Protocol-Bench: 15 published IEEE 802.11 / 3GPP procedures with ground-truth safety verdicts and replay-validated counterexamples
Browse files- README.md +172 -0
- load_dataset.py +96 -0
- protocol_bench.jsonl +15 -0
README.md
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| 1 |
+
---
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| 2 |
+
license: mit
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| 3 |
+
task_categories:
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- text-classification
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- question-answering
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language:
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- en
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tags:
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- formal-methods
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- protocol-verification
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- security
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- model-checking
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- ieee-802-11
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- 3gpp
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- reasoning
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- counterexamples
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pretty_name: Protocol-Bench
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size_categories:
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- n<1K
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configs:
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- config_name: default
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data_files: protocol_bench.jsonl
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---
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| 24 |
+
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| 25 |
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# Protocol-Bench
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**15 published IEEE 802.11 and 3GPP procedures with ground-truth safety verdicts — and, where a
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| 28 |
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property fails, the shortest counterexample trace that proves it.**
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| 29 |
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Most reasoning benchmarks accept an answer. This one asks for a **proof**: if a model says a protocol
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is broken, it must supply a trace that starts at the initial state, moves only along real
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transitions, and ends in a genuinely violating state. Traces are replayed mechanically. A
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plausible-sounding trace that does not replay earns nothing.
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## Why the metric is shaped this way
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The task set is **deliberately imbalanced** — 13 of 15 procedures are safe, which is what the
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| 38 |
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published-procedure population actually looks like.
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| Strategy | Accuracy | Balanced accuracy | Valid counterexamples |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| Answer "safe" every time | **0.867** | 0.500 | 0 |
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| Answer "violated" every time | 0.133 | 0.500 | **0** |
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| Exhaustive model checker | 1.000 | **1.000** | **2** |
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Plain accuracy is nearly uninformative here — hence **balanced accuracy** as the headline, and the
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| 47 |
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**valid-counterexample count** as the column separating a detector from a guesser.
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| 48 |
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There is a second reason, specific to language models: a verdict is separable from the reasoning that
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should justify it. *"The WPA2 four-way handshake"* is strongly associated with *"vulnerable"* in any
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| 51 |
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training corpus, so a model can be right about it having done no reasoning at all. Recalling a CVE
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| 52 |
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does not produce a replaying trace; reasoning about the state machine does.
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| 53 |
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## Schema
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| 55 |
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21 fields per row. Everything is derived from the live models at export time, never hand-maintained.
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| Field | Type | Description |
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| 59 |
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|---|---|---|
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| 60 |
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| `id` | string | Task identifier |
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| 61 |
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| `standards_body` | string | `IEEE` (8) or `3GPP` (7) |
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| 62 |
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| `spec_clause` | string | The published clause modelled |
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| 63 |
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| `property` | string | Name of the safety property that must hold |
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| 64 |
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| `label` | string | `KNOWN_COUNTEREXAMPLE` \| `CANDIDATE_COUNTEREXAMPLE` \| `PROVEN_SAFE` |
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| 65 |
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| `violated` | bool | Binary target, derived from `label` |
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| 66 |
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| `prompt` | string | Ready-to-use prompt |
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| 67 |
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| `prompt_mode` | string | `model` or `spec` (see below) |
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| 68 |
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| `state_machine` | string | Human-readable rendering of the machine |
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| 69 |
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| `state_fields` | list[string] | State variable names, in order |
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| `initial_state` | object | Field → initial value |
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| `transitions` | list[object] | Every reachable edge: `{from, label, to}` |
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| `n_state_fields` | int | Number of state variables |
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| 73 |
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| `n_reachable_states` | int | Reachable state count |
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| 74 |
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| `n_transitions` | int | Reachable edge count |
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| 75 |
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| `counterexample` | list[object] \| null | Shortest violating trace: `{label, state}` per step |
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| `counterexample_length` | int | Steps in the trace (0 if none) |
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| `has_fixed_twin` | bool | Whether a repaired variant exists |
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| `fixed_twin_holds` | bool \| null | Whether the repair actually removes the violation |
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| `citation` | string \| null | Publication, where the finding is published |
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| 80 |
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| `known_finding` | string \| null | One-line description of the published finding |
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| 82 |
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Corpus totals: **67 reachable states** and **83 transitions** across the 15 machines; 2 rows carry a
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| 83 |
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counterexample; 2 carry a repaired twin, and both twins verify.
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## Two difficulty modes
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| 86 |
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- **`model`** — the full transition table is in the prompt. No protocol knowledge needed; isolates
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formal reasoning.
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- **`spec`** — only the standards clause and a description of the procedure. The model must know or
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infer the behaviour. This is the mode corresponding to what a security researcher actually does.
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Regenerate either: `python load_dataset.py --regenerate --mode spec`.
