Add collection v2 source objects 2689-2752

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555.005/linux_auditd_find_password_db/linux_auditd_find_password_db.log

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type=EXECVE msg=audit(1723209251.519:128180): argc=3 a0="grep" a1="-Ev" a2=".Xauthority|.bashrc|.bluemix|.boto|.cer|.cloudflared|.credentials.json|.crt|.csr|.db|.der|.docker|.env|.erlang.cookie|.flyrc|.ftpconfig|.git|.git-credentials|.gitconfig|.github|.gnupg|.google_authenticator|.gpg|.htpasswd|.irssi|.jks|.k5login|.kdbx|.key|.keyring|.keystore|.keytab|.kube|.ldaprc|.lesshst|.mozilla|.msmtprc|.ovpn|.p12|.password-store|.pem|.pfx|.pgp|.plan|.profile|.psk|.pub|.pypirc|.rdg|.recently-used.xbel|.rhosts|.roadtools_auth|.secrets.mkey|.service|.socket|.sqlite|.sqlite3|.sudo_as_admin_successful|.svn|.swp|.tf|.tfstate|.timer|.vault-token|.vhd|.vhdx|.viminfo|.vmdk|.vnc|.wgetrc"
+type=EXECVE msg=audit(1723209151.427:89620): argc=3 a0="grep" a1="-E" a2="passbolt\.php$"
+type=EXECVE msg=audit(1723209151.311:89593): argc=3 a0="grep" a1="-E" a2=".*\.kdbx$|KeePass\.config.*$|KeePass\.ini$|KeePass\.enforced.*$"
+type=EXECVE msg=audit(1723209150.803:89498): argc=3 a0="grep" a1="-E" a2="\.vault-token$"
+type=EXECVE msg=audit(1723209150.795:89497): argc=3 a0="grep" a1="-E" a2="vault-ssh-helper\.hcl$"

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555.005/linux_auditd_find_password_db/linux_auditd_find_password_db.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+id: 465abfd6-ef97-11ef-b72e-629be3538068
+date: '2025-02-20'
+description: Generated datasets for linux auditd find password db in attack range.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: linux_auditd_find_password_db
+mitre_technique:
+- T1555.005
+datasets:
+- name: auditd_execve_pwd_mgr
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1555.005/linux_auditd_find_password_db/auditd_execve_pwd_mgr.log
+  sourcetype: auditd
+  source: auditd
+- name: linux_auditd_find_password_db
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1555.005/linux_auditd_find_password_db/linux_auditd_find_password_db.log
+  sourcetype: auditd
+  source: auditd

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/applying_stolen_credentials/applying_stolen_credentials_old.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Stanislav Miskovic
+id: cc9b260d-efc9-11eb-926b-550bf0943fbb
+date: '2021-02-23'
+description: Datasets containing in-line calls to all critical Mimikatz and PowerSploit
+  modules
+environment: custom
+dataset:
+- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/applying_stolen_credentials/logAllMimikatzModules.log
+- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/applying_stolen_credentials/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log
+sourcetypes:
+- WinEventLog:Security
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/applying_stolen_credentials/logAllMimikatzModules.log

@@ -0,0 +1,451 @@
+
+09/11/2020 11:45:25 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7827463
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+ 
+Creator Subject:
+    Security ID:        ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+    Account Name:       administrator
+    Account Domain:     ATTACKRANGE
+    Logon ID:       0x2097C8
+ 
+Target Subject:
+    Security ID:        NULL SID
+    Account Name:       -
+    Account Domain:     -
+    Logon ID:       0x0
+ 
+Process Information:
+    New Process ID:     0xe2c
+    New Process Name:   C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\mimikatz_trunk\x64\mimikatz.exe
+    Token Elevation Type:   %%1936
+    Mandatory Label:        Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+    Creator Process ID: 0x1b94
+    Creator Process Name:   C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+    Process Command Line:   mimikatz  ""privilege::debug""
+ 
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+ 
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+ 
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+ 
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+09/11/2020 11:45:21 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7327463
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+ 
+Creator Subject:
+    Security ID:        ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+    Account Name:       administrator
+    Account Domain:     ATTACKRANGE
+    Logon ID:       0x2097C8
+ 
+Target Subject:
+    Security ID:        NULL SID
+    Account Name:       -
+    Account Domain:     -
+    Logon ID:       0x0
+ 
+Process Information:
+    New Process ID:     0xe2c
+    New Process Name:   C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\mimikatz_trunk\x64\mimikatz.exe
+    Token Elevation Type:   %%1936
+    Mandatory Label:        Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+    Creator Process ID: 0x1b94
+    Creator Process Name:   C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+    Process Command Line:   mimikatz  ""crypto::capi crypto::cng crypto::certificates /export crypto::keys /export crypto::providers crypto::stores crypto::sc crypto::scauth""
+ 
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+ 
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+ 
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+ 
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+09/11/2020 11:45:19 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7827463
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+ 
+Creator Subject:
+    Security ID:        ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+    Account Name:       administrator
+    Account Domain:     ATTACKRANGE
+    Logon ID:       0x2097C8
+ 
+Target Subject:
+    Security ID:        NULL SID
+    Account Name:       -
+    Account Domain:     -
+    Logon ID:       0x0
+ 
+Process Information:
+    New Process ID:     0xe2c
+    New Process Name:   C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\mimikatz_trunk\x64\mimikatz.exe
+    Token Elevation Type:   %%1936
+    Mandatory Label:        Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+    Creator Process ID: 0x1b94
+    Creator Process Name:   C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+    Process Command Line:   mimikatz  ""kerberos::ptt kerberos::golden kerberos::silver  kerberos::list /export kerberos::tgt kerberos::purge""
+ 
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+ 
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+ 
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+ 
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+09/11/2020 11:45:17 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7827563
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+ 
+Creator Subject:
+    Security ID:        ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+    Account Name:       administrator
+    Account Domain:     ATTACKRANGE
+    Logon ID:       0x2097C8
+ 
+Target Subject:
+    Security ID:        NULL SID
+    Account Name:       -
+    Account Domain:     -
+    Logon ID:       0x0
+ 
+Process Information:
+    New Process ID:     0xe2c
+    New Process Name:   C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\mimikatz_trunk\x64\mimikatz.exe
+    Token Elevation Type:   %%1936
+    Mandatory Label:        Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+    Creator Process ID: 0x1b94
+    Creator Process Name:   C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+    Process Command Line:   mimikatz  ""lsadump::sam  lsadump::secrets lsadump::cache lsadump::lsa lsadump::trust lsadump::backupkeys  lsadump::rpdata  lsadump::dcsync  lsadump::netsync""
+ 
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+ 
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+ 
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+ 
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+09/11/2020 11:45:15 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7827403
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+ 
+Creator Subject:
+    Security ID:        ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+    Account Name:       administrator
+    Account Domain:     ATTACKRANGE
+    Logon ID:       0x2097C8
+ 
+Target Subject:
+    Security ID:        NULL SID
+    Account Name:       -
+    Account Domain:     -
+    Logon ID:       0x0
+ 
+Process Information:
+    New Process ID:     0xe2c
+    New Process Name:   C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\mimikatz_trunk\x64\mimikatz.exe
+    Token Elevation Type:   %%1936
+    Mandatory Label:        Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+    Creator Process ID: 0x1b94
+    Creator Process Name:   C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+    Process Command Line:   mimikatz  ""vault:: list   vault::cred""
+ 
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+ 
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+ 
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+ 
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+09/11/2020 11:45:14 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7827402
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+ 
+Creator Subject:
+    Security ID:        ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+    Account Name:       administrator
+    Account Domain:     ATTACKRANGE
+    Logon ID:       0x2097C8
+ 
+Target Subject:
+    Security ID:        NULL SID
+    Account Name:       -
+    Account Domain:     -
+    Logon ID:       0x0
+ 
+Process Information:
+    New Process ID:     0xe2c
+    New Process Name:   C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\mimikatz_trunk\x64\mimikatz.exe
+    Token Elevation Type:   %%1936
+    Mandatory Label:        Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+    Creator Process ID: 0x1b94
+    Creator Process Name:   C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+    Process Command Line:   mimikatz  ""token::whoami  token::list  token::elevate   token::revert""
+ 
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+ 
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+ 
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+ 
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+09/11/2020 11:45:13 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7877402
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+ 
+Creator Subject:
+    Security ID:        ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+    Account Name:       administrator
+    Account Domain:     ATTACKRANGE
+    Logon ID:       0x2097C8
+ 
+Target Subject:
+    Security ID:        NULL SID
+    Account Name:       -
+    Account Domain:     -
+    Logon ID:       0x0
+ 
+Process Information:
+    New Process ID:     0xe2c
+    New Process Name:   C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\mimikatz_trunk\x64\mimikatz.exe
+    Token Elevation Type:   %%1936
+    Mandatory Label:        Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+    Creator Process ID: 0x1b94
+    Creator Process Name:   C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+    Process Command Line:   mimikatz  ""event::drop event::clear""
+ 
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+ 
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+ 
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+ 
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+09/11/2020 11:45:12 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7827462
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+ 
+Creator Subject:
+    Security ID:        ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+    Account Name:       administrator
+    Account Domain:     ATTACKRANGE
+    Logon ID:       0x2097C8
+ 
+Target Subject:
+    Security ID:        NULL SID
+    Account Name:       -
+    Account Domain:     -
+    Logon ID:       0x0
+ 
+Process Information:
+    New Process ID:     0xe2c
+    New Process Name:   C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\mimikatz_trunk\x64\mimikatz.exe
+    Token Elevation Type:   %%1936
+    Mandatory Label:        Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+    Creator Process ID: 0x1b94
+    Creator Process Name:   C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+    Process Command Line:   mimikatz  ""process::list  process::start service::+ service::- service::list service::start service::stop service::suspend""
+ 
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+ 
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+ 
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+ 
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+09/11/2020 11:45:11 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7897462
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+ 
+Creator Subject:
+    Security ID:        ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+    Account Name:       administrator
+    Account Domain:     ATTACKRANGE
+    Logon ID:       0x2097C8
+ 
+Target Subject:
+    Security ID:        NULL SID
+    Account Name:       -
+    Account Domain:     -
+    Logon ID:       0x0
+ 
+Process Information:
+    New Process ID:     0xe2c
+    New Process Name:   C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\mimikatz_trunk\x64\mimikatz.exe
+    Token Elevation Type:   %%1936
+    Mandatory Label:        Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+    Creator Process ID: 0x1b94
+    Creator Process Name:   C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+    Process Command Line:   mimikatz  ""net::alias  net::user net::group net::ServerInfo net::share net::stats""
+ 
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+ 
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+ 
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+ 
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+09/11/2020 11:45:10 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=9897462
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+ 
+Creator Subject:
+    Security ID:        ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+    Account Name:       administrator
+    Account Domain:     ATTACKRANGE
+    Logon ID:       0x2097C8
+ 
+Target Subject:
+    Security ID:        NULL SID
+    Account Name:       -
+    Account Domain:     -
+    Logon ID:       0x0
+ 
+Process Information:
+    New Process ID:     0xe2c
+    New Process Name:   C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\mimikatz_trunk\x64\mimikatz.exe
+    Token Elevation Type:   %%1936
+    Mandatory Label:        Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+    Creator Process ID: 0x1b94
+    Creator Process Name:   C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+    Process Command Line:   mimikatz  ""misc::skeleton misc::memssp misc::regedit misc::taskmgr misc::ncroutemon misc::detours misc::wifi misc::addsid""
+ 
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+ 
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+ 
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+ 
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
+

