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I know that $m =m^{ed} \bmod n$, and there is Euler's $a^{\varphi(n)} = 1 \bmod n$, but how do we derive that $ed=1 \bmod(\varphi(n))$ holds for all m. Where does that equality come from? Couldn't find a proof for that.
As an example could be XTS with a 512-bit key that treats the key as one 128-bit key and one 348-bit key. As to why I'm asking it's because XTS runs on one large key that it treats like two keys. Currently, the XTS splits the key in half producing(if we were to use the example above) 2^256 + 2^256(2.3158418e+77) possib...
I am new to cryptography and I am trying to find a way to measure ciphertext entropy of encryption algorithms such as AES, Chacha20, etc for a school project. Is there any way to do it on Python? I read that the scipy library has a section for measuring entropy but I have no idea if this is recommended or even usable. ...
I got two audio files one is encrypted and the other file is a part of the plaintext. I want to extract all the plaintext. I am using the AES-ECB mode, the size of the block is 128 bits and the start of the extracted plaintext is not aligned with the start of the cipher text. So I need to align these two audio files. I...
I came across the Solana network utilizing sha256 as a "proof of history". They are using it as a pseudo-VDF (verifiable delay function). The reason it's pseudo is because verification is done by full-effort recompute in parallel using intermediate values. I am curious whether or not the way sha256 is implemented on mo...
The description of bootstrapping in Section 5 of the BFV paper (https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/144) is somewhat challenging to grasp, and I have two specific questions: The author mentions that if the norm of $\mathbf{v}$ is restricted such that $\|\mathbf{v}\|<\Delta / \mu$ for some $\mu>2$, it allows us to largely dis...
According to my previous question the proofs cannot be broken by quantum computation, you cannot obtain the witness of the generated zk-snark proof. link to my previous question. Now if the concern is that the proofs can be forge, we could add difficulty by using chain integrity proofs: our circuit should have an outpu...
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), such as AES-GCM, is a form of encryption that has a "built-in" integrity verification. This means that if the encrypted message is modified in any way, then this will be detected (with very high probability) in the decryption process and the decryption is going to f...
I am new to lattice-based cryptography, so sorry that this question might seems stupid May I ask that how can I choose the BGV parameter of ciphertext with plain text in mod 128, and error in gaussian distribution of std 3.19 and secret key in uniform distribution from -1 to 1? Do I need also need to take into account...
I am new to Cryptography and I know there are better ways to test a cipher's effectiveness out there but in this case I am trying to test a cryptographic algorithm's(AES,xchacha20,twofish) hamming distance and avalanche effect for a school assignment/paper. Basically encrypting 50 files containing almost the same conte...
I read the Wikipedia Page on ciphertext indistinguishability. Here it gives the following outline of the IND-CPA game: The challenger generates a key pair PK, SK based on some security parameter k (e.g., a key size in bits), and publishes PK to the adversary. The challenger retains SK. The adversary may perform a pol...
According to Wikipedia, PRF is an abbreviation for Pseudorandom function family. But this answer says that PRF means Pseudorandom Function. Does that mean that a Pseudorandom Function is the same as a Pseudorandom function family? Or is the abbreviation PRF used inconsistently?
I am attempting a to simulate an 'Enigma M3' machine. As I understand it, the M3 is internally wired as: Name ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ Notch I EKMFLGDQVZNTOWYHXUSPAIBRCJ Y II AJDKSIRUXBLHWTMCQGZNPYFVOE M III BDFHJLCPRTXVZNYEIWGAKMUSQO D UKW-B YRUHQSLDPXNGOKMIEBFZCWVJAT NOTE: I've only included the ...
It is well-known that AES-GCM requires the IV to be unique for each message that is encrypted with the same key. If the IV ever repeats, with the same key, then AES-GCM fails catastrophically. Now, what if we used a fixed IV (e.g. all zeros), but instead used a new random AES key for each message? The random (per-messa...