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## Usage
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| 95 |
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| 96 |
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```python
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# No dependencies
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from load_dataset import load, stats
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rows = load()
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stats() # {'n_rows': 15, 'n_violated': 2, 'trivial_always_safe_accuracy': 0.8667, ...}
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# Or as a datasets.Dataset
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| 103 |
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from load_dataset import load_hf
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ds = load_hf()
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print(ds[0]["prompt"])
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```
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```bash
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python load_dataset.py --stats # summary counts
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| 110 |
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python load_dataset.py --regenerate # rebuild from the package, so data cannot drift from code
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| 111 |
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```
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Scoring — including trace replay — needs the package, because a trace only means something when
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| 114 |
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replayed against the real model:
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| 115 |
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```bash
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| 117 |
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pip install protocol-bench
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| 118 |
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protocol-bench prompts --mode model -o prompts.json
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| 119 |
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# ... run your model, save {task_id: completion} to completions.json ...
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| 120 |
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protocol-bench score-completions completions.json
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| 121 |
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```
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| 122 |
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## Provenance
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| 124 |
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| 125 |
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Rows are generated by `protocol_bench.export.export_rows()` from the same finite-state models the
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| 126 |
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package ships and the test suite checks. Nothing in this file is hand-written:
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| 127 |
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| 128 |
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- `n_reachable_states`, `n_transitions`, and `transitions` come from exhaustive reachability;
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- `counterexample` is the shortest violating trace found by breadth-first search;
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| 130 |
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- `fixed_twin_holds` is the verdict on the repaired model;
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- `label` is cross-checked against exhaustive reachability by a test, so a label cannot drift away
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from its model.
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A further test asserts that **the committed JSONL is byte-equal to what the package generates**, and
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another asserts that **every counterexample in this file replays against its own model**.
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| 137 |
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## Labels, and one deliberate open question
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| 138 |
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| 139 |
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`KNOWN_COUNTEREXAMPLE` means the violation is published and cited. The single instance is the WPA2
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| 140 |
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4-way handshake — **KRACK** (Vanhoef & Piessens, ACM CCS 2017, CVE-2017-13077…13088).
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| 141 |
+
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| 142 |
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`CANDIDATE_COUNTEREXAMPLE` means the property fails and **no published citation was found**. It is
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| 143 |
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labelled unconfirmed on purpose, and it is a genuine open question posed publicly: if you can cite
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| 144 |
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it, or show the model is wrong, please say so.
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## Limitations
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| 148 |
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These are **models of published procedures**, not the standards themselves and not implementations.
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`PROVEN_SAFE` means the property holds over the modelled state space — not that any shipping product
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| 150 |
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is secure. Abstractions hide things.
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| 151 |
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| 152 |
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The set is small (15 rows) and drawn from one modelling effort, so a system tuned on it will overfit
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| 153 |
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quickly. Treat per-task outcomes as the primary result and the aggregate as a summary. Two further
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| 154 |
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procedures exist in the source corpus and are withheld.
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| 155 |
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| 156 |
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Replay validation checks that a trace is a genuine execution reaching a violating state; it does not
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| 157 |
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check that the trace is the *explanation* a human would give.
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| 158 |
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| 159 |
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## Licence and attribution
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| 160 |
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| 161 |
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MIT, for the code and the task metadata. The KRACK finding belongs to Vanhoef & Piessens; this
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| 162 |
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dataset reproduces it and does not claim it. Specification clauses are cited, not reproduced.
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| 163 |
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| 164 |
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## Citation
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| 165 |
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| 166 |
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```bibtex
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| 167 |
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@misc{protocolbench2026,
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| 168 |
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title = {Protocol-Bench: ground-truth safety verdicts for published IEEE 802.11 and 3GPP procedures},
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| 169 |
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year = {2026},
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| 170 |
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note = {Counterexamples are machine-validated by replay against the model.}
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}
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```
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load_dataset.py
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| 1 |
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"""Loader for the Protocol-Bench dataset.
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| 2 |
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| 3 |
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Works three ways, in order of preference:
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| 4 |
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| 5 |
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from load_dataset import load
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| 6 |
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rows = load() # plain Python, no dependencies
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| 7 |
+
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| 8 |
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ds = load_hf() # a `datasets.Dataset`, if `datasets` is installed
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| 9 |
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| 10 |
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python load_dataset.py --stats # summary from the command line
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| 11 |
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| 12 |
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The JSONL beside this file is the authoritative copy. If `protocol-bench` is installed, `regenerate()`
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| 13 |
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rebuilds it from the live models so the data can never drift from the code.
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| 14 |
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"""
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| 15 |
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| 16 |
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from __future__ import annotations
|
| 17 |
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| 18 |
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import argparse
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| 19 |
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import json
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| 20 |
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import pathlib
|
| 21 |
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import sys
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| 22 |
+
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| 23 |
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HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).parent
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| 24 |
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DATA = HERE / "protocol_bench.jsonl"
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| 25 |
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| 26 |
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def load(path: str | pathlib.Path | None = None) -> list[dict]:
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| 28 |
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"""Every row, as plain dicts. No third-party dependency."""