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/applying_stolen_credentials/logAllPowerSploitModulesWithOldNames.log

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+09/17/2020 06:59:06 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4689
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Termination
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7465312
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A process has exited.
+
+Subject:
+	Security ID:		ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+	Account Name:		administrator
+	Account Domain:		ATTACKRANGE
+	Logon ID:		0x4FDA1
+
+Process Information:
+	Process ID:	0x1498
+	Process Name:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
+	Exit Status:	0x0
+
+
+09/17/2020 06:59:05 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7946858
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+
+Creator Subject:
+	Security ID:		ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+	Account Name:		administrator
+	Account Domain:		ATTACKRANGE
+	Logon ID:		0x4FDA1
+
+Target Subject:
+	Security ID:		NULL SID
+	Account Name:		-
+	Account Domain:		-
+	Logon ID:		0x0
+
+Process Information:
+	New Process ID:		0x1498
+	New Process Name:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
+	Token Elevation Type:	%%1936
+	Mandatory Label:		Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+	Creator Process ID:	0x21c0
+	Creator Process Name:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+	Process Command Line:	powershell  -command ""Import-Module PowerSploit; Add-DomainGroupMember; Add-DomainObjectAcl; Add-Persistence; Add-RemoteConnection; Add-ServiceDacl; Convert-ADName; ConvertFrom-SID; ConvertFrom-UACValue; ConvertTo-SID; Enable-Privilege; Export-PowerViewCSV; Find-AVSignature; Find-DomainLocalGroupMember; Find-DomainObjectPropertyOutlier; Find-DomainProcess; Find-DomainShare; Find-DomainUserEvent; Find-DomainUserLocation; Find-InterestingDomainAcl; Find-InterestingDomainShareFile; Find-InterestingFile; Find-LocalAdminAccess; Find-PathDLLHijack; Find-ProcessDLLHijack; Get-ApplicationHost; Get-CachedGPPPassword; Get-ComputerDetail; Get-Domain; Get-DomainComputer; Get-DomainController; Get-DomainDFSShare; Get-DomainDNSRecord; Get-DomainDNSZone; Get-DomainFileServer; Get-DomainForeignGroupMember; Get-DomainForeignUser; Get-DomainGPO; Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping; Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup; Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping; Get-DomainGroup; Get-DomainGroupMember; Get-DomainManagedSecurityGroup; Get-DomainOU; Get-DomainObject; Get-DomainObjectAcl; Get-DomainPolicy; Get-DomainSID; Get-DomainSPNTicket; Get-DomainSite; Get-DomainSubnet; Get-DomainTrust; Get-DomainTrustMapping; Get-DomainUser; Get-DomainUserEvent; Get-Forest; Get-ForestDomain; Get-ForestGlobalCatalog; Get-ForestTrust; Get-GPPAutologon; Get-GPPPassword; Get-HttpStatus; Get-Keystrokes; Get-MicrophoneAudio; Get-ModifiablePath; Get-ModifiableRegistryAutoRun; Get-ModifiableScheduledTaskFile; Get-ModifiableService; Get-ModifiableServiceFile; Get-NetComputerSiteName; Get-NetLocalGroup; Get-NetLocalGroupMember; Get-NetLoggedon; Get-NetRDPSession; Get-NetSession; Get-NetShare; Get-PathAcl; Get-ProcessTokenGroup; Get-ProcessTokenPrivilege; Get-RegLoggedOn; Get-RegistryAlwaysInstallElevated; Get-RegistryAutoLogon; Get-SecurityPackage; Get-ServiceDetail; Get-SiteListPassword; Get-System; Get-TimedScreenshot; Get-UnattendedInstallFile; Get-UnquotedService; Get-VaultCredential; Get-VolumeShadowCopy; Get-WMIProcess; Get-WMIRegCachedRDPConnection; Get-WMIRegLastLoggedOn; Get-WMIRegMountedDrive; Get-WMIRegProxy; Get-WebConfig;""
+
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
+
+
+
+09/17/2020 06:59:04 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7946857
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+
+Creator Subject:
+	Security ID:		ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+	Account Name:		administrator
+	Account Domain:		ATTACKRANGE
+	Logon ID:		0x4FDA1
+
+Target Subject:
+	Security ID:		NULL SID
+	Account Name:		-
+	Account Domain:		-
+	Logon ID:		0x0
+
+Process Information:
+	New Process ID:		0x1498
+	New Process Name:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
+	Token Elevation Type:	%%1936
+	Mandatory Label:		Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+	Creator Process ID:	0x21c0
+	Creator Process Name:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+	Process Command Line:	powershell  -command ""Import-Module Install-SSP; Install-ServiceBinary; Invoke-CredentialInjection; Invoke-DllInjection; Invoke-Kerberoast; Invoke-Mimikatz; Invoke-NinjaCopy; Invoke-Portscan; Invoke-PrivescAudit; Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection; Invoke-ReverseDnsLookup; Invoke-RevertToSelf; Invoke-ServiceAbuse; Invoke-Shellcode; Invoke-TokenManipulation; Invoke-UserImpersonation; Invoke-WScriptUACBypass; Invoke-WmiCommand; Mount-VolumeShadowCopy; New-DomainGroup; New-DomainUser; New-ElevatedPersistenceOption; New-UserPersistenceOption; New-VolumeShadowCopy; Out-CompressedDll; Out-EncodedCommand; Out-EncryptedScript; Out-Minidump; PowerView; Remove-Comment; Remove-RemoteConnection; Remove-VolumeShadowCopy; Resolve-IPAddress; Restore-ServiceBinary; Set-CriticalProcess; Set-DomainObject; Set-DomainObjectOwner; Set-DomainUserPassword; Set-MasterBootRecord; Set-ServiceBinaryPath; Test-AdminAccess; Test-ServiceDaclPermission; VolumeShadowCopyTools; Write-HijackDll; Write-ServiceBinary; Write-UserAddMSI;""
+
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.
+
+
+09/17/2020 06:59:03 PM
+LogName=Security
+SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
+EventCode=4688
+EventType=0
+Type=Information
+ComputerName=win-dc-1603297.attackrange.local
+TaskCategory=Process Creation
+OpCode=Info
+RecordNumber=7946856
+Keywords=Audit Success
+Message=A new process has been created.
+
+Creator Subject:
+	Security ID:		ATTACKRANGE\administrator
+	Account Name:		administrator
+	Account Domain:		ATTACKRANGE
+	Logon ID:		0x4FDA1
+
+Target Subject:
+	Security ID:		NULL SID
+	Account Name:		-
+	Account Domain:		-
+	Logon ID:		0x0
+
+Process Information:
+	New Process ID:		0x1498
+	New Process Name:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
+	Token Elevation Type:	%%1936
+	Mandatory Label:		Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level
+	Creator Process ID:	0x21c0
+	Creator Process Name:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
+	Process Command Line:	powershell  -command ""Import-Module Get-IPAddress; Convert-NameToSid;  Convert-SidToName; Request-SPNTicket; Get-DNSZone; Get-DNSRecord; Get-NetDomain; Get-NetDomainController; Get-NetForest; Get-NetForestDomain; Get-NetForestCatalog; Get-NetUser; Get-UserEvent; Get-NetComputer; Get-ADObject; Set-ADObject; Get-ObjectAcl; Add-ObjectAcl; Invoke-ACLScanner; Get-NetOU; Get-NetSite; Get-NetSubnet; Get-NetGroup; Find-ManagedSecurityGroups; Get-NetGroupMember; Get-NetFileServer; Get-DFSshare; Get-NetGPO; Get-NetGPOGroup; Find-GPOLocation; Find-GPOComputerAdmin; Get-LoggedOnLocal; Invoke-CheckLocalAdminAccess; Get-SiteName; Get-Proxy; Get-LastLoggedOn; Get-CachedRDPConnection; Get-RegistryMountedDrive; Get-NetProcess; Invoke-UserHunter; Invoke-ProcessHunter; Invoke-EventHunter; Invoke-ShareFinder; Invoke-FileFinder; Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin; Get-NetDomainTrust; Get-NetForestTrust; Find-ForeignUser; Find-ForeignGroup; Invoke-MapDomainTrust;""
+
+Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.
+
+Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.
+
+Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.
+
+Type 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/cmdkey_create_credential_store/cmdkey_create_credential_store_old.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+id: 9ed3255e-c601-46bb-9159-6ccc4d89cef6
+date: '2023-11-23'
+description: Generated datasets for cmdkey create credential store in attack range.
+environment: attackrange
+dataset:
+- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/cmdkey_create_credential_store/cmdkey_gen_sys.log
+sourcetypes:
+- XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+references:
+- https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.darkgate

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/cmdkey_create_credential_store/cmdkey_gen_sec.log

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}'/><EventID>4688</EventID><Version>2</Version><Level>0</Level><Task>13312</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2023-11-23T08:42:20.585875500Z'/><EventRecordID>449544</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='4' ThreadID='160'/><Channel>Security</Channel><Computer>ar-win-2.attackrange.local</Computer><Security/></System><EventData><Data Name='SubjectUserSid'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='SubjectUserName'>administrator</Data><Data Name='SubjectDomainName'>ATTACKRANGE</Data><Data Name='SubjectLogonId'>0x6e908</Data><Data Name='NewProcessId'>0xf90</Data><Data Name='NewProcessName'>C:\Windows\System32\cmdkey.exe</Data><Data Name='TokenElevationType'>%%1936</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>0x12d4</Data><Data Name='CommandLine'>cmdkey  /generic:"127.0.0.2" /user:"SafeMode" /pass:"darkgatepassword0"</Data><Data Name='TargetUserSid'>NULL SID</Data><Data Name='TargetUserName'>-</Data><Data Name='TargetDomainName'>-</Data><Data Name='TargetLogonId'>0x0</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessName'>C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe</Data><Data Name='MandatoryLabel'>Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level</Data></EventData></Event>

