Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in software engineering tasks when trained with executable runtime environments, particularly in resolving GitHub issues. However, such runtime environments are often unavailable in other domains, especially cybersecurity, where challenge configurations and execution contexts are ephemeral or restricted. We present Cyber-Zero, the first runtime-free framework for synthesizing high-quality agent trajectories to train cybersecurity LLMs. Cyber-Zero leverages publicly available CTF writeups and employs persona-driven LLM simulation to reverse-engineer runtime behaviors and generate realistic, long-horizon interaction sequences without actual environments. Using trajectories synthesized by Cyber-Zero, we train LLM-based agents that achieve up to 13.1% absolute performance gains over baseline models on three prominent CTF benchmarks: InterCode-CTF, NYU CTF Bench, and Cybench. Our best model, Cyber-Zero-32B, establishes new state-of-the-art performance among open-weight models, matching the capabilities of proprietary systems like DeepSeek-V3-0324 and Claude-3.5-Sonnet while offering superior cost-effectiveness, and demonstrating that runtime-free trajectory synthesis can effectively democratize the development of state-of-the-art cybersecurity agents.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents can automate cybersecurity tasks and can adapt to the evolving cybersecurity landscape without re-engineering. While LLM agents have demonstrated cybersecurity capabilities on Capture-The-Flag (CTF) competitions, they have two key limitations: accessing latest cybersecurity expertise beyond training data, and integrating new knowledge into complex task planning. Knowledge-based approaches that incorporate technical understanding into the task-solving automation can tackle these limitations. We present CRAKEN, a knowledge-based LLM agent framework that improves cybersecurity capability through three core mechanisms: contextual decomposition of task-critical information, iterative self-reflected knowledge retrieval, and knowledge-hint injection that transforms insights into adaptive attack strategies. Comprehensive evaluations with different configurations show CRAKEN's effectiveness in multi-stage vulnerability detection and exploitation compared to previous approaches. Our extensible architecture establishes new methodologies for embedding new security knowledge into LLM-driven cybersecurity agentic systems. With a knowledge database of CTF writeups, CRAKEN obtained an accuracy of 22% on NYU CTF Bench, outperforming prior works by 3% and achieving state-of-the-art results. On evaluation of MITRE ATT&CK techniques, CRAKEN solves 25-30% more techniques than prior work, demonstrating improved cybersecurity capabilities via knowledge-based execution. We make our framework open source to public https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/nyuctf_agents_craken.

Although language model (LM) agents have demonstrated increased performance in multiple domains, including coding and web-browsing, their success in cybersecurity has been limited. We present EnIGMA, an LM agent for autonomously solving Capture The Flag (CTF) challenges. We introduce new tools and interfaces to improve the agent's ability to find and exploit security vulnerabilities, focusing on interactive terminal programs. These novel Interactive Agent Tools enable LM agents, for the first time, to run interactive utilities, such as a debugger and a server connection tool, which are essential for solving these challenges. Empirical analysis on 390 CTF challenges across four benchmarks demonstrate that these new tools and interfaces substantially improve our agent's performance, achieving state-of-the-art results on NYU CTF, Intercode-CTF, and CyBench. Finally, we analyze data leakage, developing new methods to quantify it and identifying a new phenomenon we term soliloquizing, where the model self-generates hallucinated observations without interacting with the environment. Our code and development dataset are available at https://github.com/SWE-agent/SWE-agent/tree/v0.7 and https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/NYU_CTF_Bench/tree/main/development respectively.

Agentic large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated on cybersecurity tasks using capture-the-flag (CTF) benchmarks, yet existing pointwise benchmarks offer limited insight into agent robustness and generalisation across alternative versions of the source code. We introduce CTF challenge families, whereby a single CTF is used to generate a family of semantically-equivalent challenges via semantics-preserving program transformations, enabling controlled evaluation of robustness while keeping the underlying exploit strategy fixed. We present Evolve-CTF, a tool that generates CTF families from Python challenges using a range of transformations. Using Evolve-CTF to derive families from Cybench and Intercode challenges, we evaluate 13 agentic LLM configurations with tool access. We find that models are remarkably robust to renaming and code insertion, but that composed transformations and deeper obfuscation degrade performance by requiring more sophisticated tool use. Enabling explicit reasoning has little effect on success rates. Our work contributes a technique and tool for future LLM evaluations, and a large dataset characterising the capabilities of current state-of-the-art models in this domain.

Recent advances in LLM agentic systems have improved the automation of offensive security tasks, particularly for Capture the Flag (CTF) challenges. We systematically investigate the key factors that drive agent success and provide a detailed recipe for building effective LLM-based offensive security agents. First, we present CTFJudge, a framework leveraging LLM as a judge to analyze agent trajectories and provide granular evaluation across CTF solving steps. Second, we propose a novel metric, CTF Competency Index (CCI) for partial correctness, revealing how closely agent solutions align with human-crafted gold standards. Third, we examine how LLM hyperparameters, namely temperature, top-p, and maximum token length, influence agent performance and automated cybersecurity task planning. For rapid evaluation, we present CTFTiny, a curated benchmark of 50 representative CTF challenges across binary exploitation, web, reverse engineering, forensics, and cryptography. Our findings identify optimal multi-agent coordination settings and lay the groundwork for future LLM agent research in cybersecurity. We make CTFTiny open source to public https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/CTFTiny along with CTFJudge on https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/CTFJudge.

Capture The Flag (CTF) challenges are puzzles related to computer security scenarios. With the advent of large language models (LLMs), more and more CTF participants are using LLMs to understand and solve the challenges. However, so far no work has evaluated the effectiveness of LLMs in solving CTF challenges with a fully automated workflow. We develop two CTF-solving workflows, human-in-the-loop (HITL) and fully-automated, to examine the LLMs' ability to solve a selected set of CTF challenges, prompted with information about the question. We collect human contestants' results on the same set of questions, and find that LLMs achieve higher success rate than an average human participant. This work provides a comprehensive evaluation of the capability of LLMs in solving real world CTF challenges, from real competition to fully automated workflow. Our results provide references for applying LLMs in cybersecurity education and pave the way for systematic evaluation of offensive cybersecurity capabilities in LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being deployed across various domains today. However, their capacity to solve Capture the Flag (CTF) challenges in cybersecurity has not been thoroughly evaluated. To address this, we develop a novel method to assess LLMs in solving CTF challenges by creating a scalable, open-source benchmark database specifically designed for these applications. This database includes metadata for LLM testing and adaptive learning, compiling a diverse range of CTF challenges from popular competitions. Utilizing the advanced function calling capabilities of LLMs, we build a fully automated system with an enhanced workflow and support for external tool calls. Our benchmark dataset and automated framework allow us to evaluate the performance of five LLMs, encompassing both black-box and open-source models. This work lays the foundation for future research into improving the efficiency of LLMs in interactive cybersecurity tasks and automated task planning. By providing a specialized benchmark, our project offers an ideal platform for developing, testing, and refining LLM-based approaches to vulnerability detection and resolution. Evaluating LLMs on these challenges and comparing with human performance yields insights into their potential for AI-driven cybersecurity solutions to perform real-world threat management. We make our benchmark dataset open source to public https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/NYU_CTF_Bench along with our playground automated framework https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/llm_ctf_automation.

Capture-the-Flag (CTF) competitions are crucial for cybersecurity education and training. As large language models (LLMs) evolve, there is increasing interest in their ability to automate CTF challenge solving. For example, DARPA has organized the AIxCC competition since 2023 to advance AI-powered automated offense and defense. However, this demands a combination of multiple abilities, from knowledge to reasoning and further to actions. In this paper, we highlight the importance of technical knowledge in solving CTF problems and deliberately construct a focused benchmark, CTFKnow, with 3,992 questions to measure LLMs' performance in this core aspect. Our study offers a focused and innovative measurement of LLMs' capability in understanding CTF knowledge and applying it to solve CTF challenges. Our key findings reveal that while LLMs possess substantial technical knowledge, they falter in accurately applying this knowledge to specific scenarios and adapting their strategies based on feedback from the CTF environment. Based on insights derived from this measurement study, we propose CTFAgent, a novel LLM-driven framework for advancing CTF problem-solving. CTFAgent introduces two new modules: two-stage Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) and interactive Environmental Augmentation, which enhance LLMs' technical knowledge and vulnerability exploitation on CTF, respectively. Our experimental results show that, on two popular CTF datasets, CTFAgent both achieves over 80% performance improvement. Moreover, in the recent picoCTF2024 hosted by CMU, CTFAgent ranked in the top 23.6% of nearly 7,000 participating teams. This reflects the benefit of our measurement study and the potential of our framework in advancing LLMs' capabilities in CTF problem-solving.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional capabilities when trained within executable runtime environments, notably excelling at software engineering tasks through verified feedback loops. Yet, scalable and generalizable execution-grounded environments remain scarce, limiting progress in training more capable ML agents. We introduce CTF-Dojo, the first large-scale executable runtime tailored for training LLMs with verifiable feedback, featuring 658 fully functional Capture-The-Flag (CTF)-style challenges containerized in Docker with guaranteed reproducibility. To enable rapid scaling without manual intervention, we develop CTF-Forge, an automated pipeline that transforms publicly available artifacts into ready-to-use execution environments in minutes, eliminating weeks of expert configuration traditionally required. We trained LLM-based agents on just 486 high-quality, execution-verified trajectories from CTF-Dojo, achieving up to 11.6% absolute gains over strong baselines across three competitive benchmarks: InterCode-CTF, NYU CTF Bench, and Cybench. Our best-performing 32B model reaches 31.9% Pass@1, establishing a new open-weight state-of-the-art that rivals frontier models like DeepSeek-V3-0324 and Gemini-2.5-Flash. By framing CTF-style tasks as a benchmark for executable-agent learning, CTF-Dojo demonstrates that execution-grounded training signals are not only effective but pivotal in advancing high-performance ML agents without dependence on costly proprietary systems.

Existing benchmarks for LLM-based offensive security agents use isolated, single-target setups with a known vulnerable service and fixed objective. They measure exploitation effectively, but miss how real Capture-the-Flag (CTF) participants triage unknown surfaces, prioritize targets, and allocate effort under uncertainty. Current evaluations therefore fail to assess strategic reasoning beyond exploitation alone. To address this, we introduce CTFExplorer, a benchmark suite that shifts offensive security evaluation toward a multi-target setting, which tests how agents explore, prioritize, and chain attacks. CTFExplorer deploys 40 web-based vulnerable services within a single environment, where agents must autonomously discover, distinguish, and exploit targets without predefined guidance. We also present a reactive multi-agent setup as a reference agent framework and develop an agent-agnostic evaluation framework that records structured reasoning traces for fine-grained assessment. This enables behavioral evaluation beyond binary flag capture, such as how agents manage target selection, handle failed hypotheses, coordinate across multiple stages, and extract security intelligence.

Agents4Pentest, an emerging class of LLM-based autonomous penetration testing systems, has become a rapidly growing area in security research. Despite this growth, the field still lacks a unified taxonomy, a systematic understanding of how agent architectures and evaluation benchmarks have co-evolved, and a clear characterization of remaining capability and reliability gaps. This survey addresses these gaps through a systematic analysis of 81 papers between 2023 and 2026. We organize the literature into six categories: evaluation benchmarks, general-purpose systems, domain-specific frameworks, CTF-based systems, defense-oriented research, and surveys. We further trace a four-phase architectural evolution from text-only reasoning agents to agents trained with Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), showing that each transition is driven by a distinct capability bottleneck. Our analysis yields several key findings. First, RLVR marks a shift in capability acquisition from imitation of expert demonstrations to reward-driven self-improvement, enabling agents to discover previously undocumented attack strategies. Second, CTF platforms have evolved from evaluation testbeds into dual-purpose infrastructure for both agent evaluation and RL training. Third, domain-specific frameworks improve efficiency through recurring specialization mechanisms, but their gains remain largely confined to narrow task classes and are difficult to compare across domains because existing evaluations rely on different benchmarks. Fourth, the field is expanding beyond offensive automation toward adversarial defense and security compliance. Across these categories, we identify three structurally linked open challenges: evaluation reliability, limited performance on multi-stage attack scenarios, and scarcity of high-quality training data.

Language Model (LM) agents for cybersecurity that are capable of autonomously identifying vulnerabilities and executing exploits have the potential to cause real-world impact. Policymakers, model providers, and other researchers in the AI and cybersecurity communities are interested in quantifying the capabilities of such agents to help mitigate cyberrisk and investigate opportunities for penetration testing. Toward that end, we introduce Cybench, a framework for specifying cybersecurity tasks and evaluating agents on those tasks. We include 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent, meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties. Each task includes its own description, starter files, and is initialized in an environment where an agent can execute bash commands and observe outputs. Since many tasks are beyond the capabilities of existing LM agents, we introduce subtasks, which break down a task into intermediary steps for more gradated evaluation; we add subtasks for 17 of the 40 tasks. To evaluate agent capabilities, we construct a cybersecurity agent and evaluate 7 models: GPT-4o, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mixtral 8x22b Instruct, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Llama 3 70B Chat, and Llama 3.1 405B Instruct. Without guidance, we find that agents are able to solve only the easiest complete tasks that took human teams up to 11 minutes to solve, with Claude 3.5 Sonnet and GPT-4o having the highest success rates. Finally, subtasks provide more signal for measuring performance compared to unguided runs, with models achieving a 3.2\% higher success rate on complete tasks with subtask-guidance than without subtask-guidance. All code and data are publicly available at https://cybench.github.io

Are Capture-the-Flag competitions obsolete? In 2025, Cybersecurity AI (CAI) systematically conquered some of the world's most prestigious hacking competitions, achieving Rank #1 at multiple events and consistently outperforming thousands of human teams. Across five major circuits-HTB's AI vs Humans, Cyber Apocalypse (8,129 teams), Dragos OT CTF, UWSP Pointer Overflow, and the Neurogrid CTF showdown-CAI demonstrated that Jeopardy-style CTFs have become a solved game for well-engineered AI agents. At Neurogrid, CAI captured 41/45 flags to claim the 50,000 top prize; at Dragos OT, it sprinted 37% faster to 10K points than elite human teams; even when deliberately paused mid-competition, it maintained top-tier rankings. Critically, CAI achieved this dominance through our specialized alias1 model architecture, which delivers enterprise-scale AI security operations at unprecedented cost efficiency and with augmented autonomy-reducing 1B token inference costs from 5,940 to just $119, making continuous security agent operation financially viable for the first time. These results force an uncomfortable reckoning: if autonomous agents now dominate competitions designed to identify top security talent at negligible cost, what are CTFs actually measuring? This paper presents comprehensive evidence of AI capability across the 2025 CTF circuit and argues that the security community must urgently transition from Jeopardy-style contests to Attack & Defense formats that genuinely test adaptive reasoning and resilience-capabilities that remain uniquely human, for now.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with the structured reasoning and tool-assisted computation needed for problem solving in cybersecurity applications. In this work, we introduce "random-crypto", a cryptographic Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenge generator framework that we use to fine-tune a tool-augmented Llama-3.1-8B with Guided Reinforcement Prompt Optimisation (GRPO), allowing the agent to iteratively write and execute Python inside an isolated REPL. GRPO yields a +53% absolute jump in Pass@8 on unseen "random-crypto" tasks (0.35 -> 0.88) and raises Majority@8 to 0.41. The fine-tuned agent also generalizes to an external dataset. On a subset of picoCTF cryptography problems, it improves Pass@8 by +13 pp. Ablations show the gains stem from more reliable tool invocation and code synthesis, rather than superficial prompt adaptation.

