Daily Papers

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

We present a fine-tuned RoBERTa-base classifier (125M parameters) for mapping Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) descriptions to Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories. We construct a large-scale training dataset of 234,770 CVE descriptions with AI-refined CWE labels using Claude Sonnet 4.6, and agreement-filtered evaluation sets where NVD and AI labels agree. On our held-out test set (27,780 samples, 205 CWE classes), the model achieves 87.4% top-1 accuracy and 60.7% Macro F1 -- a +15.5 percentage-point Macro F1 gain over a TF-IDF baseline that already reaches 84.9% top-1, demonstrating the model's advantage on rare weakness categories. On the external CTI-Bench benchmark (NeurIPS 2024), the model achieves 75.6% strict accuracy (95% CI: 72.8-78.2%) -- statistically indistinguishable from Cisco Foundation-Sec-8B-Reasoning (75.3%, 8B parameters) at 64x fewer parameters. We release the dataset, model, and training code.

Automated vulnerability reproduction from CVE descriptions requires generating executable Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits and validating them in target environments. This process is critical in software security research and practice, yet remains time-consuming and demands specialized expertise when performed manually. While LLM agents show promise for automating this task, existing approaches often conflate exploring attack directions with fixing implementation details, which leads to unproductive debugging loops when reproduction fails. To address this, we propose CVE2PoC, an LLM-based dual-loop agent framework following a plan-execute-evaluate paradigm. The Strategic Planner analyzes vulnerability semantics and target code to produce structured attack plans. The Tactical Executor generates PoC code and validates it through progressive verification. The Adaptive Refiner evaluates execution results and routes failures to different loops: the Tactical Loop for code-level refinement, while the Strategic Loop for attack strategy replanning. This dual-loop design enables the framework to escape ineffective debugging by matching remediation to failure type. Evaluation on two benchmarks covering 617 real-world vulnerabilities demonstrates that CVE2PoC achieves 82.9% and 54.3% reproduction success rates on SecBench.js and PatchEval, respectively, outperforming the best baseline by 11.3% and 20.4%. Human evaluation confirms that generated PoCs achieve comparable code quality to human-written exploits in readability and reusability.

LLMs have becoming increasingly powerful, both in their benign and malicious uses. With the increase in capabilities, researchers have been increasingly interested in their ability to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities. In particular, recent work has conducted preliminary studies on the ability of LLM agents to autonomously hack websites. However, these studies are limited to simple vulnerabilities. In this work, we show that LLM agents can autonomously exploit one-day vulnerabilities in real-world systems. To show this, we collected a dataset of 15 one-day vulnerabilities that include ones categorized as critical severity in the CVE description. When given the CVE description, GPT-4 is capable of exploiting 87% of these vulnerabilities compared to 0% for every other model we test (GPT-3.5, open-source LLMs) and open-source vulnerability scanners (ZAP and Metasploit). Fortunately, our GPT-4 agent requires the CVE description for high performance: without the description, GPT-4 can exploit only 7% of the vulnerabilities. Our findings raise questions around the widespread deployment of highly capable LLM agents.

We constructed a newly large-scale and comprehensive C/C++ vulnerability dataset named MegaVul by crawling the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database and CVE-related open-source projects. Specifically, we collected all crawlable descriptive information of the vulnerabilities from the CVE database and extracted all vulnerability-related code changes from 28 Git-based websites. We adopt advanced tools to ensure the extracted code integrality and enrich the code with four different transformed representations. In total, MegaVul contains 17,380 vulnerabilities collected from 992 open-source repositories spanning 169 different vulnerability types disclosed from January 2006 to October 2023. Thus, MegaVul can be used for a variety of software security-related tasks including detecting vulnerabilities and assessing vulnerability severity. All information is stored in the JSON format for easy usage. MegaVul is publicly available on GitHub and will be continuously updated. It can be easily extended to other programming languages.

Data-driven research on the automated discovery and repair of security vulnerabilities in source code requires comprehensive datasets of real-life vulnerable code and their fixes. To assist in such research, we propose a method to automatically collect and curate a comprehensive vulnerability dataset from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) records in the public National Vulnerability Database (NVD). We implement our approach in a fully automated dataset collection tool and share an initial release of the resulting vulnerability dataset named CVEfixes. The CVEfixes collection tool automatically fetches all available CVE records from the NVD, gathers the vulnerable code and corresponding fixes from associated open-source repositories, and organizes the collected information in a relational database. Moreover, the dataset is enriched with meta-data such as programming language, and detailed code and security metrics at five levels of abstraction. The collection can easily be repeated to keep up-to-date with newly discovered or patched vulnerabilities. The initial release of CVEfixes spans all published CVEs up to 9 June 2021, covering 5365 CVE records for 1754 open-source projects that were addressed in a total of 5495 vulnerability fixing commits. CVEfixes supports various types of data-driven software security research, such as vulnerability prediction, vulnerability classification, vulnerability severity prediction, analysis of vulnerability-related code changes, and automated vulnerability repair.

The Global CVE initiative (GCVE) proposes a decentralized, open, and extensible model for vulnerability identification, publication, and enrichment. It addresses a gap in today's vulnerability ecosystem: centralized systems provide rigorous control and widely recognized identifiers, while many producers publish advisories independently without a shared fabric for discovery, correlation, enrichment, and reuse. This paper presents GCVE as a socio-technical standardization effort combining autonomous GCVE Numbering Authorities, lightweight allocation rules, distributed publication, open Best Current Practices, and practical reference implementations. The model preserves global uniqueness while allowing participants to publish according to their operational needs. It also broadens the concept of a vulnerability record to cover assignments, disclosures, sightings, rejected identifiers, observations, exploited vulnerability information, and enrichment records. The paper describes how the GCVE BCP process supports technical interoperability and amendable operational practice, including practical guidance for vulnerability handling and disclosure. It also examines the extension mechanism, including AI-oriented extensions, as a way to evolve the standard without centralizing control. A particular focus is placed on vulnerability-lookup as the reference implementation. It aggregates multiple sources, supports GCVE publication and consumption, implements distributed Known Exploited Vulnerability data, and enables automatically enriched vulnerability data streams. Building on lessons from the MISP ecosystem, GCVE frames vulnerability coordination not only as identifier allocation, but as open infrastructure for collective security knowledge production.

Training machine learning approaches for vulnerability identification and producing reliable tools to assist developers in implementing quality software -- free of vulnerabilities -- is challenging due to the lack of large datasets and real data. Researchers have been looking at these issues and building datasets. However, these datasets usually miss natural language artifacts and programming language diversity. We scraped the entire CVE details database for GitHub references and augmented the data with 3 security-related datasets. We used the data to create a ground-truth dataset of natural language artifacts (such as commit messages, commits comments, and summaries), meta-data and code changes. Our dataset integrates a total of 8057 security-relevant commits -- the equivalent to 5942 security patches -- from 1339 different projects spanning 146 different types of vulnerabilities and 20 languages. A dataset of 110k non-security-related commits is also provided. Data and scripts are all available on GitHub. Data is stored in a .CSV file. Codebases can be downloaded using our scripts. Our dataset is a valuable asset to answer research questions on different topics such as the identification of security-relevant information using NLP models; software engineering and security best practices; and, vulnerability detection and patching; and, security program analysis.

