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from __future__ import annotations
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from fnmatch import fnmatchcase
import hashlib
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath
import shutil
import stat
import subprocess
from typing import Literal, Union
from urllib.error import HTTPError
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
import yaml
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, field_validator, model_validator
from dlb.io import atomic_json_write, sha256_file
Provenance = Literal["official", "reference_reproduction", "self_trained"]
TeacherFamily = Literal[
"continuous_flm",
"continuous_langflow",
"continuous_rdlm",
"uniform_duo",
"masked_mdlm",
"hybrid_candi",
"mixed_baselines",
]
TeacherAdapter = Literal["uniform_to_absorbing", "masked_to_absorbing"]
class ManifestModel(BaseModel):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
class DigestSpec(ManifestModel):
policy: Literal["sha256", "capture_after_download"]
sha256: str | None = Field(default=None, pattern=r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
per_file_sha256: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict)
@model_validator(mode="after")
def validate_policy(self) -> "DigestSpec":
for name, digest in self.per_file_sha256.items():
safe_remote_path(name)
if len(digest) != 64 or any(
character not in "0123456789abcdef" for character in digest
):
raise ValueError(f"invalid per-file SHA-256 for {name}")
declared = (self.sha256 is not None) + bool(self.per_file_sha256)
if self.policy == "sha256" and declared != 1:
raise ValueError("sha256 policy requires one aggregate or per-file digest set")
if self.policy == "capture_after_download" and declared:
raise ValueError("capture policy forbids declared SHA-256 values")
return self
class HuggingFaceSource(ManifestModel):
repo_id: str = Field(pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$")
revision: str = Field(pattern=r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
allow_patterns: list[str] = Field(min_length=1)
class GDriveSource(ManifestModel):
folder_id: str = Field(pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$")
expected_files: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict)
@model_validator(mode="after")
def validate_expected_files(self) -> "GDriveSource":
if len(self.expected_files.values()) != len(set(self.expected_files.values())):
raise ValueError("Google Drive file IDs must be unique")
for path, file_id in self.expected_files.items():
safe_remote_path(path)
allowed = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789_-"
if not file_id or any(character not in allowed for character in file_id):
raise ValueError(f"invalid Google Drive file id for {path}")
return self
class ZenodoSource(ManifestModel):
record_id: int = Field(gt=0)
files: list[str] = Field(min_length=1)
published_checksums: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict)
@model_validator(mode="after")
def validate_files(self) -> "ZenodoSource":
for name in self.files:
safe_remote_path(name)
if not set(self.published_checksums) <= set(self.files):
raise ValueError("published checksums must refer to selected Zenodo files")
return self
class DirectSource(ManifestModel):
url: str
filename: str
@model_validator(mode="after")
def validate_direct(self) -> "DirectSource":
if not self.url.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
raise ValueError("direct URL must use HTTP(S)")
safe_remote_path(self.filename)
return self
Source = Union[HuggingFaceSource, GDriveSource, ZenodoSource, DirectSource]
class CheckpointResource(ManifestModel):
id: str = Field(pattern=r"^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$")
backend: Literal["huggingface", "gdrive", "zenodo", "direct"]
provenance: Provenance
teacher_family: TeacherFamily
destination: str
license: str = Field(min_length=1)
terms_url: str
digest: DigestSpec
required_files: list[str] = Field(min_length=1)
source: Source
note: str | None = None
@model_validator(mode="after")
def validate_resource(self) -> "CheckpointResource":
expected = {
"huggingface": HuggingFaceSource,
"gdrive": GDriveSource,
"zenodo": ZenodoSource,
"direct": DirectSource,
}[self.backend]
if not isinstance(self.source, expected):
raise ValueError(f"{self.backend} resource has the wrong source descriptor")
path = safe_remote_path(self.destination)
if path.parts[0] != self.provenance:
raise ValueError("resource destination must begin with its provenance")
if not self.terms_url.startswith("https://"):
raise ValueError("resource terms URL must use HTTPS")
if len(self.required_files) != len(set(self.required_files)):
raise ValueError("required checkpoint files must be unique")
for name in self.required_files:
safe_remote_path(name)
if isinstance(self.source, HuggingFaceSource) and any(
not any(fnmatchcase(name, pattern) for pattern in self.source.allow_patterns)
for name in self.required_files
):
raise ValueError("required Hugging Face files must be included by allow patterns")
if isinstance(self.source, GDriveSource) and set(self.required_files) != set(
self.source.expected_files
):
raise ValueError("Google Drive required files must exactly match pinned file IDs")
if isinstance(self.source, ZenodoSource) and set(self.required_files) != set(
self.source.files
):
raise ValueError("Zenodo required files must exactly match selected record files")
if isinstance(self.source, DirectSource) and self.required_files != [
self.source.filename
]:
raise ValueError("direct required file must match the declared filename")
if self.digest.sha256 is not None and len(self.required_files) != 1:
raise ValueError("aggregate SHA-256 is incompatible with a multi-file resource")
if self.digest.per_file_sha256 and set(self.digest.per_file_sha256) != set(
