966 the Supreme Court recognized that the exigent‐cir‐\ncumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment permitted\npolice officers to order a warrantless blood draw from a con‐\nscious driver involved in an accident. See Schmerber v. Califor‐\nnia, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59, 766–72 (1966). Earlier this year, the\nCourt reinforced and extended this same point, holding that,\ndespite reductions in the time needed to obtain a warrant,\n\f6 No. 19‐1747\n\nwarrantless blood draws from unconscious drivers involved\nin car accidents do not offend with the Fourth Amendment.\nSee Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533–34, 2537–39\n(2019).\n Against the backdrop of Schmerber and Mitchell, we cannot\nsay “beyond any debate” that the police officers’ actions here\nwere unconstitutional. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Accepting\nStewart’s account that he was unconscious at the time of the\nblood draw, the officers had no reason to believe the Fourth\nAmendment barred the police from seeking the results of a\nblood test that a doctor ordered for medical purposes from a\ndriver after a collision. In these circumstances, Stewart cannot\nestablish that the officers violated a right clearly established\nunder the Fourth Amendment, and qualified immunity ap‐\nplies. Id.; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615–18 (1999)\n(holding that officers’ conduct was reasonable where they fol‐\nlowed a common police practice and no judicial opinions at\nthe time prohibited the conduct).\n Because Stewart makes no argument that the City had an\nunconstitutional policy, practice, or custom, his claim against\nthe City for the police officers’ conduct likewise fails. See Mo‐\nnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978).\n IV\n We owe a brief word in closing to the district court’s entry\nof judgment for the defendants on Stewart’s state‐law claims.\nWhile purporting to disagree with that ruling, Stewart does\nnot refer us to any evidence in the summary judgment record\ncalling the district court’s conclusions into question. He there‐\nfore has waived any challenge to the court’s rejection of those\n\fNo. 19‐1747 7\n\nclaims. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); CTL ex rel. Trebatoski\nv. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 527 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014).\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19‐1747\\nTYQUAN STEWART,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nPARKVIEW HOSPITAL, et al.,\\n Defendants‐Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\\n No. 1:17‐cv‐346 — Theresa L. Springmann, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED AUGUST 29, 2019* — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Tyquan Stewart sustained serious\\ninjuries upon crashing his car while driving under the\\n\\n*We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the\\nbriefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and\\noral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P.\\n34(a)(2)(C).\\n\\f2 No. 19‐1747\\n\\ninfluence. An emergency room doctor treated Stewart and in\\ndoing so ordered a blood draw, which confirmed that he had\\nbeen drinking. The police requested and received the blood‐\\ntest results from the hospital’s medical staff. Stewart later\\nsued both officers for violating the Fourth Amendment by ob‐\\ntaining his test results without a warrant and the hospital’s\\nmedical staff for violating the Health Insurance Portability\\nand Accountability Act by disclosing the results. The district\\ncourt entered summary judgment for the defendants. We af‐\\nfirm.\\n I\\n Stewart does not remember the time he spent in the hos‐\\npital and indeed says that he was unconscious. His treating\\nphysician, however, said that upon arriving in the emergency\\nroom, Stewart relayed that he had been drinking and lost con‐\\ntrol of his car. He also signed a form consenting to treatment.\\nAs part of determining the proper course of treatment, the\\ndoctor ordered a blood draw.\\n Suspecting that alcohol contributed to the crash, the police\\nasked the medical staff for Stewart’s blood‐test results. An In‐\\ndiana statute requires medical staff who test a person’s blood\\n“for diagnostic purposes” to “disclose the results of the test to\\na law enforcement officer who requests the … results as a part\\nof a criminal investigation” regardless of whether the person\\nhas “consented to or otherwise authorized their release.” Ind.\\nCode § 9‐30‐6‐6(a) (2016). The test results showed that Stewart\\nwas intoxicated, and the nurses shared that information with\\nthe police. The officers then arrested Stewart and Indiana\\nprosecutors later charged him with the state‐law misde‐\\nmeanor of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Stewart\\npleaded guilty.\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 3\\n\\n Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Stewart sued the police officers,\\ndoctor, nurses, and their employers in federal court. He ac‐\\ncused the hospital’s medical staff of violating the Health In‐\\nsurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA, by dis‐\\nclosing medical information (his blood‐test results) to the po‐\\nlice without his consent. He also alleged that the police offic‐\\ners and their employer, the City of Fort Wayne, violated his\\nFourth Amendment rights by obtaining those results without\\na warrant. He added claims under Indiana law for negligence,\\ninfliction of emotional distress, battery, and invasion of pri‐\\nvacy. In granting the defendants’ motions for summary judg‐\\nment, the district court concluded that Stewart’s federal\\nclaims failed as a matter of law, and that he had not brought\\nforth enough evidence to allow a jury to decide any state‐law\\nclaim in his favor.\\n Stewart now appeals.\\n II\\n We begin with Stewart’s statutory claim under HIPAA.\\nThe district court concluded that the statute provides no pri‐\\nvate right of action and accordingly entered judgment for the\\nmedical defendants on that basis. We agree.\\n HIPAA prohibits the disclosure of medical records with‐\\nout the patient’s consent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1 to d–7. But\\nnowhere does the statute expressly create a private right of\\naction to enforce this substantive prohibition. So the question\\nbecomes whether Congress nonetheless intended to allow\\nprivate enforcement and the award of a private remedy.\\nSee Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017).\\n Although we have not addressed the issue in a preceden‐\\ntial decision, all other circuits to have considered the question\\n\\f4 No. 19‐1747\\n\\nhave concluded that HIPAA does not confer individual en‐\\nforcement rights—express or implied. See Acara v. Banks, 470\\nF.3d 569, 570–72 (5th Cir. 2006); Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563,\\n569 (8th Cir. 2010); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 533 (9th\\nCir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th\\nCir. 2010). Those courts have reasoned that Congress, by del‐\\negating enforcement authority to the Secretary of Health and\\nHuman Services, did not intend for HIPAA to include or cre‐\\nate a private remedy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–3, –5. Under the\\nSupreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, Congress’s\\nchoices about enforcement authority have consequences:\\n“The express provision of one method of enforcing a substan‐\\ntive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”\\n532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).\\n HIPAA’s focus on the conduct of those with access to med‐\\nical information—as opposed to the rights of individual pa‐\\ntients—also weighs against finding an implied private right\\nof action. See id. at 289. By prohibiting the disclosure of sensi‐\\ntive information, the statute imposes obligations on medical\\nprofessionals charged with protecting the information with‐\\nout conferring individual privacy rights. See Acara, 470 F.3d\\nat 571 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1, –5, –6, and employ‐\\ning similar reasoning).\\n Seeing no reason to chart a different course, we now hold\\nthat HIPAA confers no private right of action. Medical pro‐\\nfessionals, including those who treated Stewart, are bound by\\nthe statute’s disclosure prohibitions and confidentiality re‐\\nquirements. But Congress left enforcement for violations to\\nthe Department of Health and Human Services, not to private\\nplaintiffs.\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 5\\n\\n III\\n We turn next to Stewart’s Fourth Amendment claim. The\\ndistrict court entered summary judgment for the defendant\\npolice officers on the basis that they were entitled to judgment\\nas a matter of law because they obtained the blood‐test results\\nunder the Indiana statute. The defendants urge us to affirm\\non that basis or on the grounds of qualified immunity. Agree‐\\ning that the district court committed no error, we choose the\\nlatter course.\\n Police officers enjoy immunity from liability for conduct\\nthat “does not violate clearly established statutory or consti‐\\ntutional rights of which a reasonable person would have\\nknown.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting\\nWhite v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)). For the law to be\\nclearly established, it must be “beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al‐\\nKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Qualified immunity, the Su‐\\npreme Court has emphasized, “protects ‘all but the plainly in‐\\ncompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Werner\\nv. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mullenix\\nv. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).\\n Like the district court, we have identified no case law es‐\\ntablishing that an officer’s receipt of blood‐test results from\\nmedical personnel offends the Fourth Amendment. Those\\ncases that do address the question point in the other direction.\\nIn 1966 the Supreme Court recognized that the exigent‐cir‐\\ncumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment permitted\\npolice officers to order a warrantless blood draw from a con‐\\nscious driver involved in an accident. See Schmerber v. Califor‐\\nnia, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59, 766–72 (1966). Earlier this year, the\\nCourt reinforced and extended this same point, holding that,\\ndespite reductions in the time needed to obtain a warrant,\\n\\f6 No. 19‐1747\\n\\nwarrantless blood draws from unconscious drivers involved\\nin car accidents do not offend with the Fourth Amendment.\\nSee Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533–34, 2537–39\\n(2019).\\n Against the backdrop of Schmerber and Mitchell, we cannot\\nsay “beyond any debate” that the police officers’ actions here\\nwere unconstitutional. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Accepting\\nStewart’s account that he was unconscious at the time of the\\nblood draw, the officers had no reason to believe the Fourth\\nAmendment barred the police from seeking the results of a\\nblood test that a doctor ordered for medical purposes from a\\ndriver after a collision. In these circumstances, Stewart cannot\\nestablish that the officers violated a right clearly established\\nunder the Fourth Amendment, and qualified immunity ap‐\\nplies. Id.; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615–18 (1999)\\n(holding that officers’ conduct was reasonable where they fol‐\\nlowed a common police practice and no judicial opinions at\\nthe time prohibited the conduct).\\n Because Stewart makes no argument that the City had an\\nunconstitutional policy, practice, or custom, his claim against\\nthe City for the police officers’ conduct likewise fails. See Mo‐\\nnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978).\\n IV\\n We owe a brief word in closing to the district court’s entry\\nof judgment for the defendants on Stewart’s state‐law claims.\\nWhile purporting to disagree with that ruling, Stewart does\\nnot refer us to any evidence in the summary judgment record\\ncalling the district court’s conclusions into question. He there‐\\nfore has waived any challenge to the court’s rejection of those\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 7\\n\\nclaims. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); CTL ex rel. Trebatoski\\nv. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 527 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4691,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671782,"string":"4,671,782"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"James Hanson v. United States"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1149"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"William Joseph Bauer\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-1149\\n\\nJAMES B. HANSON,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:16-cv-00428-JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Following a six-year investigation into\\na methamphetamine operation, James Hanson was indicted on\\nMay 5, 2009, with conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and\\npossess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in excess\\nof 500 grams. The Government established Hanson’s three\\n\\f2 No. 18-1149\\n\\nprior drug offenses and Kentucky felony third-degree residen-\\ntial burglary conviction. On December 10, 2009, Hanson\\npleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Per the agree-\\nment, the government listed only one prior felony drug\\nconviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851, instead of all three potentially\\nqualifying convictions, and relied in part on Hanson’s prior\\nburglary conviction for a lesser recommended sentencing\\nrange under the Guidelines.\\n In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the\\nProbation Officer calculated Hanson’s total offense level as 34,\\nwith a criminal history of VI, for a Sentencing Guidelines range\\nof 262 to 327 months. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(3). After conducting\\na sentencing hearing where the district court heard from both\\nparties, the district court adopted the PSR, sentencing Hanson\\nto 262 months in prison followed by ten years of supervised\\nrelease. On appeal, Hanson challenges the district court’s\\ndenial of his collateral challenge to his sentence under 28\\nU.S.C. § 2255. We conclude that the district court did not\\ncommit any reversible errors and affirm.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Hanson argues that the district court erred when it included\\nhis third-degree burglary as a crime of violence, enhancing\\nHanson’s status to a career offender. We review the district\\ncourt’s legal conclusions de novo. Hrobowski v. United States,\\n904 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n Postconviction sentences may be changed if the sentence\\n“was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the\\nUnited States, or [if] the court was without jurisdiction to\\nimpose such sentence, or [if] the sentence was in excess of the\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 3\\n\\nmaximum authorized by law … .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “[N]ot\\nevery error is corrigible in a post-conviction proceeding, even\\nif the error is not harmless.” Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d\\n820, 823 (7th Cir. 2013). Even errors that are not harmless may\\nnot be cognizable under a § 2255 proceeding. Id.\\n We have held that “relief under § 2255 is available ‘only in\\nextraordinary situations, such as an error of constitutional or\\njurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has\\noccurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”\\nUnited States v. Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014)\\n(quoting Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878–79 (7th Cir.\\n2013)). A defendant may file a § 2255 motion within one year\\nof the latest of four dates, including the date of final judgment\\nand “the date on which the right asserted was initially recog-\\nnized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly\\nrecognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively\\napplicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(1)\\nand (3).\\n Under § 2255(f)(1), a defendant has one year from the final\\njudgment to file a § 2255 motion. This court dismissed\\nHanson’s appeal on August 25, 2010. The conviction became\\nfinal on November 23, 2010. Hanson failed to file a § 2255\\nmotion within one year. The statute of limitations to file a\\n§ 2255 motion for Hanson’s final conviction ended on Novem-\\nber 23, 2011. Therefore, Hanson’s motion under § 2255(f)(1) is\\nuntimely.\\n Alternatively, Hanson argues the Supreme Court in Mathis\\nrecognized a new right on June 23, 2016, allowing him to file a\\n§ 2255 motion by June 23, 2017. However, the Supreme Court\\n\\f4 No. 18-1149\\n\\nstated in Mathis that the rules being applied came from\\nprecedent. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). “Our\\nprecedents make this a straightforward case. For more than\\n25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of\\nACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements.” Id.\\nat 2257. Instead, the Supreme Court distinguished between\\n“elements” and “means,” where “elements” are “constituent\\nparts” of a crime and “means” are “various factual ways of\\ncommitting some component of the offense.” Id. at 2249.\\nHanson has failed to show that the Supreme Court in Mathis\\nintended to create a new rule upon which the statute of\\nlimitations may run.\\n We briefly address Hanson’s letter to the court, which\\nconfuses the Government’s argument that Mathis must be\\ndeclared retroactive “by the Supreme Court.” Rather, the\\nGovernment states in its brief: “[n]evertheless, the measuring\\nperiod begins when the Supreme Court declares a new right,\\nnot when the courts acknowledge the right to be retroactive.”\\nWe understand the Government’s position as not requiring the\\nright to be declared retroactive by the Supreme Court, but\\nrather the Supreme Court must declare a new right for the\\ncourts to apply retroactivity.\\n Hanson argues the district court misapplied the career\\noffender enhancement under the advisory Guidelines, result-\\ning in a “miscarriage of justice.” Sentencing errors that can be\\nraised on direct appeal are generally not cognizable upon\\ncollateral review. Cognizable sentencing errors include\\nsentencing decisions rendered unlawful by a clarification in the\\nlaw or sentencing decisions that exceed the statutory maxi-\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 5\\n\\nmum. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir.\\n2011) (granting relief under the pre-Booker mandatory guide-\\nlines); and see Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 412–13 (7th\\nCir. 2010) (granting relief for errors in applying the statutory\\nenhancements under the Armed Criminal Career Act).\\n The Guidelines establish a career offender as a defendant\\nwho is “at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the\\noffense of conviction; the offense of conviction must be a felony\\nthat is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance\\noffense; and the defendant must have at least two prior felony\\nconvictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\\nsubstance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A judge uses advisory\\nGuidelines to determine whether the sentencing range is\\nconsistent with the appropriate considerations. 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a). Nonetheless, “the judge may not even presume that\\na sentence within the applicable Guidelines range would be\\nproper. [The judge] must first determine whether … the\\nsentencing considerations [comply with] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),\\nand if … not [the judge] may not impose it even though it is\\nwithin the applicable guidelines range.” Hawkins v. United\\nStates, 706 F.3d at 822.\\n A change in the law revoking the status under the now-\\nadvisory Guidelines of “crime of violence” from a prior\\nconviction is not cognizable upon collateral review. Coleman,\\n763 F.3d at 708–09. Here, the government concedes that the\\nKentucky third-degree burglary statute does not inherently\\ninvolve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” of a\\n“crime of violence” as part of the career offender designation.\\nBut the district court did not rely solely, or even principally, on\\n\\f6 No. 18-1149\\n\\nthe advisory Guidelines. Instead, it referenced multiple\\nconsiderations in imposing Hanson’s sentence, including the\\nadvisory Guidelines, the lengthy PSR, the argument of the\\nparties, and factors set forth in § 3553(a).\\n While this case directly involves, and is controlled by, our\\nprecedent on § 2255, our recent decision in Chazen regarding a\\n§ 2241 motion is aptly distinguishable here. In Chazen, we\\ndiscussed the statutory enhancement of the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act, which mandated a minimum 15-year sentence\\nfor a person with three or more prior convictions for a “violent\\nfelony” or “serious drug offense.” Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d\\n851, 853 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). Chazen\\nsought relief under § 2241, claiming the district court improp-\\nerly sentenced him to the enhanced minimum under the\\nstatute due to his prior burglary convictions, which were not\\n“violent felonies.” We found that “Mathis can provide the basis\\nfor [a] § 2241 petition … under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct” because the sentence at issue mandated a minimum\\nsentence of incarceration. Chazen, 938 F.3d at 862.\\n While Mathis may provide a basis for awarding habeas\\nrelief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 from an Armed Career Criminal\\nAct sentence as in Chazen, the reasoning of Chazen does not\\nextend to providing habeas relief from an application of the\\nadvisory Guidelines. Here, the district court sentenced Hanson\\nnot with mandatory minimums, but with combined consider-\\nations from the advisory Guidelines and the appropriate\\nfactors. While the Armed Career Criminal Act requires a\\nmandatory minimum of 15 years, a judge must independently\\ndetermine the sentence based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 7\\n\\nwhether the career offender enhancement applies. Therefore,\\nChazen does not afford relief to Hanson.\\n Hanson claims the district court committed an arguable\\nerror in applying the advisory Guidelines that created a\\nmiscarriage of justice. Hawkins and Coleman are controlling\\nhere. As in Hawkins, the sentence imposed here was based on\\nadvisory Guidelines, not mandatory Guidelines or statutory\\nminimums, as in Chazen and cases prior to Booker. An error that\\nmay have occurred in calculating the Guidelines range does\\nnot constitute a “miscarriage of justice” when the “sentence is\\nwell below the ceiling imposed by Congress.” Coleman, 763\\nF.3d at 708 (citing Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824–25).\\n The difference between the Guidelines range with the\\nburglary compared to the range without the burglary is moot,\\nbecause the court could have easily relied on the additional\\ndrug offenses or other § 3553 factors. The possibility of a\\ndifferent sentence in light of the error is not enough to distin-\\nguish this case from Hawkins or Coleman. There is no reason to\\nbelieve that the district court would be inclined to revise the\\nsentence based solely on the removal of the third-degree\\nKentucky burglary charge, considering the additional drug\\noffenses. Therefore, Hanson did not suffer a “miscarriage of\\njustice” and his claim for collateral relief is denied.\\n CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hanson’s § 2255\\nmotion in favor of respondent-appellee.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449035/\", \"author_raw\": \"William Joseph Bauer\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671782/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: James Hanson v. United States\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1149\n\nJAMES B. HANSON,\n Petitioner-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Respondent-Appellee.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Illinois.\n No. 3:16-cv-00428-JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\n\n\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\n\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON,\nCircuit Judges.\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Following a six-year investigation into\na methamphetamine operation, James Hanson was indicted on\nMay 5, 2009, with conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and\npossess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in excess\nof 500 grams. The Government established Hanson’s three\n\f2 No. 18-1149\n\nprior drug offenses and Kentucky felony third-degree residen-\ntial burglary conviction. On December 10, 2009, Hanson\npleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Per the agree-\nment, the government listed only one prior felony drug\nconviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851, instead of all three potentially\nqualifying convictions, and relied in part on Hanson’s prior\nburglary conviction for a lesser recommended sentencing\nrange under the Guidelines.\n In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the\nProbation Officer calculated Hanson’s total offense level as 34,\nwith a criminal history of VI, for a Sentencing Guidelines range\nof 262 to 327 months. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(3). After conducting\na sentencing hearing where the district court heard from both\nparties, the district court adopted the PSR, sentencing Hanson\nto 262 months in prison followed by ten years of supervised\nrelease. On appeal, Hanson challenges the district court’s\ndenial of his collateral challenge to his sentence under 28\nU.S.C. § 2255. We conclude that the district court did not\ncommit any reversible errors and affirm.\n DISCUSSION\n Hanson argues that the district court erred when it included\nhis third-degree burglary as a crime of violence, enhancing\nHanson’s status to a career offender. We review the district\ncourt’s legal conclusions de novo. Hrobowski v. United States,\n904 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2018).\n Postconviction sentences may be changed if the sentence\n“was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the\nUnited States, or [if] the court was without jurisdiction to\nimpose such sentence, or [if] the sentence was in excess of the\n\fNo. 18-1149 3\n\nmaximum authorized by law … .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “[N]ot\nevery error is corrigible in a post-conviction proceeding, even\nif the error is not harmless.” Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d\n820, 823 (7th Cir. 2013). Even errors that are not harmless may\nnot be cognizable under a § 2255 proceeding. Id.\n We have held that “relief under § 2255 is available ‘only in\nextraordinary situations, such as an error of constitutional or\njurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has\noccurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”\nUnited States v. Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014)\n(quoting Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878–79 (7th Cir.\n2013)). A defendant may file a § 2255 motion within one year\nof the latest of four dates, including the date of final judgment\nand “the date on which the right asserted was initially recog-\nnized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly\nrecognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively\napplicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(1)\nand (3).\n Under § 2255(f)(1), a defendant has one year from the final\njudgment to file a § 2255 motion. This court dismissed\nHanson’s appeal on August 25, 2010. The conviction became\nfinal on November 23, 2010. Hanson failed to file a § 2255\nmotion within one year. The statute of limitations to file a\n§ 2255 motion for Hanson’s final conviction ended on Novem-\nber 23, 2011. Therefore, Hanson’s motion under § 2255(f)(1) is\nuntimely.\n Alternatively, Hanson argues the Supreme Court in Mathis\nrecognized a new right on June 23, 2016, allowing him to file a\n§ 2255 motion by June 23, 2017. However, the Supreme Court\n\f4 No. 18-1149\n\nstated in Mathis that the rules being applied came from\nprecedent. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). “Our\nprecedents make this a straightforward case. For more than\n25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of\nACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements.” Id.\nat 2257. Instead, the Supreme Court distinguished between\n“elements” and “means,” where “elements” are “constituent\nparts” of a crime and “means” are “various factual ways of\ncommitting some component of the offense.” Id. at 2249.\nHanson has failed to show that the Supreme Court in Mathis\nintended to create a new rule upon which the statute of\nlimitations may run.\n We briefly address Hanson’s letter to the court, which\nconfuses the Government’s argument that Mathis must be\ndeclared retroactive “by the Supreme Court.” Rather, the\nGovernment states in its brief: “[n]evertheless, the measuring\nperiod begins when the Supreme Court declares a new right,\nnot when the courts acknowledge the right to be retroactive.”\nWe understand the Government’s position as not requiring the\nright to be declared retroactive by the Supreme Court, but\nrather the Supreme Court must declare a new right for the\ncourts to apply retroactivity.\n Hanson argues the district court misapplied the career\noffender enhancement under the advisory Guidelines, result-\ning in a “miscarriage of justice.” Sentencing errors that can be\nraised on direct appeal are generally not cognizable upon\ncollateral review. Cognizable sentencing errors include\nsentencing decisions rendered unlawful by a clarification in the\nlaw or sentencing decisions that exceed the statutory maxi-\n\fNo. 18-1149 5\n\nmum. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir.\n2011) (granting relief under the pre-Booker mandatory guide-\nlines); and see Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 412–13 (7th\nCir. 2010) (granting relief for errors in applying the statutory\nenhancements under the Armed Criminal Career Act).\n The Guidelines establish a career offender as a defendant\nwho is “at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the\noffense of conviction; the offense of conviction must be a felony\nthat is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance\noffense; and the defendant must have at least two prior felony\nconvictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\nsubstance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A judge uses advisory\nGuidelines to determine whether the sentencing range is\nconsistent with the appropriate considerations. 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3553(a). Nonetheless, “the judge may not even presume that\na sentence within the applicable Guidelines range would be\nproper. [The judge] must first determine whether … the\nsentencing considerations [comply with] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),\nand if … not [the judge] may not impose it even though it is\nwithin the applicable guidelines range.” Hawkins v. United\nStates, 706 F.3d at 822.\n A change in the law revoking the status under the now-\nadvisory Guidelines of “crime of violence” from a prior\nconviction is not cognizable upon collateral review. Coleman,\n763 F.3d at 708–09. Here, the government concedes that the\nKentucky third-degree burglary statute does not inherently\ninvolve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” of a\n“crime of violence” as part of the career offender designation.\nBut the district court did not rely solely, or even principally, on\n\f6 No. 18-1149\n\nthe advisory Guidelines. Instead, it referenced multiple\nconsiderations in imposing Hanson’s sentence, including the\nadvisory Guidelines, the lengthy PSR, the argument of the\nparties, and factors set forth in § 3553(a).\n While this case directly involves, and is controlled by, our\nprecedent on § 2255, our recent decision in Chazen regarding a\n§ 2241 motion is aptly distinguishable here. In Chazen, we\ndiscussed the statutory enhancement of the Armed Career\nCriminal Act, which mandated a minimum 15-year sentence\nfor a person with three or more prior convictions for a “violent\nfelony” or “serious drug offense.” Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d\n851, 853 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). Chazen\nsought relief under § 2241, claiming the district court improp-\nerly sentenced him to the enhanced minimum under the\nstatute due to his prior burglary convictions, which were not\n“violent felonies.” We found that “Mathis can provide the basis\nfor [a] § 2241 petition … under the Armed Career Criminal\nAct” because the sentence at issue mandated a minimum\nsentence of incarceration. Chazen, 938 F.3d at 862.\n While Mathis may provide a basis for awarding habeas\nrelief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 from an Armed Career Criminal\nAct sentence as in Chazen, the reasoning of Chazen does not\nextend to providing habeas relief from an application of the\nadvisory Guidelines. Here, the district court sentenced Hanson\nnot with mandatory minimums, but with combined consider-\nations from the advisory Guidelines and the appropriate\nfactors. While the Armed Career Criminal Act requires a\nmandatory minimum of 15 years, a judge must independently\ndetermine the sentence based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and\n\fNo. 18-1149 7\n\nwhether the career offender enhancement applies. Therefore,\nChazen does not afford relief to Hanson.\n Hanson claims the district court committed an arguable\nerror in applying the advisory Guidelines that created a\nmiscarriage of justice. Hawkins and Coleman are controlling\nhere. As in Hawkins, the sentence imposed here was based on\nadvisory Guidelines, not mandatory Guidelines or statutory\nminimums, as in Chazen and cases prior to Booker. An error that\nmay have occurred in calculating the Guidelines range does\nnot constitute a “miscarriage of justice” when the “sentence is\nwell below the ceiling imposed by Congress.” Coleman, 763\nF.3d at 708 (citing Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824–25).\n The difference between the Guidelines range with the\nburglary compared to the range without the burglary is moot,\nbecause the court could have easily relied on the additional\ndrug offenses or other § 3553 factors. The possibility of a\ndifferent sentence in light of the error is not enough to distin-\nguish this case from Hawkins or Coleman. There is no reason to\nbelieve that the district court would be inclined to revise the\nsentence based solely on the removal of the third-degree\nKentucky burglary charge, considering the additional drug\noffenses. Therefore, Hanson did not suffer a “miscarriage of\njustice” and his claim for collateral relief is denied.\n CONCLUSION\n We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hanson’s § 2255\nmotion in favor of respondent-appellee.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: James Hanson v. United States\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-1149\\n\\nJAMES B. HANSON,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:16-cv-00428-JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Following a six-year investigation into\\na methamphetamine operation, James Hanson was indicted on\\nMay 5, 2009, with conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and\\npossess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in excess\\nof 500 grams. The Government established Hanson’s three\\n\\f2 No. 18-1149\\n\\nprior drug offenses and Kentucky felony third-degree residen-\\ntial burglary conviction. On December 10, 2009, Hanson\\npleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Per the agree-\\nment, the government listed only one prior felony drug\\nconviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851, instead of all three potentially\\nqualifying convictions, and relied in part on Hanson’s prior\\nburglary conviction for a lesser recommended sentencing\\nrange under the Guidelines.\\n In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the\\nProbation Officer calculated Hanson’s total offense level as 34,\\nwith a criminal history of VI, for a Sentencing Guidelines range\\nof 262 to 327 months. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(3). After conducting\\na sentencing hearing where the district court heard from both\\nparties, the district court adopted the PSR, sentencing Hanson\\nto 262 months in prison followed by ten years of supervised\\nrelease. On appeal, Hanson challenges the district court’s\\ndenial of his collateral challenge to his sentence under 28\\nU.S.C. § 2255. We conclude that the district court did not\\ncommit any reversible errors and affirm.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Hanson argues that the district court erred when it included\\nhis third-degree burglary as a crime of violence, enhancing\\nHanson’s status to a career offender. We review the district\\ncourt’s legal conclusions de novo. Hrobowski v. United States,\\n904 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n Postconviction sentences may be changed if the sentence\\n“was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the\\nUnited States, or [if] the court was without jurisdiction to\\nimpose such sentence, or [if] the sentence was in excess of the\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 3\\n\\nmaximum authorized by law … .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “[N]ot\\nevery error is corrigible in a post-conviction proceeding, even\\nif the error is not harmless.” Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d\\n820, 823 (7th Cir. 2013). Even errors that are not harmless may\\nnot be cognizable under a § 2255 proceeding. Id.\\n We have held that “relief under § 2255 is available ‘only in\\nextraordinary situations, such as an error of constitutional or\\njurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has\\noccurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”\\nUnited States v. Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014)\\n(quoting Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878–79 (7th Cir.\\n2013)). A defendant may file a § 2255 motion within one year\\nof the latest of four dates, including the date of final judgment\\nand “the date on which the right asserted was initially recog-\\nnized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly\\nrecognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively\\napplicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(1)\\nand (3).\\n Under § 2255(f)(1), a defendant has one year from the final\\njudgment to file a § 2255 motion. This court dismissed\\nHanson’s appeal on August 25, 2010. The conviction became\\nfinal on November 23, 2010. Hanson failed to file a § 2255\\nmotion within one year. The statute of limitations to file a\\n§ 2255 motion for Hanson’s final conviction ended on Novem-\\nber 23, 2011. Therefore, Hanson’s motion under § 2255(f)(1) is\\nuntimely.\\n Alternatively, Hanson argues the Supreme Court in Mathis\\nrecognized a new right on June 23, 2016, allowing him to file a\\n§ 2255 motion by June 23, 2017. However, the Supreme Court\\n\\f4 No. 18-1149\\n\\nstated in Mathis that the rules being applied came from\\nprecedent. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). “Our\\nprecedents make this a straightforward case. For more than\\n25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of\\nACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements.” Id.\\nat 2257. Instead, the Supreme Court distinguished between\\n“elements” and “means,” where “elements” are “constituent\\nparts” of a crime and “means” are “various factual ways of\\ncommitting some component of the offense.” Id. at 2249.\\nHanson has failed to show that the Supreme Court in Mathis\\nintended to create a new rule upon which the statute of\\nlimitations may run.\\n We briefly address Hanson’s letter to the court, which\\nconfuses the Government’s argument that Mathis must be\\ndeclared retroactive “by the Supreme Court.” Rather, the\\nGovernment states in its brief: “[n]evertheless, the measuring\\nperiod begins when the Supreme Court declares a new right,\\nnot when the courts acknowledge the right to be retroactive.”\\nWe understand the Government’s position as not requiring the\\nright to be declared retroactive by the Supreme Court, but\\nrather the Supreme Court must declare a new right for the\\ncourts to apply retroactivity.\\n Hanson argues the district court misapplied the career\\noffender enhancement under the advisory Guidelines, result-\\ning in a “miscarriage of justice.” Sentencing errors that can be\\nraised on direct appeal are generally not cognizable upon\\ncollateral review. Cognizable sentencing errors include\\nsentencing decisions rendered unlawful by a clarification in the\\nlaw or sentencing decisions that exceed the statutory maxi-\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 5\\n\\nmum. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir.\\n2011) (granting relief under the pre-Booker mandatory guide-\\nlines); and see Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 412–13 (7th\\nCir. 2010) (granting relief for errors in applying the statutory\\nenhancements under the Armed Criminal Career Act).\\n The Guidelines establish a career offender as a defendant\\nwho is “at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the\\noffense of conviction; the offense of conviction must be a felony\\nthat is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance\\noffense; and the defendant must have at least two prior felony\\nconvictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\\nsubstance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A judge uses advisory\\nGuidelines to determine whether the sentencing range is\\nconsistent with the appropriate considerations. 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a). Nonetheless, “the judge may not even presume that\\na sentence within the applicable Guidelines range would be\\nproper. [The judge] must first determine whether … the\\nsentencing considerations [comply with] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),\\nand if … not [the judge] may not impose it even though it is\\nwithin the applicable guidelines range.” Hawkins v. United\\nStates, 706 F.3d at 822.\\n A change in the law revoking the status under the now-\\nadvisory Guidelines of “crime of violence” from a prior\\nconviction is not cognizable upon collateral review. Coleman,\\n763 F.3d at 708–09. Here, the government concedes that the\\nKentucky third-degree burglary statute does not inherently\\ninvolve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” of a\\n“crime of violence” as part of the career offender designation.\\nBut the district court did not rely solely, or even principally, on\\n\\f6 No. 18-1149\\n\\nthe advisory Guidelines. Instead, it referenced multiple\\nconsiderations in imposing Hanson’s sentence, including the\\nadvisory Guidelines, the lengthy PSR, the argument of the\\nparties, and factors set forth in § 3553(a).\\n While this case directly involves, and is controlled by, our\\nprecedent on § 2255, our recent decision in Chazen regarding a\\n§ 2241 motion is aptly distinguishable here. In Chazen, we\\ndiscussed the statutory enhancement of the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act, which mandated a minimum 15-year sentence\\nfor a person with three or more prior convictions for a “violent\\nfelony” or “serious drug offense.” Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d\\n851, 853 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). Chazen\\nsought relief under § 2241, claiming the district court improp-\\nerly sentenced him to the enhanced minimum under the\\nstatute due to his prior burglary convictions, which were not\\n“violent felonies.” We found that “Mathis can provide the basis\\nfor [a] § 2241 petition … under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct” because the sentence at issue mandated a minimum\\nsentence of incarceration. Chazen, 938 F.3d at 862.\\n While Mathis may provide a basis for awarding habeas\\nrelief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 from an Armed Career Criminal\\nAct sentence as in Chazen, the reasoning of Chazen does not\\nextend to providing habeas relief from an application of the\\nadvisory Guidelines. Here, the district court sentenced Hanson\\nnot with mandatory minimums, but with combined consider-\\nations from the advisory Guidelines and the appropriate\\nfactors. While the Armed Career Criminal Act requires a\\nmandatory minimum of 15 years, a judge must independently\\ndetermine the sentence based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 7\\n\\nwhether the career offender enhancement applies. Therefore,\\nChazen does not afford relief to Hanson.\\n Hanson claims the district court committed an arguable\\nerror in applying the advisory Guidelines that created a\\nmiscarriage of justice. Hawkins and Coleman are controlling\\nhere. As in Hawkins, the sentence imposed here was based on\\nadvisory Guidelines, not mandatory Guidelines or statutory\\nminimums, as in Chazen and cases prior to Booker. An error that\\nmay have occurred in calculating the Guidelines range does\\nnot constitute a “miscarriage of justice” when the “sentence is\\nwell below the ceiling imposed by Congress.” Coleman, 763\\nF.3d at 708 (citing Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824–25).\\n The difference between the Guidelines range with the\\nburglary compared to the range without the burglary is moot,\\nbecause the court could have easily relied on the additional\\ndrug offenses or other § 3553 factors. The possibility of a\\ndifferent sentence in light of the error is not enough to distin-\\nguish this case from Hawkins or Coleman. There is no reason to\\nbelieve that the district court would be inclined to revise the\\nsentence based solely on the removal of the third-degree\\nKentucky burglary charge, considering the additional drug\\noffenses. Therefore, Hanson did not suffer a “miscarriage of\\njustice” and his claim for collateral relief is denied.\\n CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hanson’s § 2255\\nmotion in favor of respondent-appellee.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4692,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671829,"string":"4,671,829"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Anthony Shockey"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1308"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"William Joseph Bauer\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 19-1308\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nANTHONY SHOCKEY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:15-cr-00016-RLM-MGG-1 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Anthony Shockey appeals from the\\ndistrict court’s order revoking his supervised release and\\nimposing a 15-month prison sentence. The district court found\\nthat Shockey not only used methamphetamine but also\\npossessed it, a Grade B violation of one of his supervised-\\nrelease conditions. Shockey challenges this classification.\\n\\f2 No. 19-1308\\n\\nBecause the district court reasonably could infer possession\\nfrom use, we affirm the judgment.\\n While on supervised release for possessing a firearm as a\\nfelon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Shockey tested positive for meth-\\namphetamine, which he later admitted using. Because Shockey\\nviolated the condition that he not use a controlled substance,1\\na probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervision. The\\nofficer prepared a “Summary Report of Violations” charging\\nShockey with a Grade B violation for conduct constituting an\\noffense punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.\\nSee U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).\\n At his revocation hearing, Shockey asked the district court\\nto find that he had merely used methamphetamine, rather than\\npossessed it. (Use is a less serious Grade C that does not\\nmandate revocation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)). His conduct, he\\nargued, violated the requirement of his supervised-release\\ncondition to refrain from using drugs—a violation that is not\\na felony, but instead merely a Grade C violation of “any other\\ncondition of supervision.”\\n The district court rejected Shockey’s argument. It found\\nthat the Guidelines could not be “reasonably read to make this\\na Grade C violation”; the violation had to be “either a Grade A\\nor a Grade B.” The court implicitly accepted the government’s\\nreliance on United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir.\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n Condition 3 stated: “The defendant shall not unlawfully use any controlled\\nsubstance, including marijuana, and shall submit to one drug test within 15\\ndays of the beginning of supervision and at least 2 periodic tests after that\\nfor use of a controlled substance.”\\n\\fNo. 19-1308 3\\n\\n2001), which held that marijuana use supports an inference of\\nmarijuana possession. The district court thus found that\\nShockey had both possessed and used methamphetamine—a\\nGrade B violation that corresponded to a sentencing range of\\n21 to 24 months in prison. The court sentenced him below that\\nrange to 15 months, acknowledging the need for a “significant\\nperiod of incarceration” but recognizing that Shockey had\\nstayed sober for 7 months before using methamphetamine and\\ncommitted no other crimes.\\n On appeal, Shockey maintains that the district court erred\\nin classifying his violation as Grade B without finding that he\\nviolated any law prohibiting possession of a controlled\\nsubstance that was statutorily punishable by more than a year\\nin prison. Although it would have been good practice for the\\ncourt to cite a specific statute, Shockey was entitled only to fair,\\nwritten notice of the alleged conduct underlying his Grade B\\nviolation. See United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)). Here, Shockey was\\nnotified before the hearing by the probation officer in writing\\nthat he was alleged to have violated § 35-48-4-6.1 of the Indiana\\nCode (titled “Possession of methamphetamine”), and that this\\nconstituted a Grade B violation because the offense is punish-\\nable by more than one year in prison. Moreover, in the district\\ncourt Shockey did not dispute that possession of methamphet-\\namine is punishable as such. Because the report plainly\\nidentified the statute that Shockey was alleged to have violated\\nand the district court resolved all issues of fact on the record,\\nno error occurred. See United States v. Tapia, 610 F.3d 505, 513\\n(7th Cir. 2010).\\n\\f4 No. 19-1308\\n\\n Shockey relatedly argues that his use of methamphetamine\\ndid not require a finding that he also possessed methamphet-\\namine. But he misapprehends the district court’s ruling. The\\ncourt did find that he possessed methamphetamine, which in\\nIndiana is punishable by more than a year in prison. See Ind.\\nCode §§ 35-48-4-6.1, 35-50-2-7. The district court reasonably\\ncould infer possession from use. See United States v. Barnes,\\n883 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Trotter,\\n270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001). “Inferring possession of a\\ndrug from the consumption of that drug is just as sensible as\\ninferring, from the statement ‘I ate a hamburger for lunch,’ that\\nthe person possessed the hamburger before wolfing it down.”\\nTrotter, 270 F.3d at 1153.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449082/\", \"author_raw\": \"William Joseph Bauer\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671829/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Anthony Shockey\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 19-1308\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\n\nANTHONY SHOCKEY,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\n No. 3:15-cr-00016-RLM-MGG-1 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.\n\n\n\n ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\n\n\n Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Anthony Shockey appeals from the\ndistrict court’s order revoking his supervised release and\nimposing a 15-month prison sentence. The district court found\nthat Shockey not only used methamphetamine but also\npossessed it, a Grade B violation of one of his supervised-\nrelease conditions. Shockey challenges this classification.\n\f2 No. 19-1308\n\nBecause the district court reasonably could infer possession\nfrom use, we affirm the judgment.\n While on supervised release for possessing a firearm as a\nfelon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Shockey tested positive for meth-\namphetamine, which he later admitted using. Because Shockey\nviolated the condition that he not use a controlled substance,1\na probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervision. The\nofficer prepared a “Summary Report of Violations” charging\nShockey with a Grade B violation for conduct constituting an\noffense punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.\nSee U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).\n At his revocation hearing, Shockey asked the district court\nto find that he had merely used methamphetamine, rather than\npossessed it. (Use is a less serious Grade C that does not\nmandate revocation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)). His conduct, he\nargued, violated the requirement of his supervised-release\ncondition to refrain from using drugs—a violation that is not\na felony, but instead merely a Grade C violation of “any other\ncondition of supervision.”\n The district court rejected Shockey’s argument. It found\nthat the Guidelines could not be “reasonably read to make this\na Grade C violation”; the violation had to be “either a Grade A\nor a Grade B.” The court implicitly accepted the government’s\nreliance on United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir.\n\n\n\n1\n Condition 3 stated: “The defendant shall not unlawfully use any controlled\nsubstance, including marijuana, and shall submit to one drug test within 15\ndays of the beginning of supervision and at least 2 periodic tests after that\nfor use of a controlled substance.”\n\fNo. 19-1308 3\n\n2001), which held that marijuana use supports an inference of\nmarijuana possession. The district court thus found that\nShockey had both possessed and used methamphetamine—a\nGrade B violation that corresponded to a sentencing range of\n21 to 24 months in prison. The court sentenced him below that\nrange to 15 months, acknowledging the need for a “significant\nperiod of incarceration” but recognizing that Shockey had\nstayed sober for 7 months before using methamphetamine and\ncommitted no other crimes.\n On appeal, Shockey maintains that the district court erred\nin classifying his violation as Grade B without finding that he\nviolated any law prohibiting possession of a controlled\nsubstance that was statutorily punishable by more than a year\nin prison. Although it would have been good practice for the\ncourt to cite a specific statute, Shockey was entitled only to fair,\nwritten notice of the alleged conduct underlying his Grade B\nviolation. See United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir.\n2015) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)). Here, Shockey was\nnotified before the hearing by the probation officer in writing\nthat he was alleged to have violated § 35-48-4-6.1 of the Indiana\nCode (titled “Possession of methamphetamine”), and that this\nconstituted a Grade B violation because the offense is punish-\nable by more than one year in prison. Moreover, in the district\ncourt Shockey did not dispute that possession of methamphet-\namine is punishable as such. Because the report plainly\nidentified the statute that Shockey was alleged to have violated\nand the district court resolved all issues of fact on the record,\nno error occurred. See United States v. Tapia, 610 F.3d 505, 513\n(7th Cir. 2010).\n\f4 No. 19-1308\n\n Shockey relatedly argues that his use of methamphetamine\ndid not require a finding that he also possessed methamphet-\namine. But he misapprehends the district court’s ruling. The\ncourt did find that he possessed methamphetamine, which in\nIndiana is punishable by more than a year in prison. See Ind.\nCode §§ 35-48-4-6.1, 35-50-2-7. The district court reasonably\ncould infer possession from use. See United States v. Barnes,\n883 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Trotter,\n270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001). “Inferring possession of a\ndrug from the consumption of that drug is just as sensible as\ninferring, from the statement ‘I ate a hamburger for lunch,’ that\nthe person possessed the hamburger before wolfing it down.”\nTrotter, 270 F.3d at 1153.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Anthony Shockey\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 19-1308\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nANTHONY SHOCKEY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:15-cr-00016-RLM-MGG-1 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Anthony Shockey appeals from the\\ndistrict court’s order revoking his supervised release and\\nimposing a 15-month prison sentence. The district court found\\nthat Shockey not only used methamphetamine but also\\npossessed it, a Grade B violation of one of his supervised-\\nrelease conditions. Shockey challenges this classification.\\n\\f2 No. 19-1308\\n\\nBecause the district court reasonably could infer possession\\nfrom use, we affirm the judgment.\\n While on supervised release for possessing a firearm as a\\nfelon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Shockey tested positive for meth-\\namphetamine, which he later admitted using. Because Shockey\\nviolated the condition that he not use a controlled substance,1\\na probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervision. The\\nofficer prepared a “Summary Report of Violations” charging\\nShockey with a Grade B violation for conduct constituting an\\noffense punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.\\nSee U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).\\n At his revocation hearing, Shockey asked the district court\\nto find that he had merely used methamphetamine, rather than\\npossessed it. (Use is a less serious Grade C that does not\\nmandate revocation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1)). His conduct, he\\nargued, violated the requirement of his supervised-release\\ncondition to refrain from using drugs—a violation that is not\\na felony, but instead merely a Grade C violation of “any other\\ncondition of supervision.”\\n The district court rejected Shockey’s argument. It found\\nthat the Guidelines could not be “reasonably read to make this\\na Grade C violation”; the violation had to be “either a Grade A\\nor a Grade B.” The court implicitly accepted the government’s\\nreliance on United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir.\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n Condition 3 stated: “The defendant shall not unlawfully use any controlled\\nsubstance, including marijuana, and shall submit to one drug test within 15\\ndays of the beginning of supervision and at least 2 periodic tests after that\\nfor use of a controlled substance.”\\n\\fNo. 19-1308 3\\n\\n2001), which held that marijuana use supports an inference of\\nmarijuana possession. The district court thus found that\\nShockey had both possessed and used methamphetamine—a\\nGrade B violation that corresponded to a sentencing range of\\n21 to 24 months in prison. The court sentenced him below that\\nrange to 15 months, acknowledging the need for a “significant\\nperiod of incarceration” but recognizing that Shockey had\\nstayed sober for 7 months before using methamphetamine and\\ncommitted no other crimes.\\n On appeal, Shockey maintains that the district court erred\\nin classifying his violation as Grade B without finding that he\\nviolated any law prohibiting possession of a controlled\\nsubstance that was statutorily punishable by more than a year\\nin prison. Although it would have been good practice for the\\ncourt to cite a specific statute, Shockey was entitled only to fair,\\nwritten notice of the alleged conduct underlying his Grade B\\nviolation. See United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)). Here, Shockey was\\nnotified before the hearing by the probation officer in writing\\nthat he was alleged to have violated § 35-48-4-6.1 of the Indiana\\nCode (titled “Possession of methamphetamine”), and that this\\nconstituted a Grade B violation because the offense is punish-\\nable by more than one year in prison. Moreover, in the district\\ncourt Shockey did not dispute that possession of methamphet-\\namine is punishable as such. Because the report plainly\\nidentified the statute that Shockey was alleged to have violated\\nand the district court resolved all issues of fact on the record,\\nno error occurred. See United States v. Tapia, 610 F.3d 505, 513\\n(7th Cir. 2010).\\n\\f4 No. 19-1308\\n\\n Shockey relatedly argues that his use of methamphetamine\\ndid not require a finding that he also possessed methamphet-\\namine. But he misapprehends the district court’s ruling. The\\ncourt did find that he possessed methamphetamine, which in\\nIndiana is punishable by more than a year in prison. See Ind.\\nCode §§ 35-48-4-6.1, 35-50-2-7. The district court reasonably\\ncould infer possession from use. See United States v. Barnes,\\n883 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Trotter,\\n270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001). “Inferring possession of a\\ndrug from the consumption of that drug is just as sensible as\\ninferring, from the statement ‘I ate a hamburger for lunch,’ that\\nthe person possessed the hamburger before wolfing it down.”\\nTrotter, 270 F.3d at 1153.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4693,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671830,"string":"4,671,830"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1747"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19‐1747\\nTYQUAN STEWART,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nPARKVIEW HOSPITAL, et al.,\\n Defendants‐Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\\n No. 1:17‐cv‐346 — Theresa L. Springmann, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED AUGUST 29, 2019* — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Tyquan Stewart sustained serious\\ninjuries upon crashing his car while driving under the\\n\\n*We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the\\nbriefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and\\noral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P.\\n34(a)(2)(C).\\n\\f2 No. 19‐1747\\n\\ninfluence. An emergency room doctor treated Stewart and in\\ndoing so ordered a blood draw, which confirmed that he had\\nbeen drinking. The police requested and received the blood‐\\ntest results from the hospital’s medical staff. Stewart later\\nsued both officers for violating the Fourth Amendment by ob‐\\ntaining his test results without a warrant and the hospital’s\\nmedical staff for violating the Health Insurance Portability\\nand Accountability Act by disclosing the results. The district\\ncourt entered summary judgment for the defendants. We af‐\\nfirm.\\n I\\n Stewart does not remember the time he spent in the hos‐\\npital and indeed says that he was unconscious. His treating\\nphysician, however, said that upon arriving in the emergency\\nroom, Stewart relayed that he had been drinking and lost con‐\\ntrol of his car. He also signed a form consenting to treatment.\\nAs part of determining the proper course of treatment, the\\ndoctor ordered a blood draw.\\n Suspecting that alcohol contributed to the crash, the police\\nasked the medical staff for Stewart’s blood‐test results. An In‐\\ndiana statute requires medical staff who test a person’s blood\\n“for diagnostic purposes” to “disclose the results of the test to\\na law enforcement officer who requests the … results as a part\\nof a criminal investigation” regardless of whether the person\\nhas “consented to or otherwise authorized their release.” Ind.\\nCode § 9‐30‐6‐6(a) (2016). The test results showed that Stewart\\nwas intoxicated, and the nurses shared that information with\\nthe police. The officers then arrested Stewart and Indiana\\nprosecutors later charged him with the state‐law misde‐\\nmeanor of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Stewart\\npleaded guilty.\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 3\\n\\n Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Stewart sued the police officers,\\ndoctor, nurses, and their employers in federal court. He ac‐\\ncused the hospital’s medical staff of violating the Health In‐\\nsurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA, by dis‐\\nclosing medical information (his blood‐test results) to the po‐\\nlice without his consent. He also alleged that the police offic‐\\ners and their employer, the City of Fort Wayne, violated his\\nFourth Amendment rights by obtaining those results without\\na warrant. He added claims under Indiana law for negligence,\\ninfliction of emotional distress, battery, and invasion of pri‐\\nvacy. In granting the defendants’ motions for summary judg‐\\nment, the district court concluded that Stewart’s federal\\nclaims failed as a matter of law, and that he had not brought\\nforth enough evidence to allow a jury to decide any state‐law\\nclaim in his favor.\\n Stewart now appeals.\\n II\\n We begin with Stewart’s statutory claim under HIPAA.\\nThe district court concluded that the statute provides no pri‐\\nvate right of action and accordingly entered judgment for the\\nmedical defendants on that basis. We agree.\\n HIPAA prohibits the disclosure of medical records with‐\\nout the patient’s consent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1 to d–7. But\\nnowhere does the statute expressly create a private right of\\naction to enforce this substantive prohibition. So the question\\nbecomes whether Congress nonetheless intended to allow\\nprivate enforcement and the award of a private remedy.