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/cmdkey_create_credential_store/cmdkey_gen_sys.log

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>1</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>1</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2023-11-23T08:42:20.586794600Z'/><EventRecordID>85680</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='1952' ThreadID='2476'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>ar-win-2.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2023-11-23 08:42:20.585</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{0BACA6B2-106C-655F-DD01-000000002903}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>3984</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\System32\cmdkey.exe</Data><Data Name='FileVersion'>10.0.14393.2430 (rs1_release_inmarket_aim.180806-1810)</Data><Data Name='Description'>Credential Manager Command Line Utility</Data><Data Name='Product'>Microsoft® Windows® Operating System</Data><Data Name='Company'>Microsoft Corporation</Data><Data Name='OriginalFileName'>cmdkey.exe</Data><Data Name='CommandLine'>cmdkey  /generic:"127.0.0.2" /user:"SafeMode" /pass:"darkgatepassword0"</Data><Data Name='CurrentDirectory'>C:\Temp\</Data><Data Name='User'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='LogonGuid'>{0BACA6B2-09C2-655F-08E9-060000000000}</Data><Data Name='LogonId'>0x6e908</Data><Data Name='TerminalSessionId'>2</Data><Data Name='IntegrityLevel'>High</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>MD5=343E6DA0ADF3D528C54E1767254432A6,SHA256=89B6A8CB5CF989E3D999482CECF779BA295871A9C80C8CA151694942D5881114,IMPHASH=02CCF792E6FC0981B34A77557B081489</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessGuid'>{0BACA6B2-106C-655F-DC01-000000002903}</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessId'>4820</Data><Data Name='ParentImage'>C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe</Data><Data Name='ParentCommandLine'>cmd.exe  /c cmdkey /generic:"127.0.0.2" /user:"SafeMode" /pass:"darkgatepassword0"</Data><Data Name='ParentUser'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data></EventData></Event>

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/cmdkey_delete_credentials_store/cmdkey_del_sec.log

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}'/><EventID>4688</EventID><Version>2</Version><Level>0</Level><Task>13312</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2023-11-23T08:42:20.515014300Z'/><EventRecordID>449540</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='4' ThreadID='272'/><Channel>Security</Channel><Computer>ar-win-2.attackrange.local</Computer><Security/></System><EventData><Data Name='SubjectUserSid'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='SubjectUserName'>administrator</Data><Data Name='SubjectDomainName'>ATTACKRANGE</Data><Data Name='SubjectLogonId'>0x6e908</Data><Data Name='NewProcessId'>0x13d4</Data><Data Name='NewProcessName'>C:\Windows\System32\cmdkey.exe</Data><Data Name='TokenElevationType'>%%1936</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>0x12dc</Data><Data Name='CommandLine'>cmdkey  /delete:Server01</Data><Data Name='TargetUserSid'>NULL SID</Data><Data Name='TargetUserName'>-</Data><Data Name='TargetDomainName'>-</Data><Data Name='TargetLogonId'>0x0</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessName'>C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe</Data><Data Name='MandatoryLabel'>Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level</Data></EventData></Event>

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/cmdkey_delete_credentials_store/cmdkey_del_sys.log

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>1</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>1</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2023-11-23T08:42:20.516473600Z'/><EventRecordID>85668</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='1952' ThreadID='2476'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>ar-win-2.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2023-11-23 08:42:20.514</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{0BACA6B2-106C-655F-DB01-000000002903}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>5076</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\System32\cmdkey.exe</Data><Data Name='FileVersion'>10.0.14393.2430 (rs1_release_inmarket_aim.180806-1810)</Data><Data Name='Description'>Credential Manager Command Line Utility</Data><Data Name='Product'>Microsoft® Windows® Operating System</Data><Data Name='Company'>Microsoft Corporation</Data><Data Name='OriginalFileName'>cmdkey.exe</Data><Data Name='CommandLine'>cmdkey  /delete:Server01</Data><Data Name='CurrentDirectory'>C:\Temp\</Data><Data Name='User'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='LogonGuid'>{0BACA6B2-09C2-655F-08E9-060000000000}</Data><Data Name='LogonId'>0x6e908</Data><Data Name='TerminalSessionId'>2</Data><Data Name='IntegrityLevel'>High</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>MD5=343E6DA0ADF3D528C54E1767254432A6,SHA256=89B6A8CB5CF989E3D999482CECF779BA295871A9C80C8CA151694942D5881114,IMPHASH=02CCF792E6FC0981B34A77557B081489</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessGuid'>{0BACA6B2-106C-655F-DA01-000000002903}</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessId'>4828</Data><Data Name='ParentImage'>C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe</Data><Data Name='ParentCommandLine'>cmd.exe  /c cmdkey /delete:Server01</Data><Data Name='ParentUser'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data></EventData></Event>

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/cmdkey_delete_credentials_store/cmdkey_delete_credentials_store_old.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+id: 9e430d87-b8f9-454c-9e8a-debc1e953bd1
+date: '2023-11-23'
+description: Generated datasets for cmdkey delete credentials store in attack range.
+environment: attackrange
+dataset:
+- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/cmdkey_delete_credentials_store/cmdkey_del_sys.log
+sourcetypes:
+- XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+references:
+- https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.darkgate

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir/data.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Generated by dataset_analyzer.py
+id: b195cbca-2297-4bfd-998d-c3a4081cb0ca
+date: '2025-08-12'
+description: Automatically categorized datasets in directory non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir
+environment: attack_range
+directory: non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir
+mitre_technique:
+- T1555
+datasets:
+- name: windows-xml
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir/windows-xml.log
+  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
+  source: XmlWinEventLog:Security

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir/windows-xml.log

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}'/><EventID>4663</EventID><Version>1</Version><Level>0</Level><Task>12801</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2024-02-29T05:21:56.530311800Z'/><EventRecordID>1319800</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='4' ThreadID='160'/><Channel>Security</Channel><Computer>ar-win-dc.attackrange.local</Computer><Security/></System><EventData><Data Name='SubjectUserSid'>NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM</Data><Data Name='SubjectUserName'>AR-WIN-DC$</Data><Data Name='SubjectDomainName'>ATTACKRANGE</Data><Data Name='SubjectLogonId'>0x3e7</Data><Data Name='ObjectServer'>Security</Data><Data Name='ObjectType'>Key</Data><Data Name='ObjectName'>\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Policy</Data><Data Name='HandleId'>0x340</Data><Data Name='AccessList'>%%4436
+				</Data><Data Name='AccessMask'>0x10</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>0x318</Data><Data Name='ProcessName'>C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe</Data><Data Name='ResourceAttributes'>-</Data></EventData></Event>
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}'/><EventID>4663</EventID><Version>1</Version><Level>0</Level><Task>12801</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2024-02-29T05:21:53.734853500Z'/><EventRecordID>650431</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='4' ThreadID='112'/><Channel>Security</Channel><Computer>ar-win-2.attackrange.local</Computer><Security/></System><EventData><Data Name='SubjectUserSid'>NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM</Data><Data Name='SubjectUserName'>AR-WIN-2$</Data><Data Name='SubjectDomainName'>ATTACKRANGE</Data><Data Name='SubjectLogonId'>0x3e7</Data><Data Name='ObjectServer'>Security</Data><Data Name='ObjectType'>Key</Data><Data Name='ObjectName'>\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\BackgroundModel\Policy</Data><Data Name='HandleId'>0x33c</Data><Data Name='AccessList'>%%4436
+				</Data><Data Name='AccessMask'>0x10</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>0x2c4</Data><Data Name='ProcessName'>C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe</Data><Data Name='ResourceAttributes'>-</Data></EventData></Event>
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}'/><EventID>4663</EventID><Version>1</Version><Level>0</Level><Task>12801</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2024-02-29T05:21:53.834853500Z'/><EventRecordID>650431</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='4' ThreadID='112'/><Channel>Security</Channel><Computer>ar-win-2.attackrange.local</Computer><Security/></System><EventData><Data Name='SubjectUserSid'>NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM</Data><Data Name='SubjectUserName'>AR-WIN-2$</Data><Data Name='SubjectDomainName'>ATTACKRANGE</Data><Data Name='SubjectLogonId'>0x3e7</Data><Data Name='ObjectServer'>Security</Data><Data Name='ObjectType'>Key</Data><Data Name='ObjectName'>\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppData\Roaming\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default</Data><Data Name='HandleId'>0x33c</Data><Data Name='AccessList'>%%4436
+				</Data><Data Name='AccessMask'>0x10</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>0x2c4</Data><Data Name='ProcessName'>C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe</Data><Data Name='ResourceAttributes'>-</Data></EventData></Event>

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/web_browser_pass_view.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Teoderick Contreras
+id: c3e68b5e-babb-4ef1-b835-62de0b025006
+date: '2021-11-22'
+description: simulated brwser pass view application used by remcos in attackrange
+environment: attack_range
+directory: web_browser_pass_view
+mitre_technique:
+- T1555
+datasets:
+- name: sysmon
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log
+  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
+  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.001/atomic_red_team/atomic_red_team.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+id: deab3766-be55-4bc3-8b9a-2ab47d84d1d2
+date: '2022-03-30'
+description: Atomic testing with T1553.005 related to lnk and iso.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: atomic_red_team
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556.001
+datasets:
+- name: iso_windows-sysmon
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.001/atomic_red_team/iso_windows-sysmon.log
+  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
+  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.001/atomic_red_team/iso_windows-sysmon.log