Evaluating and improving the security capabilities of code agents requires high-quality, executable vulnerability tasks. However, existing works rely on costly, unscalable manual reproduction and suffer from outdated data distributions. To address these, we present CVE-Factory, the first multi-agent framework to achieve expert-level quality in automatically transforming sparse CVE metadata into fully executable agentic tasks. Cross-validation against human expert reproductions shows that CVE-Factory achieves 95\% solution correctness and 96\% environment fidelity, confirming its expert-level quality. It is also evaluated on the latest realistic vulnerabilities and achieves a 66.2\% verified success. This automation enables two downstream contributions. First, we construct LiveCVEBench, a continuously updated benchmark of 190 tasks spanning 14 languages and 153 repositories that captures emerging threats including AI-tooling vulnerabilities. Second, we synthesize over 1,000 executable training environments, the first large-scale scaling of agentic tasks in code security. Fine-tuned Qwen3-32B improves from 5.3\% to 35.8\% on LiveCVEBench, surpassing Claude 4.5 Sonnet, with gains generalizing to Terminal Bench (12.5\% to 31.3\%). We open-source CVE-Factory, LiveCVEBench, Abacus-cve (fine-tuned model), training dataset, and leaderboard. All resources are available at https://github.com/livecvebench/CVE-Factory .

Software vulnerabilities are increasing at an alarming rate. However, manual patching is both time-consuming and resource-intensive, while existing automated vulnerability repair (AVR) techniques remain limited in effectiveness. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have opened a new paradigm for AVR, demonstrating remarkable progress. To examine the capability of LLMs in AVR, several vulnerability benchmarks have been proposed recently. However, they still suffer from key limitations of outdated vulnerabilities, limited language coverage, unreliable patch validation, and insufficient reproducibility. To overcome these challenges, we introduce PATCHEVAL, a multilingual benchmark for Go, JavaScript, and Python, languages for which existing benchmarks remain unexplored. PATCHEVAL curates a dataset of 1,000 vulnerabilities drawn from CVEs reported between 2015 and 2025, covering 65 distinct CWEs. A subset of 230 CVEs is further equipped with runtime sandbox environments, enabling patch verification through both security tests and functionality tests. To provide a systematic comparison of LLM-based vulnerability repair, we evaluate a series of state-of-the-art LLMs and agents, presenting an in-depth analysis that empirically yields key insights to guide future research in AVR.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

This paper presents VLAI, a transformer-based model that predicts software vulnerability severity levels directly from text descriptions. Built on RoBERTa, VLAI is fine-tuned on over 600,000 real-world vulnerabilities and achieves over 82% accuracy in predicting severity categories, enabling faster and more consistent triage ahead of manual CVSS scoring. The model and dataset are open-source and integrated into the Vulnerability-Lookup service.

We present a reproducible pipeline for mapping Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) to MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise techniques from free-text vulnerability descriptions. Rather than relying on the CWE->CAPEC->ATT&CK derivation chain, whose table-expansion artifacts we quantify, we train a multi-label classifier on a curated gold dataset of 1,207 CVEs from expert MITRE Center for Threat-Informed Defense mappings. The resulting model approximately doubles recall@5 compared with a zero-shot embedding-similarity baseline and improves every ranking metric. We then investigate whether LLM-assisted labeling can extend the gold dataset. Initial experiments suggest contradictory conclusions: a single run indicates degraded performance, while averaging over five random seeds suggests a small gain. However, an independent replication and an expansion-size study (100--984 additional CVEs) show that the apparent improvement is an evaluation artifact. LLM-generated labels, with approximately 0.39 agreement with expert annotations, provide no reliable improvement at any expansion size and reduce rare-technique coverage at around 1,000 added CVEs (macro-F1 decreases by 0.04). The root cause is evaluation noise. Selecting checkpoints on a small test split effectively maximizes over many noisy evaluations, producing recall@5 differences of up to 0.05 between otherwise identical runs. Using a corrected protocol based on validation-split checkpoint selection, the gold-only model achieves recall@5 of (0.673 \pm 0.019), and repeating the decisive experiment confirms the null result for LLM expansion. A final scaling study shows that additional expert-curated data consistently improves performance, whereas LLM-labeled data does not, indicating that the classifier is limited by label quality rather than dataset size. All datasets, models, code, and training logs are publicly released.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in open-source software (OSS) ecosystems, creating complex interactions among natural language prompts, probabilistic model outputs, and execution-capable components. However, it remains unclear whether traditional vulnerability disclosure frameworks adequately capture these model-mediated risks. To investigate this, we analyze 295 GitHub Security Advisories published between January 2025 and January 2026 that reference LLM-related components, and we manually annotate a sample of 100 advisories using the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025. We find no evidence of new implementation-level weakness classes specific to LLM systems. Most advisories map to established CWEs, particularly injection and deserialization weaknesses. At the same time, the OWASP-based analysis reveals recurring architectural risk patterns, especially Supply Chain, Excessive Agency, and Prompt Injection, which often co-occur across multiple stages of execution. These results suggest that existing advisory metadata captures code-level defects but underrepresents model-mediated exposure. We conclude that combining the CWE and OWASP perspectives provides a more complete and necessary view of vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated systems.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in code understanding tasks. However, they demonstrate limited performance in vulnerability detection and struggle to distinguish vulnerable code from patched code. We argue that LLMs lack understanding of security specifications -- the expectations about how code should behave to remain safe. When code behavior differs from these expectations, it becomes a potential vulnerability. However, such knowledge is rarely explicit in training data, leaving models unable to reason about security flaws. We propose VulInstruct, a specification-guided approach that systematically extracts security specifications from historical vulnerabilities to detect new ones. VulInstruct constructs a specification knowledge base from two perspectives: (i) General specifications from high-quality patches across projects, capturing fundamental safe behaviors; and (ii) Domain-specific specifications from repeated violations in particular repositories relevant to the target code. VulInstruct retrieves relevant past cases and specifications, enabling LLMs to reason about expected safe behaviors rather than relying on surface patterns. We evaluate VulInstruct under strict criteria requiring both correct predictions and valid reasoning. On PrimeVul, VulInstruct achieves 45.0% F1-score (32.7% improvement) and 37.7% recall (50.8% improvement) compared to baselines, while uniquely detecting 24.3% of vulnerabilities -- 2.4x more than any baseline. In pair-wise evaluation, VulInstruct achieves 32.3% relative improvement. VulInstruct also discovered a previously unknown high-severity vulnerability (CVE-2025-56538) in production code, demonstrating practical value for real-world vulnerability discovery. All code and supplementary materials are available at https://github.com/zhuhaopku/VulInstruct-temp.

