File size: 38,197 Bytes
aefa98b
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
source,label,flows,primary_technique,primary_technique_name,primary_tactics,secondary_techniques,family_v1_cluster,confidence,netflow_observable,documented_behaviour,evidence,caveat,skeptic_status,skeptic_note
NF-UNSW-NB15-v3,Analysis,1226,T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,initial-access,T1595 Active Scanning,EXPLOIT_PUBLIC_APP,low,partial,"Group of threats against web applications via ports, emails and scripts. The papers name no tool or protocol.","'A group that presents a variety of threats that target web applications through ports, emails and scripts.' (2021_Sarhan_NetFlow_Datasets...pdf p.8, Table 2; same text in 2021_Sarhan_Towards...pdf p.6, Table 3)","The description is a vague umbrella (web, email, ports, scripts). Several different behaviours are bundled, so one mapping cannot cover the class. Web payloads and email content are not visible in flow records. The papers do not show what the NF flows contain.",corrected by skeptic,"The quote is verbatim (NetFlow_Datasets p.8 Table 2; Towards p.6 Table 3). Secondary T1595.002 is not supported. ATT&CK describes it as checking software and version against a specific exploit, and the papers mention no vulnerability scanning. The row is also inconsistent with the Reconnaissance row"
NF-UNSW-NB15-v3,Backdoor,4659,T1205,Traffic Signaling,"stealth,persistence,command-and-control",,COMMAND_AND_CONTROL,low,partial,"Bypassing security mechanisms by replying to specially constructed client applications, which implies a hidden remote-access channel. No tool or protocol is named.","'A technique that aims to bypass security mechanisms by replying to specific constructed client applications.' (2021_Sarhan_NetFlow_Datasets...pdf p.8, Table 2)","The paper gives no mechanism. T1219 is inferred from the label and the phrase 'constructed client applications'. T1571 is a guess. Flows would show an unusual server port and a long-lived connection, but not the backdoor itself.",corrected by skeptic,"The quote is verbatim (NetFlow_Datasets p.8 Table 2). T1219 Remote Access Tools is the wrong technique. ATT&CK scopes it to legitimate remote-access software such as AnyDesk, and the paper describes a custom backdoor that replies only to specially constructed clients. The behaviour matches T1205 Tra"
NF-UNSW-NB15-v3,DoS,5980,T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,impact,T1498 Network Denial of Service,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,medium,yes,"Overloading a computer system's resources to prevent access to or availability of its data. No tool or protocol is named, so the layer (network or endpoint) is unknown.","'Denial of Service is an attempt to overload a computer system's resources with the aim of preventing access to or availability of its data.' (2021_Sarhan_NetFlow_Datasets...pdf p.8, Table 2)","The class is certainly a DoS, but no sub-technique is supported because the flood type is not stated. Parent techniques are used. UNSW DoS is a different workload from BoT-IoT and CSE-CIC DoS. Mapping is per (source, label).",accepted,"No refutation. The quote is verbatim (NetFlow_Datasets p.8 Table 2). 'Overload a computer system's resources' fits T1499 (system-resource exhaustion) better than T1498 (bandwidth exhaustion). Both are valid, non-deprecated, impact-tactic parent techniques, and the sub-techniques (T1499.001-.004, T14"
NF-UNSW-NB15-v3,Exploits,42748,T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,initial-access,T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services,EXPLOIT_PUBLIC_APP,low,partial,Sequences of commands that control a host's behaviour through a known vulnerability. The specific vulnerabilities and services are not listed in the papers read.,"'Are sequences of commands controlling the behaviour of a host through a known vulnerability.' (2021_Sarhan_NetFlow_Datasets...pdf p.8, Table 2)","The papers do not say whether the targets are public-facing, internal or client-side, so T1190 versus T1210 is a judgment call. The class is exploit-based, but flows show only a connection to a service, not the exploit payload.",corrected by skeptic,"The quote is verbatim (NetFlow_Datasets p.8 Table 2). T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution is unsupported. The paper says 'a host', not a client application, and ATT&CK scopes T1203 to client software. The primary tactic is also not determined by the papers. T1190 needs an Internet-facing target,"

NF-UNSW-NB15-v3,Fuzzers,33816,T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,impact,T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,low,partial,Sending large amounts of random data to crash a system and to discover security vulnerabilities. No tool is named.,"'An attack in which the attacker sends large amounts of random data which cause a system to crash and also aim to discover security vulnerabilities in a system.' (2021_Sarhan_NetFlow_Datasets...pdf p.8, Table 2)","ATT&CK has no fuzzing technique. The description gives two goals, vulnerability discovery (reconnaissance) and crashing the target (impact), so the primary tactic is debatable. Random payloads are invisible in flows. Only many short flows or odd sizes could show.",corrected by skeptic,"The quote is verbatim (NetFlow_Datasets p.8 Table 2), but the primary technique is questionable. The sentence leads with 'random data which cause a system to crash' and adds 'also aim to discover security vulnerabilities', so the crash is the stated effect. T1499.004 (exploit vulnerabilities to cras"