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| 29 |
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p = pathlib.Path(path) if path else DATA
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| 30 |
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if not p.exists():
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| 31 |
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raise FileNotFoundError(f"{p} not found. Regenerate it with: python load_dataset.py --regenerate")
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| 32 |
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with p.open() as fh:
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| 33 |
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return [json.loads(line) for line in fh if line.strip()]
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| 35 |
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| 36 |
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def load_hf(path: str | pathlib.Path | None = None):
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| 37 |
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"""A `datasets.Dataset`. Requires `pip install datasets`."""
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try:
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| 39 |
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from datasets import Dataset
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| 40 |
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except ImportError as e: # pragma: no cover - exercised only without the extra
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| 41 |
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raise ImportError("pip install datasets") from e
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return Dataset.from_list(load(path))
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def regenerate(path: str | pathlib.Path | None = None, mode: str = "model") -> int:
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| 46 |
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"""Rebuild the JSONL from the installed package, so data cannot drift from code."""
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| 47 |
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from protocol_bench.export import export_jsonl
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| 48 |
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| 49 |
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return export_jsonl(str(pathlib.Path(path) if path else DATA), mode=mode)
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| 50 |
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| 51 |
+
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| 52 |
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def stats(rows: list[dict] | None = None) -> dict:
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| 53 |
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"""Summary counts, derived from the rows themselves."""
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| 54 |
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rows = rows if rows is not None else load()
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| 55 |
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labels: dict[str, int] = {}
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| 56 |
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bodies: dict[str, int] = {}
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| 57 |
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for r in rows:
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| 58 |
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labels[r["label"]] = labels.get(r["label"], 0) + 1
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| 59 |
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bodies[r["standards_body"]] = bodies.get(r["standards_body"], 0) + 1
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| 60 |
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violated = sum(1 for r in rows if r["violated"])
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return {
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| 62 |
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"n_rows": len(rows),
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"by_label": labels,
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| 64 |
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"by_standards_body": bodies,
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| 65 |
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"n_violated": violated,
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| 66 |
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"n_safe": len(rows) - violated,
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| 67 |
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"trivial_always_safe_accuracy": round((len(rows) - violated) / len(rows), 4) if rows else 0,
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| 68 |
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"n_with_counterexample": sum(1 for r in rows if r["counterexample"]),
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| 69 |
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"n_with_fixed_twin": sum(1 for r in rows if r["has_fixed_twin"]),
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| 70 |
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"total_transitions": sum(r["n_transitions"] for r in rows),
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| 71 |
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"total_reachable_states": sum(r["n_reachable_states"] for r in rows),
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| 72 |
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}
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| 73 |
+
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| 74 |
+
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| 75 |
+
def main(argv=None) -> int:
|
| 76 |
+
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
|
| 77 |
+
ap.add_argument("--stats", action="store_true", help="print summary counts")
|
| 78 |
+
ap.add_argument("--regenerate", action="store_true", help="rebuild the JSONL from the package")
|
| 79 |
+
ap.add_argument("--mode", choices=("model", "spec"), default="model")
|
| 80 |
+
a = ap.parse_args(argv)
|
| 81 |
+
|
| 82 |
+
if a.regenerate:
|
| 83 |
+
n = regenerate(mode=a.mode)
|
| 84 |
+
print(f"wrote {n} rows to {DATA} ({a.mode} mode)")
|
| 85 |
+
return 0
|
| 86 |
+
|
| 87 |
+
rows = load()
|
| 88 |
+
if a.stats:
|
| 89 |
+
print(json.dumps(stats(rows), indent=2))
|
| 90 |
+
else:
|
| 91 |
+
print(f"{len(rows)} rows. Use --stats for a summary.")
