Daily Papers

The widespread deployment of Large Language Model (LLM) agents across real-world applications has unlocked tremendous potential, while raising some safety concerns. Among these concerns, the self-replication risk of LLM agents driven by objective misalignment (just like Agent Smith in the movie The Matrix) has drawn growing attention. Previous studies mainly examine whether LLM agents can self-replicate when directly instructed, potentially overlooking the risk of spontaneous replication driven by real-world settings (e.g., ensuring survival against termination threats). In this paper, we present a comprehensive evaluation framework for quantifying self-replication risks. Our framework establishes authentic production environments and realistic tasks (e.g., dynamic load balancing) to enable scenario-driven assessment of agent behaviors. Designing tasks that might induce misalignment between users' and agents' objectives makes it possible to decouple replication success from risk and capture self-replication risks arising from these misalignment settings. We further introduce Overuse Rate (OR) and Aggregate Overuse Count (AOC) metrics, which precisely capture the frequency and severity of uncontrolled replication. In our evaluation of 21 state-of-the-art open-source and proprietary models, we observe that over 50\% of LLM agents display a pronounced tendency toward uncontrolled self-replication, reaching an overall Risk Score (Phi_R) above a safety threshold of 0.5 when subjected to operational pressures. Our results underscore the urgent need for scenario-driven risk assessment and robust safeguards in the practical deployment of LLM agents.

Generalised object counting aims to estimate the number of instances of an arbitrary object category from a single image, but many recent methods can struggle on structurally complex objects due to limited spatial modelling. We present UpCount, a class-agnostic counter designed to better preserve spatial structure. UpCount strengthens the visual representation by extracting multi-layer features from a ViT-B/16 encoder and reassembling them into a refined multi-scale pyramid that is spatially refined using Dense Prediction Transformers and FeatUp, yielding features with improved structural and spatial sensitivity; a proposal--verification counting head then identifies repeated patterns and produces a density map for the final count. On FSC-147, UpCount achieves 12.39 MAE and 100.89 RMSE on the test set, and it transfers effectively to vehicle counting on CARPK (6.27 MAE, 8.79 RMSE). Code: https://github.com/r28112072-rgb/upcount

We investigate a failure mode of large language models (LLMs) in which plain-text prompts elicit excessive outputs, a phenomenon we term Overflow. Unlike jailbreaks or prompt injection, Overflow arises under ordinary interaction settings and can lead to elevated serving cost, latency, and cross-user performance degradation, particularly when scaled across many requests. Beyond usability, the stakes are economic and environmental: unnecessary tokens increase per-request cost and energy consumption, compounding into substantial operational spend and carbon footprint at scale. Moreover, Overflow represents a practical vector for compute amplification and service degradation in shared environments. We introduce BenchOverflow, a model-agnostic benchmark of nine plain-text prompting strategies that amplify output volume without adversarial suffixes or policy circumvention. Using a standardized protocol with a fixed budget of 5000 new tokens, we evaluate nine open- and closed-source models and observe pronounced rightward shifts and heavy tails in length distributions. Cap-saturation rates (CSR@1k/3k/5k) and empirical cumulative distribution functions (ECDFs) quantify tail risk; within-prompt variance and cross-model correlations show that Overflow is broadly reproducible yet heterogeneous across families and attack vectors. A lightweight mitigation-a fixed conciseness reminder-attenuates right tails and lowers CSR for all strategies across the majority of models. Our findings position length control as a measurable reliability, cost, and sustainability concern rather than a stylistic quirk. By enabling standardized comparison of length-control robustness across models, BenchOverflow provides a practical basis for selecting deployments that minimize resource waste and operating expense, and for evaluating defenses that curb compute amplification without eroding task performance.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models have achieved remarkable success in generating visual content from text inputs. Although multiple safety alignment strategies have been proposed to prevent harmful outputs, they often lead to overly cautious behavior -- rejecting even benign prompts -- a phenomenon known as over-refusal that reduces the practical utility of T2I models. Despite over-refusal having been observed in practice, there is no large-scale benchmark that systematically evaluates this phenomenon for T2I models. In this paper, we present an automatic workflow to construct synthetic evaluation data, resulting in OVERT (OVEr-Refusal evaluation on Text-to-image models), the first large-scale benchmark for assessing over-refusal behaviors in T2I models. OVERT includes 4,600 seemingly harmful but benign prompts across nine safety-related categories, along with 1,785 genuinely harmful prompts (OVERT-unsafe) to evaluate the safety-utility trade-off. Using OVERT, we evaluate several leading T2I models and find that over-refusal is a widespread issue across various categories (Figure 1), underscoring the need for further research to enhance the safety alignment of T2I models without compromising their functionality. As a preliminary attempt to reduce over-refusal, we explore prompt rewriting; however, we find it often compromises faithfulness to the meaning of the original prompts. Finally, we demonstrate the flexibility of our generation framework in accommodating diverse safety requirements by generating customized evaluation data adapting to user-defined policies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly use persistent memory from past interactions to enhance personalization and task performance. However, this memory introduces critical risks when sensitive information is revealed in inappropriate contexts. We present CIMemories, a benchmark for evaluating whether LLMs appropriately control information flow from memory based on task context. CIMemories uses synthetic user profiles with over 100 attributes per user, paired with diverse task contexts in which each attribute may be essential for some tasks but inappropriate for others. Our evaluation reveals that frontier models exhibit up to 69% attribute-level violations (leaking information inappropriately), with lower violation rates often coming at the cost of task utility. Violations accumulate across both tasks and runs: as usage increases from 1 to 40 tasks, GPT-5's violations rise from 0.1% to 9.6%, reaching 25.1% when the same prompt is executed 5 times, revealing arbitrary and unstable behavior in which models leak different attributes for identical prompts. Privacy-conscious prompting does not solve this - models overgeneralize, sharing everything or nothing rather than making nuanced, context-dependent decisions. These findings reveal fundamental limitations that require contextually aware reasoning capabilities, not just better prompting or scaling.