Users rely on execution traces to observe agent behavior, diagnose failures, and ensure accountability. These traces contain rich procedural detail, including tool invocations, intermediate decisions, and error-recovery logic. Yet this detail can expose private procedural skills, allowing downstream methods to recover key formulas, thresholds, and strategies without access to model weights or skill files. To quantify this risk and evaluate protection, we construct CapTraceBench, a benchmark of 75 specialized long-horizon tasks and 154 curated skills across seven domains. We also introduce RedAct https://github.com/XuShuwenn/RedAct, a protected trace release framework that localizes protected key information, rewrites traces while preserving verifier-critical evidence, and embeds behavioral watermarks for downstream provenance analysis. Across representative trace reuse methods, RedAct reduces normalized skill transfer (NST) from 44.7--67.1\% on raw traces to below the no-skill baseline, while preserving audit evidence. Its standalone behavioral watermarks reach 93.6--100.0\% true detection with a false alarm rate of at most 1.9\%. These results frame public agent traces as security interfaces and show that selective redaction can reduce procedural capability leakage without removing audit evidence.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their ability to understand both natural language and code, driving their use in tasks like natural language-to-code (NL2Code) and code summarization. However, LLMs are prone to hallucination-outputs that stray from intended meanings. Detecting hallucinations in code summarization is especially difficult due to the complex interplay between programming and natural languages. We introduce a first-of-its-kind dataset with sim10K samples, curated specifically for hallucination detection in code summarization. We further propose a novel Entity Tracing Framework (ETF) that a) utilizes static program analysis to identify code entities from the program and b) uses LLMs to map and verify these entities and their intents within generated code summaries. Our experimental analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of the framework, leading to a 0.73 F1 score. This approach provides an interpretable method for detecting hallucinations by grounding entities, allowing us to evaluate summary accuracy.

From automated intrusion testing to discovery of zero-day attacks before software launch, agentic AI calls for great promises in security engineering. This strong capability is bound with a similar threat: the security and research community must build up its models before the approach is leveraged by malicious actors for cybercrime. We therefore propose and evaluate RedTeamLLM, an integrated architecture with a comprehensive security model for automatization of pentest tasks. RedTeamLLM follows three key steps: summarizing, reasoning and act, which embed its operational capacity. This novel framework addresses four open challenges: plan correction, memory management, context window constraint, and generality vs. specialization. Evaluation is performed through the automated resolution of a range of entry-level, but not trivial, CTF challenges. The contribution of the reasoning capability of our agentic AI framework is specifically evaluated.

The automated detection of conspiracy theories online typically relies on supervised learning. However, creating respective training data requires expertise, time and mental resilience, given the often harmful content. Moreover, available datasets are predominantly in English and often keyword-based, introducing a token-level bias into the models. Our work addresses the task of detecting conspiracy theories in German Telegram messages. We compare the performance of supervised fine-tuning approaches using BERT-like models with prompt-based approaches using Llama2, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4 which require little or no additional training data. We use a dataset of sim!! 4,000 messages collected during the COVID-19 pandemic, without the use of keyword filters. Our findings demonstrate that both approaches can be leveraged effectively: For supervised fine-tuning, we report an F1 score of sim!! 0.8 for the positive class, making our model comparable to recent models trained on keyword-focused English corpora. We demonstrate our model's adaptability to intra-domain temporal shifts, achieving F1 scores of sim!! 0.7. Among prompting variants, the best model is GPT-4, achieving an F1 score of sim!! 0.8 for the positive class in a zero-shot setting and equipped with a custom conspiracy theory definition.

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) analysts routinely convert noisy, unstructured security artifacts into standardized, automation-ready representations. Although large language models (LLMs) show promise for this task, existing approaches remain brittle when producing structured CTI outputs and have largely relied on supervised fine-tuning (SFT). In contrast, CTI standards and community-maintained resources define canonical identifiers and schemas that enable deterministic verification of model outputs. We leverage this structure to study reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) for CTI tasks. We introduce Minerva, a unified dataset and training pipeline spanning multiple CTI subtasks, each paired with task-specific verifiers that score structured outputs and identifier predictions. To address reward sparsity during rollout, we propose MinervaRL, a lightweight self-training mechanism that generates additional verified trajectories and distills them back into the model. Averaged across four backbones and 12 CTI benchmarks, MinervaRL improves the mean score by 15.8 percentage points over the corresponding base models and by 4.3 points over GRPO.

Traditional protocol fuzzing techniques, such as those employed by AFL-based systems, often lack effectiveness due to a limited semantic understanding of complex protocol grammars and rigid seed mutation strategies. Recent works, such as ChatAFL, have integrated Large Language Models (LLMs) to guide protocol fuzzing and address these limitations, pushing protocol fuzzers to wider exploration of the protocol state space. But ChatAFL still faces issues like unreliable output, LLM hallucinations, and assumptions of LLM knowledge about protocol specifications. This paper introduces MultiFuzz, a novel dense retrieval-based multi-agent system designed to overcome these limitations by integrating semantic-aware context retrieval, specialized agents, and structured tool-assisted reasoning. MultiFuzz utilizes agentic chunks of protocol documentation (RFC Documents) to build embeddings in a vector database for a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipeline, enabling agents to generate more reliable and structured outputs, enhancing the fuzzer in mutating protocol messages with enhanced state coverage and adherence to syntactic constraints. The framework decomposes the fuzzing process into modular groups of agents that collaborate through chain-of-thought reasoning to dynamically adapt fuzzing strategies based on the retrieved contextual knowledge. Experimental evaluations on the Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) demonstrate that MultiFuzz significantly improves branch coverage and explores deeper protocol states and transitions over state-of-the-art (SOTA) fuzzers such as NSFuzz, AFLNet, and ChatAFL. By combining dense retrieval, agentic coordination, and language model reasoning, MultiFuzz establishes a new paradigm in autonomous protocol fuzzing, offering a scalable and extensible foundation for future research in intelligent agentic-based fuzzing systems.

We introduce HackSynth, a novel Large Language Model (LLM)-based agent capable of autonomous penetration testing. HackSynth's dual-module architecture includes a Planner and a Summarizer, which enable it to generate commands and process feedback iteratively. To benchmark HackSynth, we propose two new Capture The Flag (CTF)-based benchmark sets utilizing the popular platforms PicoCTF and OverTheWire. These benchmarks include two hundred challenges across diverse domains and difficulties, providing a standardized framework for evaluating LLM-based penetration testing agents. Based on these benchmarks, extensive experiments are presented, analyzing the core parameters of HackSynth, including creativity (temperature and top-p) and token utilization. Multiple open source and proprietary LLMs were used to measure the agent's capabilities. The experiments show that the agent performed best with the GPT-4o model, better than what the GPT-4o's system card suggests. We also discuss the safety and predictability of HackSynth's actions. Our findings indicate the potential of LLM-based agents in advancing autonomous penetration testing and the importance of robust safeguards. HackSynth and the benchmarks are publicly available to foster research on autonomous cybersecurity solutions.

The observations documented in Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports play a critical role in describing adversarial behaviors, providing valuable insights for security practitioners to respond to evolving threats. Recent advancements of Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in various cybersecurity applications, including CTI report understanding and attack knowledge graph construction. While previous works have proposed benchmarks that focus on the CTI extraction ability of LLMs, the sequential characteristic of adversarial behaviors within CTI reports remains largely unexplored, which holds considerable significance in developing a comprehensive understanding of how adversaries operate. To address this gap, we introduce AttackSeqBench, a benchmark tailored to systematically evaluate LLMs' capability to understand and reason attack sequences in CTI reports. Our benchmark encompasses three distinct Question Answering (QA) tasks, each task focuses on the varying granularity in adversarial behavior. To alleviate the laborious effort of QA construction, we carefully design an automated dataset construction pipeline to create scalable and well-formulated QA datasets based on real-world CTI reports. To ensure the quality of our dataset, we adopt a hybrid approach of combining human evaluation and systematic evaluation metrics. We conduct extensive experiments and analysis with both fast-thinking and slow-thinking LLMs, while highlighting their strengths and limitations in analyzing the sequential patterns in cyber attacks. The overarching goal of this work is to provide a benchmark that advances LLM-driven CTI report understanding and fosters its application in real-world cybersecurity operations. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Javiery3889/AttackSeqBench .

As large language models (LLMs) continue to evolve, their potential use in automating cyberattacks becomes increasingly likely. With capabilities such as reconnaissance, exploitation, and command execution, LLMs could soon become integral to autonomous cyber agents, capable of launching highly sophisticated attacks. In this paper, we introduce novel defense strategies that exploit the inherent vulnerabilities of attacking LLMs. By targeting weaknesses such as biases, trust in input, memory limitations, and their tunnel-vision approach to problem-solving, we develop techniques to mislead, delay, or neutralize these autonomous agents. We evaluate our defenses under black-box conditions, starting with single prompt-response scenarios and progressing to real-world tests using custom-built CTF machines. Our results show defense success rates of up to 90\%, demonstrating the effectiveness of turning LLM vulnerabilities into defensive strategies against LLM-driven cyber threats.

By 2028 most cybersecurity actions will be autonomous, with humans teleoperating. We present the first classification of autonomy levels in cybersecurity and introduce Cybersecurity AI (CAI), an open-source framework that democratizes advanced security testing through specialized AI agents. Through rigorous empirical evaluation, we demonstrate that CAI consistently outperforms state-of-the-art results in CTF benchmarks, solving challenges across diverse categories with significantly greater efficiency -up to 3,600x faster than humans in specific tasks and averaging 11x faster overall. CAI achieved first place among AI teams and secured a top-20 position worldwide in the "AI vs Human" CTF live Challenge, earning a monetary reward of $750. Based on our results, we argue against LLM-vendor claims about limited security capabilities. Beyond cybersecurity competitions, CAI demonstrates real-world effectiveness, reaching top-30 in Spain and top-500 worldwide on Hack The Box within a week, while dramatically reducing security testing costs by an average of 156x. Our framework transcends theoretical benchmarks by enabling non-professionals to discover significant security bugs (CVSS 4.3-7.5) at rates comparable to experts during bug bounty exercises. By combining modular agent design with seamless tool integration and human oversight (HITL), CAI addresses critical market gaps, offering organizations of all sizes access to AI-powered bug bounty security testing previously available only to well-resourced firms -thereby challenging the oligopolistic ecosystem currently dominated by major bug bounty platforms.

State-of-the-art fact-checking systems combat misinformation at scale by employing autonomous LLM-based agents to decompose complex claims into smaller sub-claims, verify each sub-claim individually, and aggregate the partial results to produce verdicts with justifications (explanatory rationales for the verdicts). The security of these systems is crucial, as compromised fact-checkers, which tend to be easily underexplored, can amplify misinformation. This work introduces Fact2Fiction, the first poisoning attack framework targeting such agentic fact-checking systems. Fact2Fiction mirrors the decomposition strategy and exploits system-generated justifications to craft tailored malicious evidences that compromise sub-claim verification. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Fact2Fiction achieves 8.9\%--21.2\% higher attack success rates than state-of-the-art attacks across various poisoning budgets. Fact2Fiction exposes security weaknesses in current fact-checking systems and highlights the need for defensive countermeasures.

In this paper, we examine several methods of acquiring Czech data for automated fact-checking, which is a task commonly modeled as a classification of textual claim veracity w.r.t. a corpus of trusted ground truths. We attempt to collect sets of data in form of a factual claim, evidence within the ground truth corpus, and its veracity label (supported, refuted or not enough info). As a first attempt, we generate a Czech version of the large-scale FEVER dataset built on top of Wikipedia corpus. We take a hybrid approach of machine translation and document alignment; the approach and the tools we provide can be easily applied to other languages. We discuss its weaknesses and inaccuracies, propose a future approach for their cleaning and publish the 127k resulting translations, as well as a version of such dataset reliably applicable for the Natural Language Inference task - the CsFEVER-NLI. Furthermore, we collect a novel dataset of 3,097 claims, which is annotated using the corpus of 2.2M articles of Czech News Agency. We present its extended annotation methodology based on the FEVER approach, and, as the underlying corpus is kept a trade secret, we also publish a standalone version of the dataset for the task of Natural Language Inference we call CTKFactsNLI. We analyze both acquired datasets for spurious cues - annotation patterns leading to model overfitting. CTKFacts is further examined for inter-annotator agreement, thoroughly cleaned, and a typology of common annotator errors is extracted. Finally, we provide baseline models for all stages of the fact-checking pipeline and publish the NLI datasets, as well as our annotation platform and other experimental data.

Security-agent evaluations commonly measure peak offensive capability under generous inference budgets, emphasizing vulnerability discovery, exploit development, penetration testing, and CTF completion. Such measurements are useful but incomplete: in operational security, every reasoning step, tool call, telemetry query, and enrichment request consumes budget. We evaluate language-model security agents through this cost-success lens on offensive Cybench challenges and defensive Splunk BOTS v1 investigation challenges. Instead of reporting only best-case success, we compare models at fixed cost levels and decompose performance by inference spend and tool spend. Our results show distinct scalingregimes for red- and blue-team tasks. Offensive CTF performance improves with additional test-time compute, and scaled open-weight models can approach frontier proprietary systems while remaining cost-competitive. Defensive SOC investigation does not scale in the same way: success depends more heavily on disciplined tool use, telemetry navigation, and selective enrichment than on raw reasoning budget alone. We argue that security-agent benchmarks should measure economic efficiency and operational fit alongside task success. Cost-aware, SOC-native evaluations provide a clearer picture of which models are practically useful today and where defensive agents still need to improve. We present an interactive website with our results https://evals.frontier.security.

Agentic LLM coding tools compress long session histories into compaction summaries that subsequent sessions inherit as ground truth. This paper documents a failure mode in Claude Code where partial standard output from timed-out commands (exit code 143) is recorded in compaction summaries as confirmed results, propagating false positives across sessions and model versions without re-verification. The underlying mechanism is a conflation of observation and persistence, where information that appeared in the terminal is treated as equivalent to information written to durable storage. This finding extends the analysis of LLM self-evaluation failures reported in prior work on non-determinism in LLM-as-judge grading by showing that agentic tools exhibit analogous reliability deficits when reporting on their own operational outcomes. The failure has direct implications for any workflow that relies on agentic session continuity for data processing, scientific computation, or multi-step automation.

