id string | language string | framework string | title string | description string | owasp string | owasp_api string | owasp_llm string | cwe string | mitre_attack string | severity string | difficulty string | vulnerable_code string | secure_code string | patch string | root_cause string | attack string | impact string | fix string | guideline string | tags list | metadata dict | cvss_vector string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SCP-000029 | C# | ASP.NET Core | Missing authorization on API controller | An ASP.NET Core controller exposes patient records with no [Authorize] attribute. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | CWE-862 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Critical | Beginner | [ApiController]
[Route("api/patients")]
public class PatientsController : ControllerBase
{
[HttpGet("{id}")]
public Patient Get(int id) => _repo.Get(id); // Vulnerable: no auth
}
| [ApiController]
[Route("api/patients")]
[Authorize(Policy = "Clinician")]
public class PatientsController : ControllerBase
{
[HttpGet("{id}")]
public ActionResult<Patient> Get(int id)
{
var p = _repo.GetForUser(id, User.GetUserId());
return p is null ? NotFound() : p;
}
}
| --- a/PatientsController.cs
+++ b/PatientsController.cs
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
+[Authorize(Policy = "Clinician")]
public class PatientsController : ControllerBase
{
+ var p = _repo.GetForUser(id, User.GetUserId());
+ return p is null ? NotFound() : p;
| No authorization policy is attached, so any anonymous caller reads patient data. | Caller enumerates /api/patients/1..N to scrape PHI. | Mass disclosure of protected health information (HIPAA violation). | Apply [Authorize] with a policy and scope queries to the authenticated principal. | Require authorization policies on every sensitive controller; scope by user. | [
"authorization",
"aspnet",
"csharp",
"healthcare"
] | {
"domain": "Healthcare",
"input_source": "path_param",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000167 | Kotlin | Android | Insecure broadcast receiver exported | An Android receiver is exported without permission, allowing arbitrary commands. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-925 | T1398 - Mobile Application Exploitation | High | Intermediate | <receiver android:name=".CmdReceiver" android:exported="true" /> <!-- Vulnerable --> | <receiver android:name=".CmdReceiver"
android:exported="false" // Secure: not exported
android:permission="com.app.PRIV" /> | --- a/AndroidManifest.xml
+++ b/AndroidManifest.xml
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
-<receiver android:name=".CmdReceiver" android:exported="true" />
+<receiver android:name=".CmdReceiver" android:exported="false"
+ android:permission="com.app.PRIV" /> | Exported receiver accepts broadcasts from any app. | Malicious app sends a command broadcast. | Unauthorized action in app context. | Set exported=false or require a signature permission. | Don't export receivers without permission. | [
"android",
"kotlin",
"exported",
"mobile"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "intent",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000361 | PHP | Laravel | Business logic: negative quantity | A cart uses a client-supplied quantity without bounds. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization | CWE-840 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | $cart->qty = $request->input("qty"); $cart->save(); // Vulnerable: negative\ | $q = (int)$request->input("qty");\nif ($q <= 0 || $q > 100) abort(400); // Secure\n$cart->qty = $q; $cart->save();\ | --- a/CartController.php\n+++ b/CartController.php\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\n-$cart->qty = $request->input("qty"); $cart->save();\n+$q = (int)$request->input("qty");\n+if ($q <= 0 || $q > 100) abort(400);\n+$cart->qty = $q; $cart->save();\ | Client qty not bounded. | qty=-5 => negative charge. | Revenue loss. | Validate qty server-side. | Validate business values. | [
"business-logic",
"php",
"laravel",
"ecommerce"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000448 | Rust | Actix | Insecure deserialization | Actix handler decodes untrusted bytes with a deserializer. | A08:2021 - Integrity Failures | CWE-502 | T1190 | Medium | Advanced | let v: MyStruct = ron::de::from_bytes(&body)?; | let v: MyStruct = serde_json::from_slice(&body)?; // strict schema | --- a/handler.rs
+++ b/handler.rs
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-let v: MyStruct = ron::de::from_bytes(&body)?;
+let v: MyStruct = serde_json::from_slice(&body)?; | Deserializing untrusted bytes. | Craft malicious payload. | Logic abuse / RCE. | Use strict schema deserializer. | Validate deserialized data. | [
"deserialization",
"rust",
"actix",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000296 | Scala | Play | Open redirect | A Play action redirects to a param without validation. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 - Phishing | Medium | Beginner | def go = Action { req =>
Redirect(req.getQueryString("url").getOrElse("/")) // Vulnerable
} | def go = Action { req =>
val u = req.getQueryString("url").filter(_.startsWith("/"))
Redirect(u.getOrElse("/")) // Secure
} | --- a/Links.scala
+++ b/Links.scala
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-def go = Action { req =>
Redirect(req.getQueryString("url").getOrElse("/"))
+ val u = req.getQueryString("url").filter(_.startsWith("/"))
+ Redirect(u.getOrElse("/")) | Unvalidated redirect. | url=//evil.com phishing. | Phishing. | Allowlist relative. | Validate redirects. | [
"open-redirect",
"scala",
"play",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000363 | PHP | Laravel | Verbose error display | APP_DEBUG=true in production leaks stack traces. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-209 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Beginner | APP_DEBUG=true # Vulnerable: leaks in prod\ | APP_DEBUG=false # Secure: off in prod\ | --- a/.env\n+++ b/.env\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-APP_DEBUG=true\n+APP_DEBUG=false\ | Debug on in production. | Trigger error to read source. | Info disclosure. | APP_DEBUG=false. | Never debug in prod. | [
"info-leak",
"php",
"laravel",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000480 | Python | Flask | Logging injection via unsanitized input | Flask logs user input containing newlines, enabling log forging. | A09:2021 - Logging Failures | CWE-117 | T1190 | Low | Beginner | logger.info("user %s logged in", request.args.get("u")) | u = request.args.get("u", "").replace("\n", " ").replace("\r", " ")
logger.info("user %s logged in", u) | --- a/views.py
+++ b/views.py
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
-logger.info("user %s logged in", request.args.get("u"))
+u = request.args.get("u", "").replace("\n", " ").replace("\r", " ")
+logger.info("user %s logged in", u) | Unsanitized log input. | Inject fake log lines. | Log integrity loss. | Sanitize log input. | Strip newlines from log data. | [
"logging",
"flask",
"python",
"log-injection"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | ||
SCP-000139 | Python | Flask | XML external entity in report generator | A Flask endpoint parses uploaded XML with ET.fromstring without disabling entities. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-611 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
def parse(data):
return ET.fromstring(data) # Vulnerable: external entities on by default | from defusedxml.ElementTree import fromstring # Secure
import defusedxml
def parse(data):
return fromstring(data) # disables DTD/external entities
| --- a/xmlparse.py
+++ b/xmlparse.py
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
-def parse(data):
- return ET.fromstring(data)
+from defusedxml.ElementTree import fromstring
+def parse(data):
+ return fromstring(data) | Stdlib XML parser allows external entity resolution. | DOCTYPE with SYSTEM entity reads /etc/passwd. | File disclosure, SSRF. | Use defusedxml or disable DTDs. | Parse XML with defusedxml. | [
"xxe",
"flask",
"python",
"xml"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000400 | Kotlin | Android | Insecure deep link handling | A deep link handler trusts host input for navigation/actions. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 - Phishing | Medium | Beginner | val action = intent.data?.getQueryParameter("action") // Vulnerable: trusted blindly\ | val action = intent.data?.getQueryParameter("action")\nif (action !in setOf("view", "share")) return // Secure: allowlist\ | --- a/DeepLink.kt\n+++ b/DeepLink.kt\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-val action = intent.data?.getQueryParameter("action")\n+if (action !in setOf("view", "share")) return\ | Untrusted deep link param. | Craft deeplink for unintended action. | Phishing/abuse. | Allowlist actions. | Validate deep link params. | [
"deep-link",
"kotlin",
"android",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "deeplink",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000247 | Ruby | Rails | Weak secret token in secrets.yml | A Rails app commits a static secret_key_base. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-798 | T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files | High | Beginner | production:
secret_key_base: "abc123static" # Vulnerable | production:
secret_key_base: "<%= ENV["SECRET_KEY_BASE"] %>" # Secure: env | --- a/config/secrets.yml
+++ b/config/secrets.yml
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-production:
secret_key_base: "abc123static"
+production:
secret_key_base: "<%= ENV["SECRET_KEY_BASE"] %>" | Static secret in repo. | Forge signed cookies. | Auth bypass. | Load from env/secret. | Externalize secret_key_base. | [
"secrets",
"rails",
"ruby",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000395 | Kotlin | Android | SQL injection via content resolver | A content resolver query concatenates selection args. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-89 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | cr.query(uri, null, "name='" + name + "'", null, null) // Vulnerable\ | cr.query(uri, null, "name=?", arrayOf(name), null) // Secure: selection arg\ | --- a/Provider.kt\n+++ b/Provider.kt\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-cr.query(uri, null, "name='" + name + "'", null, null)\n+cr.query(uri, null, "name=?", arrayOf(name), null)\ | Concatenated selection. | name=' OR 1=1 leaks rows. | Data disclosure. | Use selection args. | Bind SQL/selection args. | [
"sqli",
"kotlin",
"android",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000475 | Python | FastAPI | Weak password policy | Signup does not enforce password complexity. | A07:2021 - Auth Failures | API2:2023 | CWE-521 | T1110 | Medium | Beginner | def signup(pw: str):
create_user(pw) # any pw | import re
def signup(pw: str):
if not re.match(r"^(?=.*[A-Z])(?=.*[0-9]).{8,}$", pw):
raise HTTPException(400)
create_user(pw) | --- a/auth.py
+++ b/auth.py
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
-def signup(pw: str):
- create_user(pw)
+import re
+def signup(pw: str):
+ if not re.match(r"^(?=.*[A-Z])(?=.*[0-9]).{8,}$", pw):
+ raise HTTPException(400)
+ create_user(pw) | No password policy. | Weak/crackable passwords. | Account takeover. | Enforce complexity. | Strong password policy. | [
"passwords",
"fastapi",
"python",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000284 | C++ | STD | Null pointer dereference | A C++ function dereferences a pointer that may be null. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-476 | T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution | Medium | Beginner | void show(User* u) {
std::cout << u->name; // Vulnerable: u may be null
} | void show(User* u) {
if (!u) return; // Secure: null check
std::cout << u->name;
} | --- a/show.cpp
+++ b/show.cpp
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
- std::cout << u->name;
+ if (!u) return;
+ std::cout << u->name; | Missing null check. | Pass null to crash. | DoS. | Check before deref. | Null-check inputs. | [
"null-deref",
"cpp",
"memory-safety"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "argv",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000088 | Java | Spring Boot | Rounding error in interest calculation | A Spring service uses binary floating point for money, causing rounding drift. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | CWE-682 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | public BigDecimal interest(double principal, double rate) {
// Vulnerable: double for currency
return BigDecimal.valueOf(principal * rate);
}
| public BigDecimal interest(BigDecimal principal, BigDecimal rate) {
// Secure: BigDecimal throughout, explicit rounding
return principal.multiply(rate)
.setScale(2, RoundingMode.HALF_UP);
}
| --- a/InterestService.java
+++ b/InterestService.java
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
- return BigDecimal.valueOf(principal * rate);
+ return principal.multiply(rate)
+ .setScale(2, RoundingMode.HALF_UP);
| Binary floating point cannot represent decimal currency exactly, introducing drift. | Repeated calculations accumulate cents of error, enabling arbitrage or loss. | Incorrect balances, financial discrepancy. | Use BigDecimal (or integer minor units) with explicit rounding for all money. | Never use float/double for currency; use BigDecimal with scale. | [
"fintech",
"spring",
"java",
"rounding"
] | {
"domain": "Banking",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000397 | Kotlin | Android | Insecure logging of secrets | An app logs sensitive data to logcat. | A09:2021 - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures | CWE-532 | T1552 - Unsecured Credentials | Medium | Beginner | Log.d("auth", "token=$token") // Vulnerable: leaks to logcat\ | // Never log secrets; use redacted identifiers\nLog.d("auth", "tokenSet=true") // Secure: no secret\ | --- a/Auth.kt\n+++ b/Auth.kt\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-Log.d("auth", "token=$token")\n+Log.d("auth", "tokenSet=true")\ | Secrets in logs. | Read logcat for tokens. | Credential leak. | Don't log secrets. | Redact sensitive logs. | [
"logging",
"kotlin",
"android",