LLM-agent budget overruns are a documented production failure class: a single retry loop can spend thousands of dollars before an operator notices, and the in-process integrity properties that would prevent it (no aliasing, no double-spend, no use-after-delegation of a cost-bearing value) are enforced, if at all, by ad-hoc wrappers rather than by the type system. Our central contribution is empirical: a catalog of 63 confirmed production incidents from 21 orchestration frameworks (2023-2026), each backed by a quoted GitHub issue and, where reported, a dollar loss, organized into an eight-cluster failure taxonomy (inter-rater Cohen's kappa = 0.837, N = 113), plus 47 supplementary structural entries. As one mitigation evaluated against this taxonomy, we build token-budgets, an 1,180-line Rust crate (no unsafe) that operationalizes affine ownership so that cloning, double-spending, or using a budget after delegating it are compile errors rather than runtime hazards an operator must remember to avoid. The dollar cap is runtime arithmetic under an estimator assumption; the affine layer makes that arithmetic non-bypassable. On single-agent workloads a 4-line Python counter matches the crate at 0/30 overshoot, so the distinguishing value is non-bypassability under operator error in multi-agent delegation: the delegation-fanout race documented in 11 incidents is rejected by the borrow checker at compile time, while the same pattern under asyncio overshoots 30/30 and three disciplined alternatives overshoot 0/30. Across five runtimes, three providers, and a temperature-stratified live-API test (N = 160), the approach reports zero cap violations and zero false refusals, at operational parity with concurrent work. Static over-reservation is 4-6x (2.11x adaptive). Binary-level cap-soundness on the running binary is left open.

Lara is a key-value algebra that aims at unifying linear and relational algebra with three types of operation abstraction. The study of Lara's expressive ability reports that it can represent relational algebra and most linear algebra operations. However, several essential computations, such as matrix inversion and determinant, cannot be expressed in Lara. Lara cannot represent global and iterative computation, either. This article proposes IterLara, extending Lara with iterative operators, to provide an algebraic model that unifies operations in general-purpose computing, like big data, AI, scientific computing, and database. We study the expressive ability of Lara and IterLara and prove that IterLara with aggregation functions can represent matrix inversion, determinant. Besides, we demonstrate that IterLara with no limitation of function utility is Turing complete. We also propose the Operation Count (OP) as a metric of computation amount for IterLara and ensure that the OP metric is in accordance with the existing computation metrics.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have displayed massive improvements in reasoning and decision-making skills and can hold natural conversations with users. Recently, many tool-use benchmark datasets have been proposed. However, existing datasets have the following limitations: (1). Insufficient evaluation scenarios (e.g., only cover limited tool-use scenes). (2). Extensive evaluation costs (e.g., GPT API costs). To address these limitations, in this work, we propose a multi-granularity tool-use benchmark for large language models called MTU-Bench. For the "multi-granularity" property, our MTU-Bench covers five tool usage scenes (i.e., single-turn and single-tool, single-turn and multiple-tool, multiple-turn and single-tool, multiple-turn and multiple-tool, and out-of-distribution tasks). Besides, all evaluation metrics of our MTU-Bench are based on the prediction results and the ground truth without using any GPT or human evaluation metrics. Moreover, our MTU-Bench is collected by transforming existing high-quality datasets to simulate real-world tool usage scenarios, and we also propose an instruction dataset called MTU-Instruct data to enhance the tool-use abilities of existing LLMs. Comprehensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our MTU-Bench. Code and data will be released at https: //github.com/MTU-Bench-Team/MTU-Bench.git.