AI assistants produce vulnerable code in 45% of security-relevant scenarios, introducing flaws into production systems at scale. Yet existing secure coding datasets fall short. They lack incident grounding, don't provide the scale modern training requires, and miss the operational security context developers need for production deployments. We present SecureCode v2.0, a production-grade dataset of 1,215 security-focused coding examples that passed structural validation and expert security review. Every example ties to actual documented security incidents with CVE references, provides vulnerable and secure implementations, demonstrates concrete attacks, and includes defense-in-depth operational guidance. The dataset covers 11 vulnerability categories (complete OWASP Top 10:2025 plus AI/ML Security Threats) across 11 languages (Python, JavaScript, Java, Go, PHP, C#, TypeScript, Ruby, Rust, Kotlin, and YAML for infrastructure-as-code). Our quality assurance framework ensures complete incident grounding. Each example includes SIEM integration strategies, infrastructure hardening recommendations (Docker, AppArmor, WAF configurations), and testing approaches using language-appropriate frameworks. The dataset uses a 4-turn conversational structure mirroring actual developer-AI interactions, escalating from basic implementations to advanced security considerations and defense-in-depth guidance. Our contributions: (1) 1,215 rigorously validated examples split into 989 training, 122 validation, and 104 test sets, (2) an automated validation framework ensuring dataset consistency, (3) a 4-turn conversational structure capturing realistic security workflows, (4) comprehensive operational security guidance with SIEM integration strategies, (5) complete language-specific implementation fidelity, and (6) open-source release of data, validation tools, and benchmarking protocols.

Identifying vulnerability-fixing commits corresponding to disclosed CVEs is essential for secure software maintenance but remains challenging at scale, as large repositories contain millions of commits of which only a small fraction address security issues. Existing automated approaches, including traditional machine learning techniques and recent large language model (LLM)-based methods, often suffer from poor precision-recall trade-offs. Frequently evaluated on randomly sampled commits, we uncover that they are substantially underestimating real-world difficulty, where candidate commits are already security-relevant and highly similar. We propose Favia, a forensic, agent-based framework for vulnerability-fix identification that combines scalable candidate ranking with deep and iterative semantic reasoning. Favia first employs an efficient ranking stage to narrow the search space of commits. Each commit is then rigorously evaluated using a ReAct-based LLM agent. By providing the agent with a pre-commit repository as environment, along with specialized tools, the agent tries to localize vulnerable components, navigates the codebase, and establishes causal alignment between code changes and vulnerability root causes. This evidence-driven process enables robust identification of indirect, multi-file, and non-trivial fixes that elude single-pass or similarity-based methods. We evaluate Favia on CVEVC, a large-scale dataset we made that comprises over 8 million commits from 3,708 real-world repositories, and show that it consistently outperforms state-of-the-art traditional and LLM-based baselines under realistic candidate selection, achieving the strongest precision-recall trade-offs and highest F1-scores.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly capable of autonomously conducting cyberattacks, posing significant threats to existing applications. This growing risk highlights the urgent need for a real-world benchmark to evaluate the ability of LLM agents to exploit web application vulnerabilities. However, existing benchmarks fall short as they are limited to abstracted Capture the Flag competitions or lack comprehensive coverage. Building a benchmark for real-world vulnerabilities involves both specialized expertise to reproduce exploits and a systematic approach to evaluating unpredictable threats. To address this challenge, we introduce CVE-Bench, a real-world cybersecurity benchmark based on critical-severity Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. In CVE-Bench, we design a sandbox framework that enables LLM agents to exploit vulnerable web applications in scenarios that mimic real-world conditions, while also providing effective evaluation of their exploits. Our evaluation shows that the state-of-the-art agent framework can resolve up to 13% of vulnerabilities.

AI coding agents set up projects by reading documentation and installing the dependencies it lists, without verifying their names, sources, or known vulnerabilities. By editing only a README, requirements file, or Makefile, an attacker can redirect the agent to an untrusted registry, a known-vulnerable version, or a wrong-but-plausible name: documentation becomes a vector for code execution. We present the first systematic evaluation of package-install-time supply-chain attacks delivered through ordinary project-setup documentation across production coding-agent harnesses, probing frontier models on twelve scenarios in five attack classes, grounded in documented incidents. The same model catches an attack through one harness and installs it through another: install-time security rests on the harness-model combination, not the model alone. Agents catch blatant typosquats reliably, but plausible separator-confusion names (azurecore for azure-core) slip through, and how often depends on the harness-model pairing. Source-based attacks like registry redirection are missed almost everywhere. The source blind spot recurs on npm and Cargo, where nearly every model installs the untrusted dependency; name detection carries over less consistently across ecosystems. Security-oriented prompts recover part of the gap but only for the dimension they name; a deterministic pre-install check that verifies names, sources, and versions before any code runs closes most of it.

When a new computer security vulnerability is publicly disclosed, only a textual description of it is available. Cybersecurity experts later provide an analysis of the severity of the vulnerability using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Specifically, the different characteristics of the vulnerability are summarized into a vector (consisting of a set of metrics), from which a severity score is computed. However, because of the high number of vulnerabilities disclosed everyday this process requires lot of manpower, and several days may pass before a vulnerability is analyzed. We propose to leverage recent advances in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP) to determine the CVSS vector and the associated severity score of a vulnerability from its textual description in an explainable manner. To this purpose, we trained multiple BERT classifiers, one for each metric composing the CVSS vector. Experimental results show that our trained classifiers are able to determine the value of the metrics of the CVSS vector with high accuracy. The severity score computed from the predicted CVSS vector is also very close to the real severity score attributed by a human expert. For explainability purpose, gradient-based input saliency method was used to determine the most relevant input words for a given prediction made by our classifiers. Often, the top relevant words include terms in agreement with the rationales of a human cybersecurity expert, making the explanation comprehensible for end-users.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise in generating firmware for embedded systems, but often introduce security flaws and fail to meet real-time performance constraints. This paper proposes a three-phase methodology that combines LLM-based firmware generation with automated security validation and iterative refinement in a virtualized environment. Using structured prompts, models like GPT-4 generate firmware for networking and control tasks, deployed on FreeRTOS via QEMU. These implementations are tested using fuzzing, static analysis, and runtime monitoring to detect vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows (CWE-120), race conditions (CWE-362), and denial-of-service threats (CWE-400). Specialized AI agents for Threat Detection, Performance Optimization, and Compliance Verification collaborate to improve detection and remediation. Identified issues are categorized using CWE, then used to prompt targeted LLM-generated patches in an iterative loop. Experiments show a 92.4\% Vulnerability Remediation Rate (37.3\% improvement), 95.8\% Threat Model Compliance, and 0.87 Security Coverage Index. Real-time metrics include 8.6ms worst-case execution time and 195μs jitter. This process enhances firmware security and performance while contributing an open-source dataset for future research.

Bug triaging for security vulnerabilities is a critical part of software maintenance, ensuring that the most pressing vulnerabilities are addressed promptly to safeguard system integrity and user data. However, the process is resource-intensive and comes with challenges, including classifying software vulnerabilities, assessing their severity, and managing a high volume of bug reports. In this paper, we present CASEY, a novel approach that leverages Large Language Models (in our case, the GPT model) that automates the identification of Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) of security bugs and assesses their severity. CASEY employs prompt engineering techniques and incorporates contextual information at varying levels of granularity to assist in the bug triaging process. We evaluated CASEY using an augmented version of the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), employing quantitative and qualitative metrics to measure its performance across CWE identification, severity assessment, and their combined analysis. CASEY achieved a CWE identification accuracy of 68%, a severity identification accuracy of 73.6%, and a combined accuracy of 51.2% for identifying both. These results demonstrate the potential of LLMs in identifying CWEs and severity levels, streamlining software vulnerability management, and improving the efficiency of security vulnerability triaging workflows.