NF-UNSW-NB15-v3,Generic,19651,,(no ATT&CK technique),,,UNMAPPED_NO_ATTACK_COUNTERPART,low,no,"A method that targets cryptography and causes a collision with each block cipher. The papers give no tool, protocol or target.","'A method that targets cryptography and causes a collision with each block-cipher.' (2021_Sarhan_NetFlow_Datasets...pdf p.8, Table 2; 2021_Sarhan_Towards...pdf p.6, Table 3)","There is no good ATT&CK counterpart. Cryptanalytic collision attacks are not an enterprise adversary technique, and T1600 describes weakening a target's own crypto on a network device. This is a forced approximation for completeness only. The behaviour is not observable in flow statistics, so the cl",corrected by skeptic,"The quote is verbatim (NetFlow_Datasets p.8 Table 2; Towards p.6 Table 3). The mapping is a forced fit. T1600.001 Reduce Key Space covers weakening the cipher strength of a compromised network device, which is not a cryptanalytic collision attack on block ciphers. Listing the sub-technique as primar"

NF-UNSW-NB15-v3,Reconnaissance,17074,T1595,Active Scanning,reconnaissance,T1046 Network Service Discovery,RECON_DISCOVERY,medium,yes,"Gathering information about a network host, also known as a probe. No tool is named in the papers read.","'A technique for gathering information about a network host and is also known as a probe.' (2021_Sarhan_NetFlow_Datasets...pdf p.8, Table 2)","The papers do not say whether the probing is port scanning, host sweeping or vulnerability scanning, so the parent T1595 is used. T1595.001 and T1595.002 are not supported. Probing shows up in flows as many short flows to many ports or hosts.",accepted,"No refutation. The quote is verbatim (NetFlow_Datasets p.8 Table 2). The 'probe' wording supports T1595 Active Scanning (reconnaissance) at parent level, and the row rightly rejects the sub-techniques. T1046 as secondary is acceptable but marginal, since in ATT&CK it is a discovery step usually run "

NF-UNSW-NB15-v3,Shellcode,2381,T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,execution,T1055 Process Injection,EXECUTION,low,partial,"Malware that penetrates code to control a victim's host. This describes a payload, with no delivery mechanism, tool or protocol given.","'A malware that penetrates a code to control a victim's host.' (2021_Sarhan_NetFlow_Datasets...pdf p.8, Table 2)","Shellcode is a payload, not a delivery step, and the description is a loose paraphrase. The mapping is inferred from the label. The delivery vector is probably an exploit, so the class overlaps with Exploits. Payload bytes are invisible in flows, though the flow count is very small (1,365 in v1).",corrected by skeptic,"The quote is verbatim (NetFlow_Datasets p.8 Table 2). T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution is unsupported as primary, because the paper says nothing about a client application. T1203 would also overlap wrongly with the Exploits row. ATT&CK has no shellcode technique. 'Control a victim's host' onl"

NF-UNSW-NB15-v3,Worms,158,T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,lateral-movement,T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer,LATERAL_MOVEMENT,medium,partial,Attacks that replicate themselves and spread to other computers. No worm family or propagation protocol is named.,"'Attacks that replicate themselves and spread to other computers.' (2021_Sarhan_NetFlow_Datasets...pdf p.8, Table 2)","Self-propagation is documented, but the propagation method is not, so T1210 is the usual worm mechanism rather than something the paper states. Spread appears in flows as one host contacting many hosts, but it is rare (153 flows in v1) and hard to separate from Exploits. ATT&CK has no dedicated worm",corrected by skeptic,"The quote is verbatim (NetFlow_Datasets p.8 Table 2). 'Spread to other computers' does support lateral-movement as the tactic. T1021 Remote Services is unsupported as secondary, because ATT&CK describes it as logging in with valid accounts, and a worm needs no credentials. T1570 Lateral Tool Transfe"