self.required_files
):
raise ValueError("per-file SHA-256 inventory must match required files exactly")
return self
class CoverageEntry(ManifestModel):
model: str = Field(pattern=r"^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$")
dataset: Literal["lm1b", "owt"]
resource: str = Field(pattern=r"^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$")
path: str | None = None
teacher_family: TeacherFamily | None = None
sampling_config: str | None = None
sampling_config_source: Literal["resource", "project"] | None = None
sampling_config_sha256: str | None = Field(
default=None, pattern=r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$"
)
sampling_config_source_commit: str | None = Field(
default=None, pattern=r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$"
)
@model_validator(mode="after")
def validate_path(self) -> "CoverageEntry":
if self.path is not None:
safe_remote_path(self.path)
config_fields = (self.sampling_config, self.sampling_config_source)
if any(value is None for value in config_fields) != all(
value is None for value in config_fields
):
raise ValueError("coverage sampling config requires a path and source")
if self.sampling_config is not None:
config = safe_remote_path(self.sampling_config)
if config.suffix.lower() not in {".json", ".yaml", ".yml"}:
raise ValueError("coverage sampling config has an unsupported suffix")
if self.sampling_config_source == "project":
if (
self.sampling_config_sha256 is None
or self.sampling_config_source_commit is None
):
raise ValueError(
"project sampling config requires a pinned SHA-256 and source commit"
)
elif (
self.sampling_config_sha256 is not None
or self.sampling_config_source_commit is not None
):
raise ValueError(
"only project sampling configs declare SHA-256 and source commit"
)
return self
class TrainingRecipe(ManifestModel):
model: str = Field(pattern=r"^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$")
dataset: Literal["lm1b", "owt"]
provenance: Provenance
teacher_family: TeacherFamily
source: str = Field(pattern=r"^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$")
source_commit: str = Field(pattern=r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
teacher_adapter: TeacherAdapter | None = None
command: str = Field(min_length=1)
output: str
sampling_checkpoint: str | None = None
sampling_config: str | None = None
prerequisites: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
note: str | None = None
@model_validator(mode="after")
def validate_output(self) -> "TrainingRecipe":
path = safe_remote_path(self.output)
if path.parts[0] != "checkpoints" or path.parts[1] != self.provenance:
raise ValueError("recipe output must be inside checkpoints/<provenance>")
if self.sampling_checkpoint is not None:
checkpoint = safe_remote_path(self.sampling_checkpoint)
if checkpoint.suffix.lower() not in {
".bin",
".ckpt",
".pt",
".pth",
".safetensors",
}:
raise ValueError("recipe sampling checkpoint has an unsupported suffix")
if self.sampling_config is not None:
config = safe_remote_path(self.sampling_config)
if config.suffix.lower() not in {".json", ".yaml", ".yml"}:
raise ValueError("recipe sampling config has an unsupported suffix")
if self.source in {"sdtt", "di4c"}:
expected = {
"uniform_duo": "uniform_to_absorbing",
"masked_mdlm": "masked_to_absorbing",
}.get(self.teacher_family)
if self.teacher_adapter != expected:
raise ValueError(
f"{self.source} recipe for {self.teacher_family} requires {expected}"
)
if self.sampling_checkpoint is None or self.sampling_config is None:
raise ValueError(
f"{self.source} recipe requires exact sampling checkpoint and config"
)
elif self.teacher_adapter is not None:
raise ValueError("teacher adapters are only valid for SDTT/Di4C recipes")
return self
class CheckpointManifest(ManifestModel):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid", populate_by_name=True)
schema_version: Literal[1]
resources: dict[str, CheckpointResource]
recipes: dict[str, TrainingRecipe]
coverage_entries: list[CoverageEntry] = Field(alias="coverage")
@field_validator("schema_version", mode="before")
@classmethod
def validate_schema_version(cls, value: object) -> object:
if type(value) is not int or value != 1:
raise ValueError("checkpoint manifest schema_version must be integer 1")
return value
@property
def coverage(self) -> dict[tuple[str, str], CoverageEntry]:
return {(item.model, item.dataset): item for item in self.coverage_entries}
@model_validator(mode="after")
def validate_links(self) -> "CheckpointManifest":
for key, resource in self.resources.items():
if key != resource.id:
raise ValueError(f"resource key {key} does not match id {resource.id}")
cells = [(entry.model, entry.dataset) for entry in self.coverage_entries]
if len(cells) != len(set(cells)):
raise ValueError("checkpoint coverage cells must be unique")
for entry in self.coverage_entries:
if entry.resource not in self.resources:
raise ValueError(f"unknown checkpoint resource {entry.resource}")
resource = self.resources[entry.resource]
if resource.teacher_family == "mixed_baselines":
if entry.path is None or entry.teacher_family is None:
raise ValueError("mixed checkpoint resources require a path and teacher family")
elif entry.teacher_family not in {None, resource.teacher_family}:
raise ValueError("coverage teacher family differs from its checkpoint resource")
return self
def load_checkpoint_manifest(path: Path) -> CheckpointManifest:
document = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if not isinstance(document, dict):
raise ValueError("checkpoint manifest must be a mapping")
return CheckpointManifest.model_validate(document)
def validate_checkpoint_coverage(registry, manifest: CheckpointManifest) -> None:
"""Cross-check registry support cells against resources and recipe fallbacks."""