"secrets"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "device",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000322 | Go | Gin | Verbose error leak in response | A Go handler returns raw error messages including internals. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-209 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Low | Beginner | c.JSON(500, gin.H{"error": err.Error()}) // Vulnerable: leaks internals | c.JSON(500, gin.H{"error": "internal_error"}) // Secure: generic
log.Printf("err: %v", err) | --- a/handler.go
+++ b/handler.go
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
-c.JSON(500, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
+c.JSON(500, gin.H{"error": "internal_error"})
+log.Printf("err: %v", err) | Raw error to client. | Extract stack/paths from errors. | Info disclosure. | Generic errors to client. | Log detailed, return generic. | [
"info-leak",
"go",
"gin",
"error-handling"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | ||
SCP-000037 | Rust | Actix | Revealing error in HTTP response | An Actix handler returns internal error strings (including DB errors) to the client. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-209 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Low | Beginner | async fn create(req: web::Json<Item>) -> impl Responder {
match repo.insert(&req.0) {
Ok(id) => HttpResponse::Ok().json(id),
// Vulnerable: leaks DB error text
Err(e) => HttpResponse::InternalServerError().body(e.to_string()),
}
}
| async fn create(req: web::Json<Item>) -> impl Responder {
match repo.insert(&req.0) {
Ok(id) => HttpResponse::Ok().json(id),
Err(e) => {
log::error!("insert failed: {:?}", e); // server-only
HttpResponse::InternalServerError().json(serde_json::json!({"error":"internal"}))
... | --- a/item.rs
+++ b/item.rs
@@ -4,3 +4,5 @@
- Err(e) => HttpResponse::InternalServerError().body(e.to_string()),
+ Err(e) => { log::error!("insert failed: {:?}", e);
+ HttpResponse::InternalServerError().json(json!({"error":"internal"})) }
| Internal error details are returned verbatim, exposing schema and internals. | Trigger a DB error to learn table/column names and stack context. | Information disclosure that aids further attacks. | Log details server-side; return generic error messages to clients. | Return safe error codes; log the details where operators can see them. | [
"info-leak",
"rust",
"actix",
"error-handling"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | ||
SCP-000342 | C# | ASP.NET Core | Missing antiforgery on POST | A POST action has no antiforgery token validation. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-352 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Beginner | [HttpPost("update")]\npublic IActionResult Update(Profile p) { repo.Save(p); return Ok(); } // Vulnerable: no CSRF\ | [HttpPost("update")]\n[ValidateAntiForgeryToken] // Secure\npublic IActionResult Update(Profile p) { repo.Save(p); return Ok(); }\ | --- a/ProfileController.cs\n+++ b/ProfileController.cs\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n+[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]\n [HttpPost("update")]\n public IActionResult Update(Profile p) { repo.Save(p); return Ok(); }\ | No CSRF token on POST. | Cross-site POST forges update. | Unauthorized change. | Add antiforgery token. | Protect state changes. | [
"csrf",
"csharp",
"aspnet",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "form_field",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000360 | PHP | Laravel | XML external entity | A controller parses XML with external entity resolution on. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-611 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | $xml = simplexml_load_string($body, "SimpleXMLElement", LIBXML_NOENT); // Vulnerable: XXE\ | libxml_disable_entity_loader(true);\n$xml = simplexml_load_string($body, "SimpleXMLElement", LIBXML_NONET); // Secure\ | --- a/XmlController.php\n+++ b/XmlController.php\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-$xml = simplexml_load_string($body, "SimpleXMLElement", LIBXML_NOENT);\n+libxml_disable_entity_loader(true);\n+$xml = simplexml_load_string($body, "SimpleXMLElement", LIBXML_NONET);\ | External entities enabled. | DOCTYPE reads files / SSRF. | File disclosure. | Disable entities. | Harden XML parsing. | [
"xxe",
"php",
"laravel",
"xml"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000451 | Python | FastAPI | GraphQL introspection in prod | FastAPI GraphQL leaves introspection on in production. | A05:2021 - Misconfiguration | CWE-215 | T1190 | Low | Beginner | app.add_route("/graphql", graphql_view(schema)) | app.add_route("/graphql", graphql_view(schema, introspection=DEBUG)) | --- a/graphql.py
+++ b/graphql.py
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-app.add_route("/graphql", graphql_view(schema))
+app.add_route("/graphql", graphql_view(schema, introspection=DEBUG)) | Introspection exposed. | Map full schema for attacks. | Info disclosure. | Disable introspection in prod. | Limit GraphQL introspection. | [
"graphql",
"fastapi",
"python",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | ||
SCP-000137 | PHP | Laravel | File upload with executable extension | A Laravel upload stores .php files in a web-accessible dir, enabling RCE. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | CWE-434 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Critical | Intermediate | public function up(Request $r) {
$r->file('f')->storeAs('public', $r->file('f')->getClientOriginalName()); // Vulnerable
} | public function up(Request $r) {
$f = $r->file('f');
if (!in_array($f->extension(), ['jpg','png','pdf'])) abort(415); // Secure
$f->storeAs('private', Str::random(40).'.'.$f->extension());
} | --- a/UploadController.php
+++ b/UploadController.php
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
- $r->file('f')->storeAs('public', $r->file('f')->getClientOriginalName());
+ if (!in_array($f->extension(), ['jpg','png','pdf'])) abort(415);
+ $f->storeAs('private', Str::random(40).'.'.$f->extension()); | Untrusted extension stored in public path enables webshell. | Upload shell.php and request it for RCE. | Remote code execution. | Allowlist extensions; randomize names; store outside webroot. | Validate extension; store uploads outside webroot. | [
"file-upload",
"laravel",
"php",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "form_field",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000354 | PHP | Laravel | IDOR on profile update | An update action uses a client-supplied user id. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | CWE-639 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Beginner | $u = User::find($request->input("user_id")); $u->email = ...; // Vulnerable: arbitrary id\ | $u = $request->user(); $u->email = ...; // Secure: current authenticated user\ | --- a/ProfileController.php\n+++ b/ProfileController.php\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-$u = User::find($request->input("user_id")); $u->email = ...;\n+$u = $request->user(); $u->email = ...;\ | Client id not bound to session. | Edit any user by id. | Account takeover. | Use authenticated user. | Bind to session user. | [
"idor",
"php",
"laravel",
"access-control"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000108 | C++ | Embedded | Unencrypted telemetry transmission | An IoT device sends sensor telemetry over plain HTTP, exposing it to interception. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-319 | T1557 - Adversary-in-the-Middle | Medium | Beginner | void send_telemetry(const std::string& data) {
// Vulnerable: plain HTTP
http_post("http://collector/ingest", data);
}
| void send_telemetry(const std::string& data) {
// Secure: HTTPS with cert pinning
https_post("https://collector/ingest", data, COLLECTOR_PINNED_CERT);
}
| --- a/telemetry.cpp
+++ b/telemetry.cpp
@@ -2,4 +2,5 @@
- http_post("http://collector/ingest", data);
+ https_post("https://collector/ingest", data, COLLECTOR_PINNED_CERT);
| Telemetry is transmitted without transport encryption, exposing data in transit. | On-path attacker reads sensor data or injects false telemetry. | Data interception/modification. | Use TLS with certificate pinning for all device communication. | Encrypt all device telemetry with TLS + cert pinning. | [
"iot",
"cpp",
"tls",
"telemetry"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "network",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000182 | PHP | Laravel | Open redirect in Laravel redirect()->to() | A Laravel controller redirects to user input without validation. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 - Phishing | Medium | Beginner | public function go(Request $r) {
return redirect()->to($r->input('url')); // Vulnerable
} | public function go(Request $r) {
$u = $r->input('url','/');
if (!str_starts_with($u,'/') || str_starts_with($u,'//')) $u='/'; // Secure
return redirect()->to($u);
} | --- a/LinkController.php
+++ b/LinkController.php
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
- return redirect()->to($r->input('url'));
+ $u = $r->input('url','/');
+ if (!str_starts_with($u,'/') || str_starts_with($u,'//')) $u='/';
+ return redirect()->to($u); | Unvalidated redirect target. | url=//evil.com phishing. | Phishing. | Allowlist relative paths. | Validate Laravel redirects. | [
"open-redirect",
"laravel",
"php",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000190 | C# | ASP.NET Core | ViewBag XSS in Razor | An ASP.NET Core Razor view renders ViewBag content without encoding. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-79 | T1059.007 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | Medium | Beginner | @* Vulnerable: raw HTML *@
<div>@Html.Raw(ViewBag.Comment)</div> | @* Secure: encoded *@
<div>@ViewBag.Comment</div> | --- a/Views/Home/Index.cshtml
+++ b/Views/Home/Index.cshtml
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-<div>@Html.Raw(ViewBag.Comment)</div>
+<div>@ViewBag.Comment</div> | Html.Raw disables encoding on user data. | Comment=<script>steal()</script> runs. | Stored XSS. | Use default encoded output; avoid Html.Raw on user data. | Avoid Html.Raw on user input. | [
"xss",
"aspnet",
"csharp",
"razor"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "db",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000084 | Go | gRPC | Unbounded gRPC message size (DoS) | A gRPC server accepts arbitrarily large messages with no MaxRecvMsgSize limit. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-770 | T1499 - Endpoint Denial of Service | Medium | Intermediate | s := grpc.NewServer() // Vulnerable: default 4MB; raised nowhere, but no limit set
pb.RegisterSvcServer(s, &Server{})
| s := grpc.NewServer(
grpc.MaxRecvMsgSize(4 * 1024 * 1024),
grpc.MaxConcurrentStreams(100))
pb.RegisterSvcServer(s, &Server{})
| --- a/server.go
+++ b/server.go
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
-s := grpc.NewServer()
+s := grpc.NewServer(
+ grpc.MaxRecvMsgSize(4 * 1024 * 1024),
+ grpc.MaxConcurrentStreams(100))
| No explicit upper bound on inbound message size or concurrency invites memory exhaustion. | Client streams huge payloads to exhaust server memory. | Denial of service. | Set MaxRecvMsgSize and MaxConcurrentStreams explicitly. | Bound gRPC message size and stream concurrency. | [
"dos",
"grpc",
"go",
"resource-exhaustion"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "rpc",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000187 | Python | FastAPI | CORS allow credentials with wildcard origin | A FastAPI CORS config allows all origins with credentials. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-942 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Beginner | app.add_middleware(CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=['*'], allow_credentials=True) # Vulnerable | app.add_middleware(CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=['https://app.example.com'], allow_credentials=True) # Secure | --- a/main.py
+++ b/main.py
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
- allow_origins=['*'], allow_credentials=True
+ allow_origins=['https://app.example.com'], allow_credentials=True | Wildcard origin with credentials. | Malicious site reads responses with victim cookies. | Cross-origin data theft. | Pin origins; never '*' with credentials. | Restrict CORS origins. | [
"cors",
"fastapi",
"python",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "header",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000336 | C# | ASP.NET Core | Open redirect | A returnUrl param is used directly in a redirect. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 - Phishing | Medium | Beginner | return Redirect(returnUrl); // Vulnerable: unvalidated\ | if (Url.IsLocalUrl(returnUrl)) return Redirect(returnUrl); // Secure\nreturn RedirectToAction("Index");\ | --- a/AccountController.cs\n+++ b/AccountController.cs\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-return Redirect(returnUrl);\n+if (Url.IsLocalUrl(returnUrl)) return Redirect(returnUrl);\n+return RedirectToAction("Index");\ | Unvalidated redirect. | returnUrl=//evil.com phishing. | Phishing. | Use IsLocalUrl. | Validate redirects. | [
"open-redirect",
"csharp",
"aspnet",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000243 | Ruby | Rails | Insecure comparison of session token | A Rails app compares tokens with == allowing timing attacks. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-208 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | Low | Intermediate | def valid?(t); t == session[:token]; end # Vulnerable: timing | def valid?(t)
ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.secure_compare(t, session[:token]) # Secure
end | --- a/session.rb
+++ b/session.rb
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
-def valid?(t); t == session[:token]; end
+def valid?(t)
+ ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.secure_compare(t, session[:token])
+end | Non-constant-time comparison. | Brute-force token via timing. | Token recovery. | Use secure_compare. | Use constant-time comparison. | [
"crypto",
"rails",
"ruby",
"timing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "cookie",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | ||
SCP-000436 | Go | Gin | Race condition on balance | Transfer handler updates balance without locking. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API3:2023 | CWE-362 | T1190 | High | Advanced | acc.Balance -= amt // concurrent double-spend | tx := db.Begin(); defer tx.Rollback()
tx.Model(&acc).Where("balance >= ?", amt).