\\nSee Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017).\\n Although we have not addressed the issue in a preceden‐\\ntial decision, all other circuits to have considered the question\\n\\f4 No. 19‐1747\\n\\nhave concluded that HIPAA does not confer individual en‐\\nforcement rights—express or implied. See Acara v. Banks, 470\\nF.3d 569, 570–72 (5th Cir. 2006); Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563,\\n569 (8th Cir. 2010); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 533 (9th\\nCir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th\\nCir. 2010). Those courts have reasoned that Congress, by del‐\\negating enforcement authority to the Secretary of Health and\\nHuman Services, did not intend for HIPAA to include or cre‐\\nate a private remedy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–3, –5. Under the\\nSupreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, Congress’s\\nchoices about enforcement authority have consequences:\\n“The express provision of one method of enforcing a substan‐\\ntive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”\\n532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).\\n HIPAA’s focus on the conduct of those with access to med‐\\nical information—as opposed to the rights of individual pa‐\\ntients—also weighs against finding an implied private right\\nof action. See id. at 289. By prohibiting the disclosure of sensi‐\\ntive information, the statute imposes obligations on medical\\nprofessionals charged with protecting the information with‐\\nout conferring individual privacy rights. See Acara, 470 F.3d\\nat 571 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1, –5, –6, and employ‐\\ning similar reasoning).\\n Seeing no reason to chart a different course, we now hold\\nthat HIPAA confers no private right of action. Medical pro‐\\nfessionals, including those who treated Stewart, are bound by\\nthe statute’s disclosure prohibitions and confidentiality re‐\\nquirements. But Congress left enforcement for violations to\\nthe Department of Health and Human Services, not to private\\nplaintiffs.\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 5\\n\\n III\\n We turn next to Stewart’s Fourth Amendment claim. The\\ndistrict court entered summary judgment for the defendant\\npolice officers on the basis that they were entitled to judgment\\nas a matter of law because they obtained the blood‐test results\\nunder the Indiana statute. The defendants urge us to affirm\\non that basis or on the grounds of qualified immunity. Agree‐\\ning that the district court committed no error, we choose the\\nlatter course.\\n Police officers enjoy immunity from liability for conduct\\nthat “does not violate clearly established statutory or consti‐\\ntutional rights of which a reasonable person would have\\nknown.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting\\nWhite v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)). For the law to be\\nclearly established, it must be “beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al‐\\nKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Qualified immunity, the Su‐\\npreme Court has emphasized, “protects ‘all but the plainly in‐\\ncompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Werner\\nv. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mullenix\\nv. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).\\n Like the district court, we have identified no case law es‐\\ntablishing that an officer’s receipt of blood‐test results from\\nmedical personnel offends the Fourth Amendment. Those\\ncases that do address the question point in the other direction.\\nIn 1966 the Supreme Court recognized that the exigent‐cir‐\\ncumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment permitted\\npolice officers to order a warrantless blood draw from a con‐\\nscious driver involved in an accident. See Schmerber v. Califor‐\\nnia, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59, 766–72 (1966). Earlier this year, the\\nCourt reinforced and extended this same point, holding that,\\ndespite reductions in the time needed to obtain a warrant,\\n\\f6 No. 19‐1747\\n\\nwarrantless blood draws from unconscious drivers involved\\nin car accidents do not offend with the Fourth Amendment.\\nSee Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533–34, 2537–39\\n(2019).\\n Against the backdrop of Schmerber and Mitchell, we cannot\\nsay “beyond any debate” that the police officers’ actions here\\nwere unconstitutional. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Accepting\\nStewart’s account that he was unconscious at the time of the\\nblood draw, the officers had no reason to believe the Fourth\\nAmendment barred the police from seeking the results of a\\nblood test that a doctor ordered for medical purposes from a\\ndriver after a collision. In these circumstances, Stewart cannot\\nestablish that the officers violated a right clearly established\\nunder the Fourth Amendment, and qualified immunity ap‐\\nplies. Id.; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615–18 (1999)\\n(holding that officers’ conduct was reasonable where they fol‐\\nlowed a common police practice and no judicial opinions at\\nthe time prohibited the conduct).\\n Because Stewart makes no argument that the City had an\\nunconstitutional policy, practice, or custom, his claim against\\nthe City for the police officers’ conduct likewise fails. See Mo‐\\nnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978).\\n IV\\n We owe a brief word in closing to the district court’s entry\\nof judgment for the defendants on Stewart’s state‐law claims.\\nWhile purporting to disagree with that ruling, Stewart does\\nnot refer us to any evidence in the summary judgment record\\ncalling the district court’s conclusions into question. He there‐\\nfore has waived any challenge to the court’s rejection of those\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 7\\n\\nclaims. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); CTL ex rel. Trebatoski\\nv. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 527 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449083/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671830/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19‐1747\nTYQUAN STEWART,\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\n v.\n\nPARKVIEW HOSPITAL, et al.,\n Defendants‐Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\n No. 1:17‐cv‐346 — Theresa L. Springmann, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n SUBMITTED AUGUST 29, 2019* — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Tyquan Stewart sustained serious\ninjuries upon crashing his car while driving under the\n\n*We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the\nbriefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and\noral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P.\n34(a)(2)(C).\n\f2 No. 19‐1747\n\ninfluence. An emergency room doctor treated Stewart and in\ndoing so ordered a blood draw, which confirmed that he had\nbeen drinking. The police requested and received the blood‐\ntest results from the hospital’s medical staff. Stewart later\nsued both officers for violating the Fourth Amendment by ob‐\ntaining his test results without a warrant and the hospital’s\nmedical staff for violating the Health Insurance Portability\nand Accountability Act by disclosing the results. The district\ncourt entered summary judgment for the defendants. We af‐\nfirm.\n I\n Stewart does not remember the time he spent in the hos‐\npital and indeed says that he was unconscious. His treating\nphysician, however, said that upon arriving in the emergency\nroom, Stewart relayed that he had been drinking and lost con‐\ntrol of his car. He also signed a form consenting to treatment.\nAs part of determining the proper course of treatment, the\ndoctor ordered a blood draw.\n Suspecting that alcohol contributed to the crash, the police\nasked the medical staff for Stewart’s blood‐test results. An In‐\ndiana statute requires medical staff who test a person’s blood\n“for diagnostic purposes” to “disclose the results of the test to\na law enforcement officer who requests the … results as a part\nof a criminal investigation” regardless of whether the person\nhas “consented to or otherwise authorized their release.” Ind.\nCode § 9‐30‐6‐6(a) (2016). The test results showed that Stewart\nwas intoxicated, and the nurses shared that information with\nthe police. The officers then arrested Stewart and Indiana\nprosecutors later charged him with the state‐law misde‐\nmeanor of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Stewart\npleaded guilty.\n\fNo. 19‐1747 3\n\n Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Stewart sued the police officers,\ndoctor, nurses, and their employers in federal court. He ac‐\ncused the hospital’s medical staff of violating the Health In‐\nsurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA, by dis‐\nclosing medical information (his blood‐test results) to the po‐\nlice without his consent. He also alleged that the police offic‐\ners and their employer, the City of Fort Wayne, violated his\nFourth Amendment rights by obtaining those results without\na warrant. He added claims under Indiana law for negligence,\ninfliction of emotional distress, battery, and invasion of pri‐\nvacy. In granting the defendants’ motions for summary judg‐\nment, the district court concluded that Stewart’s federal\nclaims failed as a matter of law, and that he had not brought\nforth enough evidence to allow a jury to decide any state‐law\nclaim in his favor.\n Stewart now appeals.\n II\n We begin with Stewart’s statutory claim under HIPAA.\nThe district court concluded that the statute provides no pri‐\nvate right of action and accordingly entered judgment for the\nmedical defendants on that basis. We agree.\n HIPAA prohibits the disclosure of medical records with‐\nout the patient’s consent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1 to d–7. But\nnowhere does the statute expressly create a private right of\naction to enforce this substantive prohibition. So the question\nbecomes whether Congress nonetheless intended to allow\nprivate enforcement and the award of a private remedy.\nSee Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017).\n Although we have not addressed the issue in a preceden‐\ntial decision, all other circuits to have considered the question\n\f4 No. 19‐1747\n\nhave concluded that HIPAA does not confer individual en‐\nforcement rights—express or implied. See Acara v. Banks, 470\nF.3d 569, 570–72 (5th Cir. 2006); Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563,\n569 (8th Cir. 2010); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 533 (9th\nCir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th\nCir. 2010). Those courts have reasoned that Congress, by del‐\negating enforcement authority to the Secretary of Health and\nHuman Services, did not intend for HIPAA to include or cre‐\nate a private remedy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–3, –5. Under the\nSupreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, Congress’s\nchoices about enforcement authority have consequences:\n“The express provision of one method of enforcing a substan‐\ntive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”\n532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).\n HIPAA’s focus on the conduct of those with access to med‐\nical information—as opposed to the rights of individual pa‐\ntients—also weighs against finding an implied private right\nof action. See id. at 289. By prohibiting the disclosure of sensi‐\ntive information, the statute imposes obligations on medical\nprofessionals charged with protecting the information with‐\nout conferring individual privacy rights. See Acara, 470 F.3d\nat 571 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1, –5, –6, and employ‐\ning similar reasoning).\n Seeing no reason to chart a different course, we now hold\nthat HIPAA confers no private right of action. Medical pro‐\nfessionals, including those who treated Stewart, are bound by\nthe statute’s disclosure prohibitions and confidentiality re‐\nquirements. But Congress left enforcement for violations to\nthe Department of Health and Human Services, not to private\nplaintiffs.\n\fNo. 19‐1747 5\n\n III\n We turn next to Stewart’s Fourth Amendment claim. The\ndistrict court entered summary judgment for the defendant\npolice officers on the basis that they were entitled to judgment\nas a matter of law because they obtained the blood‐test results\nunder the Indiana statute. The defendants urge us to affirm\non that basis or on the grounds of qualified immunity. Agree‐\ning that the district court committed no error, we choose the\nlatter course.\n Police officers enjoy immunity from liability for conduct\nthat “does not violate clearly established statutory or consti‐\ntutional rights of which a reasonable person would have\nknown.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting\nWhite v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)). For the law to be\nclearly established, it must be “beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al‐\nKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Qualified immunity, the Su‐\npreme Court has emphasized, “protects ‘all but the plainly in‐\ncompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Werner\nv. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mullenix\nv. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).\n Like the district court, we have identified no case law es‐\ntablishing that an officer’s receipt of blood‐test results from\nmedical personnel offends the Fourth Amendment. Those\ncases that do address the question point in the other direction.\nIn 1966 the Supreme Court recognized that the exigent‐cir‐\ncumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment permitted\npolice officers to order a warrantless blood draw from a con‐\nscious driver involved in an accident. See Schmerber v. Califor‐\nnia, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59, 766–72 (1966). Earlier this year, the\nCourt reinforced and extended this same point, holding that,\ndespite reductions in the time needed to obtain a warrant,\n\f6 No. 19‐1747\n\nwarrantless blood draws from unconscious drivers involved\nin car accidents do not offend with the Fourth Amendment.\nSee Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533–34, 2537–39\n(2019).\n Against the backdrop of Schmerber and Mitchell, we cannot\nsay “beyond any debate” that the police officers’ actions here\nwere unconstitutional. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Accepting\nStewart’s account that he was unconscious at the time of the\nblood draw, the officers had no reason to believe the Fourth\nAmendment barred the police from seeking the results of a\nblood test that a doctor ordered for medical purposes from a\ndriver after a collision. In these circumstances, Stewart cannot\nestablish that the officers violated a right clearly established\nunder the Fourth Amendment, and qualified immunity ap‐\nplies. Id.; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615–18 (1999)\n(holding that officers’ conduct was reasonable where they fol‐\nlowed a common police practice and no judicial opinions at\nthe time prohibited the conduct).\n Because Stewart makes no argument that the City had an\nunconstitutional policy, practice, or custom, his claim against\nthe City for the police officers’ conduct likewise fails. See Mo‐\nnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978).\n IV\n We owe a brief word in closing to the district court’s entry\nof judgment for the defendants on Stewart’s state‐law claims.\nWhile purporting to disagree with that ruling, Stewart does\nnot refer us to any evidence in the summary judgment record\ncalling the district court’s conclusions into question. He there‐\nfore has waived any challenge to the court’s rejection of those\n\fNo. 19‐1747 7\n\nclaims. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); CTL ex rel. Trebatoski\nv. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 527 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014).\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19‐1747\\nTYQUAN STEWART,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nPARKVIEW HOSPITAL, et al.,\\n Defendants‐Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\\n No. 1:17‐cv‐346 — Theresa L. Springmann, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED AUGUST 29, 2019* — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Tyquan Stewart sustained serious\\ninjuries upon crashing his car while driving under the\\n\\n*We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the\\nbriefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and\\noral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P.\\n34(a)(2)(C).\\n\\f2 No. 19‐1747\\n\\ninfluence. An emergency room doctor treated Stewart and in\\ndoing so ordered a blood draw, which confirmed that he had\\nbeen drinking. The police requested and received the blood‐\\ntest results from the hospital’s medical staff. Stewart later\\nsued both officers for violating the Fourth Amendment by ob‐\\ntaining his test results without a warrant and the hospital’s\\nmedical staff for violating the Health Insurance Portability\\nand Accountability Act by disclosing the results. The district\\ncourt entered summary judgment for the defendants. We af‐\\nfirm.\\n I\\n Stewart does not remember the time he spent in the hos‐\\npital and indeed says that he was unconscious. His treating\\nphysician, however, said that upon arriving in the emergency\\nroom, Stewart relayed that he had been drinking and lost con‐\\ntrol of his car. He also signed a form consenting to treatment.\\nAs part of determining the proper course of treatment, the\\ndoctor ordered a blood draw.\\n Suspecting that alcohol contributed to the crash, the police\\nasked the medical staff for Stewart’s blood‐test results. An In‐\\ndiana statute requires medical staff who test a person’s blood\\n“for diagnostic purposes” to “disclose the results of the test to\\na law enforcement officer who requests the … results as a part\\nof a criminal investigation” regardless of whether the person\\nhas “consented to or otherwise authorized their release.” Ind.\\nCode § 9‐30‐6‐6(a) (2016). The test results showed that Stewart\\nwas intoxicated, and the nurses shared that information with\\nthe police. The officers then arrested Stewart and Indiana\\nprosecutors later charged him with the state‐law misde‐\\nmeanor of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Stewart\\npleaded guilty.\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 3\\n\\n Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Stewart sued the police officers,\\ndoctor, nurses, and their employers in federal court. He ac‐\\ncused the hospital’s medical staff of violating the Health In‐\\nsurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA, by dis‐\\nclosing medical information (his blood‐test results) to the po‐\\nlice without his consent. He also alleged that the police offic‐\\ners and their employer, the City of Fort Wayne, violated his\\nFourth Amendment rights by obtaining those results without\\na warrant. He added claims under Indiana law for negligence,\\ninfliction of emotional distress, battery, and invasion of pri‐\\nvacy. In granting the defendants’ motions for summary judg‐\\nment, the district court concluded that Stewart’s federal\\nclaims failed as a matter of law, and that he had not brought\\nforth enough evidence to allow a jury to decide any state‐law\\nclaim in his favor.\\n Stewart now appeals.\\n II\\n We begin with Stewart’s statutory claim under HIPAA.\\nThe district court concluded that the statute provides no pri‐\\nvate right of action and accordingly entered judgment for the\\nmedical defendants on that basis. We agree.\\n HIPAA prohibits the disclosure of medical records with‐\\nout the patient’s consent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1 to d–7. But\\nnowhere does the statute expressly create a private right of\\naction to enforce this substantive prohibition. So the question\\nbecomes whether Congress nonetheless intended to allow\\nprivate enforcement and the award of a private remedy.\\nSee Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017).\\n Although we have not addressed the issue in a preceden‐\\ntial decision, all other circuits to have considered the question\\n\\f4 No. 19‐1747\\n\\nhave concluded that HIPAA does not confer individual en‐\\nforcement rights—express or implied. See Acara v. Banks, 470\\nF.3d 569, 570–72 (5th Cir. 2006); Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563,\\n569 (8th Cir. 2010); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 533 (9th\\nCir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th\\nCir. 2010). Those courts have reasoned that Congress, by del‐\\negating enforcement authority to the Secretary of Health and\\nHuman Services, did not intend for HIPAA to include or cre‐\\nate a private remedy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–3, –5. Under the\\nSupreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, Congress’s\\nchoices about enforcement authority have consequences:\\n“The express provision of one method of enforcing a substan‐\\ntive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”\\n532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).\\n HIPAA’s focus on the conduct of those with access to med‐\\nical information—as opposed to the rights of individual pa‐\\ntients—also weighs against finding an implied private right\\nof action. See id. at 289. By prohibiting the disclosure of sensi‐\\ntive information, the statute imposes obligations on medical\\nprofessionals charged with protecting the information with‐\\nout conferring individual privacy rights. See Acara, 470 F.3d\\nat 571 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1, –5, –6, and employ‐\\ning similar reasoning).\\n Seeing no reason to chart a different course, we now hold\\nthat HIPAA confers no private right of action. Medical pro‐\\nfessionals, including those who treated Stewart, are bound by\\nthe statute’s disclosure prohibitions and confidentiality re‐\\nquirements. But Congress left enforcement for violations to\\nthe Department of Health and Human Services, not to private\\nplaintiffs.\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 5\\n\\n III\\n We turn next to Stewart’s Fourth Amendment claim. The\\ndistrict court entered summary judgment for the defendant\\npolice officers on the basis that they were entitled to judgment\\nas a matter of law because they obtained the blood‐test results\\nunder the Indiana statute. The defendants urge us to affirm\\non that basis or on the grounds of qualified immunity. Agree‐\\ning that the district court committed no error, we choose the\\nlatter course.\\n Police officers enjoy immunity from liability for conduct\\nthat “does not violate clearly established statutory or consti‐\\ntutional rights of which a reasonable person would have\\nknown.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting\\nWhite v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)). For the law to be\\nclearly established, it must be “beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al‐\\nKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Qualified immunity, the Su‐\\npreme Court has emphasized, “protects ‘all but the plainly in‐\\ncompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Werner\\nv. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mullenix\\nv. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).\\n Like the district court, we have identified no case law es‐\\ntablishing that an officer’s receipt of blood‐test results from\\nmedical personnel offends the Fourth Amendment. Those\\ncases that do address the question point in the other direction.\\nIn 1966 the Supreme Court recognized that the exigent‐cir‐\\ncumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment permitted\\npolice officers to order a warrantless blood draw from a con‐\\nscious driver involved in an accident. See Schmerber v. Califor‐\\nnia, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59, 766–72 (1966). Earlier this year, the\\nCourt reinforced and extended this same point, holding that,\\ndespite reductions in the time needed to obtain a warrant,\\n\\f6 No. 19‐1747\\n\\nwarrantless blood draws from unconscious drivers involved\\nin car accidents do not offend with the Fourth Amendment.\\nSee Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533–34, 2537–39\\n(2019).\\n Against the backdrop of Schmerber and Mitchell, we cannot\\nsay “beyond any debate” that the police officers’ actions here\\nwere unconstitutional. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Accepting\\nStewart’s account that he was unconscious at the time of the\\nblood draw, the officers had no reason to believe the Fourth\\nAmendment barred the police from seeking the results of a\\nblood test that a doctor ordered for medical purposes from a\\ndriver after a collision. In these circumstances, Stewart cannot\\nestablish that the officers violated a right clearly established\\nunder the Fourth Amendment, and qualified immunity ap‐\\nplies. Id.; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615–18 (1999)\\n(holding that officers’ conduct was reasonable where they fol‐\\nlowed a common police practice and no judicial opinions at\\nthe time prohibited the conduct).\\n Because Stewart makes no argument that the City had an\\nunconstitutional policy, practice, or custom, his claim against\\nthe City for the police officers’ conduct likewise fails. See Mo‐\\nnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978).\\n IV\\n We owe a brief word in closing to the district court’s entry\\nof judgment for the defendants on Stewart’s state‐law claims.\\nWhile purporting to disagree with that ruling, Stewart does\\nnot refer us to any evidence in the summary judgment record\\ncalling the district court’s conclusions into question. He there‐\\nfore has waived any challenge to the court’s rejection of those\\n\\fNo. 19‐1747 7\\n\\nclaims. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); CTL ex rel. Trebatoski\\nv. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 527 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4694,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671831,"string":"4,671,831"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"James Hanson v. United States"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1149"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"William Joseph Bauer\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-1149\\n\\nJAMES B. HANSON,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:16-cv-00428-JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Following a six-year investigation into\\na methamphetamine operation, James Hanson was indicted on\\nMay 5, 2009, with conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and\\npossess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in excess\\nof 500 grams. The Government established Hanson’s three\\n\\f2 No. 18-1149\\n\\nprior drug offenses and Kentucky felony third-degree residen-\\ntial burglary conviction. On December 10, 2009, Hanson\\npleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Per the agree-\\nment, the government listed only one prior felony drug\\nconviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851, instead of all three potentially\\nqualifying convictions, and relied in part on Hanson’s prior\\nburglary conviction for a lesser recommended sentencing\\nrange under the Guidelines.\\n In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the\\nProbation Officer calculated Hanson’s total offense level as 34,\\nwith a criminal history of VI, for a Sentencing Guidelines range\\nof 262 to 327 months. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(3). After conducting\\na sentencing hearing where the district court heard from both\\nparties, the district court adopted the PSR, sentencing Hanson\\nto 262 months in prison followed by ten years of supervised\\nrelease. On appeal, Hanson challenges the district court’s\\ndenial of his collateral challenge to his sentence under 28\\nU.S.C. § 2255. We conclude that the district court did not\\ncommit any reversible errors and affirm.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Hanson argues that the district court erred when it included\\nhis third-degree burglary as a crime of violence, enhancing\\nHanson’s status to a career offender. We review the district\\ncourt’s legal conclusions de novo. Hrobowski v. United States,\\n904 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n Postconviction sentences may be changed if the sentence\\n“was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the\\nUnited States, or [if] the court was without jurisdiction to\\nimpose such sentence, or [if] the sentence was in excess of the\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 3\\n\\nmaximum authorized by law … .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “[N]ot\\nevery error is corrigible in a post-conviction proceeding, even\\nif the error is not harmless.” Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d\\n820, 823 (7th Cir. 2013). Even errors that are not harmless may\\nnot be cognizable under a § 2255 proceeding. Id.\\n We have held that “relief under § 2255 is available ‘only in\\nextraordinary situations, such as an error of constitutional or\\njurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has\\noccurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”\\nUnited States v. Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014)\\n(quoting Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878–79 (7th Cir.\\n2013)). A defendant may file a § 2255 motion within one year\\nof the latest of four dates, including the date of final judgment\\nand “the date on which the right asserted was initially recog-\\nnized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly\\nrecognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively\\napplicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(1)\\nand (3).\\n Under § 2255(f)(1), a defendant has one year from the final\\njudgment to file a § 2255 motion. This court dismissed\\nHanson’s appeal on August 25, 2010. The conviction became\\nfinal on November 23, 2010. Hanson failed to file a § 2255\\nmotion within one year. The statute of limitations to file a\\n§ 2255 motion for Hanson’s final conviction ended on Novem-\\nber 23, 2011. Therefore, Hanson’s motion under § 2255(f)(1) is\\nuntimely.\\n Alternatively, Hanson argues the Supreme Court in Mathis\\nrecognized a new right on June 23, 2016, allowing him to file a\\n§ 2255 motion by June 23, 2017. However, the Supreme Court\\n\\f4 No. 18-1149\\n\\nstated in Mathis that the rules being applied came from\\nprecedent. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). “Our\\nprecedents make this a straightforward case. For more than\\n25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of\\nACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements.” Id.\\nat 2257. Instead, the Supreme Court distinguished between\\n“elements” and “means,” where “elements” are “constituent\\nparts” of a crime and “means” are “various factual ways of\\ncommitting some component of the offense.” Id. at 2249.\\nHanson has failed to show that the Supreme Court in Mathis\\nintended to create a new rule upon which the statute of\\nlimitations may run.\\n We briefly address Hanson’s letter to the court, which\\nconfuses the Government’s argument that Mathis must be\\ndeclared retroactive “by the Supreme Court.” Rather, the\\nGovernment states in its brief: “[n]evertheless, the measuring\\nperiod begins when the Supreme Court declares a new right,\\nnot when the courts acknowledge the right to be retroactive.”\\nWe understand the Government’s position as not requiring the\\nright to be declared retroactive by the Supreme Court, but\\nrather the Supreme Court must declare a new right for the\\ncourts to apply retroactivity.\\n Hanson argues the district court misapplied the career\\noffender enhancement under the advisory Guidelines, result-\\ning in a “miscarriage of justice.” Sentencing errors that can be\\nraised on direct appeal are generally not cognizable upon\\ncollateral review. Cognizable sentencing errors include\\nsentencing decisions rendered unlawful by a clarification in the\\nlaw or sentencing decisions that exceed the statutory maxi-\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 5\\n\\nmum. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir.\\n2011) (granting relief under the pre-Booker mandatory guide-\\nlines); and see Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 412–13 (7th\\nCir. 2010) (granting relief for errors in applying the statutory\\nenhancements under the Armed Criminal Career Act).\\n The Guidelines establish a career offender as a defendant\\nwho is “at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the\\noffense of conviction; the offense of conviction must be a felony\\nthat is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance\\noffense; and the defendant must have at least two prior felony\\nconvictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\\nsubstance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A judge uses advisory\\nGuidelines to determine whether the sentencing range is\\nconsistent with the appropriate considerations. 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a). Nonetheless, “the judge may not even presume that\\na sentence within the applicable Guidelines range would be\\nproper. [The judge] must first determine whether … the\\nsentencing considerations [comply with] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),\\nand if … not [the judge] may not impose it even though it is\\nwithin the applicable guidelines range.” Hawkins v. United\\nStates, 706 F.3d at 822.\\n A change in the law revoking the status under the now-\\nadvisory Guidelines of “crime of violence” from a prior\\nconviction is not cognizable upon collateral review. Coleman,\\n763 F.3d at 708–09. Here, the government concedes that the\\nKentucky third-degree burglary statute does not inherently\\ninvolve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” of a\\n“crime of violence” as part of the career offender designation.\\nBut the district court did not rely solely, or even principally, on\\n\\f6 No. 18-1149\\n\\nthe advisory Guidelines. Instead, it referenced multiple\\nconsiderations in imposing Hanson’s sentence, including the\\nadvisory Guidelines, the lengthy PSR, the argument of the\\nparties, and factors set forth in § 3553(a).\\n While this case directly involves, and is controlled by, our\\nprecedent on § 2255, our recent decision in Chazen regarding a\\n§ 2241 motion is aptly distinguishable here. In Chazen, we\\ndiscussed the statutory enhancement of the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act, which mandated a minimum 15-year sentence\\nfor a person with three or more prior convictions for a “violent\\nfelony” or “serious drug offense.” Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d\\n851, 853 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). Chazen\\nsought relief under § 2241, claiming the district court improp-\\nerly sentenced him to the enhanced minimum under the\\nstatute due to his prior burglary convictions, which were not\\n“violent felonies.” We found that “Mathis can provide the basis\\nfor [a] § 2241 petition … under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct” because the sentence at issue mandated a minimum\\nsentence of incarceration. Chazen, 938 F.3d at 862.\\n While Mathis may provide a basis for awarding habeas\\nrelief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 from an Armed Career Criminal\\nAct sentence as in Chazen, the reasoning of Chazen does not\\nextend to providing habeas relief from an application of the\\nadvisory Guidelines. Here, the district court sentenced Hanson\\nnot with mandatory minimums, but with combined consider-\\nations from the advisory Guidelines and the appropriate\\nfactors. While the Armed Career Criminal Act requires a\\nmandatory minimum of 15 years, a judge must independently\\ndetermine the sentence based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 7\\n\\nwhether the career offender enhancement applies. Therefore,\\nChazen does not afford relief to Hanson.\\n Hanson claims the district court committed an arguable\\nerror in applying the advisory Guidelines that created a\\nmiscarriage of justice. Hawkins and Coleman are controlling\\nhere. As in Hawkins, the sentence imposed here was based on\\nadvisory Guidelines, not mandatory Guidelines or statutory\\nminimums, as in Chazen and cases prior to Booker. An error that\\nmay have occurred in calculating the Guidelines range does\\nnot constitute a “miscarriage of justice” when the “sentence is\\nwell below the ceiling imposed by Congress.” Coleman, 763\\nF.3d at 708 (citing Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824–25).\\n The difference between the Guidelines range with the\\nburglary compared to the range without the burglary is moot,\\nbecause the court could have easily relied on the additional\\ndrug offenses or other § 3553 factors. The possibility of a\\ndifferent sentence in light of the error is not enough to distin-\\nguish this case from Hawkins or Coleman. There is no reason to\\nbelieve that the district court would be inclined to revise the\\nsentence based solely on the removal of the third-degree\\nKentucky burglary charge, considering the additional drug\\noffenses. Therefore, Hanson did not suffer a “miscarriage of\\njustice” and his claim for collateral relief is denied.\\n CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hanson’s § 2255\\nmotion in favor of respondent-appellee.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449084/\", \"author_raw\": \"William Joseph Bauer\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671831/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: James Hanson v. United States\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1149\n\nJAMES B. HANSON,\n Petitioner-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Respondent-Appellee.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Illinois.\n No. 3:16-cv-00428-JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\n\n\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\n\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON,\nCircuit Judges.\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Following a six-year investigation into\na methamphetamine operation, James Hanson was indicted on\nMay 5, 2009, with conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and\npossess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in excess\nof 500 grams. The Government established Hanson’s three\n\f2 No. 18-1149\n\nprior drug offenses and Kentucky felony third-degree residen-\ntial burglary conviction. On December 10, 2009, Hanson\npleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Per the agree-\nment, the government listed only one prior felony drug\nconviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851, instead of all three potentially\nqualifying convictions, and relied in part on Hanson’s prior\nburglary conviction for a lesser recommended sentencing\nrange under the Guidelines.\n In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the\nProbation Officer calculated Hanson’s total offense level as 34,\nwith a criminal history of VI, for a Sentencing Guidelines range\nof 262 to 327 months. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(3). After conducting\na sentencing hearing where the district court heard from both\nparties, the district court adopted the PSR, sentencing Hanson\nto 262 months in prison followed by ten years of supervised\nrelease. On appeal, Hanson challenges the district court’s\ndenial of his collateral challenge to his sentence under 28\nU.S.C. § 2255. We conclude that the district court did not\ncommit any reversible errors and affirm.\n DISCUSSION\n Hanson argues that the district court erred when it included\nhis third-degree burglary as a crime of violence, enhancing\nHanson’s status to a career offender. We review the district\ncourt’s legal conclusions de novo. Hrobowski v. United States,\n904 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2018).\n Postconviction sentences may be changed if the sentence\n“was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the\nUnited States, or [if] the court was without jurisdiction to\nimpose such sentence, or [if] the sentence was in excess of the\n\fNo. 18-1149 3\n\nmaximum authorized by law … .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “[N]ot\nevery error is corrigible in a post-conviction proceeding, even\nif the error is not harmless.” Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d\n820, 823 (7th Cir. 2013). Even errors that are not harmless may\nnot be cognizable under a § 2255 proceeding. Id.\n We have held that “relief under § 2255 is available ‘only in\nextraordinary situations, such as an error of constitutional or\njurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has\noccurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”\nUnited States v. Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014)\n(quoting Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878–79 (7th Cir.\n2013)). A defendant may file a § 2255 motion within one year\nof the latest of four dates, including the date of final judgment\nand “the date on which the right asserted was initially recog-\nnized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly\nrecognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively\napplicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(1)\nand (3).\n Under § 2255(f)(1), a defendant has one year from the final\njudgment to file a § 2255 motion. This court dismissed\nHanson’s appeal on August 25, 2010. The conviction became\nfinal on November 23, 2010. Hanson failed to file a § 2255\nmotion within one year. The statute of limitations to file a\n§ 2255 motion for Hanson’s final conviction ended on Novem-\nber 23, 2011. Therefore, Hanson’s motion under § 2255(f)(1) is\nuntimely.\n Alternatively, Hanson argues the Supreme Court in Mathis\nrecognized a new right on June 23, 2016, allowing him to file a\n§ 2255 motion by June 23, 2017. However, the Supreme Court\n\f4 No. 18-1149\n\nstated in Mathis that the rules being applied came from\nprecedent. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). “Our\nprecedents make this a straightforward case. For more than\n25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of\nACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements.” Id.\nat 2257. Instead, the Supreme Court distinguished between\n“elements” and “means,” where “elements” are “constituent\nparts” of a crime and “means” are “various factual ways of\ncommitting some component of the offense.” Id. at 2249.\nHanson has failed to show that the Supreme Court in Mathis\nintended to create a new rule upon which the statute of\nlimitations may run.\n We briefly address Hanson’s letter to the court, which\nconfuses the Government’s argument that Mathis must be\ndeclared retroactive “by the Supreme Court.” Rather, the\nGovernment states in its brief: “[n]evertheless, the measuring\nperiod begins when the Supreme Court declares a new right,\nnot when the courts acknowledge the right to be retroactive.”\nWe understand the Government’s position as not requiring the\nright to be declared retroactive by the Supreme Court, but\nrather the Supreme Court must declare a new right for the\ncourts to apply retroactivity.\n Hanson argues the district court misapplied the career\noffender enhancement under the advisory Guidelines, result-\ning in a “miscarriage of justice.” Sentencing errors that can be\nraised on direct appeal are generally not cognizable upon\ncollateral review. Cognizable sentencing errors include\nsentencing decisions rendered unlawful by a clarification in the\nlaw or sentencing decisions that exceed the statutory maxi-\n\fNo. 18-1149 5\n\nmum. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir.\n2011) (granting relief under the pre-Booker mandatory guide-\nlines); and see Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 412–13 (7th\nCir. 2010) (granting relief for errors in applying the statutory\nenhancements under the Armed Criminal Career Act).\n The Guidelines establish a career offender as a defendant\nwho is “at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the\noffense of conviction; the offense of conviction must be a felony\nthat is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance\noffense; and the defendant must have at least two prior felony\nconvictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\nsubstance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A judge uses advisory\nGuidelines to determine whether the sentencing range is\nconsistent with the appropriate considerations. 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3553(a). Nonetheless, “the judge may not even presume that\na sentence within the applicable Guidelines range would be\nproper. [The judge] must first determine whether … the\nsentencing considerations [comply with] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),\nand if … not [the judge] may not impose it even though it is\nwithin the applicable guidelines range.” Hawkins v. United\nStates, 706 F.3d at 822.\n A change in the law revoking the status under the now-\nadvisory Guidelines of “crime of violence” from a prior\nconviction is not cognizable upon collateral review. Coleman,\n763 F.3d at 708–09. Here, the government concedes that the\nKentucky third-degree burglary statute does not inherently\ninvolve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” of a\n“crime of violence” as part of the career offender designation.\nBut the district court did not rely solely, or even principally, on\n\f6 No. 18-1149\n\nthe advisory Guidelines. Instead, it referenced multiple\nconsiderations in imposing Hanson’s sentence, including the\nadvisory Guidelines, the lengthy PSR, the argument of the\nparties, and factors set forth in § 3553(a).\n While this case directly involves, and is controlled by, our\nprecedent on § 2255, our recent decision in Chazen regarding a\n§ 2241 motion is aptly distinguishable here. In Chazen, we\ndiscussed the statutory enhancement of the Armed Career\nCriminal Act, which mandated a minimum 15-year sentence\nfor a person with three or more prior convictions for a “violent\nfelony” or “serious drug offense.” Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d\n851, 853 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). Chazen\nsought relief under § 2241, claiming the district court improp-\nerly sentenced him to the enhanced minimum under the\nstatute due to his prior burglary convictions, which were not\n“violent felonies.” We found that “Mathis can provide the basis\nfor [a] § 2241 petition … under the Armed Career Criminal\nAct” because the sentence at issue mandated a minimum\nsentence of incarceration. Chazen, 938 F.3d at 862.\n While Mathis may provide a basis for awarding habeas\nrelief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 from an Armed Career Criminal\nAct sentence as in Chazen, the reasoning of Chazen does not\nextend to providing habeas relief from an application of the\nadvisory Guidelines. Here, the district court sentenced Hanson\nnot with mandatory minimums, but with combined consider-\nations from the advisory Guidelines and the appropriate\nfactors. While the Armed Career Criminal Act requires a\nmandatory minimum of 15 years, a judge must independently\ndetermine the sentence based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and\n\fNo. 18-1149 7\n\nwhether the career offender enhancement applies. Therefore,\nChazen does not afford relief to Hanson.\n Hanson claims the district court committed an arguable\nerror in applying the advisory Guidelines that created a\nmiscarriage of justice. Hawkins and Coleman are controlling\nhere. As in Hawkins, the sentence imposed here was based on\nadvisory Guidelines, not mandatory Guidelines or statutory\nminimums, as in Chazen and cases prior to Booker. An error that\nmay have occurred in calculating the Guidelines range does\nnot constitute a “miscarriage of justice” when the “sentence is\nwell below the ceiling imposed by Congress.” Coleman, 763\nF.3d at 708 (citing Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824–25).\n The difference between the Guidelines range with the\nburglary compared to the range without the burglary is moot,\nbecause the court could have easily relied on the additional\ndrug offenses or other § 3553 factors. The possibility of a\ndifferent sentence in light of the error is not enough to distin-\nguish this case from Hawkins or Coleman. There is no reason to\nbelieve that the district court would be inclined to revise the\nsentence based solely on the removal of the third-degree\nKentucky burglary charge, considering the additional drug\noffenses. Therefore, Hanson did not suffer a “miscarriage of\njustice” and his claim for collateral relief is denied.\n CONCLUSION\n We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hanson’s § 2255\nmotion in favor of respondent-appellee.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: James Hanson v. United States\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-1149\\n\\nJAMES B. HANSON,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:16-cv-00428-JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Following a six-year investigation into\\na methamphetamine operation, James Hanson was indicted on\\nMay 5, 2009, with conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and\\npossess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in excess\\nof 500 grams. The Government established Hanson’s three\\n\\f2 No. 18-1149\\n\\nprior drug offenses and Kentucky felony third-degree residen-\\ntial burglary conviction. On December 10, 2009, Hanson\\npleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Per the agree-\\nment, the government listed only one prior felony drug\\nconviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851, instead of all three potentially\\nqualifying convictions, and relied in part on Hanson’s prior\\nburglary conviction for a lesser recommended sentencing\\nrange under the Guidelines.\\n In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the\\nProbation Officer calculated Hanson’s total offense level as 34,\\nwith a criminal history of VI, for a Sentencing Guidelines range\\nof 262 to 327 months. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(3). After conducting\\na sentencing hearing where the district court heard from both\\nparties, the district court adopted the PSR, sentencing Hanson\\nto 262 months in prison followed by ten years of supervised\\nrelease. On appeal, Hanson challenges the district court’s\\ndenial of his collateral challenge to his sentence under 28\\nU.S.C. § 2255. We conclude that the district court did not\\ncommit any reversible errors and affirm.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Hanson argues that the district court erred when it included\\nhis third-degree burglary as a crime of violence, enhancing\\nHanson’s status to a career offender. We review the district\\ncourt’s legal conclusions de novo. Hrobowski v. United States,\\n904 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n Postconviction sentences may be changed if the sentence\\n“was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the\\nUnited States, or [if] the court was without jurisdiction to\\nimpose such sentence, or [if] the sentence was in excess of the\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 3\\n\\nmaximum authorized by law … .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “[N]ot\\nevery error is corrigible in a post-conviction proceeding, even\\nif the error is not harmless.” Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d\\n820, 823 (7th Cir. 2013). Even errors that are not harmless may\\nnot be cognizable under a § 2255 proceeding. Id.\\n We have held that “relief under § 2255 is available ‘only in\\nextraordinary situations, such as an error of constitutional or\\njurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has\\noccurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”\\nUnited States v. Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014)\\n(quoting Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878–79 (7th Cir.\\n2013)). A defendant may file a § 2255 motion within one year\\nof the latest of four dates, including the date of final judgment\\nand “the date on which the right asserted was initially recog-\\nnized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly\\nrecognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively\\napplicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(1)\\nand (3).\\n Under § 2255(f)(1), a defendant has one year from the final\\njudgment to file a § 2255 motion. This court dismissed\\nHanson’s appeal on August 25, 2010. The conviction became\\nfinal on November 23, 2010. Hanson failed to file a § 2255\\nmotion within one year. The statute of limitations to file a\\n§ 2255 motion for Hanson’s final conviction ended on Novem-\\nber 23, 2011. Therefore, Hanson’s motion under § 2255(f)(1) is\\nuntimely.\\n Alternatively, Hanson argues the Supreme Court in Mathis\\nrecognized a new right on June 23, 2016, allowing him to file a\\n§ 2255 motion by June 23, 2017. However, the Supreme Court\\n\\f4 No. 18-1149\\n\\nstated in Mathis that the rules being applied came from\\nprecedent. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). “Our\\nprecedents make this a straightforward case. For more than\\n25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of\\nACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements.” Id.\\nat 2257. Instead, the Supreme Court distinguished between\\n“elements” and “means,” where “elements” are “constituent\\nparts” of a crime and “means” are “various factual ways of\\ncommitting some component of the offense.” Id. at 2249.\\nHanson has failed to show that the Supreme Court in Mathis\\nintended to create a new rule upon which the statute of\\nlimitations may run.\\n We briefly address Hanson’s letter to the court, which\\nconfuses the Government’s argument that Mathis must be\\ndeclared retroactive “by the Supreme Court.” Rather, the\\nGovernment states in its brief: “[n]evertheless, the measuring\\nperiod begins when the Supreme Court declares a new right,\\nnot when the courts acknowledge the right to be retroactive.”\\nWe understand the Government’s position as not requiring the\\nright to be declared retroactive by the Supreme Court, but\\nrather the Supreme Court must declare a new right for the\\ncourts to apply retroactivity.\\n Hanson argues the district court misapplied the career\\noffender enhancement under the advisory Guidelines, result-\\ning in a “miscarriage of justice.” Sentencing errors that can be\\nraised on direct appeal are generally not cognizable upon\\ncollateral review. Cognizable sentencing errors include\\nsentencing decisions rendered unlawful by a clarification in the\\nlaw or sentencing decisions that exceed the statutory maxi-\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 5\\n\\nmum. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir.\\n2011) (granting relief under the pre-Booker mandatory guide-\\nlines); and see Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 412–13 (7th\\nCir. 2010) (granting relief for errors in applying the statutory\\nenhancements under the Armed Criminal Career Act).\\n The Guidelines establish a career offender as a defendant\\nwho is “at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the\\noffense of conviction; the offense of conviction must be a felony\\nthat is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance\\noffense; and the defendant must have at least two prior felony\\nconvictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\\nsubstance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A judge uses advisory\\nGuidelines to determine whether the sentencing range is\\nconsistent with the appropriate considerations. 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a). Nonetheless, “the judge may not even presume that\\na sentence within the applicable Guidelines range would be\\nproper. [The judge] must first determine whether … the\\nsentencing considerations [comply with] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),\\nand if … not [the judge] may not impose it even though it is\\nwithin the applicable guidelines range.” Hawkins v. United\\nStates, 706 F.3d at 822.\\n A change in the law revoking the status under the now-\\nadvisory Guidelines of “crime of violence” from a prior\\nconviction is not cognizable upon collateral review. Coleman,\\n763 F.3d at 708–09. Here, the government concedes that the\\nKentucky third-degree burglary statute does not inherently\\ninvolve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” of a\\n“crime of violence” as part of the career offender designation.\\nBut the district court did not rely solely, or even principally, on\\n\\f6 No. 18-1149\\n\\nthe advisory Guidelines. Instead, it referenced multiple\\nconsiderations in imposing Hanson’s sentence, including the\\nadvisory Guidelines, the lengthy PSR, the argument of the\\nparties, and factors set forth in § 3553(a).\\n While this case directly involves, and is controlled by, our\\nprecedent on § 2255, our recent decision in Chazen regarding a\\n§ 2241 motion is aptly distinguishable here. In Chazen, we\\ndiscussed the statutory enhancement of the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act, which mandated a minimum 15-year sentence\\nfor a person with three or more prior convictions for a “violent\\nfelony” or “serious drug offense.” Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d\\n851, 853 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). Chazen\\nsought relief under § 2241, claiming the district court improp-\\nerly sentenced him to the enhanced minimum under the\\nstatute due to his prior burglary convictions, which were not\\n“violent felonies.” We found that “Mathis can provide the basis\\nfor [a] § 2241 petition … under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct” because the sentence at issue mandated a minimum\\nsentence of incarceration. Chazen, 938 F.3d at 862.\\n While Mathis may provide a basis for awarding habeas\\nrelief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 from an Armed Career Criminal\\nAct sentence as in Chazen, the reasoning of Chazen does not\\nextend to providing habeas relief from an application of the\\nadvisory Guidelines. Here, the district court sentenced Hanson\\nnot with mandatory minimums, but with combined consider-\\nations from the advisory Guidelines and the appropriate\\nfactors. While the Armed Career Criminal Act requires a\\nmandatory minimum of 15 years, a judge must independently\\ndetermine the sentence based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 7\\n\\nwhether the career offender enhancement applies. Therefore,\\nChazen does not afford relief to Hanson.\\n Hanson claims the district court committed an arguable\\nerror in applying the advisory Guidelines that created a\\nmiscarriage of justice. Hawkins and Coleman are controlling\\nhere. As in Hawkins, the sentence imposed here was based on\\nadvisory Guidelines, not mandatory Guidelines or statutory\\nminimums, as in Chazen and cases prior to Booker. An error that\\nmay have occurred in calculating the Guidelines range does\\nnot constitute a “miscarriage of justice” when the “sentence is\\nwell below the ceiling imposed by Congress.” Coleman, 763\\nF.3d at 708 (citing Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824–25).\\n The difference between the Guidelines range with the\\nburglary compared to the range without the burglary is moot,\\nbecause the court could have easily relied on the additional\\ndrug offenses or other § 3553 factors. The possibility of a\\ndifferent sentence in light of the error is not enough to distin-\\nguish this case from Hawkins or Coleman. There is no reason to\\nbelieve that the district court would be inclined to revise the\\nsentence based solely on the removal of the third-degree\\nKentucky burglary charge, considering the additional drug\\noffenses. Therefore, Hanson did not suffer a “miscarriage of\\njustice” and his claim for collateral relief is denied.\\n CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hanson’s § 2255\\nmotion in favor of respondent-appellee.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4695,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4672187,"string":"4,672,187"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"James Hanson v. United States"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1149"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"William Joseph Bauer\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-1149\\n\\nJAMES B. HANSON,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:16-cv-00428-JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Following a six-year investigation into\\na methamphetamine operation, James Hanson was indicted on\\nMay 5, 2009, with conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and\\npossess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in excess\\nof 500 grams. The Government established Hanson’s three\\n\\f2 No. 18-1149\\n\\nprior drug offenses and Kentucky felony third-degree residen-\\ntial burglary conviction. On December 10, 2009, Hanson\\npleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Per the agree-\\nment, the government listed only one prior felony drug\\nconviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851, instead of all three potentially\\nqualifying convictions, and relied in part on Hanson’s prior\\nburglary conviction for a lesser recommended sentencing\\nrange under the Guidelines.\\n In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the\\nProbation Officer calculated Hanson’s total offense level as 34,\\nwith a criminal history of VI, for a Sentencing Guidelines range\\nof 262 to 327 months. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(3). After conducting\\na sentencing hearing where the district court heard from both\\nparties, the district court adopted the PSR, sentencing Hanson\\nto 262 months in prison followed by ten years of supervised\\nrelease. On appeal, Hanson challenges the district court’s\\ndenial of his collateral challenge to his sentence under 28\\nU.S.C. § 2255. We conclude that the district court did not\\ncommit any reversible errors and affirm.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Hanson argues that the district court erred when it in-\\ncluded his third-degree burglary as a crime of violence,\\nenhancing Hanson’s status to a career offender. We review the\\ndistrict court’s legal conclusions de novo. Hrobowski v. United\\nStates, 904 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n Postconviction sentences may be changed if the sentence\\n“was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the\\nUnited States, or [if] the court was without jurisdiction to\\nimpose such sentence, or [if] the sentence was in excess of the\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 3\\n\\nmaximum authorized by law … .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “[N]ot\\nevery error is corrigible in a post-conviction proceeding, even\\nif the error is not harmless.” Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d\\n820, 823 (7th Cir. 2013). Even errors that are not harmless may\\nnot be cognizable under a § 2255 proceeding. Id.\\n We have held that “relief under § 2255 is available ‘only in\\nextraordinary situations, such as an error of constitutional or\\njurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has\\noccurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”\\nUnited States v. Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014)\\n(quoting Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878–79 (7th Cir.\\n2013)). A defendant may file a § 2255 motion within one year\\nof the latest of four dates, including the date of final judgment\\nand “the date on which the right asserted was initially recog-\\nnized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly\\nrecognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively\\napplicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(1)\\nand (3).\\n Under § 2255(f)(1), a defendant has one year from the final\\njudgment to file a § 2255 motion. This court dismissed\\nHanson’s appeal on August 25, 2010. The conviction became\\nfinal on November 23, 2010. Hanson failed to file a § 2255\\nmotion within one year. The statute of limitations to file a\\n§ 2255 motion for Hanson’s final conviction ended on Novem-\\nber 23, 2011. Therefore, Hanson’s motion under § 2255(f)(1) is\\nuntimely.\\n Alternatively, Hanson argues the Supreme Court in Mathis\\nrecognized a new right on June 23, 2016, allowing him to file a\\n§ 2255 motion by June 23, 2017. However, the Supreme Court\\n\\f4 No. 18-1149\\n\\nstated in Mathis that the rules being applied came from\\nprecedent. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). “Our\\nprecedents make this a straightforward case. For more than\\n25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of\\nACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements.” Id.\\nat 2257. Instead, the Supreme Court distinguished between\\n“elements” and “means,” where “elements” are “constituent\\nparts” of a crime and “means” are “various factual ways of\\ncommitting some component of the offense.” Id. at 2249.\\nHanson has failed to show that the Supreme Court in Mathis\\nintended to create a new rule upon which the statute of\\nlimitations may run.\\n We briefly address Hanson’s letter to the court, which\\nconfuses the Government’s argument that Mathis must be\\ndeclared retroactive “by the Supreme Court.” Rather, the\\nGovernment states in its brief: “[n]evertheless, the measuring\\nperiod begins when the Supreme Court declares a new right,\\nnot when the courts acknowledge the right to be retroactive.”\\nWe understand the Government’s position as not requiring the\\nright to be declared retroactive by the Supreme Court, but\\nrather the Supreme Court must declare a new right for the\\ncourts to apply retroactivity.\\n Hanson argues the district court misapplied the career\\noffender enhancement under the advisory Guidelines, result-\\ning in a “miscarriage of justice.” Sentencing errors that can be\\nraised on direct appeal are generally not cognizable upon\\ncollateral review. Cognizable sentencing errors include\\nsentencing decisions rendered unlawful by a clarification in the\\nlaw or sentencing decisions that exceed the statutory maxi-\\nmum. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir.\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 5\\n\\n2011) (granting relief under the pre-Booker mandatory guide-\\nlines); and see Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 412–13 (7th\\nCir. 2010) (granting relief for errors in applying the statutory\\nenhancements under the Armed Criminal Career Act).\\n The Guidelines establish a career offender as a defendant\\nwho is “at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the\\noffense of conviction; the offense of conviction must be a felony\\nthat is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance\\noffense; and the defendant must have at least two prior felony\\nconvictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\\nsubstance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A judge uses advisory\\nGuidelines to determine whether the sentencing range is\\nconsistent with the appropriate considerations. 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a). Nonetheless, “the judge may not even presume that\\na sentence within the applicable Guidelines range would be\\nproper. [The judge] must first determine whether … the\\nsentencing considerations [comply with] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),\\nand if … not [the judge] may not impose it even though it is\\nwithin the applicable guidelines range.” Hawkins v. United\\nStates, 706 F.3d at 822.\\n A change in the law revoking the status under the now-\\nadvisory Guidelines of “crime of violence” from a prior\\nconviction is not cognizable upon collateral review. Coleman,\\n763 F.3d at 708–09. Here, the government concedes that the\\nKentucky third-degree burglary statute does not inherently\\ninvolve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” of a\\n“crime of violence” as part of the career offender designation.\\nBut the district court did not rely solely, or even principally, on\\nthe advisory Guidelines. Instead, it referenced multiple\\nconsiderations in imposing Hanson’s sentence, including the\\n\\f6 No. 18-1149\\n\\nadvisory Guidelines, the lengthy PSR, the argument of the\\nparties, and factors set forth in § 3553(a).\\n While this case directly involves, and is controlled by, our\\nprecedent on § 2255, our recent decision in Chazen regarding a\\n§ 2241 motion is aptly distinguishable here. In Chazen, we\\ndiscussed the statutory enhancement of the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act, which mandated a minimum 15-year sentence\\nfor a person with three or more prior convictions for a “violent\\nfelony” or “serious drug offense.” Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d\\n851, 853 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). Chazen\\nsought relief under § 2241, claiming the district court improp-\\nerly sentenced him to the enhanced minimum under the\\nstatute due to his prior burglary convictions, which were not\\n“violent felonies.” We found that “Mathis can provide the basis\\nfor [a] § 2241 petition … under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct” because the sentence at issue mandated a minimum\\nsentence of incarceration. Chazen, 938 F.3d at 862.\\n While Mathis may provide a basis for awarding habeas\\nrelief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 from an Armed Career Criminal\\nAct sentence as in Chazen, the reasoning of Chazen does not\\nextend to providing habeas relief from an application of the\\nadvisory Guidelines. Here, the district court sentenced Hanson\\nnot with mandatory minimums, but with combined consider-\\nations from the advisory Guidelines and the appropriate\\nfactors. While the Armed Career Criminal Act requires a\\nmandatory minimum of 15 years, a judge must independently\\ndetermine the sentence based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and\\nwhether the career offender enhancement applies. Therefore,\\nChazen does not afford relief to Hanson.\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 7\\n\\n Hanson claims the district court committed an arguable\\nerror in applying the advisory Guidelines that created a\\nmiscarriage of justice. Hawkins and Coleman are controlling\\nhere. As in Hawkins, the sentence imposed here was based on\\nadvisory Guidelines, not mandatory Guidelines or statutory\\nminimums, as in Chazen and cases prior to Booker. An error that\\nmay have occurred in calculating the Guidelines range does\\nnot constitute a “miscarriage of justice” when the “sentence is\\nwell below the ceiling imposed by Congress.” Coleman, 763\\nF.3d at 708 (citing Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824–25).\\n The difference between the Guidelines range with the\\nburglary compared to the range without the burglary is moot,\\nbecause the court could have easily relied on the additional\\ndrug offenses or other § 3553 factors. The possibility of a\\ndifferent sentence in light of the error is not enough to distin-\\nguish this case from Hawkins or Coleman. There is no reason to\\nbelieve that the district court would be inclined to revise the\\nsentence based solely on the removal of the third-degree\\nKentucky burglary charge, considering the additional drug\\noffenses. Therefore, Hanson did not suffer a “miscarriage of\\njustice” and his claim for collateral relief is denied.\\n CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hanson’s § 2255\\nmotion in favor of respondent-appellee.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449440/\", \"author_raw\": \"William Joseph Bauer\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4672187/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: James Hanson v. United States\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1149\n\nJAMES B. HANSON,\n Petitioner-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Respondent-Appellee.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Illinois.\n No. 3:16-cv-00428-JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\n\n\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\n\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON,\nCircuit Judges.\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Following a six-year investigation into\na methamphetamine operation, James Hanson was indicted on\nMay 5, 2009, with conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and\npossess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in excess\nof 500 grams. The Government established Hanson’s three\n\f2 No. 18-1149\n\nprior drug offenses and Kentucky felony third-degree residen-\ntial burglary conviction. On December 10, 2009, Hanson\npleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Per the agree-\nment, the government listed only one prior felony drug\nconviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851, instead of all three potentially\nqualifying convictions, and relied in part on Hanson’s prior\nburglary conviction for a lesser recommended sentencing\nrange under the Guidelines.\n In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the\nProbation Officer calculated Hanson’s total offense level as 34,\nwith a criminal history of VI, for a Sentencing Guidelines range\nof 262 to 327 months. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(3). After conducting\na sentencing hearing where the district court heard from both\nparties, the district court adopted the PSR, sentencing Hanson\nto 262 months in prison followed by ten years of supervised\nrelease. On appeal, Hanson challenges the district court’s\ndenial of his collateral challenge to his sentence under 28\nU.S.C. § 2255. We conclude that the district court did not\ncommit any reversible errors and affirm.\n DISCUSSION\n Hanson argues that the district court erred when it in-\ncluded his third-degree burglary as a crime of violence,\nenhancing Hanson’s status to a career offender. We review the\ndistrict court’s legal conclusions de novo. Hrobowski v. United\nStates, 904 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2018).\n Postconviction sentences may be changed if the sentence\n“was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the\nUnited States, or [if] the court was without jurisdiction to\nimpose such sentence, or [if] the sentence was in excess of the\n\fNo. 18-1149 3\n\nmaximum authorized by law … .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “[N]ot\nevery error is corrigible in a post-conviction proceeding, even\nif the error is not harmless.” Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d\n820, 823 (7th Cir. 2013). Even errors that are not harmless may\nnot be cognizable under a § 2255 proceeding. Id.\n We have held that “relief under § 2255 is available ‘only in\nextraordinary situations, such as an error of constitutional or\njurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has\noccurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”\nUnited States v. Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014)\n(quoting Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878–79 (7th Cir.\n2013)). A defendant may file a § 2255 motion within one year\nof the latest of four dates, including the date of final judgment\nand “the date on which the right asserted was initially recog-\nnized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly\nrecognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively\napplicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(1)\nand (3).\n Under § 2255(f)(1), a defendant has one year from the final\njudgment to file a § 2255 motion. This court dismissed\nHanson’s appeal on August 25, 2010. The conviction became\nfinal on November 23, 2010. Hanson failed to file a § 2255\nmotion within one year. The statute of limitations to file a\n§ 2255 motion for Hanson’s final conviction ended on Novem-\nber 23, 2011. Therefore, Hanson’s motion under § 2255(f)(1) is\nuntimely.\n Alternatively, Hanson argues the Supreme Court in Mathis\nrecognized a new right on June 23, 2016, allowing him to file a\n§ 2255 motion by June 23, 2017. However, the Supreme Court\n\f4 No. 18-1149\n\nstated in Mathis that the rules being applied came from\nprecedent. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). “Our\nprecedents make this a straightforward case. For more than\n25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of\nACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements.” Id.\nat 2257. Instead, the Supreme Court distinguished between\n“elements” and “means,” where “elements” are “constituent\nparts” of a crime and “means” are “various factual ways of\ncommitting some component of the offense.” Id. at 2249.\nHanson has failed to show that the Supreme Court in Mathis\nintended to create a new rule upon which the statute of\nlimitations may run.\n We briefly address Hanson’s letter to the court, which\nconfuses the Government’s argument that Mathis must be\ndeclared retroactive “by the Supreme Court.” Rather, the\nGovernment states in its brief: “[n]evertheless, the measuring\nperiod begins when the Supreme Court declares a new right,\nnot when the courts acknowledge the right to be retroactive.”\nWe understand the Government’s position as not requiring the\nright to be declared retroactive by the Supreme Court, but\nrather the Supreme Court must declare a new right for the\ncourts to apply retroactivity.\n Hanson argues the district court misapplied the career\noffender enhancement under the advisory Guidelines, result-\ning in a “miscarriage of justice.” Sentencing errors that can be\nraised on direct appeal are generally not cognizable upon\ncollateral review. Cognizable sentencing errors include\nsentencing decisions rendered unlawful by a clarification in the\nlaw or sentencing decisions that exceed the statutory maxi-\nmum. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir.\n\fNo. 18-1149 5\n\n2011) (granting relief under the pre-Booker mandatory guide-\nlines); and see Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 412–13 (7th\nCir. 2010) (granting relief for errors in applying the statutory\nenhancements under the Armed Criminal Career Act).\n The Guidelines establish a career offender as a defendant\nwho is “at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the\noffense of conviction; the offense of conviction must be a felony\nthat is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance\noffense; and the defendant must have at least two prior felony\nconvictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\nsubstance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A judge uses advisory\nGuidelines to determine whether the sentencing range is\nconsistent with the appropriate considerations. 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3553(a). Nonetheless, “the judge may not even presume that\na sentence within the applicable Guidelines range would be\nproper. [The judge] must first determine whether … the\nsentencing considerations [comply with] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),\nand if … not [the judge] may not impose it even though it is\nwithin the applicable guidelines range.” Hawkins v. United\nStates, 706 F.3d at 822.\n A change in the law revoking the status under the now-\nadvisory Guidelines of “crime of violence” from a prior\nconviction is not cognizable upon collateral review. Coleman,\n763 F.3d at 708–09. Here, the government concedes that the\nKentucky third-degree burglary statute does not inherently\ninvolve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” of a\n“crime of violence” as part of the career offender designation.\nBut the district court did not rely solely, or even principally, on\nthe advisory Guidelines. Instead, it referenced multiple\nconsiderations in imposing Hanson’s sentence, including the\n\f6 No. 18-1149\n\nadvisory Guidelines, the lengthy PSR, the argument of the\nparties, and factors set forth in § 3553(a).\n While this case directly involves, and is controlled by, our\nprecedent on § 2255, our recent decision in Chazen regarding a\n§ 2241 motion is aptly distinguishable here. In Chazen, we\ndiscussed the statutory enhancement of the Armed Career\nCriminal Act, which mandated a minimum 15-year sentence\nfor a person with three or more prior convictions for a “violent\nfelony” or “serious drug offense.” Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d\n851, 853 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). Chazen\nsought relief under § 2241, claiming the district court improp-\nerly sentenced him to the enhanced minimum under the\nstatute due to his prior burglary convictions, which were not\n“violent felonies.” We found that “Mathis can provide the basis\nfor [a] § 2241 petition … under the Armed Career Criminal\nAct” because the sentence at issue mandated a minimum\nsentence of incarceration. Chazen, 938 F.3d at 862.\n While Mathis may provide a basis for awarding habeas\nrelief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 from an Armed Career Criminal\nAct sentence as in Chazen, the reasoning of Chazen does not\nextend to providing habeas relief from an application of the\nadvisory Guidelines. Here, the district court sentenced Hanson\nnot with mandatory minimums, but with combined consider-\nations from the advisory Guidelines and the appropriate\nfactors. While the Armed Career Criminal Act requires a\nmandatory minimum of 15 years, a judge must independently\ndetermine the sentence based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and\nwhether the career offender enhancement applies. Therefore,\nChazen does not afford relief to Hanson.\n\fNo. 18-1149 7\n\n Hanson claims the district court committed an arguable\nerror in applying the advisory Guidelines that created a\nmiscarriage of justice. Hawkins and Coleman are controlling\nhere. As in Hawkins, the sentence imposed here was based on\nadvisory Guidelines, not mandatory Guidelines or statutory\nminimums, as in Chazen and cases prior to Booker. An error that\nmay have occurred in calculating the Guidelines range does\nnot constitute a “miscarriage of justice” when the “sentence is\nwell below the ceiling imposed by Congress.” Coleman, 763\nF.3d at 708 (citing Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824–25).\n The difference between the Guidelines range with the\nburglary compared to the range without the burglary is moot,\nbecause the court could have easily relied on the additional\ndrug offenses or other § 3553 factors. The possibility of a\ndifferent sentence in light of the error is not enough to distin-\nguish this case from Hawkins or Coleman. There is no reason to\nbelieve that the district court would be inclined to revise the\nsentence based solely on the removal of the third-degree\nKentucky burglary charge, considering the additional drug\noffenses. Therefore, Hanson did not suffer a “miscarriage of\njustice” and his claim for collateral relief is denied.\n CONCLUSION\n We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hanson’s § 2255\nmotion in favor of respondent-appellee.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: James Hanson v. United States\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-1149\\n\\nJAMES B. HANSON,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:16-cv-00428-JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 22, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Following a six-year investigation into\\na methamphetamine operation, James Hanson was indicted on\\nMay 5, 2009, with conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and\\npossess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in excess\\nof 500 grams. The Government established Hanson’s three\\n\\f2 No. 18-1149\\n\\nprior drug offenses and Kentucky felony third-degree residen-\\ntial burglary conviction. On December 10, 2009, Hanson\\npleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Per the agree-\\nment, the government listed only one prior felony drug\\nconviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851, instead of all three potentially\\nqualifying convictions, and relied in part on Hanson’s prior\\nburglary conviction for a lesser recommended sentencing\\nrange under the Guidelines.\\n In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the\\nProbation Officer calculated Hanson’s total offense level as 34,\\nwith a criminal history of VI, for a Sentencing Guidelines range\\nof 262 to 327 months. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(3). After conducting\\na sentencing hearing where the district court heard from both\\nparties, the district court adopted the PSR, sentencing Hanson\\nto 262 months in prison followed by ten years of supervised\\nrelease. On appeal, Hanson challenges the district court’s\\ndenial of his collateral challenge to his sentence under 28\\nU.S.C. § 2255. We conclude that the district court did not\\ncommit any reversible errors and affirm.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Hanson argues that the district court erred when it in-\\ncluded his third-degree burglary as a crime of violence,\\nenhancing Hanson’s status to a career offender. We review the\\ndistrict court’s legal conclusions de novo. Hrobowski v. United\\nStates, 904 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n Postconviction sentences may be changed if the sentence\\n“was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the\\nUnited States, or [if] the court was without jurisdiction to\\nimpose such sentence, or [if] the sentence was in excess of the\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 3\\n\\nmaximum authorized by law … .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “[N]ot\\nevery error is corrigible in a post-conviction proceeding, even\\nif the error is not harmless.” Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d\\n820, 823 (7th Cir. 2013). Even errors that are not harmless may\\nnot be cognizable under a § 2255 proceeding. Id.\\n We have held that “relief under § 2255 is available ‘only in\\nextraordinary situations, such as an error of constitutional or\\njurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has\\noccurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”\\nUnited States v. Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014)\\n(quoting Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878–79 (7th Cir.\\n2013)). A defendant may file a § 2255 motion within one year\\nof the latest of four dates, including the date of final judgment\\nand “the date on which the right asserted was initially recog-\\nnized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly\\nrecognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively\\napplicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(1)\\nand (3).\\n Under § 2255(f)(1), a defendant has one year from the final\\njudgment to file a § 2255 motion. This court dismissed\\nHanson’s appeal on August 25, 2010. The conviction became\\nfinal on November 23, 2010. Hanson failed to file a § 2255\\nmotion within one year. The statute of limitations to file a\\n§ 2255 motion for Hanson’s final conviction ended on Novem-\\nber 23, 2011. Therefore, Hanson’s motion under § 2255(f)(1) is\\nuntimely.\\n Alternatively, Hanson argues the Supreme Court in Mathis\\nrecognized a new right on June 23, 2016, allowing him to file a\\n§ 2255 motion by June 23, 2017. However, the Supreme Court\\n\\f4 No. 18-1149\\n\\nstated in Mathis that the rules being applied came from\\nprecedent. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). “Our\\nprecedents make this a straightforward case. For more than\\n25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of\\nACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements.” Id.\\nat 2257. Instead, the Supreme Court distinguished between\\n“elements” and “means,” where “elements” are “constituent\\nparts” of a crime and “means” are “various factual ways of\\ncommitting some component of the offense.” Id. at 2249.\\nHanson has failed to show that the Supreme Court in Mathis\\nintended to create a new rule upon which the statute of\\nlimitations may run.\\n We briefly address Hanson’s letter to the court, which\\nconfuses the Government’s argument that Mathis must be\\ndeclared retroactive “by the Supreme Court.” Rather, the\\nGovernment states in its brief: “[n]evertheless, the measuring\\nperiod begins when the Supreme Court declares a new right,\\nnot when the courts acknowledge the right to be retroactive.”\\nWe understand the Government’s position as not requiring the\\nright to be declared retroactive by the Supreme Court, but\\nrather the Supreme Court must declare a new right for the\\ncourts to apply retroactivity.\\n Hanson argues the district court misapplied the career\\noffender enhancement under the advisory Guidelines, result-\\ning in a “miscarriage of justice.” Sentencing errors that can be\\nraised on direct appeal are generally not cognizable upon\\ncollateral review. Cognizable sentencing errors include\\nsentencing decisions rendered unlawful by a clarification in the\\nlaw or sentencing decisions that exceed the statutory maxi-\\nmum. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir.\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 5\\n\\n2011) (granting relief under the pre-Booker mandatory guide-\\nlines); and see Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 412–13 (7th\\nCir. 2010) (granting relief for errors in applying the statutory\\nenhancements under the Armed Criminal Career Act).\\n The Guidelines establish a career offender as a defendant\\nwho is “at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the\\noffense of conviction; the offense of conviction must be a felony\\nthat is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance\\noffense; and the defendant must have at least two prior felony\\nconvictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\\nsubstance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A judge uses advisory\\nGuidelines to determine whether the sentencing range is\\nconsistent with the appropriate considerations. 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a). Nonetheless, “the judge may not even presume that\\na sentence within the applicable Guidelines range would be\\nproper. [The judge] must first determine whether … the\\nsentencing considerations [comply with] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),\\nand if … not [the judge] may not impose it even though it is\\nwithin the applicable guidelines range.” Hawkins v. United\\nStates, 706 F.3d at 822.\\n A change in the law revoking the status under the now-\\nadvisory Guidelines of “crime of violence” from a prior\\nconviction is not cognizable upon collateral review. Coleman,\\n763 F.3d at 708–09. Here, the government concedes that the\\nKentucky third-degree burglary statute does not inherently\\ninvolve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” of a\\n“crime of violence” as part of the career offender designation.\\nBut the district court did not rely solely, or even principally, on\\nthe advisory Guidelines. Instead, it referenced multiple\\nconsiderations in imposing Hanson’s sentence, including the\\n\\f6 No. 18-1149\\n\\nadvisory Guidelines, the lengthy PSR, the argument of the\\nparties, and factors set forth in § 3553(a).\\n While this case directly involves, and is controlled by, our\\nprecedent on § 2255, our recent decision in Chazen regarding a\\n§ 2241 motion is aptly distinguishable here. In Chazen, we\\ndiscussed the statutory enhancement of the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act, which mandated a minimum 15-year sentence\\nfor a person with three or more prior convictions for a “violent\\nfelony” or “serious drug offense.” Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d\\n851, 853 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). Chazen\\nsought relief under § 2241, claiming the district court improp-\\nerly sentenced him to the enhanced minimum under the\\nstatute due to his prior burglary convictions, which were not\\n“violent felonies.” We found that “Mathis can provide the basis\\nfor [a] § 2241 petition … under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct” because the sentence at issue mandated a minimum\\nsentence of incarceration. Chazen, 938 F.3d at 862.\\n While Mathis may provide a basis for awarding habeas\\nrelief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 from an Armed Career Criminal\\nAct sentence as in Chazen, the reasoning of Chazen does not\\nextend to providing habeas relief from an application of the\\nadvisory Guidelines. Here, the district court sentenced Hanson\\nnot with mandatory minimums, but with combined consider-\\nations from the advisory Guidelines and the appropriate\\nfactors. While the Armed Career Criminal Act requires a\\nmandatory minimum of 15 years, a judge must independently\\ndetermine the sentence based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and\\nwhether the career offender enhancement applies. Therefore,\\nChazen does not afford relief to Hanson.\\n\\fNo. 18-1149 7\\n\\n Hanson claims the district court committed an arguable\\nerror in applying the advisory Guidelines that created a\\nmiscarriage of justice. Hawkins and Coleman are controlling\\nhere. As in Hawkins, the sentence imposed here was based on\\nadvisory Guidelines, not mandatory Guidelines or statutory\\nminimums, as in Chazen and cases prior to Booker. An error that\\nmay have occurred in calculating the Guidelines range does\\nnot constitute a “miscarriage of justice” when the “sentence is\\nwell below the ceiling imposed by Congress.” Coleman, 763\\nF.3d at 708 (citing Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824–25).\\n The difference between the Guidelines range with the\\nburglary compared to the range without the burglary is moot,\\nbecause the court could have easily relied on the additional\\ndrug offenses or other § 3553 factors. The possibility of a\\ndifferent sentence in light of the error is not enough to distin-\\nguish this case from Hawkins or Coleman. There is no reason to\\nbelieve that the district court would be inclined to revise the\\nsentence based solely on the removal of the third-degree\\nKentucky burglary charge, considering the additional drug\\noffenses. Therefore, Hanson did not suffer a “miscarriage of\\njustice” and his claim for collateral relief is denied.\\n CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hanson’s § 2255\\nmotion in favor of respondent-appellee.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4696,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671996,"string":"4,671,996"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Western Illinois Service Coord v. Illinois Department of Human S"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-2211"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-2211\\nWESTERN ILLINOIS SERVICE COORDINATION, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nPRAIRIELAND SERVICE COORDINATION, INC., et al.,\\n Intervening Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:19-cv-3127 — Richard Mills, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Circumstances often change as\\ntime passes. And changed circumstances can have conse-\\nquences in litigation. This appeal presents a good example.\\nOur review is limited to the denial of a preliminary injunction,\\n\\f2 No. 19-2211\\n\\nwhich sought to prevent an event—the shift in the award of\\nstate contracts for the provision of case management services\\nas part of Illinois’s Medicaid program. That transition oc-\\ncurred on July 1, 2019. During oral argument, the plaintiffs—\\nparties to the former contracts—acknowledged that it would\\nbe too disruptive to rewind the clock by somehow attempting\\nto reinstate those contracts. So, too, did they confirm that they\\nnow seek different forms of relief. In these circumstances, the\\npresent appeal is moot, so we dismiss it and remand for fur-\\nther proceedings.\\n I\\n A\\n The contracts at issue relate to Illinois’s administration of\\nits Medicaid program. The Medicaid statute establishes a sys-\\ntem through which the federal government provides financial\\nassistance to states to furnish medical care to low-income in-\\ndividuals. To receive funds, states must comply with various\\nrequirements, which the federal government oversees\\nthrough a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Hu-\\nman Services. Today all 50 states participate in Medicaid,\\nwhich provides medical coverage for over 65 million people\\nnationwide.\\n The Medicaid program allows states to provide certain\\nhome-based services to participants. States do so by choosing\\nto participate in what is known as the Home and Community\\nBased, or HCBS, waiver program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c).\\nThe program is considered a waiver program because, when\\na state’s application is approved, the federal government\\nwaives certain Medicaid requirements that would otherwise\\napply. See Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 906–07 (7th Cir.\\n\\fNo. 19-2211 3\\n\\n2016) (explaining the rationale behind HCBS waivers in\\ngreater detail). Most significantly, waivers eliminate the re-\\nquirement that services be provided in an institution. They\\nalso do away with some of Medicaid’s uniformity rules, al-\\nlowing states to target specific geographic areas or certain\\ngroups of people at risk of institutionalization. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1396n(c)(3).\\n Illinois currently operates nine waivers, including one for\\nadults with developmental disabilities overseen by the Divi-\\nsion of Developmental Disabilities within the Illinois Depart-\\nment of Human Services. Under this waiver, Illinois contracts\\nwith non-profit organizations to provide case management\\nservices for adults with developmental disabilities receiving\\nhome- and community-based services as part of Medicaid.\\nOrganizations that provide these case management services\\nare known as Independent Service Coordination agencies,\\nsometimes shorthanded ISCs.\\n In the past, Illinois had contracted with 17 ISCs, which op-\\nerated in as many regions throughout the state. Illinois\\nawarded the contracts through a noncompetitive, annual re-\\nnewal process. The three plaintiff agencies before us had re-\\nceived contracts and provided case management services to\\nMedicaid participants for at least 25 years. This all changed\\nwhen, in September 2018, the state announced a new compet-\\nitive bidding process for the contracts that would begin on\\nJuly 1, 2019. The plaintiff agencies submitted bids but learned\\non January 2 that their existing contracts would not be re-\\nnewed. The new contracts went into effect on July 1, and ad-\\nministrative services are now being provided by eight agen-\\ncies operating in 12 regions across Illinois.\\n\\f4 No. 19-2211\\n\\n B\\n The three plaintiff agencies and three individual plain-\\ntiffs—their former clients—filed suit on May 16, 2019. Invok-\\ning 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they allege a violation of the Medicaid\\nAct, contending that they, as ISCs, are covered by Medicaid’s\\nfree-choice-of-provider provision, which requires that Medi-\\ncaid recipients be allowed to select any qualified provider for\\ntheir services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23); see also Planned\\nParenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dept. Health,\\n699 F.3d 962, 978 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining the operation of\\nMedicaid’s free-choice-of-provider provision). The plaintiffs’\\nposition is straightforward: Illinois’s awarding of the new\\ncontracts to new ISCs meant that the adults with developmen-\\ntal disabilities who were receiving case management services\\nwould no longer be able to choose their ISC and instead\\nwould have to transition to one of the new contract recipients.\\nThe plaintiffs, in short, see Illinois’s switch to a competitive\\nbidding process as unlawfully blocking their freedom to\\nchoose a provider of case management services. Alongside\\ntheir Medicaid claim, the plaintiffs also brought claims under\\nIllinois administrative law.\\n On June 5, 2019, knowing the new contracts were set to go\\ninto effect in less than 30 days, the plaintiffs sought a prelim-\\ninary injunction. They wanted to prevent the new contracts\\nfrom taking effect on July 1 and instead leave all existing con-\\ntracts in place. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion\\non June 25, concluding that they were unlikely to succeed on\\nthe merits of either their federal or state claims. The court rea-\\nsoned that, as providers of administrative services but not\\nmedical services, ISCs like the plaintiffs were not “qualified\\nproviders” within the meaning of the Medicaid statute and\\n\\fNo. 19-2211 5\\n\\ntherefore were not covered by the enactment’s free-choice-of-\\nprovider provision. In so concluding, however, the court rec-\\nognized that the implementation of the new contracts would\\ncause irreparable harm to both the plaintiff agencies and indi-\\nvidual plaintiffs, who would lose all or most of their funding\\nand be forced to switch case managers.\\n The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the preliminary in-\\njunction that same day. Four days later, on June 27, the plain-\\ntiffs filed a motion for emergency injunctive relief pending ap-\\npeal in this court. We denied that motion on June 28, and the\\nnew contracts went into effect as scheduled on July 1.\\n II\\n A\\n We put the appeal on our fall calendar and heard oral ar-\\ngument on September 25. During oral argument, we asked\\nwhat relief plaintiffs were seeking now that the new contracts\\nhad taken effect. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded by explaining\\nthat the former agencies were not asking us to vacate the new\\ncontracts and reinstate the old agreements. To her credit,\\nplaintiffs’ counsel candidly acknowledged that reversing\\ncourse at this point this would be too disruptive, particularly\\nto the Medicaid participants with developmental disabilities\\nwho receive case management services. While we are not cer-\\ntain what injunctive relief the plaintiffs now desire, it is clear\\nthat the passage of time and the new contracts taking effect\\nhave caused plaintiffs to revisit their prior request for prelim-\\ninary injunctive relief. Indeed, plaintiffs’ counsel made plain\\nduring oral argument that her clients are not seeking outright\\nreversal of the district court’s decision denying the prelimi-\\nnary injunction.\\n\\f6 No. 19-2211\\n\\n For their part, defendants represented that the new con-\\ntracts went into effect on July 1 as planned. We also learned\\nthat the intervenors—two of the new agencies presently un-\\nder contract—have hired many of the same case managers\\nwho had been employed by the previous agencies. While\\nthere have likely been some bumps along the road, nothing in\\nthe record before us or conveyed at oral argument suggests\\nany material issues or shortcomings in the new agencies’ im-\\nplementation of case management services for the individuals\\ncovered under this Medicaid program.\\n B\\n The parties’ briefing understandably focused on the mer-\\nits issue of whether the plaintiff ISCs constituted qualified\\nproviders and thus were covered by Medicaid’s free-choice-\\nof-provider provision. But with the plaintiffs no longer chal-\\nlenging the denial of their preliminary injunction, we do not\\nhave to decide that question. We can avoid tracing the statu-\\ntory interpretation of “qualified providers” or determining\\nwhat kinds of services the plaintiff agencies provide. The pas-\\nsage of time has rendered the issue—embodied entirely as it\\nis in the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ request for a\\npreliminary injunction—moot.\\n Mootness roots itself in Article III’s case or controversy\\nlimitation, leaving us “without power to decide questions that\\ncannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before [us].”\\nNorth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). By its terms,\\nthis appeal extends no further than the plaintiffs’ challenge to\\nthe district court’s denial of their request for preliminary in-\\njunctive relief to stop the new contracts from taking effect. Not\\nonly has that event occurred, the plaintiffs have made clear\\nthat they are not asking us to unwind it. They acknowledge it\\n\\fNo. 19-2211 7\\n\\nwould be difficult and likely even more harmful to their cli-\\nents to change course once again, particularly in the absence\\nof evidence showing that any of the new ISCs have dropped\\nthe ball in their provision of case management services.\\n We are without jurisdiction to go further. This appeal is\\nmoot. The proper course, then, is to dismiss the appeal and\\nallow the case to return to the district court, where plaintiffs,\\nif they so choose, will be free to continue to litigate the merits\\nof their claims and where management of next steps will re-\\nmain in the sound discretion of the district court. See Gjertsen\\nv. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of City of Chi., 751 F.2d 199, 202 (7th\\nCir. 1984) (explaining that when a preliminary injunction un-\\nder appeal has become moot but the case itself has not, “the\\nusual practice is just to dismiss the appeal as moot and not\\nvacate the order appealed from”).\\n In these circumstances, then, we DISMISS the appeal.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449249/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671996/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Western Illinois Service Coord v. Illinois Department of Human S\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-2211\nWESTERN ILLINOIS SERVICE COORDINATION, et al.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n v.\n\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees,\n\n v.\n\nPRAIRIELAND SERVICE COORDINATION, INC., et al.,\n Intervening Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 3:19-cv-3127 — Richard Mills, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Circumstances often change as\ntime passes. And changed circumstances can have conse-\nquences in litigation. This appeal presents a good example.\nOur review is limited to the denial of a preliminary injunction,\n\f2 No. 19-2211\n\nwhich sought to prevent an event—the shift in the award of\nstate contracts for the provision of case management services\nas part of Illinois’s Medicaid program. That transition oc-\ncurred on July 1, 2019. During oral argument, the plaintiffs—\nparties to the former contracts—acknowledged that it would\nbe too disruptive to rewind the clock by somehow attempting\nto reinstate those contracts. So, too, did they confirm that they\nnow seek different forms of relief. In these circumstances, the\npresent appeal is moot, so we dismiss it and remand for fur-\nther proceedings.\n I\n A\n The contracts at issue relate to Illinois’s administration of\nits Medicaid program. The Medicaid statute establishes a sys-\ntem through which the federal government provides financial\nassistance to states to furnish medical care to low-income in-\ndividuals. To receive funds, states must comply with various\nrequirements, which the federal government oversees\nthrough a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Hu-\nman Services. Today all 50 states participate in Medicaid,\nwhich provides medical coverage for over 65 million people\nnationwide.\n The Medicaid program allows states to provide certain\nhome-based services to participants. States do so by choosing\nto participate in what is known as the Home and Community\nBased, or HCBS, waiver program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c).\nThe program is considered a waiver program because, when\na state’s application is approved, the federal government\nwaives certain Medicaid requirements that would otherwise\napply. See Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 906–07 (7th Cir.\n\fNo. 19-2211 3\n\n2016) (explaining the rationale behind HCBS waivers in\ngreater detail). Most significantly, waivers eliminate the re-\nquirement that services be provided in an institution. They\nalso do away with some of Medicaid’s uniformity rules, al-\nlowing states to target specific geographic areas or certain\ngroups of people at risk of institutionalization. See 42 U.S.C.\n§ 1396n(c)(3).\n Illinois currently operates nine waivers, including one for\nadults with developmental disabilities overseen by the Divi-\nsion of Developmental Disabilities within the Illinois Depart-\nment of Human Services. Under this waiver, Illinois contracts\nwith non-profit organizations to provide case management\nservices for adults with developmental disabilities receiving\nhome- and community-based services as part of Medicaid.\nOrganizations that provide these case management services\nare known as Independent Service Coordination agencies,\nsometimes shorthanded ISCs.\n In the past, Illinois had contracted with 17 ISCs, which op-\nerated in as many regions throughout the state. Illinois\nawarded the contracts through a noncompetitive, annual re-\nnewal process. The three plaintiff agencies before us had re-\nceived contracts and provided case management services to\nMedicaid participants for at least 25 years. This all changed\nwhen, in September 2018, the state announced a new compet-\nitive bidding process for the contracts that would begin on\nJuly 1, 2019. The plaintiff agencies submitted bids but learned\non January 2 that their existing contracts would not be re-\nnewed. The new contracts went into effect on July 1, and ad-\nministrative services are now being provided by eight agen-\ncies operating in 12 regions across Illinois.\n\f4 No. 19-2211\n\n B\n The three plaintiff agencies and three individual plain-\ntiffs—their former clients—filed suit on May 16, 2019. Invok-\ning 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they allege a violation of the Medicaid\nAct, contending that they, as ISCs, are covered by Medicaid’s\nfree-choice-of-provider provision, which requires that Medi-\ncaid recipients be allowed to select any qualified provider for\ntheir services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23); see also Planned\nParenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dept. Health,\n699 F.3d 962, 978 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining the operation of\nMedicaid’s free-choice-of-provider provision). The plaintiffs’\nposition is straightforward: Illinois’s awarding of the new\ncontracts to new ISCs meant that the adults with developmen-\ntal disabilities who were receiving case management services\nwould no longer be able to choose their ISC and instead\nwould have to transition to one of the new contract recipients.\nThe plaintiffs, in short, see Illinois’s switch to a competitive\nbidding process as unlawfully blocking their freedom to\nchoose a provider of case management services. Alongside\ntheir Medicaid claim, the plaintiffs also brought claims under\nIllinois administrative law.\n On June 5, 2019, knowing the new contracts were set to go\ninto effect in less than 30 days, the plaintiffs sought a prelim-\ninary injunction. They wanted to prevent the new contracts\nfrom taking effect on July 1 and instead leave all existing con-\ntracts in place. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion\non June 25, concluding that they were unlikely to succeed on\nthe merits of either their federal or state claims. The court rea-\nsoned that, as providers of administrative services but not\nmedical services, ISCs like the plaintiffs were not “qualified\nproviders” within the meaning of the Medicaid statute and\n\fNo. 19-2211 5\n\ntherefore were not covered by the enactment’s free-choice-of-\nprovider provision. In so concluding, however, the court rec-\nognized that the implementation of the new contracts would\ncause irreparable harm to both the plaintiff agencies and indi-\nvidual plaintiffs, who would lose all or most of their funding\nand be forced to switch case managers.\n The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the preliminary in-\njunction that same day. Four days later, on June 27, the plain-\ntiffs filed a motion for emergency injunctive relief pending ap-\npeal in this court. We denied that motion on June 28, and the\nnew contracts went into effect as scheduled on July 1.\n II\n A\n We put the appeal on our fall calendar and heard oral ar-\ngument on September 25. During oral argument, we asked\nwhat relief plaintiffs were seeking now that the new contracts\nhad taken effect. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded by explaining\nthat the former agencies were not asking us to vacate the new\ncontracts and reinstate the old agreements. To her credit,\nplaintiffs’ counsel candidly acknowledged that reversing\ncourse at this point this would be too disruptive, particularly\nto the Medicaid participants with developmental disabilities\nwho receive case management services. While we are not cer-\ntain what injunctive relief the plaintiffs now desire, it is clear\nthat the passage of time and the new contracts taking effect\nhave caused plaintiffs to revisit their prior request for prelim-\ninary injunctive relief. Indeed, plaintiffs’ counsel made plain\nduring oral argument that her clients are not seeking outright\nreversal of the district court’s decision denying the prelimi-\nnary injunction.\n\f6 No. 19-2211\n\n For their part, defendants represented that the new con-\ntracts went into effect on July 1 as planned. We also learned\nthat the intervenors—two of the new agencies presently un-\nder contract—have hired many of the same case managers\nwho had been employed by the previous agencies. While\nthere have likely been some bumps along the road, nothing in\nthe record before us or conveyed at oral argument suggests\nany material issues or shortcomings in the new agencies’ im-\nplementation of case management services for the individuals\ncovered under this Medicaid program.\n B\n The parties’ briefing understandably focused on the mer-\nits issue of whether the plaintiff ISCs constituted qualified\nproviders and thus were covered by Medicaid’s free-choice-\nof-provider provision. But with the plaintiffs no longer chal-\nlenging the denial of their preliminary injunction, we do not\nhave to decide that question. We can avoid tracing the statu-\ntory interpretation of “qualified providers” or determining\nwhat kinds of services the plaintiff agencies provide. The pas-\nsage of time has rendered the issue—embodied entirely as it\nis in the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ request for a\npreliminary injunction—moot.\n Mootness roots itself in Article III’s case or controversy\nlimitation, leaving us “without power to decide questions that\ncannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before [us].”\nNorth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). By its terms,\nthis appeal extends no further than the plaintiffs’ challenge to\nthe district court’s denial of their request for preliminary in-\njunctive relief to stop the new contracts from taking effect. Not\nonly has that event occurred, the plaintiffs have made clear\nthat they are not asking us to unwind it. They acknowledge it\n\fNo. 19-2211 7\n\nwould be difficult and likely even more harmful to their cli-\nents to change course once again, particularly in the absence\nof evidence showing that any of the new ISCs have dropped\nthe ball in their provision of case management services.\n We are without jurisdiction to go further. This appeal is\nmoot. The proper course, then, is to dismiss the appeal and\nallow the case to return to the district court, where plaintiffs,\nif they so choose, will be free to continue to litigate the merits\nof their claims and where management of next steps will re-\nmain in the sound discretion of the district court. See Gjertsen\nv. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of City of Chi., 751 F.2d 199, 202 (7th\nCir. 1984) (explaining that when a preliminary injunction un-\nder appeal has become moot but the case itself has not, “the\nusual practice is just to dismiss the appeal as moot and not\nvacate the order appealed from”).\n In these circumstances, then, we DISMISS the appeal.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Western Illinois Service Coord v. Illinois Department of Human S\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-2211\\nWESTERN ILLINOIS SERVICE COORDINATION, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nPRAIRIELAND SERVICE COORDINATION, INC., et al.,\\n Intervening Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:19-cv-3127 — Richard Mills, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Circumstances often change as\\ntime passes. And changed circumstances can have conse-\\nquences in litigation. This appeal presents a good example.\\nOur review is limited to the denial of a preliminary injunction,\\n\\f2 No. 19-2211\\n\\nwhich sought to prevent an event—the shift in the award of\\nstate contracts for the provision of case management services\\nas part of Illinois’s Medicaid program. That transition oc-\\ncurred on July 1, 2019. During oral argument, the plaintiffs—\\nparties to the former contracts—acknowledged that it would\\nbe too disruptive to rewind the clock by somehow attempting\\nto reinstate those contracts. So, too, did they confirm that they\\nnow seek different forms of relief. In these circumstances, the\\npresent appeal is moot, so we dismiss it and remand for fur-\\nther proceedings.\\n I\\n A\\n The contracts at issue relate to Illinois’s administration of\\nits Medicaid program. The Medicaid statute establishes a sys-\\ntem through which the federal government provides financial\\nassistance to states to furnish medical care to low-income in-\\ndividuals. To receive funds, states must comply with various\\nrequirements, which the federal government oversees\\nthrough a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Hu-\\nman Services. Today all 50 states participate in Medicaid,\\nwhich provides medical coverage for over 65 million people\\nnationwide.\\n The Medicaid program allows states to provide certain\\nhome-based services to participants. States do so by choosing\\nto participate in what is known as the Home and Community\\nBased, or HCBS, waiver program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c).\\nThe program is considered a waiver program because, when\\na state’s application is approved, the federal government\\nwaives certain Medicaid requirements that would otherwise\\napply. See Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 906–07 (7th Cir.\\n\\fNo. 19-2211 3\\n\\n2016) (explaining the rationale behind HCBS waivers in\\ngreater detail). Most significantly, waivers eliminate the re-\\nquirement that services be provided in an institution. They\\nalso do away with some of Medicaid’s uniformity rules, al-\\nlowing states to target specific geographic areas or certain\\ngroups of people at risk of institutionalization. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1396n(c)(3).\\n Illinois currently operates nine waivers, including one for\\nadults with developmental disabilities overseen by the Divi-\\nsion of Developmental Disabilities within the Illinois Depart-\\nment of Human Services. Under this waiver, Illinois contracts\\nwith non-profit organizations to provide case management\\nservices for adults with developmental disabilities receiving\\nhome- and community-based services as part of Medicaid.\\nOrganizations that provide these case management services\\nare known as Independent Service Coordination agencies,\\nsometimes shorthanded ISCs.\\n In the past, Illinois had contracted with 17 ISCs, which op-\\nerated in as many regions throughout the state. Illinois\\nawarded the contracts through a noncompetitive, annual re-\\nnewal process. The three plaintiff agencies before us had re-\\nceived contracts and provided case management services to\\nMedicaid participants for at least 25 years. This all changed\\nwhen, in September 2018, the state announced a new compet-\\nitive bidding process for the contracts that would begin on\\nJuly 1, 2019. The plaintiff agencies submitted bids but learned\\non January 2 that their existing contracts would not be re-\\nnewed. The new contracts went into effect on July 1, and ad-\\nministrative services are now being provided by eight agen-\\ncies operating in 12 regions across Illinois.\\n\\f4 No. 19-2211\\n\\n B\\n The three plaintiff agencies and three individual plain-\\ntiffs—their former clients—filed suit on May 16, 2019. Invok-\\ning 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they allege a violation of the Medicaid\\nAct, contending that they, as ISCs, are covered by Medicaid’s\\nfree-choice-of-provider provision, which requires that Medi-\\ncaid recipients be allowed to select any qualified provider for\\ntheir services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23); see also Planned\\nParenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dept. Health,\\n699 F.3d 962, 978 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining the operation of\\nMedicaid’s free-choice-of-provider provision). The plaintiffs’\\nposition is straightforward: Illinois’s awarding of the new\\ncontracts to new ISCs meant that the adults with developmen-\\ntal disabilities who were receiving case management services\\nwould no longer be able to choose their ISC and instead\\nwould have to transition to one of the new contract recipients.\\nThe plaintiffs, in short, see Illinois’s switch to a competitive\\nbidding process as unlawfully blocking their freedom to\\nchoose a provider of case management services. Alongside\\ntheir Medicaid claim, the plaintiffs also brought claims under\\nIllinois administrative law.\\n On June 5, 2019, knowing the new contracts were set to go\\ninto effect in less than 30 days, the plaintiffs sought a prelim-\\ninary injunction. They wanted to prevent the new contracts\\nfrom taking effect on July 1 and instead leave all existing con-\\ntracts in place. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion\\non June 25, concluding that they were unlikely to succeed on\\nthe merits of either their federal or state claims. The court rea-\\nsoned that, as providers of administrative services but not\\nmedical services, ISCs like the plaintiffs were not “qualified\\nproviders” within the meaning of the Medicaid statute and\\n\\fNo. 19-2211 5\\n\\ntherefore were not covered by the enactment’s free-choice-of-\\nprovider provision. In so concluding, however, the court rec-\\nognized that the implementation of the new contracts would\\ncause irreparable harm to both the plaintiff agencies and indi-\\nvidual plaintiffs, who would lose all or most of their funding\\nand be forced to switch case managers.\\n The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the preliminary in-\\njunction that same day. Four days later, on June 27, the plain-\\ntiffs filed a motion for emergency injunctive relief pending ap-\\npeal in this court. We denied that motion on June 28, and the\\nnew contracts went into effect as scheduled on July 1.\\n II\\n A\\n We put the appeal on our fall calendar and heard oral ar-\\ngument on September 25. During oral argument, we asked\\nwhat relief plaintiffs were seeking now that the new contracts\\nhad taken effect. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded by explaining\\nthat the former agencies were not asking us to vacate the new\\ncontracts and reinstate the old agreements. To her credit,\\nplaintiffs’ counsel candidly acknowledged that reversing\\ncourse at this point this would be too disruptive, particularly\\nto the Medicaid participants with developmental disabilities\\nwho receive case management services. While we are not cer-\\ntain what injunctive relief the plaintiffs now desire, it is clear\\nthat the passage of time and the new contracts taking effect\\nhave caused plaintiffs to revisit their prior request for prelim-\\ninary injunctive relief. Indeed, plaintiffs’ counsel made plain\\nduring oral argument that her clients are not seeking outright\\nreversal of the district court’s decision denying the prelimi-\\nnary injunction.\\n\\f6 No. 19-2211\\n\\n For their part, defendants represented that the new con-\\ntracts went into effect on July 1 as planned. We also learned\\nthat the intervenors—two of the new agencies presently un-\\nder contract—have hired many of the same case managers\\nwho had been employed by the previous agencies. While\\nthere have likely been some bumps along the road, nothing in\\nthe record before us or conveyed at oral argument suggests\\nany material issues or shortcomings in the new agencies’ im-\\nplementation of case management services for the individuals\\ncovered under this Medicaid program.\\n B\\n The parties’ briefing understandably focused on the mer-\\nits issue of whether the plaintiff ISCs constituted qualified\\nproviders and thus were covered by Medicaid’s free-choice-\\nof-provider provision. But with the plaintiffs no longer chal-\\nlenging the denial of their preliminary injunction, we do not\\nhave to decide that question. We can avoid tracing the statu-\\ntory interpretation of “qualified providers” or determining\\nwhat kinds of services the plaintiff agencies provide. The pas-\\nsage of time has rendered the issue—embodied entirely as it\\nis in the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ request for a\\npreliminary injunction—moot.\\n Mootness roots itself in Article III’s case or controversy\\nlimitation, leaving us “without power to decide questions that\\ncannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before [us].”\\nNorth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). By its terms,\\nthis appeal extends no further than the plaintiffs’ challenge to\\nthe district court’s denial of their request for preliminary in-\\njunctive relief to stop the new contracts from taking effect. Not\\nonly has that event occurred, the plaintiffs have made clear\\nthat they are not asking us to unwind it. They acknowledge it\\n\\fNo. 19-2211 7\\n\\nwould be difficult and likely even more harmful to their cli-\\nents to change course once again, particularly in the absence\\nof evidence showing that any of the new ISCs have dropped\\nthe ball in their provision of case management services.\\n We are without jurisdiction to go further. This appeal is\\nmoot. The proper course, then, is to dismiss the appeal and\\nallow the case to return to the district court, where plaintiffs,\\nif they so choose, will be free to continue to litigate the merits\\nof their claims and where management of next steps will re-\\nmain in the sound discretion of the district court. See Gjertsen\\nv. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of City of Chi., 751 F.2d 199, 202 (7th\\nCir. 1984) (explaining that when a preliminary injunction un-\\nder appeal has become moot but the case itself has not, “the\\nusual practice is just to dismiss the appeal as moot and not\\nvacate the order appealed from”).\\n In these circumstances, then, we DISMISS the appeal.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4697,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4671997,"string":"4,671,997"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Michael P. Haldorson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2279"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2279\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL P. HALDORSON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cr-00623-1 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Michael Haldorson is a self-pro-\\nclaimed fireworks enthusiast. But he was also a drug dealer.\\nHaldorson was arrested on his way to a second controlled buy\\nand, along with drugs, officers found three pipe bombs in his\\ncar. He was charged with several counts related to drugs, ex-\\nplosives, and a firearm. Before trial, Haldorson filed several\\nmotions to suppress evidence, challenging his arrest, the ad-\\nmissibility of his post-arrest statements, and the searches of\\n\\f2 No. 18-2279\\n\\nhis car, apartment bedroom, and rented storage locker. All\\nwere denied.\\n Haldorson proceeded to trial and a jury convicted him on\\nfour counts of the seven-count indictment: Count One for dis-\\ntribution of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Count Two for pos-\\nsession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1);\\nCount Three for possession of MDMA, or ecstasy, and co-\\ncaine, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); and Count Four for possession of an\\nexplosive during the commission of a felony, 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 844(h)(2). The jury acquitted him on two additional charges\\nand the government dismissed another count at trial. The dis-\\ntrict court later vacated Count Three because it was a lesser-\\nincluded offense of Count Two. The district court sentenced\\nHaldorson to a term of imprisonment of 192 months.\\n On appeal Haldorson raises three issues. First, Haldorson\\nargues that the district court erred in denying the motions to\\nsuppress the evidence seized from his car and his apartment\\nbecause the officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest\\nhim and there were no exigent circumstances to justify the\\nwarrantless search of his apartment bedroom. Second, he as-\\nserts that the jury instructions constructively amended Count\\nFour of the indictment, unlawfully carrying an explosive, in\\nviolation of the Fifth Amendment by permitting the jury to\\nconvict him on a broader basis than the indictment charged.\\nThird, and finally, Haldorson contends that he did not receive\\na fair trial due to a multitude of alleged mistakes and errors\\nduring the investigation and asks us to vacate his convictions.\\n We conclude that probable cause supported the arrest, ex-\\nigent circumstances existed for the search of the bedroom, and\\nHaldorson had a full and fair opportunity to defend himself\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 3\\n\\nat trial. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s judgment in\\nall respects.\\n I. The Arrest and Vehicle Search\\n We begin, naturally, with Haldorson’s arrest and the re-\\nsulting search of his vehicle.\\nA. Background\\n Haldorson was arrested on June 23, 2015, but his case\\nstarts a few weeks earlier. Sometime in April or May 2015,\\nHaldorson first came on the radar of Officer Thomas Insley\\nvia a confidential informant. Officer Insley was, at the time, a\\npatrol officer with the Village of Rockdale Police Department\\nin Illinois. He was also assigned to a specialized narcotics\\nunit, the Will County Cooperative Police Assistance Team\\n(CPAT)—a collective of officers from local police departments\\nunder the umbrella of the Illinois State Police—as an Inspec-\\ntor. (For ease we will use the title of “Officer” for Insley\\nthroughout, although he also held the title of “Inspector” dur-\\ning the relevant time period.) CPAT inspectors, in general,\\nconduct narcotics investigations, control informants, and go\\nundercover. Officer Insley was the primary CPAT investigator\\nfor Haldorson’s case.\\n Officer Insley had been working with this particular con-\\nfidential informant for a few months—a detail we will return\\nto later—when the informant told Officer Insley that he could\\npurchase cocaine from an individual he knew as “Mike\\nJones.” The informant provided Officer Insley with a picture\\nof Mike Jones’s vehicle, including the license plate (that read\\n\\f4 No. 18-2279\\n\\n“MKJNZ”), and his telephone number.1 Officer Insley ran the\\nlicense plate through a law enforcement database and learned\\nthat it was registered to Haldorson. The vehicle information\\nlisted on the registration also matched the photograph of Hal-\\ndorson’s car—a black Pontiac G8. Officer Insley then showed\\nthe informant a picture of Haldorson, who the informant\\nidentified as Mike Jones. At this point, Officer Insley asked the\\ninformant to set up a deal.\\n On June 1, 2015, the informant contacted Officer Insley\\nand told him that he could make a buy from Haldorson. Of-\\nficer Insley proceeded to prepare for the controlled purchase\\nby providing the informant with funds to buy the narcotics,\\nwiring the informant with an audio transmitter and recorder\\nto monitor the deal, and setting up a visual surveillance team\\nof other CPAT officers. Before heading to the controlled buy,\\nOfficer Insley also searched the informant and his vehicle to\\nmake sure that he had no contraband, as is standard in these\\noperations.