On Wikipedia, they give the following definition of PRF: A family of functions, $f_s: \{0,1\}^{|x|} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda(|x|)}$, with $x\in \{0,1\}^*$ and $\lambda:\mathbb N \rightarrow \mathbb N$, is pseudorandom if the following conditions are satisfied: Given any $s$ and $x$, there always exists a polynomi...
During one of the seminars at my university on Cryptography, the presenter said that while computing $x/y$ over Finite Rings $\mathbb Z_{2^\ell}$, there exist some problems such as: $y^{-1}$ may not exist as over the ring $\mathbb Z_{2^\ell}$, only odd numbers have inverses and even numbers don’t. I understand this...
How would knowing a clear byte value of the decrypted data affect a brute force attack on an AES-128 encrypted message ? i.e. If I knew the 1st byte should decrypt to 0xff OR I knew that every 100 Bytes should decrypt to 0xff ? OR I knew every 100 2 bytes should decrypt to 0xff00 ?
The question is mainly stated in the title. I had to do a refreshment on public key cryptography. The algorithms are pretty straightforward however, I always stumbled upon this question. Is it in order for the same message to be able to be signed with a different signature each time, like some kind of nonce? P.S. I'm t...
If I convert a long sentence (>50 characters) to c and use the result (128 hex characters) as a password, how secure is it?
I am currently reading Homomorphic Encryption Standard. May I ask that for table 1 in the link, why increasing the security level will yield a smaller ciphertext size (log q)? I attach a screenshot below Thanks a lot!
I've been checking the NIST PQC documents to find the requirements about the minimum required numbers of signatures to be generated with a signature scheme: NIST call for proposals Call for Additional Digital Signature Schemes I think the other schemes don't have this limitation, but Hash Based Signature schemes do h...
In the Kyber Algorithm specifications document, chapter 5.1.2 primal attack, it says that: Given the matrix LWE instance $(A,b=As+e)$, one builds the lattice $\Lambda = \{x\in \mathbb{Z}^{m+kn+1}:(A\vert I_m\vert -b)x=0 \,mod \,q\}$ of dimension $d=m+kn+1$, volume $q^m$, and with a unique-SVP solution $v=(s,e,1)$ of n...
Deepfake technology has become very difficult to tackle due to sophisticated machine learning algorithms. Now, even when a journalist or bystander provides photo or video evidence, the culprit denies it, claiming that it is the result of deepfake manipulation. Can TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) cryptography techno...
I'm looking to prevent a DDoS attack on a web service, by making the cost of performing an attack prohibitive. Typical users will only need to call out it once a day, and can afford to spend a few CPU cycles on each call, but I want to make it so an attacker making millions of calls would have spend considerably more t...
I'm currently reading the 'A Graduate Course in Applied Cryptography' paper written by Boneh and Shoup. More precisely, I'm reading the chapter about 'Elliptic Curve' and I'm stuck at the exercise about scalar multiplication. I managed to answer equation 15.37 but I'm stuck for equation 15.38. What I did so far. First...
I'm trying to solve this problem. I tried this. Consider distinguisher $D$ such that $D(c) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{If there is at least $2\log_2n$ consecutive 1's} \\ 0 & \text{o.w.} \end{cases}$. Since $G$ is PRG $$|\mathbb{P}[D(G(U_n)) = 1] - \mathbb{P}[D(U_{\ell(n)}) = 1]| \leq \varepsilon(n)$$ where $\varepsilon...
I was wondering if by now any poly-time Karp reduction between GapSVP and GapCVP (exact or approximate) exist. I know of the Cook reduction between these problems, but I couldn't find anything about many-to-one reductions between these problems.