|
| 92 |
+
return 0
|
| 93 |
+
|
| 94 |
+
|
| 95 |
+
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
| 96 |
+
sys.exit(main())
|
protocol_bench.jsonl
ADDED
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{"id": "ieee_4way_handshake_krack", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a712.7.6 (4-way handshake) / IEEE 802.11i", "property": "nonce_never_reused", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a712.7.6 (4-way handshake) / IEEE 802.11i\nSafety property that must hold: nonce_never_reused\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): ptk_installed, tx_nonce, nonce_reused\nInitial state: {'ptk_installed': False, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'ptk_installed': False, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --InstallPTK_msg3--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': False} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': False} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': False} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': True} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': True} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': True} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n\nThe property 'nonce_never_reused' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): ptk_installed, tx_nonce, nonce_reused\nInitial state: {'ptk_installed': False, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'ptk_installed': False, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --InstallPTK_msg3--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': False} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': False} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': False} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': True} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': True} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': True} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}", "label": "KNOWN_COUNTEREXAMPLE", "violated": true, "citation": "Vanhoef & Piessens, \"Key Reinstallation Attacks: Forcing Nonce Reuse in WPA2\", ACM CCS 2017; CVE-2017-13077..13088 (KRACK).", "known_finding": "Retransmitted/replayed EAPOL-Key msg3 triggers PTK reinstallation, resetting the TX nonce and replay counter -> nonce reuse.", "has_fixed_twin": true, "fixed_twin_holds": true, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 7, "n_transitions": 11, "state_fields": ["ptk_installed", "tx_nonce", "nonce_reused"], "initial_state": {"ptk_installed": false, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"ptk_installed": false, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}, "label": "InstallPTK_msg3", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}, "label": "SendEncrypted", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}, "label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": false}, "label": "SendEncrypted", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 2, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": false}, "label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 2, "nonce_reused": false}, "label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}, "label": "SendEncrypted", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": true}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}, "label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": true}, "label": "SendEncrypted", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 2, "nonce_reused": true}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": true}, "label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 2, "nonce_reused": true}, "label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}}], "counterexample": [{"label": null, "state": {"ptk_installed": false, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"label": "InstallPTK_msg3", "state": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"label": "SendEncrypted", "state": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "state": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}}], "counterexample_length": 4}
|
| 2 |
+
{"id": "ieee_ft_handshake_802_11r", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a713 (Fast BSS Transition)", "property": "no_data_before_key_confirm", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a713 (Fast BSS Transition)\nSafety property that must hold: no_data_before_key_confirm\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): authed, confirmed, data\nInitial state: {'authed': False, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'authed': False, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False} --FTAuth--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False}\n {'authed': True, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False} --KeyConfirm--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': False}\n {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': False} --SendData--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': True}\n {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': True} (no outgoing transitions)\n\nThe property 'no_data_before_key_confirm' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): authed, confirmed, data\nInitial state: {'authed': False, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'authed': False, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False} --FTAuth--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False}\n {'authed': True, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False} --KeyConfirm--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': False}\n {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': False} --SendData--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': True}\n {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': True} (no outgoing transitions)", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 3, "state_fields": ["authed", "confirmed", "data"], "initial_state": {"authed": false, "confirmed": false, "data": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"authed": false, "confirmed": false, "data": false}, "label": "FTAuth", "to": {"authed": true, "confirmed": false, "data": false}}, {"from": {"authed": true, "confirmed": false, "data": false}, "label": "KeyConfirm", "to": {"authed": true, "confirmed": true, "data": false}}, {"from": {"authed": true, "confirmed": true, "data": false}, "label": "SendData", "to": {"authed": true, "confirmed": true, "data": true}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
|
| 3 |
+
{"id": "ieee_mlo_tid_to_link", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11be/bn MLO TID-to-link mapping (\u00a735)", "property": "no_tx_on_inactive_link", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11be/bn MLO TID-to-link mapping (\u00a735)\nSafety property that must hold: no_tx_on_inactive_link\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): link_active, tid_mapped, tx\nInitial state: {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --ActivateLink--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --DeactivateLink--> {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --MapTID--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False} --DeactivateLink--> {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False} --TxOnLink--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': True}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': True} --TxDone--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False}\n\nThe property 'no_tx_on_inactive_link' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): link_active, tid_mapped, tx\nInitial state: {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --ActivateLink--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --DeactivateLink--> {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --MapTID--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False} --DeactivateLink--> {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False} --TxOnLink--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': True}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': True} --TxDone--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 6, "state_fields": ["link_active", "tid_mapped", "tx"], "initial_state": {"link_active": false, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"link_active": false, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}, "label": "ActivateLink", "to": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}}, {"from": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}, "label": "DeactivateLink", "to": {"link_active": false, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}}, {"from": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}, "label": "MapTID", "to": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": true, "tx": false}}, {"from": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": true, "tx": false}, "label": "DeactivateLink", "to": {"link_active": false, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}}, {"from": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": true, "tx": false}, "label": "TxOnLink", "to": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": true, "tx": true}}, {"from": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": true, "tx": true}, "label": "TxDone", "to": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": true, "tx": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