\\n Officer Insley followed the confidential informant to a\\nWalmart parking lot in Joliet, Illinois, where he was going to\\nmeet Haldorson, and parked about an aisle over from the in-\\nformant. Haldorson then arrived, parked next to the inform-\\nant’s car, and the informant got out of his car and into Hal-\\ndorson’s car. At about that same time a customer pulled into\\nthe lot and parked in between Officer Insley and Haldorson’s\\ncar, obstructing Officer Insley’s view of the transaction. Not\\n\\n1 This Mike Jones’s phone number was not, however, 281-330-8004. For\\nthose unfamiliar with the reference, Mike Jones is an American rapper\\nwhose hit single in 2005 included a verse that recited his phone number\\nand told listeners to “hit Mike Jones up on the low.” See Mike Jones, Back\\nThen, on Who Is Mike Jones? (Warner Bros. Records 2005).\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 5\\n\\nto worry, though, Officer Insley was still able to listen to the\\ndeal in realtime from the audio transmitter.\\n After the deal went down, Officer Insley observed a black\\ncar matching the description of Haldorson’s car drive away\\nand relayed to the rest of the surveillance team that the con-\\ntrolled buy was successful and to follow Haldorson’s car.\\nMeanwhile, Officer Insley followed the informant to a prear-\\nranged location where Officer Insley retrieved the drugs from\\nthe informant, as well as re-searched the informant and his\\nvehicle. The confidential informant had purchased 1.7 grams\\nof cocaine from Haldorson in the transaction.\\n The surveillance team did not stop Haldorson that even-\\ning; the officers eventually lost him when they got stopped at\\na red light. But the plan was never to stop or arrest Haldorson\\non June 1st because Officer Insley was just beginning his in-\\nvestigation into Haldorson. Further, Officer Insley testified\\nthat if the officers arrested Haldorson immediately after the\\ncontrolled buy, it would have tipped off Haldorson that he\\nhad been set-up by the confidential informant. Officer Insley\\nwas using the same informant in other ongoing investigations\\nand did not want to burn the informant’s identity.\\n From the record it appears that very little was done to ad-\\nvance the Haldorson investigation between the June 1st con-\\ntrolled buy and June 23rd. There were perhaps, though it is\\nsomewhat unclear, attempts by the confidential informant to\\nreach out to Haldorson to set up another controlled buy on\\nJune 2nd and 5th, but those went nowhere.\\n On June 23, 2015, the day at the center of this case, the con-\\nfidential informant told Officer Insley that he could arrange\\nanother drug deal with Haldorson. The plan this time was for\\n\\f6 No. 18-2279\\n\\nthe informant to set it up but for officers to stop Haldorson on\\nhis way to the deal and arrest him. Stopping and arresting\\nHaldorson before the actual drug deal would, once again, pre-\\nserve the confidential informant’s anonymity. Eventually\\nHaldorson and the informant agreed to meet in the Village of\\nPlainfield, Illinois, specifically at Plainfield Central High\\nSchool. Officer Insley then arranged for a Plainfield police of-\\nficer in a marked car to pull Haldorson over.\\n Officer Friddle of the Plainfield Police Department posi-\\ntioned himself near the high school and waited for Haldorson\\nto pass by based on a description of Haldorson’s vehicle that\\nCPAT officers provided: black Pontiac G8 with a White Sox\\nspecialty license plate and red lights in the front grille of the\\ncar (that may or may not be illuminated). According to Officer\\nFriddle, he soon saw a black car approaching with red lights\\nin the grille.2 As it got closer, he could see the White Sox spe-\\ncialty plates too. Officer Friddle pulled out to follow Haldor-\\nson’s car, activated his emergency lights, and pulled Haldor-\\nson over at the entrance of Plainfield Central High School. The\\nstop was pretextual, and Officer Friddle made up some\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2 Haldorson strongly contested—and still does—the officers’ testimony\\nabout both the presence of the red lights on his car at the June 1st con-\\ntrolled buy (Haldorson testified and introduced receipts to demonstrate\\nthat the lights were not installed until three days later on June 4th) and\\nwhether the red lights were in fact illuminated when he was pulled over\\non June 23rd. The district court agreed with Haldorson on this point, find-\\ning that although there was a red area in the vent on top of the front hood\\nof the vehicle, there were not illuminated red lights. In the end, any dis-\\npute regarding the red grille lights is inconsequential to the contested is-\\nsues in this appeal.\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 7\\n\\nexcuses to buy time for CPAT officers to arrive on scene and\\ntake over.\\n Officer Mario Marzetta, a police officer with the Plainfield\\nPolice Department who at the time was also assigned to\\nCPAT, arrived at the traffic stop shortly thereafter and ar-\\nrested Haldorson. Another officer transported Haldorson to\\nthe Plainfield Police Department. Officer Marzetta then also\\ndrove Haldorson’s vehicle to the Plainfield Police Department\\nand parked it in the sally port, or the garage at the station,\\nwhere he and another CPAT inspector searched it.\\n The officers found numerous drugs—marijuana, cocaine,\\ncrack cocaine, MDMA or ecstasy, prescription pills, psilocy-\\nbin mushrooms—fireworks, and suspected pipe bombs in\\nHaldorson’s car. Upon discovering the pipe bombs, the offic-\\ners ceased their search and called in agents from the Bureau\\nof Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the\\nCook County Sheriff’s Police Bomb Squad. The ATF agents\\nand bomb technicians removed the explosives from the vehi-\\ncle to a safe area and rendered them safe.\\n We pause the story here to address Haldorson’s challenge\\nto his arrest and the search of his vehicle.\\nB. Analysis\\n Haldorson was later indicted on several federal charges.\\nHe thereafter moved to suppress, among other evidence, the\\nexplosives and narcotics discovered during the vehicle search\\nbecause the officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest\\nhim. The district court, after holding a two-day evidentiary\\nhearing, denied his motions to suppress. In reviewing the dis-\\ntrict court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review ques-\\ntions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2279\\n\\nUnited States v. Cherry, 920 F.3d 1126, 1132 (7th Cir. 2019). We\\nmust defer to credibility determinations that the district court\\nmade based on the testimony presented to it, absent clear er-\\nror. United States v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n 1. Probable cause to arrest Haldorson\\n The officers did not have a warrant to arrest Haldorson,\\n“but an officer may make a warrantless arrest consistent with\\nthe Fourth Amendment if there is ‘probable cause to believe\\nthat a crime has been committed.’” United States v. Daniels,\\n803 F.3d 335, 354 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Washington v.\\nHaupert, 481 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2007)). “Police officers pos-\\nsess probable cause to arrest when the facts and circum-\\nstances within their knowledge and of which they have rea-\\nsonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a\\nprudent person in believing that the suspect has committed\\nan offense.” United States v. Howard, 883 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (quotations omitted). We examine “the totality of the cir-\\ncumstances in a common sense manner” to determine\\nwhether probable cause exists in a given situation. United\\nStates v. Schaafsma, 318 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n Haldorson’s primary contention is that the information\\nfrom the controlled buy was too stale three weeks later to sup-\\nport probable cause for an arrest. The mere passage of time\\ndoes not necessarily dissipate the probable cause for an arrest.\\nIt is well-established that “there is no requirement that an of-\\nfender be arrested the moment probable cause is established.”\\nUnited States v. Reis, 906 F.2d 284, 289 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing\\nHoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966)). In Reis we\\nfound that an “overnight delay simply has no bearing on the\\nexistence of probable cause for arrest,” id., and we see no rea-\\nson to treat reasonably longer delays any different. Indeed,\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 9\\n\\nwe have previously held that the defendant’s participation in\\na controlled drug buy a month earlier “provided the police\\nwith probable cause to arrest [the suspect] which was not ren-\\ndered stale by the passage of one month.” United States v.\\nMitchell, 523 F. App’x 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).\\nOur sister circuits also agree that the passage of time alone\\ndoes not render probable cause to arrest stale. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Azor, 881 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Our case law\\nmakes clear that law enforcement is not required to arrest a\\nsuspect immediately upon development of probable cause.”);\\nUnited States v. Clark, 647 F. App’x 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2016) (per\\ncuriam) (“[P]robable cause existed to arrest [the defendant]\\nbecause the earlier tip from the confidential informant and the\\ncontrolled purchase [four to six days earlier] provided [the\\npolice] with facts that would support a reasonable person’s\\nbelief that an offense had been committed and that the indi-\\nvidual arrested was the guilty party.” (cleaned up)); United\\nStates v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 554 (1st Cir. 1999)\\n(“[W]hen probable cause exists, the timing of an arrest is a\\nmatter that the Constitution almost invariably leaves to police\\ndiscretion.”); United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 220 (1st Cir.\\n1997) (holding that “the period of time between the controlled\\nbuys [—four days after the second controlled buy and less\\nthan two weeks after the first controlled buy—] and the arrest\\nwas not so long here as to render the probable cause stale in\\nany meaningful temporal sense”); cf. Guadarrama v. United\\nStates, No. 16-6218, 2017 WL 3391683, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 13,\\n2017) (unpublished order) (stating that “[r]easonable jurists\\ncould not debate th[e] conclusion” that “while information\\nused to obtain a search warrant may go stale, the same is not\\ntrue for information underlying an arrest warrant”).\\n\\f10 No. 18-2279\\n\\n Our facts are nearly identical to those that the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit confronted in United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328 (10th\\nCir. 2009). There, the police arranged for a controlled buy be-\\ntween an informant and the defendant at an auto parts store.\\nPolice surveilled the informant while he drove to the location,\\ngot into the defendant’s car, and negotiated the purchase of\\nmethamphetamine. Id. at 1331. The police did not immedi-\\nately arrest the defendant, “[a]pparently hoping to investigate\\nfurther.” Id. About a month later, the police sought to have the\\ninformant conduct another controlled buy but the informant\\nrefused (even though a few days earlier he told the police he\\ncould set up another deal). Unable to convince the informant\\nto cooperate, the police resolved to arrest the defendant. In-\\nstead of obtaining an arrest warrant, they decided to simply\\nfollow his car until he committed a traffic violation and then\\nstop and arrest him—which they did. Id. at 1331–32. The\\nTenth Circuit held that the police officers had probable cause\\nto arrest the defendant “based on the controlled buy they wit-\\nnessed a month before his arrest.” Id. at 1334. “[T]he passage\\nof time did not make that information stale or otherwise de-\\nstroy the officers’ probable cause.” Id.\\n There was probable cause to arrest Haldorson on June 23,\\n2015, based on the June 1, 2015, controlled buy. The facts over-\\nwhelmingly support this conclusion. The confidential inform-\\nant first provided Officer Insley with Haldorson’s phone\\nnumber and a picture of his black Pontiac G8, including the\\nlicense plate. Officer Insley was able to run the license plate\\nthrough a law enforcement database and trace the car’s regis-\\ntration to Haldorson. The informant then positively identified\\na photograph of Haldorson as his drug supplier. But the prob-\\nable cause for the arrest was not merely based on a “tip” from\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 11\\n\\na confidential informant3—that was just the beginning. The\\nofficers then set up a controlled buy. Multiple officers were\\nsurveilling the deal and observed Haldorson’s car drive into\\nthe parking lot at the prearranged location, park next to the\\nconfidential informant, and the confidential informant get\\ninto the passenger seat of Haldorson’s car. Although no offic-\\ners witnessed the actual transaction, Officer Insley listened to\\nthe entire interaction in realtime via the informant’s hidden\\nwire. Officer Insley also searched the confidential informant\\nand his car both before and after the controlled buy; the only\\ndrugs he had were the 1.7 grams of cocaine purchased from\\nHaldorson during the controlled buy. On this last point, criti-\\ncally, the district court found Officer Insley’s testimony cred-\\nible, and we certainly cannot say that that finding was clearly\\nerroneous. The passage of three weeks did not render the in-\\nformation from the controlled buy stale.\\n It is the rare case where “staleness” will be relevant to the\\nlegality of a warrantless arrest.4 When there is a reasonable\\n\\n\\n3 Haldorson makes repeated references to initially undisclosed infor-\\nmation regarding the confidential informant’s history—including how he\\ncame to be an informant, his motivation (was he working for money or\\nworking off his own case), and the fact that he was arrested on an unre-\\nlated incident approximately ten days before the controlled buy. If Officer\\nInsley had relied on an affidavit from the confidential informant in an ap-\\nplication for a search warrant, the nondisclosure of such credibility infor-\\nmation would be relevant to the question of probable cause. United States\\nv. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2016). But this case does not in-\\nvolve simply relying on information from a confidential informant in an\\naffidavit.\\n4 Conversely, the concept of staleness is generally a “highly relevant” fac-\\ntor in applications for search warrants because, unlike arrests, the focus is\\non whether “evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” and\\n\\f12 No. 18-2279\\n\\nbelief that someone has committed a crime, time by itself does\\nnot make the existence of that fact any less probable. Cer-\\ntainly, “[g]ood police practice often requires postponing an\\narrest, even after probable cause has been established, in or-\\nder to place the suspect under surveillance or otherwise de-\\nvelop further evidence necessary to prove guilt to a jury.”\\nUnited States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J., con-\\ncurring). This is not to say that the passage of time can never\\ndissipate probable cause to arrest. There could be circum-\\nstances in which the subsequent investigation turns up new\\nfacts or evidence that disprove or discredit the original infor-\\nmation. Cf. id. at 432 n.5. We simply do not have those facts\\nhere and thus do not need to address if or when probable\\ncause to arrest may become stale.\\n The information provided by the confidential informant\\nand the June 1st controlled buy provided probable cause to\\narrest Haldorson on June 23, 2015.\\n 2. Vehicle search\\n Haldorson makes passing references to the search of his\\ncar but does not meaningfully contest the district court’s rul-\\ning that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.\\nIn any event, Haldorson’s challenge fails. The inevitable dis-\\ncovery doctrine provides that illegally obtained evidence will\\nnot be excluded if the government “can establish by a prepon-\\nderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or in-\\nevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix\\nv. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Once Haldorson was law-\\nfully arrested, his “car could not be left unattended\\n\\noften involve a search for perishable or transportable objects, like drugs or\\nguns. United States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 13\\n\\nindefinitely” at the entrance of a public high school. United\\nStates v. Simms, 626 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United\\nStates v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[O]bviously,\\nthe arresting officers would not have allowed the truck to just\\nsit on the street after [the arrestee] was carted away.”). The\\npolice officers would have towed his vehicle to the police sta-\\ntion and conducted an inventory search of the vehicle per es-\\ntablished Plainfield Police Department procedures. “The\\ndrugs [and explosives], therefore, inevitably would have been\\ndiscovered during an inventory search.” Cherry, 920 F.3d\\nat 1140.\\n We affirm the denial of Haldorson’s motion to suppress\\nthe evidence seized from his vehicle.\\n II. The Apartment Search\\n We pick up the facts where we left off, with Haldorson at\\nthe Plainfield Police Department and the officers’ discovery of\\ndrugs and explosives in his car.\\nA. Background\\n Officers interviewed Haldorson multiple times the even-\\ning of his arrest and carrying over into the early morning\\nhours of the next day, June 24, 2015. The officers read Haldor-\\nson his Miranda rights on at least two separate occasions over\\nthe course of the interviews. After finding pipe bombs in Hal-\\ndorson’s car, the CPAT officers and ATF agents were particu-\\nlarly concerned that Haldorson had stored additional explo-\\nsive materials at his residence. When officers initially asked\\nhim for his current address, Haldorson told the officers that\\nhe was homeless. Officer Insley believed that Haldorson lived\\nin downtown Plainfield, and specifically on or around Lock-\\nport Street, based on information he had previously gathered\\n\\f14 No. 18-2279\\n\\nand because officers had seen Haldorson’s car parked on that\\nstreet during the investigation. Haldorson told them that he\\nwas dating a woman over there but denied living in the\\ndowntown Plainfield area. He eventually claimed that he\\nlived in Joliet at his parents’ house and provided an address.\\nAsked if there were any additional explosives at that home,\\nHaldorson responded that there could be.\\n With this information, CPAT officers and ATF agents left\\nthe police station and went to the Joliet address. They arrived\\nat Haldorson’s parents’ home at approximately 2:45 a.m. on\\nJune 24, 2015. Haldorson’s parents gave the officers consent\\nto search Haldorson’s room, which revealed narcotics-related\\nitems but no explosives. After speaking with Haldorson’s fa-\\nther, the officers learned that Haldorson did in fact reside at\\nan apartment in downtown Plainfield, on Lockport Street. His\\nfather did not know the exact address but gave a general de-\\nscription of the area and Haldorson’s apartment. Officers im-\\nmediately went to that location.\\n Now on Lockport Street, at approximately four o’clock in\\nthe morning, the officers—without a precise address—pro-\\nceeded to knock on the street-level doors of the buildings (the\\nbuildings were retail business on the first floor and apart-\\nments on the second), and eventually located and gained ac-\\ncess to Haldorson’s apartment building.\\n Once inside the apartment building, the officers knocked\\non Haldorson’s unit’s front door. A woman answered the\\ndoor (and gave the same name as the name of the woman Hal-\\ndorson said he was dating), who told the officers that Haldor-\\nson lived there. She gave the officers consent to enter and\\nsearch the common areas of the apartment, and even signed a\\nwritten consent form. Haldorson had a separate bedroom in\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 15\\n\\nthe apartment, which was locked. The officers used Haldor-\\nson’s keys that were taken during his arrest to open his bed-\\nroom door. According to the Plainfield police sergeant on the\\nscene, the officers made the decision to enter Haldorson’s\\nlocked bedroom to search for explosives because they were\\nconcerned for the safety of his roommate and the other resi-\\ndents and businesses on Lockport Street if there were, indeed,\\nexplosives in the bedroom. The officers did not have a search\\nwarrant at the time.\\n In Haldorson’s bedroom officers founds fireworks and ex-\\nplosives. They removed the explosives from the bedroom and\\nsecured them in a steel box on ATF trucks. At that moment\\nthe officers did not seize anything else from Haldorson’s bed-\\nroom except for the explosives. In fact, the officers testified\\nthat they only conducted a “plain view” search for explosives\\nand then stopped their search. Instead, the officers then ap-\\nplied for and received a search warrant for the apartment. The\\nsecond search did not produce any additional explosives, but\\nofficers did seize narcotics-related items and two laptop com-\\nputers.\\n Later that same day, armed with the search warrant, offic-\\ners also searched two storage lockers that belonged to Haldor-\\nson. They did not find any explosives or narcotics in one of\\nthe lockers, but seized PVC pipe, multiple low explosive pow-\\nder canisters, fireworks, and a handgun and ammunition\\nfrom the second locker.\\n We break from recounting the facts again to tackle the le-\\ngality of the bedroom search.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2279\\n\\nB. Analysis\\n When the police officers entered Haldorson’s bedroom\\nand searched it for explosives, they did not have a search war-\\nrant or consent. “Warrantless searches and seizures within a\\nhome are considered presumptively unreasonable and a vio-\\nlation of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Huddleston,\\n593 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2010). There are, however, “certain\\nnarrowly proscribed exceptions.” United States v. Bell,\\n500 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2007). One such exception is where\\n“exigent circumstances require officers to ‘step in to prevent\\nserious injury and restore order.’” Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 600\\n(quoting Bell, 500 F.3d at 612). Under the exigent circum-\\nstances exception, “a warrantless entry into a dwelling may\\nbe lawful when there is a pressing need for the police to enter\\nbut no time for them to secure a warrant.” Sutterfield v. City of\\nMilwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 557 (7th Cir. 2014). The test is\\nwhether “an officer had an objectively ‘reasonable belief that\\nthere was a compelling need to act and no time to obtain a\\nwarrant.’” Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 600 (quoting Bell, 500 F.3d\\nat 613). The existence of exigent circumstances is a mixed\\nquestion of fact and law that we review de novo. Id. We still\\nreview the district court’s factual findings for clear error.\\nUnited States v. Delgado, 701 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n The exigent circumstances exception is “frequently in-\\nvoked in cases involving explosives.” United States v. Witzlib,\\n796 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases and citing,\\nfor example, United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386, 393–94 (1st\\nCir. 2012); Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d\\n1065, 1071–73 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lindsey,\\n877 F.2d 777, 781–82 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Al–Az-\\nzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1985)). Explosives are, by their\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 17\\n\\nvery nature, inherently dangerous. Homemade explosive de-\\nvices even more so because the persons manufacturing them\\noften lack the needed technical knowledge and skills. There-\\nfore, even though Haldorson enjoyed a strong expectation of\\nprivacy in his locked bedroom, that expectation must be bal-\\nanced against the need to protect the public from serious\\nharm where explosive materials may be present in a residen-\\ntial complex with close neighbors. United States v. Boettger,\\n71 F.3d 1410, 1414 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[Privacy] expectations\\nmust be lowered where a resident admits working with ex-\\nplosive materials in an apartment complex with close neigh-\\nbors.”); see Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297 n.8 (1984)\\n(careful “not to suggest that individual expectations of pri-\\nvacy may prevail over interests of public safety”).\\n The following objective facts, found by the district court\\nand not clearly erroneous, were known to the officers before\\nthey entered into Haldorson’s bedroom: Explosive materials,\\nincluding pipe bombs, were found in Haldorson’s car; pipe\\nbombs, according to the Cook County Sheriff’s Police Bomb\\nSquad and ATF agents, are very volatile and dangerous; Hal-\\ndorson admitted that more explosives could be at his resi-\\ndence; Haldorson falsely told officers that he lived at his par-\\nents’ house, and a search of that house uncovered no explo-\\nsives; and Haldorson actually resided at an apartment in\\ndowntown Plainfield, which was surrounded by residential\\nneighbors and businesses. Moreover, the district court found\\nthat an ATF agent credibly testified that there was a “legiti-\\nmate concern” that other homemade explosives were “poten-\\ntially unstable and therefore dangerous to others.” Based on\\nthese facts, the officers reasonably believed that there was a\\njustifiable and urgent need to act to prevent serious harm.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2279\\n\\n Because of the acute concern and the hour at which the\\nofficers and agents were urgently proceeding, around three\\nand four o’clock in the morning, there was no time to obtain\\na warrant.\\n Haldorson relies on the fact that the officers and agents\\nonly conducted a plain view search for explosives in his bed-\\nroom to question their belief that the explosives posed an im-\\nmediate threat. But, as the district court noted, law enforce-\\nment officers took additional steps consistent with their belief\\nthat the explosives posed an immediate threat, including\\nclearing Haldorson’s girlfriend from the apartment. Further,\\ncontrary to Haldorson’s contention that their “true aim and\\nintent” was to conduct a warrantless search, the fact that the\\nofficers only did a plain view search shows that the expressed\\nconcern was not simply pretext for searching for and gather-\\ning evidence of criminal activity. See Clifford, 464 U.S. at 292.\\nThe search did not exceed the scope of the exigency. See\\nUnited States v. Salava, 978 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The\\nensuing search … was appropriately limited to the [exigent]\\ncircumstances that justified it.”).\\n Haldorson also emphasizes that he was in custody and\\ntherefore “any alleged explosive materials were stable and in-\\nert.” The opposite is true—homemade pipe bombs, and other\\nimprovised explosive devices, are unstable.5 An ATF agent,\\n\\n5 It is for this same reason that we find unpersuasive Haldorson’s reliance\\n\\non United States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2013), which involved a\\nwarrantless search based on the possible threat of a grenade inside a\\nhome. Upon learning of the possible existence of a grenade, however, the\\nofficer did not call for the assistance of explosive experts, or even “remove\\nthe sleeping child from the room located directly next to the room where\\nthe ‘grenade’ was allegedly stored.” Id. at 395. The officer’s “own actions\\nbelie[d]” the argument that there were exigent circumstances. Id. at 398.\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 19\\n\\nwho has experience and expertise with explosives, credibly\\ntestified to this below.6 In short, the officers reasonably be-\\nlieved that the homemade pipe bombs posed an immediate\\nthreat to public safety.\\n Given the facts and information known at the time of the\\nsearch, “from the perspective of the officers at the scene,”\\nHuddleston, 593 F.3d at 600, there was a legitimate concern\\nthat other homemade explosive devices were in Haldorson’s\\nbedroom that were potentially unstable and therefore danger-\\nous to others. The warrantless search fell within the exigent\\ncircumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant\\nrequirement.\\n III. Constructive Amendment to the Indictment\\n Back to the facts, and with the pretrial motions and evi-\\ndentiary issues on appeal taken care of, we turn to Haldor-\\nson’s objections to the jury instructions.\\n Haldorson challenges the instructions to the jury on Count\\nFour as a constructive amendment to the indictment. Count\\n\\n\\nThe officer acted with no level of urgency. Importantly, and distinct from\\nour circumstances, the Fourth Circuit noted that there was “no indication\\nthat there might be other, more unstable explosives, inside as well.” Id. (em-\\nphasis added).\\n6 See also Fact Sheet–Illegal Explosive Devices, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,\\nFirearms and Explosives (May 2019), https://www.atf.gov/resource-cen-\\nter/fact-sheet/fact-sheet-illegal-explosive-devices (“Illegal explosive de-\\nvices … are typically extremely sensitive to heat, shock, electrostatic dis-\\ncharge and friction that may initiate, unexpectedly causing serious injury\\nor death. The risks associated with these devices are further compounded\\nbecause the persons manufacturing, transporting and using these devices\\noften do not have the knowledge, skills and experience required for such\\nactivities.”).\\n\\f20 No. 18-2279\\n\\nFour of the indictment charged, in pertinent part, that Haldor-\\nson “unlawfully carried an explosive, namely, smokeless\\npowder, during the commission of a felony … .” Because the\\nindictment charged him with carrying a specific object—\\nsmokeless powder—the jury could only convict if it found be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt that Haldorson carried smokeless\\npowder, not just any explosive material. Haldorson argues\\nthat the jury instructions on Count Four unconstitutionally\\nbroadened the bases of conviction by permitting the jury to\\nconvict if they found he carried any explosive. This is a ques-\\ntion of law that we review de novo. United States v. Mitov,\\n460 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be\\nheld to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-\\nless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S.\\nConst. amend. V. Only the grand jury can amend the indict-\\nment to broaden it. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216\\n(1960); United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n“This rule both enforces the Fifth Amendment and helps to\\nensure that a defendant is given reasonable notice of the alle-\\ngations against him so that he may best prepare a defense.”\\nPierson, 925 F.3d at 919. A constructive amendment “occurs\\nwhen either the government (usually during its presentation\\nof evidence and/or its argument), the court (usually through\\nits instructions to the jury), or both, broadens the possible ba-\\nses for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury.”\\nUnited States v. Cusimano, 148 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 1998).\\n The statute under which Haldorson was charged,\\n18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2), does not require a specific type of explo-\\nsive as an element—it criminalizes “carr[ying] an explosive\\nduring the commission of any felony” (subject only to the\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 21\\n\\ndefinition of “explosive” in 18 U.S.C. § 841(d)). But the gov-\\nernment narrowed the charge against Haldorson by including\\nthe specific language “namely, smokeless powder” in the in-\\ndictment. “Specific language in an indictment that provides\\ndetail beyond the general elements of the crime makes the\\nspecified detail essential to the charged crime and must,\\ntherefore, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierson,\\n925 F.3d at 920.\\n The district court instructed the jury on Count Four as fol-\\nlows:\\n In order for you to find the defendant guilty of\\n the charge of carrying an explosive during the\\n commission of a felony as alleged in Count\\n Four, the government must prove both of the\\n following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:\\n …\\n 2. The defendant knowingly carried an explo-\\n sive, namely, smokeless powder, during the\\n commission of that crime [in element 1 of the in-\\n struction] … .\\nThe jury instruction also included the specific language\\n“namely, smokeless powder.” It was added during the final\\njury instructions conference at the insistence of Haldorson.\\n The jury instruction for Count Four and Count Four of the\\nindictment both included the identical specific language re-\\ngarding smokeless powder. The instruction thus required the\\njury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Haldorson\\nknowingly carried an explosive and that that explosive was\\nsmokeless powder, just as Count Four charged.\\n\\f22 No. 18-2279\\n\\n This is unlike our decisions in Pierson and Leichtnam,\\nwhich Haldorson attempts to rely on for support. In both\\ncases, the indictment narrowed the bases of conviction by\\nnaming a particular firearm that the defendant was charged\\nwith. Pierson, 925 F.3d at 920; United States v. Leichtnam,\\n948 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1991). And in both cases, the corre-\\nsponding jury instruction failed to specify the exact gun\\ncharged, while at the same time evidence of additional non-\\nindicted guns were presented at trial. “[T]his combination of\\nthe evidence and untailored jury instructions added up to a\\nconstructive amendment.” Pierson, 925 F.3d at 920. This is not\\nour case. The jury instruction was tailored to the specifics of\\nthe indictment and did not permit the jury to convict Haldor-\\nson based on non-indicted explosives. No constructive\\namendment of the indictment occurred.\\n Finally, Haldorson makes a passing suggestion that there\\nis “another independent problem” with the jury instructions\\non Count Four: the instruction contained “vastly more lan-\\nguage” than the elements of the offense. According to Haldor-\\nson, the language was unnecessary, irrelevant, and suggestive\\nof the facts in evidence.\\n On a challenge to a jury instruction, our review is twofold.\\nFirst, “we review de novo whether the jury instructions accu-\\nrately summarize the law, but give the district court substan-\\ntial discretion to formulate the instructions provided that the\\ninstructions represent a complete and correct statement of the\\nlaw.” United States v. Bonin, 932 F.3d 523, 537–38 (7th Cir.\\n2019). If the instruction is legally accurate, in the second step\\nwe then “review the district court’s phrasing of the instruc-\\ntions for abuse of discretion.” Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 23\\n\\n The district court further instructed the jury that:\\n The explosive does not have to be related to the\\n other crime. A person carries an explosive if he\\n knowingly transports it on his person or in a ve-\\n hicle or container. A person may carry an explo-\\n sive even if it is not immediately accessible be-\\n cause it is in another area of a vehicle. The term\\n “during” means at any point within the conduct\\n charged in Count Two and Count Three.\\nThe first and fourth sentences accurately summarize the ap-\\nplicable law and Supreme Court precedent. In Ressam, the\\nCourt held that 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) does not require a rela-\\ntionship between the explosive carried and the underlying fel-\\nony, and that “during” denotes a straightforward temporal\\nlink. United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 274 (2008).\\n The second and third sentences above are strictly defini-\\ntional. There is no suggestion that they are incorrect, misstate-\\nments, or could not have alternatively been included in the\\nseparate “Definitions” instruction that the court provided to\\nthe jurors. Because the instruction on Count Four accurately\\nstated the law, it was not an abuse of discretion to provide the\\nadditional language to the jury.\\n IV. Mistakes During the Police Investigation\\n As a last resort, Haldorson asks this court to vacate his\\nconvictions because the convictions are “plagued by con-\\ncealed material information, false and misleading reports,\\nperjured testimony, an unlawful recording, scant evidence,\\ncontaminated evidence, [and] evidence disappearing from\\nthe evidence vault.” The crux of his argument on appeal is\\nthat the cumulative effects of the perceived mistakes and\\n\\f24 No. 18-2279\\n\\nviolations during the investigation deprived him of his Fifth\\nand Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial.7\\n The problem for Haldorson is that all of the asserted errors\\nhe claims infected his trial were known to him before trial and\\nhe made extensive use of them at trial on cross-examination.\\nEach and every misstep that the officers and the federal agents\\nallegedly made along the way came out at trial. In fact, in clos-\\ning arguments, Haldorson essentially argued to the jury what\\nhe now argues on appeal.\\n Much of Haldorson’s argument can be disposed of with\\nthat, but we conclude with a brief comment on one of the spe-\\ncific allegations concerning irregularities with Officer Insley’s\\nhandling of the confidential informant. The primary issue is\\nthat Officer Insley did not disclose the informant’s arrest that\\noccurred ten days before the controlled buy to his police su-\\npervisors or to the prosecutors. A confidential informant’s\\npersonal and criminal history is material information and is\\noften critical to different stages of an investigation or prose-\\ncution. When the police seek a search warrant based in part\\non an informant, for example, the omission of adverse infor-\\nmation may impair the neutral role of the magistrate deciding\\nwhether to issue the warrant. E.g., United States v. Glover,\\n755 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014). Similarly, the government\\n\\n\\n7 Importantly, although his argument is framed similarly, Haldorson’s ar-\\n\\ngument is not one of cumulative error because he does not allege that any\\nerrors were committed in the course of the trial. See United States v. Mar-\\nchan, 935 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 2019) (“To establish cumulative error a\\ndefendant must show that (1) at least two errors were committed in the\\ncourse of the trial; [and] (2) considered together along with the entire rec-\\nord, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied\\nthe petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 25\\n\\nwould have to disclose that same adverse information to the\\ndefense as exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373\\nU.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\\nIn this particular case, Officer Insley’s lack of disclosure did\\nnot taint any later stages of the investigation or prosecution.\\nNo warrants, evidence, or testimony relied on the informant’s\\ncredibility.\\n Mistakes were made during the police investigation of\\nHaldorson. The government readily concedes as much. But\\nthose mistakes did not deprive Haldorson of his constitu-\\ntional rights. Haldorson had a full and complete opportunity\\nto defend himself against the government’s charges and re-\\nceived a fair trial.\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449250/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671997/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Michael P. Haldorson\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2279\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMICHAEL P. HALDORSON,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:15-cr-00623-1 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Michael Haldorson is a self-pro-\nclaimed fireworks enthusiast. But he was also a drug dealer.\nHaldorson was arrested on his way to a second controlled buy\nand, along with drugs, officers found three pipe bombs in his\ncar. He was charged with several counts related to drugs, ex-\nplosives, and a firearm. Before trial, Haldorson filed several\nmotions to suppress evidence, challenging his arrest, the ad-\nmissibility of his post-arrest statements, and the searches of\n\f2 No. 18-2279\n\nhis car, apartment bedroom, and rented storage locker. All\nwere denied.\n Haldorson proceeded to trial and a jury convicted him on\nfour counts of the seven-count indictment: Count One for dis-\ntribution of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Count Two for pos-\nsession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1);\nCount Three for possession of MDMA, or ecstasy, and co-\ncaine, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); and Count Four for possession of an\nexplosive during the commission of a felony, 21 U.S.C.\n§ 844(h)(2). The jury acquitted him on two additional charges\nand the government dismissed another count at trial. The dis-\ntrict court later vacated Count Three because it was a lesser-\nincluded offense of Count Two. The district court sentenced\nHaldorson to a term of imprisonment of 192 months.\n On appeal Haldorson raises three issues. First, Haldorson\nargues that the district court erred in denying the motions to\nsuppress the evidence seized from his car and his apartment\nbecause the officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest\nhim and there were no exigent circumstances to justify the\nwarrantless search of his apartment bedroom. Second, he as-\nserts that the jury instructions constructively amended Count\nFour of the indictment, unlawfully carrying an explosive, in\nviolation of the Fifth Amendment by permitting the jury to\nconvict him on a broader basis than the indictment charged.\nThird, and finally, Haldorson contends that he did not receive\na fair trial due to a multitude of alleged mistakes and errors\nduring the investigation and asks us to vacate his convictions.\n We conclude that probable cause supported the arrest, ex-\nigent circumstances existed for the search of the bedroom, and\nHaldorson had a full and fair opportunity to defend himself\n\fNo. 18-2279 3\n\nat trial. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s judgment in\nall respects.\n I. The Arrest and Vehicle Search\n We begin, naturally, with Haldorson’s arrest and the re-\nsulting search of his vehicle.\nA. Background\n Haldorson was arrested on June 23, 2015, but his case\nstarts a few weeks earlier. Sometime in April or May 2015,\nHaldorson first came on the radar of Officer Thomas Insley\nvia a confidential informant. Officer Insley was, at the time, a\npatrol officer with the Village of Rockdale Police Department\nin Illinois. He was also assigned to a specialized narcotics\nunit, the Will County Cooperative Police Assistance Team\n(CPAT)—a collective of officers from local police departments\nunder the umbrella of the Illinois State Police—as an Inspec-\ntor. (For ease we will use the title of “Officer” for Insley\nthroughout, although he also held the title of “Inspector” dur-\ning the relevant time period.) CPAT inspectors, in general,\nconduct narcotics investigations, control informants, and go\nundercover. Officer Insley was the primary CPAT investigator\nfor Haldorson’s case.\n Officer Insley had been working with this particular con-\nfidential informant for a few months—a detail we will return\nto later—when the informant told Officer Insley that he could\npurchase cocaine from an individual he knew as “Mike\nJones.” The informant provided Officer Insley with a picture\nof Mike Jones’s vehicle, including the license plate (that read\n\f4 No. 18-2279\n\n“MKJNZ”), and his telephone number.1 Officer Insley ran the\nlicense plate through a law enforcement database and learned\nthat it was registered to Haldorson. The vehicle information\nlisted on the registration also matched the photograph of Hal-\ndorson’s car—a black Pontiac G8. Officer Insley then showed\nthe informant a picture of Haldorson, who the informant\nidentified as Mike Jones. At this point, Officer Insley asked the\ninformant to set up a deal.\n On June 1, 2015, the informant contacted Officer Insley\nand told him that he could make a buy from Haldorson. Of-\nficer Insley proceeded to prepare for the controlled purchase\nby providing the informant with funds to buy the narcotics,\nwiring the informant with an audio transmitter and recorder\nto monitor the deal, and setting up a visual surveillance team\nof other CPAT officers. Before heading to the controlled buy,\nOfficer Insley also searched the informant and his vehicle to\nmake sure that he had no contraband, as is standard in these\noperations.\n Officer Insley followed the confidential informant to a\nWalmart parking lot in Joliet, Illinois, where he was going to\nmeet Haldorson, and parked about an aisle over from the in-\nformant. Haldorson then arrived, parked next to the inform-\nant’s car, and the informant got out of his car and into Hal-\ndorson’s car. At about that same time a customer pulled into\nthe lot and parked in between Officer Insley and Haldorson’s\ncar, obstructing Officer Insley’s view of the transaction. Not\n\n1 This Mike Jones’s phone number was not, however, 281-330-8004. For\nthose unfamiliar with the reference, Mike Jones is an American rapper\nwhose hit single in 2005 included a verse that recited his phone number\nand told listeners to “hit Mike Jones up on the low.” See Mike Jones, Back\nThen, on Who Is Mike Jones? (Warner Bros. Records 2005).\n\fNo. 18-2279 5\n\nto worry, though, Officer Insley was still able to listen to the\ndeal in realtime from the audio transmitter.\n After the deal went down, Officer Insley observed a black\ncar matching the description of Haldorson’s car drive away\nand relayed to the rest of the surveillance team that the con-\ntrolled buy was successful and to follow Haldorson’s car.\nMeanwhile, Officer Insley followed the informant to a prear-\nranged location where Officer Insley retrieved the drugs from\nthe informant, as well as re-searched the informant and his\nvehicle. The confidential informant had purchased 1.7 grams\nof cocaine from Haldorson in the transaction.\n The surveillance team did not stop Haldorson that even-\ning; the officers eventually lost him when they got stopped at\na red light. But the plan was never to stop or arrest Haldorson\non June 1st because Officer Insley was just beginning his in-\nvestigation into Haldorson. Further, Officer Insley testified\nthat if the officers arrested Haldorson immediately after the\ncontrolled buy, it would have tipped off Haldorson that he\nhad been set-up by the confidential informant. Officer Insley\nwas using the same informant in other ongoing investigations\nand did not want to burn the informant’s identity.\n From the record it appears that very little was done to ad-\nvance the Haldorson investigation between the June 1st con-\ntrolled buy and June 23rd. There were perhaps, though it is\nsomewhat unclear, attempts by the confidential informant to\nreach out to Haldorson to set up another controlled buy on\nJune 2nd and 5th, but those went nowhere.\n On June 23, 2015, the day at the center of this case, the con-\nfidential informant told Officer Insley that he could arrange\nanother drug deal with Haldorson. The plan this time was for\n\f6 No. 18-2279\n\nthe informant to set it up but for officers to stop Haldorson on\nhis way to the deal and arrest him. Stopping and arresting\nHaldorson before the actual drug deal would, once again, pre-\nserve the confidential informant’s anonymity. Eventually\nHaldorson and the informant agreed to meet in the Village of\nPlainfield, Illinois, specifically at Plainfield Central High\nSchool. Officer Insley then arranged for a Plainfield police of-\nficer in a marked car to pull Haldorson over.\n Officer Friddle of the Plainfield Police Department posi-\ntioned himself near the high school and waited for Haldorson\nto pass by based on a description of Haldorson’s vehicle that\nCPAT officers provided: black Pontiac G8 with a White Sox\nspecialty license plate and red lights in the front grille of the\ncar (that may or may not be illuminated). According to Officer\nFriddle, he soon saw a black car approaching with red lights\nin the grille.2 As it got closer, he could see the White Sox spe-\ncialty plates too. Officer Friddle pulled out to follow Haldor-\nson’s car, activated his emergency lights, and pulled Haldor-\nson over at the entrance of Plainfield Central High School. The\nstop was pretextual, and Officer Friddle made up some\n\n\n\n\n2 Haldorson strongly contested—and still does—the officers’ testimony\nabout both the presence of the red lights on his car at the June 1st con-\ntrolled buy (Haldorson testified and introduced receipts to demonstrate\nthat the lights were not installed until three days later on June 4th) and\nwhether the red lights were in fact illuminated when he was pulled over\non June 23rd. The district court agreed with Haldorson on this point, find-\ning that although there was a red area in the vent on top of the front hood\nof the vehicle, there were not illuminated red lights. In the end, any dis-\npute regarding the red grille lights is inconsequential to the contested is-\nsues in this appeal.\n\fNo. 18-2279 7\n\nexcuses to buy time for CPAT officers to arrive on scene and\ntake over.\n Officer Mario Marzetta, a police officer with the Plainfield\nPolice Department who at the time was also assigned to\nCPAT, arrived at the traffic stop shortly thereafter and ar-\nrested Haldorson. Another officer transported Haldorson to\nthe Plainfield Police Department. Officer Marzetta then also\ndrove Haldorson’s vehicle to the Plainfield Police Department\nand parked it in the sally port, or the garage at the station,\nwhere he and another CPAT inspector searched it.\n The officers found numerous drugs—marijuana, cocaine,\ncrack cocaine, MDMA or ecstasy, prescription pills, psilocy-\nbin mushrooms—fireworks, and suspected pipe bombs in\nHaldorson’s car. Upon discovering the pipe bombs, the offic-\ners ceased their search and called in agents from the Bureau\nof Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the\nCook County Sheriff’s Police Bomb Squad. The ATF agents\nand bomb technicians removed the explosives from the vehi-\ncle to a safe area and rendered them safe.\n We pause the story here to address Haldorson’s challenge\nto his arrest and the search of his vehicle.\nB. Analysis\n Haldorson was later indicted on several federal charges.\nHe thereafter moved to suppress, among other evidence, the\nexplosives and narcotics discovered during the vehicle search\nbecause the officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest\nhim. The district court, after holding a two-day evidentiary\nhearing, denied his motions to suppress. In reviewing the dis-\ntrict court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review ques-\ntions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error.\n\f8 No. 18-2279\n\nUnited States v. Cherry, 920 F.3d 1126, 1132 (7th Cir. 2019). We\nmust defer to credibility determinations that the district court\nmade based on the testimony presented to it, absent clear er-\nror. United States v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018).\n 1. Probable cause to arrest Haldorson\n The officers did not have a warrant to arrest Haldorson,\n“but an officer may make a warrantless arrest consistent with\nthe Fourth Amendment if there is ‘probable cause to believe\nthat a crime has been committed.’” United States v. Daniels,\n803 F.3d 335, 354 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Washington v.\nHaupert, 481 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2007)). “Police officers pos-\nsess probable cause to arrest when the facts and circum-\nstances within their knowledge and of which they have rea-\nsonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a\nprudent person in believing that the suspect has committed\nan offense.” United States v. Howard, 883 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir.\n2018) (quotations omitted). We examine “the totality of the cir-\ncumstances in a common sense manner” to determine\nwhether probable cause exists in a given situation. United\nStates v. Schaafsma, 318 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2003).\n Haldorson’s primary contention is that the information\nfrom the controlled buy was too stale three weeks later to sup-\nport probable cause for an arrest. The mere passage of time\ndoes not necessarily dissipate the probable cause for an arrest.\nIt is well-established that “there is no requirement that an of-\nfender be arrested the moment probable cause is established.”\nUnited States v. Reis, 906 F.2d 284, 289 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing\nHoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966)). In Reis we\nfound that an “overnight delay simply has no bearing on the\nexistence of probable cause for arrest,” id., and we see no rea-\nson to treat reasonably longer delays any different. Indeed,\n\fNo. 18-2279 9\n\nwe have previously held that the defendant’s participation in\na controlled drug buy a month earlier “provided the police\nwith probable cause to arrest [the suspect] which was not ren-\ndered stale by the passage of one month.” United States v.\nMitchell, 523 F. App’x 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).\nOur sister circuits also agree that the passage of time alone\ndoes not render probable cause to arrest stale. See, e.g., United\nStates v. Azor, 881 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Our case law\nmakes clear that law enforcement is not required to arrest a\nsuspect immediately upon development of probable cause.”);\nUnited States v. Clark, 647 F. App’x 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2016) (per\ncuriam) (“[P]robable cause existed to arrest [the defendant]\nbecause the earlier tip from the confidential informant and the\ncontrolled purchase [four to six days earlier] provided [the\npolice] with facts that would support a reasonable person’s\nbelief that an offense had been committed and that the indi-\nvidual arrested was the guilty party.” (cleaned up)); United\nStates v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 554 (1st Cir. 1999)\n(“[W]hen probable cause exists, the timing of an arrest is a\nmatter that the Constitution almost invariably leaves to police\ndiscretion.”); United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 220 (1st Cir.\n1997) (holding that “the period of time between the controlled\nbuys [—four days after the second controlled buy and less\nthan two weeks after the first controlled buy—] and the arrest\nwas not so long here as to render the probable cause stale in\nany meaningful temporal sense”); cf. Guadarrama v. United\nStates, No. 16-6218, 2017 WL 3391683, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 13,\n2017) (unpublished order) (stating that “[r]easonable jurists\ncould not debate th[e] conclusion” that “while information\nused to obtain a search warrant may go stale, the same is not\ntrue for information underlying an arrest warrant”).\n\f10 No. 18-2279\n\n Our facts are nearly identical to those that the Tenth Cir-\ncuit confronted in United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328 (10th\nCir. 2009). There, the police arranged for a controlled buy be-\ntween an informant and the defendant at an auto parts store.\nPolice surveilled the informant while he drove to the location,\ngot into the defendant’s car, and negotiated the purchase of\nmethamphetamine. Id. at 1331. The police did not immedi-\nately arrest the defendant, “[a]pparently hoping to investigate\nfurther.” Id. About a month later, the police sought to have the\ninformant conduct another controlled buy but the informant\nrefused (even though a few days earlier he told the police he\ncould set up another deal). Unable to convince the informant\nto cooperate, the police resolved to arrest the defendant. In-\nstead of obtaining an arrest warrant, they decided to simply\nfollow his car until he committed a traffic violation and then\nstop and arrest him—which they did. Id. at 1331–32. The\nTenth Circuit held that the police officers had probable cause\nto arrest the defendant “based on the controlled buy they wit-\nnessed a month before his arrest.” Id. at 1334. “[T]he passage\nof time did not make that information stale or otherwise de-\nstroy the officers’ probable cause.” Id.\n There was probable cause to arrest Haldorson on June 23,\n2015, based on the June 1, 2015, controlled buy. The facts over-\nwhelmingly support this conclusion. The confidential inform-\nant first provided Officer Insley with Haldorson’s phone\nnumber and a picture of his black Pontiac G8, including the\nlicense plate. Officer Insley was able to run the license plate\nthrough a law enforcement database and trace the car’s regis-\ntration to Haldorson. The informant then positively identified\na photograph of Haldorson as his drug supplier. But the prob-\nable cause for the arrest was not merely based on a “tip” from\n\fNo. 18-2279 11\n\na confidential informant3—that was just the beginning. The\nofficers then set up a controlled buy. Multiple officers were\nsurveilling the deal and observed Haldorson’s car drive into\nthe parking lot at the prearranged location, park next to the\nconfidential informant, and the confidential informant get\ninto the passenger seat of Haldorson’s car. Although no offic-\ners witnessed the actual transaction, Officer Insley listened to\nthe entire interaction in realtime via the informant’s hidden\nwire. Officer Insley also searched the confidential informant\nand his car both before and after the controlled buy; the only\ndrugs he had were the 1.7 grams of cocaine purchased from\nHaldorson during the controlled buy. On this last point, criti-\ncally, the district court found Officer Insley’s testimony cred-\nible, and we certainly cannot say that that finding was clearly\nerroneous. The passage of three weeks did not render the in-\nformation from the controlled buy stale.\n It is the rare case where “staleness” will be relevant to the\nlegality of a warrantless arrest.4 When there is a reasonable\n\n\n3 Haldorson makes repeated references to initially undisclosed infor-\nmation regarding the confidential informant’s history—including how he\ncame to be an informant, his motivation (was he working for money or\nworking off his own case), and the fact that he was arrested on an unre-\nlated incident approximately ten days before the controlled buy. If Officer\nInsley had relied on an affidavit from the confidential informant in an ap-\nplication for a search warrant, the nondisclosure of such credibility infor-\nmation would be relevant to the question of probable cause. United States\nv. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2016). But this case does not in-\nvolve simply relying on information from a confidential informant in an\naffidavit.\n4 Conversely, the concept of staleness is generally a “highly relevant” fac-\ntor in applications for search warrants because, unlike arrests, the focus is\non whether “evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” and\n\f12 No. 18-2279\n\nbelief that someone has committed a crime, time by itself does\nnot make the existence of that fact any less probable. Cer-\ntainly, “[g]ood police practice often requires postponing an\narrest, even after probable cause has been established, in or-\nder to place the suspect under surveillance or otherwise de-\nvelop further evidence necessary to prove guilt to a jury.”\nUnited States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J., con-\ncurring). This is not to say that the passage of time can never\ndissipate probable cause to arrest. There could be circum-\nstances in which the subsequent investigation turns up new\nfacts or evidence that disprove or discredit the original infor-\nmation. Cf. id. at 432 n.5. We simply do not have those facts\nhere and thus do not need to address if or when probable\ncause to arrest may become stale.\n The information provided by the confidential informant\nand the June 1st controlled buy provided probable cause to\narrest Haldorson on June 23, 2015.\n 2. Vehicle search\n Haldorson makes passing references to the search of his\ncar but does not meaningfully contest the district court’s rul-\ning that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.\nIn any event, Haldorson’s challenge fails. The inevitable dis-\ncovery doctrine provides that illegally obtained evidence will\nnot be excluded if the government “can establish by a prepon-\nderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or in-\nevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix\nv. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Once Haldorson was law-\nfully arrested, his “car could not be left unattended\n\noften involve a search for perishable or transportable objects, like drugs or\nguns. United States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018).\n\fNo. 18-2279 13\n\nindefinitely” at the entrance of a public high school. United\nStates v. Simms, 626 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United\nStates v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[O]bviously,\nthe arresting officers would not have allowed the truck to just\nsit on the street after [the arrestee] was carted away.”). The\npolice officers would have towed his vehicle to the police sta-\ntion and conducted an inventory search of the vehicle per es-\ntablished Plainfield Police Department procedures. “The\ndrugs [and explosives], therefore, inevitably would have been\ndiscovered during an inventory search.” Cherry, 920 F.3d\nat 1140.\n We affirm the denial of Haldorson’s motion to suppress\nthe evidence seized from his vehicle.\n II. The Apartment Search\n We pick up the facts where we left off, with Haldorson at\nthe Plainfield Police Department and the officers’ discovery of\ndrugs and explosives in his car.\nA. Background\n Officers interviewed Haldorson multiple times the even-\ning of his arrest and carrying over into the early morning\nhours of the next day, June 24, 2015. The officers read Haldor-\nson his Miranda rights on at least two separate occasions over\nthe course of the interviews. After finding pipe bombs in Hal-\ndorson’s car, the CPAT officers and ATF agents were particu-\nlarly concerned that Haldorson had stored additional explo-\nsive materials at his residence. When officers initially asked\nhim for his current address, Haldorson told the officers that\nhe was homeless. Officer Insley believed that Haldorson lived\nin downtown Plainfield, and specifically on or around Lock-\nport Street, based on information he had previously gathered\n\f14 No. 18-2279\n\nand because officers had seen Haldorson’s car parked on that\nstreet during the investigation. Haldorson told them that he\nwas dating a woman over there but denied living in the\ndowntown Plainfield area. He eventually claimed that he\nlived in Joliet at his parents’ house and provided an address.\nAsked if there were any additional explosives at that home,\nHaldorson responded that there could be.\n With this information, CPAT officers and ATF agents left\nthe police station and went to the Joliet address. They arrived\nat Haldorson’s parents’ home at approximately 2:45 a.m. on\nJune 24, 2015. Haldorson’s parents gave the officers consent\nto search Haldorson’s room, which revealed narcotics-related\nitems but no explosives. After speaking with Haldorson’s fa-\nther, the officers learned that Haldorson did in fact reside at\nan apartment in downtown Plainfield, on Lockport Street. His\nfather did not know the exact address but gave a general de-\nscription of the area and Haldorson’s apartment. Officers im-\nmediately went to that location.\n Now on Lockport Street, at approximately four o’clock in\nthe morning, the officers—without a precise address—pro-\nceeded to knock on the street-level doors of the buildings (the\nbuildings were retail business on the first floor and apart-\nments on the second), and eventually located and gained ac-\ncess to Haldorson’s apartment building.\n Once inside the apartment building, the officers knocked\non Haldorson’s unit’s front door. A woman answered the\ndoor (and gave the same name as the name of the woman Hal-\ndorson said he was dating), who told the officers that Haldor-\nson lived there. She gave the officers consent to enter and\nsearch the common areas of the apartment, and even signed a\nwritten consent form. Haldorson had a separate bedroom in\n\fNo. 18-2279 15\n\nthe apartment, which was locked. The officers used Haldor-\nson’s keys that were taken during his arrest to open his bed-\nroom door. According to the Plainfield police sergeant on the\nscene, the officers made the decision to enter Haldorson’s\nlocked bedroom to search for explosives because they were\nconcerned for the safety of his roommate and the other resi-\ndents and businesses on Lockport Street if there were, indeed,\nexplosives in the bedroom. The officers did not have a search\nwarrant at the time.\n In Haldorson’s bedroom officers founds fireworks and ex-\nplosives. They removed the explosives from the bedroom and\nsecured them in a steel box on ATF trucks. At that moment\nthe officers did not seize anything else from Haldorson’s bed-\nroom except for the explosives. In fact, the officers testified\nthat they only conducted a “plain view” search for explosives\nand then stopped their search. Instead, the officers then ap-\nplied for and received a search warrant for the apartment. The\nsecond search did not produce any additional explosives, but\nofficers did seize narcotics-related items and two laptop com-\nputers.\n Later that same day, armed with the search warrant, offic-\ners also searched two storage lockers that belonged to Haldor-\nson. They did not find any explosives or narcotics in one of\nthe lockers, but seized PVC pipe, multiple low explosive pow-\nder canisters, fireworks, and a handgun and ammunition\nfrom the second locker.\n We break from recounting the facts again to tackle the le-\ngality of the bedroom search.