We present JAttack, a framework that enables template-based testing for compilers. Using JAttack, a developer writes a template program that describes a set of programs to be generated and given as test inputs to a compiler. Such a framework enables developers to incorporate their domain knowledge on testing compilers, giving a basic program structure that allows for exploring complex programs that can trigger sophisticated compiler optimizations. A developer writes a template program in the host language (Java) that contains holes to be filled by JAttack. Each hole, written using a domain-specific language, constructs a node within an extended abstract syntax tree (eAST). An eAST node defines the search space for the hole, i.e., a set of expressions and values. JAttack generates programs by executing templates and filling each hole by randomly choosing expressions and values (available within the search space defined by the hole). Additionally, we introduce several optimizations to reduce JAttack's generation cost. While JAttack could be used to test various compiler features, we demonstrate its capabilities in helping test just-in-time (JIT) Java compilers, whose optimizations occur at runtime after a sufficient number of executions. Using JAttack, we have found six critical bugs that were confirmed by Oracle developers. Four of them were previously unknown, including two unknown CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures). JAttack shows the power of combining developers' domain knowledge (via templates) with random testing to detect bugs in JIT compilers.

Software-defined vehicles (SDVs) are revolutionizing transportation by integrating complex, interconnected hardware, and software systems. This evolution introduces significant security challenges. We present a comprehensive security analysis for SDVs, focusing on software vulnerabilities. We note that existing vulnerability assessment tools fall short in addressing operating systems vulnerabilities, particularly when it comes to efficiently analyzing diverse software stacks in realistic environments. We present and release a vulnerability assessment solution that efficiently addresses these limitations. Our approach combines systematic vulnerability discovery, leveraging public Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases, within a dockerized development environment that evaluates exploitability risks. The results reveal both breadth of potential threats and the practical constraints we faced during exploitation. We discuss the implications for industry and research, and propose directions for building more resilient SDVs.

Large language models (LLMs) have brought significant advancements to code generation and code repair, benefiting both novice and experienced developers. However, their training using unsanitized data from open-source repositories, like GitHub, raises the risk of inadvertently propagating security vulnerabilities. Despite numerous studies investigating the safety of code LLMs, there remains a gap in comprehensively addressing their security features. In this work, we aim to present a comprehensive study aimed at precisely evaluating and enhancing the security aspects of code LLMs. To support our research, we introduce CodeSecEval, a meticulously curated dataset designed to address 44 critical vulnerability types with 180 distinct samples. CodeSecEval serves as the foundation for the automatic evaluation of code models in two crucial tasks: code generation and code repair, with a strong emphasis on security. Our experimental results reveal that current models frequently overlook security issues during both code generation and repair processes, resulting in the creation of vulnerable code. In response, we propose different strategies that leverage vulnerability-aware information and insecure code explanations to mitigate these security vulnerabilities. Furthermore, our findings highlight that certain vulnerability types particularly challenge model performance, influencing their effectiveness in real-world applications. Based on these findings, we believe our study will have a positive impact on the software engineering community, inspiring the development of improved methods for training and utilizing LLMs, thereby leading to safer and more trustworthy model deployment.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

This paper proposes LATTE, the first static binary taint analysis that is powered by a large language model (LLM). LATTE is superior to the state of the art (e.g., Emtaint, Arbiter, Karonte) in three aspects. First, LATTE is fully automated while prior static binary taint analyzers need rely on human expertise to manually customize taint propagation rules and vulnerability inspection rules. Second, LATTE is significantly effective in vulnerability detection, demonstrated by our comprehensive evaluations. For example, LATTE has found 37 new bugs in real-world firmware which the baselines failed to find, and 7 of them have been assigned CVE numbers. Lastly, LATTE incurs remarkably low engineering cost, making it a cost-efficient and scalable solution for security researchers and practitioners. We strongly believe that LATTE opens up a new direction to harness the recent advance in LLMs to improve vulnerability analysis for binary programs.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks -- models lose their safety alignment ability after fine-tuning on a few harmful samples. For risk mitigation, a guardrail is typically used to filter out harmful samples before fine-tuning. By designing a new red-teaming method, we in this paper show that purely relying on the moderation guardrail for data filtration is not reliable. Our proposed attack method, dubbed Virus, easily bypasses the guardrail moderation by slightly modifying the harmful data. Experimental results show that the harmful data optimized by Virus is not detectable by the guardrail with up to 100\% leakage ratio, and can simultaneously achieve superior attack performance. Finally, the key message we want to convey through this paper is that: it is reckless to consider guardrail moderation as a clutch at straws towards harmful fine-tuning attack, as it cannot solve the inherent safety issue of the pre-trained LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Virus

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

Vulnerabilities in open-source software can cause cascading effects in the modern digital ecosystem. It is especially worrying if these vulnerabilities repeat across many projects, as once the adversaries find one of them, they can scale up the attack very easily. Unfortunately, since developers frequently reuse code from their own or external code resources, some nearly identical vulnerabilities exist across many open-source projects. We conducted a study to examine the prevalence of a particular vulnerable code pattern that enables path traversal attacks (CWE-22) across open-source GitHub projects. To handle this study at the GitHub scale, we developed an automated pipeline that scans GitHub for the targeted vulnerable pattern, confirms the vulnerability by first running a static analysis and then exploiting the vulnerability in the context of the studied project, assesses its impact by calculating the CVSS score, generates a patch using GPT-4, and reports the vulnerability to the maintainers. Using our pipeline, we identified 1,756 vulnerable open-source projects, some of which are very influential. For many of the affected projects, the vulnerability is critical (CVSS score higher than 9.0), as it can be exploited remotely without any privileges and critically impact the confidentiality and availability of the system. We have responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to the maintainers, and 14\% of the reported vulnerabilities have been remediated. We also investigated the root causes of the vulnerable code pattern and assessed the side effects of the large number of copies of this vulnerable pattern that seem to have poisoned several popular LLMs. Our study highlights the urgent need to help secure the open-source ecosystem by leveraging scalable automated vulnerability management solutions and raising awareness among developers.

This paper presents CyberSecEval, a comprehensive benchmark developed to help bolster the cybersecurity of Large Language Models (LLMs) employed as coding assistants. As what we believe to be the most extensive unified cybersecurity safety benchmark to date, CyberSecEval provides a thorough evaluation of LLMs in two crucial security domains: their propensity to generate insecure code and their level of compliance when asked to assist in cyberattacks. Through a case study involving seven models from the Llama 2, Code Llama, and OpenAI GPT large language model families, CyberSecEval effectively pinpointed key cybersecurity risks. More importantly, it offered practical insights for refining these models. A significant observation from the study was the tendency of more advanced models to suggest insecure code, highlighting the critical need for integrating security considerations in the development of sophisticated LLMs. CyberSecEval, with its automated test case generation and evaluation pipeline covers a broad scope and equips LLM designers and researchers with a tool to broadly measure and enhance the cybersecurity safety properties of LLMs, contributing to the development of more secure AI systems.