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>11</EventID><Version>2</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>11</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-03-29T19:25:46.660834700Z'/><EventRecordID>58450</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='340' ThreadID='3108'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>win-dc-mhaag-attack-range-702.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2022-03-29 19:25:46.655</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-5079-6243-D905-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>4648</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE</Data><Data Name='TargetFilename'>C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\FeelTheBurn.iso.lnk</Data><Data Name='CreationUtcTime'>2022-03-29 19:25:46.655</Data></EventData></Event>
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>1</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>1</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-03-29T19:22:27.768122600Z'/><EventRecordID>56831</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='340' ThreadID='3108'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>win-dc-mhaag-attack-range-702.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2022-03-29 19:22:27.765</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-5C73-6243-BE07-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>6412</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe</Data><Data Name='FileVersion'>10.0.14393.206 (rs1_release.160915-0644)</Data><Data Name='Description'>Windows PowerShell</Data><Data Name='Product'>Microsoft® Windows® Operating System</Data><Data Name='Company'>Microsoft Corporation</Data><Data Name='OriginalFileName'>PowerShell.EXE</Data><Data Name='CommandLine'>"powershell.exe" &amp; {$keep = Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath \""C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1553.005\bin\FeelTheBurn.iso\"" -StorageType ISO -Access ReadOnly
+$driveLetter = ($keep | Get-Volume).DriveLetter
+invoke-item \""$($driveLetter):\hello.exe\""}</Data><Data Name='CurrentDirectory'>C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\</Data><Data Name='User'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='LogonGuid'>{92CAAE11-5077-6243-DC1E-580000000000}</Data><Data Name='LogonId'>0x581edc</Data><Data Name='TerminalSessionId'>2</Data><Data Name='IntegrityLevel'>High</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>MD5=097CE5761C89434367598B34FE32893B,SHA256=BA4038FD20E474C047BE8AAD5BFACDB1BFC1DDBE12F803F473B7918D8D819436,IMPHASH=CAEE994F79D85E47C06E5FA9CDEAE453</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-5091-6243-F705-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessId'>6980</Data><Data Name='ParentImage'>C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe</Data><Data Name='ParentCommandLine'>"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" </Data></EventData></Event>
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>1</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>1</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-03-29T19:22:26.851376600Z'/><EventRecordID>56727</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='340' ThreadID='3108'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>win-dc-mhaag-attack-range-702.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2022-03-29 19:22:26.849</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-5C72-6243-BA07-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>5540</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe</Data><Data Name='FileVersion'>10.0.14393.206 (rs1_release.160915-0644)</Data><Data Name='Description'>Windows PowerShell</Data><Data Name='Product'>Microsoft® Windows® Operating System</Data><Data Name='Company'>Microsoft Corporation</Data><Data Name='OriginalFileName'>PowerShell.EXE</Data><Data Name='CommandLine'>"powershell.exe" &amp; {Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath \""C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1553.005\bin\T1553.005.iso\""}</Data><Data Name='CurrentDirectory'>C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\</Data><Data Name='User'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='LogonGuid'>{92CAAE11-5077-6243-DC1E-580000000000}</Data><Data Name='LogonId'>0x581edc</Data><Data Name='TerminalSessionId'>2</Data><Data Name='IntegrityLevel'>High</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>MD5=097CE5761C89434367598B34FE32893B,SHA256=BA4038FD20E474C047BE8AAD5BFACDB1BFC1DDBE12F803F473B7918D8D819436,IMPHASH=CAEE994F79D85E47C06E5FA9CDEAE453</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-5091-6243-F705-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessId'>6980</Data><Data Name='ParentImage'>C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe</Data><Data Name='ParentCommandLine'>"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" </Data></EventData></Event>
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>1</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>1</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-03-29T19:22:05.681508500Z'/><EventRecordID>56412</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='340' ThreadID='3108'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>win-dc-mhaag-attack-range-702.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2022-03-29 19:22:05.679</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-5C5D-6243-B007-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>2384</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe</Data><Data Name='FileVersion'>10.0.14393.206 (rs1_release.160915-0644)</Data><Data Name='Description'>Windows PowerShell</Data><Data Name='Product'>Microsoft® Windows® Operating System</Data><Data Name='Company'>Microsoft Corporation</Data><Data Name='OriginalFileName'>PowerShell.EXE</Data><Data Name='CommandLine'>"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" &amp; {if (Test-Path C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1553.005\bin\FeelTheBurn.iso) {exit 0} else {exit 1}} </Data><Data Name='CurrentDirectory'>C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\</Data><Data Name='User'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='LogonGuid'>{92CAAE11-5077-6243-DC1E-580000000000}</Data><Data Name='LogonId'>0x581edc</Data><Data Name='TerminalSessionId'>2</Data><Data Name='IntegrityLevel'>High</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>MD5=097CE5761C89434367598B34FE32893B,SHA256=BA4038FD20E474C047BE8AAD5BFACDB1BFC1DDBE12F803F473B7918D8D819436,IMPHASH=CAEE994F79D85E47C06E5FA9CDEAE453</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-5091-6243-F705-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessId'>6980</Data><Data Name='ParentImage'>C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe</Data><Data Name='ParentCommandLine'>"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" </Data></EventData></Event>
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>1</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>1</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-03-29T19:22:04.875882700Z'/><EventRecordID>56366</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='340' ThreadID='3108'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>win-dc-mhaag-attack-range-702.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2022-03-29 19:22:04.870</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-5C5C-6243-AF07-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>5312</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe</Data><Data Name='FileVersion'>10.0.14393.206 (rs1_release.160915-0644)</Data><Data Name='Description'>Windows PowerShell</Data><Data Name='Product'>Microsoft® Windows® Operating System</Data><Data Name='Company'>Microsoft Corporation</Data><Data Name='OriginalFileName'>PowerShell.EXE</Data><Data Name='CommandLine'>"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" &amp; {if (Test-Path C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1553.005\bin\T1553.005.iso) {exit 0} else {exit 1}} </Data><Data Name='CurrentDirectory'>C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\</Data><Data Name='User'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='LogonGuid'>{92CAAE11-5077-6243-DC1E-580000000000}</Data><Data Name='LogonId'>0x581edc</Data><Data Name='TerminalSessionId'>2</Data><Data Name='IntegrityLevel'>High</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>MD5=097CE5761C89434367598B34FE32893B,SHA256=BA4038FD20E474C047BE8AAD5BFACDB1BFC1DDBE12F803F473B7918D8D819436,IMPHASH=CAEE994F79D85E47C06E5FA9CDEAE453</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-5091-6243-F705-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessId'>6980</Data><Data Name='ParentImage'>C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe</Data><Data Name='ParentCommandLine'>"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" </Data></EventData></Event>
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>23</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>23</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-03-29T18:45:39.182334300Z'/><EventRecordID>43137</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='340' ThreadID='3108'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>win-dc-mhaag-attack-range-702.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2022-03-29 18:45:39.181</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-50B0-6243-0206-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>7000</Data><Data Name='User'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell_ISE.exe</Data><Data Name='TargetFilename'>C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\iso\FeelTheBurn.iso</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>MD5=7A77153B5CAAF17C971EF12C2EF6AD6E,SHA256=C418A81720FC9682D197A399B82335D41CCFDFC707C2CF90F771C1C2FA4128B1,IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000</Data><Data Name='IsExecutable'>false</Data><Data Name='Archived'>true</Data></EventData></Event>
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>23</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>23</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-03-29T18:43:14.513019100Z'/><EventRecordID>41857</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='340' ThreadID='3108'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>win-dc-mhaag-attack-range-702.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2022-03-29 18:43:14.505</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-50B0-6243-0206-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>7000</Data><Data Name='User'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell_ISE.exe</Data><Data Name='TargetFilename'>C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\iso\FeelTheBurn.iso</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>MD5=D41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E,SHA256=E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649B934CA495991B7852B855,IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000</Data><Data Name='IsExecutable'>false</Data><Data Name='Archived'>true</Data></EventData></Event>
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>23</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>23</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-03-29T18:41:06.064356900Z'/><EventRecordID>40696</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='340' ThreadID='3108'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>win-dc-mhaag-attack-range-702.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2022-03-29 18:41:06.059</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-50B0-6243-0206-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>7000</Data><Data Name='User'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell_ISE.exe</Data><Data Name='TargetFilename'>C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\iso\FeelTheBurn.iso</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>MD5=D41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E,SHA256=E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649B934CA495991B7852B855,IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000</Data><Data Name='IsExecutable'>false</Data><Data Name='Archived'>true</Data></EventData></Event>
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>23</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>23</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-03-29T18:39:17.504554700Z'/><EventRecordID>39552</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='340' ThreadID='3108'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>win-dc-mhaag-attack-range-702.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2022-03-29 18:39:17.496</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-50B0-6243-0206-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>7000</Data><Data Name='User'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell_ISE.exe</Data><Data Name='TargetFilename'>C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\iso\FeelTheBurn.iso</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>MD5=D41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E,SHA256=E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649B934CA495991B7852B855,IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000</Data><Data Name='IsExecutable'>false</Data><Data Name='Archived'>true</Data></EventData></Event>
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>23</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>23</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-03-29T18:39:17.498307100Z'/><EventRecordID>39551</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='340' ThreadID='3108'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>win-dc-mhaag-attack-range-702.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2022-03-29 18:39:17.496</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-50B0-6243-0206-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>7000</Data><Data Name='User'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell_ISE.exe</Data><Data Name='TargetFilename'>C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\iso\FeelTheBurn.iso:Zone.Identifier</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>MD5=E171133FD447E86061D4609D23F3A8A5,SHA256=05FEE91BA07E8C3D23160F7271711B8DBC86BD1C4E663C7ABD2A19F0DCDA50ED,IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000</Data><Data Name='IsExecutable'>false</Data><Data Name='Archived'>false - rename failed with status 0xc000000d</Data></EventData></Event>
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>23</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>23</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-03-29T18:38:40.441830000Z'/><EventRecordID>39307</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='340' ThreadID='3108'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>win-dc-mhaag-attack-range-702.attackrange.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2022-03-29 18:38:40.427</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{92CAAE11-50B0-6243-0206-000000004102}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>7000</Data><Data Name='User'>ATTACKRANGE\Administrator</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell_ISE.exe</Data><Data Name='TargetFilename'>C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\iso\FeelTheBurn.iso:Zone.Identifier</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>MD5=E171133FD447E86061D4609D23F3A8A5,SHA256=05FEE91BA07E8C3D23160F7271711B8DBC86BD1C4E663C7ABD2A19F0DCDA50ED,IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000</Data><Data Name='IsExecutable'>false</Data><Data Name='Archived'>false - rename failed with status 0xc000000d</Data></EventData></Event>

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.002/snapattack/snapattack.log