Agentic coding tools receive goals written in natural language as input, break them down into specific tasks, and write/execute the actual code with minimal human intervention. Key to this process are agent manifests, configuration files (such as Claude.md) that provide agents with essential project context, identity, and operational rules. However, the lack of comprehensive and accessible documentation for creating these manifests presents a significant challenge for developers. We analyzed 253 Claude.md files from 242 repositories to identify structural patterns and common content. Our findings show that manifests typically have shallow hierarchies with one main heading and several subsections, with content dominated by operational commands, technical implementation notes, and high-level architecture.

Autonomous research agents produce competitive solutions and professional-looking manuscripts, yet their outputs contain verifiability failures undetectable by surface-level evaluation: fabricated citations, unreproducible scores, and method descriptions that diverge from the implementation. We address this through three contributions. First, Chain-of-Evidence (CoE), a verifiability framework requiring every claim to be traceable to its evidence source. Second, ScientistOne, an end-to-end autonomous research system that maintains evidence chains by construction throughout literature review, solution discovery, and paper writing. Third, CoE Audit, a post-hoc audit whose four integrity checks -- score verification, specification violation, reference verification, and method-code alignment -- apply uniformly to all systems. Across 75 papers spanning five systems and five frontier research tasks, every baseline exhibits at least one systematic failure mode: hallucinated reference rates reach 21%, score verification passes in as few as 42% of papers, and method-code alignment ranges from 20% to 80%. ScientistOne achieves zero hallucinated references (0/337), perfect score verification (12/12), and the highest method-code alignment (14/15), while matching or exceeding human expert performance on all five tasks. ScientistOne further generalizes to six additional tasks spanning medical imaging, fine-grained recognition, 3D perception, and language modeling, achieving state-of-the-art on Parameter Golf and gold medals on MLE-Bench tasks where baselines fail entirely.

Foundation models are increasingly becoming better autonomous programmers, raising the prospect that they could also automate dangerous offensive cyber-operations. Current frontier model audits probe the cybersecurity risks of such agents, but most fail to account for the degrees of freedom available to adversaries in the real world. In particular, with strong verifiers and financial incentives, agents for offensive cybersecurity are amenable to iterative improvement by would-be adversaries. We argue that assessments should take into account an expanded threat model in the context of cybersecurity, emphasizing the varying degrees of freedom that an adversary may possess in stateful and non-stateful environments within a fixed compute budget. We show that even with a relatively small compute budget (8 H100 GPU Hours in our study), adversaries can improve an agent's cybersecurity capability on InterCode CTF by more than 40\% relative to the baseline -- without any external assistance. These results highlight the need to evaluate agents' cybersecurity risk in a dynamic manner, painting a more representative picture of risk.

We present a fine-tuned RoBERTa-base classifier (125M parameters) for mapping Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) descriptions to Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories. We construct a large-scale training dataset of 234,770 CVE descriptions with AI-refined CWE labels using Claude Sonnet 4.6, and agreement-filtered evaluation sets where NVD and AI labels agree. On our held-out test set (27,780 samples, 205 CWE classes), the model achieves 87.4% top-1 accuracy and 60.7% Macro F1 -- a +15.5 percentage-point Macro F1 gain over a TF-IDF baseline that already reaches 84.9% top-1, demonstrating the model's advantage on rare weakness categories. On the external CTI-Bench benchmark (NeurIPS 2024), the model achieves 75.6% strict accuracy (95% CI: 72.8-78.2%) -- statistically indistinguishable from Cisco Foundation-Sec-8B-Reasoning (75.3%, 8B parameters) at 64x fewer parameters. We release the dataset, model, and training code.

Click-through rate (CTR) prediction is a critical task for many applications, as its accuracy has a direct impact on user experience and platform revenue. In recent years, CTR prediction has been widely studied in both academia and industry, resulting in a wide variety of CTR prediction models. Unfortunately, there is still a lack of standardized benchmarks and uniform evaluation protocols for CTR prediction research. This leads to non-reproducible or even inconsistent experimental results among existing studies, which largely limits the practical value and potential impact of their research. In this work, we aim to perform open benchmarking for CTR prediction and present a rigorous comparison of different models in a reproducible manner. To this end, we ran over 7,000 experiments for more than 12,000 GPU hours in total to re-evaluate 24 existing models on multiple datasets and settings. Surprisingly, our experiments show that with sufficient hyper-parameter search and model tuning, many deep models have smaller differences than expected. The results also reveal that making real progress on the modeling of CTR prediction is indeed a very challenging research task. We believe that our benchmarking work could not only allow researchers to gauge the effectiveness of new models conveniently but also make them fairly compare with the state of the arts. We have publicly released the benchmarking code, evaluation protocols, and hyper-parameter settings of our work to promote reproducible research in this field.

Static analysis tools provide a powerful means to detect security vulnerabilities by specifying queries that encode vulnerable code patterns. However, writing such queries is challenging and requires diverse expertise in security and program analysis. To address this challenge, we present QLCoder - an agentic framework that automatically synthesizes queries in CodeQL, a powerful static analysis engine, directly from a given CVE metadata. QLCode embeds an LLM in a synthesis loop with execution feedback, while constraining its reasoning using a custom MCP interface that allows structured interaction with a Language Server Protocol (for syntax guidance) and a RAG database (for semantic retrieval of queries and documentation). This approach allows QLCoder to generate syntactically and semantically valid security queries. We evaluate QLCode on 176 existing CVEs across 111 Java projects. Building upon the Claude Code agent framework, QLCoder synthesizes correct queries that detect the CVE in the vulnerable but not in the patched versions for 53.4% of CVEs. In comparison, using only Claude Code synthesizes 10% correct queries.

A radiology report comprises several sections, including the Findings and Impression of the diagnosis. Automatically generating the Impression from the Findings is crucial for reducing radiologists' workload and improving diagnostic accuracy. Pretrained models that excel in common abstractive summarization problems encounter challenges when applied to specialized medical domains largely due to the complex terminology and the necessity for accurate clinical context. Such tasks in medical domains demand extracting core information, avoiding context shifts, and maintaining proper flow. Misuse of medical terms can lead to drastic clinical errors. To address these issues, we introduce a sequential transfer learning that ensures key content extraction and coherent summarization. Sequential transfer learning often faces challenges like initial parameter decay and knowledge loss, which we resolve with the Fisher matrix regularization. Using MIMIC-CXR and Open-I datasets, our model, CSTRL - Context-driven Sequential TRansfer Learning - achieved state-of-the-art performance, showing 56.2% improvement in BLEU-1, 40.5% in BLEU-2, 84.3% in BLEU-3, 28.9% in ROUGE-1, 41.0% in ROUGE-2 and 26.5% in ROGUE-3 score over benchmark studies. We also analyze factual consistency scores while preserving the medical context. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/fahmidahossain/Report_Summarization.

Medical vision-language models often struggle with generating accurate quantitative measurements in radiology reports, leading to hallucinations that undermine clinical reliability. We introduce FactCheXcker, a modular framework that de-hallucinates radiology report measurements by leveraging an improved query-code-update paradigm. Specifically, FactCheXcker employs specialized modules and the code generation capabilities of large language models to solve measurement queries generated based on the original report. After extracting measurable findings, the results are incorporated into an updated report. We evaluate FactCheXcker on endotracheal tube placement, which accounts for an average of 78% of report measurements, using the MIMIC-CXR dataset and 11 medical report-generation models. Our results show that FactCheXcker significantly reduces hallucinations, improves measurement precision, and maintains the quality of the original reports. Specifically, FactCheXcker improves the performance of 10/11 models and achieves an average improvement of 135.0% in reducing measurement hallucinations measured by mean absolute error. Code is available at https://github.com/rajpurkarlab/FactCheXcker.

We present an openly documented methodology for fine-tuning language models to detect temporal attack patterns in multi-agent AI workflows using OpenTelemetry trace analysis. We curate a dataset of 80,851 examples from 18 public cybersecurity sources and 35,026 synthetic OpenTelemetry traces. We apply iterative QLoRA fine-tuning on resource-constrained ARM64 hardware (NVIDIA DGX Spark) through three training iterations with strategic augmentation. Our custom benchmark accuracy improves from 42.86% to 74.29%, a statistically significant 31.4-point gain. Targeted examples addressing specific knowledge gaps outperform indiscriminate scaling. Key contributions include: (1) synthetic trace generation methodology for multi-agent coordination attacks and regulatory violations, (2) empirical evidence that training data composition fundamentally determines behavior, and (3) complete open release of datasets, training scripts, and evaluation benchmarks on HuggingFace. While practical deployment requires human oversight due to false positive rates, this work establishes the first reproducible framework enabling practitioners to build custom agentic security models adapted to their threat landscapes.

Medical imaging plays a crucial role in diagnosis, with radiology reports serving as vital documentation. Automating report generation has emerged as a critical need to alleviate the workload of radiologists. While machine learning has facilitated report generation for 2D medical imaging, extending this to 3D has been unexplored due to computational complexity and data scarcity. We introduce the first method to generate radiology reports for 3D medical imaging, specifically targeting chest CT volumes. Given the absence of comparable methods, we establish a baseline using an advanced 3D vision encoder in medical imaging to demonstrate our method's effectiveness, which leverages a novel auto-regressive causal transformer. Furthermore, recognizing the benefits of leveraging information from previous visits, we augment CT2Rep with a cross-attention-based multi-modal fusion module and hierarchical memory, enabling the incorporation of longitudinal multimodal data. Access our code at https://github.com/ibrahimethemhamamci/CT2Rep

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting enables large language models (LLMs) to solve complex reasoning tasks by generating an explanation before the final prediction. Despite it's promising ability, a critical downside of CoT prompting is that the performance is greatly affected by the factuality of the generated explanation. To improve the correctness of the explanations, fine-tuning language models with explanation data is needed. However, there exists only a few datasets that can be used for such approaches, and no data collection tool for building them. Thus, we introduce CoTEVer, a tool-kit for annotating the factual correctness of generated explanations and collecting revision data of wrong explanations. Furthermore, we suggest several use cases where the data collected with CoTEVer can be utilized for enhancing the faithfulness of explanations. Our toolkit is publicly available at https://github.com/SeungoneKim/CoTEVer.

Organizations are increasingly targeted by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), which involve complex, multi-stage tactics and diverse techniques. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) sources, such as incident reports and security blogs, provide valuable insights, but are often unstructured and in natural language, making it difficult to automatically extract information. Recent studies have explored the use of AI to perform automatic extraction from CTI data, leveraging existing CTI datasets for performance evaluation and fine-tuning. However, they present challenges and limitations that impact their effectiveness. To overcome these issues, we introduce a novel dataset manually constructed from CTI reports and structured according to the MITRE ATT&CK framework. To assess its quality, we conducted an inter-annotator agreement study using Krippendorff alpha, confirming its reliability. Furthermore, the dataset was used to evaluate a Large Language Model (LLM) in a real-world business context, showing promising generalizability.

Vulnerability detection in C programs is a critical challenge in software security. Although large language models (LLMs) achieve strong detection performance, their multi-billion-parameter scale makes them impractical for integration into development workflows requiring low latency and continuous analysis. We introduce VULNSCOUT-C, a compact transformer architecture with 693M total parameters (353M active during inference), derived from the Qwen model family and optimized for C code vulnerability detection. Alongside the model, we present VULNSCOUT, a new 33,565-sample curated dataset generated through a controlled multi-agent pipeline with formal verification, designed to fill coverage gaps in existing benchmarks across underrepresented CWE categories. Evaluated on a standardized C vulnerability detection benchmark, VULNSCOUT-C outperforms all evaluated baselines, including state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs and commercial static analysis tools, while offering a fraction of their inference cost. These results demonstrate that task-specialized compact architectures can match or even outperform the detection capability of models orders of magnitude larger, making continuous, low-latency vulnerability analysis practical within real-world development workflows.

Testing is an integral part of the software development process. Yet, writing tests is time-consuming and therefore often neglected. Classical test generation tools such as EvoSuite generate behavioral test suites by optimizing for coverage, but tend to produce tests that are hard to understand. Language models trained on code can generate code that is highly similar to that written by humans, but current models are trained to generate each file separately, as is standard practice in natural language processing, and thus fail to consider the code-under-test context when producing a test file. In this work, we propose the Aligned Code And Tests Language Model (CAT-LM), a GPT-style language model with 2.7 Billion parameters, trained on a corpus of Python and Java projects. We utilize a novel pretraining signal that explicitly considers the mapping between code and test files when available. We also drastically increase the maximum sequence length of inputs to 8,192 tokens, 4x more than typical code generation models, to ensure that the code context is available to the model when generating test code. We analyze its usefulness for realistic applications, showing that sampling with filtering (e.g., by compilability, coverage) allows it to efficiently produce tests that achieve coverage similar to ones written by developers while resembling their writing style. By utilizing the code context, CAT-LM generates more valid tests than even much larger language models trained with more data (CodeGen 16B and StarCoder) and substantially outperforms a recent test-specific model (TeCo) at test completion. Overall, our work highlights the importance of incorporating software-specific insights when training language models for code and paves the way to more powerful automated test generation.

The formalization of existing mathematical proofs is a notoriously difficult process. Despite decades of research on automation and proof assistants, writing formal proofs remains arduous and only accessible to a few experts. While previous studies to automate formalization focused on powerful search algorithms, no attempts were made to take advantage of available informal proofs. In this work, we introduce Draft, Sketch, and Prove (DSP), a method that maps informal proofs to formal proof sketches, and uses the sketches to guide an automated prover by directing its search to easier sub-problems. We investigate two relevant setups where informal proofs are either written by humans or generated by a language model. Our experiments and ablation studies show that large language models are able to produce well-structured formal sketches that follow the same reasoning steps as the informal proofs. Guiding an automated prover with these sketches enhances its performance from 20.9% to 39.3% on a collection of mathematical competition problems.

The evaluation of generated reports remains a critical challenge in Computed Tomography (CT) report generation, due to the large volume of text, the diversity and complexity of findings, and the presence of fine-grained, disease-oriented attributes. Conventional evaluation metrics offer only coarse measures of lexical overlap or entity matching and fail to reflect the granular diagnostic accuracy required for clinical use. To address this gap, we propose CT-FineBench, a benchmark built from CT-RATE and Merlin to evaluate the fine-grained factual consistency of CT reports, constructed from CT-RATE and Merlin. Our benchmark is constructed through a meticulous, Question-Answering (QA) based process: first, we identify and structure key, finding-specific clinical attributes (like location, size, margin). Second, we systematically transform these attributes into a QA dataset, where questions probe for specific clinical details grounded in gold-standard reports. The evaluation protocol for CT-FineBench involves using this QA dataset to query a machine-generated report and scoring the correctness of the answers. This allows for a comprehensive, interpretable, and clinically-relevant assessment, moving beyond superficial lexical overlap to pinpoint specific clinical errors. Experiments show that CT-FineBench correlates better with expert clinical assessment and is substantially more sensitive to fine-grained factual errors than prior metrics.

Generation of plausible yet incorrect factual information, termed hallucination, is an unsolved issue in large language models. We study the ability of language models to deliberate on the responses they give in order to correct their mistakes. We develop the Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) method whereby the model first (i) drafts an initial response; then (ii) plans verification questions to fact-check its draft; (iii) answers those questions independently so the answers are not biased by other responses; and (iv) generates its final verified response. In experiments, we show CoVe decreases hallucinations across a variety of tasks, from list-based questions from Wikidata, closed book MultiSpanQA and longform text generation.