I'm learning about the scheme of a distributed data clean room. It appears to be similar to an MPC (Multi-Party Computation) framework. What is the difference between them, and why does it run faster than a normal MPC? https://www.snowflake.com/blog/distributed-data-clean-rooms-powered-by-snowflake/
I have three numbers x, a, and c, where both a and c are odd numbers. The number x is the output of the following function: $$ x = a^b\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\mod{c} $$ I am attempting to determine whether the input exponent, b, was an odd or even number based on the knowledge of the three values, a, c, and x. Is there a way to ...
Over the past few months, I have been reading and trying to understand how ECDSA works and how safe is it. So now something does not add up between its signature verification and generation. But maybe its my code so here: import ecdsa import random import libnum import hashlib import bitcoin from ecdsa import SECP256k1...
The question is mainly stated in the title. We don't consider any other changes to the scheme except for the following: We replace $S = H(R,A,M) \cdot a + r$ with $S = H(R,M) \cdot a + r$. My thoughts are that since A is the public key, it is redundant since $a$ is still present on $S$ and $A$ is still used in the veri...
$$g^a = c \bmod{N} \text{ }\rightarrow \text{ }G_{i_1}G_{i_2}G_{i_3}...G_{i_n} = C \bmod N $$ At the Discrete Log problem we try to find the exponent ($a$) of a generator ($g$) over a finite filed. e.g. $$g^a = c \bmod{N}$$ We assume everything except the exponent is known. This also includes the factorization of $...
I am reading the BGV paper. On page 18, after addition, the protocol will also refresh (modulus and key switching), may I ask why is this required? It seems to me that I can still use the same secret to decrypt the added ciphertexts. $\text{FHE.Add}(pk, c_1, c_2$): Takes two ciphertexts encrypted under the same $s_j$....
I am currently studying the cryptanalysis of Speck, but I am feeling confused about the addition in Speck. I am not sure whether the addition in Speck is done through n-bit addition over $GF(2^n)$ or addition modulo $2^n$. I have learned that the elements of $GF(2^n)$ for any $n$ can be represented as $n$-bit bitstring...
Could you not use zk-STARK for a post-quantum signature scheme? Your private key is a random symmetric encryption key, your public key is the hash of the encryption key. To sign you run an algorithm to encrypt a hash of data-to-be-signed with your private key and hash your private key to obtain the public key. The sign...
In elliptic curve cryptography using the secp256k1 curve, how can I determine the number of times the base point $G$ has been multiplied to derive a new point? The formula is as follow: $k * G = Q$ Where: $k$ is an integer $G$ is the base point on the curve $Q$ is the resulting point after multiplying $G$ by $k$ How ...
Studying for Cryptology and came across a presentation regarding on "Integrity vs Authenticity" where the discussion briefly mentions how Encryption "does not provide integrity or authenticity"? Why is this the case with Symmetric Encryption for example? Or is it with Cryptology in general? Not much details are mention...
I would like to know if there are non-lattice based NIST submissions that are affected by a polynomial time algorithm to Shortest Vector Problem. Are there known reduction from (e.g.) code based cryptography to SVP or any other non-lattice cryptographic system to SVP?
Does signing always involve encrypting a hash or can we call private key encryption of an unhashed message signing too?
I can't seem to understand what $A_{N,q}$ represents in this paper (Section 2.1 - Notations). More specifically, I'm struggling to grasp the meaning of $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^N + 1)$. Could someone please explain it to me? $\lfloor . \rfloor$ represents the ceiling function. $\mathbb Z_q = \mathbb Z \cap [-\lfloor\frac{q...
Do there exist cryptographic primitives that have proved that they cannot be constructed from CDH assumption only but can from DDH assumption? More generally, do there exist cryptographic primitives that must require decisional problems for their security?
For a project, I am writing Enigma and Bombe simulators in Python. I have coded up both and so far so good. My Enigma simulator gives the same results as the online simulator here: https://people.physik.hu-berlin.de/~palloks/js/enigma/enigma-u_v20_en.html But now I am using my Bombe simulator to find key settings with ...
