referencesource commited on
Commit
b3ba14f
·
verified ·
1 Parent(s): 3a27fa1

mirror of https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/

Browse files
Files changed (2) hide show
  1. README.md +1 -1
  2. data/records.jsonl +17 -17
README.md CHANGED
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ configs:
20
  **Canonical, always-current version: https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/**
21
  Machine-readable: https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/data.json — this mirror is a point-in-time copy.
22
 
23
- - **Last verified:** 2026-08-16
24
  - **Stale after:** 2027-02-12 (past this date, prefer the canonical copy —
25
  it re-verifies on a cadence this snapshot does not)
26
  - **Records:** 21
 
20
  **Canonical, always-current version: https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/**
21
  Machine-readable: https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/data.json — this mirror is a point-in-time copy.
22
 
23
+ - **Last verified:** 2026-09-27
24
  - **Stale after:** 2027-02-12 (past this date, prefer the canonical copy —
25
  it re-verifies on a cadence this snapshot does not)
26
  - **Records:** 21
data/records.jsonl CHANGED
@@ -1,21 +1,21 @@
1
  {"algorithm": "224-bit hash functions", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "224-bit-hash-functions", "nist_document": "SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "purpose": "hashing", "replacement": "SHA-2 or SHA-3 at 256-bit or higher output", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030, retires ECB confidentiality mode and DSA signature generation, and schedules the retirement of SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions.", "transition_status": "retirement scheduled under SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/224-bit-hash-functions/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
2
- {"algorithm": "AES-256", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "aes-256", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "encryption", "replacement": "N/A", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "It defines the formal approval status (approved, acceptable, deprecated, restricted, disallowed, or legacy use) of specific algorithms and key lengths, and it is the document a FIPS-validated implementation is measured against. The current finalized version is SP 800-131A Revision 2, published in March 2019. NIST released an initial public draft of Revision 3 in October 2024. Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030, retires ECB confidentiality mode and DSA signature generation, and schedules the retirement of SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions. To avoid forcing organizations through two separate transitions, NIST plans to fold the asymmetric-algorithm transition into the post-quantum transition rather than enforcing a separate 128-bit step for public-key algorithms. As of mid-2026, Revision 3 remains a draft, so Revision 2 is the version currently in force. What Is Not on the Schedule A common misreading is that everything cryptographic must change. It does not. The deprecation and disallowance timeline targets public-key cryptography specifically. AES-256 is not on the schedule: Grover&#8217;s algorithm offers only a quadratic speedup against symmetric ciphers, leaving AES-256 with roughly 128 bits of effective quantum security, which is acceptable for the foreseeable future. SHA-2 and SHA-3 are not on the public-key schedule: These hash families remain secure against quantum attacks at appropriate output sizes. (SHA-1 and 224-bit hashes are being retired for unrelated classical-strength reasons.) The exposure is public-key: <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/what-is-rsa/>", "transition_status": "not on the schedule", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/aes-256/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
3
- {"algorithm": "Classical algorithms below 112-bit security strength", "current_status": "Disallowed", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "classical-algorithms-below-112-bit-security-strength", "nist_document": "SP 800-131A Rev 2 / Rev 3 draft", "purpose": "various", "replacement": "algorithms at 128-bit security strength or higher", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030", "transition_status": "minimum moves from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/classical-algorithms-below-112-bit-security-strength/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
4
- {"algorithm": "DSA (signature generation)", "current_status": "Deprecated", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "dsa-signature-generation", "nist_document": "SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "ECDSA, EdDSA, or ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030, retires ECB confidentiality mode and DSA signature generation, and schedules the retirement of SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions.", "transition_status": "retired under SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/dsa-signature-generation/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
5
  {"algorithm": "ECB confidentiality mode", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "ecb-confidentiality-mode", "nist_document": "SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "purpose": "encryption", "replacement": "CBC, CTR, GCM, or other approved modes", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030, retires ECB confidentiality mode and DSA signature generation, and schedules the retirement of SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions.", "transition_status": "retired under SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ecb-confidentiality-mode/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
6
- {"algorithm": "ECDH", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "ecdh", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "key establishment", "replacement": "ML-KEM (FIPS 203)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "IR 8547&#8217;s proposed timeline: quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, finite-field DH) are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid modes that combine an approved", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ecdh/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
7
