Datasets:
Download scripts/redact.py from to0p/codex-tool-use-trajectories: direct link, hf CLI and curl.
- Browser
- Download file 13.4 kB
-
https://huggingface.co/datasets/to0p/codex-tool-use-trajectories/resolve/main/scripts/redact.py
- Command line
-
hf download hf://datasets/to0p/codex-tool-use-trajectories/scripts/redact.py
-
curl -L -o redact.py https://huggingface.co/datasets/to0p/codex-tool-use-trajectories/resolve/main/scripts/redact.py
13.4 kB
| """Redaction for the Codex rollout cleaning pipeline. | |
| Design | |
| ------ | |
| * All finders run on the ORIGINAL text and return spans (start, end, kind, replacement). | |
| Overlaps are resolved left-to-right (earliest start wins, then longest), so every | |
| replacement has exact offsets in the redacted text. That is what lets the pipeline | |
| log only replacements that survive tool-output truncation. | |
| * Finders are linear-time: nothing starts with an unbounded character class followed by | |
| a distant anchor (e.g. e-mail search is anchored on '@', not on the local part). | |
| * A second "verification" loop re-scans the redacted text with the *secret* finders and | |
| re-applies them if anything is left (belt and braces). | |
| * Nothing here ever writes an original value anywhere; callers only receive sha256 digests. | |
| """ | |
| import hashlib | |
| import re | |
| SECRET = "<SECRET>" | |
| EMAIL = "<EMAIL>" | |
| IP = "<IP>" | |
| # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- secrets | |
| _PEM_FULL = re.compile( | |
| r"-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY(?: BLOCK)?-----[\s\S]{0,20000}?-----END [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY(?: BLOCK)?-----" | |
| ) | |
| # Unterminated block (output was cut or the END line was lost): redact BEGIN line + base64 body. | |
| _PEM_OPEN = re.compile( | |
| r"-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY(?: BLOCK)?-----(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/=\s]|\\n|\\r){0,8000}" | |
| ) | |
| # Token patterns are applied exactly as written in the task spec (no left word-boundary), so a plain grep for the | |
| # same regex over the output finds nothing. Matches that are glued to a preceding word character (for example the | |
| # "sk-" inside a hyphenated file name such as "...task-board-...") are logged with kind suffix ":embedded_in_word" | |
| # so the collateral can be audited from redactions.jsonl. | |
| _AKIA = re.compile(r"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}") | |
| _GH = re.compile(r"gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}") # ghp_ (+ gho_/ghu_/ghs_/ghr_) | |
| _GH_PAT = re.compile(r"github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}") | |
| _SK = re.compile(r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}") | |
| _BEARER = re.compile( | |
| r"(?i)\bAuthorization\s*[:=]\s*\\*[\"']?\s*Bearer\s+(?P<val>[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{8,})" | |
| ) | |
| # key = value secrets. password|passwd|token|api_key|apikey|secret, optionally prefixed | |
| # (access_token, client_secret, x-api-key, DB_PASSWORD ...) but NOT suffixed (token_count, secrets...) | |
| _KV = re.compile( | |
| r"(?i)(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(?P<key>(?:[A-Za-z0-9]+[_.-])*(?:password|passwd|token|api[_-]?key|apikey|secret))" | |
| r"(?![A-Za-z0-9])\\*[\"']?[ \t]*(?::|=(?!=))[ \t]*\\*(?:" | |
| r"(?P<q>[\"'])(?P<qval>[^\"'\r\n\\]{3,200})\\*(?P=q)" | |
| r"|(?P<bval>[^\s\"'\\,;&(){}\[\]<>|`]{6,200}))" | |
| ) | |
| _IDENT = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z_]*$") # code identifier with no digits: not a literal secret | |