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" Guid="5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9">    </Provider>    <EventID>13</EventID>    <Version>2</Version>    <Level>4</Level>    <Task>13</Task>    <Opcode>0</Opcode>    <Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords>    <TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-08-03 14:20:51.972347 UTC'>    </TimeCreated>    <EventRecordID>257</EventRecordID>    <Correlation>    </Correlation>    <Execution ProcessID="5456" ThreadID="5168">    </Execution>    <Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel>    <Computer>SLABS-DC.snapattack.labs</Computer>    <Security UserID="S-1-5-18">    </Security></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data>    <Data Name='EventType'>SetValue</Data>    <Data Name='UtcTime'>2022-08-03 14:20:51.964</Data>    <Data Name='ProcessGuid'>CD3508C3-82EF-62EA-D400-00000000B301</Data>    <Data Name='ProcessId'>6888</Data>    <Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe</Data>    <Data Name='TargetObject'>HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages</Data>    <Data Name='Details'>Binary Data</Data>    <Data Name='User'>SNAPATTACK\user</Data></EventData></Event>

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.002/snapattack/snapattack.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Raven Tait, Splunk
+id: f04f48e9-ab85-4b2b-8205-1904c9302d49
+date: '2026-04-01'
+description: Generated datasets for Windows Password Filter DLL in attack range.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: snapattack
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556.002
+datasets:
+-   name: snapattack
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.002/snapattack/snapattack.log

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user/amazon_security_lake.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"activity_id":3,"activity_name":"Operational","api":{"operation":"CreateVirtualMFADevice","request":{"uid":"c07d521e-ae1e-482b-b25e-1a01c7bab147"},"response":{"error":null,"message":null},"service":{"name":"iam.amazonaws.com"},"version":null},"category_name":"Cloud Activity","category_uid":5,"class_name":"Cloud API","class_uid":5001,"cloud":{"provider":"AWS","region":"us-east-1"},"http_request":{"user_agent":"AWS Internal"},"identity":{"idp":{"name":null},"invoked_by":null,"session":{"created_time":1684761598000,"issuer":null,"mfa":false},"user":{"account_uid":"739595645681","credential_uid":"ASIA2YM2V6LYKI2RDX6F","name":"test@splunk.com","type":"IAMUser","uid":"AIDA2YM2V6LYNCMFHIMAY","uuid":"arn:aws:iam::739595645681:user/test@splunk.com"}},"metadata":{"product":{"feature":{"name":"Management, Data, and Insights"},"name":"CloudTrail","vendor_name":"AWS","version":"1.08"},"profiles":["cloud"],"version":"0.26.1"},"ref_event_uid":"c641ab3f-f458-4971-bc8c-e994469061f3","resources":null,"severity":"Unknown","severity_id":0,"src_endpoint":{"domain":null,"ip":"186.95.188.101","uid":null},"time":1684762230000,"type_name":"Cloud API: Operational","type_uid":500103,"unmapped":[{"key":"responseElements.virtualMFADevice.serialNumber","value":"arn:aws:iam::739595645681:mfa/test"},{"key":"eventCategory","value":"Management"},{"key":"sessionCredentialFromConsole","value":"true"},{"key":"requestParameters.virtualMFADeviceName","value":"test"},{"key":"requestParameters.path","value":"/"},{"key":"recipientAccountId","value":"739595645681"},{"key":"readOnly","value":"false"},{"key":"managementEvent","value":"true"}]}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user/asl_ocsf_cloudtrail.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"metadata":{"product":{"version":"1.10","name":"CloudTrail","vendor_name":"AWS","feature":{"name":"Management"}},"event_code":"AwsApiCall","uid":"ee31c0df-8274-487f-b148-c3dcf853a8c0","profiles":"cloud","profiles":"datetime","version":"1.1.0"},"time":1733992334000,"time_dt":1733992334000,"cloud":{"region":"us-east-1","provider":"AWS"},"api":{"response":{"error":"","message":"","data":"{\"virtualMFADevice\":{\"serialNumber\":\"arn:aws:iam::222222222222:mfa/test\"}}"},"operation":"CreateVirtualMFADevice","version":"","service":{"name":"iam.amazonaws.com"},"request":{"data":"{\"path\":\"/\",\"virtualMFADeviceName\":\"test\"}","uid":"30c316c3-8c67-4196-b848-07bd71d86c77"}},"dst_endpoint":{"svc_name":""},"actor":{"user":{"type":"AssumedRole","name":"","uid_alt":"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:test@test.com","uid":"arn:aws:sts::222222222222:assumed-role/7d40dd7e11854f8/test@test.com","account":{"uid":"222222222222"},"credential_uid":"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"},"session":{"created_time_dt":1733991590000,"is_mfa":false,"issuer":"arn:aws:iam::222222222222:role/aws-reserved/sso.amazonaws.com/us-west-2/7d40dd7e11854f8"},"invoked_by":"","idp":{"name":""}},"http_request":{"user_agent":"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36"},"src_endpoint":{"uid":"","ip":"84.174.65.161","domain":""},"session":{"uid":"","uid_alt":"","credential_uid":"","issuer":""},"policy":{"uid":""},"resources":null,"class_name":"Account Change","class_uid":3001,"category_name":"Identity & Access Management","category_uid":3,"severity_id":1,"severity":"Informational","user":{"uid_alt":"","uid":"","name":""},"activity_name":"Create","activity_id":1,"type_uid":300101,"type_name":"Account Change: Create","status":"Success","is_mfa":false,"unmapped":{"userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type":"Role","sessionCredentialFromConsole":"true","tlsDetails.clientProvidedHostHeader":"iam.amazonaws.com","userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName":"7d40dd7e11854f8","userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.principalId":"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA","recipientAccountId":"222222222222","readOnly":"false","tlsDetails.tlsVersion":"TLSv1.3","managementEvent":"true","userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.accountId":"222222222222","tlsDetails.cipherSuite":"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"},"accountid":"","region":"","asl_version":"","observables":{"name":"src_endpoint.ip","value":"84.174.65.161","type":"IP Address","type_id":2}}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user/aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Bhavin Patel
+id: ff860c11-881f-4d35-a9a9-83b3f311f171
+date: '2023-05-22'
+description: Registed new MFA methods for an AWS Account
+environment: attack_range
+directory: aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556.006
+datasets:
+- name: asl_ocsf_cloudtrail-json
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user/asl_ocsf_cloudtrail.json
+  sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail:lake
+  source: aws_asl

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user/cloudtrail.json

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+{"eventVersion": "1.08", "userIdentity": {"type": "Root", "principalId": "140429656527", "arn": "arn:aws:iam::140429656527:root", "accountId": "140429656527", "accessKeyId": "ASIASBMSCQHH2YXNXJBU", "sessionContext": {"sessionIssuer": {}, "webIdFederationData": {}, "attributes": {"creationDate": "2023-01-30T22:59:36Z", "mfaAuthenticated": "false"}}}, "eventTime": "2023-01-30T23:02:23Z", "eventSource": "iam.amazonaws.com", "eventName": "CreateVirtualMFADevice", "awsRegion": "us-east-1", "sourceIPAddress": "23.93.193.6", "userAgent": "AWS Internal", "requestParameters": {"path": "/", "virtualMFADeviceName": "strt_mfa_2"}, "responseElements": {"virtualMFADevice": {"serialNumber": "arn:aws:iam::140429656527:mfa/strt_mfa_2"}}, "requestID": "2fbe2074-55f8-4ec6-ad32-0b250803cf46", "eventID": "7e1c493d-c3c3-4f4a-ae4f-8cdd38970027", "readOnly": false, "eventType": "AwsApiCall", "managementEvent": true, "recipientAccountId": "140429656527", "eventCategory": "Management", "sessionCredentialFromConsole": "true"}
+{"eventVersion": "1.08", "userIdentity": {"type": "Root", "principalId": "140429656527", "arn": "arn:aws:iam::140429656527:root", "accountId": "140429656527", "accessKeyId": "ASIASBMSCQHH2YXNXJBU", "sessionContext": {"sessionIssuer": {}, "webIdFederationData": {}, "attributes": {"creationDate": "2023-01-30T22:59:36Z", "mfaAuthenticated": "false"}}}, "eventTime": "2023-01-30T23:00:16Z", "eventSource": "iam.amazonaws.com", "eventName": "CreateVirtualMFADevice", "awsRegion": "us-east-1", "sourceIPAddress": "23.93.193.6", "userAgent": "AWS Internal", "requestParameters": {"path": "/", "virtualMFADeviceName": "strt_mfa"}, "responseElements": {"virtualMFADevice": {"serialNumber": "arn:aws:iam::140429656527:mfa/strt_mfa"}}, "requestID": "f3175e7b-58c7-4dcc-9957-1ac57db6b38f", "eventID": "e2693953-e3e8-4dc9-b41e-1300567771b3", "readOnly": false, "eventType": "AwsApiCall", "managementEvent": true, "recipientAccountId": "140429656527", "eventCategory": "Management", "sessionCredentialFromConsole": "true"}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/azure_ad_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user/azure_ad_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Mauricio Velazco
+id: ff860c21-881f-4d35-a9a9-83b3f38bf171
+date: '2023-01-30'
+description: Registed new MFA methods for an Azure AD account
+environment: attack_range
+directory: azure_ad_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556.006
+datasets:
+- name: azuread
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/azure_ad_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user/azuread.log
+  sourcetype: azure:monitor:aad
+  source: azure

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/azure_ad_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user/azuread.log