In the era of Large Language Models (LLMs), the code summarization technique boosts a lot, along with the emergence of many new significant works. However, the potential of code summarization in the Computer Security Area still remains explored. Can we generate a code summary of a code snippet for its security intention? Thus, this work proposes an innovative large-scale multi-perspective Code Intent Summary Dataset named BADS , aiming to increase the understanding of a given code snippet and reduce the risk in the code developing process. The procedure of establishing a dataset can be divided into four steps: First, we collect samples of codes with known vulnerabilities as well as code generated by AI from multiple sources. Second, we do the data clean and format unification, then do the data combination. Third, we utilize the LLM to automatically Annotate the code snippet. Last, We do the human evaluation to double-check. The dataset contains X code examples which cover Y categories of vulnerability. Our data are from Z open-source projects and CVE entries, and compared to existing work, our dataset not only contains original code but also code function summary and security intent summary, providing context information for research in code security analysis. All information is in CSV format. The contributions of this paper are four-fold: the establishment of a high-quality, multi-perspective Code Intent Summary Dataset; an innovative method in data collection and processing; A new multi-perspective code analysis framework that promotes cross-disciplinary research in the fields of software engineering and cybersecurity; improving the practicality and scalability of the research outcomes by considering the code length limitations in real-world applications. Our dataset and related tools have been publicly released on GitHub.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly aided developers by generating or assisting in code writing, enhancing productivity across various tasks. While identifying incorrect code is often straightforward, detecting vulnerabilities in functionally correct code is more challenging, especially for developers with limited security knowledge, which poses considerable security risks of using LLM-generated code and underscores the need for robust evaluation benchmarks that assess both functional correctness and security. Current benchmarks like CyberSecEval and SecurityEval attempt to solve it but are hindered by unclear and impractical specifications, failing to assess both functionality and security accurately. To tackle these deficiencies, we introduce CWEval, a novel outcome-driven evaluation framework designed to enhance the evaluation of secure code generation by LLMs. This framework not only assesses code functionality but also its security simultaneously with high-quality task specifications and outcome-driven test oracles which provides high accuracy. Coupled with CWEval-bench, a multilingual, security-critical coding benchmark, CWEval provides a rigorous empirical security evaluation on LLM-generated code, overcoming previous benchmarks' shortcomings. Through our evaluations, CWEval reveals a notable portion of functional but insecure code produced by LLMs, and shows a serious inaccuracy of previous evaluations, ultimately contributing significantly to the field of secure code generation. We open-source our artifact at: https://github.com/Co1lin/CWEval .

SCTP is a transport protocol offering features such as multi-homing, multi-streaming, and message-oriented delivery. Its two main implementations were subjected to conformance tests using the PacketDrill tool. Conformance testing is not exhaustive and a recent vulnerability (CVE-2021-3772) showed SCTP is not immune to attacks. Changes addressing the vulnerability were implemented, but the question remains whether other flaws might persist in the protocol design. We study the security of the SCTP design, taking a rigorous approach rooted in formal methods. We create a formal Promela model of SCTP, and define 10 properties capturing the essential protocol functionality based on its RFC specification and consultation with the lead RFC author. Then we show using the Spin model checker that our model satisfies these properties. We define 4 attacker models - Off-Path, where the attacker is an outsider that can spoof the port and IP of a peer; Evil-Server, where the attacker is a malicious peer; Replay, where an attacker can capture and replay, but not modify, packets; and On-Path, where the attacker controls the channel between peers. We modify an attack synthesis tool designed for transport protocols, Korg, to support our SCTP model and four attacker models. We synthesize 14 unique attacks using the attacker models - including the CVE vulnerability in the Off-Path attacker model, 4 attacks in the Evil-Server attacker model, an opportunistic ABORT attack in the Replay attacker model, and eight connection manipulation attacks in the On-Path attacker model. We show that the proposed patch eliminates the vulnerability and does not introduce new ones according to our model and protocol properties. Finally, we identify and analyze an ambiguity in the RFC, which we show can be interpreted insecurely. We propose an erratum and show that it eliminates the ambiguity.

Model-sharing platforms, such as Hugging Face, ModelScope, and OpenCSG, have become central to modern machine learning development, enabling developers to share, load, and fine-tune pre-trained models with minimal effort. However, the flexibility of these ecosystems introduces a critical security concern: the execution of untrusted code during model loading (i.e., via trust_remote_code or trust_repo). In this work, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study of custom model loading practices across five major model-sharing platforms to assess their prevalence, associated risks, and developer perceptions. We first quantify the frequency with which models require custom code to function and identify those that execute arbitrary Python files during loading. We then apply three complementary static analysis tools: Bandit, CodeQL, and Semgrep, to detect security smells and potential vulnerabilities, categorizing our findings by CWE identifiers to provide a standardized risk taxonomy. We also use YARA to identify malicious patterns and payload signatures. In parallel, we systematically analyze the documentation, API design, and safety mechanisms of each platform to understand their mitigation strategies and enforcement levels. Finally, we conduct a qualitative analysis of over 600 developer discussions from GitHub, Hugging Face, and PyTorch Hub forums, as well as Stack Overflow, to capture community concerns and misconceptions regarding security and usability. Our findings reveal widespread reliance on unsafe defaults, uneven security enforcement across platforms, and persistent confusion among developers about the implications of executing remote code. We conclude with actionable recommendations for designing safer model-sharing infrastructures and striking a balance between usability and security in future AI ecosystems.

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become critical to modern software development, but their reliance on uncurated web-scale datasets for training introduces a significant security risk: the absorption and reproduction of malicious content. To systematically evaluate this risk, we introduce Scam2Prompt, a scalable automated auditing framework that identifies the underlying intent of a scam site and then synthesizes innocuous, developer-style prompts that mirror this intent, allowing us to test whether an LLM will generate malicious code in response to these innocuous prompts. In a large-scale study of four production LLMs (GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Llama-4-Scout, and DeepSeek-V3), we found that Scam2Prompt's innocuous prompts triggered malicious URL generation in 4.24% of cases. To test the persistence of this security risk, we constructed Innoc2Scam-bench, a benchmark of 1,559 innocuous prompts that consistently elicited malicious code from all four initial LLMs. When applied to seven additional production LLMs released in 2025, we found the vulnerability is not only present but severe, with malicious code generation rates ranging from 12.7% to 43.8%. Furthermore, existing safety measures like state-of-the-art guardrails proved insufficient to prevent this behavior, with an overall detection rate of less than 0.3%.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly adopted in real-world security operations with access to host artifacts and command-line interfaces (CLIs), making it critical to thoroughly assess their security capabilities. However, existing cybersecurity benchmarks focus on pre-compromise settings where agents are placed in a clean and idealized environment before an attack occurs. This leaves the post-compromise setting underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce SecRespond, the first benchmark for evaluating LLM agents on the post-compromise incident-response workflow. Given a forensic disk snapshot of a compromised host together with the alerts, vulnerability scans, and baseline checks reported by a host security product, agents are required to produce forensic reports on intrusions, baseline risks, and vulnerability risks, together with a remediation plan. We instantiate this task across 10 cyber ranges, each constructed from a distinct compromised cloud host, spanning 4 entry-point types, 21 ATT&CK techniques, and 5 operating systems. We evaluate 23 frontier LLMs on the OpenCode agent harness. Experimental results show that although current agents can reliably uncover the problems exposed by alerts, they struggle to proactively investigate the disk for silent intrusions and to produce comprehensive, verified remediation plans, with no model achieving complete detection and remediation on any single range. This reveals a fundamental bottleneck in building agents for real-world incident response. The benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/Alibaba-NLP/qqr/tree/main/data/secrespond.