|
| 4 |
+
{"id": "ieee_block_ack_scoreboard", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a710.25 (Block Ack reordering / scoreboard)", "property": "no_duplicate_delivered", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a710.25 (Block Ack reordering / scoreboard)\nSafety property that must hold: no_duplicate_delivered\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): expected, dup_delivered\nInitial state: {'expected': 0, 'dup_delivered': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'expected': 0, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvBelowWinStart_discard--> {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 3, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvBelowWinStart_discard--> {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 3, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvBelowWinStart_discard--> {'expected': 3, 'dup_delivered': False}\n\nThe property 'no_duplicate_delivered' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): expected, dup_delivered\nInitial state: {'expected': 0, 'dup_delivered': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'expected': 0, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvBelowWinStart_discard--> {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 3, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvBelowWinStart_discard--> {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 3, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvBelowWinStart_discard--> {'expected': 3, 'dup_delivered': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 2, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 6, "state_fields": ["expected", "dup_delivered"], "initial_state": {"expected": 0, "dup_delivered": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"expected": 0, "dup_delivered": false}, "label": "RecvNext", "to": {"expected": 1, "dup_delivered": false}}, {"from": {"expected": 1, "dup_delivered": false}, "label": "RecvNext", "to": {"expected": 2, "dup_delivered": false}}, {"from": {"expected": 1, "dup_delivered": false}, "label": "RecvBelowWinStart_discard", "to": {"expected": 1, "dup_delivered": false}}, {"from": {"expected": 2, "dup_delivered": false}, "label": "RecvNext", "to": {"expected": 3, "dup_delivered": false}}, {"from": {"expected": 2, "dup_delivered": false}, "label": "RecvBelowWinStart_discard", "to": {"expected": 2, "dup_delivered": false}}, {"from": {"expected": 3, "dup_delivered": false}, "label": "RecvBelowWinStart_discard", "to": {"expected": 3, "dup_delivered": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
|
| 5 |
+
{"id": "ieee_twt_wake_sleep", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11ax/be Target Wake Time (\u00a726.8)", "property": "no_delivery_while_asleep", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11ax/be Target Wake Time (\u00a726.8)\nSafety property that must hold: no_delivery_while_asleep\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): awake, delivered_asleep\nInitial state: {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPStart--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPEnd--> {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPStart--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPEnd--> {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False} --DeliverInSP--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n\nThe property 'no_delivery_while_asleep' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): awake, delivered_asleep\nInitial state: {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPStart--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPEnd--> {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPStart--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPEnd--> {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False} --DeliverInSP--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 2, "n_reachable_states": 2, "n_transitions": 5, "state_fields": ["awake", "delivered_asleep"], "initial_state": {"awake": false, "delivered_asleep": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"awake": false, "delivered_asleep": false}, "label": "SPStart", "to": {"awake": true, "delivered_asleep": false}}, {"from": {"awake": false, "delivered_asleep": false}, "label": "SPEnd", "to": {"awake": false, "delivered_asleep": false}}, {"from": {"awake": true, "delivered_asleep": false}, "label": "SPStart", "to": {"awake": true, "delivered_asleep": false}}, {"from": {"awake": true, "delivered_asleep": false}, "label": "SPEnd", "to": {"awake": false, "delivered_asleep": false}}, {"from": {"awake": true, "delivered_asleep": false}, "label": "DeliverInSP", "to": {"awake": true, "delivered_asleep": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
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| 6 |
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{"id": "ieee_uapsd_pspoll", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a711.2 (U-APSD / PS-Poll power save)", "property": "no_delivery_without_trigger", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a711.2 (U-APSD / PS-Poll power save)\nSafety property that must hold: no_delivery_without_trigger\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): buffered, trigger, delivered_no_trigger\nInitial state: {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Buffer--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': True, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Buffer--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --DeliverOnTrigger--> {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n\nThe property 'no_delivery_without_trigger' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): buffered, trigger, delivered_no_trigger\nInitial state: {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Buffer--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': True, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Buffer--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --DeliverOnTrigger--> {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 7, "state_fields": ["buffered", "trigger", "delivered_no_trigger"], "initial_state": {"buffered": false, "trigger": false, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"buffered": false, "trigger": false, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "Buffer", "to": {"buffered": true, "trigger": false, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}, {"from": {"buffered": false, "trigger": false, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "Trigger", "to": {"buffered": false, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}, {"from": {"buffered": true, "trigger": false, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "Trigger", "to": {"buffered": true, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}, {"from": {"buffered": false, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "Buffer", "to": {"buffered": true, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}, {"from": {"buffered": false, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "Trigger", "to": {"buffered": false, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}, {"from": {"buffered": true, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "Trigger", "to": {"buffered": true, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}, {"from": {"buffered": true, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "DeliverOnTrigger", "to": {"buffered": false, "trigger": false, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
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| 7 |