NF-ToN-IoT-v3,Backdoor,203384,T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,initial-access,,EXPLOIT_PUBLIC_APP,low,partial,"Metasploitable3 framework used from two Kali attacker VMs (192.168.1.33, .37) to gain unauthorised remote access to infected IIoT devices via backdoor malware; devices could then be controlled and enrolled in botnets.","""allows an adversary to gain unauthorised remote access to the infected IIoT devices by a backdoor malware... We utilised the Metasploitable3 framework"" (Alsaedi 2020, p.165139)","ATT&CK has no generic 'backdoor' technique; the paper names no specific backdoor payload or protocol, so T1219 is an approximation and T1190 is inferred from 'Metasploitable3 exploit'. Flows show only connections to the backdoor port, not the control activity. Sarhan Table 4 gives a different generi",corrected by skeptic,"All IDs exist and are not deprecated (STIX v20), but T1219 is wrong. Its STIX description says adversaries use legitimate remote access tools (TeamViewer-style), and the paper describes backdoor malware, not legitimate software. The paper only documents Metasploitable3 exploitation from Kali .33/.37"

NF-ToN-IoT-v3,DDoS,4141256,T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,impact,T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,medium,yes,"Python scripts (ddos.py, ddos2.py, ddos2_broker.py) driving the UFONet toolkit from Kali VMs 192.168.1.30, .31 and .34-.38, flooding IIoT devices/MQTT broker with many connections to exhaust CPU and memory.","""different python scripts (e.g, ddos.py, ddos2.py and ddos2_broker.py) were written to launch DDoS attacks using the UFONet toolkit"" (Alsaedi 2020, p.165139)","The papers name UFONet but do not say which protocol layer it floods; preferring the service-level sub-technique rests on my background knowledge of UFONet (HTTP floods), not on the papers. The 'distributed' sources are ~8 Kali VMs, not a real botnet. DDoS is the largest class (326,345 flows, Sarhan",corrected by skeptic,"The primary T1499.002 is not supported by the papers. Alsaedi p.165139 says only 'flooding ... with numerous connections so to exhaust the device resources (CPU and memory)'. That matches parent T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service, whose STIX text covers exhausting system resources without saturating t"

NF-ToN-IoT-v3,DoS,203456,T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,impact,T1498.001 Direct Network Flood,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,medium,yes,"A Scapy-based Python script (dos.py) run from Kali VMs 192.168.1.30, .31 and .39 sending floods of connection attempts against IoT/IIoT devices to disrupt service.","""a python script (e.g., dos.py) was developed to perform DoS attacks using the Scapy package"" (Alsaedi 2020, p.165139)","The paper does not state the packet type (SYN, UDP, ICMP) or the target layer, so no endpoint sub-technique is supported; the parent T1499 is used deliberately. Bandwidth versus resource exhaustion cannot be told apart from the text.",accepted,"Survives refutation. T1499 and T1498.001 exist, are not deprecated and have tactic impact. The quote and p.165139 are accurate, and the IPs .30/.31/.39 match. Using the parent T1499 is correct because the paper gives no packet type or layer. Minor: T1498.001 (high-volume traffic; UDP/ICMP/TCP) is no"

NF-ToN-IoT-v3,injection,381777,T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,initial-access,T1565 Data Manipulation,EXPLOIT_PUBLIC_APP,medium,partial,"Two bash scripts (injection-1.sh, injection-2.sh) injecting malicious data/code inputs into web applications (DVWA, a vulnerable public PHP site, Security Shepherd) and IoT service web pages from Kali VMs 192.168.1.{30,31,33,35,36,38}. Sarhan names SQL and code injection as the main kinds.","""two bash scripts (e.g., injection-1.sh and injection-2.sh) were written to inject data inputs against web applications (e.g., DVWA... and Security Shepherd VMs"" (Alsaedi 2020, p.165139)","The injection payloads are in HTTP bodies, which NetFlow cannot see; only the repeated connections to the web servers show. T1565.002 reflects the paper's claim that injection can manipulate telemetry and control commands, but no such manipulation is shown. Injection is the largest attack class afte",corrected by skeptic,"T1190 as primary is well supported: untrusted input to web apps (DVWA, Security Shepherd), SQL/code injection per Sarhan p.9, and the quote at p.165139 is accurate. The secondary T1565.002 is wrong. Per STIX it means altering data en route (requires interception or AiTM), whereas injection into a we"

NF-ToN-IoT-v3,mitm,6013,T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,"credential-access,collection",T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle; T1040 Network Sniffing,CREDENTIAL_ACCESS,high,no,"Ettercap run from Kali VMs 192.168.1.31-34 to carry out ARP cache poisoning, ICMP redirection and port-stealing, intercepting communication between devices and possibly manipulating it.","""We used the Ettercap tool to execute ARP Cache poisoning, ICMP redirection and port-stealing attacks."" (Alsaedi 2020, p.165140)","ARP poisoning is layer 2 and is not exported as IP flows; the labelled flows are ordinary IP traffic in the attack window, so label noise is likely. ICMP redirect and port stealing are covered only by the parent T1557. T1040 is inferred from interception, not stated. Only 1,295 flows.",corrected by skeptic,"IDs are valid and not deprecated. The quote and p.165140 are accurate (Ettercap, ARP cache poisoning, ICMP redirect, port stealing; IPs .31-.34). T1557.002 is directly named, so high confidence for the technique is defensible. One judgement is wrong: NetFlow observability 'no' should be 'partial'. I"