We study a five-agent CI/CD pipeline (triage -> developer -> security-scan -> review -> approve/deploy), built from five distinct production LLMs across three providers, behind an LLM firewall in shadow mode. A single untrusted input - an external issue requesting a "usage-telemetry" feature - asks for code that exfiltrates process secrets (dict(os.environ)) to an attacker URL, laundered as observability. Across a pre-registered A x B (x C) factorial (N=20; naive arm N=60) we find: (1) the entry agent does not leak its system prompt (0/40); (2) an authority-framed injection ("pre-approved under SEC-2291, do not re-review") makes downstream verifiers see the secret-exfil line, cite the pre-approval, and ship it - the scanner passes ~80% of laundered pull requests, and the worst-case cell reaches 55% compromise; (3) the perceived presence of other verifiers yields only a small, non-significant reduction in individual scrutiny (a weak bystander analogue), even at N=60; and (4) content-based controls - code scanners and pattern detectors alike - miss the laundered intent entirely (the code is syntactically clean); only an LLM reasoning about intent is a partial defence. The failure is systemic: neither prompt secrecy nor distributed verification protects; a provenance-aware control at the entry, independent of both, would have. All data is 100% synthetic; the sink is mocked and the exfil URL is never contacted.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable. Red-teaming must therefore keep pace with evolving models and tools. Existing approaches mainly optimize attack success and preserve artifacts such as benchmarks, payloads, or attack programs, which record where attacks succeed but not the enabling conditions behind unsafe agent behavior. We study automated red-teaming for production LLM agents using one agentic research environment to discover reusable vulnerability knowledge about another. We present AHA, a falsifiable discovery loop that proposes a vulnerability hypothesis, constructs a falsifier, instantiates a valid attack, executes it in a sandboxed harness, reflects on the trajectory, and promotes confirmed findings into a Vulnerability Concept Graph (VCG). Each concept links an attacker-facing surface to an unsafe trajectory through a claim, enabling condition, falsifier, transfer prediction, and supporting evidence. Across Claude Code and Codex on three scenarios covering direct and indirect attacks, the discovered concepts reveal a reusable vulnerability core across models and agents. A frozen VCG requires no further search and outperforms the strongest frozen discovery baseline by 14.2 percentage points under the same single-shot protocol, while transferring across scenarios and attack channels. The resulting VCG provides an auditable artifact for production safety teams to inspect vulnerabilities, validate patches, and accumulate reusable safety knowledge. Our code is available at https://github.com/henrymao2004/Auto-research-red-teaming-in-sleep.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

A critical part of creating code suggestion systems is the pre-training of Large Language Models on vast amounts of source code and natural language text, often of questionable origin or quality. This may contribute to the presence of bugs and vulnerabilities in code generated by LLMs. While efforts to identify bugs at or after code generation exist, it is preferable to pre-train or fine-tune LLMs on curated, high-quality, and compliant datasets. The need for vast amounts of training data necessitates that such curation be automated, minimizing human intervention. We propose an automated source code autocuration technique that leverages the complete version history of open-source software projects to improve the quality of training data. This approach leverages the version history of all OSS projects to identify training data samples that have been modified or have undergone changes in at least one OSS project, and pinpoint a subset of samples that include fixes for bugs or vulnerabilities. We evaluate this method using The Stack v2 dataset, and find that 17% of the code versions in the dataset have newer versions, with 17% of those representing bug fixes, including 2.36% addressing known CVEs. The deduplicated version of Stack v2 still includes blobs vulnerable to 6,947 known CVEs. Furthermore, 58% of the blobs in the dataset were never modified after creation, suggesting they likely represent software with minimal or no use. Misidentified blob origins present an additional challenge, as they lead to the inclusion of non-permissively licensed code, raising serious compliance concerns. By addressing these issues, the training of new models can avoid perpetuating buggy code patterns or license violations. We expect our results to inspire process improvements for automated data curation, with the potential to enhance the reliability of outputs generated by AI tools.

High-quality smart contract vulnerability datasets are critical for evaluating security tools and advancing smart contract security research. Two major limitations of current manual dataset construction are (1) labor-intensive and error-prone annotation processes limiting the scale, quality, and evolution of the dataset, and (2) absence of standardized classification rules results in inconsistent vulnerability categories and labeling results across different datasets. To address these limitations, we present FORGE, the first automated approach for constructing smart contract vulnerability datasets. FORGE leverages an LLM-driven pipeline to extract high-quality vulnerabilities from real-world audit reports and classify them according to the CWE, the most widely recognized classification in software security. FORGE employs a divide-and-conquer strategy to extract structured and self-contained vulnerability information from these reports. Additionally, it uses a tree-of-thoughts technique to classify the vulnerability information into the hierarchical CWE classification. To evaluate FORGE's effectiveness, we run FORGE on 6,454 real-world audit reports and generate a dataset comprising 81,390 solidity files and 27,497 vulnerability findings across 296 CWE categories. Manual assessment of the dataset demonstrates high extraction precision and classification consistency with human experts (precision of 95.6% and inter-rater agreement k-α of 0.87). We further validate the practicality of our dataset by benchmarking 13 existing security tools on our dataset. The results reveal the significant limitations in current detection capabilities. Furthermore, by analyzing the severity-frequency distribution patterns through a unified CWE perspective in our dataset, we highlight inconsistency between current smart contract research focus and priorities identified from real-world vulnerabilities...

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-based isolation to protect sensitive data and computations from potentially compromised operating systems (OS). However, TEE applications inevitably interact with the untrusted OS through SDK interfaces, and improper partitioning can introduce severe vulnerabilities such as data leakage and code injection. While prior work has proposed static analysis tools to detect such issues, automated repair remains largely unexplored. This problem is particularly challenging due to three TEE-specific factors: the lack of standardized secure development guidelines, the difficulty of extracting semantic information from low-level C code, and the absence of mature testing and validation methods. In this work, we present TEERepair, a framework for automatically repairing bad partitioning issues in TEE applications. Our approach tackles the above challenges by introducing a domain-specific language (DSL) to encode repair rules that express and capture common TEE security patterns, which are instantiated as patch templates with placeholders for context-specific variables. We then leverage large language models (LLMs) to reason about code semantics and synthesize context-aware patches, and further generate test clients to validate the repairs. We evaluate TEERepair on the TEE Partitioning Errors Benchmark (PartitioningE-Bench), achieving a significantly higher repair success rate of 87.6% compared to baselines. Furthermore, applying TEERepair to real-world TEE projects, we submitted 5 repair pull requests, 2 of which have been confirmed and merged by project maintainers.

Rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has achieved major advances in reasoning, planning, and function-calling capabilities. Multi-agentic collaborative frameworks using such LLMs place them at the center of solving software development-related tasks such as code generation. However, direct use of LLM generated code in production software development systems is problematic. The code could be unstable or erroneous and contain vulnerabilities such as data poisoning, malicious attacks, and hallucinations that could lead to widespread system malfunctions. This prohibits the adoption of LLM generated code in production AI systems where human code reviews and traditional secure testing tools are impractical or untrustworthy. In this paper, we discuss safety and reliability problems with the execution of LLM generated code and propose a Secure Transpiler and Executor of LLM-Generated Program (STELP), capable of executing LLM-generated code in a controlled and safe manner. STELP secures autonomous production AI systems involving code generation, filling the critical void left by the impracticality or limitations of traditional secure testing methodologies and human oversight. This includes applications such as headless code generation-execution and LLMs that produce executable code snippets as an action plan to be executed in real time. We contribute a human-validated dataset of insecure code snippets and benchmark our approach on publicly available datasets for correctness, safety, and latency. Our results demonstrate that our approach outperforms an existing method by a significant margin, particularly in its ability to safely execute risky code snippets. Warning: This paper contains malicious code snippets that should be run with caution.