Iterative RAG for multi-hop question answering faces challenges with lengthy contexts and the buildup of irrelevant information. This hinders a model's capacity to process and reason over retrieved content and limits performance. While recent methods focus on compressing retrieved information, they are either restricted to single-round RAG, require finetuning or lack scalability in iterative RAG. To address these challenges, we propose Notes Writing, a method that generates concise and relevant notes from retrieved documents at each step, thereby reducing noise and retaining only essential information. This indirectly increases the effective context length of Large Language Models (LLMs), enabling them to reason and plan more effectively while processing larger volumes of input text. Notes Writing is framework agnostic and can be integrated with different iterative RAG methods. We demonstrate its effectiveness with three iterative RAG methods, across two models and four evaluation datasets. Notes writing yields an average improvement of 15.6 percentage points overall, with minimal increase in output tokens.

AI-powered development platforms are making software creation accessible to a broader audience, but this democratization has triggered a scalability crisis in security auditing. With studies showing that up to 40% of AI-generated code contains vulnerabilities, the pace of development now vastly outstrips the capacity for thorough security assessment. We present MAPTA, a multi-agent system for autonomous web application security assessment that combines large language model orchestration with tool-grounded execution and end-to-end exploit validation. On the 104-challenge XBOW benchmark, MAPTA achieves 76.9% overall success with perfect performance on SSRF and misconfiguration vulnerabilities, 83% success on broken authorization, and strong results on injection attacks including server-side template injection (85%) and SQL injection (83%). Cross-site scripting (57%) and blind SQL injection (0%) remain challenging. Our comprehensive cost analysis across all challenges totals 21.38 with a median cost of 0.073 for successful attempts versus 0.357 for failures. Success correlates strongly with resource efficiency, enabling practical early-stopping thresholds at approximately 40 tool calls or 0.30 per challenge. MAPTA's real-world findings are impactful given both the popularity of the respective scanned GitHub repositories (8K-70K stars) and MAPTA's low average operating cost of $3.67 per open-source assessment: MAPTA discovered critical vulnerabilities including RCEs, command injections, secret exposure, and arbitrary file write vulnerabilities. Findings are responsibly disclosed, 10 findings are under CVE review.

This paper introduces Patched Round-Trip Correctness (Patched RTC), a novel evaluation technique for Large Language Models (LLMs) applied to diverse software development tasks, particularly focusing on "outer loop" activities such as bug fixing, code review, and documentation updates. Patched RTC extends the original Round-Trip Correctness method to work with any LLM and downstream task, offering a self-evaluating framework that measures consistency and robustness of model responses without human intervention. The study demonstrates a correlation between Patched RTC scores and task-specific accuracy metrics, presenting it as an alternative to the LLM-as-Judge paradigm for open-domain task evaluation. We implement Patched RTC in an open-source framework called patchwork, allowing for transparent evaluation during inference across various patchflows. Experiments comparing GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 models across different software development tasks reveal that Patched RTC effectively distinguishes model performance and task difficulty. The paper also explores the impact of consistency prompts on improving model accuracy, suggesting that Patched RTC can guide prompt refinement and model selection for complex software development workflows.

Synthetic insider threat benchmarks face a consistency problem: corpora generated without an external factual constraint cannot rule out cross-artifact contradictions. The CERT dataset -- the field's canonical benchmark -- is also static, lacks cross-surface correlation scenarios, and predates the LLM era. We present OrgForge-IT, a verifiable synthetic benchmark in which a deterministic simulation engine maintains ground truth and language models generate only surface prose, making cross-artifact consistency an architectural guarantee. The corpus spans 51 simulated days, 2,904 telemetry records at a 96.4% noise rate, and four detection scenarios designed to defeat single-surface and single-day triage strategies across three threat classes and eight injectable behaviors. A ten-model leaderboard reveals several findings: (1) triage and verdict accuracy dissociate - eight models achieve identical triage F1=0.80 yet split between verdict F1=1.0 and 0.80; (2) baseline false-positive rate is a necessary companion to verdict F1, with models at identical verdict accuracy differing by two orders of magnitude on triage noise; (3) victim attribution in the vishing scenario separates tiers - Tier A models exonerate the compromised account holder while Tier B models detect the attack but misclassify the victim; (4) rigid multi-signal thresholds structurally exclude single-surface negligent insiders, demonstrating the necessity of parallel, threat-class-specific triage pipelines; and (5) agentic software-engineering training acts as a force multiplier for multi-day temporal correlation, but only when paired with frontier-level parameter scale. Finally, prompt sensitivity analysis reveals that unstructured prompts induce vocabulary hallucination, motivating a two-track scoring framework separating prompt adherence from reasoning capability. OrgForge-IT is open source under the MIT license.

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across delivery vectors, attack modalities, and propagation behaviors. Our meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 78 recent studies (2021--2026), consolidating evidence that attack success rates against state-of-the-art defenses exceed 85\% when adaptive attack strategies are employed. We systematically catalog 42 distinct attack techniques spanning input manipulation, tool poisoning, protocol exploitation, multimodal injection, and cross-origin context poisoning. Through critical analysis of 18 defense mechanisms reported in prior work, we identify that most achieve less than 50\% mitigation against sophisticated adaptive attacks. We contribute: (1) a unified taxonomy bridging disparate attack classifications, (2) the first systematic analysis of skill-based architecture vulnerabilities with concrete exploit chains, and (3) a defense-in-depth framework grounded in the limitations we identify. Our findings indicate that the security community must treat prompt injection as a first-class vulnerability class requiring architectural-level mitigations rather than ad-hoc filtering approaches.

We introduce Frankentexts, a new type of long-form narratives produced by LLMs under the extreme constraint that most tokens (e.g., 90%) must be copied verbatim from human writings. This task presents a challenging test of controllable generation, requiring models to satisfy a writing prompt, integrate disparate text fragments, and still produce a coherent narrative. To generate Frankentexts, we instruct the model to produce a draft by selecting and combining human-written passages, then iteratively revise the draft while maintaining a user-specified copy ratio. We evaluate the resulting Frankentexts along three axes: writing quality, instruction adherence, and detectability. Gemini-2.5-Pro performs surprisingly well on this task: 81% of its Frankentexts are coherent and 100% relevant to the prompt. Notably, up to 59% of these outputs are misclassified as human-written by detectors like Pangram, revealing limitations in AI text detectors. Human annotators can sometimes identify Frankentexts through their abrupt tone shifts and inconsistent grammar between segments, especially in longer generations. Beyond presenting a challenging generation task, Frankentexts invite discussion on building effective detectors for this new grey zone of authorship, provide training data for mixed authorship detection, and serve as a sandbox for studying human-AI co-writing processes.

Automated vulnerability reproduction from CVE descriptions requires generating executable Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits and validating them in target environments. This process is critical in software security research and practice, yet remains time-consuming and demands specialized expertise when performed manually. While LLM agents show promise for automating this task, existing approaches often conflate exploring attack directions with fixing implementation details, which leads to unproductive debugging loops when reproduction fails. To address this, we propose CVE2PoC, an LLM-based dual-loop agent framework following a plan-execute-evaluate paradigm. The Strategic Planner analyzes vulnerability semantics and target code to produce structured attack plans. The Tactical Executor generates PoC code and validates it through progressive verification. The Adaptive Refiner evaluates execution results and routes failures to different loops: the Tactical Loop for code-level refinement, while the Strategic Loop for attack strategy replanning. This dual-loop design enables the framework to escape ineffective debugging by matching remediation to failure type. Evaluation on two benchmarks covering 617 real-world vulnerabilities demonstrates that CVE2PoC achieves 82.9% and 54.3% reproduction success rates on SecBench.js and PatchEval, respectively, outperforming the best baseline by 11.3% and 20.4%. Human evaluation confirms that generated PoCs achieve comparable code quality to human-written exploits in readability and reusability.

Analyzing Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) from large volumes of data is critical for drafting and publishing comprehensive CTI reports. This process usually follows a three-stage workflow -- triage, deep search and TI drafting. While Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a promising route toward automation, existing benchmarks still have limitations. These benchmarks often consist of tasks that do not reflect real-world analyst workflows. For example, human analysts rarely receive tasks in the form of multiple-choice questions. Also, existing benchmarks often rely on model-centric metrics that emphasize lexical overlap rather than actionable, detailed insights essential for security analysts. Moreover, they typically fail to cover the complete three-stage workflow. To address these issues, we introduce CyberThreat-Eval, which is collected from the daily CTI workflow of a world-leading company. This expert-annotated benchmark assesses LLMs on practical tasks across all three stages as mentioned above. It utilizes analyst-centric metrics that measure factual accuracy, content quality, and operational costs. Our evaluation using this benchmark reveals important insights into the limitations of current LLMs. For example, LLMs often lack the nuanced expertise required to handle complex details and struggle to distinguish between correct and incorrect information. To address these challenges, the CTI workflow incorporates both external ground-truth databases and human expert knowledge. TRA allows human experts to iteratively provide feedback for continuous improvement. The code is available at https://github.com/xschen-beb/CyberThreat-Eval{GitHub} and https://huggingface.co/datasets/xse/CyberThreat-Eval{HuggingFace}.

The rise of reasoning models necessitates large-scale verifiable data, for which programming tasks serve as an ideal source. However, while competitive programming platforms provide abundant problems and solutions, high-quality test cases for verification remain scarce. Existing approaches attempt to synthesize test cases using Large Language Models (LLMs), but rely solely on the model's intrinsic generation capabilities without external feedback, frequently resulting in insufficiently diverse cases. To address this limitation, we propose a Feedback-Driven Iterative Framework for comprehensive test case construction. Specifically, our method leverages the LLM to generate initial test cases, executes them against known correct and incorrect solutions, and utilizes the failed results as feedback to guide the LLM in refining the test cases toward high fidelity and discriminability. We then apply this method to the CodeContests dataset to construct an optimized high-quality derivative, CodeContests-O. Evaluating against the entire pool of solutions (1.1 times 10^7 in total), our dataset achieves an average True Positive Rate (TPR) of 89.37% and True Negative Rate (TNR) of 90.89%, significantly outperforming the CodeContests and CodeContests+ by margins of 4.32% and 9.37%, respectively. Furthermore, fine-tuning the Qwen2.5-7B model on CodeContests-O results in a 9.52% improvement on LiveCodeBench (Pass@1). Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework and the quality of CodeContests-O. To support reproducibility and facilitate future research, we release the https://github.com/cai-jianfeng/CodeContests-O{code} and https://huggingface.co/datasets/caijanfeng/CodeContests-O{dataset}.

LLM agents often rely on Skills to describe available tools and recommended procedures. We study a hidden-comment prompt injection risk in this documentation layer: when a Markdown Skill is rendered to HTML, HTML comment blocks can become invisible to human reviewers, yet the raw text may still be supplied verbatim to the model. In experiments, we find that DeepSeek-V3.2 and GLM-4.5-Air can be influenced by malicious instructions embedded in a hidden comment appended to an otherwise legitimate Skill, yielding outputs that contain sensitive tool intentions. A short defensive system prompt that treats Skills as untrusted and forbids sensitive actions prevents these malicious tool calls and instead surfaces the suspicious hidden instructions.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has significantly advanced code completion capabilities, giving rise to a new generation of LLM-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs). Unlike general-purpose LLMs, these tools possess unique workflows, integrating multiple information sources as input and prioritizing code suggestions over natural language interaction, which introduces distinct security challenges. Additionally, LCCTs often rely on proprietary code datasets for training, raising concerns about the potential exposure of sensitive data. This paper exploits these distinct characteristics of LCCTs to develop targeted attack methodologies on two critical security risks: jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks. Our experimental results expose significant vulnerabilities within LCCTs, including a 99.4% success rate in jailbreaking attacks on GitHub Copilot and a 46.3% success rate on Amazon Q. Furthermore, We successfully extracted sensitive user data from GitHub Copilot, including 54 real email addresses and 314 physical addresses associated with GitHub usernames. Our study also demonstrates that these code-based attack methods are effective against general-purpose LLMs, such as the GPT series, highlighting a broader security misalignment in the handling of code by modern LLMs. These findings underscore critical security challenges associated with LCCTs and suggest essential directions for strengthening their security frameworks. The example code and attack samples from our research are provided at https://github.com/Sensente/Security-Attacks-on-LCCTs.

We introduce miniCTX, which tests a model's ability to prove formal mathematical theorems that depend on new definitions, lemmas, or other contextual information that was not observed during training. miniCTX contains theorems sourced from real Lean projects and textbooks, each associated with a context that can span tens of thousands of tokens. Models are tasked with proving a theorem given access to code from the theorem's repository, which contains context that is helpful or needed for the proof. As a baseline for miniCTX, we introduce file-tuning, a simple recipe that trains a model to generate a proof step conditioned on the preceding file contents. File-tuning substantially outperforms the traditional neural theorem proving approach that fine-tunes on states alone. Additionally, our file-tuned model improves performance on the standard miniF2F benchmark, achieving a pass rate of 33.61%, which is a new state-of-the-art for 1.3B parameter models. Alongside miniCTX, we offer ntp-toolkit for automatically extracting and annotating theorem proving data, making it easy to add new projects into miniCTX to ensure that contexts are not seen during training. miniCTX offers a challenging and realistic perspective on evaluating neural theorem provers.

Evaluating and improving the security capabilities of code agents requires high-quality, executable vulnerability tasks. However, existing works rely on costly, unscalable manual reproduction and suffer from outdated data distributions. To address these, we present CVE-Factory, the first multi-agent framework to achieve expert-level quality in automatically transforming sparse CVE metadata into fully executable agentic tasks. Cross-validation against human expert reproductions shows that CVE-Factory achieves 95\% solution correctness and 96\% environment fidelity, confirming its expert-level quality. It is also evaluated on the latest realistic vulnerabilities and achieves a 66.2\% verified success. This automation enables two downstream contributions. First, we construct LiveCVEBench, a continuously updated benchmark of 190 tasks spanning 14 languages and 153 repositories that captures emerging threats including AI-tooling vulnerabilities. Second, we synthesize over 1,000 executable training environments, the first large-scale scaling of agentic tasks in code security. Fine-tuned Qwen3-32B improves from 5.3\% to 35.8\% on LiveCVEBench, surpassing Claude 4.5 Sonnet, with gains generalizing to Terminal Bench (12.5\% to 31.3\%). We open-source CVE-Factory, LiveCVEBench, Abacus-cve (fine-tuned model), training dataset, and leaderboard. All resources are available at https://github.com/livecvebench/CVE-Factory .