Update("balance", gorm.Expr("balance - ?", amt))
tx.Commit() // atomic | --- a/transfer.go
+++ b/transfer.go
@@ -1,2 +1,5 @@
-acc.Balance -= amt
+tx := db.Begin(); defer tx.Rollback()
+tx.Model(&acc).Where("balance >= ?", amt).
+ Update("balance", gorm.Expr("balance - ?", amt))
+tx.Commit() | Unlocked shared mutation. | Double-spend via concurrent requests. | Financial loss. | Use DB transactions. | Protect financial state. | [
"race-condition",
"fintech",
"banking",
"concurrency"
] | {
"domain": "Banking",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000429 | YAML | Kubernetes | RBAC cluster-admin binding | A ServiceAccount is bound to cluster-admin. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-269 | T1078 - Valid Accounts | Critical | Intermediate | kind: ClusterRoleBinding\nsubjects:\n- kind: ServiceAccount\n name: app\nroleRef:\n kind: ClusterRole\n name: cluster-admin # Vulnerable\ | kind: RoleBinding\n# bind only the verbs needed in the namespace\nroleRef:\n kind: Role\n name: app-role # Secure: least privilege\ | --- a/rbac.yaml\n+++ b/rbac.yaml\n@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@\n-kind: ClusterRoleBinding\nsubjects:\n- kind: ServiceAccount\n name: app\n-roleRef:\n kind: ClusterRole\n name: cluster-admin\n+kind: RoleBinding\n+roleRef:\n+ kind: Role\n+ name: app-role\ | Over-privileged RBAC. | SA abused for cluster control. | Cluster compromise. | Least-privilege RBAC. | Minimize RBAC scope. | [
"kubernetes",
"yaml",
"rbac",
"privilege"
] | {
"domain": "Kubernetes",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000052 | Ruby | Rails | Mass assignment via update_attributes | A Rails action updates a model from the whole params hash, allowing role escalation. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization | CWE-915 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Beginner | def update
@user = User.find(params[:id])
# Vulnerable: mass assignment of all params
@user.update_attributes(params[:user])
end
| def update
@user = User.find(params[:id])
# Secure: permit only intended fields
@user.update(user_params)
end
private
def user_params
params.require(:user).permit(:display_name, :bio, :avatar_url)
end
| --- a/app/controllers/users_controller.rb
+++ b/app/controllers/users_controller.rb
@@ -3,4 +3,10 @@
- @user.update_attributes(params[:user])
+ @user.update(user_params)
+private
+def user_params
+ params.require(:user).permit(:display_name, :bio, :avatar_url)
+end
| All request fields are bound to the model, including admin-only attributes like role. | POST user[role]=admin escalates privileges. | Privilege escalation. | Use strong parameters to allowlist assignable fields. | Always use strong parameters; never update from raw params. | [
"mass-assignment",
"rails",
"ruby",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000459 | JavaScript | Express | No authorization on admin route | Express admin route lacks role middleware. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - BOLA | CWE-862 | T1190 | Critical | Intermediate | app.delete("/admin/user/:id", (req, res) =>
repo.remove(req.params.id)); | app.delete("/admin/user/:id", requireAdmin, (req, res) =>
repo.remove(req.params.id)); | --- a/admin.js
+++ b/admin.js
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-app.delete("/admin/user/:id", (req, res) =>
- repo.remove(req.params.id));
+app.delete("/admin/user/:id", requireAdmin, (req, res) =>
+ repo.remove(req.params.id)); | No role middleware. | Any user deletes accounts. | Privilege escalation. | Add role middleware. | Enforce admin authz. | [
"authorization",
"express",
"node",
"broken-access-control"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "path_param",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000417 | YAML | Kubernetes | Container running as root | A Pod does not set runAsNonRoot / runAsUser. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-250 | T1611 - Escape to Host | High | Beginner | securityContext: {} # Vulnerable: runs as root (uid 0)\ | securityContext:\n runAsNonRoot: true\n runAsUser: 1000\n runAsGroup: 3000 # Secure\ | --- a/deploy.yaml\n+++ b/deploy.yaml\n@@ -1,2 +1,5 @@\n-securityContext: {}\n+securityContext:\n+ runAsNonRoot: true\n+ runAsUser: 1000\n+ runAsGroup: 3000\ | Root container. | Root in container eases escape. | Host compromise. | runAsNonRoot. | Non-root containers. | [
"kubernetes",
"yaml",
"privilege",
"container"
] | {
"domain": "Kubernetes",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000149 | Python | FastAPI | MCP tool lacks input validation (excessive agency) | A Model Context Protocol tool accepts free-form shell params from the agent without validation. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | LLM06:2025 - Excessive Agency | CWE-20 | T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter | High | Advanced | @mcp.tool()
def run_query(sql: str) -> str:
# Vulnerable: agent-supplied SQL run as admin
return db.admin_execute(sql) | @mcp.tool()
@requires_permission('db:readonly')
def run_query(sql: str, ctx: AuthCtx) -> str:
if not _is_select(sql): raise ValueError('only SELECT') # Secure
return db.readonly_execute(sql, tenant=ctx.tenant) | --- a/mcp_tools.py
+++ b/mcp_tools.py
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-@mcp.tool()
def run_query(sql: str) -> str:
- return db.admin_execute(sql)
+@mcp.tool()
+@requires_permission('db:readonly')
def run_query(sql: str, ctx: AuthCtx) -> str:
+ if not _is_select(sql): raise ValueError('only SELECT')
+ return db.readonly_execute(sql,... | Agent tool runs arbitrary SQL as admin with no validation or scoping. | A prompt-injected agent issues DROP TABLE via the tool. | Mass data loss via excessive agency. | Validate SQL (SELECT-only), scope by tenant, require permission. | Constrain agent tools; validate and scope; require permissions. | [
"mcp",
"excessive-agency",
"fastapi",
"llm"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "agent",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
SCP-000117 | PHP | Laravel | SQL injection via raw query | A Laravel controller uses a raw DB statement with interpolated input. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-89 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | public function search(Request $r) {
$q = $r->input('q');
// Vulnerable
return DB::select("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '$q'");
} | public function search(Request $r) {
$q = $r->input('q');
// Secure: bindings
return DB::select('SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?', [$q]);
} | --- a/SearchController.php
+++ b/SearchController.php
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
- return DB::select("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '$q'");
+ return DB::select('SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?', [$q]); | Raw SQL with concatenation. | q=' OR '1'='1 dumps rows. | Data disclosure. | Use parameter bindings. | Bind all params in raw queries. | [
"sqli",
"laravel",
"php",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000349 | PHP | Laravel | Missing authorization on admin route | An admin route has no middleware check. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | CWE-862 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Critical | Intermediate | Route::delete("/admin/user/{id}", [Admin::class, "delete"]); // Vulnerable: no middleware\ | Route::delete("/admin/user/{id}", [Admin::class, "delete"])->middleware("can:admin"); // Secure\ | --- a/routes/web.php\n+++ b/routes/web.php\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-Route::delete("/admin/user/{id}", [Admin::class, "delete"]);\n+Route::delete("/admin/user/{id}", [Admin::class, "delete"])->middleware("can:admin");\ | No authz middleware. | Any user deletes accounts. | Privilege escalation. | Add middleware. | Enforce admin authz. | [
"authorization",
"php",
"laravel",
"broken-access-control"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "path_param",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000024 | Go | Gin | Insecure file upload (no type/size check) | A Gin upload handler writes the file to disk using the client filename with no validation. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | CWE-434 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | func upload(c *gin.Context) {
f, _ := c.FormFile("file")
// Vulnerable: trusts client filename, no size/type check
c.SaveUploadedFile(f, "/uploads/" + f.Filename)
c.JSON(200, gin.H{"saved": f.Filename})
}
| const maxBytes = 5 << 20
func upload(c *gin.Context) {
f, err := c.FormFile("file")
if err != nil { c.Status(400); return }
if f.Size > maxBytes { c.Status(413); return }
// Secure: generate safe name, restrict extension, store outside webroot
if !strings.HasSuffix(f.Filename, ".png") { c.Status(415... | --- a/upload.go
+++ b/upload.go
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
+const maxBytes = 5 << 20
- c.SaveUploadedFile(f, "/uploads/" + f.Filename)
+ if f.Size > maxBytes || !strings.HasSuffix(f.Filename, ".png") { c.Status(400); return }
+ name := filepath.Join("/safe/uploads", uuid.NewString()+".png")
+ c.SaveUploadedFile(f, na... | Uploads accept arbitrary names/types/sizes, enabling overwrite, webshell drop, or disk exhaustion. | Upload shell.php with a crafted multipart name, then request it to achieve RCE. | RCE, storage exhaustion, or overwrite of existing files. | Validate size, MIME/extension allowlist, generate random server-side names, store outside webroot. | Allowlist types, cap size, randomize names, serve uploads with no execution context. | [
"file-upload",
"gin",
"go",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "form_field",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000036 | Rust | Actix | Command injection via shell string | A Rust service builds a shell command from user input and runs it via sh -c. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-78 | T1059.004 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell | Critical | Intermediate | use std::process::Command;
fn convert(input: &str) -> String {
// Vulnerable: input interpolated into shell
let out = Command::new("sh")
.arg("-c")
.arg(format!("convert {} out.png", input))
.output()
.unwrap();
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).into_owned()
}
| use std::process::Command;
fn convert(input: &str) -> std::io::Result<String> {
// Secure: no shell, pass args as separate vector elements
let out = Command::new("convert")
.arg(input)
.arg("out.png")
.output()?;
Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).into_owned())
}
| --- a/convert.rs
+++ b/convert.rs
@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
- let out = Command::new("sh").arg("-c")
- .arg(format!("convert {} out.png", input)).output().unwrap();
+ let out = Command::new("convert").arg(input).arg("out.png").output()?;
| User input is passed to a shell via string interpolation, allowing metacharacter injection. | input = a.png; rm -rf / executes arbitrary commands on the host. | Remote code execution. | Avoid shells; pass arguments as a vector and validate inputs. | Use argument vectors, never sh -c with untrusted data; validate inputs. | [
"command-injection",
"rust",
"actix",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "Serverless",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000371 | Rust | Actix | XSS via raw HTML response | An Actix handler returns user input as text/html without escaping. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-79 | T1059.007 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | Medium | Beginner | HttpResponse::Ok().content_type("text/html").body(format!("<div>{}</div>", comment)) // Vulnerable\ | let esc = html_escape::encode_text(&comment); // Secure: escape\nHttpResponse::Ok().content_type("text/html").body(format!("<div>{}</div>", esc))\ | --- a/post.rs\n+++ b/post.rs\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-HttpResponse::Ok().content_type("text/html").body(format!("<div>{}</div>", comment))\n+let esc = html_escape::encode_text(&comment);\n+HttpResponse::Ok().content_type("text/html").body(format!("<div>{}</div>", esc))\ | Unescaped HTML in body. | comment=<script>steal()</script> runs. | XSS. | Escape output. | Escape user HTML. | [
"xss",
"rust",
"actix",
"template"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "db",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000099 | YAML | Kubernetes | Image pulled from unpinned tag (latest) | A Deployment references an image by mutable :latest tag, enabling supply-chain drift. | A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures | CWE-494 | T1195.001 - Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies | High | Beginner | spec:
containers:
- name: app
image: registry/app:latest # Vulnerable: mutable tag
| spec:
containers:
- name: app
image: registry/app@sha256:9f86d0818... # Secure: digest-pinned
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
| --- a/deploy.yaml
+++ b/deploy.yaml
@@ -3,4 +3,5 @@
- image: registry/app:latest
+ image: registry/app@sha256:9f86d0818...
+ imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
| Mutable image tags let an attacker-controlled rebuild run as the same deployment. | Attacker pushes a malicious :latest; the next rollout runs it. | Supply-chain compromise of workloads. | Pin images by immutable digest and verify signatures (cosign). | Pin images by sha256 digest; sign and verify with cosign. | [
"kubernetes",
"supply-chain",
"yaml",
"image"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000306 | Go | Gin | SQL injection in raw query | A Gin handler builds a SQL query by string formatting. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-89 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | q := fmt.Sprintf("SELECT * FROM u WHERE name = '%s'", name)
rows, _ := db.Query(q) // Vulnerable | rows, _ := db.Query("SELECT * FROM u WHERE name = $1", name) // Secure: bound | --- a/handler.go
+++ b/handler.go
@@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
-q := fmt.Sprintf("SELECT * FROM u WHERE name = '%s'", name)
-rows, _ := db.Query(q)
+rows, _ := db.Query("SELECT * FROM u WHERE name = $1", name) | String formatting into SQL. | name=' OR 1=1 dumps rows. | Data disclosure. | Use bound parameters. | Bind all SQL params. | [
"sqli",
"go",
"gin",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000186 | JavaScript | GraphQL | GraphQL depth bombing (DoS) | A GraphQL server has no query depth limit, allowing nested queries that exhaust CPU. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-770 | T1499 - Endpoint Denial of Service | Medium | Intermediate | const server = new ApolloServer({ typeDefs, resolvers }); // Vulnerable: no depth limit | import { createComplexityLimitRule } from 'graphql-validation-complexity';
const server = new ApolloServer({
typeDefs, resolvers,
validationRules: [createComplexityLimitRule(1000)] // Secure
}); | --- a/graphql/server.js
+++ b/graphql/server.js
@@ -1,2 +1,5 @@
-const server = new ApolloServer({ typeDefs, resolvers });
+import { createComplexityLimitRule } from 'graphql-validation-complexity';
+const server = new ApolloServer({
+ typeDefs, resolvers,
+ validationRules: [createComplexityLimitRule(1000)]
+}); | No depth/complexity limit lets attackers craft expensive queries. | Deeply nested query consumes all CPU. | Denial of service. | Enforce query depth/complexity limits. | Limit GraphQL query depth/complexity. | [
"graphql",
"dos",
"javascript",
"resource-exhaustion"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "query",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000327 | C# | ASP.NET Core | Command injection via Process.Start | A controller runs a shell command with user input. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-78 | T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter | High | Intermediate | Process.Start("cmd.exe", "/c ping " + host); // Vulnerable: shell\ | if (!Regex.IsMatch(host, @"^[\w.-]+$")) return BadRequest();\nProcess.Start("ping", "-c1 " + host); // Secure: validate + arg\ | --- a/PingController.cs\n+++ b/PingController.cs\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-Process.Start("cmd.exe", "/c ping " + host);\n+if (!Regex.IsMatch(host, @"^[\w.-]+$")) return BadRequest();\n+Process.Start("ping", "-c1 " + host);\ | Shell string with user input. | host=;del /F /Q * executes. | Command injection. | Validate + arg array. | Avoid shell interpolation. | [
"command-injection",
"csharp",
"aspnet",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000332 | C# | ASP.NET Core | No rate limit on login | A login action has no throttling. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-307 | T1110 - Brute Force | Medium | Beginner | [HttpPost("login")]\npublic IActionResult Login(Login m) { return Ok(auth(m)); } // Vulnerable: no throttle\ | [HttpPost("login")]\n[EnableRateLimiting("login")] // Secure\npublic IActionResult Login(Login m) { return Ok(auth(m)); }\ | --- a/AuthController.cs\n+++ b/AuthController.cs\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n+[EnableRateLimiting("login")]\n [HttpPost("login")]\n public IActionResult Login(Login m) { return Ok(auth(m)); }\ | No throttle on auth. | Brute force credentials. | Account takeover. | Rate limit login. | Throttle auth endpoints. | [
"rate-limiting",
"csharp",
"aspnet",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000151 | Python | Flask | Header injection via Set-Cookie CRLF | A Flask route sets a cookie value from input without CRLF sanitization. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-93 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | @app.route('/set')
def set_c():
theme = request.args.get('theme','light')
resp = make_response('ok')
resp.set_cookie('theme', theme) # Vulnerable if theme has CRLF
return resp | @app.route('/set')
def set_c():
theme = request.args.get('theme','light')
if not re.fullmatch(r'[a-z]+', theme or ''): theme='light' # Secure
resp = make_response('ok')
resp.set_cookie('theme', theme)
return resp | --- a/cookie.py
+++ b/cookie.py
@@ -3,5 +3,6 @@
- resp.set_cookie('theme', theme)
+ if not re.fullmatch(r'[a-z]+', theme or ''): theme='light'
+ resp.set_cookie('theme', theme) | Cookie value from input may contain CRLF, injecting headers. | theme=light%0d%0aSet-Cookie:admin=1 injects a header. | Header injection, response splitting. | Validate cookie values; strip CRLF. | Validate header/cookie values; strip CRLF. | [
"header-injection",
"flask",
"python",
"crlf"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000293 | Scala | Akka HTTP | Path traversal in static route | An Akka HTTP route serves files from a user path. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-22 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | path("files" / Segment) { name =>
getFromFile("/data/" + name) // Vulnerable: traversal
} | path("files" / Segment) { name =>
val safe = Paths.get("/data").resolve(name).normalize()
if (!safe.startsWith(Paths.get("/data"))) reject else getFromFile(safe.toFile) // Secure
} | --- a/StaticRoutes.scala
+++ b/StaticRoutes.scala
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
- getFromFile("/data/" + name)
+ val safe = Paths.get("/data").resolve(name).normalize()
+ if (!safe.startsWith(Paths.get("/data"))) reject
+ else getFromFile(safe.toFile) | Unsanitized filename. | name=../../etc/passwd reads file. | File disclosure. | Confine to base dir. | Confine file paths. | [
"path-traversal",
"scala",
"akka",
"file-read"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "path_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000041 | JavaScript | Express | Prototype pollution via deep merge | An Express route deep-merges user JSON into a config object, allowing prototype pollution. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-1321 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Advanced | function deepMerge(target, src) {
for (const k in src) {
if (typeof src[k] === 'object') target[k] = deepMerge(target[k]||{}, src[k]);
else target[k] = src[k];
}
return target;
}
app.post('/config', (req,res)=>{ config = deepMerge(config, req.body); res.json(config); });
| function deepMerge(target, src) {
for (const k of Object.keys(src)) {
if (k === '__proto__' || k === 'constructor' || k === 'prototype') continue;
if (src[k] && typeof src[k] === 'object' && !Array.isArray(src[k])) {
target[k] = deepMerge(target[k] || {}, src[k]);
} else target[k] = src[k];
}
re... | --- a/merge.js
+++ b/merge.js
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
- for (const k in src) {
+ for (const k of Object.keys(src)) {
+ if (k === '__proto__' || k === 'constructor' || k === 'prototype') continue;
| Recursive merge copies __proto__ keys, polluting Object.prototype for all objects. | Send {"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true}} to inject properties into every object. | Logic bypass, RCE in some frameworks, or DoS. | Reject __proto__/constructor/prototype keys; use a vetted merge utility. | Block prototype keys in any recursive merge of untrusted input. | [
"prototype-pollution",
"express",
"javascript",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000194 | Go | gRPC | gRPC method allows unauthenticated delete | A gRPC Delete method has no auth interceptor. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | CWE-306 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Critical | Intermediate | func (s *S) Delete(ctx context.Context, r *pb.Id) (*pb.Empty, error) {
return &pb.Empty{}, s.repo.Delete(r.Id) // Vulnerable
} | func (s *S) Delete(ctx context.Context, r *pb.Id) (*pb.Empty, error) {
if !isAdmin(ctx) { return nil, status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "forbidden") } // Secure
return &pb.Empty{}, s.repo.Delete(r.Id)
} | --- a/server.go
+++ b/server.go
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
- return &pb.Empty{}, s.repo.Delete(r.Id)
+ if !isAdmin(ctx) { return nil, status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "forbidden") }
+ return &pb.Empty{}, s.repo.Delete(r.Id) | No auth on destructive method. | Unauthenticated delete wipes data. | Data loss. | Enforce auth in interceptor/method. | Authorize destructive gRPC methods. | [
"grpc",
"go",
"authorization",
"broken-access-control"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "rpc",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000064 | C | POSIX | Integer overflow in allocation size | A C program multiplies user-controlled counts without overflow checks before malloc. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-190 | T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution | High | Advanced | #include <stdlib.h>
void *make(size_t n, size_t sz) {
// Vulnerable: unchecked multiplication
return malloc(n * sz);
}
| #include <stdlib.h>
void *make(size_t n, size_t sz) {
// Secure: checked multiplication
size_t total;
if (__builtin_mul_overflow(n, sz, &total)) return NULL;
return malloc(total);
}
| --- a/alloc.c
+++ b/alloc.c
@@ -2,4 +2,6 @@
- return malloc(n * sz);
+ size_t total;
+ if (__builtin_mul_overflow(n, sz, &total)) return NULL;
+ return malloc(total);
| Unchecked multiplication can wrap, allocating a tiny buffer for huge input. | n*sz wraps to a small value, then out-of-bounds write corrupts heap. | Heap overflow, potential code execution. | Use checked arithmetic (e.g. __builtin_mul_overflow) before allocating. | Check integer operations before using them as allocation sizes. | [
"integer-overflow",
"c",
"memory-safety"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "argv",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000285 | C++ | STD | Improper TLS certificate verification | A C++ TLS client disables peer verification. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-295 | T1557 - Adversary-in-the-Middle | Critical | Advanced | ctx->set_verify_mode(boost::asio::ssl::verify_none); // Vulnerable | ctx->set_verify_mode(boost::asio::ssl::verify_peer); // Secure
ctx->set_default_verify_paths(); | --- a/tls.cpp
+++ b/tls.cpp
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
-ctx->set_verify_mode(boost::asio::ssl::verify_none);
+ctx->set_verify_mode(boost::asio::ssl::verify_peer);
+ctx->set_default_verify_paths(); | Verification disabled. | MITM intercepts TLS. | Credential/data theft. | Enable peer verify. | Always verify TLS. | [
"tls",
"cpp",
"mitm"
] | {
"domain": "Banking",
"input_source": "network",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000246 | Ruby | Rails | Open redirect in redirect_to | A Rails action redirects to a param without validation. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 - Phishing | Medium | Beginner | def go
redirect_to params[:url] # Vulnerable
end | def go
url = params[:url]
redirect_to (url if url&.start_with?("/")) || root_path # Secure
end | --- a/links_controller.rb
+++ b/links_controller.rb
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-def go
redirect_to params[:url]
+ url = params[:url]
+ redirect_to (url if url&.start_with?("/")) || root_path | Unvalidated redirect target. | url=//evil.com phishing. | Phishing. | Allowlist relative paths. | Validate redirects. | [
"open-redirect",
"rails",
"ruby",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000384 | Rust | Actix | File upload without type check | An upload stores any content type. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | CWE-434 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | std::fs::write(format!("/up/{}", fname), data)?; // Vulnerable: any type\ | if ct != "image/png" && ct != "image/jpeg" { return Err(...); } // Secure\nlet name = format!("{}.png", Uuid::new_v4());\nstd::fs::write(format!("/up/{}", name), data)?;\ | --- a/upload.rs\n+++ b/upload.rs\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\n-std::fs::write(format!("/up/{}", fname), data)?;\n+if ct != "image/png" && ct != "image/jpeg" { return Err(...); }\n+let name = format!("{}.png", Uuid::new_v4());\n+std::fs::write(format!("/up/{}", name), data)?;\ | No type validation. | Upload .rs/.sh webshell. | RCE. | Allowlist types; randomize. | Validate uploads. | [
"file-upload",
"rust",