According to the author of the original paper[1], Verkle Trees basically let you save space (typically bandwidth, which can be expensive) by replacing a secure hash with a vector commitment scheme, making the tree shorter and fatter with some branching factor $k > 2$. This saved bandwidth comes at the cost of some ext...
Besides the limited nonce size of 96 bits, are there any other weaknesses to the GCM mode of AES? I am creating a password vault and am trying to narrow down my options of encryption schemes. Also, is this a safe and secure implementation of AES-GCM? public static async Task<byte[]> EncryptAsyncV2(byte[] plainText, byt...
It's a very standard move in a game-based security proof to have a transition in which we "abort" on some event such as a hash collision; the two games are identical apart from the abort step, and we add the probability of the abort to the advantage term at the end. Example: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1368 I'm curiou...
I have the following problem. Here's a rephrased version of your problem, keeping the LaTeX commands unchanged: We are given $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $p, q \in \mathbb{N}$, and $y \in \mathbb{N}^{n+2}$. Assume the existence of a constant $K$ and a vector $x \in \mathbb{Z}^{n}$, fulfilling the relation: $$y_{j+2} = \left((K ...
SHA-2 makes use of non-ARX non-linear operators such as the Choice and Majority functions: \begin{align} \mathsf{Ch}(E,F,G) &= (E \wedge F) \oplus (\neg E \wedge G)\\ \mathsf{Ma}(A, B, C) &= (A \wedge B) \oplus (A \wedge C) \oplus (B \wedge C) \end{align} Why is it considered an ARX cipher the same way other primitives...
In Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher, and Joseph H. Silverman's book An Introduction to mathematical cryptography, 2nd edition, page 78, there is: If we are working in the group $\mathbb F^∗_p$ and if we treat modular addition as our basic operation, then modular multiplication of two $k$-bit numbers takes (approximately...
I have seen other answers here on Stack Exchange regarding MAC-Then-Encrypt vs. Encrypt-Then-MAC (and this article regarding MAC-Then-Encrypt padding oracle attacks on SSL) as well as generic Hash-Then-Encrypt vs. Encrypt-Then-Hash, but in this case I am seeking insights on the security aspects of a specific authentica...
Christof Paar explains in his lectures that Elgamal encryption scheme picks the private key from $\{2, \ldots, p-2\}$, is there a reason for excluding the last and first elements?
I know the theory of lattice attacks against ECDSA from Minerva. So, as far as I can understand, the lattice that they build is $$ L_M = \begin{bmatrix} 2^ln & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 2^ln & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 2^ln & \cdots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ & \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots &...
I want to test a C implementation of Hash_DRBG—which test_demo.c file I will modify to produce random binaries indefinitely to STDOUT as to be used by piping its output—using DIEHARDER for a research. I want to base my research around this research, however I don't find any mention of how it's seeded. NIST have several...
I'm building a service, that works as the cipher and decipher for instant messages. It works by following the following steps: The sender encrypts the text(not long, mostly chatting messages) using a public key; The sender saves the encrypted text to a server. The server generates a customized URL schema as the link t...
In the implementation of centered binomial distribution of crystals-kyber, the authors load 24-bits of buffer to a 32 bit integer and then they and the answer with 0x00249249. The complete operations are below: t = load24_littleendian(buf+3*i) d = t & 0x00249249 d += (t>>1) & 0x00249249 d += (t>>2) & 0x00249249 Can s...
If it is could you give me a paper that states it is possible? Thank you
Is there a curve that supports both? Or are there two curves that can be mapped between using a 2-isogeny that support pairing checks on one and Montgomery ladders on the other? Is there a paper on it?
Are there two curves that can be mapped between using a 2-isogeny that support pairing checks on on curve and Montgomery ladders on another? Is there a paper?
Given an Ed25519 key pair, can you think of any way to get to the same X25519 public key from the Ed25519 secret as from the non-clamped(!) Ed25519 public key? Ed25519 secret \=> Ed25519 non-clamped public \=> X25519 public (transported) v^ should match /=> X25519 public (...