Continuous Chain-of-Thought methods replace verbose reasoning traces with a short sequence of dense latent representations. Earlier continuous CoT methods indirectly supervise the latent representations such that its final state match that of verbose reasoning traces, requiring autoregressive, slow generation during training. We introduce C-MTP, a simpler, faster direct supervision approach that models each latent as an average of the embeddings in the CoT traces to be compressed. Our approach outperforms a prior direct supervision method that approximates the distribution of compressed tokens, and performs competitively to slower indirect supervision approaches in existing evaluation setup with simplified CoT traces (less than 100 tokens). Lastly, we extend the evaluation of Continuous CoT methods to complex tasks with longer reasoning traces (ge few hundreds reasoning tokens). We find both direct and indirect supervision training methods perform poorly (roughly 65\% performance drop) in this setting, revealing the limitations of current continuous CoT methods. The code and checkpoints are released at https://github.com/Varun221/cmtp_research

Although synthetic data is widely promoted as a remedy, its prevailing production paradigm -- one optimizing for statistical smoothness -- systematically removes the long-tail, cognitively grounded irregularities that characterize human text. Prolonged training on such statistically optimal but cognitively impoverished data accelerates model collapse. This paper proposes a paradigm shift: instead of imitating the surface properties of data, we simulate the cognitive processes that generate human text. We introduce the Prompt-driven Cognitive Computing Framework (PMCSF), whose core consists of a Cognitive State Decoder (CSD) that reverse-engineers unstructured text into structured cognitive vectors, and a Cognitive Text Encoder (CTE) that re-materializes these states into text enriched with human-typical imperfections via mathematically defined Cognitive Perturbation Operators. The framework is validated through a two-stage objective evaluation pipeline. First, in cognitive codec verification, CTE text yields a Jensen-Shannon divergence of 0.0614 from human text (vs. 0.4431 for standard LLM output), passes double-blind professional media review, and achieves an intraclass correlation coefficient ICC > 0.9 for cognitive profile alignment across heterogeneous models. Second, in functional gain evaluation, isomorphic stress tests in the A-share market show that strategies incorporating CTE-generated data reduce maximum drawdown by 47.4% during the 2015 crash and deliver 8.6% Defensive Alpha, exceeding transaction costs by a factor of 33. Our findings demonstrate that modelling human cognitive limitations -- not copying surface data -- enables synthetic data with genuine functional gain, offering a viable technical pathway toward resolving the AI data-collapse crisis.

Penetration testing, a critical component of cybersecurity, typically requires extensive time and effort to find vulnerabilities. Beginners in this field often benefit from collaborative approaches with the community or experts. To address this, we develop CIPHER (Cybersecurity Intelligent Penetration-testing Helper for Ethical Researchers), a large language model specifically trained to assist in penetration testing tasks. We trained CIPHER using over 300 high-quality write-ups of vulnerable machines, hacking techniques, and documentation of open-source penetration testing tools. Additionally, we introduced the Findings, Action, Reasoning, and Results (FARR) Flow augmentation, a novel method to augment penetration testing write-ups to establish a fully automated pentesting simulation benchmark tailored for large language models. This approach fills a significant gap in traditional cybersecurity Q\&A benchmarks and provides a realistic and rigorous standard for evaluating AI's technical knowledge, reasoning capabilities, and practical utility in dynamic penetration testing scenarios. In our assessments, CIPHER achieved the best overall performance in providing accurate suggestion responses compared to other open-source penetration testing models of similar size and even larger state-of-the-art models like Llama 3 70B and Qwen1.5 72B Chat, particularly on insane difficulty machine setups. This demonstrates that the current capabilities of general LLMs are insufficient for effectively guiding users through the penetration testing process. We also discuss the potential for improvement through scaling and the development of better benchmarks using FARR Flow augmentation results. Our benchmark will be released publicly at https://github.com/ibndias/CIPHER.

Agentic AI coding editors driven by large language models have recently become more popular due to their ability to improve developer productivity during software development. Modern editors such as Cursor are designed not just for code completion, but also with more system privileges for complex coding tasks (e.g., run commands in the terminal, access development environments, and interact with external systems). While this brings us closer to the "fully automated programming" dream, it also raises new security concerns. In this study, we present the first empirical analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting these high-privilege agentic AI coding editors. We show how attackers can remotely exploit these systems by poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions, effectively hijacking AI agents to run malicious commands, turning "your AI" into "attacker's shell". To perform this analysis, we implement AIShellJack, an automated testing framework for assessing prompt injection vulnerabilities in agentic AI coding editors. AIShellJack contains 314 unique attack payloads that cover 70 techniques from the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Using AIShellJack, we conduct a large-scale evaluation on GitHub Copilot and Cursor, and our evaluation results show that attack success rates can reach as high as 84% for executing malicious commands. Moreover, these attacks are proven effective across a wide range of objectives, ranging from initial access and system discovery to credential theft and data exfiltration.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising potentials in program generation and no-code automation. However, LLMs are prone to generate hallucinations, i.e., they generate text which sounds plausible but is incorrect. Although there has been a recent surge in research on LLM hallucinations for text generation, similar hallucination phenomenon can happen in code generation. Sometimes the generated code can have syntactical or logical errors as well as more advanced issues like security vulnerabilities, memory leaks, etc. Given the wide adaptation of LLMs to enhance efficiency in code generation and development in general, it becomes imperative to investigate hallucinations in code generation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt at studying hallucinations in the code generated by LLMs. We start by introducing the code hallucination definition and a comprehensive taxonomy of code hallucination types. We propose the first benchmark CodeMirage dataset for code hallucinations. The benchmark contains 1,137 GPT-3.5 generated hallucinated code snippets for Python programming problems from two base datasets - HumanEval and MBPP. We then propose the methodology for code hallucination detection and experiment with open source LLMs such as CodeLLaMA as well as OpenAI's GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 models using one-shot prompt. We find that GPT-4 performs the best on HumanEval dataset and gives comparable results to the fine-tuned CodeBERT baseline on MBPP dataset. Towards the end, we discuss various mitigation strategies for code hallucinations and conclude our work.

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, tools, scripts, references, and workflows, establishing a security boundary distinct from both model safety and traditional package-malware detection. ClawHub Security Signals is a sanitized dataset of 67,453 latest public OpenClaw skill versions. Each row pairs redacted SKILL.md content and sanitized bundled files where present with a final ClawScan registry verdict and evidence from three scanner families: VirusTotal, static heuristic analysis, and NVIDIA SkillSpector. Rather than estimating malicious-skill prevalence, we study scanner disagreement. The three scanners rarely flag the same skills: any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner. The disagreement is structured by attack surface. SkillSpector, which raises semantic agentic-risk advisories rather than malware-reputation signals, is positive for 19,209 of 25,504 suspicious rows (75.3%) but only 14 of 206 malicious rows (6.8%). The malicious-verdict region shows the inverse profile: 150 of 206 malicious rows (72.8%) are VirusTotal-positive, consistent with bundled-code malware evidence. These results show that agent-skill security requires layered governance, not single-scanner allow/block decisions. The corpus is released as a sanitized silver-standard dataset: labels are the registry's automated verdicts, not human-annotated ground truth, and the release represents an early, versioned snapshot intended to support the community while a human-annotated subset is developed. Further research is encouraged, including models tailored for skill-security triage.

This paper describes VILLAIN, a multimodal fact-checking system that verifies image-text claims through prompt-based multi-agent collaboration. For the AVerImaTeC shared task, VILLAIN employs vision-language model agents across multiple stages of fact-checking. Textual and visual evidence is retrieved from the knowledge store enriched through additional web collection. To identify key information and address inconsistencies among evidence items, modality-specific and cross-modal agents generate analysis reports. In the subsequent stage, question-answer pairs are produced based on these reports. Finally, the Verdict Prediction agent produces the verification outcome based on the image-text claim and the generated question-answer pairs. Our system ranked first on the leaderboard across all evaluation metrics. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/ssu-humane/VILLAIN.

Existing deep-learning approaches to semantic column type annotation (CTA) have important shortcomings: they rely on semantic types which are fixed at training time; require a large number of training samples per type and incur large run-time inference costs; and their performance can degrade when evaluated on novel datasets, even when types remain constant. Large language models have exhibited strong zero-shot classification performance on a wide range of tasks and in this paper we explore their use for CTA. We introduce ArcheType, a simple, practical method for context sampling, prompt serialization, model querying, and label remapping, which enables large language models to solve CTA problems in a fully zero-shot manner. We ablate each component of our method separately, and establish that improvements to context sampling and label remapping provide the most consistent gains. ArcheType establishes a new state-of-the-art performance on zero-shot CTA benchmarks (including three new domain-specific benchmarks which we release along with this paper), and when used in conjunction with classical CTA techniques, it outperforms a SOTA DoDuo model on the fine-tuned SOTAB benchmark. Our code is available at https://github.com/penfever/ArcheType.

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

The evaluation of Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation relies heavily on the quality and robustness of test cases. However, existing benchmarks often lack coverage for subtle corner cases, allowing incorrect solutions to pass. To bridge this gap, we propose CodeHacker, an automated agent framework dedicated to generating targeted adversarial test cases that expose latent vulnerabilities in program submissions. Mimicking the hack mechanism in competitive programming, CodeHacker employs a multi-strategy approach, including stress testing, anti-hash attacks, and logic-specific targeting to break specific code submissions. To ensure the validity and reliability of these attacks, we introduce a Calibration Phase, where the agent iteratively refines its own Validator and Checker via self-generated adversarial probes before evaluating contestant code.Experiments demonstrate that CodeHacker significantly improves the True Negative Rate (TNR) of existing datasets, effectively filtering out incorrect solutions that were previously accepted. Furthermore, generated adversarial cases prove to be superior training data, boosting the performance of RL-trained models on benchmarks like LiveCodeBench.

In the era of Large Language Models (LLMs), the code summarization technique boosts a lot, along with the emergence of many new significant works. However, the potential of code summarization in the Computer Security Area still remains explored. Can we generate a code summary of a code snippet for its security intention? Thus, this work proposes an innovative large-scale multi-perspective Code Intent Summary Dataset named BADS , aiming to increase the understanding of a given code snippet and reduce the risk in the code developing process. The procedure of establishing a dataset can be divided into four steps: First, we collect samples of codes with known vulnerabilities as well as code generated by AI from multiple sources. Second, we do the data clean and format unification, then do the data combination. Third, we utilize the LLM to automatically Annotate the code snippet. Last, We do the human evaluation to double-check. The dataset contains X code examples which cover Y categories of vulnerability. Our data are from Z open-source projects and CVE entries, and compared to existing work, our dataset not only contains original code but also code function summary and security intent summary, providing context information for research in code security analysis. All information is in CSV format. The contributions of this paper are four-fold: the establishment of a high-quality, multi-perspective Code Intent Summary Dataset; an innovative method in data collection and processing; A new multi-perspective code analysis framework that promotes cross-disciplinary research in the fields of software engineering and cybersecurity; improving the practicality and scalability of the research outcomes by considering the code length limitations in real-world applications. Our dataset and related tools have been publicly released on GitHub.

LLM-Agents have evolved into autonomous systems for complex task execution, with the SKILL.md specification emerging as a de facto standard for encapsulating agent capabilities. However, a critical bottleneck remains: different agent frameworks exhibit starkly different sensitivities to prompt formatting, causing up to 40% performance variation, yet nearly all skills exist as a single, format-agnostic Markdown version. Manual per-platform rewriting creates an unsustainable maintenance burden, while prior audits have found that over one third of community skills contain security vulnerabilities. To address this, we present SkCC, a compilation framework that introduces classical compiler design into agent skill development. At its core, SkIR - a strongly-typed intermediate representation - decouples skill semantics from platform-specific formatting, enabling portable deployment across heterogeneous agent frameworks. Around this IR, a compile-time Analyzer enforces security constraints via Anti-Skill Injection before deployment. Through a four-phase pipeline, SkCC reduces adaptation complexity from O(m times n) to O(m + n). Experiments on SkillsBench demonstrate that compiled skills consistently outperform their original counterparts, improving pass rates from 21.1% to 33.3% on Claude Code and from 35.1% to 48.7% on Kimi CLI, while achieving sub-10ms compilation latency, a 94.8% proactive security trigger rate, and 10-46% runtime token savings across platforms.

Conspiracy Theory Identication task is a new shared task proposed for the first time at the Evalita 2023. The ACTI challenge, based exclusively on comments published on conspiratorial channels of telegram, is divided into two subtasks: (i) Conspiratorial Content Classification: identifying conspiratorial content and (ii) Conspiratorial Category Classification about specific conspiracy theory classification. A total of fifteen teams participated in the task for a total of 81 submissions. We illustrate the best performing approaches were based on the utilization of large language models. We finally draw conclusions about the utilization of these models for counteracting the spreading of misinformation in online platforms.

Trustworthy deployment of LLM-based agents in software systems requires evaluating how they perform on application-specific workflows, with enough granularity to localize where they succeed and fail. Yet existing agent evaluation mechanisms are limited: benchmarks have low construct validity for application-specific workflows and environments, and replica evaluation environments are expensive and prone to drift. We propose Copy-on-Write (CoW) Scoring, a framework that evaluates agent operations directly within application environments using a PostgreSQL-level Copy-on-Write mechanism to isolate agent writes. CoW Scoring produces session- and operation-level scores that highlight where agents' database write operations succeed and fail in a given application environment, enabling inexpensive evaluation and iteration on agent harnesses and tool surfaces. We demonstrate the framework on Plane, an open-source project-management platform, where analysis surfaced specific issues in the tool surface, and corresponding fixes produced measurable improvements on affected models. Python library: https://github.com/trail-ml/agent-cow-python

Claim verification is essential in combating misinformation, and large language models (LLMs) have recently emerged in this area as powerful tools for assessing the veracity of claims using external knowledge. Existing LLM-based methods for claim verification typically adopt a Decompose-Then-Verify paradigm, which involves decomposing complex claims into several independent sub-claims and verifying each sub-claim separately. However, this paradigm often introduces errors during the claim decomposition process. To mitigate these errors, we propose to develop the Chain-of-Thought (CoT)-Verify paradigm, which leverages LLM reasoning methods to generate CoT-verification paths for the original complex claim without requiring decompositions into sub-claims and separate verification stages. The CoT-Verify paradigm allows us to propose a natural fine-tuning method called Reasoning-CV to enhance the verification capabilities in LLMs. Reasoning-CV includes a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage and a self-improvement direct preference optimization (DPO) stage. Utilizing only an 8B pre-trained LLM, Reasoning-CV demonstrates superior knowledge-assisted claim verification performances compared to existing Decompose-Then-Verify methods, as well as powerful black-box LLMs such as GPT-4o+CoT and o1-preview. Our code is available.