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{"id": "ieee_sa_query", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a711.3 / \u00a712 (SA Query, protected management frames / 802.11w)", "property": "no_spoofed_disassoc_accepted", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a711.3 / \u00a712 (SA Query, protected management frames / 802.11w)\nSafety property that must hold: no_spoofed_disassoc_accepted\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): associated, query_pending, spoof_accepted\nInitial state: {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False} --RecvUnprotectedDisassoc_startSAQuery--> {'associated': True, 'query_pending': True, 'spoof_accepted': False}\n {'associated': True, 'query_pending': True, 'spoof_accepted': False} --SAQueryResponse_keepAssoc--> {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False}\n\nThe property 'no_spoofed_disassoc_accepted' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): associated, query_pending, spoof_accepted\nInitial state: {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False} --RecvUnprotectedDisassoc_startSAQuery--> {'associated': True, 'query_pending': True, 'spoof_accepted': False}\n {'associated': True, 'query_pending': True, 'spoof_accepted': False} --SAQueryResponse_keepAssoc--> {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 2, "n_transitions": 2, "state_fields": ["associated", "query_pending", "spoof_accepted"], "initial_state": {"associated": true, "query_pending": false, "spoof_accepted": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"associated": true, "query_pending": false, "spoof_accepted": false}, "label": "RecvUnprotectedDisassoc_startSAQuery", "to": {"associated": true, "query_pending": true, "spoof_accepted": false}}, {"from": {"associated": true, "query_pending": true, "spoof_accepted": false}, "label": "SAQueryResponse_keepAssoc", "to": {"associated": true, "query_pending": false, "spoof_accepted": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
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| 8 |
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{"id": "ieee_fils_auth", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11ai Fast Initial Link Setup (\u00a712.12)", "property": "no_data_before_key", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11ai Fast Initial Link Setup (\u00a712.12)\nSafety property that must hold: no_data_before_key\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): fils_auth, key, data\nInitial state: {'fils_auth': False, 'key': False, 'data': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'fils_auth': False, 'key': False, 'data': False} --FILSAuth--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': False, 'data': False}\n {'fils_auth': True, 'key': False, 'data': False} --EstablishKey--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': False}\n {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': False} --SendData--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': True}\n {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': True} (no outgoing transitions)\n\nThe property 'no_data_before_key' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): fils_auth, key, data\nInitial state: {'fils_auth': False, 'key': False, 'data': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'fils_auth': False, 'key': False, 'data': False} --FILSAuth--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': False, 'data': False}\n {'fils_auth': True, 'key': False, 'data': False} --EstablishKey--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': False}\n {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': False} --SendData--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': True}\n {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': True} (no outgoing transitions)", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 3, "state_fields": ["fils_auth", "key", "data"], "initial_state": {"fils_auth": false, "key": false, "data": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"fils_auth": false, "key": false, "data": false}, "label": "FILSAuth", "to": {"fils_auth": true, "key": false, "data": false}}, {"from": {"fils_auth": true, "key": false, "data": false}, "label": "EstablishKey", "to": {"fils_auth": true, "key": true, "data": false}}, {"from": {"fils_auth": true, "key": true, "data": false}, "label": "SendData", "to": {"fils_auth": true, "key": true, "data": true}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
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| 9 |
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{"id": "3gpp_rrc_state_machine", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.331 \u00a74.2 (RRC states: IDLE/INACTIVE/CONNECTED)", "property": "no_data_in_idle", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.331 \u00a74.2 (RRC states: IDLE/INACTIVE/CONNECTED)\nSafety property that must hold: no_data_in_idle\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): state, data\nInitial state: {'state': 0, 'data': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'state': 0, 'data': False} --Connect--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': False} --Suspend--> {'state': 1, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': False} --Release--> {'state': 0, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': False} --SendData--> {'state': 2, 'data': True}\n {'state': 1, 'data': False} --Resume--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}\n {'state': 1, 'data': False} --ReleaseFromInactive--> {'state': 0, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': True} --DataDone--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}\n\nThe property 'no_data_in_idle' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): state, data\nInitial state: {'state': 0, 'data': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'state': 0, 'data': False} --Connect--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': False} --Suspend--> {'state': 1, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': False} --Release--> {'state': 0, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': False} --SendData--> {'state': 2, 'data': True}\n {'state': 1, 'data': False} --Resume--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}\n {'state': 1, 'data': False} --ReleaseFromInactive--> {'state': 0, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': True} --DataDone--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 2, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 7, "state_fields": ["state", "data"], "initial_state": {"state": 0, "data": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"state": 0, "data": false}, "label": "Connect", "to": {"state": 2, "data": false}}, {"from": {"state": 2, "data": false}, "label": "Suspend", "to": {"state": 1, "data": false}}, {"from": {"state": 2, "data": false}, "label": "Release", "to": {"state": 0, "data": false}}, {"from": {"state": 2, "data": false}, "label": "SendData", "to": {"state": 2, "data": true}}, {"from": {"state": 1, "data": false}, "label": "Resume", "to": {"state": 2, "data": false}}, {"from": {"state": 1, "data": false}, "label": "ReleaseFromInactive", "to": {"state": 0, "data": false}}, {"from": {"state": 2, "data": true}, "label": "DataDone", "to": {"state": 2, "data": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
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| 10 |
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{"id": "3gpp_pdcp_reordering", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.323 \u00a75.2 (PDCP reordering / duplication discard)", "property": "no_duplicate_delivered", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.323 \u00a75.2 (PDCP reordering / duplication discard)\nSafety property that must hold: no_duplicate_delivered\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): next_count, dup\nInitial state: {'next_count': 0, 'dup': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'next_count': 0, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False} --RecvDuplicate_discard--> {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 3, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False} --RecvDuplicate_discard--> {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 3, 'dup': False} --RecvDuplicate_discard--> {'next_count': 3, 'dup': False}\n\nThe property 'no_duplicate_delivered' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): next_count, dup\nInitial state: {'next_count': 0, 'dup': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'next_count': 0, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False} --RecvDuplicate_discard--> {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 3, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False} --RecvDuplicate_discard--> {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 3, 'dup': False} --RecvDuplicate_discard--> {'next_count': 3, 'dup': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 2, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 6, "state_fields": ["next_count", "dup"], "initial_state": {"next_count": 0, "dup": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"next_count": 0, "dup": false}, "label": "DeliverInOrder", "to": {"next_count": 1, "dup": false}}, {"from": {"next_count": 1, "dup": false}, "label": "DeliverInOrder", "to": {"next_count": 2, "dup": false}}, {"from": {"next_count": 1, "dup": false}, "label": "RecvDuplicate_discard", "to": {"next_count": 1, "dup": false}}, {"from": {"next_count": 2, "dup": false}, "label": "DeliverInOrder", "to": {"next_count": 3, "dup": false}}, {"from": {"next_count": 2, "dup": false}, "label": "RecvDuplicate_discard", "to": {"next_count": 2, "dup": false}}, {"from": {"next_count": 3, "dup": false}, "label": "RecvDuplicate_discard", "to": {"next_count": 3, "dup": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