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+{"time": "2023-01-30T21:11:30.8690619Z", "resourceId": "/tenants/91da745f-8abb-4a7d-ba94-5667c6f9e01a/providers/Microsoft.aadiam", "operationName": "User registered security info", "operationVersion": "1.0", "category": "AuditLogs", "tenantId": "91da745f-8abb-4a7d-ba94-5667c6f9e01a", "resultSignature": "None", "resultDescription": "User registered App Password", "durationMs": 0, "callerIpAddress": "72.1.2.43", "correlationId": "14279c94-7ebc-409f-be4e-7861f13c8a79", "Level": 4, "properties": {"id": "IAMUX_14279c94-7ebc-409f-be4e-7861f13c8a79_K2ATV_323947358", "category": "UserManagement", "correlationId": "14279c94-7ebc-409f-be4e-7861f13c8a79", "result": "success", "resultReason": "User registered App Password", "activityDisplayName": "User registered security info", "activityDateTime": "2023-01-30T21:11:30.8690619+00:00", "loggedByService": "Authentication Methods", "operationType": "Add", "userAgent": null, "initiatedBy": {"user": {"id": "40b61050-e814-4ae5-8ffe-66b6f0c53998", "displayName": null, "userPrincipalName": "User30@splunkresearch.com", "ipAddress": "72.1.2.43", "roles": []}}, "targetResources": [{"id": "40b61050-e814-4ae5-8ffe-66b6f0c53998", "displayName": "User30", "type": "User", "userPrincipalName": "User30@splunkresearch.com", "modifiedProperties": [], "administrativeUnits": []}], "additionalDetails": []}}
+{"time": "2023-01-30T21:05:11.7829705Z", "resourceId": "/tenants/91da745f-8abb-4a7d-ba94-5667c6f9e01a/providers/Microsoft.aadiam", "operationName": "User registered security info", "operationVersion": "1.0", "category": "AuditLogs", "tenantId": "91da745f-8abb-4a7d-ba94-5667c6f9e01a", "resultSignature": "None", "resultDescription": "User registered Mobile Phone SMS", "durationMs": 0, "callerIpAddress": "72.1.2.43", "correlationId": "5670a54f-2dee-4bf5-b4af-d6d88f97e30f", "Level": 4, "properties": {"id": "IAMUX_5670a54f-2dee-4bf5-b4af-d6d88f97e30f_1LSPN_286276643", "category": "UserManagement", "correlationId": "5670a54f-2dee-4bf5-b4af-d6d88f97e30f", "result": "success", "resultReason": "User registered Mobile Phone SMS", "activityDisplayName": "User registered security info", "activityDateTime": "2023-01-30T21:05:11.7829705+00:00", "loggedByService": "Authentication Methods", "operationType": "Add", "userAgent": null, "initiatedBy": {"user": {"id": "40b61050-e814-4ae5-8ffe-66b6f0c53998", "displayName": null, "userPrincipalName": "User30@splunkresearch.com", "ipAddress": "72.1.2.43", "roles": []}}, "targetResources": [{"id": "40b61050-e814-4ae5-8ffe-66b6f0c53998", "displayName": "User30", "type": "User", "userPrincipalName": "User30@splunkresearch.com", "modifiedProperties": [], "administrativeUnits": []}], "additionalDetails": []}}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/azure_ad_temporary_access_pass/azure-audit.log

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"time": "2026-06-12T02:38:47.9081123Z", "resourceId": "/tenants/8f3b2a91-6e4d-4b7a-9c1e-2d5f8a3b6c47/providers/Microsoft.aadiam", "operationName": "Create Temporary Access Pass method for user", "operationVersion": "1.0", "category": "AuditLogs", "tenantId": "8f3b2a91-6e4d-4b7a-9c1e-2d5f8a3b6c47", "resultSignature": "None", "resultDescription": "None", "durationMs": 0, "callerIpAddress": "185.220.101.47", "correlationId": "2a3b4c5d-6e1f-4a7b-9c8d-1a2b3c4d5e6f", "Level": 4, "properties": {"id": "Directory_2a3b4c5d-6e1f-4a7b-9c8d-1a2b3c4d5e6f_TAP_50231277", "category": "UserManagement", "correlationId": "2a3b4c5d-6e1f-4a7b-9c8d-1a2b3c4d5e6f", "result": "success", "resultReason": "", "activityDisplayName": "Create Temporary Access Pass method for user", "activityDateTime": "2026-06-12T02:38:47.9081123+00:00", "loggedByService": "Authentication Methods", "operationType": "Assign", "userAgent": null, "initiatedBy": {"user": {"id": "5c7d9e21-4a3b-4f6c-8d1e-2b7a9c4e6f83", "displayName": null, "userPrincipalName": "svc-deploy-admin@splunkresearch.com", "ipAddress": "185.220.101.47", "roles": []}}, "targetResources": [{"id": "0e1f2a3b-4c5d-46e1-8a7b-9c8d1a2b3c4d", "displayName": null, "type": "User", "userPrincipalName": "global.admin@splunkresearch.com", "modifiedProperties": [], "administrativeUnits": []}], "additionalDetails": [{"key": "TapLifetimeMinutes", "value": "480"}]}}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/azure_ad_temporary_access_pass/azure_ad_temporary_access_pass.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+author: descambiado
+id: 7f1a9c3e-5b2d-4f8a-b6e1-3c9d5a7f2b48
+date: '2026-06-12'
+description: Created a Temporary Access Pass for a Global Administrator account
+  outside of business hours, granting an MFA/FIDO2-bypassing authentication path
+  into the account. Tenant specific details have been replaced in the dataset including
+  tenant id, user names, ips, etc.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: azure_ad_temporary_access_pass
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556.006
+- T1078.004
+datasets:
+- name: azure-audit
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/azure_ad_temporary_access_pass/azure-audit.log
+  sourcetype: azure:monitor:aad
+  source: azure

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/okta_mfa_method_disabled/okta_mfa_method_disabled.log

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+{"actor": {"id": "00ufb5gta21oowKfZ5d7", "type": "User", "alternateId": "user15@splunkresearch.com", "displayName": "user15 V", "detailEntry": null}, "client": {"userAgent": {"rawUserAgent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/122.0.0.0 Safari/537.36", "os": "Mac OS 14.3.1 (Sonoma)", "browser": "CHROME"}, "zone": "null", "device": "Computer", "id": null, "ipAddress": "120.1.121.43", "geographicalContext": {"city": "Ohio", "state": "Ohio", "country": "United States", "postalCode": "10065", "geolocation": {"lat": 20.7652, "lon": -43.9588}}}, "device": null, "authenticationContext": {"authenticationProvider": null, "credentialProvider": null, "credentialType": null, "issuer": null, "interface": null, "authenticationStep": 0, "externalSessionId": "102xP96gJgFT32rsDF3o7IHRg"}, "displayMessage": "Reset factor for user", "eventType": "user.mfa.factor.deactivate", "outcome": {"result": "SUCCESS", "reason": "User reset OKTA_VERIFY_PUSH factor"}, "published": "2024-03-11T16:28:18.167Z", "securityContext": {"asNumber": 12271, "asOrg": "twc internal spectrum", "isp": "charter communications inc", "domain": "rr.com", "isProxy": false}, "severity": "INFO", "debugContext": {"debugData": {"requestId": "5e32024c5d1d1ed06a7d7d7bcce98d24", "dtHash": "3b76be837500675c6436185fd1a47a89f6eb66f513476bc98ef010e9fb7e772e", "requestUri": "/api/v1/devices/guofgkgif6Rfvzahn5d7/lifecycle/deactivate", "url": "/api/v1/devices/guofgkgif6Rfvzahn5d7/lifecycle/deactivate?"}}, "legacyEventType": "core.user.factor.deactivate", "transaction": {"type": "WEB", "id": "5e32024c5d1d1ed06a7d7d7bcce98d24", "detail": {}}, "uuid": "5e2d38e1-dfc4-11ee-be83-538191b64b24", "version": "0", "request": {"ipChain": [{"ip": "120.1.121.43", "geographicalContext": {"city": "Ohio", "state": "Ohio", "country": "United States", "postalCode": "10065", "geolocation": {"lat": 40.7652, "lon": -73.9588}}, "version": "V4", "source": null}]}, "target": [{"id": "00uffks4r9kkYNxpj5d7", "type": "User", "alternateId": "user15o@splunkresearch.com", "displayName": "user15 2 V", "detailEntry": null}]}
+{"actor": {"id": "00ufb5gta21oowKfZ5d7", "type": "User", "alternateId": "user15@splunkresearch.com", "displayName": "user15 V", "detailEntry": null}, "client": {"userAgent": {"rawUserAgent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/122.0.0.0 Safari/537.36", "os": "Mac OS 14.3.1 (Sonoma)", "browser": "CHROME"}, "zone": "null", "device": "Computer", "id": null, "ipAddress": "120.1.121.43", "geographicalContext": {"city": "Ohio", "state": "Ohio", "country": "United States", "postalCode": "10065", "geolocation": {"lat": 20.7652, "lon": -43.9588}}}, "device": null, "authenticationContext": {"authenticationProvider": null, "credentialProvider": null, "credentialType": null, "issuer": null, "interface": null, "authenticationStep": 0, "externalSessionId": "102xP96gJgFT32rsDF3o7IHRg"}, "displayMessage": "Reset factor for user", "eventType": "user.mfa.factor.deactivate", "outcome": {"result": "SUCCESS", "reason": "User reset OKTA_SOFT_TOKEN factor"}, "published": "2024-03-11T16:28:18.155Z", "securityContext": {"asNumber": 12271, "asOrg": "twc internal spectrum", "isp": "charter communications inc", "domain": "rr.com", "isProxy": false}, "severity": "INFO", "debugContext": {"debugData": {"requestId": "5e32024c5d1d1ed06a7d7d7bcce98d24", "dtHash": "3b76be837500675c6436185fd1a47a89f6eb66f513476bc98ef010e9fb7e772e", "requestUri": "/api/v1/devices/guofgkgif6Rfvzahn5d7/lifecycle/deactivate", "url": "/api/v1/devices/guofgkgif6Rfvzahn5d7/lifecycle/deactivate?"}}, "legacyEventType": "core.user.factor.deactivate", "transaction": {"type": "WEB", "id": "5e32024c5d1d1ed06a7d7d7bcce98d24", "detail": {}}, "uuid": "5e2b641e-dfc4-11ee-be83-538191b64b24", "version": "0", "request": {"ipChain": [{"ip": "120.1.121.43", "geographicalContext": {"city": "Ohio", "state": "Ohio", "country": "United States", "postalCode": "10065", "geolocation": {"lat": 40.7652, "lon": -73.9588}}, "version": "V4", "source": null}]}, "target": [{"id": "00uffks4r9kkYNxpj5d7", "type": "User", "alternateId": "user15@splunkresearch.com", "displayName": "user15 2 V", "detailEntry": null}]}
+{"actor": {"id": "00ufb5gta21oowKfZ5d7", "type": "User", "alternateId": "user15@splunkresearch.com", "displayName": "user15 V", "detailEntry": null}, "client": {"userAgent": {"rawUserAgent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/122.0.0.0 Safari/537.36", "os": "Mac OS 14.3.1 (Sonoma)", "browser": "CHROME"}, "zone": "null", "device": "Computer", "id": null, "ipAddress": "120.1.121.43", "geographicalContext": {"city": "Ohio", "state": "Ohio", "country": "United States", "postalCode": "10065", "geolocation": {"lat": 20.7652, "lon": -43.9588}}}, "device": null, "authenticationContext": {"authenticationProvider": null, "credentialProvider": null, "credentialType": null, "issuer": null, "interface": null, "authenticationStep": 0, "externalSessionId": "102xP96gJgFT32rsDF3o7IHRg"}, "displayMessage": "Reset factor for user", "eventType": "user.mfa.factor.deactivate", "outcome": {"result": "SUCCESS", "reason": "User reset SIGNED_NONCE factor"}, "published": "2024-03-11T16:28:18.144Z", "securityContext": {"asNumber": 12271, "asOrg": "twc internal spectrum", "isp": "charter communications inc", "domain": "rr.com", "isProxy": false}, "severity": "INFO", "debugContext": {"debugData": {"requestId": "5e32024c5d1d1ed06a7d7d7bcce98d24", "dtHash": "3b76be837500675c6436185fd1a47a89f6eb66f513476bc98ef010e9fb7e772e", "requestUri": "/api/v1/devices/guofgkgif6Rfvzahn5d7/lifecycle/deactivate", "url": "/api/v1/devices/guofgkgif6Rfvzahn5d7/lifecycle/deactivate?"}}, "legacyEventType": "core.user.factor.deactivate", "transaction": {"type": "WEB", "id": "5e32024c5d1d1ed06a7d7d7bcce98d24", "detail": {}}, "uuid": "5e29b66b-dfc4-11ee-be83-538191b64b24", "version": "0", "request": {"ipChain": [{"ip": "120.1.121.43", "geographicalContext": {"city": "Ohio", "state": "Ohio", "country": "United States", "postalCode": "10065", "geolocation": {"lat": 40.7652, "lon": -73.9588}}, "version": "V4", "source": null}]}, "target": [{"id": "00uffks4r9kkYNxpj5d7", "type": "User", "alternateId": "user15o@splunkresearch.com", "displayName": "user15 2 V", "detailEntry": null}]}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/okta_mfa_method_disabled/okta_mfa_method_disabled.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Mauricio Velazco
+id: b582f8e4-283c-4b96-b64d-7723c540ff5e
+date: '2024-03-11'
+description: Using the Okta admin portal, disabled MFA for a user.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: okta_mfa_method_disabled
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556.006
+datasets:
+- name: okta_mfa_method_disabled
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/okta_mfa_method_disabled/okta_mfa_method_disabled.log
+  sourcetype: OktaIM2:log
+  source: Okta