- {"algorithm": "ECDSA", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "ecdsa", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "IR 8547&#8217;s proposed timeline: quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, finite-field DH) are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid modes that combine an approved", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ecdsa/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
8
- {"algorithm": "EdDSA", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "eddsa", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "The IR 8547 Transition Timeline IR 8547 proposes a two-stage retirement for quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms. Understanding the difference between the two stages is the whole point of the document. Stage | Date | What it means | Deprecated | After 2030 | The algorithm is still permitted but its use is discouraged. In practice, no longer acceptable for new deployments on federal systems. | Disallowed | After 2035 | The algorithm may no longer be used for the stated purpose. A disallowed signature scheme is treated as forgeable; a disallowed key-establishment scheme is treated as vulnerable to key recovery. | The algorithms on this schedule are the public-key workhorses of today&#8217;s internet: RSA and elliptic-curve signatures ( <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/what-is-ecdsa/> ECDSA , EdDSA,", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/eddsa/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
9
- {"algorithm": "Falcon", "current_status": "selected for ongoing standardization", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "falcon", "nist_document": "NIST PQC project", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "N/A (this is a future post-quantum standard)", "source": "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography", "source_quote": "Falcon digital signature algorithm and <https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2025/hqc-announced-as-a-4th-round-selection> HQC key encapsulation mechanism were selected for ongoing standardization;", "transition_status": "standardization underway", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/falcon/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
10
  {"algorithm": "finite-field Diffie-Hellman", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "finite-field-diffie-hellman", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "key establishment", "replacement": "ML-KEM (FIPS 203)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "Under NIST IR 8547, quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. What are the NIST 2030 and 2035 deadlines? Under the NIST IR 8547 draft timeline, quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, finite-field Diffie-Hellman)", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/finite-field-diffie-hellman/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
11
- {"algorithm": "HQC", "current_status": "selected for ongoing standardization", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "hqc", "nist_document": "NIST PQC project", "purpose": "key establishment", "replacement": "N/A (this is a future post-quantum standard)", "source": "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography", "source_quote": "<https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2025/hqc-announced-as-a-4th-round-selection> HQC key encapsulation mechanism were selected for ongoing standardization;", "transition_status": "standardization underway", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/hqc/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
12
- {"algorithm": "ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "ml-dsa-fips-204", "nist_document": "FIPS 204", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "N/A (this is the replacement)", "source": "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography", "source_quote": "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA)", "transition_status": "post-quantum standard, published August 2024", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ml-dsa-fips-204/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
13
- {"algorithm": "ML-KEM (FIPS 203)", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "ml-kem-fips-203", "nist_document": "FIPS 203", "purpose": "key establishment", "replacement": "N/A (this is the replacement)", "source": "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography", "source_quote": "Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard (ML-KEM)", "transition_status": "post-quantum standard, published August 2024", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ml-kem-fips-203/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
14
- {"algorithm": "RSA key transport", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "rsa-key-transport", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "key establishment", "replacement": "ML-KEM (FIPS 203)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "RSA key transport, elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), and finite-field Diffie-Hellman. All are broken by Shor&#8217;s algorithm on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, which is why migrating from RSA to <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/elliptic-curve-cryptography-ecc/> ECC solves nothing here: both fall to the same attack. Deprecated Is Not the Same as Disallowed The practical reading: after 2030, RSA and ECDH are no longer acceptable for new deployments on US federal systems, but existing deployed systems have until 2035 to complete migration. The window between the two dates is the migration runway. Treating 2035 as the only deadline misses the point, because procurement, auditing, and cyber-insurance practices tend to tighten around the 2030 deprecation date, not the 2035 disallowance date. How Hybrid Modes Fit In IR 8547 explicitly supports hybrid cryptography during the transition. A hybrid scheme combines a classical algorithm with a post-quantum algorithm so the result stays secure unless both are broken. NIST has clarified that the 2035 disallowance of quantum-vulnerable algorithms is not intended to prohibit hybrid modes that incorporate an approved post-quantum algorithm alongside a classical one in a composite scheme.", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/rsa-key-transport/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
15