By providing a standardized interface for LLM agents to interact with external tools, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) is quickly becoming a cornerstone of the modern autonomous agent ecosystem. However, it creates novel attack surfaces due to untrusted external tools. While prior work has focused on attacks injected through external tool outputs, we investigate a more fundamental vulnerability: Tool Poisoning, where malicious instructions are embedded within a tool's metadata without execution. To date, this threat has been primarily demonstrated through isolated cases, lacking a systematic, large-scale evaluation. We introduce MCPTox, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate agent robustness against Tool Poisoning in realistic MCP settings. MCPTox is constructed upon 45 live, real-world MCP servers and 353 authentic tools. To achieve this, we design three distinct attack templates to generate a comprehensive suite of 1312 malicious test cases by few-shot learning, covering 10 categories of potential risks. Our evaluation on 20 prominent LLM agents setting reveals a widespread vulnerability to Tool Poisoning, with o1-mini, achieving an attack success rate of 72.8\%. We find that more capable models are often more susceptible, as the attack exploits their superior instruction-following abilities. Finally, the failure case analysis reveals that agents rarely refuse these attacks, with the highest refused rate (Claude-3.7-Sonnet) less than 3\%, demonstrating that existing safety alignment is ineffective against malicious actions that use legitimate tools for unauthorized operation. Our findings create a crucial empirical baseline for understanding and mitigating this widespread threat, and we release MCPTox for the development of verifiably safer AI agents. Our dataset is available at an anonymized repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AAAI26-7C02.

We introduce behavioral fidelity -- a third evaluation dimension for synthetic tabular data that measures whether generated data preserves the temporal, sequential, and structural behavioral patterns that distinguish real-world entity activity. Existing frameworks evaluate statistical fidelity (marginal distributions and correlations) and downstream utility (classifier AUROC on synthetic-trained models), but neither tests for the behavioral signals that operational detection and analysis systems actually rely on. We formalize a taxonomy of four behavioral fraud patterns (P1-P4) covering inter-event timing, burst structure, multi-account graph motifs, and velocity-rule trigger rates; define a degradation ratio metric calibrated to a real-data noise floor (1.0 = matches real variability, k = k-times worse); and prove that row-independent generators -- the dominant paradigm -- are structurally incapable of reproducing P3 graph motifs (Proposition 1) and produce non-positive within-entity IET autocorrelation (Proposition 2), making the positive burst fingerprint of fraud sequences unachievable regardless of architecture or training data size. We benchmark CTGAN, TVAE, GaussianCopula, and TabularARGN on IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection and the Amazon Fraud Dataset. All four fail severely: on IEEE-CIS composite degradation ratios range from 24.4x (TVAE) to 39.0x (GaussianCopula); on Amazon FDB, row-independent generators score 81.6-99.7x, while TabularARGN achieves 17.2x. We document generator-specific failure modes and their resolutions. The P1-P4 framework extends to any domain with entity-level sequential tabular data, including healthcare and network security. We release our evaluation framework as open source.

Training machine learning approaches for vulnerability identification and producing reliable tools to assist developers in implementing quality software -- free of vulnerabilities -- is challenging due to the lack of large datasets and real data. Researchers have been looking at these issues and building datasets. However, these datasets usually miss natural language artifacts and programming language diversity. We scraped the entire CVE details database for GitHub references and augmented the data with 3 security-related datasets. We used the data to create a ground-truth dataset of natural language artifacts (such as commit messages, commits comments, and summaries), meta-data and code changes. Our dataset integrates a total of 8057 security-relevant commits -- the equivalent to 5942 security patches -- from 1339 different projects spanning 146 different types of vulnerabilities and 20 languages. A dataset of 110k non-security-related commits is also provided. Data and scripts are all available on GitHub. Data is stored in a .CSV file. Codebases can be downloaded using our scripts. Our dataset is a valuable asset to answer research questions on different topics such as the identification of security-relevant information using NLP models; software engineering and security best practices; and, vulnerability detection and patching; and, security program analysis.

In this research, we use user defined labels from three internet text sources (Reddit, Stackexchange, Arxiv) to train 21 different machine learning models for the topic classification task of detecting cybersecurity discussions in natural text. We analyze the false positive and false negative rates of each of the 21 model's in a cross validation experiment. Then we present a Cybersecurity Topic Classification (CTC) tool, which takes the majority vote of the 21 trained machine learning models as the decision mechanism for detecting cybersecurity related text. We also show that the majority vote mechanism of the CTC tool provides lower false negative and false positive rates on average than any of the 21 individual models. We show that the CTC tool is scalable to the hundreds of thousands of documents with a wall clock time on the order of hours.

Medical report generation has achieved remarkable advancements yet has still been faced with several challenges. First, the inherent imbalance in the distribution of normal and abnormal cases may lead models to exhibit a biased focus on normal samples, resulting in unreliable diagnoses. Second, the frequent occurrence of common template sentences in the reports may overwhelm the critical abnormal information. Moreover, existing works focus on 2D chest X-rays, leaving CT report generation underexplored due to the high-dimensional nature of CT images and the limited availability of CT-report pairs. Recently, LLM has shown a great ability to generate reliable answers with appropriate prompts, which shed light on addressing the aforementioned challenges. In this paper, we propose Dia-LLaMA, a framework to adapt the LLaMA2-7B for CT report generation by incorporating diagnostic information as guidance prompts. Considering the high dimension of CT, we leverage a pre-trained ViT3D with perceiver to extract the visual information. To tailor the LLM for report generation and emphasize abnormality, we extract additional diagnostic information by referring to a disease prototype memory bank, which is updated during training to capture common disease representations. Furthermore, we introduce disease-aware attention to enable the model to adjust attention for different diseases. Experiments on the chest CT dataset demonstrated that our proposed method outperformed previous methods and achieved state-of-the-art on both clinical efficacy performance and natural language generation metrics. The code will be made publically available.

Generative modeling has experienced substantial progress in recent years, particularly in text-to-image and text-to-video synthesis. However, the medical field has not yet fully exploited the potential of large-scale foundational models for synthetic data generation. In this paper, we introduce GenerateCT, the first method for text-conditional computed tomography (CT) generation, addressing the limitations in 3D medical imaging research and making our entire framework open-source. GenerateCT consists of a pre-trained large language model, a transformer-based text-conditional 3D chest CT generation architecture, and a text-conditional spatial super-resolution diffusion model. We also propose CT-ViT, which efficiently compresses CT volumes while preserving auto-regressiveness in-depth, enabling the generation of 3D CT volumes with variable numbers of axial slices. Our experiments demonstrate that GenerateCT can produce realistic, high-resolution, and high-fidelity 3D chest CT volumes consistent with medical language text prompts. We further investigate the potential of GenerateCT by training a model using generated CT volumes for multi-abnormality classification of chest CT volumes. Our contributions provide a valuable foundation for future research in text-conditional 3D medical image generation and have the potential to accelerate advancements in medical imaging research. Our code, pre-trained models, and generated data are available at https://github.com/ibrahimethemhamamci/GenerateCT.

The recently introduced Controlled Text Reduction (CTR) task isolates the text generation step within typical summarization-style tasks. It does so by challenging models to generate coherent text conforming to pre-selected content within the input text (``highlights''). This framing enables increased modularity in summarization-like tasks, allowing to couple a single CTR model with various content-selection setups and modules. However, there are currently no reliable CTR models, while the performance of the existing baseline for the task is mediocre, falling short of practical utility. Here, we address this gap by introducing a high-quality, open-source CTR model that tackles two prior key limitations: inadequate enforcement of the content-preservation constraint, and suboptimal silver training data. Addressing these, we amplify the content-preservation constraint in both training, via RL, and inference, via a controlled decoding strategy. Further, we substantially improve the silver training data quality via GPT-4 distillation. Overall, pairing the distilled dataset with the highlight-adherence strategies yields marked gains over the current baseline, of up to 30 ROUGE-L points, providing a reliable CTR model for downstream use.

Deep Click-Through Rate (CTR) prediction models play an important role in modern industrial recommendation scenarios. However, high memory overhead and computational costs limit their deployment in resource-constrained environments. Low-rank approximation is an effective method for computer vision and natural language processing models, but its application in compressing CTR prediction models has been less explored. Due to the limited memory and computing resources, compression of CTR prediction models often confronts three fundamental challenges, i.e., (1). How to reduce the model sizes to adapt to edge devices? (2). How to speed up CTR prediction model inference? (3). How to retain the capabilities of original models after compression? Previous low-rank compression research mostly uses tensor decomposition, which can achieve a high parameter compression ratio, but brings in AUC degradation and additional computing overhead. To address these challenges, we propose a unified low-rank decomposition framework for compressing CTR prediction models. We find that even with the most classic matrix decomposition SVD method, our framework can achieve better performance than the original model. To further improve the effectiveness of our framework, we locally compress the output features instead of compressing the model weights. Our unified low-rank compression framework can be applied to embedding tables and MLP layers in various CTR prediction models. Extensive experiments on two academic datasets and one real industrial benchmark demonstrate that, with 3-5x model size reduction, our compressed models can achieve both faster inference and higher AUC than the uncompressed original models. Our code is at https://github.com/yuhao318/Atomic_Feature_Mimicking.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in natural language reasoning, yet their application to Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) remains limited. CTI analysis involves distilling large volumes of unstructured reports into actionable knowledge, a process where LLMs could substantially reduce analyst workload. CTIBench introduced a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLMs across multiple CTI tasks. In this work, we extend CTIBench by developing AthenaBench, an enhanced benchmark that includes an improved dataset creation pipeline, duplicate removal, refined evaluation metrics, and a new task focused on risk mitigation strategies. We evaluate twelve LLMs, including state-of-the-art proprietary models such as GPT-5 and Gemini-2.5 Pro, alongside seven open-source models from the LLaMA and Qwen families. While proprietary LLMs achieve stronger results overall, their performance remains subpar on reasoning-intensive tasks, such as threat actor attribution and risk mitigation, with open-source models trailing even further behind. These findings highlight fundamental limitations in the reasoning capabilities of current LLMs and underscore the need for models explicitly tailored to CTI workflows and automation.

Fake news and misinformation poses a significant threat to society, making efficient mitigation essential. However, manual fact-checking is costly and lacks scalability. Large Language Models (LLMs) offer promise in automating counter-response generation to mitigate misinformation, but a critical challenge lies in their tendency to hallucinate non-factual information. Existing models mainly rely on LLM self-feedback to reduce hallucination, but this approach is computationally expensive. In this paper, we propose MisMitiFact, Misinformation Mitigation grounded in Facts, an efficient framework for generating fact-grounded counter-responses at scale. MisMitiFact generates simple critique feedback to refine LLM outputs, ensuring responses are grounded in evidence. We develop lightweight, fine-grained critique models trained on data sourced from readily available fact-checking sites to identify and correct errors in key elements such as numerals, entities, and topics in LLM generations. Experiments show that MisMitiFact generates counter-responses of comparable quality to LLMs' self-feedback while using significantly smaller critique models. Importantly, it achieves ~5x increase in feedback generation throughput, making it highly suitable for cost-effective, large-scale misinformation mitigation. Code and LLM prompt templates are at https://github.com/xxfwin/MisMitiFact.

Software testing is a critical aspect of software development, yet generating test cases remains a routine task for engineers. This paper presents a benchmark, CLOVER, to evaluate models' capabilities in generating and completing test cases under specific conditions. Spanning from simple assertion completions to writing test cases that cover specific code blocks across multiple files, these tasks are based on 12 python repositories, analyzing 845 problems with context lengths ranging from 4k to 128k tokens. Utilizing code testing frameworks, we propose a method to construct retrieval contexts using coverage information. While models exhibit comparable performance with short contexts, notable differences emerge with 16k contexts. Notably, models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 can effectively leverage relevant snippets; however, all models score below 35\% on the complex Task III, even with the oracle context provided, underscoring the benchmark's significance and the potential for model improvement. The benchmark is containerized for code execution across tasks, and we will release the code, data, and construction methodologies.

Large Language Model (LLM) Agents leverage the advanced reasoning capabilities of LLMs in real-world applications. To interface with an environment, these agents often rely on tools, such as web search or database APIs. As the agent provides the LLM with tool documentation along the user query, the completeness and correctness of this documentation is critical. However, tool documentation is often over-, under-, or ill-specified, impeding the agent's accuracy. Standard software testing approaches struggle to identify these errors as they are expressed in natural language. Thus, despite its importance, there currently exists no automated method to test the tool documentation for agents. To address this issue, we present ToolFuzz, the first method for automated testing of tool documentations. ToolFuzz is designed to discover two types of errors: (1) user queries leading to tool runtime errors and (2) user queries that lead to incorrect agent responses. ToolFuzz can generate a large and diverse set of natural inputs, effectively finding tool description errors at a low false positive rate. Further, we present two straightforward prompt-engineering approaches. We evaluate all three tool testing approaches on 32 common LangChain tools and 35 newly created custom tools and 2 novel benchmarks to further strengthen the assessment. We find that many publicly available tools suffer from underspecification. Specifically, we show that ToolFuzz identifies 20x more erroneous inputs compared to the prompt-engineering approaches, making it a key component for building reliable AI agents.

We present eCream-MedCorpus, a new and unique large-scale dataset of clinical notes produced in Emergency Departments of Italian hospitals. The corpus, in its current version, is composed of approximately 4 million clinical notes fully anonymized, covering diverse phases of patient care during the stay in the emergency department. In addition, a subset of about six thousand notes has been manually annotated by clinical experts through a structured Case Report Form (CRF) containing 132 items relevant for two patient situations in emergency departments, dyspnea and loss of consciousness. Items may assume numerical values (e.g., for blood saturation), categorical (e.g., for level of consciousness ), binary (e.g., for presence of traumas), and mixed value types. The annotation process involved multiple clinicians and underwent iterative revision to resolve ambiguities in item formulation, resulting in a richly structured (although high imbalanced) resource. The dataset aims to fill a relevant gap of data able to support both the development and the use of Large Language Models in concrete medical applications. We describe the data collection protocol, the on-site anonymisation pipeline, corpus statistics, and the annotation scheme. Finally, we propose CRF-filling as a novel structured information extraction benchmark, and provide zero-shot baseline resulting from Gemma-27B and MedGemma-27B. To the best of our knowledge, eCream-MedCorpus is the largest freely available dataset of clinical notes existing for the Italian language.

This paper introduces the first systematic evaluation framework for quantifying the quality and risks of papers written by modern coding agents. While AI-driven paper writing has become a growing concern, rigorous evaluation of the quality and potential risks of AI-written papers remains limited, and a unified understanding of their reliability is still lacking. We introduce Paper Reconstruction Evaluation (PaperRecon), an evaluation framework in which an overview (overview.md) is created from an existing paper, after which an agent generates a full paper based on the overview and minimal additional resources, and the result is subsequently compared against the original paper. PaperRecon disentangles the evaluation of the AI-written papers into two orthogonal dimensions, Presentation and Hallucination, where Presentation is evaluated using a rubric and Hallucination is assessed via agentic evaluation grounded in the original paper source. For evaluation, we introduce PaperWrite-Bench, a benchmark of 51 papers from top-tier venues across diverse domains published after 2025. Our experiments reveal a clear trade-off: while both ClaudeCode and Codex improve with model advances, ClaudeCode achieves higher presentation quality at the cost of more than 10 hallucinations per paper on average, whereas Codex produces fewer hallucinations but lower presentation quality. This work takes a first step toward establishing evaluation frameworks for AI-driven paper writing and improving the understanding of its risks within the research community.