This is a follow up question to: Bit Flipping Attack on CBC Mode which demonstrates that a bit flipping attack with a known IV is possible on CBC mode. Is it safe to assume that the bit flicking attack is not possible if the attacker doesn't know the IV?
I am currently doing the elliptic curves and I'm stuck for 8 hours without finding solutions. I under stand the process of double and add but don't know how to obtain 5 * 8P = 4OP =11 P. 11 P was in the answers my teacher gave me please someone help.
Why Oribatida uses previous capacity $V_{a+m-1}$ instead of current capacity $V_{a+m}$ for rate masking?
I'm working on a local, client-side password manager. I want to hash a master password with argon2 to store it safely in an SQLite database. This will be how a user could login and be authenticated. (Also I'm using Rust for this project, with sodiumoxide, a rust wrapper for libsodium) I was also planning on somehow usi...
Is it possible to extend the general concept of homomorphic encryption: $$f(m_1)\cdot f(m_2)=f(m_1+m_2)$$ to: $$f(m_1)\cdot g(m_2)=f\cdot g(m_1+m_2)$$ is it further possible to construct the scheme in a way that the key (if compromised) $f\cdot g(\cdot)$ does not allow drawing conclusions on the encryption keys $f$ or ...
I am studying the Shortest Vector Problem and I have some troubles understanding the actual Lovàsz condition used in the LLL algorithm. On the one hand, the original LLL article, the Springer book "The LLL Algorithm" and A Complete Analysis of the BKZ Lattice Reduction Algorithm state that the LLL algorithm outputs a r...
I'm learning PHP and I've come to the password hashing section of a course I'm following, but it's not explained well enough for my liking. It seems that when using the crypt function, and using the CRYPT_BLOWFISH hash type, I get a resultant hash that contains the salt itself. For example with the following code: $sal...
Suppose in Patterson's algorithm for the correction of binary Goppa codes, we wish to compute the syndrome polynomial when the defining polynomial is $g(x) = x^{4} + x + 1$, and the error polynomial is $e(x) = x^{3} + x^{14} + x^{7}$ where these are polynomials over $\mathbb F_{16}$ where we write $F_{16} := F_{2}[\ga...
Currently, I am using AES-GCM to encode and decode a plain text file. The key is derived from a plain text password using PBKDF2 and a random salt with SHA-256. However, I have been thinking and came to the conclusion that the resulting ciphertext is only as secure as the plain password and its entropy, plus the number...
I am looking for a secret sharing algorithm which accepts a large array, some elements of which are real shares and the rest are fake. The algorithm should satisfy the following conditions: If all the real secret shares are present in the array (in whatever places, in whatever order), then the result of the algorithm ...
Given a hash cipher f(sha1($pepper . $plaintext)) where f is some transformation to an 11-byte string pepper is 24 bytes long with a character space of 62 (and is not unique for a given plaintext) plaintext is known for a set of ciphertexts Is it possible to determine what the pepper is?
Is my summary understanding of current (classical) Digital signature standards essentially correct? I may be totally wrong. DSA is no longer to be used for new signature generation just for checking existing signatures. EdDSA is to be used for new signature generation. Question: Does this mean all (most?) current stand...
Just like picking one of the papers in a bowl is used to anonymously distribute a given set of numbers among individuals which lets nobody (including the person who distributes them) know who got what. Is it possible to achieve the same with cryptography. The requirements in a setup where there is 1 distributor and "n"...
Alice and Bob fix a largish $n$, say $n = 1000$, and they publish a simple, undirected graph $G$ on $n$ vertices (more precisely, its adjacency matrix, or a similar form of representation). Moreover they publicly agree on some hash function $h:\{0,1\}^*\to \{0,1\}^{1024}$ (or some other constant number of output bits)....
