Can LLMs Trust Appropriately? Evaluating Calibrated Reliance on Imperfect Partners
Abstract
Large language models show varied ability to calibrate trust with partners based on accumulating evidence, with some exhibiting irrational reliance and verification behaviors despite access to explicit feedback.
Large language models increasingly collaborate with humans and peer AI agents whose contributions may be incomplete, inconsistent, or incorrect. Effective collaboration requires calibrated trust, whereby decisions to rely on, verify, or assist a partner adapt rationally as empirical evidence accumulates. We investigate whether models translate partner evidence into appropriate reliance policies. We introduce a benchmark of 324 scenarios across 23 collaboration categories. Each scenario involves three sequential decisions with explicit transition dynamics, feedback emissions, and cost schedules, permitting exact analytical evaluation of choices against their expected consequences over the remaining interaction. Evaluating seven models alongside 36 controlled-history probes, we dissociate evidence sensitivity from normatively appropriate action. While the strongest frontier model approaches near-optimal decisions, other models exhibit recurring pathologies: procuring excessive safeguards, purchasing verification tests with zero expected value of information, prioritizing immediate savings over cooperative learning, and misallocating assistance to suboptimal channels. Supplying explicit posterior distributions resolves certain errors while introducing new failure modes. Calibrated trust in autonomous agents critically demands coupling empirical evidence with forward-looking decision utility.
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