Given the widespread dissemination of misinformation on social media, implementing fact-checking mechanisms for online claims is essential. Manually verifying every claim is highly challenging, underscoring the need for an automated fact-checking system. This paper presents our system designed to address this issue. We utilize the Averitec dataset to assess the veracity of claims. In addition to veracity prediction, our system provides supporting evidence, which is extracted from the dataset. We develop a Retrieve and Generate (RAG) pipeline to extract relevant evidence sentences from a knowledge base, which are then inputted along with the claim into a large language model (LLM) for classification. We also evaluate the few-shot In-Context Learning (ICL) capabilities of multiple LLMs. Our system achieves an 'Averitec' score of 0.33, which is a 22% absolute improvement over the baseline. All code will be made available on All code will be made available on https://github.com/ronit-singhal/evidence-backed-fact-checking-using-rag-and-few-shot-in-context-learning-with-llms.

Code generation aims to automatically generate code from input requirements, significantly enhancing development efficiency. Recent large language models (LLMs) based approaches have shown promising results and revolutionized code generation task. Despite the promising performance, LLMs often generate contents with hallucinations, especially for the code generation scenario requiring the handling of complex contextual dependencies in practical development process. Although previous study has analyzed hallucinations in LLM-powered code generation, the study is limited to standalone function generation. In this paper, we conduct an empirical study to study the phenomena, mechanism, and mitigation of LLM hallucinations within more practical and complex development contexts in repository-level generation scenario. First, we manually examine the code generation results from six mainstream LLMs to establish a hallucination taxonomy of LLM-generated code. Next, we elaborate on the phenomenon of hallucinations, analyze their distribution across different models. We then analyze causes of hallucinations and identify four potential factors contributing to hallucinations. Finally, we propose an RAG-based mitigation method, which demonstrates consistent effectiveness in all studied LLMs. The replication package including code, data, and experimental results is available at https://github.com/DeepSoftwareAnalytics/LLMCodingHallucination

LLM agents acquire new capabilities by downloading skills from open registries. Instead of browsing these catalogs manually, developers typically ask the agent to recommend and install a skill. This convenience hides a risk: agents frequently invent names for skills that exist in no registry. We term this flaw skill name hallucination. A fake name may seem harmless, but it opens the door to supply-chain attacks. Because registries rarely verify publishers, an adversary can prompt the agent, collect the fake names it returns, pre-register malicious skills under them, and wait for a victim to install the payload. We conducted the first large-scale measurement of skill name hallucination, evaluating 15,000 prompts across 12 configurations (4 standalone LLMs and 8 agents). We conservatively counted a name as hallucinated only if it was missing from all live registries and GitHub. The results reveal a systemic vulnerability: every configuration hallucinates. Rates average 36.0% for standalone LLMs and 36.9% for agents, rising to 43.1% on real-world developer questions. In total, the systems generated 5,669 distinct hallucinated names. Crucially, these names are not random noise. Agents repeat the same fake names across prompts and models, giving attackers highly reliable targets to hijack. Finally, we tested four model-level defenses and found a severe conflict between security and usability. The strongest, retrieval grounding, cut the hallucination rate from 40.8% to 3.2% but crippled usefulness: even the best-defended system recommended the correct skill only about one in six times. Skill name hallucination is thus a highly exploitable vulnerability requiring minimal attacker effort. Fixing it cannot rely on prompt engineering or model tuning alone. It demands ecosystem-wide structural changes: registry-level name reservations and verified recommendation pipelines.

Query-focused summarization (QFS) aims to provide a summary of a single document/multi documents that can satisfy the information needs of a given query. It is useful for various real-world applications, such as abstractive snippet generation or more recent retrieval augmented generation (RAG). A prototypical QFS pipeline consists of a retriever (sparse or dense retrieval) and a generator (usually a large language model). However, applying large language models (LLM) potentially leads to hallucinations, especially when the evidence contradicts the prior belief of LLMs. There has been growing interest in developing new decoding methods to improve generation quality and reduce hallucination. In this work, we conduct a large-scale reproducibility study on one recently proposed decoding method -- Context-aware Decoding (CAD). In addition to replicating CAD's experiments on news summarization datasets, we include experiments on QFS datasets, and conduct more rigorous analysis on computational complexity and hyperparameter sensitivity. Experiments with eight different language models show that performance-wise, CAD improves QFS quality by (1) reducing factuality errors/hallucinations while (2) mostly retaining the match of lexical patterns, measured by ROUGE scores, while also at a cost of increased inference-time FLOPs and reduced decoding speed. The code implementation based on Huggingface Library is made available https://github.com/zhichaoxu-shufe/context-aware-decoding-qfs

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in enterprise applications, yet their reliability remains limited by hallucinations, i.e., confident but factually incorrect information. Existing detection approaches, such as SelfCheckGPT and MetaQA, primarily target standalone LLMs and do not address the unique challenges of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, where responses must be consistent with retrieved evidence. We therefore present MetaRAG, a metamorphic testing framework for hallucination detection in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems. MetaRAG operates in a real-time, unsupervised, black-box setting, requiring neither ground-truth references nor access to model internals, making it suitable for proprietary and high-stakes domains. The framework proceeds in four stages: (1) decompose answers into atomic factoids, (2) generate controlled mutations of each factoid using synonym and antonym substitutions, (3) verify each variant against the retrieved context (synonyms are expected to be entailed and antonyms contradicted), and (4) aggregate penalties for inconsistencies into a response-level hallucination score. Crucially for identity-aware AI, MetaRAG localizes unsupported claims at the factoid span where they occur (e.g., pregnancy-specific precautions, LGBTQ+ refugee rights, or labor eligibility), allowing users to see flagged spans and enabling system designers to configure thresholds and guardrails for identity-sensitive queries. Experiments on a proprietary enterprise dataset illustrate the effectiveness of MetaRAG for detecting hallucinations and enabling trustworthy deployment of RAG-based conversational agents. We also outline a topic-based deployment design that translates MetaRAG's span-level scores into identity-aware safeguards; this design is discussed but not evaluated in our experiments.

The Global CVE initiative (GCVE) proposes a decentralized, open, and extensible model for vulnerability identification, publication, and enrichment. It addresses a gap in today's vulnerability ecosystem: centralized systems provide rigorous control and widely recognized identifiers, while many producers publish advisories independently without a shared fabric for discovery, correlation, enrichment, and reuse. This paper presents GCVE as a socio-technical standardization effort combining autonomous GCVE Numbering Authorities, lightweight allocation rules, distributed publication, open Best Current Practices, and practical reference implementations. The model preserves global uniqueness while allowing participants to publish according to their operational needs. It also broadens the concept of a vulnerability record to cover assignments, disclosures, sightings, rejected identifiers, observations, exploited vulnerability information, and enrichment records. The paper describes how the GCVE BCP process supports technical interoperability and amendable operational practice, including practical guidance for vulnerability handling and disclosure. It also examines the extension mechanism, including AI-oriented extensions, as a way to evolve the standard without centralizing control. A particular focus is placed on vulnerability-lookup as the reference implementation. It aggregates multiple sources, supports GCVE publication and consumption, implements distributed Known Exploited Vulnerability data, and enables automatically enriched vulnerability data streams. Building on lessons from the MISP ecosystem, GCVE frames vulnerability coordination not only as identifier allocation, but as open infrastructure for collective security knowledge production.

Language models (LMs) are susceptible to in-context reward hacking, where they exploit flaws in tainted or faulty written specifications or rubrics to achieve high scores without fulfilling the user's true intent. We introduce Specification Self-Correction (SSC), a novel, test-time framework that enables an LM to identify and correct flaws within its own guiding specification. SSC employs a multi-step inference process where the model first generates a response based on a potentially tainted specification, critiques its output, and then revises the specification itself to remove the exploitable loophole. A final, more robust response is then generated using this self-corrected specification. Across experiments spanning creative writing and agentic coding tasks with several LMs, we demonstrate that while models initially game tainted specifications in 50-70\% of cases, the SSC process reduces this vulnerability by over 90\%. This dynamic repair occurs at inference time, requires no weight modification, and leads to more robustly aligned model behavior. Code at https://github.com/vicgalle/specification-self-correction .

Large Language Models (LLMs) present an intriguing avenue for exploration in the field of formal theorem proving. Nevertheless, their full potential, particularly concerning the mitigation of hallucinations and refinement through prover error messages, remains an area that has yet to be thoroughly investigated. To enhance the effectiveness of LLMs in the field, we introduce the Lyra, a new framework that employs two distinct correction mechanisms: Tool Correction (TC) and Conjecture Correction (CC). To implement Tool Correction in the post-processing of formal proofs, we leverage prior knowledge to utilize predefined prover tools (e.g., Sledgehammer) for guiding the replacement of incorrect tools. Tool Correction significantly contributes to mitigating hallucinations, thereby improving the overall accuracy of the proof. In addition, we introduce Conjecture Correction, an error feedback mechanism designed to interact with prover to refine formal proof conjectures with prover error messages. Compared to the previous refinement framework, the proposed Conjecture Correction refines generation with instruction but does not collect paired (generation, error & refinement) prompts. Our method has achieved state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on both miniF2F validation (48.0% -> 55.3%) and test (45.5% -> 51.2%). We also present 3 IMO problems solved by Lyra. We believe Tool Correction (post-process for hallucination mitigation) and Conjecture Correction (subgoal adjustment from interaction with environment) could provide a promising avenue for future research in this field.

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is crucial in today's cybersecurity landscape, providing essential insights to understand and mitigate the ever-evolving cyber threats. The recent rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown potential in this domain, but concerns about their reliability, accuracy, and hallucinations persist. While existing benchmarks provide general evaluations of LLMs, there are no benchmarks that address the practical and applied aspects of CTI-specific tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce CTIBench, a benchmark designed to assess LLMs' performance in CTI applications. CTIBench includes multiple datasets focused on evaluating knowledge acquired by LLMs in the cyber-threat landscape. Our evaluation of several state-of-the-art models on these tasks provides insights into their strengths and weaknesses in CTI contexts, contributing to a better understanding of LLM capabilities in CTI.

Third-party agent skills extend LLM-based agents with instruction files and executable code that run on users' machines. Skills execute with user privileges and are distributed through community registries with minimal vetting, but no ground-truth dataset exists to characterize the resulting threats. We construct the first labeled dataset of malicious agent skills by behaviorally verifying 98,380 skills from two community registries, confirming 157 malicious skills with 632 vulnerabilities. These attacks are not incidental. Malicious skills average 4.03 vulnerabilities across a median of three kill chain phases, and the ecosystem has split into two archetypes: Data Thieves that exfiltrate credentials through supply chain techniques, and Agent Hijackers that subvert agent decision-making through instruction manipulation. A single actor accounts for 54.1\% of confirmed cases through templated brand impersonation. Shadow features, capabilities absent from public documentation, appear in 0\% of basic attacks but 100\% of advanced ones; several skills go further by exploiting the AI platform's own hook system and permission flags. Responsible disclosure led to 93.6\% removal within 30 days. We release the dataset and analysis pipeline to support future work on agent skill security.

Automated Test Case Generation (ATCG) is crucial for evaluating software reliability, particularly in competitive programming where robust algorithm assessments depend on diverse and accurate test cases. However, existing ATCG methods often fail to meet complex specifications or generate effective corner cases, limiting their utility. In this work, we introduce Context-Free Grammars with Counters (CCFGs), a formalism that captures both syntactic and semantic structures in input specifications. Using a fine-tuned CodeT5 model, we translate natural language input specifications into CCFGs, enabling the systematic generation of high-quality test cases. Experiments on the CodeContests dataset demonstrate that CCFG-based test cases outperform baseline methods in identifying incorrect algorithms, achieving significant gains in validity and effectiveness. Our approach provides a scalable and reliable grammar-driven framework for enhancing automated competitive programming evaluations.

Persistent memory has enabled large language model (LLM) agents to store factual knowledge, prior decisions, reasoning histories, tool usage information, and context. While this has improved the agent's functionality and continuity across tasks, it has also introduced a new attack surface: the agent's own reasoning history. In this paper, we introduce the Forged Amplifying Rationale Memory Attack (FARMA), which poisons an agent's remembered reasoning rather than its factual knowledge. It inserts forged reasoning traces using evasive language that bypasses keyword-based defenses, then amplifies them through self-referential reinforcement that defeats consensus-based defenses. To address FARMA, we introduce SENTINEL, a layered defense pipeline to detect forged reasoning entries. Its central component is the Reasoning Guard that structurally analyzes candidate entries for forgery using five weighted signals. We evaluate FARMA and SENTINEL across multiple agents and different LLM models with 50 trials and show that FARMA achieves an attack success rate of up to 100% under baseline conditions and is capable of defeating defense mechanisms like keyword filter and A-MemGuard. Our evaluation also shows that SENTINEL reduces FARMA's attack success rate to as low as 0% with no false positives observed across 326 benign agent traces. Our work demonstrates the need to protect not only an agent's retrieved content but also the integrity of its reasoning history.

Case Report Forms (CRFs) are largely used in medical research as they ensure accuracy, reliability, and validity of results in clinical studies. However, publicly available, wellannotated CRF datasets are scarce, limiting the development of CRF slot filling systems able to fill in a CRF from clinical notes. To mitigate the scarcity of CRF datasets, we propose to take advantage of available datasets annotated for information extraction tasks and to convert them into structured CRFs. We present a semi-automatic conversion methodology, which has been applied to the E3C dataset in two languages (English and Italian), resulting in a new, high-quality dataset for CRF slot filling. Through several experiments on the created dataset, we report that slot filling achieves 59.7% for Italian and 67.3% for English on a closed Large Language Models (zero-shot) and worse performances on three families of open-source models, showing that filling CRFs is challenging even for recent state-of-the-art LLMs. We release the datest at https://huggingface.co/collections/NLP-FBK/e3c-to-crf-67b9844065460cbe42f80166

Computed tomography (CT) is a central to three-dimensional medical imaging, yet CT-based artificial intelligence remains fragmented across task-specific models for segmentation, classification, registration, and report analysis. Here we present FlexiCT, a family of CT foundation models trained by agglomerative continual pretraining on 266,227 CT volumes from 56 publicly available datasets, forming a large-scale public resource for CT representation learning. FlexiCT uses agglomerative pretraining across three stages: two-dimensional axial pretraining, three-dimensional anatomical pretraining and report-guided semantic alignment. This training strategy supports slice-level, volume-level and vision-language analysis. Across five downstream task families (segmentation, classification, registration, vision-language understanding and clinical retrieval), FlexiCT matches or exceeds prior task-specific approaches on multiple benchmarks. Its embeddings further organize CT scans along gradients associated with various tumor stages, suggesting that CT foundation models can capture imaging features relevant to disease phenotype characterization. Code is available at https://github.com/ricklisz/FlexiCT

State-of-the-art language models (LMs) are notoriously susceptible to generating hallucinated information. Such inaccurate outputs not only undermine the reliability of these models but also limit their use and raise serious concerns about misinformation and propaganda. In this work, we focus on hallucinated book and article references and present them as the "model organism" of language model hallucination research, due to their frequent and easy-to-discern nature. We posit that if a language model cites a particular reference in its output, then it should ideally possess sufficient information about its authors and content, among other relevant details. Using this basic insight, we illustrate that one can identify hallucinated references without ever consulting any external resources, by asking a set of direct or indirect queries to the language model about the references. These queries can be considered as "consistency checks." Our findings highlight that while LMs, including GPT-4, often produce inconsistent author lists for hallucinated references, they also often accurately recall the authors of real references. In this sense, the LM can be said to "know" when it is hallucinating references. Furthermore, these findings show how hallucinated references can be dissected to shed light on their nature. Replication code and results can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/hallucinated-references.