referenced_recipes: set[str] = set()
for model_name, model in registry.models.items():
for dataset, support in model.datasets.items():
cell = (model_name, dataset)
coverage = manifest.coverage.get(cell)
recipe_id = support.train_recipe
if support.status == "unsupported":
if coverage is not None:
raise ValueError(f"unsupported cell {model_name}/{dataset} has a checkpoint")
continue
if (coverage is None) == (recipe_id is None):
raise ValueError(
f"supported cell {model_name}/{dataset} requires exactly one resource or recipe"
)
if coverage is not None:
resource = manifest.resources[coverage.resource]
if resource.provenance != support.provenance:
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint provenance differs for {model_name}/{dataset}")
else:
if recipe_id not in manifest.recipes:
raise ValueError(f"unknown recipe {recipe_id} for {model_name}/{dataset}")
recipe = manifest.recipes[recipe_id]
if (recipe.model, recipe.dataset) != cell:
raise ValueError(f"recipe {recipe_id} does not describe {model_name}/{dataset}")
if recipe.provenance != support.provenance:
raise ValueError(f"recipe provenance differs for {model_name}/{dataset}")
referenced_recipes.add(recipe_id)
known_cells = {
(model_name, dataset)
for model_name, model in registry.models.items()
for dataset in model.datasets
}
extras = set(manifest.coverage) - known_cells
if extras:
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint coverage contains unknown cells: {sorted(extras)}")
if referenced_recipes != set(manifest.recipes):
raise ValueError("checkpoint manifest contains unreferenced training recipes")
def safe_remote_path(name: str) -> PurePosixPath:
"""Return a safe relative POSIX path controlled by a remote provider."""
if not name or name in {".", ".."} or "\\" in name:
raise ValueError(f"unsafe remote path: {name!r}")
path = PurePosixPath(name)
if path.is_absolute() or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in path.parts):
raise ValueError(f"unsafe remote path: {name!r}")
return path
def require_server_platform(system_name: str) -> None:
"""Permit real checkpoint acquisition only on the approved Linux server."""
if system_name != "Linux":
raise RuntimeError(
f"checkpoint downloads are Linux server-only; detected {system_name or 'unknown'}"
)
def safe_checkpoint_destination(checkpoint_root: Path, relative_name: str) -> Path:
"""Resolve a manifest path while rejecting symlink ancestors and escapes."""
relative = safe_remote_path(relative_name)
root = checkpoint_root.absolute()
if root.is_symlink():
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint root is a symlink: {root}")
candidate = root.joinpath(*relative.parts)
current = root
for part in relative.parts:
current = current / part
if current.is_symlink():
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint destination contains a symlink: {current}")
try:
candidate.resolve(strict=False).relative_to(root.resolve(strict=False))
except ValueError as error:
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint destination escapes root: {candidate}") from error
return candidate
def verify_published_file(
path: Path,
*,
size_bytes: int | None,
checksum: str | None,
) -> None:
"""Validate provider-published size/checksum metadata before publication."""