| _HEX = re.compile(r"^0[xX][0-9A-Fa-f]+$") # decompiler metadata tokens: "// Token: 0x06000001" | |
| _DOTTED = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z_]\w*(?:\.[A-Za-z_]\w*)+$") # member access: this.token_value (JWTs are far longer) | |
| def _kv_value_ok(val, quoted): | |
| if not val or val[0] in "$%<{(@#*": | |
| return False | |
| if val.lower() in ("null", "none", "true", "false", "undefined", "nullptr", "redacted"): | |
| return False | |
| if quoted: | |
| return True | |
| if _IDENT.match(val) or _HEX.match(val): | |
| return False | |
| if len(val) <= 64 and _DOTTED.match(val): | |
| return False | |
| return True | |
| _EMAIL_LOCAL = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+$") | |
| _EMAIL_DOMAIN = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9-]+(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9-]+)*\.([A-Za-z]{2,})") | |
| # TLD-looking file extensions: icon@2x.png, foo@bar.cpp ... are not mail addresses. | |
| _FILE_EXT = frozenset( | |
| "png jpg jpeg gif svg webp bmp ico tga dds tif tiff psd bin dll exe lib obj asm so dylib pdb log xml yml yaml " | |
| "html htm css js ts json txt md c h cc cpp hpp cs py rs go java rb php sh bat ps1 cmd csv tsv bk2 bik bik2 " | |
| "mp4 mkv avi mov wav mp3 ogg zip rar 7z gz tar".split() | |
| ) | |
| def _find_emails(text): | |
| out = [] | |
| i = text.find("@") | |
| n = len(text) | |
| while i != -1: | |
| # local part: walk left (bounded) | |
| j = i | |
| lo = max(0, i - 64) | |
| while j > lo and text[j - 1] in "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789._%+-": | |
| j -= 1 | |
| local = text[j:i] | |
| if local and any(ch.isalnum() for ch in local): | |
| m = _EMAIL_DOMAIN.match(text, i + 1) | |
| if m and m.group(1).lower() not in _FILE_EXT: | |
| out.append((j, m.end(), "email", EMAIL)) | |
| i = text.find("@", i + 1) | |
| return out | |
| # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- windows user paths | |
| _SYSTEM_PROFILES = frozenset(("public", "default", "default user", "all users", "user", "defaultuser0")) | |
| _WIN_USER = re.compile( | |
| r"(?P<drive>[A-Za-z]:)(?P<s1>\\{1,8}|/{1,2})(?i:Users)(?P<s2>\\{1,8}|/{1,2})(?P<name>[^\\/\s\"'<>|:*?,;(){}\[\]`]+)" | |
| ) | |
| _UNIX_USER = re.compile( | |
| r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_.-])(?P<pre>/mnt/[a-z]|/[a-z])/(?i:Users)/(?P<name>[^\\/\s\"'<>|:*?,;(){}\[\]`]+)" | |
| ) | |
| def _find_user_paths(text): | |
| out = [] | |
| if "sers" not in text and "SERS" not in text: | |
| return out | |
| for m in _WIN_USER.finditer(text): | |
| name = m.group("name") | |
| if name.lower() in _SYSTEM_PROFILES: | |
| continue | |
| rep = f"{m.group('drive')}{m.group('s1')}Users{m.group('s2')}user" | |
| out.append((m.start(), m.end(), "win_user_path", rep)) | |
| for m in _UNIX_USER.finditer(text): | |
| name = m.group("name") | |
| if name.lower() in _SYSTEM_PROFILES: | |
| continue | |
| out.append((m.start(), m.end(), "win_user_path_posix", f"{m.group('pre')}/Users/user")) | |
| return out | |
| # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- OneDrive organisation names | |
| # Work/school OneDrive folders are named "OneDrive - <organisation>" and are followed by a path separator, | |
| # e.g. "D:\OneDrive - Some School\Documents". The organisation identifies the account owner, so it is masked. | |
| # The generic consumer folder "OneDrive - Personal" is not an organisation and is kept. | |
| ORG = "<ORG>" | |
| _ONEDRIVE_ORG = re.compile(r"(?<=OneDrive - )(?P<org>[^\\/\r\n\"<>|:*?]{1,80}?)(?=\\|/)") | |
| _ONEDRIVE_KEEP = frozenset(("personal",)) | |