NF-ToN-IoT-v3,password,1594777,T1110.001,Password Guessing,credential-access,,CREDENTIAL_ACCESS,high,partial,"Dictionary attacks using CeWL-generated wordlists (password-1.sh) and brute-force attacks using Hydra (password-2.sh), run in parallel against IoT/IIoT devices from Kali VMs 192.168.1.30, .31, .33, .35, .38.","""password-1.sh using the CeWL toolkit for dictionary attacks and (password-2.sh) using the Hydra toolkit for brute force attacks"" (Alsaedi 2020, p.165140)","Online guessing shows as many short flows to one service port, but flows cannot reveal success or the target protocol's credentials. Offline cracking (T1110.002) is not documented. Sarhan Table 4 also says 'or sniffing' (p.9); the Alsaedi paper documents only guessing, so T1040 is not mapped.",accepted,"Survives refutation. T1110.001 exists, is not deprecated and is credential-access. Hydra brute force and CeWL dictionary attacks to guess device passwords fit online password guessing. The quote omits '(e.g.,' and citation markers but is faithful, and p.165140 is correct (IPs .30/.31/.33/.35/.38 mat"

NF-ToN-IoT-v3,ransomware,3971,T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,impact,T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application,RANSOMWARE_IMPACT,medium,no,Kali VMs 192.168.1.33 and .37 used Metasploitable3 to exploit weaknesses in target devices and then ran a ransomware attack that denies access by encrypting and demanding payment.,"""We used a Metasploitable3 framework to exploit weaknesses in the target devices and then executed the ransomware attack."" (Alsaedi 2020, p.165139)","File encryption is host-level and leaves no flow signature; any flows labelled ransomware are the exploitation or delivery traffic. The paper names no ransomware family or exploit, so T1190 is inferred. Very rare (142 flows, Sarhan p.9), so flow-level evaluation will be weak. Shares attacker IPs wit",accepted,"Survives refutation. T1486 exists, is not deprecated and is impact. The quote is exact and the page is correct (Alsaedi p.165139, Kali .33/.37). Paper and Sarhan p.9 both state the encrypt-and-demand-payment behaviour. T1190 is an inference, because the paper only says 'exploit weaknesses in the tar"

NF-ToN-IoT-v3,scanning,1358977,T1595,Active Scanning,reconnaissance,T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks; T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning,RECON_DISCOVERY,medium,yes,Nmap and Nessus run from Kali VMs 192.168.1.30-33 and .38 against the IoT/IIoT devices in 192.168.1.0/24 and the public MQTT broker to find open ports and services.,"""We used both Nmap and Nessus tools from the offensive Kali systems to perform scanning attacks against the victim IoT/IIoT devices in the subnet (192.168.1.0/24)"" (Alsaedi 2020, p.165137)","Tactic depends on vantage: attackers sit inside the testbed subnet, so T1046 (discovery) is primary; an external attacker would be T1595 (reconnaissance). Nessus supports T1595.002, but flows cannot separate Nmap from Nessus. The paper's scan against the MQTT broker is documented, with no further de",corrected by skeptic,"IDs are valid and not deprecated, and the quote and p.165137 are accurate. The primary tactic is wrong. The paper itself frames scanning as 'the first step where an attacker gathers information about a target system ... before launching the actual attack' (p.165137), which is reconnaissance. The STI"

NF-ToN-IoT-v3,xss,2834435,T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,initial-access,T1059.007 JavaScript,EXPLOIT_PUBLIC_APP,medium,partial,"Scripts xss1.sh and xss2.sh using the XSSer toolkit to inject web scripts (HTTP/JavaScript) into DVWA, Security Shepherd and IoT service web pages from Kali VMs 192.168.1.{32,35,36,39}.","""scripts (e.g., xss1-sh and xss2.sh) using the Cross-Site Scripter (XSSer) toolkit to perform XSS attacks on the Web applications of DVWA, Security Shepherd VMs"" (Alsaedi 2020, p.165140)","ATT&CK has no XSS technique. The documented behaviour is the tool firing payloads at a vulnerable web server, so T1190 fits; T1189 (drive-by) was rejected because no victim browsing is described. Payloads are invisible to NetFlow, so xss and injection flows will look alike (both are web attacks on t",accepted,"Survives refutation. T1190 and T1059.007 exist, are not deprecated and have tactics initial-access and execution. The quote is faithful and the page is correct (XSSer against DVWA/Security Shepherd, IPs .32/.35/.36/.39, p.165140; 99,944 flows per Sarhan p.9). The paper says XSS 'attempts to run mali"