Jupyter notebook allows data scientists to write machine learning code together with its documentation in cells. In this paper, we propose a new task of code documentation generation (CDG) for computational notebooks. In contrast to the previous CDG tasks which focus on generating documentation for single code snippets, in a computational notebook, one documentation in a markdown cell often corresponds to multiple code cells, and these code cells have an inherent structure. We proposed a new model (HAConvGNN) that uses a hierarchical attention mechanism to consider the relevant code cells and the relevant code tokens information when generating the documentation. Tested on a new corpus constructed from well-documented Kaggle notebooks, we show that our model outperforms other baseline models.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents, using tools to execute code, read and write files, and access networks, creating novel security risks. To mitigate these risks, agents are commonly deployed and evaluated in isolated "sandbox" environments, often implemented using Docker/OCI containers. We introduce SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH, an open benchmark that safely measures an LLM's capacity to break out of these sandboxes. The benchmark is implemented as an Inspect AI Capture the Flag (CTF) evaluation utilising a nested sandbox architecture with the outer layer containing the flag and no known vulnerabilities. Following a threat model of a motivated adversarial agent with shell access inside a container, SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH covers a spectrum of sandboxescape mechanisms spanning misconfiguration, privilege allocation mistakes, kernel flaws, and runtime/orchestration weaknesses. We find that, when vulnerabilities are added, LLMs are able to identify and exploit them, showing that use of evaluation like SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH is needed to ensure sandboxing continues to provide the encapsulation needed for highly-capable models.

Foundation models are trained on increasingly immense and opaque datasets. Even while these models are now key in AI system building, it can be difficult to answer the straightforward question: has the model already encountered a given example during training? We therefore propose a widespread adoption of Data Portraits: artifacts that record training data and allow for downstream inspection. First we outline the properties of such an artifact and discuss how existing solutions can be used to increase transparency. We then propose and implement a solution based on data sketching, stressing fast and space efficient querying. Using our tools, we document a popular language modeling corpus (The Pile) and a recently released code modeling dataset (The Stack). We show that our solution enables answering questions about test set leakage and model plagiarism. Our tool is lightweight and fast, costing only 3% of the dataset size in overhead. We release a live interface of our tools at https://dataportraits.org/ and call on dataset and model creators to release Data Portraits as a complement to current documentation practices.

Typical fact verification models use retrieved written evidence to verify claims. Evidence sources, however, often change over time as more information is gathered and revised. In order to adapt, models must be sensitive to subtle differences in supporting evidence. We present VitaminC, a benchmark infused with challenging cases that require fact verification models to discern and adjust to slight factual changes. We collect over 100,000 Wikipedia revisions that modify an underlying fact, and leverage these revisions, together with additional synthetically constructed ones, to create a total of over 400,000 claim-evidence pairs. Unlike previous resources, the examples in VitaminC are contrastive, i.e., they contain evidence pairs that are nearly identical in language and content, with the exception that one supports a given claim while the other does not. We show that training using this design increases robustness -- improving accuracy by 10% on adversarial fact verification and 6% on adversarial natural language inference (NLI). Moreover, the structure of VitaminC leads us to define additional tasks for fact-checking resources: tagging relevant words in the evidence for verifying the claim, identifying factual revisions, and providing automatic edits via factually consistent text generation.

The rapid proliferation of agentic AI skill ecosystems -- exemplified by OpenClaw (228,000 GitHub stars) and Anthropic Agent Skills (75,600 stars) -- has introduced a critical supply chain attack surface. The ClawHavoc campaign (January-February 2026) infiltrated over 1,200 malicious skills into the OpenClaw marketplace, while MalTool catalogued 6,487 malicious tools that evade conventional detection. In response, twelve reactive security tools emerged, yet all rely on heuristic methods that provide no formal guarantees. We present SkillFortify, the first formal analysis framework for agent skill supply chains, with six contributions: (1) the DY-Skill attacker model, a Dolev-Yao adaptation to the five-phase skill lifecycle with a maximality proof; (2) a sound static analysis framework grounded in abstract interpretation; (3) capability-based sandboxing with a confinement proof; (4) an Agent Dependency Graph with SAT-based resolution and lockfile semantics; (5) a trust score algebra with formal monotonicity; and (6) SkillFortifyBench, a 540-skill benchmark. SkillFortify achieves 96.95% F1 (95% CI: [95.1%, 98.4%]) with 100% precision and 0% false positive rate on 540 skills, while SAT-based resolution handles 1,000-node graphs in under 100 ms.

This study aims to explore the implementation of Natural Language Processing (NLP) and machine learning (ML) techniques to automate the coding of medical letters with visualised explainability and light-weighted local computer settings. Currently in clinical settings, coding is a manual process that involves assigning codes to each condition, procedure, and medication in a patient's paperwork (e.g., 56265001 heart disease using SNOMED CT code). There are preliminary research on automatic coding in this field using state-of-the-art ML models; however, due to the complexity and size of the models, the real-world deployment is not achieved. To further facilitate the possibility of automatic coding practice, we explore some solutions in a local computer setting; in addition, we explore the function of explainability for transparency of AI models. We used the publicly available MIMIC-III database and the HAN/HLAN network models for ICD code prediction purposes. We also experimented with the mapping between ICD and SNOMED CT knowledge bases. In our experiments, the models provided useful information for 97.98\% of codes. The result of this investigation can shed some light on implementing automatic clinical coding in practice, such as in hospital settings, on the local computers used by clinicians , project page https://github.com/Glenj01/Medical-Coding.

State-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive code generation capabilities but struggle with real-world software engineering tasks, such as revising source code to address code reviews, hindering their practical use. Code review comments are often implicit, ambiguous, and colloquial, requiring models to grasp both code and human intent. This challenge calls for evaluating large language models' ability to bridge both technical and conversational contexts. While existing work has employed the automated code refinement (ACR) task to resolve these comments, current evaluation methods fall short, relying on text matching metrics that provide limited insight into model failures and remain susceptible to training data contamination. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel evaluation benchmark, CodeReviewQA that enables us to conduct fine-grained assessment of model capabilities and mitigate data contamination risks. In CodeReviewQA, we decompose the generation task of code refinement into three essential reasoning steps: change type recognition (CTR), change localisation (CL), and solution identification (SI). Each step is reformulated as multiple-choice questions with varied difficulty levels, enabling precise assessment of model capabilities, while mitigating data contamination risks. Our comprehensive evaluation spans 72 recently released large language models on 900 manually curated, high-quality examples across nine programming languages. Our results show that CodeReviewQA is able to expose specific model weaknesses in code review comprehension, disentangled from their generative automated code refinement results.

Generating deep research reports requires large-scale information acquisition and the synthesis of insight-driven analysis, posing a significant challenge for current language models. Most existing approaches follow a plan-then-write paradigm, whose performance heavily depends on the quality of the initial outline. However, constructing a comprehensive outline itself demands strong reasoning ability, causing current deep research systems to rely almost exclusively on closed-source or online large models. This reliance raises practical barriers to deployment and introduces safety and privacy concerns for user-authored data. In this work, we present AgentCPM-Report, a lightweight yet high-performing local solution composed of a framework that mirrors the human writing process and an 8B-parameter deep research agent. Our framework uses a Writing As Reasoning Policy (WARP), which enables models to dynamically revise outlines during report generation. Under this policy, the agent alternates between Evidence-Based Drafting and Reasoning-Driven Deepening, jointly supporting information acquisition, knowledge refinement, and iterative outline evolution. To effectively equip small models with this capability, we introduce a Multi-Stage Agentic Training strategy, consisting of cold-start, atomic skill RL, and holistic pipeline RL. Experiments on DeepResearch Bench, DeepConsult, and DeepResearch Gym demonstrate that AgentCPM-Report outperforms leading closed-source systems, with substantial gains in Insight.

Large Language Model (LLM) code agents increasingly resolve repository-level issues by iteratively editing code, invoking tools, and validating candidate patches. In these workflows, agents often write tests on the fly, a paradigm adopted by many high-ranking agents on the SWE-bench leaderboard. However, we observe that GPT-5.2, which writes almost no new tests, can even achieve performance comparable to top-ranking agents. This raises the critical question: whether such tests meaningfully improve issue resolution or merely mimic human testing practices while consuming a substantial interaction budget. To reveal the impact of agent-written tests, we present an empirical study that analyzes agent trajectories across six state-of-the-art LLMs on SWE-bench Verified. Our results show that while test writing is commonly adopted, but resolved and unresolved tasks within the same model exhibit similar test-writing frequencies Furthermore, these tests typically serve as observational feedback channels, where agents prefer value-revealing print statements significantly more than formal assertion-based checks. Based on these insights, we perform a controlled experiment by revising the prompts of four agents to either increase or reduce test writing. The results suggest that changes in the volume of agent-written tests do not significantly change final outcomes. Taken together, our study reveals that current test-writing practices may provide marginal utility in autonomous software engineering tasks.

We present swarm-attack, an open-source adversarial testing framework in which multiple lightweight LLM agents coordinate through shared memory, parallel exploration, and evolutionary optimization. Together, our results demonstrate that both safety bypass of frontier models and software vulnerability discovery, i.e., the capability class that motivated restricted release of Anthropic's Mythos Preview, are achievable at effectively zero cost using commodity hardware and openly available models. We report two experiments. In the first, five instances of a 1.2 billion parameter model conducted 225 jailbreak attacks each against GPT-4o and Claude Sonnet~4. Against GPT-4o, the swarm achieved an Effective Harm Rate of 45.8%, producing 49 critical-severity breaches; against Claude Sonnet-4, the Effective Harm Rate was 0% despite a 40% technical success rate. In the second experiment, the same models performed combined source code analysis and binary fuzzing against a vulnerable C application with 9 planted CWEs. With a hand-crafted exploit seed corpus, regex pattern detection, and AddressSanitizer-based crash classification, the pipeline recovers 9 of 9 vulnerabilities (100% recall) in approximately four minutes on a consumer MacBook. With those scaffold components disabled, the same model recovers 0 of 9 by crash verification and 2 of 9 by citation. The capability class that motivated restricted release of Anthropic's Mythos Preview is therefore reproducible at effectively zero cost; the important enabler is the system scaffold itself, which compensates for the limited reasoning capacity of small individual models.

How do language models use information provided as context when generating a response? Can we infer whether a particular generated statement is actually grounded in the context, a misinterpretation, or fabricated? To help answer these questions, we introduce the problem of context attribution: pinpointing the parts of the context (if any) that led a model to generate a particular statement. We then present ContextCite, a simple and scalable method for context attribution that can be applied on top of any existing language model. Finally, we showcase the utility of ContextCite through three applications: (1) helping verify generated statements (2) improving response quality by pruning the context and (3) detecting poisoning attacks. We provide code for ContextCite at https://github.com/MadryLab/context-cite.

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is being used to search for indicators of attacks that might have compromised an enterprise network for a long time without being discovered. To have a more effective analysis, CTI open standards have incorporated descriptive relationships showing how the indicators or observables are related to each other. However, these relationships are either completely overlooked in information gathering or not used for threat hunting. In this paper, we propose a system, called POIROT, which uses these correlations to uncover the steps of a successful attack campaign. We use kernel audits as a reliable source that covers all causal relations and information flows among system entities and model threat hunting as an inexact graph pattern matching problem. Our technical approach is based on a novel similarity metric which assesses an alignment between a query graph constructed out of CTI correlations and a provenance graph constructed out of kernel audit log records. We evaluate POIROT on publicly released real-world incident reports as well as reports of an adversarial engagement designed by DARPA, including ten distinct attack campaigns against different OS platforms such as Linux, FreeBSD, and Windows. Our evaluation results show that POIROT is capable of searching inside graphs containing millions of nodes and pinpoint the attacks in a few minutes, and the results serve to illustrate that CTI correlations could be used as robust and reliable artifacts for threat hunting.

Code generation aims to produce code that fulfills requirements written in natural languages automatically. Large language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT have demonstrated promising effectiveness in this area. Nonetheless, these LLMs often fail to ensure the syntactic and semantic correctness of the generated code. Recently, researchers proposed multi-agent frameworks that guide LLMs with different prompts to analyze programming tasks, generate code, perform testing in a sequential workflow. However, the performance of the workflow is not robust as the code generation depends on the performance of each agent. To address this challenge, we propose CodeCoR, a self-reflective multi-agent framework that evaluates the effectiveness of each agent and their collaborations. Specifically, for a given task description, four agents in CodeCoR generate prompts, code, test cases, and repair advice, respectively. Each agent generates more than one output and prunes away the low-quality ones. The generated code is tested in the local environment: the code that fails to pass the generated test cases is sent to the repair agent and the coding agent re-generates the code based on repair advice. Finally, the code that passes the most number of generated test cases is returned to users. Our experiments on four widely used datasets, HumanEval, HumanEval-ET, MBPP, and MBPP-ET, demonstrate that CodeCoR significantly outperforms existing baselines (e.g., CodeCoT and MapCoder), achieving an average Pass@1 score of 77.8%.

Harm reporting in Artificial Intelligence (AI) currently lacks a structured process for disclosing and addressing algorithmic flaws, relying largely on an ad-hoc approach. This contrasts sharply with the well-established Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) ecosystem in software security. While global efforts to establish frameworks for AI transparency and collaboration are underway, the unique challenges presented by machine learning (ML) models demand a specialized approach. To address this gap, we propose implementing a Coordinated Flaw Disclosure (CFD) framework tailored to the complexities of ML and AI issues. This paper reviews the evolution of ML disclosure practices, from ad hoc reporting to emerging participatory auditing methods, and compares them with cybersecurity norms. Our framework introduces innovations such as extended model cards, dynamic scope expansion, an independent adjudication panel, and an automated verification process. We also outline a forthcoming real-world pilot of CFD. We argue that CFD could significantly enhance public trust in AI systems. By balancing organizational and community interests, CFD aims to improve AI accountability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

To tackle the AVeriTeC shared task hosted by the FEVER-24, we introduce a system that only employs publicly available large language models (LLMs) for each step of automated fact-checking, dubbed the Herd of Open LLMs for verifying real-world claims (HerO). For evidence retrieval, a language model is used to enhance a query by generating hypothetical fact-checking documents. We prompt pretrained and fine-tuned LLMs for question generation and veracity prediction by crafting prompts with retrieved in-context samples. HerO achieved 2nd place on the leaderboard with the AVeriTeC score of 0.57, suggesting the potential of open LLMs for verifying real-world claims. For future research, we make our code publicly available at https://github.com/ssu-humane/HerO.

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.