| def _find_onedrive_org(text): | |
| out = [] | |
| if "OneDrive - " not in text: | |
| return out | |
| for m in _ONEDRIVE_ORG.finditer(text): | |
| if m.group("org").strip().lower() in _ONEDRIVE_KEEP: | |
| continue | |
| out.append((m.start("org"), m.end("org"), "onedrive_org", ORG)) | |
| return out | |
| # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- IPv4 | |
| _OCT = r"(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4]\d|1\d\d|[1-9]?\d)" | |
| _IPV4 = re.compile(rf"(?<![\w.]){_OCT}(?:\.{_OCT}){{3}}(?!\d|\.\d)") | |
| _VERSION_CTX = re.compile(r"(?i)version[\"']?\s*[=:]?\s*[\"']?$") | |
| def _find_ips(text): | |
| out = [] | |
| for m in _IPV4.finditer(text): | |
| v = m.group(0) | |
| if v == "0.0.0.0" or v.startswith("127."): | |
| continue | |
| if _VERSION_CTX.search(text[max(0, m.start() - 16):m.start()]): | |
| continue # .NET "Version=4.0.0.0" style assembly versions are not addresses | |
| out.append((m.start(), m.end(), "ipv4", IP)) | |
| return out | |
| # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- finders | |
| def _emb(text, start): | |
| """':embedded_in_word' when the match is glued to a preceding word character.""" | |
| return ":embedded_in_word" if start > 0 and (text[start - 1].isalnum() or text[start - 1] in "_-") else "" | |
| def _find_secrets(text): | |
| out = [] | |
| if "-----BEGIN" in text: | |
| for m in _PEM_FULL.finditer(text): | |
| out.append((m.start(), m.end(), "secret:pem_private_key", SECRET)) | |
| for m in _PEM_OPEN.finditer(text): | |
| out.append((m.start(), m.end(), "secret:pem_private_key", SECRET)) | |
| if "AKIA" in text: | |
| for m in _AKIA.finditer(text): | |
| out.append((m.start(), m.end(), "secret:aws_access_key" + _emb(text, m.start()), SECRET)) | |
| if "gh" in text: | |
| for m in _GH.finditer(text): | |
| out.append((m.start(), m.end(), "secret:github_token" + _emb(text, m.start()), SECRET)) | |
| if "github_pat_" in text: | |
| for m in _GH_PAT.finditer(text): | |
| out.append((m.start(), m.end(), "secret:github_pat" + _emb(text, m.start()), SECRET)) | |
| if "sk-" in text: | |
| for m in _SK.finditer(text): | |
| out.append((m.start(), m.end(), "secret:sk_key" + _emb(text, m.start()), SECRET)) | |
| if "earer" in text: | |
| for m in _BEARER.finditer(text): | |
| v = m.group("val") | |
| if v[0] in "$%<{": | |
| continue | |
| out.append((m.start("val"), m.end("val"), "secret:bearer_token", SECRET)) | |
| low = text.lower() | |
| if ("password" in low) or ("passwd" in low) or ("token" in low) or ("secret" in low) or ("apikey" in low) or ("api_key" in low) or ("api-key" in low): | |
| for m in _KV.finditer(text): | |
| if m.group("q"): | |
| s, e, val, quoted = m.start("qval"), m.end("qval"), m.group("qval"), True | |
| else: | |
| s, e, val, quoted = m.start("bval"), m.end("bval"), m.group("bval"), False | |
| if not _kv_value_ok(val, quoted): | |
| continue | |
| kname = re.sub(r"[^a-z]", "", m.group("key").lower().split("_")[-1].split("-")[-1].split(".")[-1]) | |
| out.append((s, e, "secret:kv:" + (kname or "key"), SECRET)) | |
| return out | |
| def _resolve(spans): | |
| """Earliest start wins; at equal start the longer span wins. Overlapping losers are dropped.""" | |
| spans.sort(key=lambda s: (s[0], -(s[1] - s[0]))) | |
| kept = [] | |
| last_end = -1 | |
| for s in spans: | |
| if s[0] >= last_end: | |
| kept.append(s) | |
| last_end = s[1] | |
| return kept | |
| def _sha(s): | |
| return hashlib.sha256(s.encode("utf-8", "surrogatepass")).hexdigest() | |
| def redact_text(text): | |
| """Redact `text`. Returns (new_text, events) where events is a list of | |