"actix",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "form_field",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000023 | Go | Gin | Race condition in balance transfer | A Gin handler updates an account balance with a read-modify-write that is not atomic. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization | CWE-362 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Advanced | func transfer(c *gin.Context) {
acct := load(c.Query("acct"))
amt := parse(c.Query("amt"))
// Vulnerable: non-atomic read-modify-write
acct.Balance = acct.Balance - amt
save(acct)
c.JSON(200, acct)
}
| func transfer(c *gin.Context) {
acctID := c.Query("acct")
amt := parse(c.Query("amt"))
// Secure: DB-level atomic update with constraint
rows, err := db.Exec(
`UPDATE accounts SET balance = balance - $1
WHERE id=$2 AND balance >= $1`, amt, acctID)
if err != nil || rows == 0 { c.Stat... | --- a/transfer.go
+++ b/transfer.go
@@ -2,7 +2,10 @@
- acct.Balance = acct.Balance - amt
- save(acct)
+ rows, err := db.Exec(
+ `UPDATE accounts SET balance = balance - $1 WHERE id=$2 AND balance >= $1`, amt, acctID)
+ if err != nil || rows == 0 { c.Status(409); return }
| Concurrent requests interleave read-modify-write, allowing the same balance to be spent twice. | Send two near-simultaneous transfers; both pass the balance check before either writes. | Double-spend / inconsistent financial state. | Perform the update atomically in the database with a conditional constraint and transactions. | Use DB transactions and conditional updates; never trust in-memory read-modify-write for money. | [
"race-condition",
"gin",
"go",
"banking"
] | {
"domain": "Banking",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000136 | Go | Gin | Insecure cookie SameSite none with HTTP | A Gin handler sets SameSite=None without Secure, exposing CSRF. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-614 | T1539 - Steal Web Session Cookie | Medium | Beginner | c.SetCookie("sid", t, 3600, "/", "", false, false) # Vulnerable: not Secure
c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteNoneMode) | c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode) # Secure
c.SetCookie("sid", t, 3600, "/", "", true, true) | --- a/auth.go
+++ b/auth.go
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-c.SetCookie("sid", t, 3600, "/", "", false, false)
-c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteNoneMode)
+c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode)
+c.SetCookie("sid", t, 3600, "/", "", true, true) | SameSite=None without Secure lets cookies ride insecure requests. | Network attacker reads the cookie over HTTP. | Session theft. | Use Secure + HttpOnly; prefer Lax unless cross-site needed. | Pair SameSite with Secure; prefer Lax. | [
"session",
"gin",
"go",
"cookies"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "cookie",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000320 | Go | Gin | Unsafe reflection by name | A Go handler instantiates a type from a request param. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-470 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Advanced | typ := reflect.TypeOf(structs[req.FormValue("t")]) // Vulnerable: arbitrary
obj := reflect.New(typ).Interface() | ALLOWED := map[string]bool{"A": true, "B": true}
if !ALLOWED[req.FormValue("t")] { c.AbortWithStatus(400); return } // Secure | --- a/handler.go
+++ b/handler.go
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-typ := reflect.TypeOf(structs[req.FormValue("t")])
-obj := reflect.New(typ).Interface()
+ALLOWED := map[string]bool{"A": true, "B": true}
+if !ALLOWED[req.FormValue("t")] { c.AbortWithStatus(400); return } | Unrestricted reflection. | Pick unexpected type for abuse. | Logic abuse / RCE. | Allowlist reflectable types. | Restrict reflection. | [
"injection",
"go",
"gin",
"reflection"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "form_field",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000177 | Ruby | Rails | SQL injection via .order with params | A Rails controller orders by a raw request param, enabling injection. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-89 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | def index
@users = User.order(params[:sort]) # Vulnerable: raw column
end | ALLOWED = %w[name email created_at].freeze
def index
col = ALLOWED.include?(params[:sort]) ? params[:sort] : 'created_at' # Secure
@users = User.order(col)
end | --- a/users_controller.rb
+++ b/users_controller.rb
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-def index
@users = User.order(params[:sort])
+ col = ALLOWED.include?(params[:sort]) ? params[:sort] : 'created_at'
+ @users = User.order(col) | Sort param inserted into ORDER BY without validation. | sort=CASE WHEN... performs blind SQLi. | Data disclosure. | Allowlist sortable columns. | Allowlist ORDER BY columns. | [
"sqli",
"rails",
"ruby",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000184 | C | POSIX | TOCTOU on file permission check | A C program checks file ownership then opens it, allowing swap between checks. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-367 | T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution | High | Advanced | if (access(path, W_OK) == 0) { // Vulnerable: TOCTOU
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
write(fd, buf, n);
} | fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); // Secure: open, then fstat on fd
if (fd >= 0) {
struct stat st; fstat(fd, &st);
if (st.st_uid != getuid()) { close(fd); }
else write(fd, buf, n);
} | --- a/write.c
+++ b/write.c
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
-if (access(path, W_OK) == 0) {
- fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
- write(fd, buf, n);
+fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+if (fd >= 0) {
+ struct stat st; fstat(fd, &st);
+ if (st.st_uid != getuid()) { close(fd); } else write(fd, buf, n);
} | Check-then-open race lets an attacker swap the file. | Swap target with a symlink to a privileged file between access() and open(). | Arbitrary file write. | Operate on the fd; fstat after open. | Avoid TOCTOU; use open + fstat. | [
"toctou",
"c",
"race-condition"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "file",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000050 | Rust | Actix | Unbounded request body (DoS) | An Actix handler reads the entire request body with no size limit, enabling memory exhaustion. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-770 | T1499 - Endpoint Denial of Service | Medium | Intermediate | async fn upload(mut body: web::Payload) -> impl Responder {
// Vulnerable: no max size
let bytes = body.to_bytes_limited(usize::MAX).await.unwrap();
process(&bytes);
HttpResponse::Ok().finish()
}
| async fn upload(mut body: web::Payload) -> impl Responder {
// Secure: cap at 1 MiB
let bytes = match body.to_bytes_limited(1 << 20).await {
Ok(b) => b,
Err(_) => return HttpResponse::PayloadTooLarge().finish(),
};
process(&bytes);
HttpResponse::Ok().finish()
}
| --- a/upload.rs
+++ b/upload.rs
@@ -2,4 +2,7 @@
- let bytes = body.to_bytes_limited(usize::MAX).await.unwrap();
+ let bytes = match body.to_bytes_limited(1 << 20).await {
+ Ok(b) => b,
+ Err(_) => return HttpResponse::PayloadTooLarge().finish(),
+ };
| No limit is enforced on request body size, allowing attackers to exhaust memory. | Send a multi-gigabyte body to crash or slow the service for everyone. | Denial of service via resource exhaustion. | Enforce a strict maximum body size and reject oversized requests early. | Bound all inputs; enforce payload size limits at the edge and per-route. | [
"dos",
"rust",
"actix",
"resource-exhaustion"
] | {
"domain": "Serverless",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000195 | YAML | Kubernetes | Container with added Linux capabilities | A Pod adds CAP_SYS_ADMIN, enabling privilege escalation. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-250 | T1611 - Escape to Host | Critical | Intermediate | securityContext:
capabilities:
add: ["SYS_ADMIN"] # Vulnerable | securityContext:
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"] # Secure
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false | --- a/pod.yaml
+++ b/pod.yaml
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
- add: ["SYS_ADMIN"]
+ drop: ["ALL"]
+ allowPrivilegeEscalation: false | Excess capabilities permit container escape. | SYS_ADMIN lets the container mount host filesystem. | Host compromise. | Drop all capabilities; add only what's required. | Drop capabilities; avoid SYS_ADMIN. | [
"kubernetes",
"privilege",
"yaml",
"container"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000461 | Go | Gin | SSRF in proxy endpoint | Gin proxy fetches arbitrary user URLs. | A10:2021 - SSRF | CWE-918 | T1190 | High | Intermediate | resp, _ := http.Get(c.Query("url")) // SSRF | u, err := url.Parse(c.Query("url"))
if err != nil || !allowlist[u.Host] { c.AbortWithStatus(403); return }
resp, _ := http.Get(u.String()) | --- a/proxy.go
+++ b/proxy.go
@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
-resp, _ := http.Get(c.Query("url"))
+u, err := url.Parse(c.Query("url"))
+if err != nil || !allowlist[u.Host] { c.AbortWithStatus(403); return }
+resp, _ := http.Get(u.String()) | Unvalidated fetch URL. | Fetch cloud metadata. | Metadata theft. | Allowlist hosts. | Validate fetch targets. | [
"ssrf",
"go",
"gin",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "Cloud",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000471 | Go | Gin | Hardcoded JWT secret in Go | Gin service uses hardcoded JWT signing secret. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | API2:2023 | CWE-798 | T1600 | Critical | Intermediate | var jwtSecret = []byte("secret") // brute-forceable | var jwtSecret = []byte(os.Getenv("JWT_SECRET")) // env | --- a/auth.go
+++ b/auth.go
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-var jwtSecret = []byte("secret")
+var jwtSecret = []byte(os.Getenv("JWT_SECRET")) | Weak hardcoded secret. | Forge tokens. | Auth bypass. | Use env secret. | Externalize JWT secret. | [
"jwt",
"go",
"gin",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000173 | YAML | Kubernetes | Service account token automount enabled | A Pod mounts the default service account token, widening blast radius if compromised. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-250 | T1078 - Valid Accounts | Medium | Beginner | spec:
containers:
- name: app
image: app:1.0
# Vulnerable: default token automounted | spec:
automountServiceAccountToken: false # Secure: opt-in only
containers:
- name: app
image: app:1.0
env:
- name: TOKEN
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef: { name: app-token, key: token } | --- a/pod.yaml
+++ b/pod.yaml
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+ automountServiceAccountToken: false
containers:
- name: app
image: app:1.0 | Default SA token automounted gives API access if the pod is compromised. | Compromised app uses the token to call the Kubernetes API. | Lateral movement in the cluster. | Disable automount; use scoped tokens. | Disable SA token automount by default. | [
"kubernetes",
"rbac",
"yaml",
"secrets"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000401 | Swift | iOS | SQL injection in Core Data fetch | An iOS fetch uses a concatenated predicate format. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-89 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | let req = NSFetchRequest<User>(entityName: "User")\nreq.predicate = NSPredicate(format: "name == '\(name)'") // Vulnerable: format injection\ | req.predicate = NSPredicate(format: "name == %@", name) // Secure: bound arg\ | --- a/Store.swift\n+++ b/Store.swift\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-let req = NSFetchRequest<User>(entityName: "User")\n-req.predicate = NSPredicate(format: "name == '\(name)'")\n+req.predicate = NSPredicate(format: "name == %@", name)\ | Predicate format with interpolation. | name=' OR 1=1 bypasses. | Data disclosure. | Use %@ bound args. | Bind all predicates. | [
"sqli",
"swift",
"ios",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000111 | Java | Spring Boot | Open redirect via ModelAndView | A Spring controller returns a user-supplied URL in a redirect. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 - Phishing | Medium | Beginner | @GetMapping("/out")
public String out(@RequestParam String url) {
return "redirect:" + url; // Vulnerable
} | @GetMapping("/out")
public String out(@RequestParam String url) {
if (!url.startsWith("/")) return "redirect:/"; // Secure
return "redirect:" + url;
} | --- a/LinkController.java
+++ b/LinkController.java
@@ -2,4 +2,5 @@
- return "redirect:" + url;
+ if (!url.startsWith("/")) return "redirect:/";
+ return "redirect:" + url; | Redirect target is unvalidated user input. | out?url=//evil.com phishes the user. | Phishing, credential theft. | Allowlist relative same-origin paths. | Validate redirect targets. | [
"open-redirect",
"spring",
"java",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000080 | JavaScript | GraphQL | Broken object level auth in GraphQL resolver | A GraphQL resolver returns a user by id without checking the caller owns it. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | CWE-639 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | const resolvers = {