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/azuread/azure-audit.log

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"time": "2023-07-11T00:01:35.0251899Z", "resourceId": "/tenants/fc69e276-e9e8-4af9-9002-1e410d77244e/providers/Microsoft.aadiam", "operationName": "Disable Strong Authentication", "operationVersion": "1.0", "category": "AuditLogs", "tenantId": "fc69e276-e9e8-4af9-9002-1e410d77244e", "resultSignature": "None", "durationMs": 0, "correlationId": "7e3ee05c-ce4f-4ff1-8230-55555c25c97e", "Level": 4, "properties": {"id": "Directory_7e3ee05c-ce4f-4ff1-8230-55555c25c97e_DADCR_14299826", "category": "UserManagement", "correlationId": "7e3ee05c-ce4f-4ff1-8230-55555c25c97e", "result": "success", "resultReason": "", "activityDisplayName": "Disable Strong Authentication", "activityDateTime": "2023-07-11T00:01:35.0251899+00:00", "loggedByService": "Core Directory", "operationType": "Update", "userAgent": null, "initiatedBy": {"user": {"id": "728989f4-eb3d-45c2-8741-2f2af4e485ce", "displayName": null, "userPrincipalName": "oops@splunkresearch.com", "ipAddress": "", "roles": []}}, "targetResources": [{"id": "94b969a3-11cb-4075-a1fd-9fee3daf692e", "displayName": null, "type": "User", "userPrincipalName": "Abigail.Clark@splunkresearch.com", "modifiedProperties": [{"displayName": "StrongAuthenticationRequirement", "oldValue": "[{\"RelyingParty\":\"*\",\"State\":1,\"RememberDevicesNotIssuedBefore\":\"2023-07-11T00:01:26+00:00\"}]", "newValue": "[]"}, {"displayName": "Included Updated Properties", "oldValue": null, "newValue": "\"StrongAuthenticationRequirement\""}], "administrativeUnits": []}], "additionalDetails": []}}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/azuread/azuread.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Mauricio Velazco
+id: b0db79c9-1e82-4a32-9f69-998dc33508a8
+date: '2022-08-15'
+description: Logs on disabling the MFA for a user
+environment: attack_range
+directory: azuread
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556
+datasets:
+- name: azure-audit
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/azuread/azure-audit.log
+  sourcetype: azure:monitor:aad
+  source: azure

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_bulk_policy_deletion/cisco_duo_administrator.json

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+{"ctime": "Thu Jul 10 07:24:12 2025", "action": "policy_bulk_delete", "description": "{\"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\", \"policies\": \"test2: PO9XV84OQJ5JXDBROM4O, test3: PO6OTE8JJQBX2C19SK3X, test4: POC0MJSTLYIB0RODL505, test5: POIHKCZ5M2DDE6BTGNE6\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-10T07:24:12+00:00", "object": null, "timestamp": 1752132252, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "policy_bulk_delete"}
+{"ctime": "Thu Jul 10 05:53:12 2025", "action": "policy_bulk_delete", "description": "{\"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\", \"policies\": \"test1: POH0LOUHMRGGSEYIA25F, test2: PO2YGPCR71YARPO1FHPH\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-10T05:53:12+00:00", "object": null, "timestamp": 1752126792, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "policy_bulk_delete"}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_bulk_policy_deletion/cisco_duo_bulk_policy_deletion.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Patrick Bareiss
+id: 01167925-4c70-4c62-a850-54c3da8ed54e
+date: '2025-07-10'
+description: Deleted multiple policies in Duo.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: cisco_duo_bulk_policy_deletion
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556
+datasets:
+- name: cisco_duo_administrator-json
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_bulk_policy_deletion/cisco_duo_administrator.json
+  sourcetype: cisco:duo:administrator
+  source: duo

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_bypass_2FA/cisco_duo_activity.json

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 09:20:34 2025", "access_device": {"browser": "Chrome", "browser_version": "137.0.0.0", "ip": {"address": "1.1.1.1"}, "location": {"city": "Unknown", "country": "Germany", "state": "Baden-Wurttemberg"}, "os": "Mac OS X", "os_version": "10.15.7"}, "action": {"details": null, "name": "user_update"}, "activity_id": "85578f9d-7d2d-4184-9519-e2ecde587de0", "actor": {"details": "{\"created\": \"2025-07-02T09:18:46.000000+00:00\", \"last_login\": \"2025-07-08T09:05:52.000000+00:00\", \"email\": \"test@test.com\", \"status\": null, \"groups\": null}", "key": "DEKXVXLFZBK5U0C9F1ST", "name": "Test Test", "type": "admin"}, "akey": "DAYQ46XVNT0NKTYQ5L5O", "application": null, "old_target": {"details": "{\"uname\": \"test2\", \"realname\": \"\", \"status\": \"Active\", \"notes\": \"\", \"email\": \"test@test.com\", \"enable_auto_prompt\": true}", "key": "DUH58CIOA5MG7ARNF2GL", "name": "test2", "type": "user"}, "outcome": null, "target": {"details": "{\"uname\": \"test2\", \"realname\": \"\", \"status\": \"Bypass\", \"notes\": \"\", \"email\": \"test@test.com\", \"enable_auto_prompt\": true, \"firstname\": \"\", \"lastname\": \"\", \"date_of_birth\": \"\"}", "key": "DUH58CIOA5MG7ARNF2GL", "name": "test2", "type": "user"}, "ts": "2025-07-08T09:20:34.233762+00:00", "timestamp": 1751966434, "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "activity"}
+{"ctime": "Mon Jul  7 13:25:03 2025", "access_device": {"browser": "Chrome", "browser_version": "137.0.0.0", "ip": {"address": "1.1.1.1"}, "location": {"city": "Unknown", "country": "Germany", "state": "Baden-Wurttemberg"}, "os": "Mac OS X", "os_version": "10.15.7"}, "action": {"details": null, "name": "user_update"}, "activity_id": "cdd1354b-fcb3-4937-a201-b7dfc2309f93", "actor": {"details": "{\"created\": \"2025-07-02T09:18:46.000000+00:00\", \"last_login\": \"2025-07-07T12:56:25.000000+00:00\", \"email\": \"test@test.com\", \"status\": null, \"groups\": null}", "key": "DEKXVXLFZBK5U0C9F1ST", "name": "Test Test", "type": "admin"}, "akey": "DAYQ46XVNT0NKTYQ5L5O", "application": null, "old_target": {"details": "{\"uname\": \"test\", \"realname\": \"\", \"status\": \"Bypass\", \"notes\": \"\", \"email\": \"\", \"enable_auto_prompt\": true}", "key": "DU4362HMS7HWQRNBA88C", "name": "test", "type": "user"}, "outcome": null, "target": {"details": "{\"uname\": \"test\", \"realname\": \"\", \"status\": \"Bypass\", \"notes\": \"\", \"email\": \"test@test.com\", \"enable_auto_prompt\": true, \"firstname\": \"\", \"lastname\": \"\", \"date_of_birth\": \"\"}", "key": "DU4362HMS7HWQRNBA88C", "name": "test", "type": "user"}, "ts": "2025-07-07T13:25:03.794234+00:00", "timestamp": 1751894703, "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "activity"}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_bypass_2FA/cisco_duo_bypass_2FA.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Patrick Bareiss
+id: 27cc5ad7-1afd-4409-863e-9fac6f4cf941
+date: '2025-07-08'
+description: Changed the setting for a user to allow them to bypass 2FA in Duo.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: cisco_duo_bypass_2FA
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556
+datasets:
+- name: cisco_duo_activity-json
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_bypass_2FA/cisco_duo_activity.json
+  sourcetype: cisco:duo:administrator
+  source: duo

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_bypass_code/cisco_duo_activity.json