| (start, end, kind, sha256_of_original, replacement) with start/end in *new_text* coordinates.""" | |
| if not text: | |
| return text, [] | |
| spans = _find_secrets(text) + _find_emails(text) + _find_user_paths(text) + _find_onedrive_org(text) + _find_ips(text) | |
| if not spans: | |
| return text, [] | |
| kept = _resolve(spans) | |
| pieces = [] | |
| events = [] | |
| pos = 0 | |
| out_len = 0 | |
| for s, e, kind, rep in kept: | |
| seg = text[pos:s] | |
| pieces.append(seg) | |
| out_len += len(seg) | |
| events.append((out_len, out_len + len(rep), kind, _sha(text[s:e]), rep)) | |
| pieces.append(rep) | |
| out_len += len(rep) | |
| pos = e | |
| pieces.append(text[pos:]) | |
| new = "".join(pieces) | |
| # Verification loop: a secret-class match must never survive. | |
| for _ in range(3): | |
| left = _find_secrets(new) | |
| if not left: | |
| break | |
| left = _resolve(left) | |
| pieces = [] | |
| pos = 0 | |
| shift_events = [] | |
| for s, e, kind, rep in left: | |
| pieces.append(new[pos:s]) | |
| pieces.append(rep) | |
| shift_events.append((s, e, kind, _sha(new[s:e]), rep)) | |
| pos = e | |
| pieces.append(new[pos:]) | |
| new = "".join(pieces) | |
| # offsets of earlier events can shift; recompute coarsely by dropping offsets (rare path) | |
| events = [(-1, -1, k, h, r) for (_, _, k, h, r) in events] + [(-1, -1, k, h, r) for (_, _, k, h, r) in shift_events] | |
| return new, events | |
| def redact_json_leaves(obj, sink): | |
| """Redact every string leaf of a parsed JSON value. `sink` receives (kind, sha, replacement) tuples. | |
| Returns (new_obj, changed).""" | |
| if isinstance(obj, str): | |
| new, ev = redact_text(obj) | |
| for (_, _, k, h, r) in ev: | |
| sink.append((k, h, r)) | |
| return new, bool(ev) | |
| if isinstance(obj, list): | |
| changed = False | |
| res = [] | |
| for x in obj: | |
| y, c = redact_json_leaves(x, sink) | |
| res.append(y) | |
| changed = changed or c | |
| return res, changed | |
| if isinstance(obj, dict): | |
| changed = False | |
| res = {} | |
| for k, v in obj.items(): | |
| y, c = redact_json_leaves(v, sink) | |
| res[k] = y | |
| changed = changed or c | |
| return res, changed | |
| return obj, False | |
| # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- validation regexes | |
| # Plain (un-boundaried) secret regexes used by the *validation* step, deliberately broader than the | |
| # redaction finders so that a miss caused by a boundary rule is still surfaced. | |
| VALIDATION_REGEXES = { | |
| "AKIA": re.compile(r"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"), | |
| "ghp_": re.compile(r"ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"), | |
| "github_pat_": re.compile(r"github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}"), | |
| "sk-": re.compile(r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}"), | |
| "PEM PRIVATE KEY": re.compile(r"-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY"), | |
| "Authorization: Bearer": re.compile(r"(?i)Authorization\s*[:=]\s*\\*[\"']?\s*Bearer\s+(?!<SECRET>)[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{8,}"), | |
| } | |
| # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- phone-like candidates | |
| # Reported, never redacted. | |
| PHONE_RE = re.compile( | |
| r"(?<![\w.:/\\-])(?:\+\d{1,3}[ .-]?)?(?:\(\d{2,4}\)[ .-]?|\d{2,4}[ .-])\d{3,4}[ .-]\d{3,4}(?:[ .-]\d{1,4})?(?![\w.:/\\-])" | |
| ) | |
| def phone_candidates(text): | |
| res = [] | |
| for m in PHONE_RE.finditer(text): | |
| v = m.group(0) | |
| digits = re.sub(r"\D", "", v) | |
| if 9 <= len(digits) <= 15 and re.search(r"[ ().+-]", v): | |
| res.append(v) | |
| return res | |