card

README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+---
+license: cc-by-4.0
+pretty_name: "Flypaper: open honeypot data"
+size_categories:
+- 100K<n<1M
+tags:
+- cybersecurity
+- honeypot
+- threat-intelligence
+- cowrie
+- ssh
+- telnet
+- malware
+- intrusion-detection
+configs:
+- config_name: sessions
+  default: true
+  data_files: sessions/*/*.jsonl.gz
+- config_name: web
+  data_files: web/*/*.jsonl.gz
+- config_name: campaigns
+  data_files: campaigns/campaigns.csv
+- config_name: malware
+  data_files: malware/samples.csv
+---
+
+# Flypaper: open honeypot data
+
+Everything that attacked three internet-facing honeypots on one residential IPv4 address in the
+United States: SSH and Telnet sessions with every login attempt and command, malware hashes, web
+exploit requests, and the attack campaigns they group into. It's rebuilt nightly from the raw logs
+and released under CC-BY-4.0.
+
+Current contents (2026-08-10 to 2026-11-01, UTC):
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| SSH/Telnet sessions | 203,880 (165,004 honeyfleet, 38,876 Cowrie) |
+| login attempts | 195,957 |
+| commands typed | 336,475 |
+| files dropped (hashes) | 9,972 |
+| web requests | 31,569 |
+| IPs that hit the Cowrie and web sensors (since 2026-08-09) | 3,233 |
+| campaigns | 740 |
+| malware samples triaged | 115 |
+
+## Sensors
+
+| `sensor` | what it is | data from |
+|---|---|---|
+| `honeyfleet` | SSH honeypot: a fork of Cowrie with a lived-in fake filesystem, rewritten common commands, and a per-session classification of the client (bot or human, typing cadence, command skeleton) | 2026-08-10 |
+| `cowrie` | stock [Cowrie](https://github.com/cowrie/cowrie) on SSH and Telnet | 2026-10-17 |
+| web | low-interaction HTTP catch-all with a fake WordPress login form | 2026-10-19 |
+
+Raw Cowrie logs before 2026-10-17 and web logs before 2026-10-19 were not kept. For those weeks
+`attackers.csv.gz` still has per-IP totals, usernames and passwords going back to 2026-08-09.
+
+Every sensor accepts some logins on purpose, so `success: true` means the honeypot let the
+attacker in. It doesn't mean the password is real anywhere.
+
+## Files
+
+```
+sessions/YYYY-MM/sessions-YYYY-MM-DD.jsonl.gz   one JSON object per SSH/Telnet session, by UTC start day
+web/YYYY-MM/web-YYYY-MM-DD.jsonl.gz             one JSON object per HTTP request
+attackers.csv.gz                                per-IP history for the Cowrie and web sensors since 2026-08-09
+campaigns/campaigns.csv                         campaigns found by grouping sessions on behaviour
+campaigns/campaign_ips.csv.gz                   which IPs took part in which campaign
+campaigns/campaign_daily.csv                    sessions and new IPs per campaign per day
+malware/samples.csv                             static triage of captured files (hashes only)
+malware/iocs.csv                                C2 addresses from those samples, confirmed by decompiling or from the dropper script
+stats.json                                      the numbers above
+```
+
+Only finished UTC days are published. A day's file can still change on a later run if a late log
+rotation adds sessions to it.
+
+### Session fields
+
+| field | |
+|---|---|
+| `session`, `sensor`, `protocol` | session id (unique per sensor), `cowrie`/`honeyfleet`, `ssh`/`telnet` |
+| `start`, `end`, `duration_s` | ISO-8601 UTC; `end` is null if the close event was lost |
+| `src_ip`, `src_port` | the attacking address |
+| `asn`, `as_name`, `as_country` | from [iptoasn.com](https://iptoasn.com) at export time, not at the time of the attack |
+| `known_scanner` | label (e.g. Censys, Shodan) when reverse DNS identifies a research scanner |
+| `client_version`, `hassh`, `ssh_key_fingerprints`, `ja4` | client fingerprints |
+| `logins[]` | `t`, `username`, `password`, `success` |
+| `commands[]` | `t`, `input`, `ok` (false if the honeypot didn't implement some part of the line, true if it ran all of it, null if it logged neither) |
+| `downloads[]`, `uploads[]` | `sha256` and the path or filename the attacker used |
+| `failed_downloads[]` | URLs the honeypot could not fetch |
+| `tunnels[]` | `direct-tcpip` forwarding requests: the host and port the attacker tried to reach through us |
+| `classification` | honeyfleet only: `actor`, `actor_confidence`, `cadence`, `cadence_confidence`, `command_skeleton` |
+
+Web records have `ts`, `src_ip`, the ASN fields, `known_scanner`, `method`, `path`, `query`,
+`user_agent`, and the `username`/`password` sent to the fake login form.
+
+## What was changed or left out
+
+- The sensors' own public IP is replaced with `<sensor-ip>` wherever an attacker typed it (it
+  turns up as a password and in client version strings). Any private IPv4 address is replaced with
+  `<private-ip>`, and domain names belonging to the operator with `<own-domain>`.
+- Sessions from private or local addresses (our own testing) are dropped.
+- Not published: malware binaries (the hashes are on MalwareBazaar), terminal recordings, what the
+  honeypots printed back, payload bytes sent through tunnels, and IDS logs.
+
+## Using it
+
+```python
+import pandas as pd
+s = pd.read_json("sessions/2026-10/sessions-2026-10-31.jsonl.gz", lines=True)
+s.explode("logins").dropna(subset=["logins"])["logins"].apply(pd.Series)["password"].value_counts().head(20)
+```
+
+Most source addresses are compromised machines or rented servers, not the people behind them.
+Don't treat an IP in this data as proof of who did something.
+
+Detection rules written from this data are in
+[honeypot-detections](https://github.com/zer0contextlost/honeypot-detections). Live views of the
+same sensors: [watch](https://watch.zer0contextlost.net), [fleet](https://fleet.zer0contextlost.net).
+
+## License and citation
+
+Data: [CC-BY-4.0](LICENSE). ASN data: iptoasn.com (PDDL).
+
+```
+zer0contextlost. Flypaper: open honeypot data. https://github.com/zer0contextlost/flypaper
+```
+
+Questions and corrections: open an issue.
+
+Mirror of https://github.com/zer0contextlost/flypaper (rebuilt nightly).