if size_bytes is not None and path.stat().st_size != size_bytes:
raise ValueError(f"published size mismatch for {path}")
if checksum is None:
return
try:
algorithm, expected = checksum.split(":", 1)
except ValueError as error:
raise ValueError(f"invalid published checksum for {path}") from error
if algorithm == "md5":
digest = hashlib.md5(usedforsecurity=False)
elif algorithm == "sha256":
digest = hashlib.sha256()
else:
raise ValueError(f"unsupported published checksum algorithm: {algorithm}")
with path.open("rb") as handle:
for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
digest.update(chunk)
if digest.hexdigest() != expected:
raise ValueError(f"published checksum mismatch for {path}")
def build_hf_snapshot_kwargs(source: HuggingFaceSource, partial: Path) -> dict[str, object]:
return {
"repo_id": source.repo_id,
"revision": source.revision,
"allow_patterns": list(source.allow_patterns),
"local_dir": str(partial),
"resume_download": True,
}
def build_gdrive_commands(source: GDriveSource, staging: Path) -> list[list[str]]:
"""Address each Drive object by immutable file ID, never folder-discovered name."""
object_root = staging / ".objects"
return [
[
"gdown",
"--continue",
file_id,
"--output",
str(object_root / f"{file_id}.partial"),
]
for file_id in source.expected_files.values()
]
def _quarantine_path(target: Path, quarantine_root: Path, timestamp: str) -> Path:
try:
relative = target.relative_to(quarantine_root.parent)
except ValueError:
relative = Path(target.name)
destination = quarantine_root / timestamp / relative
destination.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return destination
def publish_partial(
partial: Path,
target: Path,
digest: DigestSpec,
*,
quarantine_root: Path | None = None,
timestamp: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Validate a partial file, quarantine a mismatch, and atomically publish it."""
if partial.is_symlink():
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint partial path is a symlink: {partial}")
if target.is_symlink():
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint target path is a symlink: {target}")
observed = sha256_file(partial)
if digest.sha256 is not None and observed != digest.sha256:
raise ValueError(f"download digest mismatch for {target}")
quarantined = None
if target.exists():
existing = sha256_file(target)
if digest.sha256 is not None and existing == digest.sha256:
partial.unlink()
return {
"status": "reused",
"sha256": existing,
"size_bytes": target.stat().st_size,
"quarantined": None,
}
quarantine_root = quarantine_root or target.parents[1] / "quarantine"
timestamp = timestamp or datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
quarantine = _quarantine_path(target, quarantine_root, timestamp)
os.replace(target, quarantine)
quarantined = quarantine.as_posix()
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
os.replace(partial, target)
return {
"status": "downloaded",
"sha256": observed,
"size_bytes": target.stat().st_size,
"quarantined": quarantined,
}
def download_direct(
source: DirectSource,
target: Path,
digest: DigestSpec,
*,
quarantine_root: Path | None = None,
published_size_bytes: int | None = None,
published_checksum: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Resume an HTTP download into ``.partial`` and atomically publish it."""
quarantined_existing = None
try:
target_info = target.lstat()
except FileNotFoundError:
target_info = None
if target_info is not None:
valid_target = stat.S_ISREG(target_info.st_mode) and target_info.st_size > 0
if not valid_target:
effective_quarantine_root = (
quarantine_root or target.parents[1] / "quarantine"
)
stamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%S.%fZ")
quarantine = _quarantine_path(
target, effective_quarantine_root, stamp
)
os.replace(target, quarantine)
quarantined_existing = quarantine.as_posix()
elif digest.sha256 and sha256_file(target) == digest.sha256:
return {
"status": "reused",
"sha256": digest.sha256,
"size_bytes": target_info.st_size,
"quarantined": None,
}
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
partial = target.with_name(target.name + ".partial")
if partial.is_symlink():
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint partial path is a symlink: {partial}")
if partial.exists() and not partial.is_file():
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint partial path is not a file: {partial}")
metadata_path = partial.with_name(partial.name + ".meta.json")
def discard_partial() -> None:
partial.unlink(missing_ok=True)
metadata_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
def load_resume_metadata() -> dict[str, object] | None:
if not partial.exists() or partial.stat().st_size == 0:
metadata_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
return None
try:
metadata = json.loads(metadata_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if metadata.get("url") != source.url:
raise ValueError("partial URL differs")
if metadata.get("validator_header") not in {"ETag", "Last-Modified"}:
raise ValueError("partial has no supported validator")