Does anyone know an article that explains Fortuna algorithm for people without cryptographical background? If not, I would like to have an explanation because I don't manage to understand it.
Digital Signatures use an asymmetric algorithm, meaning that if I want to apply a digital signature to a document I sign it with my own private key and send it to the recipient. The recipient, thanks to the public key, can already verify that the message really comes from me: a man in the middle could have intercepted ...
this is a followup of the post I made there: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/77428690/merging-structured-encrypted-data Essentialy, I'd like to know if there is a way to merge bencoded data (or otherwise structured data), encrypted. i.e. you have something like this { "comment": "Big Buck Bunny, Sunflower versio...
I have this problem where I need to guess if bob wrote "yes" or "no" It is using AES-128-CBC and it tells me the next IV to be used. it takes input as a hex string and does the encryption for me I thought I completely understood this problem but I am not getting matching ciphertexts. My thought process is myGuess XOR ...
I'm new to cryptography, sorry if this question is dumb. I've just read the paper of Dwork and Naor Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail and understand the example of squaring on $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$. Now I'm wondering how to apply the proof of work for a different kind of data, for example, I want to che...
Post-Compromise Security and Backward Security seem to mean that the attacker has obtained the communication key between two parties or groups in the current state, but cannot further obtain subsequent keys. What is the specific difference between them?
Recently, I was reading about Blake2B and its properties regarding randomness and security, and its connection to Daniel Bernstein's CHA CHA digest. As a budding cryptographer, I find it doable to implement those algorithms, but I find it very hard to grasp why the specific functions were chosen. From wikipedia, this i...
I'm comparing the Wikipedia description of SRP to the BouncyCastle implementation and some differences and I want to be sure the BouncyCastle implementation is suitable for my purpose. Wikipedia article: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Remote_Password_protocol The article has a a description of how M1 and M2 are c...
We know that a trapdoor function $f()$ is easy to compute in its original direction $y=f(x)$ while finding its inverse $x=f^{-1}(y)$ requires a secret information: without that trapdoor inverting $f()$ is hard: let's say it requires applying $f()$ to many preimages $x$ until the required image $y$ is found, so it's som...
If a system provide n bits of security, it is known that the best possible attack against the system would be 2^n (security parameter). However, why are the key sizes of some cryptosystems much larger than their security parameters? Is it because these cryptosystems have a weak and vulnerable algorithm?
In RSA ,the encryption, Can we choose the public exponent (e) greater than m (modulus) or e > φ(n) ? I wonder about choosing public key exponents (e) because the most information on the internet or articles has generated public keys from these 2 conditions : 1 < e < phi(n) e < m So is it possible that we can choose...
If $\Pi=(\mathrm{Gen},\mathrm{Enc},\mathrm{Dec})$ is a CPA secure public key encryption protocol, is the following public key encryption CPA secure? $\Pi'$: $\mathrm{Gen'}$: Run $\mathrm{Gen}$ twice to get keys $\langle pk_1,sk_1\rangle$ and $\langle pk_2,sk_2\rangle$. $\mathrm{Enc'}$: Take $pk=\langle pk_1,pk_2\rangl...
I found this recent paper The Wiener Attack on RSA Revisited: A Quest for the Exact Bound, which reported a new bound $d\le \frac 1 {\sqrt[4]{18}} N^\frac 1 4$. Is this well accepted in the cryptanalysis research community? With a Python script, I personally verified the d revealed from the given (N,e) in Section 4 (pa...
I'm using Pedersen commitments to maintain the account balance in the ledger. Assume that when I create the account, I record the Pedersen commitment of 0 in a ledger (here, the blinding factor and generators are also recorded in a ledger). First, I minted some tokens, let's say 10 tokens. Now I retrieve Pedersen's c...