Query: {
user: (_, { id }) => db.users.find({ id }), // Vulnerable: no owner check
}
};
| const resolvers = {
Query: {
user: (_, { id }, ctx) => {
// Secure: scope to authenticated user
if (id !== ctx.user.id && !ctx.user.isAdmin)
throw new ForbiddenError('no access');
return db.users.find({ id });
}
}
};
| --- a/graphql/resolvers.js
+++ b/graphql/resolvers.js
@@ -2,4 +2,8 @@
- user: (_, { id }) => db.users.find({ id }),
+ user: (_, { id }, ctx) => {
+ if (id !== ctx.user.id && !ctx.user.isAdmin)
+ throw new ForbiddenError('no access');
+ return db.users.find({ id });
+ }
| The resolver trusts the requested id without verifying caller ownership/role. | Caller requests other users' ids to scrape PII. | Cross-user data disclosure. | Enforce object-level authorization in every resolver using the auth context. | Authorize in resolvers by owner/role from the auth context. | [
"idor",
"graphql",
"javascript",
"access-control"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "args",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000445 | Ruby | Rails | Weak JWT secret in Rails | Rails API uses a short, guessable JWT secret. | A07:2021 - Auth Failures | API2:2023 | CWE-345 | T1600 | Critical | Advanced | secret = "secret123" # brute-forceable | secret = ENV["JWT_SECRET"] # 32+ random bytes | --- a/initializers/jwt.rb
+++ b/initializers/jwt.rb
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-secret = "secret123"
+secret = ENV["JWT_SECRET"] | Weak JWT secret. | Brute-force / crack signature. | Auth bypass. | Use strong random secret. | Long random JWT secret. | [
"jwt",
"rails",
"ruby",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000175 | Java | Spring Boot | Unbounded request size (upload DoS) | A Spring endpoint accepts any multipart size, exhausting disk. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-770 | T1499 - Endpoint Denial of Service | Medium | Beginner | @PostMapping("/upload")
public String up(@RequestParam MultipartFile f) { // Vulnerable: no size cap
f.transferTo(new File("/data/" + f.getOriginalFilename()));
return "ok";
} | @PostMapping("/upload")
public String up(@RequestParam MultipartFile f) {
if (f.getSize() > 5_000_000) return "too big"; // Secure
if (!f.getContentType().startsWith("image/")) return "bad type";
f.transferTo(new File("/data/" + UUID.randomUUID()));
return "ok";
} | --- a/UploadController.java
+++ b/UploadController.java
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
- f.transferTo(new File("/data/" + f.getOriginalFilename()));
+ if (f.getSize() > 5_000_000) return "too big";
+ if (!f.getContentType().startsWith("image/")) return "bad type";
+ f.transferTo(new File("/data/" + UUID.randomUUID())); | No size/type limits on upload. | Upload huge file to fill disk. | Denial of service. | Cap size; validate type; randomize name. | Limit uploads; validate type. | [
"dos",
"spring",
"java",
"upload"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "form_field",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000464 | C# | ASP.NET Core | SSRF in HttpClient | Controller fetches user-supplied URL. | A10:2021 - SSRF | CWE-918 | T1190 | High | Intermediate | var html = await client.GetStringAsync(url); | if (!Uri.TryCreate(url, UriKind.Absolute, out var u) ||
!ALLOWED_HOSTS.Contains(u.Host))
return BadRequest();
var html = await client.GetStringAsync(u); | --- a/ProxyController.cs
+++ b/ProxyController.cs
@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
-var html = await client.GetStringAsync(url);
+if (!Uri.TryCreate(url, UriKind.Absolute, out var u) ||
+ !ALLOWED_HOSTS.Contains(u.Host)) return BadRequest();
+var html = await client.GetStringAsync(u); | Unvalidated fetch URL. | Fetch internal metadata. | Metadata theft. | Allowlist hosts. | Validate fetch targets. | [
"ssrf",
"csharp",
"aspnet",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "Cloud",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000368 | Rust | Actix | Path traversal in file serve | An Actix handler serves a file from a user path. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-22 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | let path = format!("/data/{}", name); // Vulnerable: traversal\nactix_files::NamedFile::open(path)?.into_response(&req)\ | let name = Path::new(&name).file_name().ok_or(404)?;\nlet path = Path::new("/data").join(name); // Secure: basename\nactix_files::NamedFile::open(path)?.into_response(&req)\ | --- a/files.rs\n+++ b/files.rs\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n-let path = format!("/data/{}", name);\n-actix_files::NamedFile::open(path)?.into_response(&req)\n+let name = Path::new(&name).file_name().ok_or(404)?;\n+let path = Path::new("/data").join(name);\n+actix_files::NamedFile::open(path)?.into_response(&req)\ | Unsanitized filename. | name=../../etc/passwd reads file. | File disclosure. | Basename + confine. | Confine file paths. | [
"path-traversal",
"rust",
"actix",
"file-read"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "query_param",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000082 | JavaScript | GraphQL | GraphQL batching abuse for brute force | A GraphQL endpoint accepts batched requests with no rate limit, defeating lockout. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-307 | T1110 - Brute Force | Medium | Intermediate | // accepts [{query: login}, ...] in one HTTP call
app.post('/graphql', (req, res) => {
const batch = Array.isArray(req.body) ? req.body : [req.body];
// Vulnerable: no per-batch rate limit
Promise.all(batch.map(b => execute(b))).then(r => res.json(r));
});
| const limiter = rateLimit({ windowMs: 15*60*1000, max: 20 });
app.post('/graphql', limiter, (req, res) => {
const batch = Array.isArray(req.body) ? req.body : [req.body];
if (batch.length > 5) return res.status(413).end(); // Secure: cap batch
Promise.all(batch.map(b => execute(b))).then(r => res.json(r));
});
| --- a/graphql/server.js
+++ b/graphql/server.js
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
+const limiter = rateLimit({ windowMs: 15*60*1000, max: 20 });
+app.post('/graphql', limiter, (req, res) => {
+ if (batch.length > 5) return res.status(413).end();
| Batched queries let an attacker try many credentials in a single request, bypassing per-request limits. | Send 1000 login mutations in one batch to brute force passwords. | Credential brute force / stuffing. | Limit batch size and apply per-IP/per-account rate limiting. | Cap GraphQL batch size; rate limit auth mutations. | [
"rate-limiting",
"graphql",
"javascript",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000423 | YAML | Kubernetes | Capability NET_ADMIN added | A container adds dangerous Linux capabilities. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-250 | T1611 - Escape to Host | High | Intermediate | securityContext:\n capabilities:\n add: ["NET_ADMIN", "SYS_ADMIN"] # Vulnerable\ | securityContext:\n capabilities:\n drop: ["ALL"] # Secure: least privilege\ | --- a/deploy.yaml\n+++ b/deploy.yaml\n@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@\n-securityContext:\n capabilities:\n add: ["NET_ADMIN", "SYS_ADMIN"]\n+securityContext:\n+ capabilities:\n+ drop: ["ALL"]\ | Dangerous capabilities added. | Manipulate networking / host. | Container escape. | Drop ALL caps. | Minimal capabilities. | [
"kubernetes",
"yaml",
"capability",
"container"
] | {
"domain": "Kubernetes",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000399 | Kotlin | Android | Business logic: negative in-app purchase | A purchase flow accepts a negative quantity from client. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization | CWE-840 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Intermediate | order.qty = intent.getIntExtra("qty", 1) // Vulnerable: negative\ | val qty = intent.getIntExtra("qty", 1)\nif (qty <= 0 || qty > 100) throw IllegalArgumentException("bad") // Secure\ | --- a/Purchase.kt\n+++ b/Purchase.kt\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-order.qty = intent.getIntExtra("qty", 1)\n+val qty = intent.getIntExtra("qty", 1)\n+if (qty <= 0 || qty > 100) throw IllegalArgumentException("bad")\ | Client qty not bounded. | qty=-5 => negative charge. | Revenue loss. | Validate qty. | Validate business values. | [
"business-logic",
"kotlin",
"android",
"ecommerce"
] | {
"domain": "Mobile",
"input_source": "intent",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000004 | Python | FastAPI | Missing authentication on admin endpoint | A FastAPI endpoint exposes administrative actions without any authentication dependency. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API2:2023 - Broken Authentication | CWE-306 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Critical | Beginner | from fastapi import FastAPI
app = FastAPI()
@app.delete('/admin/users/{uid}')
def delete_user(uid: int):
# Vulnerable: no auth dependency
repository.remove_user(uid)
return {'deleted': uid}
| from fastapi import FastAPI, Depends, HTTPException
from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer
app = FastAPI()
bearer = HTTPBearer()
def require_admin(token=Depends(bearer)):
claims = decode_token(token.credentials)
if not claims.get('role') == 'admin':
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail='forbid... | --- a/main.py
+++ b/main.py
@@ -1,8 +1,16 @@
+from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException
+from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer
+def require_admin(token=Depends(bearer)):
+ claims = decode_token(token.credentials)
+ if not claims.get('role') == 'admin':
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail='forb... | Authorization logic was never attached to the protected route. | Any unauthenticated caller hits DELETE /admin/users/1 and removes arbitrary accounts. | Privilege escalation to full administrative control and data loss. | Enforce authentication and role-based authorization via route dependencies or middleware. | Deny by default. Every sensitive route must declare an auth dependency. | [
"auth",
"authorization",
"fastapi",
"python"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "path_param",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000425 | YAML | Kubernetes | ServiceAccount token automount enabled | A Pod mounts the API token by default, widening blast radius. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-668 | T1078 - Valid Accounts | Medium | Beginner | automountServiceAccountToken: true # Vulnerable: API token in pod\ | automountServiceAccountToken: false # Secure: only if needed\ | --- a/deploy.yaml\n+++ b/deploy.yaml\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-automountServiceAccountToken: true\n+automountServiceAccountToken: false\ | API token mounted unnecessarily. | Token theft -> API abuse. | Cluster compromise. | Disable automount. | Least privilege SA. | [
"kubernetes",
"yaml",
"token",
"serviceaccount"
] | {
"domain": "Kubernetes",
"input_source": "manifest",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000143 | Python | Django | Debug mode enabled in production | A Django project runs with DEBUG=True in production, leaking stack traces. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-209 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Beginner | # settings.py
DEBUG = True # Vulnerable in prod | # settings.py
import os
DEBUG = os.environ.get('DJANGO_DEBUG', 'False') == 'True' # Secure: off by default
if not DEBUG:
ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['app.example.com'] | --- a/settings.py
+++ b/settings.py
@@ -1,2 +1,5 @@
-DEBUG = True
+import os
+DEBUG = os.environ.get('DJANGO_DEBUG', 'False') == 'True'
+if not DEBUG:
+ ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['app.example.com'] | DEBUG=True exposes the full traceback and settings. | Trigger an error to read the stack and config. | Information disclosure. | Keep DEBUG off in production; set ALLOWED_HOSTS. | Never run DEBUG=True in production. | [
"config",
"django",
"python",
"info-leak"
] | {
"domain": "Backend",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000312 | Go | Gin | No rate limit on login | A Gin login has no throttling. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-307 | T1110 - Brute Force | Medium | Beginner | r.POST("/login", login) // Vulnerable: no throttle | r.POST("/login", rateLimiter(5, time.Minute), login) // Secure: middleware | --- a/routes.go
+++ b/routes.go
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-r.POST("/login", login)
+r.POST("/login", rateLimiter(5, time.Minute), login) | No throttle on auth. | Brute force credentials. | Account takeover. | Rate limit login. | Throttle auth endpoints. | [
"rate-limiting",
"go",
"gin",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000240 | Java | Spring Boot | CORS allow-all with credentials | A Spring CORS config permits any origin together with credentials. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-942 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Beginner | config.setAllowedOriginPatterns(Arrays.asList("*")); // Vulnerable