NF-BoT-IoT-v3,DDoS,7150882,T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,impact,T1499.001 OS Exhaustion Flood; T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,medium,yes,"Bot-IoT testbed: DDoS from bots against the Ubuntu server using hping3 (TCP SYN flood, UDP flood) and GoldenEye (HTTP POST flood). Table 5: TCP 19.5M and UDP 19.0M records vs HTTP 19.8K, so about 99.9% is volumetric TCP/UDP flooding.","Koroniotis 2019 PDF p.19: ""we used the tool Hping3 for both DDoS, DoS for TCP and UDP, for example hping3 --syn --flood -d 100 -p 80 192.168.100.3""; HTTP via Golden-eye (Table 5, p.20).","ATT&CK has no DoS vs DDoS distinction, so both labels map to the same techniques; the difference is only the number of sources (a dataset property, worth checking against source-IP counts). A SYN flood is arguably T1499.001 rather than T1498.001, a judgement call. The HTTP part is tiny. Tool-generat",corrected by skeptic,"All IDs exist, none deprecated or revoked, and the tactics match the STIX file. (1) T1499.003 is wrong for GoldenEye. The STIX text for T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood names the 'simple HTTP flood ... large number of HTTP requests to a web server' as its example. T1499.003 covers repeated request"

NF-BoT-IoT-v3,DoS,8034190,T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,impact,T1499.001 OS Exhaustion Flood; T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,medium,yes,"Same tools and protocols as DDoS (hping3 TCP SYN and UDP floods; GoldenEye HTTP) but from a single attacker. Table 5: TCP 12.3M, UDP 20.7M, HTTP 29.7K records.","Koroniotis 2019 PDF p.19: ""Denial of Service ... attempt to disrupt a service, thus making it unavailable to legitimate users""; tools hping3 and Golden-eye (Table 5, p.20).","Behaviourally identical to DDoS in ATT&CK terms; separating them in a classifier relies on source multiplicity, not on a different technique. The paper text says DDoS and DoS are both 'performed by a group of compromised machines called Bots', which blurs the distinction, so treat the DoS/DDoS bound",corrected by skeptic,"(1) Same technique fix as DDoS: replace T1499.003 with T1499.002, because an HTTP flood is the T1499.002 example. (2) documented_behaviour says 'from a single attacker', but Koroniotis p.18 says the opposite: 'DDoS and DoS attacks are performed by a group of compromised machines called Bots'. The si"

NF-BoT-IoT-v3,Reconnaissance,1695132,T1595,Active Scanning,reconnaissance,T1046 Network Service Discovery,RECON_DISCOVERY,high,yes,"Active probing: port/service scanning with Nmap (-sT) and hping3 (SYN scan), about 1.46M records, and OS fingerprinting with Nmap -O and Xprobe2, about 0.36M records. Passive probing was excluded.","Koroniotis 2019 PDF p.18: ""Nmap was launched to scan open services and protocols of the VMs, for example, nmap -sT 192.168.100.3""; OS fingerprinting with Nmap and Xprobe2.","The label mixes service scanning (about 80%) and OS fingerprinting (about 20%); NF-BoT-IoT does not separate them. T1595.001 (Scanning IP Blocks) was not chosen because single hosts were scanned, not ranges. T1046 is tagged Discovery (post-compromise) while the scans here run from outside, so T1595 ",corrected by skeptic,"T1595 as primary and T1046 as secondary are sound; both IDs exist and are valid. The recon quote and its p.18 citation verify. The error is in the OS-fingerprinting technique. In the STIX file, T1592.002 Software covers installed software types and versions. OS and version are listed under T1592.004"

NF-BoT-IoT-v3,Theft,1615,T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,exfiltration,T1056.001 Keylogging; T1110.001 Password Guessing,EXFILTRATION,medium,partial,"Data theft: Metasploit exploits EternalBlue (SMB) on Windows 7 and weak admin credentials on Ubuntu, then a reverse Meterpreter TCP session exfiltrates whole directories. Keylogging: SSH dictionary attack with Hydra, Metasploit session upgraded to sudo Meterpreter, logkeys records keystrokes, record","Koroniotis 2019 PDF p.20: ""Post exploitation, we set-up a reverse meterpeter tcp connection through which exfiltration of entire directories became possible.""","Keylogging happens on the host and is invisible to NetFlow; only the Hydra SSH guessing, the Meterpreter session and the download are visible. By record count the label is about 93% keylogging-scenario traffic, so the flows may actually reflect credential-access/C2 rather than exfiltration. Sarhan T",corrected by skeptic,"(1) The evidence citation is wrong: the exfiltration quote is on PDF p.19, not p.20; only Table 5 is on p.20. (2) The quote is not verbatim. The paper spells 'meterpeter'; the mapping silently corrected it to 'meterpreter', and the quote also drops the line-break hyphen. (3) T1210 Exploitation of Re"