By SHAKE256_256, I mean taking first 256 bits of the output of SHAKE256 i.e. SHAKE256_256(M) = SHAKE256(M,256) What is the motivation of choosing SHAKE256_256 instead of SHA3-256 in XMSS and SPHINCS. Are there any advantages of SHAKE256_256 over SHA3-256. As far as I know, they both have 24 rounds keccak with instant...
Can we define an RSA variant in which the public key with $n$-bit public modulus $N$ has a compact representation of $\kappa\ll n/2$ bits, with a security argument that it is as safe as regular RSA for a given $n$ (e.g. $n=2048$), and the constraint that the two prime factors $p$ and $q$ of $N$ have (about) equal bit s...
In Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3, they mention that with a hybrid approach, we concatenate the shared secret from each method (say KEM like Kyber768 + classical ECDH X25519 = X22519Kyer768). concatenated_shared_secret = shared_secret_1 || shared_secret_2 The idea for the hybrid is that it is quantum safe to prot...
SPHINCS+ is an interesting post-quantum algorithm, and I'm curious about what its limitations are. What I know about hash-based signature formats in the past are that you needed to remember which signing key branches have been "used"--statefulness--and that the tree could only be used for a certain number of signature...
I was thinking about how SRP might be used with Curve25519 or Curve448. In this question, Can SRP be used with Elliptic Curves?, the answer is that you can't directly translate SRP to a group that isn't also a ring, because SRP uses not just multiplication but also addition. In traditional SRP-6a, the server computes ...
I have a scenario where $k_2 = -k_1$ while $z_1$ and $z_2$ are identical but the values $s_1$ and $s_2$ are different. So we have $r_1 = r_2$ and $z_1 = z_2$ but $s_1 \neq s_2$. Does this mean an attacker can recover my secret key or I am protected?
In RSA ,the encryption, Can we choose the public exponent (e) greater than m (modulus) or e > φ(n) ? I wonder about choosing public key exponents (e) because the most information on the internet or articles has generated public keys from these 2 conditions : 1 < e < phi(n) e < m So is it possible that we can choose...
An efficient algorithm for factoring would be a major mathematical achievement giving the person who discovered it anstant fame. About two years ago, C. P. Schnorr claimed such a breakthrough but it turned out the approach did not work as well as he thought. The technical details of his approach were extensively discus...
Passkeys are being introduced. From what I understand so far, a passkey involves the storage of a private key, and retention of a public key with the internet service. Eg Google, Apple, Microsoft, Reddit, StackExchange, etc. Does the formation of a passkey, or the subsequent use of a passkey by itself alone, identity t...
Hashing functions are used for data integrity when integrated with signing asymmetric algorithms but I miss a step. In multiple sources like here or here I read for granted that hashing algorithm per se are enough for ensuring data integrity. Let's go into an example. We hash the content and send it alongside the origi...
For some common curve, can we exhibit three distinct ECDSA signatures $(r,s_1)$, $(r,s_2)$, $(r,s_3)$, a message $m$, and valid public key $Q$, such that the signatures verify? Can we also generate the private key $d$ matching $Q$? Can we do this for given $Q$ and matching $d$? For two signatures, that's trivial: $s_2...
I generated a Pedersen commitment for a given account balance (say, 10) and stored it in the ledger. Now, when I debit 15 tokens from the same account, I first retrieve the Pedersen commitment of 10 from the ledger and subtract it from the Pedersen commitment of 15, and then I want to check whether the resultant Peders...
I'm an amateur so bear with me. I was thinking about an E2E solution for data-at-rest proxy scenarios (like cloud storage provider) that allows you to issue and revoke users via symmetric keys. I'm thinking that Alice wants to communicate with Bob, via Eve. Without revealing the master key to Bob or Eve, this seems pre...
i have a pretty straightforward question but i can’t seem to find an answer : Regardless of the physical protection provided by an HSM or TPM or any hardware cryptographic key storage system, are keys generated in hardware “higher quality” than those generated in software? in the sense that in software, pseudorandom nu...