- {"algorithm": "RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (signatures)", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "rsa-pkcs-1-v1-5-signatures", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "ECDSA , EdDSA, RSA-PSS, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5), and key-establishment schemes including RSA key transport, elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), and finite-field Diffie-Hellman.", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/rsa-pkcs-1-v1-5-signatures/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
16
- {"algorithm": "RSA-PSS", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "rsa-pss", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "The IR 8547 Transition Timeline IR 8547 proposes a two-stage retirement for quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms. Understanding the difference between the two stages is the whole point of the document. Stage | Date | What it means | Deprecated | After 2030 | The algorithm is still permitted but its use is discouraged. In practice, no longer acceptable for new deployments on federal systems. | Disallowed | After 2035 | The algorithm may no longer be used for the stated purpose. A disallowed signature scheme is treated as forgeable; a disallowed key-establishment scheme is treated as vulnerable to key recovery. | The algorithms on this schedule are the public-key workhorses of today&#8217;s internet: RSA and elliptic-curve signatures ( <https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/what-is-ecdsa/> ECDSA , EdDSA, RSA-PSS,", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/rsa-pss/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
17
- {"algorithm": "RSA (signatures)", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "rsa-signatures", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, finite-field DH) are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/rsa-signatures/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
18
  {"algorithm": "SHA-1", "current_status": "Deprecated", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "sha-1", "nist_document": "SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "purpose": "hashing", "replacement": "SHA-2 or SHA-3", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030, retires ECB confidentiality mode and DSA signature generation, and schedules the retirement of SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions.", "transition_status": "retirement scheduled under SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/sha-1/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
19
- {"algorithm": "SHA-2 family", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "sha-2-family", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "hashing", "replacement": "N/A", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "SHA-2 and SHA-3 are not on the public-key schedule: These hash families remain secure against quantum attacks at appropriate output sizes.", "transition_status": "not on the public-key schedule", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/sha-2-family/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
20
- {"algorithm": "SHA-3 family", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "sha-3-family", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "hashing", "replacement": "N/A", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "SHA-2 and SHA-3 are not on the public-key schedule: These hash families remain secure against quantum attacks at appropriate output sizes.", "transition_status": "not on the public-key schedule", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/sha-3-family/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
21
- {"algorithm": "SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "slh-dsa-fips-205", "nist_document": "FIPS 205", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "N/A (this is the replacement)", "source": "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography", "source_quote": "Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard (SLH-DSA)", "transition_status": "post-quantum standard, published August 2024", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/slh-dsa-fips-205/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
 
1
  {"algorithm": "224-bit hash functions", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "224-bit-hash-functions", "nist_document": "SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "purpose": "hashing", "replacement": "SHA-2 or SHA-3 at 256-bit or higher output", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030, retires ECB confidentiality mode and DSA signature generation, and schedules the retirement of SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions.", "transition_status": "retirement scheduled under SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/224-bit-hash-functions/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
2
+ {"algorithm": "AES-256", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "aes-256", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "encryption", "replacement": "N/A", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "It defines the formal approval status (approved, acceptable, deprecated, restricted, disallowed, or legacy use) of specific algorithms and key lengths, and it is the document a FIPS-validated implementation is measured against. The current finalized version is SP 800-131A Revision 2, published in March 2019. NIST released an initial public draft of Revision 3 in October 2024. Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030, retires ECB confidentiality mode and DSA signature generation, and schedules the retirement of SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions. To avoid forcing organizations through two separate transitions, NIST plans to fold the asymmetric-algorithm transition into the post-quantum transition rather than enforcing a separate 128-bit step for public-key algorithms. As of mid-2026, Revision 3 remains a draft, so Revision 2 is the version currently in force. What Is Not on the Schedule A common misreading is that everything cryptographic must change. It does not. The deprecation and disallowance timeline targets public-key cryptography specifically. AES-256 is not on the schedule: Grover’s algorithm offers only a quadratic speedup against symmetric ciphers, leaving AES-256 with roughly 128 bits of effective quantum security, which is acceptable for the foreseeable future. SHA-2 and SHA-3 are not on the public-key schedule: These hash families remain secure against quantum attacks at appropriate output sizes. (SHA-1 and 224-bit hashes are being retired for unrelated classical-strength reasons.) The exposure is public-key:", "transition_status": "not on the schedule", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/aes-256/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