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,Bot,207703,T1071,Application Layer Protocol,command-and-control,T1584.005 Botnet,COMMAND_AND_CONTROL,medium,partial,Hijacked hosts remotely controlled to perform malicious activity. Papers read name no bot family or tool for 2018 (the 2017 survey lists Ares for CICIDS2017 only).,Sarhan_2021_NetFlow_Datasets.pdf p.10 Table 5: 'enables an attacker to remotely control several hijacked computers to perform malicious activities.',Sub-technique T1071.001 not chosen because the papers do not state HTTP C2 for 2018. Flows show periodic C2 beaconing at best; T1583.005 is adversary preparation and is not directly observable in flows.,corrected by skeptic,"T1583.005 is the wrong Botnet technique. In the STIX file T1583.005 (Acquire Infrastructure: Botnet, resource-development) means buying, leasing or renting a botnet. T1584.005 (Compromise Infrastructure: Botnet, resource-development) covers building a botnet by compromising third-party systems, whic"

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,Brute_Force_-Web,1618,T1110.001,Password Guessing,credential-access,,CREDENTIAL_ACCESS,low,partial,"Dictionary brute force against web service accounts. The 2018 scenario is not described in the papers read. The 2017 generator paper describes brute force against at least two services, and Sarhan lumps Brute Force-Web into the BruteForce parent class.",Sharafaldin_2017 p.15: 'acquiring different services accounts by running a dictionary brute force attack against the main server (at least two major services...)'. Sarhan_2021 p.14: Brute Force-Web merged into brute-force.,"Per-label 2018 behaviour inferred from label name plus the 2017 generator description. Many HTTP login attempts appear as repeated flows to one server, but flows cannot show credentials or success.",corrected by skeptic,"Evidence is misattributed. Sarhan_2021 p.14 does not say Brute Force-Web was merged into brute-force. That merge is in the NF-UQ-NIDS paragraph on p.8-9, and p.14 is Table 12 results. In the per-dataset NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018 table (Table 5, p.9), Brute Force-Web is not in BruteForce. The counts show th"

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,Brute_Force_-XSS,480,T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,initial-access,T1059.007 JavaScript,EXPLOIT_PUBLIC_APP,low,no,"Cross-site scripting: attacker uses web applications to send malicious scripts to end users. The 2018 scenario details are not in the papers read. The 2017 web-attack scenario scans a vulnerable web app, then runs SQLi, command injection and file upload; XSS is only a label in Sarhan.",Sarhan_2021_NetFlow_Datasets.pdf p.9-10 Table 6 (XSS definition): 'Cross-site Scripting is a type of injection in which an attacker uses web applications to send malicious scripts to end-users.',"Label name says 'Brute Force' but Sarhan defines XSS as injection; Sarhan merges it into brute-force in NF-UQ-NIDS, so the label is ambiguous and may be a web brute-force/XSS mix. Payloads are in HTTP content, invisible to NetFlow; only repeated HTTP requests to one host are visible. Earlier dedup f",corrected by skeptic,"The quote is from the wrong dataset. 'Cross-site Scripting is a type of injection...' is the XSS row of Table 4 (NF-ToN-IoT, Sarhan_2021 p.9). It is not 'Table 6' and not a 2018 definition; the 2018 tables have no XSS class. The label is 'Brute Force -XSS', which mixes a credential-guessing name wit"

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,DDOS_attack-HOIC,1032311,T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,impact,T1498.001 Direct Network Flood,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,low,yes,"Distributed DoS flood; only the parent DDoS definition is given. The tool (High Orbit Ion Cannon, HTTP flood) is known from the label and not described in the papers read.",Sarhan_2021_NetFlow_Datasets.pdf p.10 Table 5: DDoS 'An attempt similar to DoS but has multiple different distributed sources.' Renaming to DDoS on p.8.,"HTTP-layer flood assumed from the tool name, not from the papers. ATT&CK has no distributed-source field; DDoS vs DoS is not an ATT&CK distinction, so source count must be derived from flows.",corrected by skeptic,"Technique choice is defensible. T1499.002 text explicitly describes a 'simple HTTP flood', and T1498.001 as secondary is optional. In ATT&CK, T1499 is DoS without saturating the network, while T1498 saturates it. Observability 'yes' is overstated. The HTTP content is invisible, the caveat admits the"