if not isinstance(metadata.get("validator_value"), str) or not metadata[
"validator_value"
]:
raise ValueError("partial validator is empty")
total_size = metadata.get("total_size")
if not isinstance(total_size, int) or total_size < partial.stat().st_size:
raise ValueError("partial total size is invalid")
return metadata
except (OSError, TypeError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
discard_partial()
return None
def response_header(response, name: str) -> str | None:
value = response.headers.get(name)
if value is not None:
return value
lowered = name.lower()
for key, candidate in response.headers.items():
if key.lower() == lowered:
return candidate
return None
def content_range(response) -> tuple[int, int, int] | None:
value = response_header(response, "Content-Range")
if value is None or not value.startswith("bytes "):
return None
try:
span, total = value.removeprefix("bytes ").split("/", 1)
start, end = span.split("-", 1)
return int(start), int(end), int(total)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
resume_metadata = load_resume_metadata()
for attempt in range(2):
offset = partial.stat().st_size if partial.exists() and resume_metadata else 0
complete_partial = bool(
offset and offset == resume_metadata.get("total_size")
)
headers = {}
if offset:
headers = {
"Range": "bytes=0-0" if complete_partial else f"bytes={offset}-",
"If-Range": str(resume_metadata["validator_value"]),
}
request = Request(source.url, headers=headers)
try:
response_context = urlopen(request)
except HTTPError as error:
if error.code == 416 and offset and attempt == 0:
discard_partial()
resume_metadata = None
continue
raise
with response_context as response:
status = getattr(response, "status", response.getcode())
response_range = content_range(response)
if offset and status == 416:
discard_partial()
resume_metadata = None
if attempt == 0:
continue
raise ValueError("HTTP range remained unsatisfiable after restart")
if complete_partial and status == 206:
validator_header = str(resume_metadata["validator_header"])
validator = response_header(response, validator_header)
probe = response.read()
with partial.open("rb") as handle:
first_byte = handle.read(1)
trusted = (
response_range == (0, 0, resume_metadata["total_size"])
and validator == resume_metadata["validator_value"]
and probe == first_byte
)
if trusted:
break
discard_partial()
resume_metadata = None
if attempt == 0:
continue
raise ValueError("complete HTTP partial could not be revalidated")
if offset and status == 206:
validator_header = str(resume_metadata["validator_header"])
validator = response_header(response, validator_header)
trusted = (
response_range is not None
and response_range[0] == offset
and response_range[1] + 1 == response_range[2]
and response_range[2] == resume_metadata["total_size"]
and validator == resume_metadata["validator_value"]
)
if not trusted:
discard_partial()
resume_metadata = None
if attempt == 0:
continue
raise ValueError("HTTP range response could not be validated")
mode = "ab"
total_size = response_range[2]
elif offset and status == 200:
mode = "wb"
length = response_header(response, "Content-Length")
total_size = int(length) if length is not None else None
elif not offset and status in {200, 206}:
if status == 206 and (
response_range is None
or response_range[0] != 0
or response_range[1] + 1 != response_range[2]
):
raise ValueError("fresh HTTP range response is incomplete")
mode = "wb"
length = response_header(response, "Content-Length")
total_size = (
response_range[2]
if response_range is not None
else int(length) if length is not None else None
)
else:
if offset and attempt == 0:
discard_partial()
resume_metadata = None
continue
raise ValueError(f"unexpected HTTP download status {status}")
etag = response_header(response, "ETag")
modified = response_header(response, "Last-Modified")
validator_header = "ETag" if etag else "Last-Modified" if modified else None
validator_value = etag or modified
if validator_header and validator_value and total_size is not None:
atomic_json_write(
metadata_path,
{
"url": source.url,
"validator_header": validator_header,
"validator_value": validator_value,
"total_size": total_size,
},
)
else:
metadata_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
with partial.open(mode) as handle:
shutil.copyfileobj(response, handle, length=1024 * 1024)
handle.flush()
os.fsync(handle.fileno())
if total_size is not None and partial.stat().st_size != total_size:
raise ValueError("HTTP response size differs from validated total")
break
else: # pragma: no cover - both attempts either break or raise
raise RuntimeError("HTTP download retry loop exhausted")
if partial.stat().st_size == 0:
raise FileNotFoundError(f"required checkpoint file is empty: {source.filename}")
verify_published_file(
partial,
size_bytes=published_size_bytes,
checksum=published_checksum,
)
metadata_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
result = publish_partial(
partial,
target,
digest,
quarantine_root=quarantine_root,
)
if quarantined_existing is not None and result["quarantined"] is None:
