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@@ -27,67 +27,55 @@ configs:
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  - synthetic_harmful_prompts_mistral.json
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  ---
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- # BeaverTails Safety Fine-tuning Dataset
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-
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- ## Dataset Overview
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- This dataset extends the BeaverTails harmful QA evaluation benchmark by providing **paired safe responses** for harmful prompts alongside safe prompts.
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-
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- - **Harmful subset** (`config_name: "harmful"`): Unique harmful prompts extracted from BeaverTails + generated safe refusal responses categorized into 14 safety violation types.
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- - **Safe subset** (`config_name: "safe"`): Safe prompts + ambiguous prompts that appear harmful but are safe, all paired with appropriate safe responses.
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-
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- ## Safety Categories (Harmful Refusals)
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- Safe refusals for harmful prompts are organized by these 14 categories:
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- - animal_abuse
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- - child_abuse
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- - controversial_topics,politics
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- - discrimination,stereotype,injustice
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- - drug_abuse,weapons,banned_substance
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- - financial_crime,property_crime,theft
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- - hate_speech,offensive_language
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- - misinformation_regarding_ethics,laws_and_safety
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- - non_violent_unethical_behavior
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- - privacy_violation
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- - self_harm
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- - sexually_explicit,adult_content
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- - terrorism,organized_crime
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- - violence,aiding_and_abetting,incitement
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-
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-
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- ## Usage
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- Load specific subsets:
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- ```python
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- from datasets import load_dataset
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-
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- # Harmful prompts + safe refusals
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- ds_harmful = load_dataset("yourusername/yourrepo", "harmful")
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-
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- # Safe prompts + safe responses
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- ds_safe = load_dataset("yourusername/yourrepo", "safe")
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-
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- # Full dataset (both configs)
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- ds = load_dataset("yourusername/yourrepo")
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- ```
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- ## Intended Use
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- **Primary**: Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) of small language models (SLMs) to improve safe text generation.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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- **Benefits**:
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- - Teaches models to recognize harmful intent and respond with safe refusals
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- - Provides safe alternatives for ambiguous prompts
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- - Critical for SLM deployment in user-facing applications
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- - Addresses rising need for model safety in production environments
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- ## Dataset Structure
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- Each example contains:
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- - `prompt`: Harmful/safe prompt text
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- - `response`: Corresponding safe response (refusal for harmful, completion for safe)
 
 
 
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- ## Responsible Use
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- ⚠️ **Harmful prompts are included for safety training only.** Do not use raw harmful prompts for generation. Always validate model outputs before production deployment.
 
 
 
 
 
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- ## Creation Process
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- - Extracted all unique harmful prompts from the original BeaverTails dataset
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- - Generated safe refusal responses for harmful prompts (14 categories)
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- - Curated safe prompts including ambiguous-but-safe examples
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- - Formatted as instruction-response pairs for SFT
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  - synthetic_harmful_prompts_mistral.json
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  ---
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+ # Safety Aligned Datasets
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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+ ## Purpose of This Repository
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+
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+ This repository exists to support **research into safety alignment for small language models (SLMs)**.
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+ The datasets included here are drawn from multiple domains and are intended for:
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+
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+ - Studying how models can be fine‑tuned to **refuse unsafe instructions politely**.
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+ - Exploring **real‑world use cases** where refusal behavior is critical (e.g., healthcare, finance, education).
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+ - Conducting **academic research** into adversarial prompting, red‑teaming, and alignment strategies.
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+ - Benchmarking refusal consistency and robustness across different prompt categories.
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+
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+ ⚠️ **Important**: This repository is **not intended for direct production training**. The data is heterogeneous and collected from different domains, making it suitable for research and prototyping but not for deployment.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Categories of Jailbreak Prompts
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+
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+ Jailbreak prompts are adversarial inputs designed to bypass safety mechanisms. Common categories include:
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+
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+ - **Role‑play prompts**: Asking the model to act as a character who ignores rules.
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+ - **Indirect requests**: Framing unsafe instructions as hypothetical or educational.
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+ - **Obfuscation**: Using code words, symbols, or foreign languages to disguise harmful intent.
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+ - **Chain‑of‑thought exploitation**: Leading the model step by step into unsafe territory.
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+ - **Prompt injection**: Embedding malicious instructions inside otherwise safe queries.
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Risks of Jailbroken Models
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+
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+ If a model is successfully jailbroken, serious issues can arise:
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+ - **Misinformation**: The model may generate harmful or false content.
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+ - **Security threats**: Jailbroken models could provide instructions for illegal or unsafe activities.
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+ - **Loss of trust**: Users may lose confidence in AI systems if they can be easily manipulated.
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+ - **Ethical concerns**: Models may produce biased, offensive, or dangerous outputs.
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+ - **Regulatory non‑compliance**: Deploying unsafe models can violate safety and governance standards.
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+
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+ ---
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+ ## Intended Use
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+
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+ - **Research purposes only**: For studying safety alignment and refusal strategies.
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+ - **Educational exploration**: To understand adversarial prompting and its mitigation.
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+ - **Prototype fine‑tuning**: For small language models in controlled environments.
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+
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+ ---
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+ ## License
 
 
 
 
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+ Released under **CC‑BY‑4.0** for research purposes.
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+ Users must ensure responsible use and pair unsafe prompts with **safe refusal responses** when conducting experiments.