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 11:36:17 2025", "action": "bypass_create", "description": "{\"bypass\": \"\", \"count\": 1, \"valid_secs\": 3600, \"auto_generated\": true, \"remaining_uses\": 1, \"user_id\": \"DUH58CIOA5MG7ARNF2GL\", \"bypass_code_ids\": [\"DB3RWNVFVIPX3WJDD8NR\"], \"endpoint_verification\": \"verify passworless\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-08T11:36:17+00:00", "object": "test2", "timestamp": 1751974577, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Generated bypass code"}
+{"ctime": "Mon Jul  7 13:35:56 2025", "action": "bypass_create", "description": "{\"bypass\": \"\", \"count\": 1, \"valid_secs\": 3600, \"auto_generated\": true, \"remaining_uses\": 1, \"user_id\": \"DU4362HMS7HWQRNBA88C\", \"bypass_code_ids\": [\"DB8PD991EIEU7HNUXAAN\"], \"endpoint_verification\": \"verify passworless\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-07T13:35:56+00:00", "object": "test", "timestamp": 1751895356, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Generated bypass code"}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_bypass_code/cisco_duo_bypass_code.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Patrick Bareiss
+id: 876dbd42-57bb-40dc-a61f-269b6b6f6a4a
+date: '2025-07-08'
+description: Generate a bypass code for a user in Duo.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: cisco_duo_bypass_code
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556
+datasets:
+- name: cisco_duo_activity-json
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_bypass_code/cisco_duo_activity.json
+  sourcetype: cisco:duo:administrator
+  source: duo

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_allow_devices_without_screen_lock/cisco_duo_administrator.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"ctime": "Thu Jul 10 07:05:15 2025", "action": "policy_create", "description": "{\"require_lock\": false, \"name\": \"test4\", \"pretty_trusted_devices\": \"\", \"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-10T07:05:15+00:00", "object": "test4", "timestamp": 1752131115, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Added policy"}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_allow_devices_without_screen_lock/cisco_duo_policy_allow_devices_without_screen_lock.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Patrick Bareiss
+id: 61a63676-89fe-4c8a-aa62-f0cf0e917837
+date: '2025-07-10'
+description: Created a policy which allows devices without screen lock in Duo.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: cisco_duo_policy_allow_devices_without_screen_lock
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556
+datasets:
+- name: cisco_duo_administrator-json
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_allow_devices_without_screen_lock/cisco_duo_administrator.json
+  sourcetype: cisco:duo:administrator
+  source: duo

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_allow_network_bypass_2fa/cisco_duo_administrator.json

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+{"ctime": "Wed Jul  9 11:59:49 2025", "action": "policy_update", "description": "{\"networks_allow\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-09T11:59:49+00:00", "object": "test2", "timestamp": 1752062389, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Modified policy"}
+{"ctime": "Wed Jul  9 11:59:41 2025", "action": "policy_create", "description": "{\"networks_allow\": \"1.2.3.4,2.3.4.5\", \"networks_2fa\": \"\", \"networks_block\": \"\", \"networks_default_action\": \"No action\", \"networks_enroll_policy\": \"allow\", \"name\": \"test2\", \"pretty_trusted_devices\": \"\", \"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-09T11:59:41+00:00", "object": "test2", "timestamp": 1752062381, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Added policy"}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_allow_network_bypass_2fa/cisco_duo_policy_allow_network_bypass_2fa.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Patrick Bareiss
+id: db6c74e0-aaac-4bd2-b557-d2327746d105
+date: '2025-07-09'
+description: Created a policy which allow network bypass 2FA in Duo.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: cisco_duo_policy_allow_network_bypass_2fa
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556
+datasets:
+- name: cisco_duo_administrator-json
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_allow_network_bypass_2fa/cisco_duo_administrator.json
+  sourcetype: cisco:duo:administrator
+  source: duo

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_allow_old_flash_and_java/cisco_duo_administrator.json

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+{"ctime": "Wed Jul  9 11:01:58 2025", "action": "policy_update", "description": "{\"java_remediation\": \"no remediation\", \"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\", \"flash_remediation\": \"no remediation\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-09T11:01:58+00:00", "object": "test1", "timestamp": 1752058918, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Modified policy"}
+{"ctime": "Wed Jul  9 11:01:52 2025", "action": "policy_update", "description": "{\"flash_remediation\": \"block all\", \"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\", \"java_remediation\": \"block all\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-09T11:01:52+00:00", "object": "test1", "timestamp": 1752058912, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Modified policy"}
+{"ctime": "Wed Jul  9 11:01:42 2025", "action": "policy_create", "description": "{\"flash_remediation\": \"no remediation\", \"java_remediation\": \"no remediation\", \"flash_max_ood_days\": 30, \"java_max_ood_days\": 30, \"name\": \"test1\", \"pretty_trusted_devices\": \"\", \"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-09T11:01:42+00:00", "object": "test1", "timestamp": 1752058902, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Added policy"}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_allow_old_flash_and_java/cisco_duo_policy_allow_old_flash_and_java.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Patrick Bareiss
+id: ed19ab1d-7610-4e8c-89a9-8c82ff450bb0
+date: '2025-07-09'
+description: Created a policy which allow old Flash and Java versions in Duo.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: cisco_duo_policy_allow_old_flash_and_java
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556
+datasets:
+- name: cisco_duo_administrator-json
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_allow_old_flash_and_java/cisco_duo_administrator.json
+  sourcetype: cisco:duo:administrator
+  source: duo

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_allow_tampered_devices/cisco_duo_administrator.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"ctime": "Thu Jul 10 06:56:40 2025", "action": "policy_create", "description": "{\"allow_rooted_devices\": true, \"name\": \"test3\", \"pretty_trusted_devices\": \"\", \"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-10T06:56:40+00:00", "object": "test3", "timestamp": 1752130600, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Added policy"}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_allow_tampered_devices/cisco_duo_policy_allow_tampered_devices.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Patrick Bareiss
+id: b8be207e-3693-4653-aecf-a26dba43c5cc
+date: '2025-07-10'
+description: Created a policy which allows tampered devices in Duo.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: cisco_duo_policy_allow_tampered_devices
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556
+datasets:
+- name: cisco_duo_administrator-json
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_allow_tampered_devices/cisco_duo_administrator.json
+  sourcetype: cisco:duo:administrator
+  source: duo

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_bypass_2FA/cisco_duo_administrator.json

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 12:32:39 2025", "action": "policy_update", "description": "{\"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\", \"auth_status\": \"Allow access without 2FA\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-08T12:32:39+00:00", "object": "test5", "timestamp": 1751977959, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Modified policy"}
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 12:32:35 2025", "action": "policy_update", "description": "{\"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\", \"auth_status\": \"No action\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-08T12:32:35+00:00", "object": "test5", "timestamp": 1751977955, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Modified policy"}
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 12:32:29 2025", "action": "policy_create", "description": "{\"auth_status\": \"Allow access without 2FA\", \"name\": \"test5\", \"pretty_trusted_devices\": \"\", \"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-08T12:32:29+00:00", "object": "test5", "timestamp": 1751977949, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Added policy"}
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 12:29:00 2025", "action": "policy_update", "description": "{\"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\", \"enroll_policy\": \"Allow Access\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-08T12:29:00+00:00", "object": "test4", "timestamp": 1751977740, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Modified policy"}
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 12:28:55 2025", "action": "policy_update", "description": "{\"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\", \"enroll_policy\": \"Require Enrollment\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-08T12:28:55+00:00", "object": "test4", "timestamp": 1751977735, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Modified policy"}
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 12:28:47 2025", "action": "policy_create", "description": "{\"enroll_policy\": \"Allow Access\", \"name\": \"test4\", \"pretty_trusted_devices\": \"\", \"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-08T12:28:47+00:00", "object": "test4", "timestamp": 1751977727, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Added policy"}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_bypass_2FA/cisco_duo_policy_bypass_2FA.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Patrick Bareiss
+id: 6aa8cb0c-fde5-4c1f-abc6-45aba2142277
+date: '2025-07-08'
+description: Created a policy which allows bypass 2FA in Duo.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: cisco_duo_policy_bypass_2FA
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556
+datasets:
+- name: cisco_duo_administrator-json
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_bypass_2FA/cisco_duo_administrator.json
+  sourcetype: cisco:duo:administrator
+  source: duo

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_bypass_2FA_other_countries/cisco_duo_administrator.json

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 13:45:13 2025", "action": "policy_update", "description": "{\"user_locations_default_action\": \"Allow access without 2FA\", \"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-08T13:45:13+00:00", "object": "test7", "timestamp": 1751982313, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Modified policy"}
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 13:44:59 2025", "action": "policy_create", "description": "{\"user_locations_deny\": \"\", \"user_locations_allow\": \"\", \"user_locations_2fa\": \"\", \"user_locations_pass\": \"US,DE\", \"user_locations_default_action\": \"Deny access\", \"name\": \"test7\", \"pretty_trusted_devices\": \"\", \"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-08T13:44:59+00:00", "object": "test7", "timestamp": 1751982299, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Added policy"}

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_bypass_2FA_other_countries/cisco_duo_policy_bypass_2FA_other_countries.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+author: Patrick Bareiss
+id: bf1b3ff6-c06c-4782-8949-8f3dfc7557c2
+date: '2025-07-08'
+description: Created a policy which allows bypass 2FA in Duo for users in other countries.
+environment: attack_range
+directory: cisco_duo_policy_bypass_2FA_other_countries
+mitre_technique:
+- T1556
+datasets:
+- name: cisco_duo_administrator-json
+  path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_bypass_2FA_other_countries/cisco_duo_administrator.json
+  sourcetype: cisco:duo:administrator
+  source: duo

collection/v2/sources/splunk_attack_data/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/cisco_duo_policy_deny_access/cisco_duo_administrator.json

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 12:54:09 2025", "action": "policy_update", "description": "{\"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\", \"auth_status\": \"Deny access\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-08T12:54:09+00:00", "object": "test6", "timestamp": 1751979249, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Modified policy"}
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 12:54:04 2025", "action": "policy_update", "description": "{\"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\", \"auth_status\": \"Allow access without 2FA\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-08T12:54:04+00:00", "object": "test6", "timestamp": 1751979244, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Modified policy"}
+{"ctime": "Tue Jul  8 12:53:59 2025", "action": "policy_create", "description": "{\"auth_status\": \"Deny access\", \"name\": \"test6\", \"pretty_trusted_devices\": \"\", \"admin_email\": \"test@test.com\"}", "isotimestamp": "2025-07-08T12:53:59+00:00", "object": "test6", "timestamp": 1751979239, "username": "Test Test", "host": "api-41e72ada.duosecurity.com", "extracted_eventtype": "administrator", "actionlabel": "Added policy"}