\n\f16 No. 18-2279\n\nB. Analysis\n When the police officers entered Haldorson’s bedroom\nand searched it for explosives, they did not have a search war-\nrant or consent. “Warrantless searches and seizures within a\nhome are considered presumptively unreasonable and a vio-\nlation of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Huddleston,\n593 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2010). There are, however, “certain\nnarrowly proscribed exceptions.” United States v. Bell,\n500 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2007). One such exception is where\n“exigent circumstances require officers to ‘step in to prevent\nserious injury and restore order.’” Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 600\n(quoting Bell, 500 F.3d at 612). Under the exigent circum-\nstances exception, “a warrantless entry into a dwelling may\nbe lawful when there is a pressing need for the police to enter\nbut no time for them to secure a warrant.” Sutterfield v. City of\nMilwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 557 (7th Cir. 2014). The test is\nwhether “an officer had an objectively ‘reasonable belief that\nthere was a compelling need to act and no time to obtain a\nwarrant.’” Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 600 (quoting Bell, 500 F.3d\nat 613). The existence of exigent circumstances is a mixed\nquestion of fact and law that we review de novo. Id. We still\nreview the district court’s factual findings for clear error.\nUnited States v. Delgado, 701 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 2012).\n The exigent circumstances exception is “frequently in-\nvoked in cases involving explosives.” United States v. Witzlib,\n796 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases and citing,\nfor example, United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386, 393–94 (1st\nCir. 2012); Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d\n1065, 1071–73 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lindsey,\n877 F.2d 777, 781–82 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Al–Az-\nzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1985)). Explosives are, by their\n\fNo. 18-2279 17\n\nvery nature, inherently dangerous. Homemade explosive de-\nvices even more so because the persons manufacturing them\noften lack the needed technical knowledge and skills. There-\nfore, even though Haldorson enjoyed a strong expectation of\nprivacy in his locked bedroom, that expectation must be bal-\nanced against the need to protect the public from serious\nharm where explosive materials may be present in a residen-\ntial complex with close neighbors. United States v. Boettger,\n71 F.3d 1410, 1414 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[Privacy] expectations\nmust be lowered where a resident admits working with ex-\nplosive materials in an apartment complex with close neigh-\nbors.”); see Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297 n.8 (1984)\n(careful “not to suggest that individual expectations of pri-\nvacy may prevail over interests of public safety”).\n The following objective facts, found by the district court\nand not clearly erroneous, were known to the officers before\nthey entered into Haldorson’s bedroom: Explosive materials,\nincluding pipe bombs, were found in Haldorson’s car; pipe\nbombs, according to the Cook County Sheriff’s Police Bomb\nSquad and ATF agents, are very volatile and dangerous; Hal-\ndorson admitted that more explosives could be at his resi-\ndence; Haldorson falsely told officers that he lived at his par-\nents’ house, and a search of that house uncovered no explo-\nsives; and Haldorson actually resided at an apartment in\ndowntown Plainfield, which was surrounded by residential\nneighbors and businesses. Moreover, the district court found\nthat an ATF agent credibly testified that there was a “legiti-\nmate concern” that other homemade explosives were “poten-\ntially unstable and therefore dangerous to others.” Based on\nthese facts, the officers reasonably believed that there was a\njustifiable and urgent need to act to prevent serious harm.\n\f18 No. 18-2279\n\n Because of the acute concern and the hour at which the\nofficers and agents were urgently proceeding, around three\nand four o’clock in the morning, there was no time to obtain\na warrant.\n Haldorson relies on the fact that the officers and agents\nonly conducted a plain view search for explosives in his bed-\nroom to question their belief that the explosives posed an im-\nmediate threat. But, as the district court noted, law enforce-\nment officers took additional steps consistent with their belief\nthat the explosives posed an immediate threat, including\nclearing Haldorson’s girlfriend from the apartment. Further,\ncontrary to Haldorson’s contention that their “true aim and\nintent” was to conduct a warrantless search, the fact that the\nofficers only did a plain view search shows that the expressed\nconcern was not simply pretext for searching for and gather-\ning evidence of criminal activity. See Clifford, 464 U.S. at 292.\nThe search did not exceed the scope of the exigency. See\nUnited States v. Salava, 978 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The\nensuing search … was appropriately limited to the [exigent]\ncircumstances that justified it.”).\n Haldorson also emphasizes that he was in custody and\ntherefore “any alleged explosive materials were stable and in-\nert.” The opposite is true—homemade pipe bombs, and other\nimprovised explosive devices, are unstable.5 An ATF agent,\n\n5 It is for this same reason that we find unpersuasive Haldorson’s reliance\n\non United States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2013), which involved a\nwarrantless search based on the possible threat of a grenade inside a\nhome. Upon learning of the possible existence of a grenade, however, the\nofficer did not call for the assistance of explosive experts, or even “remove\nthe sleeping child from the room located directly next to the room where\nthe ‘grenade’ was allegedly stored.” Id. at 395. The officer’s “own actions\nbelie[d]” the argument that there were exigent circumstances. Id. at 398.\n\fNo. 18-2279 19\n\nwho has experience and expertise with explosives, credibly\ntestified to this below.6 In short, the officers reasonably be-\nlieved that the homemade pipe bombs posed an immediate\nthreat to public safety.\n Given the facts and information known at the time of the\nsearch, “from the perspective of the officers at the scene,”\nHuddleston, 593 F.3d at 600, there was a legitimate concern\nthat other homemade explosive devices were in Haldorson’s\nbedroom that were potentially unstable and therefore danger-\nous to others. The warrantless search fell within the exigent\ncircumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant\nrequirement.\n III. Constructive Amendment to the Indictment\n Back to the facts, and with the pretrial motions and evi-\ndentiary issues on appeal taken care of, we turn to Haldor-\nson’s objections to the jury instructions.\n Haldorson challenges the instructions to the jury on Count\nFour as a constructive amendment to the indictment. Count\n\n\nThe officer acted with no level of urgency. Importantly, and distinct from\nour circumstances, the Fourth Circuit noted that there was “no indication\nthat there might be other, more unstable explosives, inside as well.” Id. (em-\nphasis added).\n6 See also Fact Sheet–Illegal Explosive Devices, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,\nFirearms and Explosives (May 2019), https://www.atf.gov/resource-cen-\nter/fact-sheet/fact-sheet-illegal-explosive-devices (“Illegal explosive de-\nvices … are typically extremely sensitive to heat, shock, electrostatic dis-\ncharge and friction that may initiate, unexpectedly causing serious injury\nor death. The risks associated with these devices are further compounded\nbecause the persons manufacturing, transporting and using these devices\noften do not have the knowledge, skills and experience required for such\nactivities.”).\n\f20 No. 18-2279\n\nFour of the indictment charged, in pertinent part, that Haldor-\nson “unlawfully carried an explosive, namely, smokeless\npowder, during the commission of a felony … .” Because the\nindictment charged him with carrying a specific object—\nsmokeless powder—the jury could only convict if it found be-\nyond a reasonable doubt that Haldorson carried smokeless\npowder, not just any explosive material. Haldorson argues\nthat the jury instructions on Count Four unconstitutionally\nbroadened the bases of conviction by permitting the jury to\nconvict if they found he carried any explosive. This is a ques-\ntion of law that we review de novo. United States v. Mitov,\n460 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2006).\n The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be\nheld to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-\nless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S.\nConst. amend. V. Only the grand jury can amend the indict-\nment to broaden it. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216\n(1960); United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019).\n“This rule both enforces the Fifth Amendment and helps to\nensure that a defendant is given reasonable notice of the alle-\ngations against him so that he may best prepare a defense.”\nPierson, 925 F.3d at 919. A constructive amendment “occurs\nwhen either the government (usually during its presentation\nof evidence and/or its argument), the court (usually through\nits instructions to the jury), or both, broadens the possible ba-\nses for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury.”\nUnited States v. Cusimano, 148 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 1998).\n The statute under which Haldorson was charged,\n18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2), does not require a specific type of explo-\nsive as an element—it criminalizes “carr[ying] an explosive\nduring the commission of any felony” (subject only to the\n\fNo. 18-2279 21\n\ndefinition of “explosive” in 18 U.S.C. § 841(d)). But the gov-\nernment narrowed the charge against Haldorson by including\nthe specific language “namely, smokeless powder” in the in-\ndictment. “Specific language in an indictment that provides\ndetail beyond the general elements of the crime makes the\nspecified detail essential to the charged crime and must,\ntherefore, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierson,\n925 F.3d at 920.\n The district court instructed the jury on Count Four as fol-\nlows:\n In order for you to find the defendant guilty of\n the charge of carrying an explosive during the\n commission of a felony as alleged in Count\n Four, the government must prove both of the\n following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:\n …\n 2. The defendant knowingly carried an explo-\n sive, namely, smokeless powder, during the\n commission of that crime [in element 1 of the in-\n struction] … .\nThe jury instruction also included the specific language\n“namely, smokeless powder.” It was added during the final\njury instructions conference at the insistence of Haldorson.\n The jury instruction for Count Four and Count Four of the\nindictment both included the identical specific language re-\ngarding smokeless powder. The instruction thus required the\njury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Haldorson\nknowingly carried an explosive and that that explosive was\nsmokeless powder, just as Count Four charged.\n\f22 No. 18-2279\n\n This is unlike our decisions in Pierson and Leichtnam,\nwhich Haldorson attempts to rely on for support. In both\ncases, the indictment narrowed the bases of conviction by\nnaming a particular firearm that the defendant was charged\nwith. Pierson, 925 F.3d at 920; United States v. Leichtnam,\n948 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1991). And in both cases, the corre-\nsponding jury instruction failed to specify the exact gun\ncharged, while at the same time evidence of additional non-\nindicted guns were presented at trial. “[T]his combination of\nthe evidence and untailored jury instructions added up to a\nconstructive amendment.” Pierson, 925 F.3d at 920. This is not\nour case. The jury instruction was tailored to the specifics of\nthe indictment and did not permit the jury to convict Haldor-\nson based on non-indicted explosives. No constructive\namendment of the indictment occurred.\n Finally, Haldorson makes a passing suggestion that there\nis “another independent problem” with the jury instructions\non Count Four: the instruction contained “vastly more lan-\nguage” than the elements of the offense. According to Haldor-\nson, the language was unnecessary, irrelevant, and suggestive\nof the facts in evidence.\n On a challenge to a jury instruction, our review is twofold.\nFirst, “we review de novo whether the jury instructions accu-\nrately summarize the law, but give the district court substan-\ntial discretion to formulate the instructions provided that the\ninstructions represent a complete and correct statement of the\nlaw.” United States v. Bonin, 932 F.3d 523, 537–38 (7th Cir.\n2019). If the instruction is legally accurate, in the second step\nwe then “review the district court’s phrasing of the instruc-\ntions for abuse of discretion.” Id.\n\fNo. 18-2279 23\n\n The district court further instructed the jury that:\n The explosive does not have to be related to the\n other crime. A person carries an explosive if he\n knowingly transports it on his person or in a ve-\n hicle or container. A person may carry an explo-\n sive even if it is not immediately accessible be-\n cause it is in another area of a vehicle. The term\n “during” means at any point within the conduct\n charged in Count Two and Count Three.\nThe first and fourth sentences accurately summarize the ap-\nplicable law and Supreme Court precedent. In Ressam, the\nCourt held that 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) does not require a rela-\ntionship between the explosive carried and the underlying fel-\nony, and that “during” denotes a straightforward temporal\nlink. United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 274 (2008).\n The second and third sentences above are strictly defini-\ntional. There is no suggestion that they are incorrect, misstate-\nments, or could not have alternatively been included in the\nseparate “Definitions” instruction that the court provided to\nthe jurors. Because the instruction on Count Four accurately\nstated the law, it was not an abuse of discretion to provide the\nadditional language to the jury.\n IV. Mistakes During the Police Investigation\n As a last resort, Haldorson asks this court to vacate his\nconvictions because the convictions are “plagued by con-\ncealed material information, false and misleading reports,\nperjured testimony, an unlawful recording, scant evidence,\ncontaminated evidence, [and] evidence disappearing from\nthe evidence vault.” The crux of his argument on appeal is\nthat the cumulative effects of the perceived mistakes and\n\f24 No. 18-2279\n\nviolations during the investigation deprived him of his Fifth\nand Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial.7\n The problem for Haldorson is that all of the asserted errors\nhe claims infected his trial were known to him before trial and\nhe made extensive use of them at trial on cross-examination.\nEach and every misstep that the officers and the federal agents\nallegedly made along the way came out at trial. In fact, in clos-\ning arguments, Haldorson essentially argued to the jury what\nhe now argues on appeal.\n Much of Haldorson’s argument can be disposed of with\nthat, but we conclude with a brief comment on one of the spe-\ncific allegations concerning irregularities with Officer Insley’s\nhandling of the confidential informant. The primary issue is\nthat Officer Insley did not disclose the informant’s arrest that\noccurred ten days before the controlled buy to his police su-\npervisors or to the prosecutors. A confidential informant’s\npersonal and criminal history is material information and is\noften critical to different stages of an investigation or prose-\ncution. When the police seek a search warrant based in part\non an informant, for example, the omission of adverse infor-\nmation may impair the neutral role of the magistrate deciding\nwhether to issue the warrant. E.g., United States v. Glover,\n755 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014). Similarly, the government\n\n\n7 Importantly, although his argument is framed similarly, Haldorson’s ar-\n\ngument is not one of cumulative error because he does not allege that any\nerrors were committed in the course of the trial. See United States v. Mar-\nchan, 935 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 2019) (“To establish cumulative error a\ndefendant must show that (1) at least two errors were committed in the\ncourse of the trial; [and] (2) considered together along with the entire rec-\nord, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied\nthe petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.”).\n\fNo. 18-2279 25\n\nwould have to disclose that same adverse information to the\ndefense as exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373\nU.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\nIn this particular case, Officer Insley’s lack of disclosure did\nnot taint any later stages of the investigation or prosecution.\nNo warrants, evidence, or testimony relied on the informant’s\ncredibility.\n Mistakes were made during the police investigation of\nHaldorson. The government readily concedes as much. But\nthose mistakes did not deprive Haldorson of his constitu-\ntional rights. Haldorson had a full and complete opportunity\nto defend himself against the government’s charges and re-\nceived a fair trial.\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Michael P. Haldorson\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2279\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL P. HALDORSON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cr-00623-1 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Michael Haldorson is a self-pro-\\nclaimed fireworks enthusiast. But he was also a drug dealer.\\nHaldorson was arrested on his way to a second controlled buy\\nand, along with drugs, officers found three pipe bombs in his\\ncar. He was charged with several counts related to drugs, ex-\\nplosives, and a firearm. Before trial, Haldorson filed several\\nmotions to suppress evidence, challenging his arrest, the ad-\\nmissibility of his post-arrest statements, and the searches of\\n\\f2 No. 18-2279\\n\\nhis car, apartment bedroom, and rented storage locker. All\\nwere denied.\\n Haldorson proceeded to trial and a jury convicted him on\\nfour counts of the seven-count indictment: Count One for dis-\\ntribution of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Count Two for pos-\\nsession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1);\\nCount Three for possession of MDMA, or ecstasy, and co-\\ncaine, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); and Count Four for possession of an\\nexplosive during the commission of a felony, 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 844(h)(2). The jury acquitted him on two additional charges\\nand the government dismissed another count at trial. The dis-\\ntrict court later vacated Count Three because it was a lesser-\\nincluded offense of Count Two. The district court sentenced\\nHaldorson to a term of imprisonment of 192 months.\\n On appeal Haldorson raises three issues. First, Haldorson\\nargues that the district court erred in denying the motions to\\nsuppress the evidence seized from his car and his apartment\\nbecause the officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest\\nhim and there were no exigent circumstances to justify the\\nwarrantless search of his apartment bedroom. Second, he as-\\nserts that the jury instructions constructively amended Count\\nFour of the indictment, unlawfully carrying an explosive, in\\nviolation of the Fifth Amendment by permitting the jury to\\nconvict him on a broader basis than the indictment charged.\\nThird, and finally, Haldorson contends that he did not receive\\na fair trial due to a multitude of alleged mistakes and errors\\nduring the investigation and asks us to vacate his convictions.\\n We conclude that probable cause supported the arrest, ex-\\nigent circumstances existed for the search of the bedroom, and\\nHaldorson had a full and fair opportunity to defend himself\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 3\\n\\nat trial. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s judgment in\\nall respects.\\n I. The Arrest and Vehicle Search\\n We begin, naturally, with Haldorson’s arrest and the re-\\nsulting search of his vehicle.\\nA. Background\\n Haldorson was arrested on June 23, 2015, but his case\\nstarts a few weeks earlier. Sometime in April or May 2015,\\nHaldorson first came on the radar of Officer Thomas Insley\\nvia a confidential informant. Officer Insley was, at the time, a\\npatrol officer with the Village of Rockdale Police Department\\nin Illinois. He was also assigned to a specialized narcotics\\nunit, the Will County Cooperative Police Assistance Team\\n(CPAT)—a collective of officers from local police departments\\nunder the umbrella of the Illinois State Police—as an Inspec-\\ntor. (For ease we will use the title of “Officer” for Insley\\nthroughout, although he also held the title of “Inspector” dur-\\ning the relevant time period.) CPAT inspectors, in general,\\nconduct narcotics investigations, control informants, and go\\nundercover. Officer Insley was the primary CPAT investigator\\nfor Haldorson’s case.\\n Officer Insley had been working with this particular con-\\nfidential informant for a few months—a detail we will return\\nto later—when the informant told Officer Insley that he could\\npurchase cocaine from an individual he knew as “Mike\\nJones.” The informant provided Officer Insley with a picture\\nof Mike Jones’s vehicle, including the license plate (that read\\n\\f4 No. 18-2279\\n\\n“MKJNZ”), and his telephone number.1 Officer Insley ran the\\nlicense plate through a law enforcement database and learned\\nthat it was registered to Haldorson. The vehicle information\\nlisted on the registration also matched the photograph of Hal-\\ndorson’s car—a black Pontiac G8. Officer Insley then showed\\nthe informant a picture of Haldorson, who the informant\\nidentified as Mike Jones. At this point, Officer Insley asked the\\ninformant to set up a deal.\\n On June 1, 2015, the informant contacted Officer Insley\\nand told him that he could make a buy from Haldorson. Of-\\nficer Insley proceeded to prepare for the controlled purchase\\nby providing the informant with funds to buy the narcotics,\\nwiring the informant with an audio transmitter and recorder\\nto monitor the deal, and setting up a visual surveillance team\\nof other CPAT officers. Before heading to the controlled buy,\\nOfficer Insley also searched the informant and his vehicle to\\nmake sure that he had no contraband, as is standard in these\\noperations.\\n Officer Insley followed the confidential informant to a\\nWalmart parking lot in Joliet, Illinois, where he was going to\\nmeet Haldorson, and parked about an aisle over from the in-\\nformant. Haldorson then arrived, parked next to the inform-\\nant’s car, and the informant got out of his car and into Hal-\\ndorson’s car. At about that same time a customer pulled into\\nthe lot and parked in between Officer Insley and Haldorson’s\\ncar, obstructing Officer Insley’s view of the transaction. Not\\n\\n1 This Mike Jones’s phone number was not, however, 281-330-8004. For\\nthose unfamiliar with the reference, Mike Jones is an American rapper\\nwhose hit single in 2005 included a verse that recited his phone number\\nand told listeners to “hit Mike Jones up on the low.” See Mike Jones, Back\\nThen, on Who Is Mike Jones? (Warner Bros. Records 2005).\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 5\\n\\nto worry, though, Officer Insley was still able to listen to the\\ndeal in realtime from the audio transmitter.\\n After the deal went down, Officer Insley observed a black\\ncar matching the description of Haldorson’s car drive away\\nand relayed to the rest of the surveillance team that the con-\\ntrolled buy was successful and to follow Haldorson’s car.\\nMeanwhile, Officer Insley followed the informant to a prear-\\nranged location where Officer Insley retrieved the drugs from\\nthe informant, as well as re-searched the informant and his\\nvehicle. The confidential informant had purchased 1.7 grams\\nof cocaine from Haldorson in the transaction.\\n The surveillance team did not stop Haldorson that even-\\ning; the officers eventually lost him when they got stopped at\\na red light. But the plan was never to stop or arrest Haldorson\\non June 1st because Officer Insley was just beginning his in-\\nvestigation into Haldorson. Further, Officer Insley testified\\nthat if the officers arrested Haldorson immediately after the\\ncontrolled buy, it would have tipped off Haldorson that he\\nhad been set-up by the confidential informant. Officer Insley\\nwas using the same informant in other ongoing investigations\\nand did not want to burn the informant’s identity.\\n From the record it appears that very little was done to ad-\\nvance the Haldorson investigation between the June 1st con-\\ntrolled buy and June 23rd. There were perhaps, though it is\\nsomewhat unclear, attempts by the confidential informant to\\nreach out to Haldorson to set up another controlled buy on\\nJune 2nd and 5th, but those went nowhere.\\n On June 23, 2015, the day at the center of this case, the con-\\nfidential informant told Officer Insley that he could arrange\\nanother drug deal with Haldorson. The plan this time was for\\n\\f6 No. 18-2279\\n\\nthe informant to set it up but for officers to stop Haldorson on\\nhis way to the deal and arrest him. Stopping and arresting\\nHaldorson before the actual drug deal would, once again, pre-\\nserve the confidential informant’s anonymity. Eventually\\nHaldorson and the informant agreed to meet in the Village of\\nPlainfield, Illinois, specifically at Plainfield Central High\\nSchool. Officer Insley then arranged for a Plainfield police of-\\nficer in a marked car to pull Haldorson over.\\n Officer Friddle of the Plainfield Police Department posi-\\ntioned himself near the high school and waited for Haldorson\\nto pass by based on a description of Haldorson’s vehicle that\\nCPAT officers provided: black Pontiac G8 with a White Sox\\nspecialty license plate and red lights in the front grille of the\\ncar (that may or may not be illuminated). According to Officer\\nFriddle, he soon saw a black car approaching with red lights\\nin the grille.2 As it got closer, he could see the White Sox spe-\\ncialty plates too. Officer Friddle pulled out to follow Haldor-\\nson’s car, activated his emergency lights, and pulled Haldor-\\nson over at the entrance of Plainfield Central High School. The\\nstop was pretextual, and Officer Friddle made up some\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2 Haldorson strongly contested—and still does—the officers’ testimony\\nabout both the presence of the red lights on his car at the June 1st con-\\ntrolled buy (Haldorson testified and introduced receipts to demonstrate\\nthat the lights were not installed until three days later on June 4th) and\\nwhether the red lights were in fact illuminated when he was pulled over\\non June 23rd. The district court agreed with Haldorson on this point, find-\\ning that although there was a red area in the vent on top of the front hood\\nof the vehicle, there were not illuminated red lights. In the end, any dis-\\npute regarding the red grille lights is inconsequential to the contested is-\\nsues in this appeal.\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 7\\n\\nexcuses to buy time for CPAT officers to arrive on scene and\\ntake over.\\n Officer Mario Marzetta, a police officer with the Plainfield\\nPolice Department who at the time was also assigned to\\nCPAT, arrived at the traffic stop shortly thereafter and ar-\\nrested Haldorson. Another officer transported Haldorson to\\nthe Plainfield Police Department. Officer Marzetta then also\\ndrove Haldorson’s vehicle to the Plainfield Police Department\\nand parked it in the sally port, or the garage at the station,\\nwhere he and another CPAT inspector searched it.\\n The officers found numerous drugs—marijuana, cocaine,\\ncrack cocaine, MDMA or ecstasy, prescription pills, psilocy-\\nbin mushrooms—fireworks, and suspected pipe bombs in\\nHaldorson’s car. Upon discovering the pipe bombs, the offic-\\ners ceased their search and called in agents from the Bureau\\nof Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the\\nCook County Sheriff’s Police Bomb Squad. The ATF agents\\nand bomb technicians removed the explosives from the vehi-\\ncle to a safe area and rendered them safe.\\n We pause the story here to address Haldorson’s challenge\\nto his arrest and the search of his vehicle.\\nB. Analysis\\n Haldorson was later indicted on several federal charges.\\nHe thereafter moved to suppress, among other evidence, the\\nexplosives and narcotics discovered during the vehicle search\\nbecause the officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest\\nhim. The district court, after holding a two-day evidentiary\\nhearing, denied his motions to suppress. In reviewing the dis-\\ntrict court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review ques-\\ntions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2279\\n\\nUnited States v. Cherry, 920 F.3d 1126, 1132 (7th Cir. 2019). We\\nmust defer to credibility determinations that the district court\\nmade based on the testimony presented to it, absent clear er-\\nror. United States v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n 1. Probable cause to arrest Haldorson\\n The officers did not have a warrant to arrest Haldorson,\\n“but an officer may make a warrantless arrest consistent with\\nthe Fourth Amendment if there is ‘probable cause to believe\\nthat a crime has been committed.’” United States v. Daniels,\\n803 F.3d 335, 354 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Washington v.\\nHaupert, 481 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2007)). “Police officers pos-\\nsess probable cause to arrest when the facts and circum-\\nstances within their knowledge and of which they have rea-\\nsonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a\\nprudent person in believing that the suspect has committed\\nan offense.” United States v. Howard, 883 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (quotations omitted). We examine “the totality of the cir-\\ncumstances in a common sense manner” to determine\\nwhether probable cause exists in a given situation. United\\nStates v. Schaafsma, 318 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n Haldorson’s primary contention is that the information\\nfrom the controlled buy was too stale three weeks later to sup-\\nport probable cause for an arrest. The mere passage of time\\ndoes not necessarily dissipate the probable cause for an arrest.\\nIt is well-established that “there is no requirement that an of-\\nfender be arrested the moment probable cause is established.”\\nUnited States v. Reis, 906 F.2d 284, 289 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing\\nHoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966)). In Reis we\\nfound that an “overnight delay simply has no bearing on the\\nexistence of probable cause for arrest,” id., and we see no rea-\\nson to treat reasonably longer delays any different. Indeed,\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 9\\n\\nwe have previously held that the defendant’s participation in\\na controlled drug buy a month earlier “provided the police\\nwith probable cause to arrest [the suspect] which was not ren-\\ndered stale by the passage of one month.” United States v.\\nMitchell, 523 F. App’x 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).\\nOur sister circuits also agree that the passage of time alone\\ndoes not render probable cause to arrest stale. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Azor, 881 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Our case law\\nmakes clear that law enforcement is not required to arrest a\\nsuspect immediately upon development of probable cause.”);\\nUnited States v. Clark, 647 F. App’x 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2016) (per\\ncuriam) (“[P]robable cause existed to arrest [the defendant]\\nbecause the earlier tip from the confidential informant and the\\ncontrolled purchase [four to six days earlier] provided [the\\npolice] with facts that would support a reasonable person’s\\nbelief that an offense had been committed and that the indi-\\nvidual arrested was the guilty party.” (cleaned up)); United\\nStates v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 554 (1st Cir. 1999)\\n(“[W]hen probable cause exists, the timing of an arrest is a\\nmatter that the Constitution almost invariably leaves to police\\ndiscretion.”); United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 220 (1st Cir.\\n1997) (holding that “the period of time between the controlled\\nbuys [—four days after the second controlled buy and less\\nthan two weeks after the first controlled buy—] and the arrest\\nwas not so long here as to render the probable cause stale in\\nany meaningful temporal sense”); cf. Guadarrama v. United\\nStates, No. 16-6218, 2017 WL 3391683, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 13,\\n2017) (unpublished order) (stating that “[r]easonable jurists\\ncould not debate th[e] conclusion” that “while information\\nused to obtain a search warrant may go stale, the same is not\\ntrue for information underlying an arrest warrant”).\\n\\f10 No. 18-2279\\n\\n Our facts are nearly identical to those that the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit confronted in United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328 (10th\\nCir. 2009). There, the police arranged for a controlled buy be-\\ntween an informant and the defendant at an auto parts store.\\nPolice surveilled the informant while he drove to the location,\\ngot into the defendant’s car, and negotiated the purchase of\\nmethamphetamine. Id. at 1331. The police did not immedi-\\nately arrest the defendant, “[a]pparently hoping to investigate\\nfurther.” Id. About a month later, the police sought to have the\\ninformant conduct another controlled buy but the informant\\nrefused (even though a few days earlier he told the police he\\ncould set up another deal). Unable to convince the informant\\nto cooperate, the police resolved to arrest the defendant. In-\\nstead of obtaining an arrest warrant, they decided to simply\\nfollow his car until he committed a traffic violation and then\\nstop and arrest him—which they did. Id. at 1331–32. The\\nTenth Circuit held that the police officers had probable cause\\nto arrest the defendant “based on the controlled buy they wit-\\nnessed a month before his arrest.” Id. at 1334. “[T]he passage\\nof time did not make that information stale or otherwise de-\\nstroy the officers’ probable cause.” Id.\\n There was probable cause to arrest Haldorson on June 23,\\n2015, based on the June 1, 2015, controlled buy. The facts over-\\nwhelmingly support this conclusion. The confidential inform-\\nant first provided Officer Insley with Haldorson’s phone\\nnumber and a picture of his black Pontiac G8, including the\\nlicense plate. Officer Insley was able to run the license plate\\nthrough a law enforcement database and trace the car’s regis-\\ntration to Haldorson. The informant then positively identified\\na photograph of Haldorson as his drug supplier. But the prob-\\nable cause for the arrest was not merely based on a “tip” from\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 11\\n\\na confidential informant3—that was just the beginning. The\\nofficers then set up a controlled buy. Multiple officers were\\nsurveilling the deal and observed Haldorson’s car drive into\\nthe parking lot at the prearranged location, park next to the\\nconfidential informant, and the confidential informant get\\ninto the passenger seat of Haldorson’s car. Although no offic-\\ners witnessed the actual transaction, Officer Insley listened to\\nthe entire interaction in realtime via the informant’s hidden\\nwire. Officer Insley also searched the confidential informant\\nand his car both before and after the controlled buy; the only\\ndrugs he had were the 1.7 grams of cocaine purchased from\\nHaldorson during the controlled buy. On this last point, criti-\\ncally, the district court found Officer Insley’s testimony cred-\\nible, and we certainly cannot say that that finding was clearly\\nerroneous. The passage of three weeks did not render the in-\\nformation from the controlled buy stale.\\n It is the rare case where “staleness” will be relevant to the\\nlegality of a warrantless arrest.4 When there is a reasonable\\n\\n\\n3 Haldorson makes repeated references to initially undisclosed infor-\\nmation regarding the confidential informant’s history—including how he\\ncame to be an informant, his motivation (was he working for money or\\nworking off his own case), and the fact that he was arrested on an unre-\\nlated incident approximately ten days before the controlled buy. If Officer\\nInsley had relied on an affidavit from the confidential informant in an ap-\\nplication for a search warrant, the nondisclosure of such credibility infor-\\nmation would be relevant to the question of probable cause. United States\\nv. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2016). But this case does not in-\\nvolve simply relying on information from a confidential informant in an\\naffidavit.\\n4 Conversely, the concept of staleness is generally a “highly relevant” fac-\\ntor in applications for search warrants because, unlike arrests, the focus is\\non whether “evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” and\\n\\f12 No. 18-2279\\n\\nbelief that someone has committed a crime, time by itself does\\nnot make the existence of that fact any less probable. Cer-\\ntainly, “[g]ood police practice often requires postponing an\\narrest, even after probable cause has been established, in or-\\nder to place the suspect under surveillance or otherwise de-\\nvelop further evidence necessary to prove guilt to a jury.”\\nUnited States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J., con-\\ncurring). This is not to say that the passage of time can never\\ndissipate probable cause to arrest. There could be circum-\\nstances in which the subsequent investigation turns up new\\nfacts or evidence that disprove or discredit the original infor-\\nmation. Cf. id. at 432 n.5. We simply do not have those facts\\nhere and thus do not need to address if or when probable\\ncause to arrest may become stale.\\n The information provided by the confidential informant\\nand the June 1st controlled buy provided probable cause to\\narrest Haldorson on June 23, 2015.\\n 2. Vehicle search\\n Haldorson makes passing references to the search of his\\ncar but does not meaningfully contest the district court’s rul-\\ning that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.\\nIn any event, Haldorson’s challenge fails. The inevitable dis-\\ncovery doctrine provides that illegally obtained evidence will\\nnot be excluded if the government “can establish by a prepon-\\nderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or in-\\nevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix\\nv. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Once Haldorson was law-\\nfully arrested, his “car could not be left unattended\\n\\noften involve a search for perishable or transportable objects, like drugs or\\nguns. United States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 13\\n\\nindefinitely” at the entrance of a public high school. United\\nStates v. Simms, 626 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United\\nStates v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[O]bviously,\\nthe arresting officers would not have allowed the truck to just\\nsit on the street after [the arrestee] was carted away.”). The\\npolice officers would have towed his vehicle to the police sta-\\ntion and conducted an inventory search of the vehicle per es-\\ntablished Plainfield Police Department procedures. “The\\ndrugs [and explosives], therefore, inevitably would have been\\ndiscovered during an inventory search.” Cherry, 920 F.3d\\nat 1140.\\n We affirm the denial of Haldorson’s motion to suppress\\nthe evidence seized from his vehicle.\\n II. The Apartment Search\\n We pick up the facts where we left off, with Haldorson at\\nthe Plainfield Police Department and the officers’ discovery of\\ndrugs and explosives in his car.\\nA. Background\\n Officers interviewed Haldorson multiple times the even-\\ning of his arrest and carrying over into the early morning\\nhours of the next day, June 24, 2015. The officers read Haldor-\\nson his Miranda rights on at least two separate occasions over\\nthe course of the interviews. After finding pipe bombs in Hal-\\ndorson’s car, the CPAT officers and ATF agents were particu-\\nlarly concerned that Haldorson had stored additional explo-\\nsive materials at his residence. When officers initially asked\\nhim for his current address, Haldorson told the officers that\\nhe was homeless. Officer Insley believed that Haldorson lived\\nin downtown Plainfield, and specifically on or around Lock-\\nport Street, based on information he had previously gathered\\n\\f14 No. 18-2279\\n\\nand because officers had seen Haldorson’s car parked on that\\nstreet during the investigation. Haldorson told them that he\\nwas dating a woman over there but denied living in the\\ndowntown Plainfield area. He eventually claimed that he\\nlived in Joliet at his parents’ house and provided an address.\\nAsked if there were any additional explosives at that home,\\nHaldorson responded that there could be.\\n With this information, CPAT officers and ATF agents left\\nthe police station and went to the Joliet address. They arrived\\nat Haldorson’s parents’ home at approximately 2:45 a.m. on\\nJune 24, 2015. Haldorson’s parents gave the officers consent\\nto search Haldorson’s room, which revealed narcotics-related\\nitems but no explosives. After speaking with Haldorson’s fa-\\nther, the officers learned that Haldorson did in fact reside at\\nan apartment in downtown Plainfield, on Lockport Street. His\\nfather did not know the exact address but gave a general de-\\nscription of the area and Haldorson’s apartment. Officers im-\\nmediately went to that location.\\n Now on Lockport Street, at approximately four o’clock in\\nthe morning, the officers—without a precise address—pro-\\nceeded to knock on the street-level doors of the buildings (the\\nbuildings were retail business on the first floor and apart-\\nments on the second), and eventually located and gained ac-\\ncess to Haldorson’s apartment building.\\n Once inside the apartment building, the officers knocked\\non Haldorson’s unit’s front door. A woman answered the\\ndoor (and gave the same name as the name of the woman Hal-\\ndorson said he was dating), who told the officers that Haldor-\\nson lived there. She gave the officers consent to enter and\\nsearch the common areas of the apartment, and even signed a\\nwritten consent form. Haldorson had a separate bedroom in\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 15\\n\\nthe apartment, which was locked. The officers used Haldor-\\nson’s keys that were taken during his arrest to open his bed-\\nroom door. According to the Plainfield police sergeant on the\\nscene, the officers made the decision to enter Haldorson’s\\nlocked bedroom to search for explosives because they were\\nconcerned for the safety of his roommate and the other resi-\\ndents and businesses on Lockport Street if there were, indeed,\\nexplosives in the bedroom. The officers did not have a search\\nwarrant at the time.\\n In Haldorson’s bedroom officers founds fireworks and ex-\\nplosives. They removed the explosives from the bedroom and\\nsecured them in a steel box on ATF trucks. At that moment\\nthe officers did not seize anything else from Haldorson’s bed-\\nroom except for the explosives. In fact, the officers testified\\nthat they only conducted a “plain view” search for explosives\\nand then stopped their search. Instead, the officers then ap-\\nplied for and received a search warrant for the apartment. The\\nsecond search did not produce any additional explosives, but\\nofficers did seize narcotics-related items and two laptop com-\\nputers.\\n Later that same day, armed with the search warrant, offic-\\ners also searched two storage lockers that belonged to Haldor-\\nson. They did not find any explosives or narcotics in one of\\nthe lockers, but seized PVC pipe, multiple low explosive pow-\\nder canisters, fireworks, and a handgun and ammunition\\nfrom the second locker.\\n We break from recounting the facts again to tackle the le-\\ngality of the bedroom search.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2279\\n\\nB. Analysis\\n When the police officers entered Haldorson’s bedroom\\nand searched it for explosives, they did not have a search war-\\nrant or consent. “Warrantless searches and seizures within a\\nhome are considered presumptively unreasonable and a vio-\\nlation of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Huddleston,\\n593 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2010). There are, however, “certain\\nnarrowly proscribed exceptions.” United States v. Bell,\\n500 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2007). One such exception is where\\n“exigent circumstances require officers to ‘step in to prevent\\nserious injury and restore order.’” Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 600\\n(quoting Bell, 500 F.3d at 612). Under the exigent circum-\\nstances exception, “a warrantless entry into a dwelling may\\nbe lawful when there is a pressing need for the police to enter\\nbut no time for them to secure a warrant.” Sutterfield v. City of\\nMilwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 557 (7th Cir. 2014). The test is\\nwhether “an officer had an objectively ‘reasonable belief that\\nthere was a compelling need to act and no time to obtain a\\nwarrant.’” Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 600 (quoting Bell, 500 F.3d\\nat 613). The existence of exigent circumstances is a mixed\\nquestion of fact and law that we review de novo. Id. We still\\nreview the district court’s factual findings for clear error.\\nUnited States v. Delgado, 701 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n The exigent circumstances exception is “frequently in-\\nvoked in cases involving explosives.” United States v. Witzlib,\\n796 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases and citing,\\nfor example, United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386, 393–94 (1st\\nCir. 2012); Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d\\n1065, 1071–73 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lindsey,\\n877 F.2d 777, 781–82 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Al–Az-\\nzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1985)). Explosives are, by their\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 17\\n\\nvery nature, inherently dangerous. Homemade explosive de-\\nvices even more so because the persons manufacturing them\\noften lack the needed technical knowledge and skills. There-\\nfore, even though Haldorson enjoyed a strong expectation of\\nprivacy in his locked bedroom, that expectation must be bal-\\nanced against the need to protect the public from serious\\nharm where explosive materials may be present in a residen-\\ntial complex with close neighbors. United States v. Boettger,\\n71 F.3d 1410, 1414 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[Privacy] expectations\\nmust be lowered where a resident admits working with ex-\\nplosive materials in an apartment complex with close neigh-\\nbors.”); see Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297 n.8 (1984)\\n(careful “not to suggest that individual expectations of pri-\\nvacy may prevail over interests of public safety”).\\n The following objective facts, found by the district court\\nand not clearly erroneous, were known to the officers before\\nthey entered into Haldorson’s bedroom: Explosive materials,\\nincluding pipe bombs, were found in Haldorson’s car; pipe\\nbombs, according to the Cook County Sheriff’s Police Bomb\\nSquad and ATF agents, are very volatile and dangerous; Hal-\\ndorson admitted that more explosives could be at his resi-\\ndence; Haldorson falsely told officers that he lived at his par-\\nents’ house, and a search of that house uncovered no explo-\\nsives; and Haldorson actually resided at an apartment in\\ndowntown Plainfield, which was surrounded by residential\\nneighbors and businesses. Moreover, the district court found\\nthat an ATF agent credibly testified that there was a “legiti-\\nmate concern” that other homemade explosives were “poten-\\ntially unstable and therefore dangerous to others.” Based on\\nthese facts, the officers reasonably believed that there was a\\njustifiable and urgent need to act to prevent serious harm.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2279\\n\\n Because of the acute concern and the hour at which the\\nofficers and agents were urgently proceeding, around three\\nand four o’clock in the morning, there was no time to obtain\\na warrant.\\n Haldorson relies on the fact that the officers and agents\\nonly conducted a plain view search for explosives in his bed-\\nroom to question their belief that the explosives posed an im-\\nmediate threat. But, as the district court noted, law enforce-\\nment officers took additional steps consistent with their belief\\nthat the explosives posed an immediate threat, including\\nclearing Haldorson’s girlfriend from the apartment. Further,\\ncontrary to Haldorson’s contention that their “true aim and\\nintent” was to conduct a warrantless search, the fact that the\\nofficers only did a plain view search shows that the expressed\\nconcern was not simply pretext for searching for and gather-\\ning evidence of criminal activity. See Clifford, 464 U.S. at 292.\\nThe search did not exceed the scope of the exigency. See\\nUnited States v. Salava, 978 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The\\nensuing search … was appropriately limited to the [exigent]\\ncircumstances that justified it.”).\\n Haldorson also emphasizes that he was in custody and\\ntherefore “any alleged explosive materials were stable and in-\\nert.” The opposite is true—homemade pipe bombs, and other\\nimprovised explosive devices, are unstable.5 An ATF agent,\\n\\n5 It is for this same reason that we find unpersuasive Haldorson’s reliance\\n\\non United States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2013), which involved a\\nwarrantless search based on the possible threat of a grenade inside a\\nhome. Upon learning of the possible existence of a grenade, however, the\\nofficer did not call for the assistance of explosive experts, or even “remove\\nthe sleeping child from the room located directly next to the room where\\nthe ‘grenade’ was allegedly stored.” Id. at 395. The officer’s “own actions\\nbelie[d]” the argument that there were exigent circumstances. Id. at 398.\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 19\\n\\nwho has experience and expertise with explosives, credibly\\ntestified to this below.6 In short, the officers reasonably be-\\nlieved that the homemade pipe bombs posed an immediate\\nthreat to public safety.\\n Given the facts and information known at the time of the\\nsearch, “from the perspective of the officers at the scene,”\\nHuddleston, 593 F.3d at 600, there was a legitimate concern\\nthat other homemade explosive devices were in Haldorson’s\\nbedroom that were potentially unstable and therefore danger-\\nous to others. The warrantless search fell within the exigent\\ncircumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant\\nrequirement.\\n III. Constructive Amendment to the Indictment\\n Back to the facts, and with the pretrial motions and evi-\\ndentiary issues on appeal taken care of, we turn to Haldor-\\nson’s objections to the jury instructions.\\n Haldorson challenges the instructions to the jury on Count\\nFour as a constructive amendment to the indictment. Count\\n\\n\\nThe officer acted with no level of urgency. Importantly, and distinct from\\nour circumstances, the Fourth Circuit noted that there was “no indication\\nthat there might be other, more unstable explosives, inside as well.” Id. (em-\\nphasis added).\\n6 See also Fact Sheet–Illegal Explosive Devices, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,\\nFirearms and Explosives (May 2019), https://www.atf.gov/resource-cen-\\nter/fact-sheet/fact-sheet-illegal-explosive-devices (“Illegal explosive de-\\nvices … are typically extremely sensitive to heat, shock, electrostatic dis-\\ncharge and friction that may initiate, unexpectedly causing serious injury\\nor death. The risks associated with these devices are further compounded\\nbecause the persons manufacturing, transporting and using these devices\\noften do not have the knowledge, skills and experience required for such\\nactivities.”).\\n\\f20 No. 18-2279\\n\\nFour of the indictment charged, in pertinent part, that Haldor-\\nson “unlawfully carried an explosive, namely, smokeless\\npowder, during the commission of a felony … .” Because the\\nindictment charged him with carrying a specific object—\\nsmokeless powder—the jury could only convict if it found be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt that Haldorson carried smokeless\\npowder, not just any explosive material. Haldorson argues\\nthat the jury instructions on Count Four unconstitutionally\\nbroadened the bases of conviction by permitting the jury to\\nconvict if they found he carried any explosive. This is a ques-\\ntion of law that we review de novo. United States v. Mitov,\\n460 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be\\nheld to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-\\nless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S.\\nConst. amend. V. Only the grand jury can amend the indict-\\nment to broaden it. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216\\n(1960); United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n“This rule both enforces the Fifth Amendment and helps to\\nensure that a defendant is given reasonable notice of the alle-\\ngations against him so that he may best prepare a defense.”\\nPierson, 925 F.3d at 919. A constructive amendment “occurs\\nwhen either the government (usually during its presentation\\nof evidence and/or its argument), the court (usually through\\nits instructions to the jury), or both, broadens the possible ba-\\nses for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury.”\\nUnited States v. Cusimano, 148 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 1998).\\n The statute under which Haldorson was charged,\\n18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2), does not require a specific type of explo-\\nsive as an element—it criminalizes “carr[ying] an explosive\\nduring the commission of any felony” (subject only to the\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 21\\n\\ndefinition of “explosive” in 18 U.S.C. § 841(d)). But the gov-\\nernment narrowed the charge against Haldorson by including\\nthe specific language “namely, smokeless powder” in the in-\\ndictment. “Specific language in an indictment that provides\\ndetail beyond the general elements of the crime makes the\\nspecified detail essential to the charged crime and must,\\ntherefore, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierson,\\n925 F.3d at 920.\\n The district court instructed the jury on Count Four as fol-\\nlows:\\n In order for you to find the defendant guilty of\\n the charge of carrying an explosive during the\\n commission of a felony as alleged in Count\\n Four, the government must prove both of the\\n following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:\\n …\\n 2. The defendant knowingly carried an explo-\\n sive, namely, smokeless powder, during the\\n commission of that crime [in element 1 of the in-\\n struction] … .\\nThe jury instruction also included the specific language\\n“namely, smokeless powder.” It was added during the final\\njury instructions conference at the insistence of Haldorson.\\n The jury instruction for Count Four and Count Four of the\\nindictment both included the identical specific language re-\\ngarding smokeless powder. The instruction thus required the\\njury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Haldorson\\nknowingly carried an explosive and that that explosive was\\nsmokeless powder, just as Count Four charged.\\n\\f22 No. 18-2279\\n\\n This is unlike our decisions in Pierson and Leichtnam,\\nwhich Haldorson attempts to rely on for support. In both\\ncases, the indictment narrowed the bases of conviction by\\nnaming a particular firearm that the defendant was charged\\nwith. Pierson, 925 F.3d at 920; United States v. Leichtnam,\\n948 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1991). And in both cases, the corre-\\nsponding jury instruction failed to specify the exact gun\\ncharged, while at the same time evidence of additional non-\\nindicted guns were presented at trial. “[T]his combination of\\nthe evidence and untailored jury instructions added up to a\\nconstructive amendment.” Pierson, 925 F.3d at 920. This is not\\nour case. The jury instruction was tailored to the specifics of\\nthe indictment and did not permit the jury to convict Haldor-\\nson based on non-indicted explosives. No constructive\\namendment of the indictment occurred.\\n Finally, Haldorson makes a passing suggestion that there\\nis “another independent problem” with the jury instructions\\non Count Four: the instruction contained “vastly more lan-\\nguage” than the elements of the offense. According to Haldor-\\nson, the language was unnecessary, irrelevant, and suggestive\\nof the facts in evidence.\\n On a challenge to a jury instruction, our review is twofold.\\nFirst, “we review de novo whether the jury instructions accu-\\nrately summarize the law, but give the district court substan-\\ntial discretion to formulate the instructions provided that the\\ninstructions represent a complete and correct statement of the\\nlaw.” United States v. Bonin, 932 F.3d 523, 537–38 (7th Cir.\\n2019). If the instruction is legally accurate, in the second step\\nwe then “review the district court’s phrasing of the instruc-\\ntions for abuse of discretion.” Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 23\\n\\n The district court further instructed the jury that:\\n The explosive does not have to be related to the\\n other crime. A person carries an explosive if he\\n knowingly transports it on his person or in a ve-\\n hicle or container. A person may carry an explo-\\n sive even if it is not immediately accessible be-\\n cause it is in another area of a vehicle. The term\\n “during” means at any point within the conduct\\n charged in Count Two and Count Three.\\nThe first and fourth sentences accurately summarize the ap-\\nplicable law and Supreme Court precedent. In Ressam, the\\nCourt held that 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) does not require a rela-\\ntionship between the explosive carried and the underlying fel-\\nony, and that “during” denotes a straightforward temporal\\nlink. United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 274 (2008).\\n The second and third sentences above are strictly defini-\\ntional. There is no suggestion that they are incorrect, misstate-\\nments, or could not have alternatively been included in the\\nseparate “Definitions” instruction that the court provided to\\nthe jurors. Because the instruction on Count Four accurately\\nstated the law, it was not an abuse of discretion to provide the\\nadditional language to the jury.\\n IV. Mistakes During the Police Investigation\\n As a last resort, Haldorson asks this court to vacate his\\nconvictions because the convictions are “plagued by con-\\ncealed material information, false and misleading reports,\\nperjured testimony, an unlawful recording, scant evidence,\\ncontaminated evidence, [and] evidence disappearing from\\nthe evidence vault.” The crux of his argument on appeal is\\nthat the cumulative effects of the perceived mistakes and\\n\\f24 No. 18-2279\\n\\nviolations during the investigation deprived him of his Fifth\\nand Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial.7\\n The problem for Haldorson is that all of the asserted errors\\nhe claims infected his trial were known to him before trial and\\nhe made extensive use of them at trial on cross-examination.\\nEach and every misstep that the officers and the federal agents\\nallegedly made along the way came out at trial. In fact, in clos-\\ning arguments, Haldorson essentially argued to the jury what\\nhe now argues on appeal.\\n Much of Haldorson’s argument can be disposed of with\\nthat, but we conclude with a brief comment on one of the spe-\\ncific allegations concerning irregularities with Officer Insley’s\\nhandling of the confidential informant. The primary issue is\\nthat Officer Insley did not disclose the informant’s arrest that\\noccurred ten days before the controlled buy to his police su-\\npervisors or to the prosecutors. A confidential informant’s\\npersonal and criminal history is material information and is\\noften critical to different stages of an investigation or prose-\\ncution. When the police seek a search warrant based in part\\non an informant, for example, the omission of adverse infor-\\nmation may impair the neutral role of the magistrate deciding\\nwhether to issue the warrant. E.g., United States v. Glover,\\n755 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014). Similarly, the government\\n\\n\\n7 Importantly, although his argument is framed similarly, Haldorson’s ar-\\n\\ngument is not one of cumulative error because he does not allege that any\\nerrors were committed in the course of the trial. See United States v. Mar-\\nchan, 935 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 2019) (“To establish cumulative error a\\ndefendant must show that (1) at least two errors were committed in the\\ncourse of the trial; [and] (2) considered together along with the entire rec-\\nord, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied\\nthe petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 25\\n\\nwould have to disclose that same adverse information to the\\ndefense as exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373\\nU.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\\nIn this particular case, Officer Insley’s lack of disclosure did\\nnot taint any later stages of the investigation or prosecution.\\nNo warrants, evidence, or testimony relied on the informant’s\\ncredibility.\\n Mistakes were made during the police investigation of\\nHaldorson. The government readily concedes as much. But\\nthose mistakes did not deprive Haldorson of his constitu-\\ntional rights. Haldorson had a full and complete opportunity\\nto defend himself against the government’s charges and re-\\nceived a fair trial.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4698,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4672182,"string":"4,672,182"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Western Illinois Service Coord v. Illinois Department of Human S"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-2211"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-2211\\nWESTERN ILLINOIS SERVICE COORDINATION, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nPRAIRIELAND SERVICE COORDINATION, INC., et al.,\\n Intervening Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:19-cv-3127 — Richard Mills, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Circumstances often change as\\ntime passes. And changed circumstances can have conse-\\nquences in litigation. This appeal presents a good example.\\nOur review is limited to the denial of a preliminary injunction,\\n\\f2 No. 19-2211\\n\\nwhich sought to prevent an event—the shift in the award of\\nstate contracts for the provision of case management services\\nas part of Illinois’s Medicaid program. That transition oc-\\ncurred on July 1, 2019. During oral argument, the plaintiffs—\\nparties to the former contracts—acknowledged that it would\\nbe too disruptive to rewind the clock by somehow attempting\\nto reinstate those contracts. So, too, did they confirm that they\\nnow seek different forms of relief. In these circumstances, the\\npresent appeal is moot, so we dismiss it and remand for fur-\\nther proceedings.\\n I\\n A\\n The contracts at issue relate to Illinois’s administration of\\nits Medicaid program. The Medicaid statute establishes a sys-\\ntem through which the federal government provides financial\\nassistance to states to furnish medical care to low-income in-\\ndividuals. To receive funds, states must comply with various\\nrequirements, which the federal government oversees\\nthrough a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Hu-\\nman Services. Today all 50 states participate in Medicaid,\\nwhich provides medical coverage for over 65 million people\\nnationwide.\\n The Medicaid program allows states to provide certain\\nhome-based services to participants. States do so by choosing\\nto participate in what is known as the Home and Community\\nBased, or HCBS, waiver program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c).\\nThe program is considered a waiver program because, when\\na state’s application is approved, the federal government\\nwaives certain Medicaid requirements that would otherwise\\napply. See Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 906–07 (7th Cir.\\n\\fNo. 19-2211 3\\n\\n2016) (explaining the rationale behind HCBS waivers in\\ngreater detail). Most significantly, waivers eliminate the re-\\nquirement that services be provided in an institution. They\\nalso do away with some of Medicaid’s uniformity rules, al-\\nlowing states to target specific geographic areas or certain\\ngroups of people at risk of institutionalization. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1396n(c)(3).\\n Illinois currently operates nine waivers, including one for\\nadults with developmental disabilities overseen by the Divi-\\nsion of Developmental Disabilities within the Illinois Depart-\\nment of Human Services. Under this waiver, Illinois contracts\\nwith non-profit organizations to provide case management\\nservices for adults with developmental disabilities receiving\\nhome- and community-based services as part of Medicaid.\\nOrganizations that provide these case management services\\nare known as Independent Service Coordination agencies,\\nsometimes shorthanded ISCs.