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,DDOS_attack-LOIC-UDP,3450,T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,impact,,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,low,yes,"Distributed UDP flood with LOIC; the papers only give the parent DDoS definition. The Ring survey says LOIC was used for DDoS in CICIDS2017, not 2018.",Sarhan_2021_NetFlow_Datasets.pdf p.10 Table 5: DDoS 'similar to DoS but has multiple different distributed sources.' Ring_2019 p.8 lists 'DDoS (executed through LOIC)' for CICIDS2017.,UDP transport comes from the label name only; the 2018 scenario is not described in the papers read. Volumetric floods are well captured in flows.,corrected by skeptic,"Technique T1498.001 is correct, and its text names UDP as a typical flood protocol. Confidence medium is too high under the rule, because UDP and LOIC come from the label name only. The papers give only the parent DDoS definition (Table 5, p.9), and Ring p.8 is about CICIDS2017 LOIC. It should be lo"

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,DDoS_attacks-LOIC-HTTP,288589,T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,impact,T1498.001 Direct Network Flood,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,low,yes,Distributed HTTP flood with LOIC; the papers only give the parent DDoS definition and (for 2017) LOIC as the DDoS tool.,Ring_2019 p.8: CICIDS2017 'DDoS (executed through LOIC)'. Sarhan_2021 p.10 Table 5: DDoS 'multiple different distributed sources.',"Evidence is about 2017, not 2018, and the HTTP layer comes from the label name. Per-request HTTP content is not in NetFlow; only flow counts and volumes.",corrected by skeptic,"Confidence medium is inconsistent with the HOIC row, which has the same evidence quality (parent DDoS definition plus 2017 LOIC), and should be low. Observability 'yes' contradicts the row's own caveat that per-request HTTP content is not in NetFlow, so it should be 'partial'. Table 12 p.14 gives F1"

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,DoS_attacks-GoldenEye,61300,T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,impact,,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,low,partial,HTTP DoS tool. The 2018 scenario is not described in the papers read. The 2017 generator paper describes HTTP DoS tools that hold full TCP connections open with valid incomplete HTTP requests.,"Ring_2019 p.8: CICIDS2017 'DoS (executed through Hulk, GoldenEye, Slowloris, and Slowhttptest)'. Sharafaldin_2017 p.15: tools 'start by making a full TCP connection... holds the connection open'.","Evidence concerns CIC-IDS2017, not 2018. GoldenEye issues keep-alive HTTP requests; this is inferred from tool knowledge, not the papers. The attack is a single-source DoS.",corrected by skeptic,"The Sharafaldin p.15 quote does not name GoldenEye. It describes slow-HTTP tools that hold sockets open, and the caveat then says GoldenEye is a keep-alive HTTP flood, so the cited quote supports a different mechanism. Ring p.8 only lists GoldenEye as a CICIDS2017 tool. The 2018 class is not describ"

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,DoS_attacks-Hulk,100076,T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,impact,,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,low,partial,HTTP flood DoS tool. The papers read name Hulk only as a CICIDS2017 DoS tool and do not describe its behaviour.,"Ring_2019 p.8: CICIDS2017 'DoS (executed through Hulk, GoldenEye, Slowloris, and Slowhttptest)'.","Hulk behaviour (many unique HTTP requests) is from tool knowledge, not the papers read, and the evidence is about 2017. Mapping to T1499.002 follows the ATT&CK text on simple HTTP floods.",corrected by skeptic,"The only evidence is a tool name in a 2017 list (Ring p.8). The papers give no behaviour for Hulk in either 2017 or 2018, so confidence medium is wrong and the rule requires low. T1499.002 matches ATT&CK's 'simple HTTP flood' text and is a reasonable choice. The caveat already admits the behaviour c"

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,DoS_attacks-SlowHTTPTest,105550,T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,impact,,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,low,partial,Low-and-slow HTTP DoS holding connections open with valid but incomplete HTTP requests until the server's sockets are exhausted. The generator paper describes this class of tool in general and does not name SlowHTTPTest for 2018.,"Sharafaldin_2017 p.15: 'holds the connection open by sending valid, incomplete HTTP requests... all sockets are used up and no other connection can be made.'","ATT&CK has no slow-DoS sub-technique; T1499.002 is the closest fit but describes volume floods. The paper is the 2017 generator model, not the 2018 dataset. Earlier dedup found this label collapses to a single distinct feature vector.",corrected by skeptic,"T1499.002 does not fit. Its STIX text describes a 'simple HTTP flood' that 'relies on raw volume' (or SSL renegotiation), whereas slow-HTTP attacks are low-rate connection holding. The row's own caveat concedes this. T1499 (Endpoint Denial of Service) says it covers exhausting the hosting system's r"