config.setAllowCredentials(true); | config.setAllowedOrigins(Arrays.asList("https://app.example.com")); // Secure
config.setAllowCredentials(true); | --- a/Cors.java
+++ b/Cors.java
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-config.setAllowedOriginPatterns(Arrays.asList("*"));
+config.setAllowedOrigins(Arrays.asList("https://app.example.com")); | Wildcard origin with credentials. | Malicious site reads responses with victim cookies. | Cross-origin data theft. | Pin origins; never * with credentials. | Restrict CORS origins. | [
"cors",
"spring",
"java",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "header",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000113 | JavaScript | Express | JWT secret hardcoded and weak | An Express app signs JWTs with a hardcoded, guessable secret. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | API2:2023 - Broken Authentication | CWE-798 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | High | Beginner | const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const SECRET = 'secret'; // Vulnerable
function sign(u){ return jwt.sign({u}, SECRET); } | const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET; // from env/secret manager
function sign(u){ return jwt.sign({u}, SECRET, { algorithm:'HS256', expiresIn:'1h' }); } | --- a/auth.js
+++ b/auth.js
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-const SECRET = 'secret';
+const SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
-function sign(u){ return jwt.sign({u}, SECRET); }
+function sign(u){ return jwt.sign({u}, SECRET, { algorithm:'HS256', expiresIn:'1h' }); } | A weak hardcoded secret lets attackers forge valid JWTs. | Attacker signs their own admin token with the known secret. | Privilege escalation, auth bypass. | Use a strong secret from env; set algorithm and expiry. | Never hardcode JWT secrets; use env + HS256 + expiry. | [
"jwt",
"express",
"javascript",
"secrets"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000215 | Python | Django | Clickjacking protection disabled | A Django app removes the X-Frame-Options / clickjacking middleware. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-1021 | T1185 - Browser Session Hijacking | Medium | Beginner | MIDDLEWARE = [m for m in MIDDLEWARE if "ClickjackingMiddleware" not in m] # Vulnerable | MIDDLEWARE = MIDDLEWARE + ["django.middleware.clickjacking.XFrameOptionsMiddleware"] # Secure | --- a/settings.py
+++ b/settings.py
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-MIDDLEWARE = [m for m in MIDDLEWARE if "ClickjackingMiddleware" not in m]
+MIDDLEWARE = MIDDLEWARE + ["django.middleware.clickjacking.XFrameOptionsMiddleware"] | Clickjacking middleware removed. | Frame the page to trick clicks. | UI redress. | Keep X-Frame-Options middleware; set DENY/SAMEORIGIN. | Enable clickjacking protection. | [
"clickjacking",
"django",
"python",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000468 | Ruby | Rails | Timing-unsafe token compare | Rails API compares tokens with ==. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-208 | T1600 | Low | Intermediate | def valid?(t); t == session[:csrf]; end | def valid?(t)
ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.secure_compare(t, session[:csrf])
end | --- a/csrf.rb
+++ b/csrf.rb
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
-def valid?(t); t == session[:csrf]; end
+def valid?(t)
+ ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.secure_compare(t, session[:csrf])
+end | Non-constant-time compare. | Timing attack on CSRF. | Token forgery. | Use secure_compare. | Constant-time compare. | [
"crypto",
"rails",
"ruby",
"timing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "cookie",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | ||
SCP-000370 | Rust | Actix | Hardcoded secret in source | A Rust service hardcodes an API key. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-798 | T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files | High | Beginner | const API_KEY: &str = "sk_live_7b6a5948"; // Vulnerable\ | let api_key = std::env::var("API_KEY").expect("API_KEY"); // Secure: env\ | --- a/config.rs\n+++ b/config.rs\n@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@\n-const API_KEY: &str = "sk_live_7b6a5948";\n+let api_key = std::env::var("API_KEY").expect("API_KEY");\ | Secret in source. | Repo access reveals key. | Key compromise. | Use env/secret. | Externalize secrets. | [
"secrets",
"rust",
"actix",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "Banking",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000343 | C# | ASP.NET Core | Improper certificate validation (ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback) | An HttpClient accepts any server certificate. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-295 | T1557 - Adversary-in-the-Middle | Critical | Advanced | handler.ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback = (m, c, ch, e) => true; // Vulnerable: accept all\ | // Use default validation; do not override the callback\nusing var client = new HttpClient(); // Secure: validates chain\ | --- a/Client.cs\n+++ b/Client.cs\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\n-handler.ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback = (m, c, ch, e) => true;\n+// Use default validation; do not override the callback\ | Certificate validation disabled. | MITM intercepts TLS. | Credential/data theft. | Keep default validation. | Always verify TLS peers. | [
"tls",
"csharp",
"aspnet",
"mitm"
] | {
"domain": "Banking",
"input_source": "network",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000377 | Rust | Actix | Weak random for token (rand::random default) | A token generator uses a weak RNG. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-338 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | High | Intermediate | let tok = rand::random::<u64>().to_string(); // Vulnerable if thread_rng weak\ | use rand::rngs::OsRng;\nlet mut buf = [0u8; 32]; OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut buf); // Secure: OS CSPRNG\ | --- a/token.rs\n+++ b/token.rs\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n-let tok = rand::random::<u64>().to_string();\n+use rand::rngs::OsRng;\n+let mut buf = [0u8; 32]; OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut buf);\ | Weak RNG token. | Predict token. | Token forgery. | Use OsRng/getrandom. | Use CSPRNG for tokens. | [
"crypto",
"rust",
"actix",
"tokens"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "server",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000102 | C | Embedded | Hardcoded WiFi credentials in firmware | An embedded IoT firmware stores WiFi credentials as string literals in flash. | A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures | CWE-798 | T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files | High | Beginner | const char *SSID = "HomeNet";
const char *PSK = "password123"; // Vulnerable: hardcoded
| char ssid[33], psk[64];
// Secure: load from secure element / provisioning at first boot
if (load_credentials(ssid, psk) != 0) {
enter_provisioning_mode();
}
| --- a/wifi.c
+++ b/wifi.c
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
-const char *SSID = "HomeNet";
-const char *PSK = "password123";
+char ssid[33], psk[64];
+if (load_credentials(ssid, psk) != 0) {
+ enter_provisioning_mode();
+}
| Credentials compiled into firmware are recoverable by dumping flash. | Attacker extracts the firmware and reads the WiFi PSK for network access. | Network compromise via recovered credentials. | Store credentials in a secure element; provision at first boot. | Never store secrets in firmware; use secure provisioning. | [
"iot",
"c",
"secrets",
"firmware"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "source_code",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000298 | Scala | Akka HTTP | No rate limit on login | An Akka HTTP login route has no throttling. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-307 | T1110 - Brute Force | Medium | Beginner | path("login") { post { entity(as[Login]) { l => complete(auth(l)) } } } // Vulnerable: no throttle | path("login") { post { throttle(5, 1.minute) { // Secure
entity(as[Login]) { l => complete(auth(l)) } } } } | --- a/LoginRoute.scala
+++ b/LoginRoute.scala
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-path("login") { post { entity(as[Login]) { l => complete(auth(l)) } } }
+path("login") { post { throttle(5, 1.minute) {
+ entity(as[Login]) { l => complete(auth(l)) } } } } | No throttle on auth. | Brute force credentials. | Account takeover. | Throttle login. | Rate limit auth. | [
"rate-limiting",
"scala",
"akka",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000014 | JavaScript | Express | NoSQL injection in MongoDB query | An Express route passes the raw request body into a MongoDB filter, enabling operator injection. | A03:2021 - Injection | API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization | CWE-943 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | High | Intermediate | app.post('/login', (req, res) => {
const { user, pass } = req.body;
// Vulnerable: body used directly as query
db.users.findOne({ user, pass }, (e, doc) => res.json(doc));
});
| app.post('/login', (req, res) => {
const user = String(req.body.user || '');
const pass = String(req.body.pass || '');
if (!user || !pass) return res.status(400).end();
// Secure: strict string values, no operators
db.users.findOne({ user: user, pass: pass }, (e, doc) => res.json(doc));
});
| --- a/routes.js
+++ b/routes.js
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
- db.users.findOne({ user, pass }, cb);
+ const user = String(req.body.user || '');
+ const pass = String(req.body.pass || '');
+ db.users.findOne({ user: user, pass: pass }, cb);
| Untrusted JSON is used as a query object, so operators like $gt or $ne can be injected. | Send {"user":{"$ne":null},"pass":{"$ne":null}} to bypass authentication. | Authentication bypass and data disclosure. | Validate and cast inputs to expected scalar types; reject nested objects/operators. | Never pass raw request bodies into query builders; validate shape and types. | [
"nosql",
"injection",
"express",
"javascript"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000319 | Go | Gin | Deserialization of untrusted JSON with reflection | A Go handler decodes JSON into an interface{} enabling type confusion. | A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures | CWE-502 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Medium | Advanced | var data interface{}
json.Unmarshal(body, &data) // Vulnerable: loose typing | var data StrictDTO
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &data); err != nil { c.AbortWithStatus(400); return } // Secure: typed | --- a/handler.go
+++ b/handler.go
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-var data interface{}
-json.Unmarshal(body, &data)
+var data StrictDTO
+if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &data); err != nil { c.AbortWithStatus(400); return } | Untyped JSON decode. | Type confusion in downstream logic. | Logic abuse. | Use strict DTOs. | Type all JSON input. | [
"deserialization",
"go",
"gin",
"injection"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000269 | C | POSIX | Race condition on shared file | A C program checks then opens a file (TOCTOU). | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-367 | T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution | High | Advanced | if (access(path, R_OK) == 0) { fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); } // Vulnerable: TOCTOU | fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
if (fd >= 0) { struct stat st; fstat(fd, &st); } // Secure: fd-based | --- a/open.c
+++ b/open.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-if (access(path, R_OK) == 0) { fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); }
+fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+if (fd >= 0) { struct stat st; fstat(fd, &st); } | Check-then-open race. | Swap file between access and open. | Arbitrary read. | Operate on fd. | Avoid TOCTOU with fd. | [
"toctou",
"c",
"race-condition"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "file",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000120 | Kotlin | Android | WebView addJavascriptInterface abuse | An Android WebView exposes a Java object to JS, enabling native calls. | A04:2021 - Insecure Design | CWE-749 | T1398 - Mobile Application Exploitation | High | Intermediate | web.addJavascriptInterface(NativeBridge(), "bridge") // Vulnerable
web.loadUrl(intent.getStringExtra("url")!!) | if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 24) {
web.settings.javaScriptEnabled = false // Secure
} else web.removeJavascriptInterface("bridge")
if (URL(url).host == "trusted.example.com") web.loadUrl(url) | --- a/MainActivity.kt
+++ b/MainActivity.kt
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
-web.addJavascriptInterface(NativeBridge(), "bridge")
-web.loadUrl(intent.getStringExtra("url")!!)