\\n In the past, Illinois had contracted with 17 ISCs, which op-\\nerated in as many regions throughout the state. Illinois\\nawarded the contracts through a noncompetitive, annual re-\\nnewal process. The three plaintiff agencies before us had re-\\nceived contracts and provided case management services to\\nMedicaid participants for at least 25 years. This all changed\\nwhen, in September 2018, the state announced a new compet-\\nitive bidding process for the contracts that would begin on\\nJuly 1, 2019. The plaintiff agencies submitted bids but learned\\non January 2 that their existing contracts would not be re-\\nnewed. The new contracts went into effect on July 1, and ad-\\nministrative services are now being provided by eight agen-\\ncies operating in 12 regions across Illinois.\\n\\f4 No. 19-2211\\n\\n B\\n The three plaintiff agencies and three individual plain-\\ntiffs—their former clients—filed suit on May 16, 2019. Invok-\\ning 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they allege a violation of the Medicaid\\nAct, contending that they, as ISCs, are covered by Medicaid’s\\nfree-choice-of-provider provision, which requires that Medi-\\ncaid recipients be allowed to select any qualified provider for\\ntheir services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23); see also Planned\\nParenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dept. Health,\\n699 F.3d 962, 978 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining the operation of\\nMedicaid’s free-choice-of-provider provision). The plaintiffs’\\nposition is straightforward: Illinois’s awarding of the new\\ncontracts to new ISCs meant that the adults with developmen-\\ntal disabilities who were receiving case management services\\nwould no longer be able to choose their ISC and instead\\nwould have to transition to one of the new contract recipients.\\nThe plaintiffs, in short, see Illinois’s switch to a competitive\\nbidding process as unlawfully blocking their freedom to\\nchoose a provider of case management services. Alongside\\ntheir Medicaid claim, the plaintiffs also brought claims under\\nIllinois administrative law.\\n On June 5, 2019, knowing the new contracts were set to go\\ninto effect in less than 30 days, the plaintiffs sought a prelim-\\ninary injunction. They wanted to prevent the new contracts\\nfrom taking effect on July 1 and instead leave all existing con-\\ntracts in place. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion\\non June 25, concluding that they were unlikely to succeed on\\nthe merits of either their federal or state claims. The court rea-\\nsoned that, as providers of administrative services but not\\nmedical services, ISCs like the plaintiffs were not “qualified\\nproviders” within the meaning of the Medicaid statute and\\n\\fNo. 19-2211 5\\n\\ntherefore were not covered by the enactment’s free-choice-of-\\nprovider provision. In so concluding, however, the court rec-\\nognized that the implementation of the new contracts would\\ncause irreparable harm to both the plaintiff agencies and indi-\\nvidual plaintiffs, who would lose all or most of their funding\\nand be forced to switch case managers.\\n The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the preliminary in-\\njunction that same day. Four days later, on June 27, the plain-\\ntiffs filed a motion for emergency injunctive relief pending ap-\\npeal in this court. We denied that motion on June 28, and the\\nnew contracts went into effect as scheduled on July 1.\\n II\\n A\\n We put the appeal on our fall calendar and heard oral ar-\\ngument on September 25. During oral argument, we asked\\nwhat relief plaintiffs were seeking now that the new contracts\\nhad taken effect. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded by explaining\\nthat the former agencies were not asking us to vacate the new\\ncontracts and reinstate the old agreements. To her credit,\\nplaintiffs’ counsel candidly acknowledged that reversing\\ncourse at this point this would be too disruptive, particularly\\nto the Medicaid participants with developmental disabilities\\nwho receive case management services. While we are not cer-\\ntain what injunctive relief the plaintiffs now desire, it is clear\\nthat the passage of time and the new contracts taking effect\\nhave caused plaintiffs to revisit their prior request for prelim-\\ninary injunctive relief. Indeed, plaintiffs’ counsel made plain\\nduring oral argument that her clients are not seeking outright\\nreversal of the district court’s decision denying the prelimi-\\nnary injunction.\\n\\f6 No. 19-2211\\n\\n For their part, defendants represented that the new con-\\ntracts went into effect on July 1 as planned. We also learned\\nthat the intervenors—two of the new agencies presently un-\\nder contract—have hired many of the same case managers\\nwho had been employed by the previous agencies. While\\nthere have likely been some bumps along the road, nothing in\\nthe record before us or conveyed at oral argument suggests\\nany material issues or shortcomings in the new agencies’ im-\\nplementation of case management services for the individuals\\ncovered under this Medicaid program.\\n B\\n The parties’ briefing understandably focused on the mer-\\nits issue of whether the plaintiff ISCs constituted qualified\\nproviders and thus were covered by Medicaid’s free-choice-\\nof-provider provision. But with the plaintiffs no longer chal-\\nlenging the denial of their preliminary injunction, we do not\\nhave to decide that question. We can avoid tracing the statu-\\ntory interpretation of “qualified providers” or determining\\nwhat kinds of services the plaintiff agencies provide. The pas-\\nsage of time has rendered the issue—embodied entirely as it\\nis in the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ request for a\\npreliminary injunction—moot.\\n Mootness roots itself in Article III’s case or controversy\\nlimitation, leaving us “without power to decide questions that\\ncannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before [us].”\\nNorth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). By its terms,\\nthis appeal extends no further than the plaintiffs’ challenge to\\nthe district court’s denial of their request for preliminary in-\\njunctive relief to stop the new contracts from taking effect. Not\\nonly has that event occurred, the plaintiffs have made clear\\nthat they are not asking us to unwind it. They acknowledge it\\n\\fNo. 19-2211 7\\n\\nwould be difficult and likely even more harmful to their cli-\\nents to change course once again, particularly in the absence\\nof evidence showing that any of the new ISCs have dropped\\nthe ball in their provision of case management services.\\n We are without jurisdiction to go further. This appeal is\\nmoot. The proper course, then, is to dismiss the appeal and\\nallow the case to return to the district court, where plaintiffs,\\nif they so choose, will be free to continue to litigate the merits\\nof their claims and where management of next steps will re-\\nmain in the sound discretion of the district court. See Gjertsen\\nv. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of City of Chi., 751 F.2d 199, 202 (7th\\nCir. 1984) (explaining that when a preliminary injunction un-\\nder appeal has become moot but the case itself has not, “the\\nusual practice is just to dismiss the appeal as moot and not\\nvacate the order appealed from”).\\n In these circumstances, then, we DISMISS the appeal.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449435/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Yale Scudder\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4672182/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Western Illinois Service Coord v. Illinois Department of Human S\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-2211\nWESTERN ILLINOIS SERVICE COORDINATION, et al.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n v.\n\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees,\n\n v.\n\nPRAIRIELAND SERVICE COORDINATION, INC., et al.,\n Intervening Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 3:19-cv-3127 — Richard Mills, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Circumstances often change as\ntime passes. And changed circumstances can have conse-\nquences in litigation. This appeal presents a good example.\nOur review is limited to the denial of a preliminary injunction,\n\f2 No. 19-2211\n\nwhich sought to prevent an event—the shift in the award of\nstate contracts for the provision of case management services\nas part of Illinois’s Medicaid program. That transition oc-\ncurred on July 1, 2019. During oral argument, the plaintiffs—\nparties to the former contracts—acknowledged that it would\nbe too disruptive to rewind the clock by somehow attempting\nto reinstate those contracts. So, too, did they confirm that they\nnow seek different forms of relief. In these circumstances, the\npresent appeal is moot, so we dismiss it and remand for fur-\nther proceedings.\n I\n A\n The contracts at issue relate to Illinois’s administration of\nits Medicaid program. The Medicaid statute establishes a sys-\ntem through which the federal government provides financial\nassistance to states to furnish medical care to low-income in-\ndividuals. To receive funds, states must comply with various\nrequirements, which the federal government oversees\nthrough a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Hu-\nman Services. Today all 50 states participate in Medicaid,\nwhich provides medical coverage for over 65 million people\nnationwide.\n The Medicaid program allows states to provide certain\nhome-based services to participants. States do so by choosing\nto participate in what is known as the Home and Community\nBased, or HCBS, waiver program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c).\nThe program is considered a waiver program because, when\na state’s application is approved, the federal government\nwaives certain Medicaid requirements that would otherwise\napply. See Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 906–07 (7th Cir.\n\fNo. 19-2211 3\n\n2016) (explaining the rationale behind HCBS waivers in\ngreater detail). Most significantly, waivers eliminate the re-\nquirement that services be provided in an institution. They\nalso do away with some of Medicaid’s uniformity rules, al-\nlowing states to target specific geographic areas or certain\ngroups of people at risk of institutionalization. See 42 U.S.C.\n§ 1396n(c)(3).\n Illinois currently operates nine waivers, including one for\nadults with developmental disabilities overseen by the Divi-\nsion of Developmental Disabilities within the Illinois Depart-\nment of Human Services. Under this waiver, Illinois contracts\nwith non-profit organizations to provide case management\nservices for adults with developmental disabilities receiving\nhome- and community-based services as part of Medicaid.\nOrganizations that provide these case management services\nare known as Independent Service Coordination agencies,\nsometimes shorthanded ISCs.\n In the past, Illinois had contracted with 17 ISCs, which op-\nerated in as many regions throughout the state. Illinois\nawarded the contracts through a noncompetitive, annual re-\nnewal process. The three plaintiff agencies before us had re-\nceived contracts and provided case management services to\nMedicaid participants for at least 25 years. This all changed\nwhen, in September 2018, the state announced a new compet-\nitive bidding process for the contracts that would begin on\nJuly 1, 2019. The plaintiff agencies submitted bids but learned\non January 2 that their existing contracts would not be re-\nnewed. The new contracts went into effect on July 1, and ad-\nministrative services are now being provided by eight agen-\ncies operating in 12 regions across Illinois.\n\f4 No. 19-2211\n\n B\n The three plaintiff agencies and three individual plain-\ntiffs—their former clients—filed suit on May 16, 2019. Invok-\ning 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they allege a violation of the Medicaid\nAct, contending that they, as ISCs, are covered by Medicaid’s\nfree-choice-of-provider provision, which requires that Medi-\ncaid recipients be allowed to select any qualified provider for\ntheir services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23); see also Planned\nParenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dept. Health,\n699 F.3d 962, 978 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining the operation of\nMedicaid’s free-choice-of-provider provision). The plaintiffs’\nposition is straightforward: Illinois’s awarding of the new\ncontracts to new ISCs meant that the adults with developmen-\ntal disabilities who were receiving case management services\nwould no longer be able to choose their ISC and instead\nwould have to transition to one of the new contract recipients.\nThe plaintiffs, in short, see Illinois’s switch to a competitive\nbidding process as unlawfully blocking their freedom to\nchoose a provider of case management services. Alongside\ntheir Medicaid claim, the plaintiffs also brought claims under\nIllinois administrative law.\n On June 5, 2019, knowing the new contracts were set to go\ninto effect in less than 30 days, the plaintiffs sought a prelim-\ninary injunction. They wanted to prevent the new contracts\nfrom taking effect on July 1 and instead leave all existing con-\ntracts in place. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion\non June 25, concluding that they were unlikely to succeed on\nthe merits of either their federal or state claims. The court rea-\nsoned that, as providers of administrative services but not\nmedical services, ISCs like the plaintiffs were not “qualified\nproviders” within the meaning of the Medicaid statute and\n\fNo. 19-2211 5\n\ntherefore were not covered by the enactment’s free-choice-of-\nprovider provision. In so concluding, however, the court rec-\nognized that the implementation of the new contracts would\ncause irreparable harm to both the plaintiff agencies and indi-\nvidual plaintiffs, who would lose all or most of their funding\nand be forced to switch case managers.\n The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the preliminary in-\njunction that same day. Four days later, on June 27, the plain-\ntiffs filed a motion for emergency injunctive relief pending ap-\npeal in this court. We denied that motion on June 28, and the\nnew contracts went into effect as scheduled on July 1.\n II\n A\n We put the appeal on our fall calendar and heard oral ar-\ngument on September 25. During oral argument, we asked\nwhat relief plaintiffs were seeking now that the new contracts\nhad taken effect. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded by explaining\nthat the former agencies were not asking us to vacate the new\ncontracts and reinstate the old agreements. To her credit,\nplaintiffs’ counsel candidly acknowledged that reversing\ncourse at this point this would be too disruptive, particularly\nto the Medicaid participants with developmental disabilities\nwho receive case management services. While we are not cer-\ntain what injunctive relief the plaintiffs now desire, it is clear\nthat the passage of time and the new contracts taking effect\nhave caused plaintiffs to revisit their prior request for prelim-\ninary injunctive relief. Indeed, plaintiffs’ counsel made plain\nduring oral argument that her clients are not seeking outright\nreversal of the district court’s decision denying the prelimi-\nnary injunction.\n\f6 No. 19-2211\n\n For their part, defendants represented that the new con-\ntracts went into effect on July 1 as planned. We also learned\nthat the intervenors—two of the new agencies presently un-\nder contract—have hired many of the same case managers\nwho had been employed by the previous agencies. While\nthere have likely been some bumps along the road, nothing in\nthe record before us or conveyed at oral argument suggests\nany material issues or shortcomings in the new agencies’ im-\nplementation of case management services for the individuals\ncovered under this Medicaid program.\n B\n The parties’ briefing understandably focused on the mer-\nits issue of whether the plaintiff ISCs constituted qualified\nproviders and thus were covered by Medicaid’s free-choice-\nof-provider provision. But with the plaintiffs no longer chal-\nlenging the denial of their preliminary injunction, we do not\nhave to decide that question. We can avoid tracing the statu-\ntory interpretation of “qualified providers” or determining\nwhat kinds of services the plaintiff agencies provide. The pas-\nsage of time has rendered the issue—embodied entirely as it\nis in the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ request for a\npreliminary injunction—moot.\n Mootness roots itself in Article III’s case or controversy\nlimitation, leaving us “without power to decide questions that\ncannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before [us].”\nNorth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). By its terms,\nthis appeal extends no further than the plaintiffs’ challenge to\nthe district court’s denial of their request for preliminary in-\njunctive relief to stop the new contracts from taking effect. Not\nonly has that event occurred, the plaintiffs have made clear\nthat they are not asking us to unwind it. They acknowledge it\n\fNo. 19-2211 7\n\nwould be difficult and likely even more harmful to their cli-\nents to change course once again, particularly in the absence\nof evidence showing that any of the new ISCs have dropped\nthe ball in their provision of case management services.\n We are without jurisdiction to go further. This appeal is\nmoot. The proper course, then, is to dismiss the appeal and\nallow the case to return to the district court, where plaintiffs,\nif they so choose, will be free to continue to litigate the merits\nof their claims and where management of next steps will re-\nmain in the sound discretion of the district court. See Gjertsen\nv. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of City of Chi., 751 F.2d 199, 202 (7th\nCir. 1984) (explaining that when a preliminary injunction un-\nder appeal has become moot but the case itself has not, “the\nusual practice is just to dismiss the appeal as moot and not\nvacate the order appealed from”).\n In these circumstances, then, we DISMISS the appeal.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Western Illinois Service Coord v. Illinois Department of Human S\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-2211\\nWESTERN ILLINOIS SERVICE COORDINATION, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nPRAIRIELAND SERVICE COORDINATION, INC., et al.,\\n Intervening Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:19-cv-3127 — Richard Mills, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Circumstances often change as\\ntime passes. And changed circumstances can have conse-\\nquences in litigation. This appeal presents a good example.\\nOur review is limited to the denial of a preliminary injunction,\\n\\f2 No. 19-2211\\n\\nwhich sought to prevent an event—the shift in the award of\\nstate contracts for the provision of case management services\\nas part of Illinois’s Medicaid program. That transition oc-\\ncurred on July 1, 2019. During oral argument, the plaintiffs—\\nparties to the former contracts—acknowledged that it would\\nbe too disruptive to rewind the clock by somehow attempting\\nto reinstate those contracts. So, too, did they confirm that they\\nnow seek different forms of relief. In these circumstances, the\\npresent appeal is moot, so we dismiss it and remand for fur-\\nther proceedings.\\n I\\n A\\n The contracts at issue relate to Illinois’s administration of\\nits Medicaid program. The Medicaid statute establishes a sys-\\ntem through which the federal government provides financial\\nassistance to states to furnish medical care to low-income in-\\ndividuals. To receive funds, states must comply with various\\nrequirements, which the federal government oversees\\nthrough a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Hu-\\nman Services. Today all 50 states participate in Medicaid,\\nwhich provides medical coverage for over 65 million people\\nnationwide.\\n The Medicaid program allows states to provide certain\\nhome-based services to participants. States do so by choosing\\nto participate in what is known as the Home and Community\\nBased, or HCBS, waiver program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c).\\nThe program is considered a waiver program because, when\\na state’s application is approved, the federal government\\nwaives certain Medicaid requirements that would otherwise\\napply. See Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 906–07 (7th Cir.\\n\\fNo. 19-2211 3\\n\\n2016) (explaining the rationale behind HCBS waivers in\\ngreater detail). Most significantly, waivers eliminate the re-\\nquirement that services be provided in an institution. They\\nalso do away with some of Medicaid’s uniformity rules, al-\\nlowing states to target specific geographic areas or certain\\ngroups of people at risk of institutionalization. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1396n(c)(3).\\n Illinois currently operates nine waivers, including one for\\nadults with developmental disabilities overseen by the Divi-\\nsion of Developmental Disabilities within the Illinois Depart-\\nment of Human Services. Under this waiver, Illinois contracts\\nwith non-profit organizations to provide case management\\nservices for adults with developmental disabilities receiving\\nhome- and community-based services as part of Medicaid.\\nOrganizations that provide these case management services\\nare known as Independent Service Coordination agencies,\\nsometimes shorthanded ISCs.\\n In the past, Illinois had contracted with 17 ISCs, which op-\\nerated in as many regions throughout the state. Illinois\\nawarded the contracts through a noncompetitive, annual re-\\nnewal process. The three plaintiff agencies before us had re-\\nceived contracts and provided case management services to\\nMedicaid participants for at least 25 years. This all changed\\nwhen, in September 2018, the state announced a new compet-\\nitive bidding process for the contracts that would begin on\\nJuly 1, 2019. The plaintiff agencies submitted bids but learned\\non January 2 that their existing contracts would not be re-\\nnewed. The new contracts went into effect on July 1, and ad-\\nministrative services are now being provided by eight agen-\\ncies operating in 12 regions across Illinois.\\n\\f4 No. 19-2211\\n\\n B\\n The three plaintiff agencies and three individual plain-\\ntiffs—their former clients—filed suit on May 16, 2019. Invok-\\ning 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they allege a violation of the Medicaid\\nAct, contending that they, as ISCs, are covered by Medicaid’s\\nfree-choice-of-provider provision, which requires that Medi-\\ncaid recipients be allowed to select any qualified provider for\\ntheir services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23); see also Planned\\nParenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dept. Health,\\n699 F.3d 962, 978 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining the operation of\\nMedicaid’s free-choice-of-provider provision). The plaintiffs’\\nposition is straightforward: Illinois’s awarding of the new\\ncontracts to new ISCs meant that the adults with developmen-\\ntal disabilities who were receiving case management services\\nwould no longer be able to choose their ISC and instead\\nwould have to transition to one of the new contract recipients.\\nThe plaintiffs, in short, see Illinois’s switch to a competitive\\nbidding process as unlawfully blocking their freedom to\\nchoose a provider of case management services. Alongside\\ntheir Medicaid claim, the plaintiffs also brought claims under\\nIllinois administrative law.\\n On June 5, 2019, knowing the new contracts were set to go\\ninto effect in less than 30 days, the plaintiffs sought a prelim-\\ninary injunction. They wanted to prevent the new contracts\\nfrom taking effect on July 1 and instead leave all existing con-\\ntracts in place. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion\\non June 25, concluding that they were unlikely to succeed on\\nthe merits of either their federal or state claims. The court rea-\\nsoned that, as providers of administrative services but not\\nmedical services, ISCs like the plaintiffs were not “qualified\\nproviders” within the meaning of the Medicaid statute and\\n\\fNo. 19-2211 5\\n\\ntherefore were not covered by the enactment’s free-choice-of-\\nprovider provision. In so concluding, however, the court rec-\\nognized that the implementation of the new contracts would\\ncause irreparable harm to both the plaintiff agencies and indi-\\nvidual plaintiffs, who would lose all or most of their funding\\nand be forced to switch case managers.\\n The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the preliminary in-\\njunction that same day. Four days later, on June 27, the plain-\\ntiffs filed a motion for emergency injunctive relief pending ap-\\npeal in this court. We denied that motion on June 28, and the\\nnew contracts went into effect as scheduled on July 1.\\n II\\n A\\n We put the appeal on our fall calendar and heard oral ar-\\ngument on September 25. During oral argument, we asked\\nwhat relief plaintiffs were seeking now that the new contracts\\nhad taken effect. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded by explaining\\nthat the former agencies were not asking us to vacate the new\\ncontracts and reinstate the old agreements. To her credit,\\nplaintiffs’ counsel candidly acknowledged that reversing\\ncourse at this point this would be too disruptive, particularly\\nto the Medicaid participants with developmental disabilities\\nwho receive case management services. While we are not cer-\\ntain what injunctive relief the plaintiffs now desire, it is clear\\nthat the passage of time and the new contracts taking effect\\nhave caused plaintiffs to revisit their prior request for prelim-\\ninary injunctive relief. Indeed, plaintiffs’ counsel made plain\\nduring oral argument that her clients are not seeking outright\\nreversal of the district court’s decision denying the prelimi-\\nnary injunction.\\n\\f6 No. 19-2211\\n\\n For their part, defendants represented that the new con-\\ntracts went into effect on July 1 as planned. We also learned\\nthat the intervenors—two of the new agencies presently un-\\nder contract—have hired many of the same case managers\\nwho had been employed by the previous agencies. While\\nthere have likely been some bumps along the road, nothing in\\nthe record before us or conveyed at oral argument suggests\\nany material issues or shortcomings in the new agencies’ im-\\nplementation of case management services for the individuals\\ncovered under this Medicaid program.\\n B\\n The parties’ briefing understandably focused on the mer-\\nits issue of whether the plaintiff ISCs constituted qualified\\nproviders and thus were covered by Medicaid’s free-choice-\\nof-provider provision. But with the plaintiffs no longer chal-\\nlenging the denial of their preliminary injunction, we do not\\nhave to decide that question. We can avoid tracing the statu-\\ntory interpretation of “qualified providers” or determining\\nwhat kinds of services the plaintiff agencies provide. The pas-\\nsage of time has rendered the issue—embodied entirely as it\\nis in the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ request for a\\npreliminary injunction—moot.\\n Mootness roots itself in Article III’s case or controversy\\nlimitation, leaving us “without power to decide questions that\\ncannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before [us].”\\nNorth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). By its terms,\\nthis appeal extends no further than the plaintiffs’ challenge to\\nthe district court’s denial of their request for preliminary in-\\njunctive relief to stop the new contracts from taking effect. Not\\nonly has that event occurred, the plaintiffs have made clear\\nthat they are not asking us to unwind it. They acknowledge it\\n\\fNo. 19-2211 7\\n\\nwould be difficult and likely even more harmful to their cli-\\nents to change course once again, particularly in the absence\\nof evidence showing that any of the new ISCs have dropped\\nthe ball in their provision of case management services.\\n We are without jurisdiction to go further. This appeal is\\nmoot. The proper course, then, is to dismiss the appeal and\\nallow the case to return to the district court, where plaintiffs,\\nif they so choose, will be free to continue to litigate the merits\\nof their claims and where management of next steps will re-\\nmain in the sound discretion of the district court. See Gjertsen\\nv. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of City of Chi., 751 F.2d 199, 202 (7th\\nCir. 1984) (explaining that when a preliminary injunction un-\\nder appeal has become moot but the case itself has not, “the\\nusual practice is just to dismiss the appeal as moot and not\\nvacate the order appealed from”).\\n In these circumstances, then, we DISMISS the appeal.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4699,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4672183,"string":"4,672,183"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Michael P. Haldorson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-10-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2279"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2279\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL P. HALDORSON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cr-00623-1 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Michael Haldorson is a self-pro-\\nclaimed fireworks enthusiast. But he was also a drug dealer.\\nHaldorson was arrested on his way to a second controlled buy\\nand, along with drugs, officers found three pipe bombs in his\\ncar. He was charged with several counts related to drugs, ex-\\nplosives, and a firearm. Before trial, Haldorson filed several\\nmotions to suppress evidence, challenging his arrest, the ad-\\nmissibility of his post-arrest statements, and the searches of\\n\\f2 No. 18-2279\\n\\nhis car, apartment bedroom, and rented storage locker. All\\nwere denied.\\n Haldorson proceeded to trial and a jury convicted him on\\nfour counts of the seven-count indictment: Count One for dis-\\ntribution of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Count Two for pos-\\nsession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1);\\nCount Three for possession of MDMA, or ecstasy, and co-\\ncaine, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); and Count Four for possession of an\\nexplosive during the commission of a felony, 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 844(h)(2). The jury acquitted him on two additional charges\\nand the government dismissed another count at trial. The dis-\\ntrict court later vacated Count Three because it was a lesser-\\nincluded offense of Count Two. The district court sentenced\\nHaldorson to a term of imprisonment of 192 months.\\n On appeal Haldorson raises three issues. First, Haldorson\\nargues that the district court erred in denying the motions to\\nsuppress the evidence seized from his car and his apartment\\nbecause the officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest\\nhim and there were no exigent circumstances to justify the\\nwarrantless search of his apartment bedroom. Second, he as-\\nserts that the jury instructions constructively amended Count\\nFour of the indictment, unlawfully carrying an explosive, in\\nviolation of the Fifth Amendment by permitting the jury to\\nconvict him on a broader basis than the indictment charged.\\nThird, and finally, Haldorson contends that he did not receive\\na fair trial due to a multitude of alleged mistakes and errors\\nduring the investigation and asks us to vacate his convictions.\\n We conclude that probable cause supported the arrest, ex-\\nigent circumstances existed for the search of the bedroom, and\\nHaldorson had a full and fair opportunity to defend himself\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 3\\n\\nat trial. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s judgment in\\nall respects.\\n I. The Arrest and Vehicle Search\\n We begin, naturally, with Haldorson’s arrest and the re-\\nsulting search of his vehicle.\\nA. Background\\n Haldorson was arrested on June 23, 2015, but his case\\nstarts a few weeks earlier. Sometime in April or May 2015,\\nHaldorson first came on the radar of Officer Thomas Insley\\nvia a confidential informant. Officer Insley was, at the time, a\\npatrol officer with the Village of Rockdale Police Department\\nin Illinois. He was also assigned to a specialized narcotics\\nunit, the Will County Cooperative Police Assistance Team\\n(CPAT)—a collective of officers from local police departments\\nunder the umbrella of the Illinois State Police—as an Inspec-\\ntor. (For ease we will use the title of “Officer” for Insley\\nthroughout, although he also held the title of “Inspector” dur-\\ning the relevant time period.) CPAT inspectors, in general,\\nconduct narcotics investigations, control informants, and go\\nundercover. Officer Insley was the primary CPAT investigator\\nfor Haldorson’s case.\\n Officer Insley had been working with this particular con-\\nfidential informant for a few months—a detail we will return\\nto later—when the informant told Officer Insley that he could\\npurchase cocaine from an individual he knew as “Mike\\nJones.” The informant provided Officer Insley with a picture\\nof Mike Jones’s vehicle, including the license plate (that read\\n\\f4 No. 18-2279\\n\\n“MKJNZ”), and his telephone number.1 Officer Insley ran the\\nlicense plate through a law enforcement database and learned\\nthat it was registered to Haldorson. The vehicle information\\nlisted on the registration also matched the photograph of Hal-\\ndorson’s car—a black Pontiac G8. Officer Insley then showed\\nthe informant a picture of Haldorson, who the informant\\nidentified as Mike Jones. At this point, Officer Insley asked the\\ninformant to set up a deal.\\n On June 1, 2015, the informant contacted Officer Insley\\nand told him that he could make a buy from Haldorson. Of-\\nficer Insley proceeded to prepare for the controlled purchase\\nby providing the informant with funds to buy the narcotics,\\nwiring the informant with an audio transmitter and recorder\\nto monitor the deal, and setting up a visual surveillance team\\nof other CPAT officers. Before heading to the controlled buy,\\nOfficer Insley also searched the informant and his vehicle to\\nmake sure that he had no contraband, as is standard in these\\noperations.\\n Officer Insley followed the confidential informant to a\\nWalmart parking lot in Joliet, Illinois, where he was going to\\nmeet Haldorson, and parked about an aisle over from the in-\\nformant. Haldorson then arrived, parked next to the inform-\\nant’s car, and the informant got out of his car and into Hal-\\ndorson’s car. At about that same time a customer pulled into\\nthe lot and parked in between Officer Insley and Haldorson’s\\ncar, obstructing Officer Insley’s view of the transaction. Not\\n\\n1 This Mike Jones’s phone number was not, however, 281-330-8004. For\\nthose unfamiliar with the reference, Mike Jones is an American rapper\\nwhose hit single in 2005 included a verse that recited his phone number\\nand told listeners to “hit Mike Jones up on the low.” See Mike Jones, Back\\nThen, on Who Is Mike Jones? (Warner Bros. Records 2005).\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 5\\n\\nto worry, though, Officer Insley was still able to listen to the\\ndeal in realtime from the audio transmitter.\\n After the deal went down, Officer Insley observed a black\\ncar matching the description of Haldorson’s car drive away\\nand relayed to the rest of the surveillance team that the con-\\ntrolled buy was successful and to follow Haldorson’s car.\\nMeanwhile, Officer Insley followed the informant to a prear-\\nranged location where Officer Insley retrieved the drugs from\\nthe informant, as well as re-searched the informant and his\\nvehicle. The confidential informant had purchased 1.7 grams\\nof cocaine from Haldorson in the transaction.\\n The surveillance team did not stop Haldorson that even-\\ning; the officers eventually lost him when they got stopped at\\na red light. But the plan was never to stop or arrest Haldorson\\non June 1st because Officer Insley was just beginning his in-\\nvestigation into Haldorson. Further, Officer Insley testified\\nthat if the officers arrested Haldorson immediately after the\\ncontrolled buy, it would have tipped off Haldorson that he\\nhad been set-up by the confidential informant. Officer Insley\\nwas using the same informant in other ongoing investigations\\nand did not want to burn the informant’s identity.\\n From the record it appears that very little was done to ad-\\nvance the Haldorson investigation between the June 1st con-\\ntrolled buy and June 23rd. There were perhaps, though it is\\nsomewhat unclear, attempts by the confidential informant to\\nreach out to Haldorson to set up another controlled buy on\\nJune 2nd and 5th, but those went nowhere.\\n On June 23, 2015, the day at the center of this case, the con-\\nfidential informant told Officer Insley that he could arrange\\nanother drug deal with Haldorson. The plan this time was for\\n\\f6 No. 18-2279\\n\\nthe informant to set it up but for officers to stop Haldorson on\\nhis way to the deal and arrest him. Stopping and arresting\\nHaldorson before the actual drug deal would, once again, pre-\\nserve the confidential informant’s anonymity. Eventually\\nHaldorson and the informant agreed to meet in the Village of\\nPlainfield, Illinois, specifically at Plainfield Central High\\nSchool. Officer Insley then arranged for a Plainfield police of-\\nficer in a marked car to pull Haldorson over.\\n Officer Friddle of the Plainfield Police Department posi-\\ntioned himself near the high school and waited for Haldorson\\nto pass by based on a description of Haldorson’s vehicle that\\nCPAT officers provided: black Pontiac G8 with a White Sox\\nspecialty license plate and red lights in the front grille of the\\ncar (that may or may not be illuminated). According to Officer\\nFriddle, he soon saw a black car approaching with red lights\\nin the grille.2 As it got closer, he could see the White Sox spe-\\ncialty plates too. Officer Friddle pulled out to follow Haldor-\\nson’s car, activated his emergency lights, and pulled Haldor-\\nson over at the entrance of Plainfield Central High School. The\\nstop was pretextual, and Officer Friddle made up some\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2 Haldorson strongly contested—and still does—the officers’ testimony\\nabout both the presence of the red lights on his car at the June 1st con-\\ntrolled buy (Haldorson testified and introduced receipts to demonstrate\\nthat the lights were not installed until three days later on June 4th) and\\nwhether the red lights were in fact illuminated when he was pulled over\\non June 23rd. The district court agreed with Haldorson on this point, find-\\ning that although there was a red area in the vent on top of the front hood\\nof the vehicle, there were not illuminated red lights. In the end, any dis-\\npute regarding the red grille lights is inconsequential to the contested is-\\nsues in this appeal.\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 7\\n\\nexcuses to buy time for CPAT officers to arrive on scene and\\ntake over.\\n Officer Mario Marzetta, a police officer with the Plainfield\\nPolice Department who at the time was also assigned to\\nCPAT, arrived at the traffic stop shortly thereafter and ar-\\nrested Haldorson. Another officer transported Haldorson to\\nthe Plainfield Police Department. Officer Marzetta then also\\ndrove Haldorson’s vehicle to the Plainfield Police Department\\nand parked it in the sally port, or the garage at the station,\\nwhere he and another CPAT inspector searched it.\\n The officers found numerous drugs—marijuana, cocaine,\\ncrack cocaine, MDMA or ecstasy, prescription pills, psilocy-\\nbin mushrooms—fireworks, and suspected pipe bombs in\\nHaldorson’s car. Upon discovering the pipe bombs, the offic-\\ners ceased their search and called in agents from the Bureau\\nof Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the\\nCook County Sheriff’s Police Bomb Squad. The ATF agents\\nand bomb technicians removed the explosives from the vehi-\\ncle to a safe area and rendered them safe.\\n We pause the story here to address Haldorson’s challenge\\nto his arrest and the search of his vehicle.\\nB. Analysis\\n Haldorson was later indicted on several federal charges.\\nHe thereafter moved to suppress, among other evidence, the\\nexplosives and narcotics discovered during the vehicle search\\nbecause the officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest\\nhim. The district court, after holding a two-day evidentiary\\nhearing, denied his motions to suppress. In reviewing the dis-\\ntrict court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review ques-\\ntions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2279\\n\\nUnited States v. Cherry, 920 F.3d 1126, 1132 (7th Cir. 2019). We\\nmust defer to credibility determinations that the district court\\nmade based on the testimony presented to it, absent clear er-\\nror. United States v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n 1. Probable cause to arrest Haldorson\\n The officers did not have a warrant to arrest Haldorson,\\n“but an officer may make a warrantless arrest consistent with\\nthe Fourth Amendment if there is ‘probable cause to believe\\nthat a crime has been committed.’” United States v. Daniels,\\n803 F.3d 335, 354 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Washington v.\\nHaupert, 481 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2007)). “Police officers pos-\\nsess probable cause to arrest when the facts and circum-\\nstances within their knowledge and of which they have rea-\\nsonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a\\nprudent person in believing that the suspect has committed\\nan offense.” United States v. Howard, 883 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (quotations omitted). We examine “the totality of the cir-\\ncumstances in a common sense manner” to determine\\nwhether probable cause exists in a given situation. United\\nStates v. Schaafsma, 318 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n Haldorson’s primary contention is that the information\\nfrom the controlled buy was too stale three weeks later to sup-\\nport probable cause for an arrest. The mere passage of time\\ndoes not necessarily dissipate the probable cause for an arrest.\\nIt is well-established that “there is no requirement that an of-\\nfender be arrested the moment probable cause is established.”\\nUnited States v. Reis, 906 F.2d 284, 289 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing\\nHoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966)). In Reis we\\nfound that an “overnight delay simply has no bearing on the\\nexistence of probable cause for arrest,” id., and we see no rea-\\nson to treat reasonably longer delays any different. Indeed,\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 9\\n\\nwe have previously held that the defendant’s participation in\\na controlled drug buy a month earlier “provided the police\\nwith probable cause to arrest [the suspect] which was not ren-\\ndered stale by the passage of one month.” United States v.\\nMitchell, 523 F. App’x 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).\\nOur sister circuits also agree that the passage of time alone\\ndoes not render probable cause to arrest stale. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Azor, 881 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Our case law\\nmakes clear that law enforcement is not required to arrest a\\nsuspect immediately upon development of probable cause.”);\\nUnited States v. Clark, 647 F. App’x 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2016) (per\\ncuriam) (“[P]robable cause existed to arrest [the defendant]\\nbecause the earlier tip from the confidential informant and the\\ncontrolled purchase [four to six days earlier] provided [the\\npolice] with facts that would support a reasonable person’s\\nbelief that an offense had been committed and that the indi-\\nvidual arrested was the guilty party.” (cleaned up)); United\\nStates v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 554 (1st Cir. 1999)\\n(“[W]hen probable cause exists, the timing of an arrest is a\\nmatter that the Constitution almost invariably leaves to police\\ndiscretion.”); United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 220 (1st Cir.\\n1997) (holding that “the period of time between the controlled\\nbuys [—four days after the second controlled buy and less\\nthan two weeks after the first controlled buy—] and the arrest\\nwas not so long here as to render the probable cause stale in\\nany meaningful temporal sense”); cf. Guadarrama v. United\\nStates, No. 16-6218, 2017 WL 3391683, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 13,\\n2017) (unpublished order) (stating that “[r]easonable jurists\\ncould not debate th[e] conclusion” that “while information\\nused to obtain a search warrant may go stale, the same is not\\ntrue for information underlying an arrest warrant”).\\n\\f10 No. 18-2279\\n\\n Our facts are nearly identical to those that the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit confronted in United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328 (10th\\nCir. 2009). There, the police arranged for a controlled buy be-\\ntween an informant and the defendant at an auto parts store.\\nPolice surveilled the informant while he drove to the location,\\ngot into the defendant’s car, and negotiated the purchase of\\nmethamphetamine. Id. at 1331. The police did not immedi-\\nately arrest the defendant, “[a]pparently hoping to investigate\\nfurther.” Id. About a month later, the police sought to have the\\ninformant conduct another controlled buy but the informant\\nrefused (even though a few days earlier he told the police he\\ncould set up another deal). Unable to convince the informant\\nto cooperate, the police resolved to arrest the defendant. In-\\nstead of obtaining an arrest warrant, they decided to simply\\nfollow his car until he committed a traffic violation and then\\nstop and arrest him—which they did. Id. at 1331–32. The\\nTenth Circuit held that the police officers had probable cause\\nto arrest the defendant “based on the controlled buy they wit-\\nnessed a month before his arrest.” Id. at 1334. “[T]he passage\\nof time did not make that information stale or otherwise de-\\nstroy the officers’ probable cause.” Id.\\n There was probable cause to arrest Haldorson on June 23,\\n2015, based on the June 1, 2015, controlled buy. The facts over-\\nwhelmingly support this conclusion. The confidential inform-\\nant first provided Officer Insley with Haldorson’s phone\\nnumber and a picture of his black Pontiac G8, including the\\nlicense plate. Officer Insley was able to run the license plate\\nthrough a law enforcement database and trace the car’s regis-\\ntration to Haldorson. The informant then positively identified\\na photograph of Haldorson as his drug supplier. But the prob-\\nable cause for the arrest was not merely based on a “tip” from\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 11\\n\\na confidential informant3—that was just the beginning. The\\nofficers then set up a controlled buy. Multiple officers were\\nsurveilling the deal and observed Haldorson’s car drive into\\nthe parking lot at the prearranged location, park next to the\\nconfidential informant, and the confidential informant get\\ninto the passenger seat of Haldorson’s car. Although no offic-\\ners witnessed the actual transaction, Officer Insley listened to\\nthe entire interaction in realtime via the informant’s hidden\\nwire. Officer Insley also searched the confidential informant\\nand his car both before and after the controlled buy; the only\\ndrugs he had were the 1.7 grams of cocaine purchased from\\nHaldorson during the controlled buy. On this last point, criti-\\ncally, the district court found Officer Insley’s testimony cred-\\nible, and we certainly cannot say that that finding was clearly\\nerroneous. The passage of three weeks did not render the in-\\nformation from the controlled buy stale.\\n It is the rare case where “staleness” will be relevant to the\\nlegality of a warrantless arrest.4 When there is a reasonable\\n\\n\\n3 Haldorson makes repeated references to initially undisclosed infor-\\nmation regarding the confidential informant’s history—including how he\\ncame to be an informant, his motivation (was he working for money or\\nworking off his own case), and the fact that he was arrested on an unre-\\nlated incident approximately ten days before the controlled buy. If Officer\\nInsley had relied on an affidavit from the confidential informant in an ap-\\nplication for a search warrant, the nondisclosure of such credibility infor-\\nmation would be relevant to the question of probable cause. United States\\nv. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2016). But this case does not in-\\nvolve simply relying on information from a confidential informant in an\\naffidavit.\\n4 Conversely, the concept of staleness is generally a “highly relevant” fac-\\ntor in applications for search warrants because, unlike arrests, the focus is\\non whether “evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” and\\n\\f12 No. 18-2279\\n\\nbelief that someone has committed a crime, time by itself does\\nnot make the existence of that fact any less probable. Cer-\\ntainly, “[g]ood police practice often requires postponing an\\narrest, even after probable cause has been established, in or-\\nder to place the suspect under surveillance or otherwise de-\\nvelop further evidence necessary to prove guilt to a jury.”\\nUnited States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J., con-\\ncurring). This is not to say that the passage of time can never\\ndissipate probable cause to arrest. There could be circum-\\nstances in which the subsequent investigation turns up new\\nfacts or evidence that disprove or discredit the original infor-\\nmation. Cf. id. at 432 n.5. We simply do not have those facts\\nhere and thus do not need to address if or when probable\\ncause to arrest may become stale.\\n The information provided by the confidential informant\\nand the June 1st controlled buy provided probable cause to\\narrest Haldorson on June 23, 2015.\\n 2. Vehicle search\\n Haldorson makes passing references to the search of his\\ncar but does not meaningfully contest the district court’s rul-\\ning that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.\\nIn any event, Haldorson’s challenge fails. The inevitable dis-\\ncovery doctrine provides that illegally obtained evidence will\\nnot be excluded if the government “can establish by a prepon-\\nderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or in-\\nevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix\\nv. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Once Haldorson was law-\\nfully arrested, his “car could not be left unattended\\n\\noften involve a search for perishable or transportable objects, like drugs or\\nguns. United States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 13\\n\\nindefinitely” at the entrance of a public high school. United\\nStates v. Simms, 626 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United\\nStates v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[O]bviously,\\nthe arresting officers would not have allowed the truck to just\\nsit on the street after [the arrestee] was carted away.”). The\\npolice officers would have towed his vehicle to the police sta-\\ntion and conducted an inventory search of the vehicle per es-\\ntablished Plainfield Police Department procedures. “The\\ndrugs [and explosives], therefore, inevitably would have been\\ndiscovered during an inventory search.” Cherry, 920 F.3d\\nat 1140.\\n We affirm the denial of Haldorson’s motion to suppress\\nthe evidence seized from his vehicle.\\n II. The Apartment Search\\n We pick up the facts where we left off, with Haldorson at\\nthe Plainfield Police Department and the officers’ discovery of\\ndrugs and explosives in his car.\\nA. Background\\n Officers interviewed Haldorson multiple times the even-\\ning of his arrest and carrying over into the early morning\\nhours of the next day, June 24, 2015. The officers read Haldor-\\nson his Miranda rights on at least two separate occasions over\\nthe course of the interviews. After finding pipe bombs in Hal-\\ndorson’s car, the CPAT officers and ATF agents were particu-\\nlarly concerned that Haldorson had stored additional explo-\\nsive materials at his residence. When officers initially asked\\nhim for his current address, Haldorson told the officers that\\nhe was homeless. Officer Insley believed that Haldorson lived\\nin downtown Plainfield, and specifically on or around Lock-\\nport Street, based on information he had previously gathered\\n\\f14 No. 18-2279\\n\\nand because officers had seen Haldorson’s car parked on that\\nstreet during the investigation. Haldorson told them that he\\nwas dating a woman over there but denied living in the\\ndowntown Plainfield area. He eventually claimed that he\\nlived in Joliet at his parents’ house and provided an address.\\nAsked if there were any additional explosives at that home,\\nHaldorson responded that there could be.\\n With this information, CPAT officers and ATF agents left\\nthe police station and went to the Joliet address. They arrived\\nat Haldorson’s parents’ home at approximately 2:45 a.m. on\\nJune 24, 2015. Haldorson’s parents gave the officers consent\\nto search Haldorson’s room, which revealed narcotics-related\\nitems but no explosives. After speaking with Haldorson’s fa-\\nther, the officers learned that Haldorson did in fact reside at\\nan apartment in downtown Plainfield, on Lockport Street. His\\nfather did not know the exact address but gave a general de-\\nscription of the area and Haldorson’s apartment. Officers im-\\nmediately went to that location.\\n Now on Lockport Street, at approximately four o’clock in\\nthe morning, the officers—without a precise address—pro-\\nceeded to knock on the street-level doors of the buildings (the\\nbuildings were retail business on the first floor and apart-\\nments on the second), and eventually located and gained ac-\\ncess to Haldorson’s apartment building.\\n Once inside the apartment building, the officers knocked\\non Haldorson’s unit’s front door. A woman answered the\\ndoor (and gave the same name as the name of the woman Hal-\\ndorson said he was dating), who told the officers that Haldor-\\nson lived there. She gave the officers consent to enter and\\nsearch the common areas of the apartment, and even signed a\\nwritten consent form. Haldorson had a separate bedroom in\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 15\\n\\nthe apartment, which was locked. The officers used Haldor-\\nson’s keys that were taken during his arrest to open his bed-\\nroom door. According to the Plainfield police sergeant on the\\nscene, the officers made the decision to enter Haldorson’s\\nlocked bedroom to search for explosives because they were\\nconcerned for the safety of his roommate and the other resi-\\ndents and businesses on Lockport Street if there were, indeed,\\nexplosives in the bedroom. The officers did not have a search\\nwarrant at the time.\\n In Haldorson’s bedroom officers founds fireworks and ex-\\nplosives. They removed the explosives from the bedroom and\\nsecured them in a steel box on ATF trucks. At that moment\\nthe officers did not seize anything else from Haldorson’s bed-\\nroom except for the explosives. In fact, the officers testified\\nthat they only conducted a “plain view” search for explosives\\nand then stopped their search. Instead, the officers then ap-\\nplied for and received a search warrant for the apartment. The\\nsecond search did not produce any additional explosives, but\\nofficers did seize narcotics-related items and two laptop com-\\nputers.\\n Later that same day, armed with the search warrant, offic-\\ners also searched two storage lockers that belonged to Haldor-\\nson. They did not find any explosives or narcotics in one of\\nthe lockers, but seized PVC pipe, multiple low explosive pow-\\nder canisters, fireworks, and a handgun and ammunition\\nfrom the second locker.\\n We break from recounting the facts again to tackle the le-\\ngality of the bedroom search.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2279\\n\\nB. Analysis\\n When the police officers entered Haldorson’s bedroom\\nand searched it for explosives, they did not have a search war-\\nrant or consent. “Warrantless searches and seizures within a\\nhome are considered presumptively unreasonable and a vio-\\nlation of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Huddleston,\\n593 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2010). There are, however, “certain\\nnarrowly proscribed exceptions.” United States v. Bell,\\n500 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2007). One such exception is where\\n“exigent circumstances require officers to ‘step in to prevent\\nserious injury and restore order.’” Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 600\\n(quoting Bell, 500 F.3d at 612). Under the exigent circum-\\nstances exception, “a warrantless entry into a dwelling may\\nbe lawful when there is a pressing need for the police to enter\\nbut no time for them to secure a warrant.” Sutterfield v. City of\\nMilwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 557 (7th Cir. 2014). The test is\\nwhether “an officer had an objectively ‘reasonable belief that\\nthere was a compelling need to act and no time to obtain a\\nwarrant.’” Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 600 (quoting Bell, 500 F.3d\\nat 613). The existence of exigent circumstances is a mixed\\nquestion of fact and law that we review de novo. Id. We still\\nreview the district court’s factual findings for clear error.\\nUnited States v. Delgado, 701 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n The exigent circumstances exception is “frequently in-\\nvoked in cases involving explosives.” United States v. Witzlib,\\n796 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases and citing,\\nfor example, United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386, 393–94 (1st\\nCir. 2012); Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d\\n1065, 1071–73 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lindsey,\\n877 F.2d 777, 781–82 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Al–Az-\\nzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1985)). Explosives are, by their\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 17\\n\\nvery nature, inherently dangerous. Homemade explosive de-\\nvices even more so because the persons manufacturing them\\noften lack the needed technical knowledge and skills. There-\\nfore, even though Haldorson enjoyed a strong expectation of\\nprivacy in his locked bedroom, that expectation must be bal-\\nanced against the need to protect the public from serious\\nharm where explosive materials may be present in a residen-\\ntial complex with close neighbors. United States v. Boettger,\\n71 F.3d 1410, 1414 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[Privacy] expectations\\nmust be lowered where a resident admits working with ex-\\nplosive materials in an apartment complex with close neigh-\\nbors.”); see Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297 n.8 (1984)\\n(careful “not to suggest that individual expectations of pri-\\nvacy may prevail over interests of public safety”).\\n The following objective facts, found by the district court\\nand not clearly erroneous, were known to the officers before\\nthey entered into Haldorson’s bedroom: Explosive materials,\\nincluding pipe bombs, were found in Haldorson’s car; pipe\\nbombs, according to the Cook County Sheriff’s Police Bomb\\nSquad and ATF agents, are very volatile and dangerous; Hal-\\ndorson admitted that more explosives could be at his resi-\\ndence; Haldorson falsely told officers that he lived at his par-\\nents’ house, and a search of that house uncovered no explo-\\nsives; and Haldorson actually resided at an apartment in\\ndowntown Plainfield, which was surrounded by residential\\nneighbors and businesses. Moreover, the district court found\\nthat an ATF agent credibly testified that there was a “legiti-\\nmate concern” that other homemade explosives were “poten-\\ntially unstable and therefore dangerous to others.” Based on\\nthese facts, the officers reasonably believed that there was a\\njustifiable and urgent need to act to prevent serious harm.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2279\\n\\n Because of the acute concern and the hour at which the\\nofficers and agents were urgently proceeding, around three\\nand four o’clock in the morning, there was no time to obtain\\na warrant.\\n Haldorson relies on the fact that the officers and agents\\nonly conducted a plain view search for explosives in his bed-\\nroom to question their belief that the explosives posed an im-\\nmediate threat. But, as the district court noted, law enforce-\\nment officers took additional steps consistent with their belief\\nthat the explosives posed an immediate threat, including\\nclearing Haldorson’s girlfriend from the apartment. Further,\\ncontrary to Haldorson’s contention that their “true aim and\\nintent” was to conduct a warrantless search, the fact that the\\nofficers only did a plain view search shows that the expressed\\nconcern was not simply pretext for searching for and gather-\\ning evidence of criminal activity. See Clifford, 464 U.S. at 292.\\nThe search did not exceed the scope of the exigency. See\\nUnited States v. Salava, 978 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The\\nensuing search … was appropriately limited to the [exigent]\\ncircumstances that justified it.”).\\n Haldorson also emphasizes that he was in custody and\\ntherefore “any alleged explosive materials were stable and in-\\nert.” The opposite is true—homemade pipe bombs, and other\\nimprovised explosive devices, are unstable.5 An ATF agent,\\n\\n5 It is for this same reason that we find unpersuasive Haldorson’s reliance\\n\\non United States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2013), which involved a\\nwarrantless search based on the possible threat of a grenade inside a\\nhome. Upon learning of the possible existence of a grenade, however, the\\nofficer did not call for the assistance of explosive experts, or even “remove\\nthe sleeping child from the room located directly next to the room where\\nthe ‘grenade’ was allegedly stored.” Id. at 395. The officer’s “own actions\\nbelie[d]” the argument that there were exigent circumstances. Id. at 398.\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 19\\n\\nwho has experience and expertise with explosives, credibly\\ntestified to this below.6 In short, the officers reasonably be-\\nlieved that the homemade pipe bombs posed an immediate\\nthreat to public safety.\\n Given the facts and information known at the time of the\\nsearch, “from the perspective of the officers at the scene,”\\nHuddleston, 593 F.3d at 600, there was a legitimate concern\\nthat other homemade explosive devices were in Haldorson’s\\nbedroom that were potentially unstable and therefore danger-\\nous to others. The warrantless search fell within the exigent\\ncircumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant\\nrequirement.\\n III. Constructive Amendment to the Indictment\\n Back to the facts, and with the pretrial motions and evi-\\ndentiary issues on appeal taken care of, we turn to Haldor-\\nson’s objections to the jury instructions.\\n Haldorson challenges the instructions to the jury on Count\\nFour as a constructive amendment to the indictment. Count\\n\\n\\nThe officer acted with no level of urgency. Importantly, and distinct from\\nour circumstances, the Fourth Circuit noted that there was “no indication\\nthat there might be other, more unstable explosives, inside as well.” Id. (em-\\nphasis added).\\n6 See also Fact Sheet–Illegal Explosive Devices, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,\\nFirearms and Explosives (May 2019), https://www.atf.gov/resource-cen-\\nter/fact-sheet/fact-sheet-illegal-explosive-devices (“Illegal explosive de-\\nvices … are typically extremely sensitive to heat, shock, electrostatic dis-\\ncharge and friction that may initiate, unexpectedly causing serious injury\\nor death. The risks associated with these devices are further compounded\\nbecause the persons manufacturing, transporting and using these devices\\noften do not have the knowledge, skills and experience required for such\\nactivities.”).\\n\\f20 No. 18-2279\\n\\nFour of the indictment charged, in pertinent part, that Haldor-\\nson “unlawfully carried an explosive, namely, smokeless\\npowder, during the commission of a felony … .” Because the\\nindictment charged him with carrying a specific object—\\nsmokeless powder—the jury could only convict if it found be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt that Haldorson carried smokeless\\npowder, not just any explosive material. Haldorson argues\\nthat the jury instructions on Count Four unconstitutionally\\nbroadened the bases of conviction by permitting the jury to\\nconvict if they found he carried any explosive. This is a ques-\\ntion of law that we review de novo. United States v. Mitov,\\n460 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be\\nheld to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-\\nless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S.\\nConst. amend. V. Only the grand jury can amend the indict-\\nment to broaden it. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216\\n(1960); United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n“This rule both enforces the Fifth Amendment and helps to\\nensure that a defendant is given reasonable notice of the alle-\\ngations against him so that he may best prepare a defense.”\\nPierson, 925 F.3d at 919. A constructive amendment “occurs\\nwhen either the government (usually during its presentation\\nof evidence and/or its argument), the court (usually through\\nits instructions to the jury), or both, broadens the possible ba-\\nses for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury.”\\nUnited States v. Cusimano, 148 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 1998).