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,DoS_attacks-Slowloris,36040,T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,impact,T1499.002 Service Exhaustion Flood,DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,low,partial,"Same slow-HTTP DoS mechanism: full TCP connections kept open with incomplete HTTP requests, exhausting server sockets.","Sharafaldin_2017 p.15: 'sending valid, incomplete HTTP requests to the server at regular intervals to keep the sockets from closing.' Ring_2019 p.8 lists Slowloris for CICIDS2017.","Same caveats as SlowHTTPTest: the 2017 generator description is applied to 2018, and no slow-DoS sub-technique exists. Long-lived low-rate flows are visible, but the incomplete HTTP requests are not.",corrected by skeptic,"Same issue as SlowHTTPTest. T1499.002 describes a volume-based HTTP flood, but Slowloris holds sockets open with incomplete requests at low rate, so T1499 is the better primary. The Sharafaldin p.15 quote matches the Slowloris mechanism well, but the paper never names Slowloris. Only Ring p.8 names "

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,FTP-BruteForce,386720,T1110.001,Password Guessing,credential-access,,CREDENTIAL_ACCESS,high,partial,"Dictionary password guessing against an FTP service. Sarhan merges it into BruteForce, defined as obtaining credentials from a list of predefined possibilities. The FTP tool is not named in the papers read.",Sarhan_2021_NetFlow_Datasets.pdf p.10 Table 5: BruteForce 'obtain usernames and password credentials by accessing a list of predefined possibilities.' Sharafaldin_2017 p.15: dictionary brute force.,"Repeated short FTP control connections from one source are visible, but credentials and success are not. The label collapses to a single distinct vector after dedup, so it is a fingerprint of one tool run.",accepted,"T1110.001 is correct, and the STIX text lists FTP (21/TCP) as a commonly guessed service. Sarhan Table 5 'BruteForce' (p.9, not p.10) is a direct description of the 2018 class. The counts show Table 5 BruteForce (287,597) is FTP plus SSH, since Web and XSS are the 4,358 in 'Web Attacks'. High confid"

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,SSH-Bruteforce,188474,T1110.001,Password Guessing,credential-access,,CREDENTIAL_ACCESS,high,partial,Dictionary password guessing against SSH. The 2017 generator paper lists SSH password brute force; the Ring survey lists SSH brute force for CICIDS2017.,"Ring_2019 p.8: CICIDS2017 'heartbleed, infiltration, SSH brute force, SQL injection'. Sarhan_2021 p.10 Table 5: BruteForce 'list of predefined possibilities.'",Repeated SSH sessions from one source are visible; encrypted content hides credentials and success. Evidence for SSH is about 2017. The successful-login follow-up (T1021.004) is not in this label.,accepted,"T1110.001 is correct, and SSH (22/TCP) is listed in the STIX text. The Ring p.8 quote is accurate but about CICIDS2017. The direct 2018 support is Sarhan Table 5 BruteForce, p.9 and not p.10, which equals FTP+SSH by the count arithmetic. The first agent should cite that as primary evidence. High con"

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,Infilteration,188152,T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,initial-access,T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution,CLIENT_INITIAL_ACCESS,medium,partial,"Inside attack: a malicious file is emailed to a victim, exploiting an application, then a backdoor scans the network for other vulnerable hosts. The 2017 generator paper describes a vulnerable document viewer exploited from an email.",Sarhan_2021_NetFlow_Datasets.pdf p.10 Table 5: 'inside attack that sends a malicious file via an email to exploit an application and is followed by a backdoor that scans the network.',"Multi-stage: the email and exploit are not in flows; only the post-compromise internal scanning (T1046) and backdoor C2 are, so the labelled flows probably capture the discovery stage, not the primary technique. Sarhan gives a summary, not a per-stage description. Label is spelled 'Infilteration' in",accepted,"The mapping holds. T1566.001, T1203 and T1046 exist, are not deprecated, and have the stated tactics. The Sarhan Table 5 quote is accurate (p.9, not p.10), and it is a direct description of the 2018 class. A stronger second source was missed: Sharafaldin_2017 p.14 describes the 'vulnerable document "

NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3,SQL_Injection,440,T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,initial-access,,EXPLOIT_PUBLIC_APP,high,no,Injection of untrusted input into a web application to alter query execution. The 2017 generator paper lists SQL injection in its web-attack scenario after a vulnerability scan.,"Sharafaldin_2017 p.15: vulnerable web app, 'different web attacks... (including SQL injection, command injection, unrestricted file upload).' Sarhan_2021 Table 6: injection definition.","The payload is in HTTP content, so NetFlow shows only HTTP requests to the web server, indistinguishable from benign browsing except by volume and timing. The scenario is described for 2017; 2018 is inferred. T1190 is the most specific supported ID; no SQLi sub-technique exists.",corrected by skeptic,