result["quarantined"] = quarantined_existing
return result
def select_zenodo_files(
metadata: dict[str, object], source: ZenodoSource
) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
by_name: dict[str, dict[str, object]] = {}
for item in metadata.get("files", []):
name = str(item["key"])
safe_remote_path(name)
by_name[name] = item
selected = []
for name in source.files:
safe_remote_path(name)
if name not in by_name:
raise FileNotFoundError(f"Zenodo record {source.record_id} lacks {name}")
item = by_name[name]
links = item["links"]
selected.append(
{
"filename": name,
"url": links.get("content") or links["self"],
"size_bytes": int(item["size"]),
"published_checksum": item.get("checksum"),
}
)
return selected
def _file_records(path: Path, root: Path) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
paths = [path] if path.is_file() else sorted(item for item in path.rglob("*") if item.is_file())
records = []
for item in paths:
if item.is_symlink():
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint tree contains a symlink: {item}")
safe_remote_path(item.relative_to(path.parent if path.is_file() else path).as_posix())
records.append(
{
"path": item.relative_to(root).as_posix(),
"size_bytes": item.stat().st_size,
"sha256": sha256_file(item),
}
)
return records
def _verify_required_files(staging: Path, required_files: list[str]) -> None:
for relative_name in required_files:
expected = staging.joinpath(*safe_remote_path(relative_name).parts)
if not expected.is_file() or expected.is_symlink():
raise FileNotFoundError(f"required checkpoint file is missing: {relative_name}")
if expected.stat().st_size == 0:
raise FileNotFoundError(f"required checkpoint file is empty: {relative_name}")
def _digest_for_file(digest: DigestSpec, relative_name: str) -> DigestSpec:
if digest.policy == "capture_after_download":
return digest
if digest.sha256 is not None:
return digest
return DigestSpec(policy="sha256", sha256=digest.per_file_sha256[relative_name])
def _verify_resource_digest(
staging: Path, digest: DigestSpec, required_files: list[str]
) -> None:
if digest.policy == "capture_after_download":
return
for relative_name in required_files:
expected = _digest_for_file(digest, relative_name).sha256
path = staging.joinpath(*safe_remote_path(relative_name).parts)
if expected is None or sha256_file(path) != expected:
raise ValueError(f"download digest mismatch for {path}")
def _quarantine_unexpected_gdrive_staging(
partial: Path,
source: GDriveSource,
quarantine_root: Path,
) -> list[str]:
allowed_files = set(source.expected_files)
allowed_object_files = {
f".objects/{file_id}.partial" for file_id in source.expected_files.values()
}
allowed_files.update(allowed_object_files)
allowed_directories = {".objects"}
for name in allowed_files:
relative = PurePosixPath(name)
allowed_directories.update(
parent.as_posix() for parent in relative.parents if parent.as_posix() != "."
)
stamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%S.%fZ")
quarantined = []
for name in allowed_object_files:
relative = PurePosixPath(name)
current = partial
valid_parents = True
for part in relative.parts[:-1]:
current = current / part
try:
parent_info = current.lstat()
except FileNotFoundError:
valid_parents = False
break
if not stat.S_ISDIR(parent_info.st_mode):
valid_parents = False
break
if not valid_parents:
continue
item = partial.joinpath(*relative.parts)
try:
item_info = item.lstat()
except FileNotFoundError:
continue
if stat.S_ISREG(item_info.st_mode) and item_info.st_size > 0:
continue
quarantine = _quarantine_path(item, quarantine_root, stamp)
os.replace(item, quarantine)
quarantined.append(quarantine.as_posix())
for item in sorted(
partial.rglob("*"), key=lambda path: len(path.parts), reverse=True
):
relative_name = item.relative_to(partial).as_posix()
if item.is_symlink() or not item.is_dir():
if relative_name not in allowed_files:
quarantine = _quarantine_path(item, quarantine_root, stamp)
os.replace(item, quarantine)
quarantined.append(quarantine.as_posix())
elif relative_name not in allowed_directories:
try:
item.rmdir()
except OSError:
pass
return quarantined
def _publish_directory(partial: Path, destination: Path, quarantine_root: Path) -> str | None:
if partial.is_symlink():
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint partial path is a symlink: {partial}")
for item in partial.rglob("*"):
if item.is_symlink():
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint tree contains a symlink: {item}")
safe_remote_path(item.relative_to(partial).as_posix())
quarantined = None
if destination.exists():
stamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
quarantine = _quarantine_path(destination, quarantine_root, stamp)
os.replace(destination, quarantine)
quarantined = quarantine.as_posix()
destination.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
os.replace(partial, destination)
return quarantined
def fetch_resource(root: Path, resource: CheckpointResource) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Fetch one resource and return a lock-ready status record."""