\\n The statute under which Haldorson was charged,\\n18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2), does not require a specific type of explo-\\nsive as an element—it criminalizes “carr[ying] an explosive\\nduring the commission of any felony” (subject only to the\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 21\\n\\ndefinition of “explosive” in 18 U.S.C. § 841(d)). But the gov-\\nernment narrowed the charge against Haldorson by including\\nthe specific language “namely, smokeless powder” in the in-\\ndictment. “Specific language in an indictment that provides\\ndetail beyond the general elements of the crime makes the\\nspecified detail essential to the charged crime and must,\\ntherefore, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierson,\\n925 F.3d at 920.\\n The district court instructed the jury on Count Four as fol-\\nlows:\\n In order for you to find the defendant guilty of\\n the charge of carrying an explosive during the\\n commission of a felony as alleged in Count\\n Four, the government must prove both of the\\n following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:\\n …\\n 2. The defendant knowingly carried an explo-\\n sive, namely, smokeless powder, during the\\n commission of that crime [in element 1 of the in-\\n struction] … .\\nThe jury instruction also included the specific language\\n“namely, smokeless powder.” It was added during the final\\njury instructions conference at the insistence of Haldorson.\\n The jury instruction for Count Four and Count Four of the\\nindictment both included the identical specific language re-\\ngarding smokeless powder. The instruction thus required the\\njury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Haldorson\\nknowingly carried an explosive and that that explosive was\\nsmokeless powder, just as Count Four charged.\\n\\f22 No. 18-2279\\n\\n This is unlike our decisions in Pierson and Leichtnam,\\nwhich Haldorson attempts to rely on for support. In both\\ncases, the indictment narrowed the bases of conviction by\\nnaming a particular firearm that the defendant was charged\\nwith. Pierson, 925 F.3d at 920; United States v. Leichtnam,\\n948 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1991). And in both cases, the corre-\\nsponding jury instruction failed to specify the exact gun\\ncharged, while at the same time evidence of additional non-\\nindicted guns were presented at trial. “[T]his combination of\\nthe evidence and untailored jury instructions added up to a\\nconstructive amendment.” Pierson, 925 F.3d at 920. This is not\\nour case. The jury instruction was tailored to the specifics of\\nthe indictment and did not permit the jury to convict Haldor-\\nson based on non-indicted explosives. No constructive\\namendment of the indictment occurred.\\n Finally, Haldorson makes a passing suggestion that there\\nis “another independent problem” with the jury instructions\\non Count Four: the instruction contained “vastly more lan-\\nguage” than the elements of the offense. According to Haldor-\\nson, the language was unnecessary, irrelevant, and suggestive\\nof the facts in evidence.\\n On a challenge to a jury instruction, our review is twofold.\\nFirst, “we review de novo whether the jury instructions accu-\\nrately summarize the law, but give the district court substan-\\ntial discretion to formulate the instructions provided that the\\ninstructions represent a complete and correct statement of the\\nlaw.” United States v. Bonin, 932 F.3d 523, 537–38 (7th Cir.\\n2019). If the instruction is legally accurate, in the second step\\nwe then “review the district court’s phrasing of the instruc-\\ntions for abuse of discretion.” Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 23\\n\\n The district court further instructed the jury that:\\n The explosive does not have to be related to the\\n other crime. A person carries an explosive if he\\n knowingly transports it on his person or in a ve-\\n hicle or container. A person may carry an explo-\\n sive even if it is not immediately accessible be-\\n cause it is in another area of a vehicle. The term\\n “during” means at any point within the conduct\\n charged in Count Two and Count Three.\\nThe first and fourth sentences accurately summarize the ap-\\nplicable law and Supreme Court precedent. In Ressam, the\\nCourt held that 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) does not require a rela-\\ntionship between the explosive carried and the underlying fel-\\nony, and that “during” denotes a straightforward temporal\\nlink. United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 274 (2008).\\n The second and third sentences above are strictly defini-\\ntional. There is no suggestion that they are incorrect, misstate-\\nments, or could not have alternatively been included in the\\nseparate “Definitions” instruction that the court provided to\\nthe jurors. Because the instruction on Count Four accurately\\nstated the law, it was not an abuse of discretion to provide the\\nadditional language to the jury.\\n IV. Mistakes During the Police Investigation\\n As a last resort, Haldorson asks this court to vacate his\\nconvictions because the convictions are “plagued by con-\\ncealed material information, false and misleading reports,\\nperjured testimony, an unlawful recording, scant evidence,\\ncontaminated evidence, [and] evidence disappearing from\\nthe evidence vault.” The crux of his argument on appeal is\\nthat the cumulative effects of the perceived mistakes and\\n\\f24 No. 18-2279\\n\\nviolations during the investigation deprived him of his Fifth\\nand Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial.7\\n The problem for Haldorson is that all of the asserted errors\\nhe claims infected his trial were known to him before trial and\\nhe made extensive use of them at trial on cross-examination.\\nEach and every misstep that the officers and the federal agents\\nallegedly made along the way came out at trial. In fact, in clos-\\ning arguments, Haldorson essentially argued to the jury what\\nhe now argues on appeal.\\n Much of Haldorson’s argument can be disposed of with\\nthat, but we conclude with a brief comment on one of the spe-\\ncific allegations concerning irregularities with Officer Insley’s\\nhandling of the confidential informant. The primary issue is\\nthat Officer Insley did not disclose the informant’s arrest that\\noccurred ten days before the controlled buy to his police su-\\npervisors or to the prosecutors. A confidential informant’s\\npersonal and criminal history is material information and is\\noften critical to different stages of an investigation or prose-\\ncution. When the police seek a search warrant based in part\\non an informant, for example, the omission of adverse infor-\\nmation may impair the neutral role of the magistrate deciding\\nwhether to issue the warrant. E.g., United States v. Glover,\\n755 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014). Similarly, the government\\n\\n\\n7 Importantly, although his argument is framed similarly, Haldorson’s ar-\\n\\ngument is not one of cumulative error because he does not allege that any\\nerrors were committed in the course of the trial. See United States v. Mar-\\nchan, 935 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 2019) (“To establish cumulative error a\\ndefendant must show that (1) at least two errors were committed in the\\ncourse of the trial; [and] (2) considered together along with the entire rec-\\nord, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied\\nthe petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 25\\n\\nwould have to disclose that same adverse information to the\\ndefense as exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373\\nU.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\\nIn this particular case, Officer Insley’s lack of disclosure did\\nnot taint any later stages of the investigation or prosecution.\\nNo warrants, evidence, or testimony relied on the informant’s\\ncredibility.\\n Mistakes were made during the police investigation of\\nHaldorson. The government readily concedes as much. But\\nthose mistakes did not deprive Haldorson of his constitu-\\ntional rights. Haldorson had a full and complete opportunity\\nto defend himself against the government’s charges and re-\\nceived a fair trial.\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4449436/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4672183/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":10,"string":"10"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Michael P. Haldorson\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-10-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2279\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMICHAEL P. HALDORSON,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:15-cr-00623-1 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Michael Haldorson is a self-pro-\nclaimed fireworks enthusiast. But he was also a drug dealer.\nHaldorson was arrested on his way to a second controlled buy\nand, along with drugs, officers found three pipe bombs in his\ncar. He was charged with several counts related to drugs, ex-\nplosives, and a firearm. Before trial, Haldorson filed several\nmotions to suppress evidence, challenging his arrest, the ad-\nmissibility of his post-arrest statements, and the searches of\n\f2 No. 18-2279\n\nhis car, apartment bedroom, and rented storage locker. All\nwere denied.\n Haldorson proceeded to trial and a jury convicted him on\nfour counts of the seven-count indictment: Count One for dis-\ntribution of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Count Two for pos-\nsession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1);\nCount Three for possession of MDMA, or ecstasy, and co-\ncaine, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); and Count Four for possession of an\nexplosive during the commission of a felony, 21 U.S.C.\n§ 844(h)(2). The jury acquitted him on two additional charges\nand the government dismissed another count at trial. The dis-\ntrict court later vacated Count Three because it was a lesser-\nincluded offense of Count Two. The district court sentenced\nHaldorson to a term of imprisonment of 192 months.\n On appeal Haldorson raises three issues. First, Haldorson\nargues that the district court erred in denying the motions to\nsuppress the evidence seized from his car and his apartment\nbecause the officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest\nhim and there were no exigent circumstances to justify the\nwarrantless search of his apartment bedroom. Second, he as-\nserts that the jury instructions constructively amended Count\nFour of the indictment, unlawfully carrying an explosive, in\nviolation of the Fifth Amendment by permitting the jury to\nconvict him on a broader basis than the indictment charged.\nThird, and finally, Haldorson contends that he did not receive\na fair trial due to a multitude of alleged mistakes and errors\nduring the investigation and asks us to vacate his convictions.\n We conclude that probable cause supported the arrest, ex-\nigent circumstances existed for the search of the bedroom, and\nHaldorson had a full and fair opportunity to defend himself\n\fNo. 18-2279 3\n\nat trial. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s judgment in\nall respects.\n I. The Arrest and Vehicle Search\n We begin, naturally, with Haldorson’s arrest and the re-\nsulting search of his vehicle.\nA. Background\n Haldorson was arrested on June 23, 2015, but his case\nstarts a few weeks earlier. Sometime in April or May 2015,\nHaldorson first came on the radar of Officer Thomas Insley\nvia a confidential informant. Officer Insley was, at the time, a\npatrol officer with the Village of Rockdale Police Department\nin Illinois. He was also assigned to a specialized narcotics\nunit, the Will County Cooperative Police Assistance Team\n(CPAT)—a collective of officers from local police departments\nunder the umbrella of the Illinois State Police—as an Inspec-\ntor. (For ease we will use the title of “Officer” for Insley\nthroughout, although he also held the title of “Inspector” dur-\ning the relevant time period.) CPAT inspectors, in general,\nconduct narcotics investigations, control informants, and go\nundercover. Officer Insley was the primary CPAT investigator\nfor Haldorson’s case.\n Officer Insley had been working with this particular con-\nfidential informant for a few months—a detail we will return\nto later—when the informant told Officer Insley that he could\npurchase cocaine from an individual he knew as “Mike\nJones.” The informant provided Officer Insley with a picture\nof Mike Jones’s vehicle, including the license plate (that read\n\f4 No. 18-2279\n\n“MKJNZ”), and his telephone number.1 Officer Insley ran the\nlicense plate through a law enforcement database and learned\nthat it was registered to Haldorson. The vehicle information\nlisted on the registration also matched the photograph of Hal-\ndorson’s car—a black Pontiac G8. Officer Insley then showed\nthe informant a picture of Haldorson, who the informant\nidentified as Mike Jones. At this point, Officer Insley asked the\ninformant to set up a deal.\n On June 1, 2015, the informant contacted Officer Insley\nand told him that he could make a buy from Haldorson. Of-\nficer Insley proceeded to prepare for the controlled purchase\nby providing the informant with funds to buy the narcotics,\nwiring the informant with an audio transmitter and recorder\nto monitor the deal, and setting up a visual surveillance team\nof other CPAT officers. Before heading to the controlled buy,\nOfficer Insley also searched the informant and his vehicle to\nmake sure that he had no contraband, as is standard in these\noperations.\n Officer Insley followed the confidential informant to a\nWalmart parking lot in Joliet, Illinois, where he was going to\nmeet Haldorson, and parked about an aisle over from the in-\nformant. Haldorson then arrived, parked next to the inform-\nant’s car, and the informant got out of his car and into Hal-\ndorson’s car. At about that same time a customer pulled into\nthe lot and parked in between Officer Insley and Haldorson’s\ncar, obstructing Officer Insley’s view of the transaction. Not\n\n1 This Mike Jones’s phone number was not, however, 281-330-8004. For\nthose unfamiliar with the reference, Mike Jones is an American rapper\nwhose hit single in 2005 included a verse that recited his phone number\nand told listeners to “hit Mike Jones up on the low.” See Mike Jones, Back\nThen, on Who Is Mike Jones? (Warner Bros. Records 2005).\n\fNo. 18-2279 5\n\nto worry, though, Officer Insley was still able to listen to the\ndeal in realtime from the audio transmitter.\n After the deal went down, Officer Insley observed a black\ncar matching the description of Haldorson’s car drive away\nand relayed to the rest of the surveillance team that the con-\ntrolled buy was successful and to follow Haldorson’s car.\nMeanwhile, Officer Insley followed the informant to a prear-\nranged location where Officer Insley retrieved the drugs from\nthe informant, as well as re-searched the informant and his\nvehicle. The confidential informant had purchased 1.7 grams\nof cocaine from Haldorson in the transaction.\n The surveillance team did not stop Haldorson that even-\ning; the officers eventually lost him when they got stopped at\na red light. But the plan was never to stop or arrest Haldorson\non June 1st because Officer Insley was just beginning his in-\nvestigation into Haldorson. Further, Officer Insley testified\nthat if the officers arrested Haldorson immediately after the\ncontrolled buy, it would have tipped off Haldorson that he\nhad been set-up by the confidential informant. Officer Insley\nwas using the same informant in other ongoing investigations\nand did not want to burn the informant’s identity.\n From the record it appears that very little was done to ad-\nvance the Haldorson investigation between the June 1st con-\ntrolled buy and June 23rd. There were perhaps, though it is\nsomewhat unclear, attempts by the confidential informant to\nreach out to Haldorson to set up another controlled buy on\nJune 2nd and 5th, but those went nowhere.\n On June 23, 2015, the day at the center of this case, the con-\nfidential informant told Officer Insley that he could arrange\nanother drug deal with Haldorson. The plan this time was for\n\f6 No. 18-2279\n\nthe informant to set it up but for officers to stop Haldorson on\nhis way to the deal and arrest him. Stopping and arresting\nHaldorson before the actual drug deal would, once again, pre-\nserve the confidential informant’s anonymity. Eventually\nHaldorson and the informant agreed to meet in the Village of\nPlainfield, Illinois, specifically at Plainfield Central High\nSchool. Officer Insley then arranged for a Plainfield police of-\nficer in a marked car to pull Haldorson over.\n Officer Friddle of the Plainfield Police Department posi-\ntioned himself near the high school and waited for Haldorson\nto pass by based on a description of Haldorson’s vehicle that\nCPAT officers provided: black Pontiac G8 with a White Sox\nspecialty license plate and red lights in the front grille of the\ncar (that may or may not be illuminated). According to Officer\nFriddle, he soon saw a black car approaching with red lights\nin the grille.2 As it got closer, he could see the White Sox spe-\ncialty plates too. Officer Friddle pulled out to follow Haldor-\nson’s car, activated his emergency lights, and pulled Haldor-\nson over at the entrance of Plainfield Central High School. The\nstop was pretextual, and Officer Friddle made up some\n\n\n\n\n2 Haldorson strongly contested—and still does—the officers’ testimony\nabout both the presence of the red lights on his car at the June 1st con-\ntrolled buy (Haldorson testified and introduced receipts to demonstrate\nthat the lights were not installed until three days later on June 4th) and\nwhether the red lights were in fact illuminated when he was pulled over\non June 23rd. The district court agreed with Haldorson on this point, find-\ning that although there was a red area in the vent on top of the front hood\nof the vehicle, there were not illuminated red lights. In the end, any dis-\npute regarding the red grille lights is inconsequential to the contested is-\nsues in this appeal.\n\fNo. 18-2279 7\n\nexcuses to buy time for CPAT officers to arrive on scene and\ntake over.\n Officer Mario Marzetta, a police officer with the Plainfield\nPolice Department who at the time was also assigned to\nCPAT, arrived at the traffic stop shortly thereafter and ar-\nrested Haldorson. Another officer transported Haldorson to\nthe Plainfield Police Department. Officer Marzetta then also\ndrove Haldorson’s vehicle to the Plainfield Police Department\nand parked it in the sally port, or the garage at the station,\nwhere he and another CPAT inspector searched it.\n The officers found numerous drugs—marijuana, cocaine,\ncrack cocaine, MDMA or ecstasy, prescription pills, psilocy-\nbin mushrooms—fireworks, and suspected pipe bombs in\nHaldorson’s car. Upon discovering the pipe bombs, the offic-\ners ceased their search and called in agents from the Bureau\nof Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the\nCook County Sheriff’s Police Bomb Squad. The ATF agents\nand bomb technicians removed the explosives from the vehi-\ncle to a safe area and rendered them safe.\n We pause the story here to address Haldorson’s challenge\nto his arrest and the search of his vehicle.\nB. Analysis\n Haldorson was later indicted on several federal charges.\nHe thereafter moved to suppress, among other evidence, the\nexplosives and narcotics discovered during the vehicle search\nbecause the officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest\nhim. The district court, after holding a two-day evidentiary\nhearing, denied his motions to suppress. In reviewing the dis-\ntrict court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review ques-\ntions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error.\n\f8 No. 18-2279\n\nUnited States v. Cherry, 920 F.3d 1126, 1132 (7th Cir. 2019). We\nmust defer to credibility determinations that the district court\nmade based on the testimony presented to it, absent clear er-\nror. United States v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018).\n 1. Probable cause to arrest Haldorson\n The officers did not have a warrant to arrest Haldorson,\n“but an officer may make a warrantless arrest consistent with\nthe Fourth Amendment if there is ‘probable cause to believe\nthat a crime has been committed.’” United States v. Daniels,\n803 F.3d 335, 354 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Washington v.\nHaupert, 481 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2007)). “Police officers pos-\nsess probable cause to arrest when the facts and circum-\nstances within their knowledge and of which they have rea-\nsonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a\nprudent person in believing that the suspect has committed\nan offense.” United States v. Howard, 883 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir.\n2018) (quotations omitted). We examine “the totality of the cir-\ncumstances in a common sense manner” to determine\nwhether probable cause exists in a given situation. United\nStates v. Schaafsma, 318 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2003).\n Haldorson’s primary contention is that the information\nfrom the controlled buy was too stale three weeks later to sup-\nport probable cause for an arrest. The mere passage of time\ndoes not necessarily dissipate the probable cause for an arrest.\nIt is well-established that “there is no requirement that an of-\nfender be arrested the moment probable cause is established.”\nUnited States v. Reis, 906 F.2d 284, 289 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing\nHoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966)). In Reis we\nfound that an “overnight delay simply has no bearing on the\nexistence of probable cause for arrest,” id., and we see no rea-\nson to treat reasonably longer delays any different. Indeed,\n\fNo. 18-2279 9\n\nwe have previously held that the defendant’s participation in\na controlled drug buy a month earlier “provided the police\nwith probable cause to arrest [the suspect] which was not ren-\ndered stale by the passage of one month.” United States v.\nMitchell, 523 F. App’x 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).\nOur sister circuits also agree that the passage of time alone\ndoes not render probable cause to arrest stale. See, e.g., United\nStates v. Azor, 881 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Our case law\nmakes clear that law enforcement is not required to arrest a\nsuspect immediately upon development of probable cause.”);\nUnited States v. Clark, 647 F. App’x 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2016) (per\ncuriam) (“[P]robable cause existed to arrest [the defendant]\nbecause the earlier tip from the confidential informant and the\ncontrolled purchase [four to six days earlier] provided [the\npolice] with facts that would support a reasonable person’s\nbelief that an offense had been committed and that the indi-\nvidual arrested was the guilty party.” (cleaned up)); United\nStates v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 554 (1st Cir. 1999)\n(“[W]hen probable cause exists, the timing of an arrest is a\nmatter that the Constitution almost invariably leaves to police\ndiscretion.”); United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 220 (1st Cir.\n1997) (holding that “the period of time between the controlled\nbuys [—four days after the second controlled buy and less\nthan two weeks after the first controlled buy—] and the arrest\nwas not so long here as to render the probable cause stale in\nany meaningful temporal sense”); cf. Guadarrama v. United\nStates, No. 16-6218, 2017 WL 3391683, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 13,\n2017) (unpublished order) (stating that “[r]easonable jurists\ncould not debate th[e] conclusion” that “while information\nused to obtain a search warrant may go stale, the same is not\ntrue for information underlying an arrest warrant”).\n\f10 No. 18-2279\n\n Our facts are nearly identical to those that the Tenth Cir-\ncuit confronted in United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328 (10th\nCir. 2009). There, the police arranged for a controlled buy be-\ntween an informant and the defendant at an auto parts store.\nPolice surveilled the informant while he drove to the location,\ngot into the defendant’s car, and negotiated the purchase of\nmethamphetamine. Id. at 1331. The police did not immedi-\nately arrest the defendant, “[a]pparently hoping to investigate\nfurther.” Id. About a month later, the police sought to have the\ninformant conduct another controlled buy but the informant\nrefused (even though a few days earlier he told the police he\ncould set up another deal). Unable to convince the informant\nto cooperate, the police resolved to arrest the defendant. In-\nstead of obtaining an arrest warrant, they decided to simply\nfollow his car until he committed a traffic violation and then\nstop and arrest him—which they did. Id. at 1331–32. The\nTenth Circuit held that the police officers had probable cause\nto arrest the defendant “based on the controlled buy they wit-\nnessed a month before his arrest.” Id. at 1334. “[T]he passage\nof time did not make that information stale or otherwise de-\nstroy the officers’ probable cause.” Id.\n There was probable cause to arrest Haldorson on June 23,\n2015, based on the June 1, 2015, controlled buy. The facts over-\nwhelmingly support this conclusion. The confidential inform-\nant first provided Officer Insley with Haldorson’s phone\nnumber and a picture of his black Pontiac G8, including the\nlicense plate. Officer Insley was able to run the license plate\nthrough a law enforcement database and trace the car’s regis-\ntration to Haldorson. The informant then positively identified\na photograph of Haldorson as his drug supplier. But the prob-\nable cause for the arrest was not merely based on a “tip” from\n\fNo. 18-2279 11\n\na confidential informant3—that was just the beginning. The\nofficers then set up a controlled buy. Multiple officers were\nsurveilling the deal and observed Haldorson’s car drive into\nthe parking lot at the prearranged location, park next to the\nconfidential informant, and the confidential informant get\ninto the passenger seat of Haldorson’s car. Although no offic-\ners witnessed the actual transaction, Officer Insley listened to\nthe entire interaction in realtime via the informant’s hidden\nwire. Officer Insley also searched the confidential informant\nand his car both before and after the controlled buy; the only\ndrugs he had were the 1.7 grams of cocaine purchased from\nHaldorson during the controlled buy. On this last point, criti-\ncally, the district court found Officer Insley’s testimony cred-\nible, and we certainly cannot say that that finding was clearly\nerroneous. The passage of three weeks did not render the in-\nformation from the controlled buy stale.\n It is the rare case where “staleness” will be relevant to the\nlegality of a warrantless arrest.4 When there is a reasonable\n\n\n3 Haldorson makes repeated references to initially undisclosed infor-\nmation regarding the confidential informant’s history—including how he\ncame to be an informant, his motivation (was he working for money or\nworking off his own case), and the fact that he was arrested on an unre-\nlated incident approximately ten days before the controlled buy. If Officer\nInsley had relied on an affidavit from the confidential informant in an ap-\nplication for a search warrant, the nondisclosure of such credibility infor-\nmation would be relevant to the question of probable cause. United States\nv. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2016). But this case does not in-\nvolve simply relying on information from a confidential informant in an\naffidavit.\n4 Conversely, the concept of staleness is generally a “highly relevant” fac-\ntor in applications for search warrants because, unlike arrests, the focus is\non whether “evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” and\n\f12 No. 18-2279\n\nbelief that someone has committed a crime, time by itself does\nnot make the existence of that fact any less probable. Cer-\ntainly, “[g]ood police practice often requires postponing an\narrest, even after probable cause has been established, in or-\nder to place the suspect under surveillance or otherwise de-\nvelop further evidence necessary to prove guilt to a jury.”\nUnited States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J., con-\ncurring). This is not to say that the passage of time can never\ndissipate probable cause to arrest. There could be circum-\nstances in which the subsequent investigation turns up new\nfacts or evidence that disprove or discredit the original infor-\nmation. Cf. id. at 432 n.5. We simply do not have those facts\nhere and thus do not need to address if or when probable\ncause to arrest may become stale.\n The information provided by the confidential informant\nand the June 1st controlled buy provided probable cause to\narrest Haldorson on June 23, 2015.\n 2. Vehicle search\n Haldorson makes passing references to the search of his\ncar but does not meaningfully contest the district court’s rul-\ning that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.\nIn any event, Haldorson’s challenge fails. The inevitable dis-\ncovery doctrine provides that illegally obtained evidence will\nnot be excluded if the government “can establish by a prepon-\nderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or in-\nevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix\nv. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Once Haldorson was law-\nfully arrested, his “car could not be left unattended\n\noften involve a search for perishable or transportable objects, like drugs or\nguns. United States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018).\n\fNo. 18-2279 13\n\nindefinitely” at the entrance of a public high school. United\nStates v. Simms, 626 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United\nStates v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[O]bviously,\nthe arresting officers would not have allowed the truck to just\nsit on the street after [the arrestee] was carted away.”). The\npolice officers would have towed his vehicle to the police sta-\ntion and conducted an inventory search of the vehicle per es-\ntablished Plainfield Police Department procedures. “The\ndrugs [and explosives], therefore, inevitably would have been\ndiscovered during an inventory search.” Cherry, 920 F.3d\nat 1140.\n We affirm the denial of Haldorson’s motion to suppress\nthe evidence seized from his vehicle.\n II. The Apartment Search\n We pick up the facts where we left off, with Haldorson at\nthe Plainfield Police Department and the officers’ discovery of\ndrugs and explosives in his car.\nA. Background\n Officers interviewed Haldorson multiple times the even-\ning of his arrest and carrying over into the early morning\nhours of the next day, June 24, 2015. The officers read Haldor-\nson his Miranda rights on at least two separate occasions over\nthe course of the interviews. After finding pipe bombs in Hal-\ndorson’s car, the CPAT officers and ATF agents were particu-\nlarly concerned that Haldorson had stored additional explo-\nsive materials at his residence. When officers initially asked\nhim for his current address, Haldorson told the officers that\nhe was homeless. Officer Insley believed that Haldorson lived\nin downtown Plainfield, and specifically on or around Lock-\nport Street, based on information he had previously gathered\n\f14 No. 18-2279\n\nand because officers had seen Haldorson’s car parked on that\nstreet during the investigation. Haldorson told them that he\nwas dating a woman over there but denied living in the\ndowntown Plainfield area. He eventually claimed that he\nlived in Joliet at his parents’ house and provided an address.\nAsked if there were any additional explosives at that home,\nHaldorson responded that there could be.\n With this information, CPAT officers and ATF agents left\nthe police station and went to the Joliet address. They arrived\nat Haldorson’s parents’ home at approximately 2:45 a.m. on\nJune 24, 2015. Haldorson’s parents gave the officers consent\nto search Haldorson’s room, which revealed narcotics-related\nitems but no explosives. After speaking with Haldorson’s fa-\nther, the officers learned that Haldorson did in fact reside at\nan apartment in downtown Plainfield, on Lockport Street. His\nfather did not know the exact address but gave a general de-\nscription of the area and Haldorson’s apartment. Officers im-\nmediately went to that location.\n Now on Lockport Street, at approximately four o’clock in\nthe morning, the officers—without a precise address—pro-\nceeded to knock on the street-level doors of the buildings (the\nbuildings were retail business on the first floor and apart-\nments on the second), and eventually located and gained ac-\ncess to Haldorson’s apartment building.\n Once inside the apartment building, the officers knocked\non Haldorson’s unit’s front door. A woman answered the\ndoor (and gave the same name as the name of the woman Hal-\ndorson said he was dating), who told the officers that Haldor-\nson lived there. She gave the officers consent to enter and\nsearch the common areas of the apartment, and even signed a\nwritten consent form. Haldorson had a separate bedroom in\n\fNo. 18-2279 15\n\nthe apartment, which was locked. The officers used Haldor-\nson’s keys that were taken during his arrest to open his bed-\nroom door. According to the Plainfield police sergeant on the\nscene, the officers made the decision to enter Haldorson’s\nlocked bedroom to search for explosives because they were\nconcerned for the safety of his roommate and the other resi-\ndents and businesses on Lockport Street if there were, indeed,\nexplosives in the bedroom. The officers did not have a search\nwarrant at the time.\n In Haldorson’s bedroom officers founds fireworks and ex-\nplosives. They removed the explosives from the bedroom and\nsecured them in a steel box on ATF trucks. At that moment\nthe officers did not seize anything else from Haldorson’s bed-\nroom except for the explosives. In fact, the officers testified\nthat they only conducted a “plain view” search for explosives\nand then stopped their search. Instead, the officers then ap-\nplied for and received a search warrant for the apartment. The\nsecond search did not produce any additional explosives, but\nofficers did seize narcotics-related items and two laptop com-\nputers.\n Later that same day, armed with the search warrant, offic-\ners also searched two storage lockers that belonged to Haldor-\nson. They did not find any explosives or narcotics in one of\nthe lockers, but seized PVC pipe, multiple low explosive pow-\nder canisters, fireworks, and a handgun and ammunition\nfrom the second locker.\n We break from recounting the facts again to tackle the le-\ngality of the bedroom search.\n\f16 No. 18-2279\n\nB. Analysis\n When the police officers entered Haldorson’s bedroom\nand searched it for explosives, they did not have a search war-\nrant or consent. “Warrantless searches and seizures within a\nhome are considered presumptively unreasonable and a vio-\nlation of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Huddleston,\n593 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2010). There are, however, “certain\nnarrowly proscribed exceptions.” United States v. Bell,\n500 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2007). One such exception is where\n“exigent circumstances require officers to ‘step in to prevent\nserious injury and restore order.’” Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 600\n(quoting Bell, 500 F.3d at 612). Under the exigent circum-\nstances exception, “a warrantless entry into a dwelling may\nbe lawful when there is a pressing need for the police to enter\nbut no time for them to secure a warrant.” Sutterfield v. City of\nMilwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 557 (7th Cir. 2014). The test is\nwhether “an officer had an objectively ‘reasonable belief that\nthere was a compelling need to act and no time to obtain a\nwarrant.’” Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 600 (quoting Bell, 500 F.3d\nat 613). The existence of exigent circumstances is a mixed\nquestion of fact and law that we review de novo. Id. We still\nreview the district court’s factual findings for clear error.\nUnited States v. Delgado, 701 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 2012).\n The exigent circumstances exception is “frequently in-\nvoked in cases involving explosives.” United States v. Witzlib,\n796 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases and citing,\nfor example, United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386, 393–94 (1st\nCir. 2012); Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d\n1065, 1071–73 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lindsey,\n877 F.2d 777, 781–82 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Al–Az-\nzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1985)). Explosives are, by their\n\fNo. 18-2279 17\n\nvery nature, inherently dangerous. Homemade explosive de-\nvices even more so because the persons manufacturing them\noften lack the needed technical knowledge and skills. There-\nfore, even though Haldorson enjoyed a strong expectation of\nprivacy in his locked bedroom, that expectation must be bal-\nanced against the need to protect the public from serious\nharm where explosive materials may be present in a residen-\ntial complex with close neighbors. United States v. Boettger,\n71 F.3d 1410, 1414 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[Privacy] expectations\nmust be lowered where a resident admits working with ex-\nplosive materials in an apartment complex with close neigh-\nbors.”); see Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297 n.8 (1984)\n(careful “not to suggest that individual expectations of pri-\nvacy may prevail over interests of public safety”).\n The following objective facts, found by the district court\nand not clearly erroneous, were known to the officers before\nthey entered into Haldorson’s bedroom: Explosive materials,\nincluding pipe bombs, were found in Haldorson’s car; pipe\nbombs, according to the Cook County Sheriff’s Police Bomb\nSquad and ATF agents, are very volatile and dangerous; Hal-\ndorson admitted that more explosives could be at his resi-\ndence; Haldorson falsely told officers that he lived at his par-\nents’ house, and a search of that house uncovered no explo-\nsives; and Haldorson actually resided at an apartment in\ndowntown Plainfield, which was surrounded by residential\nneighbors and businesses. Moreover, the district court found\nthat an ATF agent credibly testified that there was a “legiti-\nmate concern” that other homemade explosives were “poten-\ntially unstable and therefore dangerous to others.” Based on\nthese facts, the officers reasonably believed that there was a\njustifiable and urgent need to act to prevent serious harm.\n\f18 No. 18-2279\n\n Because of the acute concern and the hour at which the\nofficers and agents were urgently proceeding, around three\nand four o’clock in the morning, there was no time to obtain\na warrant.\n Haldorson relies on the fact that the officers and agents\nonly conducted a plain view search for explosives in his bed-\nroom to question their belief that the explosives posed an im-\nmediate threat. But, as the district court noted, law enforce-\nment officers took additional steps consistent with their belief\nthat the explosives posed an immediate threat, including\nclearing Haldorson’s girlfriend from the apartment. Further,\ncontrary to Haldorson’s contention that their “true aim and\nintent” was to conduct a warrantless search, the fact that the\nofficers only did a plain view search shows that the expressed\nconcern was not simply pretext for searching for and gather-\ning evidence of criminal activity. See Clifford, 464 U.S. at 292.\nThe search did not exceed the scope of the exigency. See\nUnited States v. Salava, 978 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The\nensuing search … was appropriately limited to the [exigent]\ncircumstances that justified it.”).\n Haldorson also emphasizes that he was in custody and\ntherefore “any alleged explosive materials were stable and in-\nert.” The opposite is true—homemade pipe bombs, and other\nimprovised explosive devices, are unstable.5 An ATF agent,\n\n5 It is for this same reason that we find unpersuasive Haldorson’s reliance\n\non United States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2013), which involved a\nwarrantless search based on the possible threat of a grenade inside a\nhome. Upon learning of the possible existence of a grenade, however, the\nofficer did not call for the assistance of explosive experts, or even “remove\nthe sleeping child from the room located directly next to the room where\nthe ‘grenade’ was allegedly stored.” Id. at 395. The officer’s “own actions\nbelie[d]” the argument that there were exigent circumstances. Id. at 398.\n\fNo. 18-2279 19\n\nwho has experience and expertise with explosives, credibly\ntestified to this below.6 In short, the officers reasonably be-\nlieved that the homemade pipe bombs posed an immediate\nthreat to public safety.\n Given the facts and information known at the time of the\nsearch, “from the perspective of the officers at the scene,”\nHuddleston, 593 F.3d at 600, there was a legitimate concern\nthat other homemade explosive devices were in Haldorson’s\nbedroom that were potentially unstable and therefore danger-\nous to others. The warrantless search fell within the exigent\ncircumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant\nrequirement.\n III. Constructive Amendment to the Indictment\n Back to the facts, and with the pretrial motions and evi-\ndentiary issues on appeal taken care of, we turn to Haldor-\nson’s objections to the jury instructions.\n Haldorson challenges the instructions to the jury on Count\nFour as a constructive amendment to the indictment. Count\n\n\nThe officer acted with no level of urgency. Importantly, and distinct from\nour circumstances, the Fourth Circuit noted that there was “no indication\nthat there might be other, more unstable explosives, inside as well.” Id. (em-\nphasis added).\n6 See also Fact Sheet–Illegal Explosive Devices, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,\nFirearms and Explosives (May 2019), https://www.atf.gov/resource-cen-\nter/fact-sheet/fact-sheet-illegal-explosive-devices (“Illegal explosive de-\nvices … are typically extremely sensitive to heat, shock, electrostatic dis-\ncharge and friction that may initiate, unexpectedly causing serious injury\nor death. The risks associated with these devices are further compounded\nbecause the persons manufacturing, transporting and using these devices\noften do not have the knowledge, skills and experience required for such\nactivities.”).\n\f20 No. 18-2279\n\nFour of the indictment charged, in pertinent part, that Haldor-\nson “unlawfully carried an explosive, namely, smokeless\npowder, during the commission of a felony … .” Because the\nindictment charged him with carrying a specific object—\nsmokeless powder—the jury could only convict if it found be-\nyond a reasonable doubt that Haldorson carried smokeless\npowder, not just any explosive material. Haldorson argues\nthat the jury instructions on Count Four unconstitutionally\nbroadened the bases of conviction by permitting the jury to\nconvict if they found he carried any explosive. This is a ques-\ntion of law that we review de novo. United States v. Mitov,\n460 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2006).\n The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be\nheld to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-\nless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S.\nConst. amend. V. Only the grand jury can amend the indict-\nment to broaden it. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216\n(1960); United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019).\n“This rule both enforces the Fifth Amendment and helps to\nensure that a defendant is given reasonable notice of the alle-\ngations against him so that he may best prepare a defense.”\nPierson, 925 F.3d at 919. A constructive amendment “occurs\nwhen either the government (usually during its presentation\nof evidence and/or its argument), the court (usually through\nits instructions to the jury), or both, broadens the possible ba-\nses for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury.”\nUnited States v. Cusimano, 148 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 1998).\n The statute under which Haldorson was charged,\n18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2), does not require a specific type of explo-\nsive as an element—it criminalizes “carr[ying] an explosive\nduring the commission of any felony” (subject only to the\n\fNo. 18-2279 21\n\ndefinition of “explosive” in 18 U.S.C. § 841(d)). But the gov-\nernment narrowed the charge against Haldorson by including\nthe specific language “namely, smokeless powder” in the in-\ndictment. “Specific language in an indictment that provides\ndetail beyond the general elements of the crime makes the\nspecified detail essential to the charged crime and must,\ntherefore, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierson,\n925 F.3d at 920.\n The district court instructed the jury on Count Four as fol-\nlows:\n In order for you to find the defendant guilty of\n the charge of carrying an explosive during the\n commission of a felony as alleged in Count\n Four, the government must prove both of the\n following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:\n …\n 2. The defendant knowingly carried an explo-\n sive, namely, smokeless powder, during the\n commission of that crime [in element 1 of the in-\n struction] … .\nThe jury instruction also included the specific language\n“namely, smokeless powder.” It was added during the final\njury instructions conference at the insistence of Haldorson.\n The jury instruction for Count Four and Count Four of the\nindictment both included the identical specific language re-\ngarding smokeless powder. The instruction thus required the\njury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Haldorson\nknowingly carried an explosive and that that explosive was\nsmokeless powder, just as Count Four charged.\n\f22 No. 18-2279\n\n This is unlike our decisions in Pierson and Leichtnam,\nwhich Haldorson attempts to rely on for support. In both\ncases, the indictment narrowed the bases of conviction by\nnaming a particular firearm that the defendant was charged\nwith. Pierson, 925 F.3d at 920; United States v. Leichtnam,\n948 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1991). And in both cases, the corre-\nsponding jury instruction failed to specify the exact gun\ncharged, while at the same time evidence of additional non-\nindicted guns were presented at trial. “[T]his combination of\nthe evidence and untailored jury instructions added up to a\nconstructive amendment.” Pierson, 925 F.3d at 920. This is not\nour case. The jury instruction was tailored to the specifics of\nthe indictment and did not permit the jury to convict Haldor-\nson based on non-indicted explosives. No constructive\namendment of the indictment occurred.\n Finally, Haldorson makes a passing suggestion that there\nis “another independent problem” with the jury instructions\non Count Four: the instruction contained “vastly more lan-\nguage” than the elements of the offense. According to Haldor-\nson, the language was unnecessary, irrelevant, and suggestive\nof the facts in evidence.\n On a challenge to a jury instruction, our review is twofold.\nFirst, “we review de novo whether the jury instructions accu-\nrately summarize the law, but give the district court substan-\ntial discretion to formulate the instructions provided that the\ninstructions represent a complete and correct statement of the\nlaw.” United States v. Bonin, 932 F.3d 523, 537–38 (7th Cir.\n2019). If the instruction is legally accurate, in the second step\nwe then “review the district court’s phrasing of the instruc-\ntions for abuse of discretion.” Id.\n\fNo. 18-2279 23\n\n The district court further instructed the jury that:\n The explosive does not have to be related to the\n other crime. A person carries an explosive if he\n knowingly transports it on his person or in a ve-\n hicle or container. A person may carry an explo-\n sive even if it is not immediately accessible be-\n cause it is in another area of a vehicle. The term\n “during” means at any point within the conduct\n charged in Count Two and Count Three.\nThe first and fourth sentences accurately summarize the ap-\nplicable law and Supreme Court precedent. In Ressam, the\nCourt held that 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) does not require a rela-\ntionship between the explosive carried and the underlying fel-\nony, and that “during” denotes a straightforward temporal\nlink. United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 274 (2008).\n The second and third sentences above are strictly defini-\ntional. There is no suggestion that they are incorrect, misstate-\nments, or could not have alternatively been included in the\nseparate “Definitions” instruction that the court provided to\nthe jurors. Because the instruction on Count Four accurately\nstated the law, it was not an abuse of discretion to provide the\nadditional language to the jury.\n IV. Mistakes During the Police Investigation\n As a last resort, Haldorson asks this court to vacate his\nconvictions because the convictions are “plagued by con-\ncealed material information, false and misleading reports,\nperjured testimony, an unlawful recording, scant evidence,\ncontaminated evidence, [and] evidence disappearing from\nthe evidence vault.” The crux of his argument on appeal is\nthat the cumulative effects of the perceived mistakes and\n\f24 No. 18-2279\n\nviolations during the investigation deprived him of his Fifth\nand Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial.7\n The problem for Haldorson is that all of the asserted errors\nhe claims infected his trial were known to him before trial and\nhe made extensive use of them at trial on cross-examination.\nEach and every misstep that the officers and the federal agents\nallegedly made along the way came out at trial. In fact, in clos-\ning arguments, Haldorson essentially argued to the jury what\nhe now argues on appeal.\n Much of Haldorson’s argument can be disposed of with\nthat, but we conclude with a brief comment on one of the spe-\ncific allegations concerning irregularities with Officer Insley’s\nhandling of the confidential informant. The primary issue is\nthat Officer Insley did not disclose the informant’s arrest that\noccurred ten days before the controlled buy to his police su-\npervisors or to the prosecutors. A confidential informant’s\npersonal and criminal history is material information and is\noften critical to different stages of an investigation or prose-\ncution. When the police seek a search warrant based in part\non an informant, for example, the omission of adverse infor-\nmation may impair the neutral role of the magistrate deciding\nwhether to issue the warrant. E.g., United States v. Glover,\n755 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014). Similarly, the government\n\n\n7 Importantly, although his argument is framed similarly, Haldorson’s ar-\n\ngument is not one of cumulative error because he does not allege that any\nerrors were committed in the course of the trial. See United States v. Mar-\nchan, 935 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 2019) (“To establish cumulative error a\ndefendant must show that (1) at least two errors were committed in the\ncourse of the trial; [and] (2) considered together along with the entire rec-\nord, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied\nthe petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.”).\n\fNo. 18-2279 25\n\nwould have to disclose that same adverse information to the\ndefense as exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373\nU.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\nIn this particular case, Officer Insley’s lack of disclosure did\nnot taint any later stages of the investigation or prosecution.\nNo warrants, evidence, or testimony relied on the informant’s\ncredibility.\n Mistakes were made during the police investigation of\nHaldorson. The government readily concedes as much. But\nthose mistakes did not deprive Haldorson of his constitu-\ntional rights. Haldorson had a full and complete opportunity\nto defend himself against the government’s charges and re-\nceived a fair trial.\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Michael P. Haldorson\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-10-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2279\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL P. HALDORSON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cr-00623-1 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Michael Haldorson is a self-pro-\\nclaimed fireworks enthusiast. But he was also a drug dealer.\\nHaldorson was arrested on his way to a second controlled buy\\nand, along with drugs, officers found three pipe bombs in his\\ncar. He was charged with several counts related to drugs, ex-\\nplosives, and a firearm. Before trial, Haldorson filed several\\nmotions to suppress evidence, challenging his arrest, the ad-\\nmissibility of his post-arrest statements, and the searches of\\n\\f2 No. 18-2279\\n\\nhis car, apartment bedroom, and rented storage locker. All\\nwere denied.\\n Haldorson proceeded to trial and a jury convicted him on\\nfour counts of the seven-count indictment: Count One for dis-\\ntribution of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Count Two for pos-\\nsession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1);\\nCount Three for possession of MDMA, or ecstasy, and co-\\ncaine, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); and Count Four for possession of an\\nexplosive during the commission of a felony, 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 844(h)(2). The jury acquitted him on two additional charges\\nand the government dismissed another count at trial. The dis-\\ntrict court later vacated Count Three because it was a lesser-\\nincluded offense of Count Two. The district court sentenced\\nHaldorson to a term of imprisonment of 192 months.\\n On appeal Haldorson raises three issues. First, Haldorson\\nargues that the district court erred in denying the motions to\\nsuppress the evidence seized from his car and his apartment\\nbecause the officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest\\nhim and there were no exigent circumstances to justify the\\nwarrantless search of his apartment bedroom. Second, he as-\\nserts that the jury instructions constructively amended Count\\nFour of the indictment, unlawfully carrying an explosive, in\\nviolation of the Fifth Amendment by permitting the jury to\\nconvict him on a broader basis than the indictment charged.\\nThird, and finally, Haldorson contends that he did not receive\\na fair trial due to a multitude of alleged mistakes and errors\\nduring the investigation and asks us to vacate his convictions.\\n We conclude that probable cause supported the arrest, ex-\\nigent circumstances existed for the search of the bedroom, and\\nHaldorson had a full and fair opportunity to defend himself\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 3\\n\\nat trial. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s judgment in\\nall respects.\\n I. The Arrest and Vehicle Search\\n We begin, naturally, with Haldorson’s arrest and the re-\\nsulting search of his vehicle.\\nA. Background\\n Haldorson was arrested on June 23, 2015, but his case\\nstarts a few weeks earlier. Sometime in April or May 2015,\\nHaldorson first came on the radar of Officer Thomas Insley\\nvia a confidential informant. Officer Insley was, at the time, a\\npatrol officer with the Village of Rockdale Police Department\\nin Illinois. He was also assigned to a specialized narcotics\\nunit, the Will County Cooperative Police Assistance Team\\n(CPAT)—a collective of officers from local police departments\\nunder the umbrella of the Illinois State Police—as an Inspec-\\ntor. (For ease we will use the title of “Officer” for Insley\\nthroughout, although he also held the title of “Inspector” dur-\\ning the relevant time period.) CPAT inspectors, in general,\\nconduct narcotics investigations, control informants, and go\\nundercover. Officer Insley was the primary CPAT investigator\\nfor Haldorson’s case.\\n Officer Insley had been working with this particular con-\\nfidential informant for a few months—a detail we will return\\nto later—when the informant told Officer Insley that he could\\npurchase cocaine from an individual he knew as “Mike\\nJones.” The informant provided Officer Insley with a picture\\nof Mike Jones’s vehicle, including the license plate (that read\\n\\f4 No. 18-2279\\n\\n“MKJNZ”), and his telephone number.1 Officer Insley ran the\\nlicense plate through a law enforcement database and learned\\nthat it was registered to Haldorson. The vehicle information\\nlisted on the registration also matched the photograph of Hal-\\ndorson’s car—a black Pontiac G8. Officer Insley then showed\\nthe informant a picture of Haldorson, who the informant\\nidentified as Mike Jones. At this point, Officer Insley asked the\\ninformant to set up a deal.\\n On June 1, 2015, the informant contacted Officer Insley\\nand told him that he could make a buy from Haldorson. Of-\\nficer Insley proceeded to prepare for the controlled purchase\\nby providing the informant with funds to buy the narcotics,\\nwiring the informant with an audio transmitter and recorder\\nto monitor the deal, and setting up a visual surveillance team\\nof other CPAT officers. Before heading to the controlled buy,\\nOfficer Insley also searched the informant and his vehicle to\\nmake sure that he had no contraband, as is standard in these\\noperations.\\n Officer Insley followed the confidential informant to a\\nWalmart parking lot in Joliet, Illinois, where he was going to\\nmeet Haldorson, and parked about an aisle over from the in-\\nformant. Haldorson then arrived, parked next to the inform-\\nant’s car, and the informant got out of his car and into Hal-\\ndorson’s car. At about that same time a customer pulled into\\nthe lot and parked in between Officer Insley and Haldorson’s\\ncar, obstructing Officer Insley’s view of the transaction. Not\\n\\n1 This Mike Jones’s phone number was not, however, 281-330-8004. For\\nthose unfamiliar with the reference, Mike Jones is an American rapper\\nwhose hit single in 2005 included a verse that recited his phone number\\nand told listeners to “hit Mike Jones up on the low.” See Mike Jones, Back\\nThen, on Who Is Mike Jones? (Warner Bros. Records 2005).\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 5\\n\\nto worry, though, Officer Insley was still able to listen to the\\ndeal in realtime from the audio transmitter.\\n After the deal went down, Officer Insley observed a black\\ncar matching the description of Haldorson’s car drive away\\nand relayed to the rest of the surveillance team that the con-\\ntrolled buy was successful and to follow Haldorson’s car.\\nMeanwhile, Officer Insley followed the informant to a prear-\\nranged location where Officer Insley retrieved the drugs from\\nthe informant, as well as re-searched the informant and his\\nvehicle. The confidential informant had purchased 1.7 grams\\nof cocaine from Haldorson in the transaction.\\n The surveillance team did not stop Haldorson that even-\\ning; the officers eventually lost him when they got stopped at\\na red light. But the plan was never to stop or arrest Haldorson\\non June 1st because Officer Insley was just beginning his in-\\nvestigation into Haldorson. Further, Officer Insley testified\\nthat if the officers arrested Haldorson immediately after the\\ncontrolled buy, it would have tipped off Haldorson that he\\nhad been set-up by the confidential informant. Officer Insley\\nwas using the same informant in other ongoing investigations\\nand did not want to burn the informant’s identity.\\n From the record it appears that very little was done to ad-\\nvance the Haldorson investigation between the June 1st con-\\ntrolled buy and June 23rd. There were perhaps, though it is\\nsomewhat unclear, attempts by the confidential informant to\\nreach out to Haldorson to set up another controlled buy on\\nJune 2nd and 5th, but those went nowhere.\\n On June 23, 2015, the day at the center of this case, the con-\\nfidential informant told Officer Insley that he could arrange\\nanother drug deal with Haldorson. The plan this time was for\\n\\f6 No. 18-2279\\n\\nthe informant to set it up but for officers to stop Haldorson on\\nhis way to the deal and arrest him. Stopping and arresting\\nHaldorson before the actual drug deal would, once again, pre-\\nserve the confidential informant’s anonymity. Eventually\\nHaldorson and the informant agreed to meet in the Village of\\nPlainfield, Illinois, specifically at Plainfield Central High\\nSchool. Officer Insley then arranged for a Plainfield police of-\\nficer in a marked car to pull Haldorson over.\\n Officer Friddle of the Plainfield Police Department posi-\\ntioned himself near the high school and waited for Haldorson\\nto pass by based on a description of Haldorson’s vehicle that\\nCPAT officers provided: black Pontiac G8 with a White Sox\\nspecialty license plate and red lights in the front grille of the\\ncar (that may or may not be illuminated). According to Officer\\nFriddle, he soon saw a black car approaching with red lights\\nin the grille.2 As it got closer, he could see the White Sox spe-\\ncialty plates too. Officer Friddle pulled out to follow Haldor-\\nson’s car, activated his emergency lights, and pulled Haldor-\\nson over at the entrance of Plainfield Central High School. The\\nstop was pretextual, and Officer Friddle made up some\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2 Haldorson strongly contested—and still does—the officers’ testimony\\nabout both the presence of the red lights on his car at the June 1st con-\\ntrolled buy (Haldorson testified and introduced receipts to demonstrate\\nthat the lights were not installed until three days later on June 4th) and\\nwhether the red lights were in fact illuminated when he was pulled over\\non June 23rd. The district court agreed with Haldorson on this point, find-\\ning that although there was a red area in the vent on top of the front hood\\nof the vehicle, there were not illuminated red lights. In the end, any dis-\\npute regarding the red grille lights is inconsequential to the contested is-\\nsues in this appeal.\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 7\\n\\nexcuses to buy time for CPAT officers to arrive on scene and\\ntake over.\\n Officer Mario Marzetta, a police officer with the Plainfield\\nPolice Department who at the time was also assigned to\\nCPAT, arrived at the traffic stop shortly thereafter and ar-\\nrested Haldorson. Another officer transported Haldorson to\\nthe Plainfield Police Department. Officer Marzetta then also\\ndrove Haldorson’s vehicle to the Plainfield Police Department\\nand parked it in the sally port, or the garage at the station,\\nwhere he and another CPAT inspector searched it.\\n The officers found numerous drugs—marijuana, cocaine,\\ncrack cocaine, MDMA or ecstasy, prescription pills, psilocy-\\nbin mushrooms—fireworks, and suspected pipe bombs in\\nHaldorson’s car. Upon discovering the pipe bombs, the offic-\\ners ceased their search and called in agents from the Bureau\\nof Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the\\nCook County Sheriff’s Police Bomb Squad. The ATF agents\\nand bomb technicians removed the explosives from the vehi-\\ncle to a safe area and rendered them safe.\\n We pause the story here to address Haldorson’s challenge\\nto his arrest and the search of his vehicle.\\nB. Analysis\\n Haldorson was later indicted on several federal charges.\\nHe thereafter moved to suppress, among other evidence, the\\nexplosives and narcotics discovered during the vehicle search\\nbecause the officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest\\nhim. The district court, after holding a two-day evidentiary\\nhearing, denied his motions to suppress. In reviewing the dis-\\ntrict court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review ques-\\ntions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2279\\n\\nUnited States v. Cherry, 920 F.3d 1126, 1132 (7th Cir. 2019). We\\nmust defer to credibility determinations that the district court\\nmade based on the testimony presented to it, absent clear er-\\nror. United States v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n 1. Probable cause to arrest Haldorson\\n The officers did not have a warrant to arrest Haldorson,\\n“but an officer may make a warrantless arrest consistent with\\nthe Fourth Amendment if there is ‘probable cause to believe\\nthat a crime has been committed.’” United States v. Daniels,\\n803 F.3d 335, 354 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Washington v.\\nHaupert, 481 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2007)). “Police officers pos-\\nsess probable cause to arrest when the facts and circum-\\nstances within their knowledge and of which they have rea-\\nsonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a\\nprudent person in believing that the suspect has committed\\nan offense.” United States v. Howard, 883 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (quotations omitted). We examine “the totality of the cir-\\ncumstances in a common sense manner” to determine\\nwhether probable cause exists in a given situation. United\\nStates v. Schaafsma, 318 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n Haldorson’s primary contention is that the information\\nfrom the controlled buy was too stale three weeks later to sup-\\nport probable cause for an arrest. The mere passage of time\\ndoes not necessarily dissipate the probable cause for an arrest.\\nIt is well-established that “there is no requirement that an of-\\nfender be arrested the moment probable cause is established.”\\nUnited States v. Reis, 906 F.2d 284, 289 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing\\nHoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966)). In Reis we\\nfound that an “overnight delay simply has no bearing on the\\nexistence of probable cause for arrest,” id., and we see no rea-\\nson to treat reasonably longer delays any different. Indeed,\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 9\\n\\nwe have previously held that the defendant’s participation in\\na controlled drug buy a month earlier “provided the police\\nwith probable cause to arrest [the suspect] which was not ren-\\ndered stale by the passage of one month.” United States v.