+if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 24) web.settings.javaScriptEnabled = false
+else web.removeJavascriptInterface("bridge")
+if (URL(url).host == "trusted.example.com... | A JS bridge on a WebView loading untrusted URLs allows native method calls. | Malicious page calls bridge.sensitiveMethod(). | Native code execution in app context. | Disable JS bridge unless required; validate URLs. | Avoid addJavascriptInterface with untrusted content. | [
"android",
"kotlin",
"webview",
"mobile"
] | {
"domain": "IoT",
"input_source": "intent",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000112 | Java | Spring Boot | Insecure JWT alg none | A Spring JWT parser accepts the 'none' algorithm, forging tokens. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API2:2023 - Broken Authentication | CWE-345 | T1609 - Container Administration Command | Critical | Advanced | public Claims parse(String t) {
// Vulnerable: none allowed
return Jwts.parser().parseClaimsJwt(t).getBody();
} | public Claims parse(String t, Key k) {
// Secure: pin algorithm
return Jwts.parserBuilder().setSigningKey(k)
.require("alg","HS256").build().parseClaimsJws(t).getBody();
} | --- a/Jwt.java
+++ b/Jwt.java
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
- return Jwts.parser().parseClaimsJwt(t).getBody();
+ return Jwts.parserBuilder().setSigningKey(k)
+ .require("alg","HS256").build().parseClaimsJws(t).getBody(); | No algorithm pinning lets attackers use alg=none. | Attacker sends a token with alg=none and arbitrary claims. | Full auth bypass. | Pin and verify the signing algorithm. | Never accept alg=none; pin algorithm. | [
"jwt",
"spring",
"java",
"auth-bypass"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "header",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000048 | PHP | Laravel | Unescaped output in Blade template (XSS) | A Blade view uses {!! !!} to render user content, bypassing Laravel's auto-escaping. | A03:2021 - Injection | CWE-79 | T1059.007 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | Medium | Beginner | <!-- profile.blade.php -->
<div class="bio">{!! $user->bio !!}</div> {{-- Vulnerable: raw, no escaping --}}
| <!-- profile.blade.php -->
<div class="bio">{{ $user->bio }}</div> {{-- Secure: auto-escaped --}}
| --- a/profile.blade.php
+++ b/profile.blade.php
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-<div class="bio">{!! $user->bio !!}</div>
+<div class="bio">{{ $user->bio }}</div>
| Blade's raw echo ({!! !!}), which skips escaping, is used on untrusted data. | User sets bio to <script>steal()</script>, executed for every profile viewer. | Stored XSS, session theft. | Use escaped echo ({{ }}) for untrusted data; sanitize only when HTML is genuinely needed. | Default to escaped output; only use {!! !!} with vetted, sanitized HTML. | [
"xss",
"laravel",
"php",
"blade"
] | {
"domain": "E-commerce",
"input_source": "db",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000016 | JavaScript | Express | Missing rate limiting on login | A login endpoint has no rate limiting, allowing unlimited credential guessing. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API4:2023 - Unrestricted Resource Consumption | CWE-307 | T1110 - Brute Force | Medium | Beginner | app.post('/login', async (req, res) => {
const { user, pass } = req.body;
const ok = await verify(user, pass);
res.json({ ok });
});
| const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
const loginLimiter = rateLimit({
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, max: 5, standardHeaders: true, legacyHeaders: false });
app.post('/login', loginLimiter, async (req, res) => {
const { user, pass } = req.body;
const ok = await verify(user, pass);
res.json({ ok });
});
| --- a/routes.js
+++ b/routes.js
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
+const loginLimiter = rateLimit({ windowMs: 15*60*1000, max: 5 });
-app.post('/login', async (req, res) => {
+app.post('/login', loginLimiter, async (req, res) => {
| No throttling on an authentication endpoint permits automated brute-force/credential-stuffing. | Attacker scripts millions of password attempts against known usernames. | Account takeover via brute force or credential stuffing. | Apply per-IP and per-account rate limiting plus lockout/backoff and MFA. | Throttle auth endpoints; add lockout, CAPTCHA, and MFA for sensitive flows. | [
"rate-limiting",
"express",
"javascript",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000017 | JavaScript | Express | Open redirect via unvalidated next parameter | A post-login redirect uses a user-supplied 'next' parameter without validation. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | CWE-601 | T1566 - Phishing | Medium | Beginner | app.post('/login', (req, res) => {
authenticate(req.body);
// Vulnerable: arbitrary redirect target
res.redirect(req.body.next || '/home');
});
| function isSafeRedirect(target) {
return typeof target === 'string'
&& target.startsWith('/') && !target.startsWith('//');
}
app.post('/login', (req, res) => {
authenticate(req.body);
const next = req.body.next;
res.redirect(isSafeRedirect(next) ? next : '/home');
});
| --- a/routes.js
+++ b/routes.js
@@ -2,4 +2,9 @@
- res.redirect(req.body.next || '/home');
+ function isSafeRedirect(t){return typeof t==='string'&&t.startsWith('/')&&!t.startsWith('//');}
+ const next = req.body.next;
+ res.redirect(isSafeRedirect(next) ? next : '/home');
| Redirect target is taken from user input without confirming it is a same-origin relative path. | Phishing link uses next=//evil.com to send victims to a credential-harvesting clone after login. | Phishing, credential theft, and loss of user trust. | Allowlist internal paths only; reject absolute/protocol-relative URLs. | Validate redirect targets against an allowlist of same-origin relative paths. | [
"open-redirect",
"express",
"javascript",
"phishing"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "form_field",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | ||
SCP-000217 | Python | FastAPI | Missing dependency in admin router (authz bypass) | A FastAPI admin route omits the admin-role dependency. | A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization | CWE-862 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Critical | Advanced | @app.delete("/admin/user/{uid}")
async def delete(uid: int): # Vulnerable: no admin check
repo.remove(uid) | @app.delete("/admin/user/{uid}")
async def delete(uid: int, admin: AdminUser = Depends(require_admin)): # Secure
repo.remove(uid) | --- a/admin.py
+++ b/admin.py
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-async def delete(uid: int):
+async def delete(uid: int, admin: AdminUser = Depends(require_admin)):
repo.remove(uid) | Admin dependency missing on destructive route. | Unauthenticated admin action. | Privilege escalation. | Attach role dependency. | Always enforce admin deps on admin routes. | [
"authorization",
"fastapi",
"python",
"broken-access-control"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "path_param",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000313 | Go | Gin | Insecure JWT verification (none alg) | A Go JWT verifier allows the none algorithm. | A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures | API2:2023 - Broken Authentication | CWE-345 | T1600 - Weaken Encryption | Critical | Advanced | token, _ := jwt.Parse(t, func(t *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { return key, nil }) // Vulnerable: any alg | token, _ := jwt.Parse(t, func(t *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok { return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad") } // Secure: pin
return key, nil
}) | --- a/auth.go
+++ b/auth.go
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
-token, _ := jwt.Parse(t, func(t *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { return key, nil })
+token, _ := jwt.Parse(t, func(t *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
+ if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok { return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad") }
+ return key, nil
+}) | No algorithm pinning. | Forge alg=none token. | Auth bypass. | Pin algorithm. | Forbid none. | [
"jwt",
"go",
"gin",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "header",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | |
SCP-000045 | TypeScript | Next.js | GraphQL introspection enabled in production | A Next.js GraphQL endpoint leaves introspection on in production, exposing the full schema. | A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration | CWE-215 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Low | Beginner | const server = new ApolloServer({
schema,
introspection: true, // Vulnerable: on in prod
});
| const server = new ApolloServer({
schema,
introspection: process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production',
csrfPrevention: true,
});
| --- a/apollo.ts
+++ b/apollo.ts
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@
- introspection: true,
+ introspection: process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production',
+ csrfPrevention: true,
| Introspection is not disabled in production, leaking the schema to attackers. | An attacker queries __schema to map every type/field and find unprotected ones. | Reconnaissance that accelerates targeted attacks. | Disable introspection in production and enable CSRF prevention. | Gate introspection to non-prod; enable CSRF prevention on GraphQL. | [
"graphql",
"nextjs",
"typescript",
"config"
] | {
"domain": "REST API",
"input_source": "schema",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | ||
SCP-000290 | C++ | STD | Insecure deserialization (boost) | A C++ app deserializes untrusted bytes with boost::serialization. | A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures | CWE-502 | T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application | Critical | Advanced | std::istringstream iss(data);
boost::archive::text_iarchive ia(iss);
ia >> obj; // Vulnerable: untrusted bytes | // Use a schema-validated JSON/Protobuf with strict parsing
auto obj = parse_json_strict(data); // Secure | --- a/load.cpp
+++ b/load.cpp
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-std::istringstream iss(data);
-boost::archive::text_iarchive ia(iss);
-ia >> obj;
+auto obj = parse_json_strict(data); | Native deserialization of untrusted data. | Craft malicious archive for RCE. | Remote code execution. | Use safe serialization. | Validate deserialized data. | [
"deserialization",
"cpp",
"rce"
] | {
"domain": "Microservices",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | ||
SCP-000467 | Go | Gin | Session fixation in Gin | Gin login does not rotate session id. | A07:2021 - Auth Failures | API2:2023 | CWE-384 | T1539 | Medium | Beginner | session.Set("uid", uid) // same id | old := session.ID()
session.Set("uid", uid)
session.Save()
_ = store.RegenID(old, session) // rotate | --- a/login.go
+++ b/login.go
@@ -1,2 +1,5 @@
-session.Set("uid", uid)
+old := session.ID()
+session.Set("uid", uid)
+session.Save()
+_ = store.RegenID(old, session) | No session rotation. | Fixation. | Account takeover. | Rotate session id. | Rotate session on auth. | [
"session",
"go",
"gin",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": true
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | |
SCP-000477 | Rust | Actix | No rate limit on Actix login | Actix login has no throttling. | A07:2021 - Auth Failures | API4:2023 | CWE-307 | T1110 | Medium | Beginner | .route("/login", web::post().to(login)) | .route("/login", web::post().to(login))
.wrap(RateLimiter::new(5, 60)) | --- a/routes.rs
+++ b/routes.rs
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
-.route("/login", web::post().to(login))
+.route("/login", web::post().to(login))
+.wrap(RateLimiter::new(5, 60)) | No throttle on auth. | Brute force credentials. | Account takeover. | Rate limit login. | Throttle auth endpoints. | [
"rate-limiting",
"actix",
"rust",
"auth"
] | {
"domain": "Authentication systems",
"input_source": "request_body",
"auth_required": false
} | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N |
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