3
+ {"algorithm": "Classical algorithms below 112-bit security strength", "current_status": "Disallowed", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "classical-algorithms-below-112-bit-security-strength", "nist_document": "SP 800-131A Rev 2 / Rev 3 draft", "purpose": "various", "replacement": "algorithms at 128-bit security strength or higher", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030", "transition_status": "minimum moves from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/classical-algorithms-below-112-bit-security-strength/"}
4
+ {"algorithm": "DSA (signature generation)", "current_status": "Deprecated", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "dsa-signature-generation", "nist_document": "SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "ECDSA, EdDSA, or ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030, retires ECB confidentiality mode and DSA signature generation, and schedules the retirement of SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions.", "transition_status": "retired under SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/dsa-signature-generation/"}
5
  {"algorithm": "ECB confidentiality mode", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "ecb-confidentiality-mode", "nist_document": "SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "purpose": "encryption", "replacement": "CBC, CTR, GCM, or other approved modes", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030, retires ECB confidentiality mode and DSA signature generation, and schedules the retirement of SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions.", "transition_status": "retired under SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ecb-confidentiality-mode/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
6
+ {"algorithm": "ECDH", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "ecdh", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "key establishment", "replacement": "ML-KEM (FIPS 203)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "IR 8547’s proposed timeline: quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, finite-field DH) are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid modes that combine an approved", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ecdh/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
7
+ {"algorithm": "ECDSA", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "ecdsa", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "IR 8547’s proposed timeline: quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, finite-field DH) are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid modes that combine an approved", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ecdsa/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
8
+ {"algorithm": "EdDSA", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "eddsa", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "The IR 8547 Transition Timeline IR 8547 proposes a two-stage retirement for quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms. Understanding the difference between the two stages is the whole point of the document. Stage | Date | What it means | Deprecated | After 2030 | The algorithm is still permitted but its use is discouraged. In practice, no longer acceptable for new deployments on federal systems. | Disallowed | After 2035 | The algorithm may no longer be used for the stated purpose. A disallowed signature scheme is treated as forgeable; a disallowed key-establishment scheme is treated as vulnerable to key recovery. | The algorithms on this schedule are the public-key workhorses of today’s internet: RSA and elliptic-curve signatures ( ECDSA , EdDSA,", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/eddsa/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
9
+ {"algorithm": "Falcon", "current_status": "selected for ongoing standardization", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "falcon", "nist_document": "NIST PQC project", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "N/A (this is a future post-quantum standard)", "source": "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography", "source_quote": "Falcon digital signature algorithm and HQC key encapsulation mechanism were selected for ongoing standardization;", "transition_status": "standardization underway", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/falcon/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
10
  {"algorithm": "finite-field Diffie-Hellman", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "finite-field-diffie-hellman", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "key establishment", "replacement": "ML-KEM (FIPS 203)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "Under NIST IR 8547, quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. What are the NIST 2030 and 2035 deadlines? Under the NIST IR 8547 draft timeline, quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, finite-field Diffie-Hellman)", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/finite-field-diffie-hellman/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
11
+ {"algorithm": "HQC", "current_status": "selected for ongoing standardization", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "hqc", "nist_document": "NIST PQC project", "purpose": "key establishment", "replacement": "N/A (this is a future post-quantum standard)", "source": "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography", "source_quote": "HQC key encapsulation mechanism were selected for ongoing standardization;", "transition_status": "standardization underway", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/hqc/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
12
+ {"algorithm": "ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "ml-dsa-fips-204", "nist_document": "FIPS 204", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "N/A (this is the replacement)", "source": "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography", "source_quote": "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA)", "transition_status": "post-quantum standard, published August 2024", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ml-dsa-fips-204/"}
13