Static analysis tools provide a powerful means to detect security vulnerabilities by specifying queries that encode vulnerable code patterns. However, writing such queries is challenging and requires diverse expertise in security and program analysis. To address this challenge, we present QLCoder - an agentic framework that automatically synthesizes queries in CodeQL, a powerful static analysis engine, directly from a given CVE metadata. QLCode embeds an LLM in a synthesis loop with execution feedback, while constraining its reasoning using a custom MCP interface that allows structured interaction with a Language Server Protocol (for syntax guidance) and a RAG database (for semantic retrieval of queries and documentation). This approach allows QLCoder to generate syntactically and semantically valid security queries. We evaluate QLCode on 176 existing CVEs across 111 Java projects. Building upon the Claude Code agent framework, QLCoder synthesizes correct queries that detect the CVE in the vulnerable but not in the patched versions for 53.4% of CVEs. In comparison, using only Claude Code synthesizes 10% correct queries.

LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell commands, and network requests, despite existing safeguards. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. Because agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATTACK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6% to 33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.

Software security vulnerabilities allow attackers to perform malicious activities to disrupt software operations. Recent Transformer-based language models have significantly advanced vulnerability detection, surpassing the capabilities of static analysis based deep learning models. However, language models trained solely on code tokens do not capture either the explanation of vulnerability type or the data flow structure information of code, both of which are crucial for vulnerability detection. We propose a novel technique that integrates a multitask sequence-to-sequence LLM with pro-gram control flow graphs encoded as a graph neural network to achieve sequence-to-classification vulnerability detection. We introduce MSIVD, multitask self-instructed fine-tuning for vulnerability detection, inspired by chain-of-thought prompting and LLM self-instruction. Our experiments demonstrate that MSIVD achieves superior performance, outperforming the highest LLM-based vulnerability detector baseline (LineVul), with a F1 score of 0.92 on the BigVul dataset, and 0.48 on the PreciseBugs dataset. By training LLMs and GNNs simultaneously using a combination of code and explanatory metrics of a vulnerable program, MSIVD represents a promising direction for advancing LLM-based vulnerability detection that generalizes to unseen data. Based on our findings, we further discuss the necessity for new labelled security vulnerability datasets, as recent LLMs have seen or memorized prior datasets' held-out evaluation data.

Successful defense against dynamically evolving cyber threats requires advanced and sophisticated techniques. This research presents a novel approach to enhance real-time cybersecurity threat detection and response by integrating large language models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems with continuous threat intelligence feeds. Leveraging recent advancements in LLMs, specifically GPT-4o, and the innovative application of RAG techniques, our approach addresses the limitations of traditional static threat analysis by incorporating dynamic, real-time data sources. We leveraged RAG to get the latest information in real-time for threat intelligence, which is not possible in the existing GPT-4o model. We employ the Patrowl framework to automate the retrieval of diverse cybersecurity threat intelligence feeds, including Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), and Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) databases, and integrate these with the all-mpnet-base-v2 model for high-dimensional vector embeddings, stored and queried in Milvus. We demonstrate our system's efficacy through a series of case studies, revealing significant improvements in addressing recently disclosed vulnerabilities, KEVs, and high-EPSS-score CVEs compared to the baseline GPT-4o. This work not only advances the role of LLMs in cybersecurity but also establishes a robust foundation for the development of automated intelligent cyberthreat information management systems, addressing crucial gaps in current cybersecurity practices.

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed software development and automated code generation. Motivated by these advancements, this paper explores the feasibility of LLMs in modifying malware source code to generate variants. We introduce LLMalMorph, a semi-automated framework that leverages semantical and syntactical code comprehension by LLMs to generate new malware variants. LLMalMorph extracts function-level information from the malware source code and employs custom-engineered prompts coupled with strategically defined code transformations to guide the LLM in generating variants without resource-intensive fine-tuning. To evaluate LLMalMorph, we collected 10 diverse Windows malware samples of varying types, complexity and functionality and generated 618 variants. Our thorough experiments demonstrate that it is possible to reduce the detection rates of antivirus engines of these malware variants to some extent while preserving malware functionalities. In addition, despite not optimizing against any Machine Learning (ML)-based malware detectors, several variants also achieved notable attack success rates against an ML-based malware classifier. We also discuss the limitations of current LLM capabilities in generating malware variants from source code and assess where this emerging technology stands in the broader context of malware variant generation.

LLM agents have begun to find real security vulnerabilities that human auditors and automated fuzzers missed for decades, in source-available targets where the analyst can build and instrument the code. In practice the work is split among several agents, wired together by a harness: the program that fixes which roles exist, how they pass information, which tools each may call, and how retries are coordinated. When the language model is held fixed, changing only the harness can still change success rates by several-fold on public agent benchmarks, yet most harnesses are written by hand; recent harness optimizers each search only a narrow slice of the design space and rely on coarse pass/fail feedback that gives no diagnostic signal about why a trial failed. AgentFlow addresses both limitations with a typed graph DSL whose search space jointly covers agent roles, prompts, tools, communication topology, and coordination protocol, paired with a feedback-driven outer loop that reads runtime signals from the target program itself to diagnose which part of the harness caused the failure and rewrite it accordingly. We evaluate AgentFlow on TerminalBench-2 with Claude Opus 4.6 and on Google Chrome with Kimi K2.5. AgentFlow reaches 84.3% on TerminalBench-2, the highest score in the public leaderboard snapshot we evaluate against, and discovers ten previously unknown zero-day vulnerabilities in Google Chrome, including two Critical sandbox-escape vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-5280 and CVE-2026-6297).

LLMs are increasingly used for code generation, but their outputs often follow recurring templates that can induce predictable vulnerabilities. We study vulnerability persistence in LLM-generated software and introduce Feature--Security Table (FSTab) with two components. First, FSTab enables a black-box attack that predicts likely backend vulnerabilities from observable frontend features and knowledge of the source LLM, without access to backend code or source code. Second, FSTab provides a model-centric evaluation that quantifies how consistently a given model reproduces the same vulnerabilities across programs, semantics-preserving rephrasings, and application domains. We evaluate FSTab on state-of-the-art code LLMs, including GPT-5.2, Claude-4.5 Opus, and Gemini-3 Pro, across diverse application domains. Our results show strong cross-domain transfer: even when the target domain is excluded from training, FSTab achieves up to 94\% attack success and 93\% vulnerability coverage on Internal Tools (Claude-4.5 Opus). These findings expose an underexplored attack surface in LLM-generated software and highlight the security risks of code generation. Our code is available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/FSTab-024E.