checkpoint_root = root / "checkpoints"
destination = safe_checkpoint_destination(checkpoint_root, resource.destination)
quarantine_root = safe_checkpoint_destination(checkpoint_root, "quarantine")
if resource.backend == "direct":
source = resource.source
target = safe_checkpoint_destination(
checkpoint_root, f"{resource.destination}/{source.filename}"
)
result = download_direct(
source,
target,
_digest_for_file(resource.digest, source.filename),
quarantine_root=quarantine_root,
)
quarantined = result.get("quarantined")
elif resource.backend == "huggingface":
source = resource.source
partial = safe_checkpoint_destination(
checkpoint_root, resource.destination + ".partial"
)
if partial.exists() and not partial.is_dir():
raise ValueError(f"HF partial path is not a directory: {partial}")
partial.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
from huggingface_hub import snapshot_download
snapshot_download(**build_hf_snapshot_kwargs(source, partial))
_verify_required_files(partial, resource.required_files)
_verify_resource_digest(partial, resource.digest, resource.required_files)
quarantined = _publish_directory(partial, destination, quarantine_root)
elif resource.backend == "gdrive":
source = resource.source
partial = safe_checkpoint_destination(
checkpoint_root, resource.destination + ".partial"
)
partial.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
_quarantine_unexpected_gdrive_staging(partial, source, quarantine_root)
object_root = partial / ".objects"
object_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
commands = build_gdrive_commands(source, partial)
for (relative_name, file_id), command in zip(
source.expected_files.items(), commands
):
object_path = safe_checkpoint_destination(
checkpoint_root,
f"{resource.destination}.partial/.objects/{file_id}.partial",
)
subprocess.run(command, check=True)
if not object_path.is_file() or object_path.is_symlink():
raise FileNotFoundError(f"Google Drive file ID {file_id} produced no file")
declared_path = safe_checkpoint_destination(
checkpoint_root, f"{resource.destination}.partial/{relative_name}"
)
declared_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
os.replace(object_path, declared_path)
object_root.rmdir()
_verify_required_files(partial, resource.required_files)
observed_inventory = {
item.relative_to(partial).as_posix()
for item in partial.rglob("*")
if item.is_file()
}
if observed_inventory != set(source.expected_files):
raise ValueError("Google Drive staging inventory differs from pinned ID/path map")
_verify_resource_digest(partial, resource.digest, resource.required_files)
quarantined = _publish_directory(partial, destination, quarantine_root)
elif resource.backend == "zenodo":
source = resource.source
api_url = f"https://zenodo.org/api/records/{source.record_id}"
with urlopen(api_url) as response:
metadata = json.load(response)
destination.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
quarantined = None
for item in select_zenodo_files(metadata, source):
filename = str(item["filename"])
published_checksum = item.get("published_checksum")
pinned_checksum = source.published_checksums.get(filename)
if pinned_checksum is not None and published_checksum != pinned_checksum:
raise ValueError(f"Zenodo metadata checksum drift for {filename}")
result = download_direct(
DirectSource(url=str(item["url"]), filename=filename),
safe_checkpoint_destination(
checkpoint_root, f"{resource.destination}/{filename}"
),
_digest_for_file(resource.digest, filename),
quarantine_root=quarantine_root,
published_size_bytes=int(item["size_bytes"]),
published_checksum=pinned_checksum or published_checksum,
)
quarantined = quarantined or result.get("quarantined")
_verify_required_files(destination, resource.required_files)
else: # pragma: no cover - Pydantic makes this unreachable
raise ValueError(f"unsupported backend {resource.backend}")
files = _file_records(destination, root)
if not files:
raise FileNotFoundError(f"checkpoint resource {resource.id} produced no files")
return {
"status": "downloaded",
"backend": resource.backend,
"provenance": resource.provenance,
"teacher_family": resource.teacher_family,
"destination": destination.relative_to(root).as_posix(),
"quarantined": quarantined,
"files": files,
}
def fetch_all_resources(root: Path, manifest_path: Path, manifest: CheckpointManifest) -> dict[str, object]:
records: dict[str, object] = {}
for resource_id, resource in manifest.resources.items():
try:
records[resource_id] = fetch_resource(root, resource)
except Exception as error: # preserve provider failures as structured lock evidence
status = "unavailable" if isinstance(error, (FileNotFoundError, HTTPError)) else "error"
records[resource_id] = {
"status": status,
"backend": resource.backend,
"provenance": resource.provenance,
"teacher_family": resource.teacher_family,
"destination": f"checkpoints/{resource.destination}",
"files": [],
"error": {"type": type(error).__name__, "message": str(error)},
}
lock = {
"schema_version": 1,
"created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
"manifest_sha256": sha256_file(manifest_path),
"resources": records,
}
atomic_json_write(root / "artifacts" / "checkpoint_lock.json", lock)
return lock
def _lstat_regular_checkpoint_path(root: Path, relative: PurePosixPath) -> Path:
"""Reject symlinks/non-directories at every component and require a regular file."""