\\nMitchell, 523 F. App’x 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).\\nOur sister circuits also agree that the passage of time alone\\ndoes not render probable cause to arrest stale. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Azor, 881 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Our case law\\nmakes clear that law enforcement is not required to arrest a\\nsuspect immediately upon development of probable cause.”);\\nUnited States v. Clark, 647 F. App’x 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2016) (per\\ncuriam) (“[P]robable cause existed to arrest [the defendant]\\nbecause the earlier tip from the confidential informant and the\\ncontrolled purchase [four to six days earlier] provided [the\\npolice] with facts that would support a reasonable person’s\\nbelief that an offense had been committed and that the indi-\\nvidual arrested was the guilty party.” (cleaned up)); United\\nStates v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 554 (1st Cir. 1999)\\n(“[W]hen probable cause exists, the timing of an arrest is a\\nmatter that the Constitution almost invariably leaves to police\\ndiscretion.”); United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 220 (1st Cir.\\n1997) (holding that “the period of time between the controlled\\nbuys [—four days after the second controlled buy and less\\nthan two weeks after the first controlled buy—] and the arrest\\nwas not so long here as to render the probable cause stale in\\nany meaningful temporal sense”); cf. Guadarrama v. United\\nStates, No. 16-6218, 2017 WL 3391683, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 13,\\n2017) (unpublished order) (stating that “[r]easonable jurists\\ncould not debate th[e] conclusion” that “while information\\nused to obtain a search warrant may go stale, the same is not\\ntrue for information underlying an arrest warrant”).\\n\\f10 No. 18-2279\\n\\n Our facts are nearly identical to those that the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit confronted in United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328 (10th\\nCir. 2009). There, the police arranged for a controlled buy be-\\ntween an informant and the defendant at an auto parts store.\\nPolice surveilled the informant while he drove to the location,\\ngot into the defendant’s car, and negotiated the purchase of\\nmethamphetamine. Id. at 1331. The police did not immedi-\\nately arrest the defendant, “[a]pparently hoping to investigate\\nfurther.” Id. About a month later, the police sought to have the\\ninformant conduct another controlled buy but the informant\\nrefused (even though a few days earlier he told the police he\\ncould set up another deal). Unable to convince the informant\\nto cooperate, the police resolved to arrest the defendant. In-\\nstead of obtaining an arrest warrant, they decided to simply\\nfollow his car until he committed a traffic violation and then\\nstop and arrest him—which they did. Id. at 1331–32. The\\nTenth Circuit held that the police officers had probable cause\\nto arrest the defendant “based on the controlled buy they wit-\\nnessed a month before his arrest.” Id. at 1334. “[T]he passage\\nof time did not make that information stale or otherwise de-\\nstroy the officers’ probable cause.” Id.\\n There was probable cause to arrest Haldorson on June 23,\\n2015, based on the June 1, 2015, controlled buy. The facts over-\\nwhelmingly support this conclusion. The confidential inform-\\nant first provided Officer Insley with Haldorson’s phone\\nnumber and a picture of his black Pontiac G8, including the\\nlicense plate. Officer Insley was able to run the license plate\\nthrough a law enforcement database and trace the car’s regis-\\ntration to Haldorson. The informant then positively identified\\na photograph of Haldorson as his drug supplier. But the prob-\\nable cause for the arrest was not merely based on a “tip” from\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 11\\n\\na confidential informant3—that was just the beginning. The\\nofficers then set up a controlled buy. Multiple officers were\\nsurveilling the deal and observed Haldorson’s car drive into\\nthe parking lot at the prearranged location, park next to the\\nconfidential informant, and the confidential informant get\\ninto the passenger seat of Haldorson’s car. Although no offic-\\ners witnessed the actual transaction, Officer Insley listened to\\nthe entire interaction in realtime via the informant’s hidden\\nwire. Officer Insley also searched the confidential informant\\nand his car both before and after the controlled buy; the only\\ndrugs he had were the 1.7 grams of cocaine purchased from\\nHaldorson during the controlled buy. On this last point, criti-\\ncally, the district court found Officer Insley’s testimony cred-\\nible, and we certainly cannot say that that finding was clearly\\nerroneous. The passage of three weeks did not render the in-\\nformation from the controlled buy stale.\\n It is the rare case where “staleness” will be relevant to the\\nlegality of a warrantless arrest.4 When there is a reasonable\\n\\n\\n3 Haldorson makes repeated references to initially undisclosed infor-\\nmation regarding the confidential informant’s history—including how he\\ncame to be an informant, his motivation (was he working for money or\\nworking off his own case), and the fact that he was arrested on an unre-\\nlated incident approximately ten days before the controlled buy. If Officer\\nInsley had relied on an affidavit from the confidential informant in an ap-\\nplication for a search warrant, the nondisclosure of such credibility infor-\\nmation would be relevant to the question of probable cause. United States\\nv. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2016). But this case does not in-\\nvolve simply relying on information from a confidential informant in an\\naffidavit.\\n4 Conversely, the concept of staleness is generally a “highly relevant” fac-\\ntor in applications for search warrants because, unlike arrests, the focus is\\non whether “evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” and\\n\\f12 No. 18-2279\\n\\nbelief that someone has committed a crime, time by itself does\\nnot make the existence of that fact any less probable. Cer-\\ntainly, “[g]ood police practice often requires postponing an\\narrest, even after probable cause has been established, in or-\\nder to place the suspect under surveillance or otherwise de-\\nvelop further evidence necessary to prove guilt to a jury.”\\nUnited States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J., con-\\ncurring). This is not to say that the passage of time can never\\ndissipate probable cause to arrest. There could be circum-\\nstances in which the subsequent investigation turns up new\\nfacts or evidence that disprove or discredit the original infor-\\nmation. Cf. id. at 432 n.5. We simply do not have those facts\\nhere and thus do not need to address if or when probable\\ncause to arrest may become stale.\\n The information provided by the confidential informant\\nand the June 1st controlled buy provided probable cause to\\narrest Haldorson on June 23, 2015.\\n 2. Vehicle search\\n Haldorson makes passing references to the search of his\\ncar but does not meaningfully contest the district court’s rul-\\ning that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.\\nIn any event, Haldorson’s challenge fails. The inevitable dis-\\ncovery doctrine provides that illegally obtained evidence will\\nnot be excluded if the government “can establish by a prepon-\\nderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or in-\\nevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix\\nv. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Once Haldorson was law-\\nfully arrested, his “car could not be left unattended\\n\\noften involve a search for perishable or transportable objects, like drugs or\\nguns. United States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 13\\n\\nindefinitely” at the entrance of a public high school. United\\nStates v. Simms, 626 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United\\nStates v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[O]bviously,\\nthe arresting officers would not have allowed the truck to just\\nsit on the street after [the arrestee] was carted away.”). The\\npolice officers would have towed his vehicle to the police sta-\\ntion and conducted an inventory search of the vehicle per es-\\ntablished Plainfield Police Department procedures. “The\\ndrugs [and explosives], therefore, inevitably would have been\\ndiscovered during an inventory search.” Cherry, 920 F.3d\\nat 1140.\\n We affirm the denial of Haldorson’s motion to suppress\\nthe evidence seized from his vehicle.\\n II. The Apartment Search\\n We pick up the facts where we left off, with Haldorson at\\nthe Plainfield Police Department and the officers’ discovery of\\ndrugs and explosives in his car.\\nA. Background\\n Officers interviewed Haldorson multiple times the even-\\ning of his arrest and carrying over into the early morning\\nhours of the next day, June 24, 2015. The officers read Haldor-\\nson his Miranda rights on at least two separate occasions over\\nthe course of the interviews. After finding pipe bombs in Hal-\\ndorson’s car, the CPAT officers and ATF agents were particu-\\nlarly concerned that Haldorson had stored additional explo-\\nsive materials at his residence. When officers initially asked\\nhim for his current address, Haldorson told the officers that\\nhe was homeless. Officer Insley believed that Haldorson lived\\nin downtown Plainfield, and specifically on or around Lock-\\nport Street, based on information he had previously gathered\\n\\f14 No. 18-2279\\n\\nand because officers had seen Haldorson’s car parked on that\\nstreet during the investigation. Haldorson told them that he\\nwas dating a woman over there but denied living in the\\ndowntown Plainfield area. He eventually claimed that he\\nlived in Joliet at his parents’ house and provided an address.\\nAsked if there were any additional explosives at that home,\\nHaldorson responded that there could be.\\n With this information, CPAT officers and ATF agents left\\nthe police station and went to the Joliet address. They arrived\\nat Haldorson’s parents’ home at approximately 2:45 a.m. on\\nJune 24, 2015. Haldorson’s parents gave the officers consent\\nto search Haldorson’s room, which revealed narcotics-related\\nitems but no explosives. After speaking with Haldorson’s fa-\\nther, the officers learned that Haldorson did in fact reside at\\nan apartment in downtown Plainfield, on Lockport Street. His\\nfather did not know the exact address but gave a general de-\\nscription of the area and Haldorson’s apartment. Officers im-\\nmediately went to that location.\\n Now on Lockport Street, at approximately four o’clock in\\nthe morning, the officers—without a precise address—pro-\\nceeded to knock on the street-level doors of the buildings (the\\nbuildings were retail business on the first floor and apart-\\nments on the second), and eventually located and gained ac-\\ncess to Haldorson’s apartment building.\\n Once inside the apartment building, the officers knocked\\non Haldorson’s unit’s front door. A woman answered the\\ndoor (and gave the same name as the name of the woman Hal-\\ndorson said he was dating), who told the officers that Haldor-\\nson lived there. She gave the officers consent to enter and\\nsearch the common areas of the apartment, and even signed a\\nwritten consent form. Haldorson had a separate bedroom in\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 15\\n\\nthe apartment, which was locked. The officers used Haldor-\\nson’s keys that were taken during his arrest to open his bed-\\nroom door. According to the Plainfield police sergeant on the\\nscene, the officers made the decision to enter Haldorson’s\\nlocked bedroom to search for explosives because they were\\nconcerned for the safety of his roommate and the other resi-\\ndents and businesses on Lockport Street if there were, indeed,\\nexplosives in the bedroom. The officers did not have a search\\nwarrant at the time.\\n In Haldorson’s bedroom officers founds fireworks and ex-\\nplosives. They removed the explosives from the bedroom and\\nsecured them in a steel box on ATF trucks. At that moment\\nthe officers did not seize anything else from Haldorson’s bed-\\nroom except for the explosives. In fact, the officers testified\\nthat they only conducted a “plain view” search for explosives\\nand then stopped their search. Instead, the officers then ap-\\nplied for and received a search warrant for the apartment. The\\nsecond search did not produce any additional explosives, but\\nofficers did seize narcotics-related items and two laptop com-\\nputers.\\n Later that same day, armed with the search warrant, offic-\\ners also searched two storage lockers that belonged to Haldor-\\nson. They did not find any explosives or narcotics in one of\\nthe lockers, but seized PVC pipe, multiple low explosive pow-\\nder canisters, fireworks, and a handgun and ammunition\\nfrom the second locker.\\n We break from recounting the facts again to tackle the le-\\ngality of the bedroom search.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2279\\n\\nB. Analysis\\n When the police officers entered Haldorson’s bedroom\\nand searched it for explosives, they did not have a search war-\\nrant or consent. “Warrantless searches and seizures within a\\nhome are considered presumptively unreasonable and a vio-\\nlation of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Huddleston,\\n593 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2010). There are, however, “certain\\nnarrowly proscribed exceptions.” United States v. Bell,\\n500 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2007). One such exception is where\\n“exigent circumstances require officers to ‘step in to prevent\\nserious injury and restore order.’” Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 600\\n(quoting Bell, 500 F.3d at 612). Under the exigent circum-\\nstances exception, “a warrantless entry into a dwelling may\\nbe lawful when there is a pressing need for the police to enter\\nbut no time for them to secure a warrant.” Sutterfield v. City of\\nMilwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 557 (7th Cir. 2014). The test is\\nwhether “an officer had an objectively ‘reasonable belief that\\nthere was a compelling need to act and no time to obtain a\\nwarrant.’” Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 600 (quoting Bell, 500 F.3d\\nat 613). The existence of exigent circumstances is a mixed\\nquestion of fact and law that we review de novo. Id. We still\\nreview the district court’s factual findings for clear error.\\nUnited States v. Delgado, 701 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n The exigent circumstances exception is “frequently in-\\nvoked in cases involving explosives.” United States v. Witzlib,\\n796 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases and citing,\\nfor example, United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386, 393–94 (1st\\nCir. 2012); Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d\\n1065, 1071–73 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lindsey,\\n877 F.2d 777, 781–82 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Al–Az-\\nzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1985)). Explosives are, by their\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 17\\n\\nvery nature, inherently dangerous. Homemade explosive de-\\nvices even more so because the persons manufacturing them\\noften lack the needed technical knowledge and skills. There-\\nfore, even though Haldorson enjoyed a strong expectation of\\nprivacy in his locked bedroom, that expectation must be bal-\\nanced against the need to protect the public from serious\\nharm where explosive materials may be present in a residen-\\ntial complex with close neighbors. United States v. Boettger,\\n71 F.3d 1410, 1414 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[Privacy] expectations\\nmust be lowered where a resident admits working with ex-\\nplosive materials in an apartment complex with close neigh-\\nbors.”); see Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297 n.8 (1984)\\n(careful “not to suggest that individual expectations of pri-\\nvacy may prevail over interests of public safety”).\\n The following objective facts, found by the district court\\nand not clearly erroneous, were known to the officers before\\nthey entered into Haldorson’s bedroom: Explosive materials,\\nincluding pipe bombs, were found in Haldorson’s car; pipe\\nbombs, according to the Cook County Sheriff’s Police Bomb\\nSquad and ATF agents, are very volatile and dangerous; Hal-\\ndorson admitted that more explosives could be at his resi-\\ndence; Haldorson falsely told officers that he lived at his par-\\nents’ house, and a search of that house uncovered no explo-\\nsives; and Haldorson actually resided at an apartment in\\ndowntown Plainfield, which was surrounded by residential\\nneighbors and businesses. Moreover, the district court found\\nthat an ATF agent credibly testified that there was a “legiti-\\nmate concern” that other homemade explosives were “poten-\\ntially unstable and therefore dangerous to others.” Based on\\nthese facts, the officers reasonably believed that there was a\\njustifiable and urgent need to act to prevent serious harm.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2279\\n\\n Because of the acute concern and the hour at which the\\nofficers and agents were urgently proceeding, around three\\nand four o’clock in the morning, there was no time to obtain\\na warrant.\\n Haldorson relies on the fact that the officers and agents\\nonly conducted a plain view search for explosives in his bed-\\nroom to question their belief that the explosives posed an im-\\nmediate threat. But, as the district court noted, law enforce-\\nment officers took additional steps consistent with their belief\\nthat the explosives posed an immediate threat, including\\nclearing Haldorson’s girlfriend from the apartment. Further,\\ncontrary to Haldorson’s contention that their “true aim and\\nintent” was to conduct a warrantless search, the fact that the\\nofficers only did a plain view search shows that the expressed\\nconcern was not simply pretext for searching for and gather-\\ning evidence of criminal activity. See Clifford, 464 U.S. at 292.\\nThe search did not exceed the scope of the exigency. See\\nUnited States v. Salava, 978 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The\\nensuing search … was appropriately limited to the [exigent]\\ncircumstances that justified it.”).\\n Haldorson also emphasizes that he was in custody and\\ntherefore “any alleged explosive materials were stable and in-\\nert.” The opposite is true—homemade pipe bombs, and other\\nimprovised explosive devices, are unstable.5 An ATF agent,\\n\\n5 It is for this same reason that we find unpersuasive Haldorson’s reliance\\n\\non United States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2013), which involved a\\nwarrantless search based on the possible threat of a grenade inside a\\nhome. Upon learning of the possible existence of a grenade, however, the\\nofficer did not call for the assistance of explosive experts, or even “remove\\nthe sleeping child from the room located directly next to the room where\\nthe ‘grenade’ was allegedly stored.” Id. at 395. The officer’s “own actions\\nbelie[d]” the argument that there were exigent circumstances. Id. at 398.\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 19\\n\\nwho has experience and expertise with explosives, credibly\\ntestified to this below.6 In short, the officers reasonably be-\\nlieved that the homemade pipe bombs posed an immediate\\nthreat to public safety.\\n Given the facts and information known at the time of the\\nsearch, “from the perspective of the officers at the scene,”\\nHuddleston, 593 F.3d at 600, there was a legitimate concern\\nthat other homemade explosive devices were in Haldorson’s\\nbedroom that were potentially unstable and therefore danger-\\nous to others. The warrantless search fell within the exigent\\ncircumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant\\nrequirement.\\n III. Constructive Amendment to the Indictment\\n Back to the facts, and with the pretrial motions and evi-\\ndentiary issues on appeal taken care of, we turn to Haldor-\\nson’s objections to the jury instructions.\\n Haldorson challenges the instructions to the jury on Count\\nFour as a constructive amendment to the indictment. Count\\n\\n\\nThe officer acted with no level of urgency. Importantly, and distinct from\\nour circumstances, the Fourth Circuit noted that there was “no indication\\nthat there might be other, more unstable explosives, inside as well.” Id. (em-\\nphasis added).\\n6 See also Fact Sheet–Illegal Explosive Devices, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,\\nFirearms and Explosives (May 2019), https://www.atf.gov/resource-cen-\\nter/fact-sheet/fact-sheet-illegal-explosive-devices (“Illegal explosive de-\\nvices … are typically extremely sensitive to heat, shock, electrostatic dis-\\ncharge and friction that may initiate, unexpectedly causing serious injury\\nor death. The risks associated with these devices are further compounded\\nbecause the persons manufacturing, transporting and using these devices\\noften do not have the knowledge, skills and experience required for such\\nactivities.”).\\n\\f20 No. 18-2279\\n\\nFour of the indictment charged, in pertinent part, that Haldor-\\nson “unlawfully carried an explosive, namely, smokeless\\npowder, during the commission of a felony … .” Because the\\nindictment charged him with carrying a specific object—\\nsmokeless powder—the jury could only convict if it found be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt that Haldorson carried smokeless\\npowder, not just any explosive material. Haldorson argues\\nthat the jury instructions on Count Four unconstitutionally\\nbroadened the bases of conviction by permitting the jury to\\nconvict if they found he carried any explosive. This is a ques-\\ntion of law that we review de novo. United States v. Mitov,\\n460 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be\\nheld to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-\\nless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S.\\nConst. amend. V. Only the grand jury can amend the indict-\\nment to broaden it. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216\\n(1960); United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n“This rule both enforces the Fifth Amendment and helps to\\nensure that a defendant is given reasonable notice of the alle-\\ngations against him so that he may best prepare a defense.”\\nPierson, 925 F.3d at 919. A constructive amendment “occurs\\nwhen either the government (usually during its presentation\\nof evidence and/or its argument), the court (usually through\\nits instructions to the jury), or both, broadens the possible ba-\\nses for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury.”\\nUnited States v. Cusimano, 148 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 1998).\\n The statute under which Haldorson was charged,\\n18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2), does not require a specific type of explo-\\nsive as an element—it criminalizes “carr[ying] an explosive\\nduring the commission of any felony” (subject only to the\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 21\\n\\ndefinition of “explosive” in 18 U.S.C. § 841(d)). But the gov-\\nernment narrowed the charge against Haldorson by including\\nthe specific language “namely, smokeless powder” in the in-\\ndictment. “Specific language in an indictment that provides\\ndetail beyond the general elements of the crime makes the\\nspecified detail essential to the charged crime and must,\\ntherefore, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierson,\\n925 F.3d at 920.\\n The district court instructed the jury on Count Four as fol-\\nlows:\\n In order for you to find the defendant guilty of\\n the charge of carrying an explosive during the\\n commission of a felony as alleged in Count\\n Four, the government must prove both of the\\n following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:\\n …\\n 2. The defendant knowingly carried an explo-\\n sive, namely, smokeless powder, during the\\n commission of that crime [in element 1 of the in-\\n struction] … .\\nThe jury instruction also included the specific language\\n“namely, smokeless powder.” It was added during the final\\njury instructions conference at the insistence of Haldorson.\\n The jury instruction for Count Four and Count Four of the\\nindictment both included the identical specific language re-\\ngarding smokeless powder. The instruction thus required the\\njury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Haldorson\\nknowingly carried an explosive and that that explosive was\\nsmokeless powder, just as Count Four charged.\\n\\f22 No. 18-2279\\n\\n This is unlike our decisions in Pierson and Leichtnam,\\nwhich Haldorson attempts to rely on for support. In both\\ncases, the indictment narrowed the bases of conviction by\\nnaming a particular firearm that the defendant was charged\\nwith. Pierson, 925 F.3d at 920; United States v. Leichtnam,\\n948 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1991). And in both cases, the corre-\\nsponding jury instruction failed to specify the exact gun\\ncharged, while at the same time evidence of additional non-\\nindicted guns were presented at trial. “[T]his combination of\\nthe evidence and untailored jury instructions added up to a\\nconstructive amendment.” Pierson, 925 F.3d at 920. This is not\\nour case. The jury instruction was tailored to the specifics of\\nthe indictment and did not permit the jury to convict Haldor-\\nson based on non-indicted explosives. No constructive\\namendment of the indictment occurred.\\n Finally, Haldorson makes a passing suggestion that there\\nis “another independent problem” with the jury instructions\\non Count Four: the instruction contained “vastly more lan-\\nguage” than the elements of the offense. According to Haldor-\\nson, the language was unnecessary, irrelevant, and suggestive\\nof the facts in evidence.\\n On a challenge to a jury instruction, our review is twofold.\\nFirst, “we review de novo whether the jury instructions accu-\\nrately summarize the law, but give the district court substan-\\ntial discretion to formulate the instructions provided that the\\ninstructions represent a complete and correct statement of the\\nlaw.” United States v. Bonin, 932 F.3d 523, 537–38 (7th Cir.\\n2019). If the instruction is legally accurate, in the second step\\nwe then “review the district court’s phrasing of the instruc-\\ntions for abuse of discretion.” Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 23\\n\\n The district court further instructed the jury that:\\n The explosive does not have to be related to the\\n other crime. A person carries an explosive if he\\n knowingly transports it on his person or in a ve-\\n hicle or container. A person may carry an explo-\\n sive even if it is not immediately accessible be-\\n cause it is in another area of a vehicle. The term\\n “during” means at any point within the conduct\\n charged in Count Two and Count Three.\\nThe first and fourth sentences accurately summarize the ap-\\nplicable law and Supreme Court precedent. In Ressam, the\\nCourt held that 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) does not require a rela-\\ntionship between the explosive carried and the underlying fel-\\nony, and that “during” denotes a straightforward temporal\\nlink. United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 274 (2008).\\n The second and third sentences above are strictly defini-\\ntional. There is no suggestion that they are incorrect, misstate-\\nments, or could not have alternatively been included in the\\nseparate “Definitions” instruction that the court provided to\\nthe jurors. Because the instruction on Count Four accurately\\nstated the law, it was not an abuse of discretion to provide the\\nadditional language to the jury.\\n IV. Mistakes During the Police Investigation\\n As a last resort, Haldorson asks this court to vacate his\\nconvictions because the convictions are “plagued by con-\\ncealed material information, false and misleading reports,\\nperjured testimony, an unlawful recording, scant evidence,\\ncontaminated evidence, [and] evidence disappearing from\\nthe evidence vault.” The crux of his argument on appeal is\\nthat the cumulative effects of the perceived mistakes and\\n\\f24 No. 18-2279\\n\\nviolations during the investigation deprived him of his Fifth\\nand Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial.7\\n The problem for Haldorson is that all of the asserted errors\\nhe claims infected his trial were known to him before trial and\\nhe made extensive use of them at trial on cross-examination.\\nEach and every misstep that the officers and the federal agents\\nallegedly made along the way came out at trial. In fact, in clos-\\ning arguments, Haldorson essentially argued to the jury what\\nhe now argues on appeal.\\n Much of Haldorson’s argument can be disposed of with\\nthat, but we conclude with a brief comment on one of the spe-\\ncific allegations concerning irregularities with Officer Insley’s\\nhandling of the confidential informant. The primary issue is\\nthat Officer Insley did not disclose the informant’s arrest that\\noccurred ten days before the controlled buy to his police su-\\npervisors or to the prosecutors. A confidential informant’s\\npersonal and criminal history is material information and is\\noften critical to different stages of an investigation or prose-\\ncution. When the police seek a search warrant based in part\\non an informant, for example, the omission of adverse infor-\\nmation may impair the neutral role of the magistrate deciding\\nwhether to issue the warrant. E.g., United States v. Glover,\\n755 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014). Similarly, the government\\n\\n\\n7 Importantly, although his argument is framed similarly, Haldorson’s ar-\\n\\ngument is not one of cumulative error because he does not allege that any\\nerrors were committed in the course of the trial. See United States v. Mar-\\nchan, 935 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 2019) (“To establish cumulative error a\\ndefendant must show that (1) at least two errors were committed in the\\ncourse of the trial; [and] (2) considered together along with the entire rec-\\nord, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied\\nthe petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2279 25\\n\\nwould have to disclose that same adverse information to the\\ndefense as exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373\\nU.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\\nIn this particular case, Officer Insley’s lack of disclosure did\\nnot taint any later stages of the investigation or prosecution.\\nNo warrants, evidence, or testimony relied on the informant’s\\ncredibility.\\n Mistakes were made during the police investigation of\\nHaldorson. The government readily concedes as much. But\\nthose mistakes did not deprive Haldorson of his constitu-\\ntional rights. Haldorson had a full and complete opportunity\\nto defend himself against the government’s charges and re-\\nceived a fair trial.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":46,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":31175,"offset":4600,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsImtpZCI6IjVHZDBvd0g5MTM2eDZjc1FvbE1zcktNWUZoRVFoUm5PVVVybEpjOUhaUEEifQ.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc4NjU1MTM4MiwianRpIjoiOWM0Nzg2MTctY2NjNi00MTNlLTllN2UtMWZiODEyZDBkNjYyIiwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9jbC1jb2RpbmctaW5wdXQiLCJleHAiOjE3ODY1NTQ5ODIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaHVnZ2luZ2ZhY2UuY28ifQ.fcCEIAtqEsqGuCdCIo3NKNP54B5XrNKQe9R8CWMSmXMy_Jo3vOCqatLjESfA-Z9tleIv2uC8QVSOMsuyRTTFDQ","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":31175,"numBytesParquet":1629387251}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":1,"total":1},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
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4,673,042 | Jane Doe v. Dallas Independent School Dist | 2019-10-25 | 18-10720 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SMITH, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HAYNES, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-10720 Document: 00515174041 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/25/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR TH... | SMITH | DENNIS | HAYNES | 1 | {"SMITH": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit", "HAYNES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4673042/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
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"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,673,310 | Aleashia Clarkston v. John White | 2019-10-25 | 18-31099 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before OWEN, Chief Judge, SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-31099 Document: 00515175015 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/25/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | OWEN | SMITH | DENNIS | 1 | {"OWEN": ", Chief", "SMITH": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4673310/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
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"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,673,522 | United States v. Billy Gentry, Jr. | 2019-10-28 | 17-10165 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before KING, HIGGINSON, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-10165 Document: 00515175756 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/28/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | KING | HIGGINSON | DUNCAN | 1 | {"KING": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit", "DUNCAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4673522/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
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"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,673,882 | United States v. Albert Diaz | 2019-10-29 | 18-60455 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JONES and OWEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n United Stat... | STEWART | JONES | OWEN | 1 | {"STEWART": ", Chief", "JONES": ", Circuit", "OWEN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4673882/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
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"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,673,884 | RSL-3B-IL, Limited v. Symetra Life Insuranc | 2019-10-29 | 18-20762 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SMITH, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HAYNES, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-20245 Document: 00515178032 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/29/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FI... | SMITH | DENNIS | HAYNES | 1 | {"SMITH": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit", "HAYNES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4673884/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,674,332 | ID 100235033 v. BP Exploration & Prodn, I | 2019-10-30 | 18-30908 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and SOUTHWICK and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30908 Document: 00515178359 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/29/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF AP... | OWEN | SOUTHWICK | HIGGINSON | 1 | {"OWEN": ", Chief", "SOUTHWICK": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4674332/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,674,333 | Charles Thompson v. Lorie Davis, Director | 2019-10-30 | 17-70008 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HIGGINBOTHAM, HAYNES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-70008 Document: 00515179080 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/29/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ... | HIGGINBOTHAM | HAYNES | GRAVES | 1 | {"HIGGINBOTHAM": ", Circuit", "HAYNES": ", Circuit", "GRAVES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4674333/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,674,944 | United States v. Tinghui Xie | 2019-10-31 | 18-31299 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before DAVIS, GRAVES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-31299 Document: 00515182773 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/31/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | DAVIS | GRAVES | HIGGINSON | 1 | {"DAVIS": ", Circuit", "GRAVES": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4674944/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,224 | United States v. Sirous Asgari | 2019-10-04 | 19-3657 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: BATCHELDER, SUTTON, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n Fil... | BATCHELDER | SUTTON | DONALD | 1 | {"BATCHELDER": ", Circuit", "SUTTON": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667224/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,225 | Kenneth Bisig v. Time Warner Cable | 2019-10-04 | 18-5483 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MERRITT, GIBBONS, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | MERRITT | GIBBONS | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {"MERRITT": ", Circuit", "GIBBONS": ", Circuit", "NALBANDIAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667225/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,226 | Gilberto Garcia-Romo v. William P. Barr | 2019-10-04 | 18-3857 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: ROGERS, BUSH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File ... | ROGERS | BUSH | LARSEN | 1 | {"ROGERS": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667226/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,560 | Evoqua Water Techs. v. M.W. Watermark | 2019-10-07 | 18-2398 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: WHITE, BUSH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File... | WHITE | BUSH | LARSEN | 1 | {"WHITE": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667560/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,900 | Vincent White v. Warden, Ross Correctional Inst. | 2019-10-08 | 18-3277 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: DAUGHTREY, GRIFFIN, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges _________________ COUNSEL ON BRIEF: C. Mark Pickrell, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, CIRCUIT JUDGE", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n ... | DAUGHTREY | GRIFFIN | STRANCH | 1 | {"DAUGHTREY": ", Circuit", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667900/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,901 | Paula Bennett v. Shawn Brewer | 2019-10-08 | 17-1574 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: DAUGHTREY, GIBBONS, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, CIRCUIT JUDGE", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | DAUGHTREY | GIBBONS | GRIFFIN | 1 | {"DAUGHTREY": ", Circuit", "GIBBONS": ", Circuit", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667901/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,902 | Jerome Byrd v. Greg Skipper | 2019-10-08 | 18-2021 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: DAUGHTREY, COOK, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Elizabeth L. Jacobs, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n ... | DAUGHTREY | COOK | GRIFFIN | 1 | {"DAUGHTREY": ", Circuit", "COOK": ", Circuit", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667902/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,150 | Vincent White v. Warden, Ross Correctional Inst. | 2019-10-08 | 18-3277 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: DAUGHTREY, GRIFFIN, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges _________________ COUNSEL ON BRIEF: C. Mark Pickrell, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, CIRCUIT JUDGE", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n ... | DAUGHTREY | GRIFFIN | STRANCH | 1 | {"DAUGHTREY": ", Circuit", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668150/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,149 | Diana Jomaa v. United States | 2019-10-09 | 19-1156 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MERRITT, DAUGHTREY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n Fi... | MERRITT | DAUGHTREY | GRIFFIN | 1 | {"MERRITT": ", Circuit", "DAUGHTREY": ", Circuit", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668149/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,648 | United States v. Michael Owen | 2019-10-10 | 18-5736 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MERRITT, THAPAR, and READLER, Circuit Judges _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Jennifer Niles Coffin, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\... | MERRITT | THAPAR | READLER | 1 | {"MERRITT": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit", "READLER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668648/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,652 | Kenneth Chapman v. Tristar Prods., Inc. | 2019-10-10 | 18-3866 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: ROGERS, BUSH and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n Fi... | ROGERS | BUSH | LARSEN | 1 | {"ROGERS": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668652/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,669,150 | Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes | 2019-10-11 | 18-3329 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: COLE, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER and DONALD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "judge's weighing and balancing of the equities should be disturbed on appeal only in the rarest of", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n ... | COLE | BATCHELDER | DONALD | 1 | {"COLE": ", Chief", "BATCHELDER": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669150/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,669,549 | United States v. Nestor Barron | 2019-10-15 | 18-5222 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SILER and CLAY, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLE, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File ... | COLE | SILER | CLAY | 1 | {"COLE": ", Chief", "SILER": ", Circuit", "CLAY": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669549/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,992 | United States v. Lawrence Flack | 2019-10-23 | 18-1676 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MOORE, KETHLEDGE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Na... | MOORE | KETHLEDGE | MURPHY | 1 | {"MOORE": ", Circuit", "KETHLEDGE": ", Circuit", "MURPHY": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671992/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,993 | United States v. Arvis Williams, Jr. | 2019-10-23 | 18-4072 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: BATCHELDER, DONALD, and READLER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a... | BATCHELDER | DONALD | READLER | 1 | {"BATCHELDER": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit", "READLER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671993/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,995 | Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Indian Head Indus., Inc. | 2019-10-23 | 18-2152 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MOORE, McKEAGUE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File... | MOORE | MCKEAGUE | LARSEN | 1 | {"MOORE": ", Circuit", "McKEAGUE": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671995/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,672,556 | Thomas Richardson v. Carmen Palmer | 2019-10-24 | 18-1434 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: SUHRHEINRICH, CLAY, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | SUHRHEINRICH | CLAY | DONALD | 1 | {"SUHRHEINRICH": ", Circuit", "CLAY": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4672556/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,673,759 | Kevin McGee v. Thomas Armstrong | 2019-10-29 | 18-3886 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: COLE, Chief Judge; MERRITT and LARSEN, Circuit Judges _________________ COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Michael J. McGee, HARRINGTON, HOPPE & MITCHELL LTD, Warren, Ohio, for Appellant.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MERRITT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBL... | COLE | MERRITT | LARSEN | 1 | {"COLE": ", Chief", "MERRITT": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4673759/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,159 | Michael Daniels v. United States | 2019-10-04 | 17-2618 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2618\nMICHAEL DANIELS... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667159/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,180 | Michael Daniels v. United States | 2019-10-04 | 17-2618 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2618\nMICHAEL DANIELS... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667180/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,392 | Michael Daniels v. United States | 2019-10-04 | 17-2618 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2618\nMICHAEL DANIELS... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667392/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,608 | 4SEMO.COM, Incorporated v. Southern Illinois Storm Shelte | 2019-10-07 | 18-2095 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\n\nNos. 18-1998 & 18-2095\n4SEMO.C... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667608/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,623 | Union Pacific Railroad Compan v. Wisconsin Department of Reven | 2019-10-07 | 19-1741 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1741\nUNION PACIFIC RAILROA... | FLAUM | ROVNER | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667623/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,624 | Paul Nigl v. Jon Litscher | 2019-10-07 | 19-1618 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1618\nPAUL NIGL, et ... | FLAUM | ROVNER | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667624/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,625 | 4SEMO.COM, Incorporated v. Southern Illinois Storm Shelte | 2019-10-07 | 18-2095 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\n\nNos. 18-1998 & 18-2095\n4SEMO.C... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667625/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,669 | Union Pacific Railroad Compan v. Wisconsin Department of Reven | 2019-10-07 | 19-1741 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1741\nUNION PACIFIC RAILROA... | FLAUM | ROVNER | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667669/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,670 | Paul Nigl v. Jon Litscher | 2019-10-07 | 19-1618 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1618\nPAUL NIGL, et ... | FLAUM | ROVNER | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667670/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,671 | 4SEMO.COM, Incorporated v. Southern Illinois Storm Shelte | 2019-10-07 | 18-2095 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\n\nNos. 18-1998 & 18-2095\n4SEMO.C... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667671/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,740 | United States v. Sergio Zacahua | 2019-10-08 | 16-4046 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-4046\nUNITED... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667740/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,859 | United States v. Sergio Zacahua | 2019-10-08 | 16-4046 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-4046\nUNITED... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667859/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,860 | United States v. Dennis D. Jackson | 2019-10-08 | 18-3534 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3534\nUNITED STATES OF AME... | FLAUM | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667860/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,936 | United States v. Dennis D. Jackson | 2019-10-08 | 18-3534 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3534\nUNITED STATES OF AME... | FLAUM | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667936/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,937 | Alejandro Yeatts v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. | 2019-10-08 | 19-1269 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1269\nALEJANDR... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | MANION | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667937/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,667,970 | Alejandro Yeatts v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. | 2019-10-08 | 19-1269 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1269\nALEJANDR... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | MANION | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4667970/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,048 | David McDaniel v. Progress Rail Locomotive, Inc. | 2019-10-09 | 18-3565 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3565\nDAVID MCDANI... | ROVNER | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668048/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,063 | David McDaniel v. Progress Rail Locomotive, Inc. | 2019-10-09 | 18-3565 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3565\nDAVID MCDANI... | ROVNER | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668063/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,064 | Brian Miller v. United States | 2019-10-09 | 19-1552 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Yale Scudder", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1552\nBRIAN MILLER,\n ... | FLAUM | ROVNER | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668064/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,151 | United States v. Darin Kaufmann | 2019-10-09 | 18-2742 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2742\nUNITED STA... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668151/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,152 | David McDaniel v. Progress Rail Locomotive, Inc. | 2019-10-09 | 18-3565 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3565\nDAVID MCDANI... | ROVNER | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668152/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,153 | Christine Dancel v. Groupon, Inc. | 2019-10-09 | 19-1831 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1831\nCHRISTINE DAN... | BAUER | BRENNAN | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668153/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,154 | Brian Miller v. United States | 2019-10-09 | 19-1552 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Yale Scudder", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1552\nBRIAN MILLER,\n ... | FLAUM | ROVNER | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668154/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,351 | United States v. Darin Kaufmann | 2019-10-09 | 18-2742 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2742\nUNITED STA... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668351/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,352 | Christine Dancel v. Groupon, Inc. | 2019-10-09 | 19-1831 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1831\nCHRISTINE DAN... | BAUER | BRENNAN | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668352/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,353 | Brian Miller v. United States | 2019-10-09 | 19-1552 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Yale Scudder", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1552\nBRIAN MILLER,\n ... | FLAUM | ROVNER | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668353/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,617 | Victor Brown v. Jane Doe | 2019-10-10 | 19-1420 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-14... | WOOD | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SCUDDER": ", Cir cuit", "ST EVE": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668617/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,696 | Victor Brown v. Jane Doe | 2019-10-10 | 19-1420 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-14... | WOOD | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SCUDDER": ", Cir cuit", "ST EVE": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668696/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,697 | United States v. Reynold De La Torre | 2019-10-10 | 18-2009 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18‐2009, 18‐2218, 18‐228... | FLAUM | SYKES | ST EVE | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668697/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,668,791 | United States v. Reynold De La Torre | 2019-10-10 | 18-2009 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18‐2009, 18‐2218, 18‐228... | FLAUM | SYKES | ST EVE | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4668791/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,669,162 | Jamie Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue | 2019-10-11 | 18-3260 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3260\nJAMIE SWARTZ, et al.... | FLAUM | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669162/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,669,254 | Jamie Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue | 2019-10-11 | 18-3260 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3260\nJAMIE SWARTZ, et al.... | FLAUM | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669254/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,669,577 | Antoinette Wonsey v. City of Chicago | 2019-10-15 | 19-1171 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Brian Brennan", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1171\nANTOINETTE WON... | BAUER | BRENNAN | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669577/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,669,626 | Antoinette Wonsey v. City of Chicago | 2019-10-15 | 19-1171 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Brian Brennan", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1171\nANTOINETTE WON... | BAUER | BRENNAN | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669626/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,669,666 | Henrikas Malukas v. William Barr | 2019-10-15 | 19-1633 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 19-1633\nHENRIK... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669666/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,669,671 | Henrikas Malukas v. William Barr | 2019-10-15 | 19-1633 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 19-1633\nHENRIK... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669671/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,669,672 | George Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. | 2019-10-15 | 17-2821 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2821\nGEORGE WALKER,\n ... | FLAUM | SYKES | ST EVE | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669672/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,669,731 | Henrikas Malukas v. William Barr | 2019-10-15 | 19-1633 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 19-1633\nHENRIK... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669731/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,669,732 | George Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. | 2019-10-15 | 17-2821 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2821\nGEORGE WALKER,\n ... | FLAUM | SYKES | ST EVE | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669732/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,669,897 | Chicago Studio Rental, Incorpo v. Illinois Department of Commerc | 2019-10-16 | 18-3134 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18–3134\nCHICAGO STUD... | ROVNER | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4669897/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,066 | Marvin Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois Railroad Comp | 2019-10-16 | 18-2153 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\nMARVIN ... | KANNE | SYKES | HAMILTON | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670066/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,067 | Chicago Studio Rental, Incorpo v. Illinois Department of Commerc | 2019-10-16 | 18-3134 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18–3134\nCHICAGO STUD... | ROVNER | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670067/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,079 | Marvin Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois Railroad Comp | 2019-10-16 | 18-2153 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\nMARVIN ... | KANNE | SYKES | HAMILTON | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670079/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,112 | Marvin Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois Railroad Comp | 2019-10-16 | 18-2153 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2068 & 18-2153\nMARVIN ... | KANNE | SYKES | HAMILTON | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670112/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,525 | Priscilla Rainey v. Jayceon Taylor | 2019-10-17 | 18-2990 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\... | WOOD | FLAUM | SYKES | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670525/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,633 | Priscilla Rainey v. Jayceon Taylor | 2019-10-17 | 18-2990 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 16-4153 & 18-2990\... | WOOD | FLAUM | SYKES | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670633/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,788 | United States v. David Holly | 2019-10-18 | 19-1216 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Yale Scudder", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1216\nUNITED STATES ... | ROVNER | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670788/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,789 | Lisa Ulrey v. William Reichhart | 2019-10-18 | 19-1221 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before SYKES, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1221\nLISA ULREY,\n ... | SYKES | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670789/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,790 | Gai Levy v. Marion County Sheriff | 2019-10-18 | 19-1424 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1424\nGAI LEVY,\n ... | FLAUM | SYKES | ST EVE | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670790/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,825 | United States v. David Holly | 2019-10-18 | 19-1216 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Yale Scudder", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1216\nUNITED STATES ... | ROVNER | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670825/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,826 | MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC | 2019-10-18 | 19-2782 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\n... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670826/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,827 | Lisa Ulrey v. William Reichhart | 2019-10-18 | 19-1221 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before SYKES, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1221\nLISA ULREY,\n ... | SYKES | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670827/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,828 | Gai Levy v. Marion County Sheriff | 2019-10-18 | 19-1424 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1424\nGAI LEVY,\n ... | FLAUM | SYKES | ST EVE | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670828/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,860 | United States v. David Holly | 2019-10-18 | 19-1216 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Yale Scudder", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1216\nUNITED STATES ... | ROVNER | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670860/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,861 | MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC | 2019-10-18 | 19-2782 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\n... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670861/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,670,948 | MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC | 2019-10-18 | 19-2782 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 19-2200, 19-2713 & 19-2782\n... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4670948/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,329 | Keith Horist v. Sudler & Company | 2019-10-21 | 18-2150 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2150\nKEITH HORIST, JOSHUA ... | SYKES | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671329/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,382 | Keith Horist v. Sudler & Company | 2019-10-21 | 18-2150 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2150\nKEITH HORIST, JOSHUA ... | SYKES | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671382/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,411 | Keith Horist v. Sudler & Company | 2019-10-21 | 18-2150 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before SYKES, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2150\nKEITH HORIST, JOSHUA ... | SYKES | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671411/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,506 | CFTC v. John Robert Blakey | 2019-10-22 | 19-2769 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 19-2769\nIN THE MATTER OF:\n COMMODITY FUTUR... | EASTERBROOK | RIPPLE | SYKES | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671506/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,682 | CFTC v. John Robert Blakey | 2019-10-22 | 19-2769 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 19-2769\nIN THE MATTER OF:\n COMMODITY FUTUR... | EASTERBROOK | RIPPLE | SYKES | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671682/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,765 | United States v. Anthony Shockey | 2019-10-22 | 19-1308 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 19-1308\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | BAUER | RIPPLE | HAMILTON | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671765/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,766 | Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital | 2019-10-22 | 19-1747 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Yale Scudder", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19‐1747\... | WOOD | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671766/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,780 | United States v. Anthony Shockey | 2019-10-22 | 19-1308 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 19-1308\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | BAUER | RIPPLE | HAMILTON | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671780/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,781 | Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital | 2019-10-22 | 19-1747 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Yale Scudder", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19‐1747\... | WOOD | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671781/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,782 | James Hanson v. United States | 2019-10-22 | 18-1149 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1149\n\nJAMES B. HANSON,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671782/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,829 | United States v. Anthony Shockey | 2019-10-22 | 19-1308 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 19-1308\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | BAUER | RIPPLE | HAMILTON | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671829/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,830 | Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital | 2019-10-22 | 19-1747 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Yale Scudder", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19‐1747\... | WOOD | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671830/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,831 | James Hanson v. United States | 2019-10-22 | 18-1149 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1149\n\nJAMES B. HANSON,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671831/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,672,187 | James Hanson v. United States | 2019-10-22 | 18-1149 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1149\n\nJAMES B. HANSON,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4672187/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,996 | Western Illinois Service Coord v. Illinois Department of Human S | 2019-10-23 | 19-2211 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Yale Scudder", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-2211\nWESTERN ILLINOIS ... | FLAUM | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671996/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,671,997 | United States v. Michael P. Haldorson | 2019-10-23 | 18-2279 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2279\nUNITED STATES ... | BAUER | MANION | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4671997/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,672,182 | Western Illinois Service Coord v. Illinois Department of Human S | 2019-10-23 | 19-2211 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Yale Scudder", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-2211\nWESTERN ILLINOIS ... | FLAUM | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4672182/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,672,183 | United States v. Michael P. Haldorson | 2019-10-23 | 18-2279 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2279\nUNITED STATES ... | BAUER | MANION | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4672183/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 10 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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