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| 11 |
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{"id": "3gpp_rlc_am_retx", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.322 \u00a75.2/\u00a75.3 (RLC AM retransmission, maxRetxThreshold)", "property": "retx_bounded_no_runaway", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.322 \u00a75.2/\u00a75.3 (RLC AM retransmission, maxRetxThreshold)\nSafety property that must hold: retx_bounded_no_runaway\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): retx, acked, failed\nInitial state: {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 0, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 2, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 1, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 0, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 2, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 3, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 2, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 2, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 1, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 3, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 3, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 3, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 2, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 4, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --MaxRetx_RLF--> {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': True}\n {'retx': 3, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': True} (no outgoing transitions)\n\nThe property 'retx_bounded_no_runaway' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): retx, acked, failed\nInitial state: {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 0, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 2, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 1, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 0, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 2, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 3, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 2, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 2, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 1, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 3, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 3, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 3, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 2, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 4, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --MaxRetx_RLF--> {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': True}\n {'retx': 3, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': True} (no outgoing transitions)", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 11, "n_transitions": 10, "state_fields": ["retx", "acked", "failed"], "initial_state": {"retx": 0, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"retx": 0, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Retransmit", "to": {"retx": 1, "acked": false, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 0, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Ack", "to": {"retx": 0, "acked": true, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 1, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Retransmit", "to": {"retx": 2, "acked": false, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 1, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Ack", "to": {"retx": 1, "acked": true, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 2, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Retransmit", "to": {"retx": 3, "acked": false, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 2, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Ack", "to": {"retx": 2, "acked": true, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 3, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Retransmit", "to": {"retx": 4, "acked": false, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 3, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Ack", "to": {"retx": 3, "acked": true, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 4, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Ack", "to": {"retx": 4, "acked": true, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 4, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "MaxRetx_RLF", "to": {"retx": 4, "acked": false, "failed": true}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
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{"id": "3gpp_drx_timers", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.321 \u00a75.7 (DRX onDuration / inactivity / RTT timers)", "property": "awake_when_pdcch_expected", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.321 \u00a75.7 (DRX onDuration / inactivity / RTT timers)\nSafety property that must hold: awake_when_pdcch_expected\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): active, pdcch_expected\nInitial state: {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --ExpectPDCCH--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --InactivityExpire_sleep--> {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True} --PDCCHReceived--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n\nThe property 'awake_when_pdcch_expected' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): active, pdcch_expected\nInitial state: {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --ExpectPDCCH--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --InactivityExpire_sleep--> {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True} --PDCCHReceived--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 2, "n_reachable_states": 3, "n_transitions": 6, "state_fields": ["active", "pdcch_expected"], "initial_state": {"active": false, "pdcch_expected": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"active": false, "pdcch_expected": false}, "label": "OnDurationStart", "to": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": false}}, {"from": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": false}, "label": "OnDurationStart", "to": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": false}}, {"from": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": false}, "label": "ExpectPDCCH", "to": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": true}}, {"from": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": false}, "label": "InactivityExpire_sleep", "to": {"active": false, "pdcch_expected": false}}, {"from": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": true}, "label": "OnDurationStart", "to": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": true}}, {"from": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": true}, "label": "PDCCHReceived", "to": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
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{"id": "3gpp_rach_contention", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.321 \u00a75.1 (Random access, contention resolution)", "property": "no_undetected_collision", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.321 \u00a75.1 (Random access, contention resolution)\nSafety property that must hold: no_undetected_collision\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): preamble, contention, resolved, undetected\nInitial state: {'preamble': False, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'preamble': False, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --SendPreamble--> {'preamble': True, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}\n {'preamble': True, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --CollisionOccurs--> {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}\n {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --ContentionResolutionID--> {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': True, 'undetected': False}\n {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': True, 'undetected': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n\nThe property 'no_undetected_collision' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): preamble, contention, resolved, undetected\nInitial state: {'preamble': False, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'preamble': False, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --SendPreamble--> {'preamble': True, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}\n {'preamble': True, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --CollisionOccurs--> {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}\n {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --ContentionResolutionID--> {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': True, 'undetected': False}\n {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': True, 'undetected': False} (no outgoing transitions)", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 4, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 3, "state_fields": ["preamble", "contention", "resolved", "undetected"], "initial_state": {"preamble": false, "contention": false, "resolved": false, "undetected": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"preamble": false, "contention": false, "resolved": false, "undetected": false}, "label": "SendPreamble", "to": {"preamble": true, "contention": false, "resolved": false, "undetected": false}}, {"from": {"preamble": true, "contention": false, "resolved": false, "undetected": false}, "label": "CollisionOccurs", "to": {"preamble": true, "contention": true, "resolved": false, "undetected": false}}, {"from": {"preamble": true, "contention": true, "resolved": false, "undetected": false}, "label": "ContentionResolutionID", "to": {"preamble": true, "contention": true, "resolved": true, "undetected": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
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{"id": "3gpp_beam_failure_recovery", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.321 \u00a75.17 / TS 38.213 \u00a76 (Beam failure recovery)", "property": "recover_before_rlf", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.321 \u00a75.17 / TS 38.213 \u00a76 (Beam failure recovery)\nSafety property that must hold: recover_before_rlf\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): bf_detected, bfr_sent, recovered, rlf\nInitial state: {'bf_detected': False, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'bf_detected': False, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --DetectBeamFailure--> {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}\n {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --SendBFR--> {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}\n {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --RecoverBeam--> {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': True, 'rlf': False}\n {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': True, 'rlf': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n\nThe property 'recover_before_rlf' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): bf_detected, bfr_sent, recovered, rlf\nInitial state: {'bf_detected': False, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'bf_detected': False, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --DetectBeamFailure--> {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}\n {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --SendBFR--> {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}\n {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --RecoverBeam--> {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': True, 'rlf': False}\n {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': True, 'rlf': False} (no outgoing transitions)", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 4, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 3, "state_fields": ["bf_detected", "bfr_sent", "recovered", "rlf"], "initial_state": {"bf_detected": false, "bfr_sent": false, "recovered": false, "rlf": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"bf_detected": false, "bfr_sent": false, "recovered": false, "rlf": false}, "label": "DetectBeamFailure", "to": {"bf_detected": true, "bfr_sent": false, "recovered": false, "rlf": false}}, {"from": {"bf_detected": true, "bfr_sent": false, "recovered": false, "rlf": false}, "label": "SendBFR", "to": {"bf_detected": true, "bfr_sent": true, "recovered": false, "rlf": false}}, {"from": {"bf_detected": true, "bfr_sent": true, "recovered": false, "rlf": false}, "label": "RecoverBeam", "to": {"bf_detected": true, "bfr_sent": true, "recovered": true, "rlf": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0}
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{"id": "3gpp_xn_handover_premature_release", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.300 \u00a79.2.3 / TS 38.423 (Xn handover, data forwarding & path switch)", "property": "always_one_serving_context", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.300 \u00a79.2.3 / TS 38.423 (Xn handover, data forwarding & path switch)\nSafety property that must hold: always_one_serving_context\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): source_ctx, target_ctx, path_switched, data_lost\nInitial state: {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': False, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': False, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --PrepareTarget--> {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False}\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --ReleaseSourceEarly--> {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': True}\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --PathSwitchAck--> {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False}\n {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': True} --PathSwitchAck--> {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': True}\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False} --ReleaseSourceEarly--> {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False}\n {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': True} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n\nThe property 'always_one_serving_context' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): source_ctx, target_ctx, path_switched, data_lost\nInitial state: {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': False, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': False, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --PrepareTarget--> {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False}\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --ReleaseSourceEarly--> {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': True}\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --PathSwitchAck--> {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False}\n {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': True} --PathSwitchAck--> {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': True}\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False} --ReleaseSourceEarly--> {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False}\n {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': True} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False} (no outgoing transitions)", "label": "CANDIDATE_COUNTEREXAMPLE", "violated": true, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": true, "fixed_twin_holds": true, "n_state_fields": 4, "n_reachable_states": 6, "n_transitions": 5, "state_fields": ["source_ctx", "target_ctx", "path_switched", "data_lost"], "initial_state": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": false, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": false, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}, "label": "PrepareTarget", "to": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}}, {"from": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}, "label": "ReleaseSourceEarly", "to": {"source_ctx": false, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": true}}, {"from": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}, "label": "PathSwitchAck", "to": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": true, "data_lost": false}}, {"from": {"source_ctx": false, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": true}, "label": "PathSwitchAck", "to": {"source_ctx": false, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": true, "data_lost": true}}, {"from": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": true, "data_lost": false}, "label": "ReleaseSourceEarly", "to": {"source_ctx": false, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": true, "data_lost": false}}], "counterexample": [{"label": null, "state": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": false, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}}, {"label": "PrepareTarget", "state": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}}, {"label": "ReleaseSourceEarly", "state": {"source_ctx": false, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": true}}], "counterexample_length": 3}
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