current = root.absolute()
for index, part in enumerate(relative.parts):
current = current / part
info = current.lstat()
if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode):
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint lock path contains a symlink: {current}")
final = index == len(relative.parts) - 1
if final and not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint lock path is not a regular file: {current}")
if not final and not stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode):
raise ValueError(f"checkpoint lock ancestor is not a directory: {current}")
return current
def verify_checkpoint_lock(
root: Path,
lock: dict[str, object],
*,
manifest_path: Path | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
report: dict[str, object] = {
"ok": True,
"schema_status": (
"verified"
if type(lock.get("schema_version")) is int and lock.get("schema_version") == 1
else "invalid"
),
"resources": {},
}
if report["schema_status"] != "verified":
report["ok"] = False
resources = lock.get("resources")
if not isinstance(resources, dict) or not resources:
report["resource_set_status"] = "invalid"
report["ok"] = False
resources = resources if isinstance(resources, dict) else {}
else:
report["resource_set_status"] = "verified"
manifest = None
if manifest_path is not None:
expected_manifest = lock.get("manifest_sha256")
observed_manifest = sha256_file(manifest_path) if manifest_path.is_file() else None
report["manifest_status"] = (
"verified" if observed_manifest == expected_manifest else "mismatch"
)
if report["manifest_status"] != "verified":
report["ok"] = False
try:
manifest = load_checkpoint_manifest(manifest_path)
expected_ids = set(manifest.resources)
except (OSError, ValueError):
report["resource_set_status"] = "invalid"
report["ok"] = False
else:
if set(resources) != expected_ids:
report["resource_set_status"] = "mismatch"
report["ok"] = False
for resource_id, record in resources.items():
if not isinstance(record, dict):
report["resources"][resource_id] = {
"status": "invalid",
"files": [],
"error": {
"type": "InvalidResourceRecord",
"message": f"lock resource {resource_id} must be a mapping",
},
}
report["ok"] = False
continue
manifest_resource = manifest.resources.get(resource_id) if manifest is not None else None
if manifest_resource is not None:
expected_metadata = {
"backend": manifest_resource.backend,
"provenance": manifest_resource.provenance,
"teacher_family": manifest_resource.teacher_family,
"destination": f"checkpoints/{manifest_resource.destination}",
}
if any(record.get(field) != value for field, value in expected_metadata.items()):
report["resources"][resource_id] = {
"status": "invalid",
"error": {"message": "lock resource metadata differs from manifest"},
}
report["ok"] = False
continue
if record.get("status") not in {"downloaded", "verified"}:
report["resources"][resource_id] = {
"status": record.get("status", "unavailable"),
"error": record.get("error"),
}
report["ok"] = False
continue
files = record.get("files")
if not isinstance(files, list) or not files:
report["resources"][resource_id] = {"status": "invalid", "files": []}
report["ok"] = False
continue
status = "verified"
details = []
seen_paths: set[str] = set()
relative_to_destination: set[str] = set()
destination_prefix = PurePosixPath(
f"checkpoints/{manifest_resource.destination}"
if manifest_resource is not None
else "checkpoints"
)
for expected in files:
try:
if not isinstance(expected, dict):
raise ValueError("lock file record must be a mapping")
relative = safe_remote_path(str(expected["path"]))
if relative == destination_prefix or not relative.is_relative_to(
destination_prefix
):
raise ValueError("lock file lies outside its resource destination")
path_text = relative.as_posix()
if path_text in seen_paths:
raise ValueError("lock contains a duplicate file path")
seen_paths.add(path_text)
size_bytes = expected["size_bytes"]
digest = expected["sha256"]
if not isinstance(size_bytes, int) or size_bytes < 0:
raise ValueError("invalid locked file size")
if not isinstance(digest, str) or len(digest) != 64 or any(
character not in "0123456789abcdef" for character in digest
):
raise ValueError("invalid locked SHA-256")
relative_to_destination.add(
relative.relative_to(destination_prefix).as_posix()
)
path = _lstat_regular_checkpoint_path(root, relative)
except FileNotFoundError:
status = "missing"
details.append({"path": expected.get("path"), "status": "missing"})
continue
except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError, OSError):
status = "invalid"
details.append({"path": expected.get("path"), "status": "invalid"})
break
if path.stat().st_size != size_bytes or sha256_file(path) != digest:
status = "mismatch"
details.append({"path": expected["path"], "status": "mismatch"})
else:
details.append({"path": expected["path"], "status": "verified"})
if (
status == "verified"
and manifest_resource is not None
and not set(manifest_resource.required_files) <= relative_to_destination
):
status = "invalid"
details.append({"status": "invalid", "error": "required file missing from lock"})
report["resources"][resource_id] = {"status": status, "files": details}
if status != "verified":
report["ok"] = False
return report
|