+ {"algorithm": "ML-KEM (FIPS 203)", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "ml-kem-fips-203", "nist_document": "FIPS 203", "purpose": "key establishment", "replacement": "N/A (this is the replacement)", "source": "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography", "source_quote": "Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard (ML-KEM)", "transition_status": "post-quantum standard, published August 2024", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/ml-kem-fips-203/"}
14
+ {"algorithm": "RSA key transport", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "rsa-key-transport", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "key establishment", "replacement": "ML-KEM (FIPS 203)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "RSA key transport, elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), and finite-field Diffie-Hellman. All are broken by Shor’s algorithm on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, which is why migrating from RSA to ECC solves nothing here: both fall to the same attack. Deprecated Is Not the Same as Disallowed The practical reading: after 2030, RSA and ECDH are no longer acceptable for new deployments on US federal systems, but existing deployed systems have until 2035 to complete migration. The window between the two dates is the migration runway. Treating 2035 as the only deadline misses the point, because procurement, auditing, and cyber-insurance practices tend to tighten around the 2030 deprecation date, not the 2035 disallowance date. How Hybrid Modes Fit In IR 8547 explicitly supports hybrid cryptography during the transition. A hybrid scheme combines a classical algorithm with a post-quantum algorithm so the result stays secure unless both are broken. NIST has clarified that the 2035 disallowance of quantum-vulnerable algorithms is not intended to prohibit hybrid modes that incorporate an approved post-quantum algorithm alongside a classical one in a composite scheme.", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/rsa-key-transport/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
15
+ {"algorithm": "RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (signatures)", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "rsa-pkcs-1-v1-5-signatures", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "ECDSA , EdDSA, RSA-PSS, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5), and key-establishment schemes including RSA key transport, elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), and finite-field Diffie-Hellman.", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/rsa-pkcs-1-v1-5-signatures/"}
16
+ {"algorithm": "RSA-PSS", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "rsa-pss", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "The IR 8547 Transition Timeline IR 8547 proposes a two-stage retirement for quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms. Understanding the difference between the two stages is the whole point of the document. Stage | Date | What it means | Deprecated | After 2030 | The algorithm is still permitted but its use is discouraged. In practice, no longer acceptable for new deployments on federal systems. | Disallowed | After 2035 | The algorithm may no longer be used for the stated purpose. A disallowed signature scheme is treated as forgeable; a disallowed key-establishment scheme is treated as vulnerable to key recovery. | The algorithms on this schedule are the public-key workhorses of today’s internet: RSA and elliptic-curve signatures ( ECDSA , EdDSA, RSA-PSS,", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/rsa-pss/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
17
+ {"algorithm": "RSA (signatures)", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "rsa-signatures", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "ML-DSA (FIPS 204)", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, finite-field DH) are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "transition_status": "deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/rsa-signatures/"}
18
  {"algorithm": "SHA-1", "current_status": "Deprecated", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "sha-1", "nist_document": "SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "purpose": "hashing", "replacement": "SHA-2 or SHA-3", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "Rev. 3 proposes moving the minimum classical security strength from 112 bits to 128 bits at the end of 2030, retires ECB confidentiality mode and DSA signature generation, and schedules the retirement of SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions.", "transition_status": "retirement scheduled under SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/sha-1/", "verified_fields": ["algorithm"]}
19
+ {"algorithm": "SHA-2 family", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "sha-2-family", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "hashing", "replacement": "N/A", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "SHA-2 and SHA-3 are not on the public-key schedule: These hash families remain secure against quantum attacks at appropriate output sizes.", "transition_status": "not on the public-key schedule", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/sha-2-family/"}
20
+ {"algorithm": "SHA-3 family", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "sha-3-family", "nist_document": "IR 8547", "purpose": "hashing", "replacement": "N/A", "source": "https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/nist-ir-8547-sp-800-131a-algorithm-transitions/", "source_quote": "SHA-2 and SHA-3 are not on the public-key schedule: These hash families remain secure against quantum attacks at appropriate output sizes.", "transition_status": "not on the public-key schedule", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/sha-3-family/"}
21
+ {"algorithm": "SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)", "current_status": "Approved", "derived_fields": ["current_status", "nist_document", "purpose", "replacement", "transition_status"], "id": "slh-dsa-fips-205", "nist_document": "FIPS 205", "purpose": "digital signature", "replacement": "N/A (this is the replacement)", "source": "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography", "source_quote": "Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard (SLH-DSA)", "transition_status": "post-quantum standard, published August 2024", "url": "https://referencesource.org/nist-cryptographic-algorithm-deprecation-schedule/slh-dsa-fips-205/"}