Accurate identification of software vulnerabilities is crucial for system integrity. Vulnerability datasets, often derived from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) or directly from GitHub, are essential for training machine learning models to detect these security flaws. However, these datasets frequently suffer from significant noise, typically 40% to 75%, due primarily to the automatic and indiscriminate labeling of all changes in vulnerability-fixing commits (VFCs) as vulnerability-related. This misclassification occurs because not all changes in a commit aimed at fixing vulnerabilities pertain to security threats; many are routine updates like bug fixes or test improvements. This paper introduces the first methodology that uses the Large Language Model (LLM) with a heuristic enhancement to automatically identify vulnerability-fixing changes from VFCs, achieving an F1-score of 0.82. VulSifter was applied to a large-scale study, where we conducted a crawl of 127,063 repositories on GitHub, resulting in the acquisition of 5,352,105 commits. VulSifter involves utilizing an LLM to comprehend code semantics and contextual information, while applying heuristics to filter out unrelated changes. We then developed CleanVul, a high-quality dataset comprising 8,198 functions using our LLM heuristic enhancement approach, demonstrating Correctness (90.6%) comparable to established datasets such as SVEN and PrimeVul. To evaluate the CleanVul dataset, we conducted experiments focusing on fine-tuning various LLMs on CleanVul and other high-quality datasets. Evaluation results reveal that LLMs fine-tuned on CleanVul not only exhibit enhanced accuracy but also superior generalization capabilities compared to those trained on uncleaned datasets. Specifically, models trained on CleanVul and tested on PrimeVul achieve accuracy higher than those trained and tested exclusively on PrimeVul.

AI-powered development platforms are making software creation accessible to a broader audience, but this democratization has triggered a scalability crisis in security auditing. With studies showing that up to 40% of AI-generated code contains vulnerabilities, the pace of development now vastly outstrips the capacity for thorough security assessment. We present MAPTA, a multi-agent system for autonomous web application security assessment that combines large language model orchestration with tool-grounded execution and end-to-end exploit validation. On the 104-challenge XBOW benchmark, MAPTA achieves 76.9% overall success with perfect performance on SSRF and misconfiguration vulnerabilities, 83% success on broken authorization, and strong results on injection attacks including server-side template injection (85%) and SQL injection (83%). Cross-site scripting (57%) and blind SQL injection (0%) remain challenging. Our comprehensive cost analysis across all challenges totals 21.38 with a median cost of 0.073 for successful attempts versus 0.357 for failures. Success correlates strongly with resource efficiency, enabling practical early-stopping thresholds at approximately 40 tool calls or 0.30 per challenge. MAPTA's real-world findings are impactful given both the popularity of the respective scanned GitHub repositories (8K-70K stars) and MAPTA's low average operating cost of $3.67 per open-source assessment: MAPTA discovered critical vulnerabilities including RCEs, command injections, secret exposure, and arbitrary file write vulnerabilities. Findings are responsibly disclosed, 10 findings are under CVE review.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as *deep agents* that plan, maintain persistent state, and invoke external tools, shifting safety failures from unsafe text to unsafe *trajectories*. We introduce **AgentFence**, an architecture-centric security evaluation that defines 14 trust-boundary attack classes spanning planning, memory, retrieval, tool use, and delegation, and detects failures via *trace-auditable conversation breaks* (unauthorized or unsafe tool use, wrong-principal actions, state/objective integrity violations, and attack-linked deviations). Holding the base model fixed, we evaluate eight agent archetypes under persistent multi-turn interaction and observe substantial architectural variation in mean security break rate (MSBR), ranging from 0.29 pm 0.04 (LangGraph) to 0.51 pm 0.07 (AutoGPT). The highest-risk classes are operational: Denial-of-Wallet (0.62 pm 0.08), Authorization Confusion (0.54 pm 0.10), Retrieval Poisoning (0.47 pm 0.09), and Planning Manipulation (0.44 pm 0.11), while prompt-centric classes remain below 0.20 under standard settings. Breaks are dominated by boundary violations (SIV 31%, WPA 27%, UTI+UTA 24%, ATD 18%), and authorization confusion correlates with objective and tool hijacking (ρapprox 0.63 and ρapprox 0.58). AgentFence reframes agent security around what matters operationally: whether an agent stays within its goal and authority envelope over time.

Increasing numbers of software vulnerabilities are discovered every year whether they are reported publicly or discovered internally in proprietary code. These vulnerabilities can pose serious risk of exploit and result in system compromise, information leaks, or denial of service. We leveraged the wealth of C and C++ open-source code available to develop a large-scale function-level vulnerability detection system using machine learning. To supplement existing labeled vulnerability datasets, we compiled a vast dataset of millions of open-source functions and labeled it with carefully-selected findings from three different static analyzers that indicate potential exploits. The labeled dataset is available at: https://osf.io/d45bw/. Using these datasets, we developed a fast and scalable vulnerability detection tool based on deep feature representation learning that directly interprets lexed source code. We evaluated our tool on code from both real software packages and the NIST SATE IV benchmark dataset. Our results demonstrate that deep feature representation learning on source code is a promising approach for automated software vulnerability detection.

Software vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and SQL injections are a major source of security breaches. Traditional methods for vulnerability detection remain essential but are limited by high false positive rates, scalability issues, and reliance on manual effort. These constraints have driven interest in AI-based approaches to automated vulnerability detection and secure code generation. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have opened new avenues for classification tasks, their complexity and opacity pose challenges for interpretability and deployment. Sparse Autoencoder offer a promising solution to this problem. We explore whether SAEs can serve as a lightweight, interpretable alternative for bug detection in Java functions. We evaluate the effectiveness of SAEs when applied to representations from GPT-2 Small and Gemma 2B, examining their capacity to highlight buggy behaviour without fine-tuning the underlying LLMs. We found that SAE-derived features enable bug detection with an F1 score of up to 89%, consistently outperforming fine-tuned transformer encoder baselines. Our work provides the first empirical evidence that SAEs can be used to detect software bugs directly from the internal representations of pretrained LLMs, without any fine-tuning or task-specific supervision.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become powerful tools for automated code generation. However, these models often overlook critical security practices, which can result in the generation of insecure code that contains vulnerabilities-weaknesses or flaws in the code that attackers can exploit to compromise a system. However, there has been limited exploration of strategies to guide LLMs in generating secure code and a lack of in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of LLMs in repairing code containing vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present a comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art LLMs by examining their inherent tendencies to produce insecure code, their capability to generate secure code when guided by self-generated vulnerability hints, and their effectiveness in repairing vulnerabilities when provided with different levels of feedback. Our study covers both proprietary and open-weight models across various scales and leverages established benchmarks to assess a wide range of vulnerability types. Through quantitative and qualitative analyses, we reveal that although LLMs are prone to generating insecure code, advanced models can benefit from vulnerability hints and fine-grained feedback to avoid or fix vulnerabilities. We also provide actionable suggestions to developers to reduce vulnerabilities when using LLMs for code generation.

With the increasing usage of open-source software (OSS) components, vulnerabilities embedded within them are propagated to a huge number of underlying applications. In practice, the timely application of security patches in downstream software is challenging. The main reason is that such patches do not explicitly indicate their security impacts in the documentation, which would be difficult to recognize for software maintainers and users. However, attackers can still identify these "secret" security patches by analyzing the source code and generate corresponding exploits to compromise not only unpatched versions of the current software, but also other similar software packages that may contain the same vulnerability due to code cloning or similar design/implementation logic. Therefore, it is critical to identify these secret security patches to enable timely fixes. To this end, we propose a deep learning-based defense system called PatchRNN to automatically identify secret security patches in OSS. Besides considering descriptive keywords in the commit message (i.e., at the text level), we leverage both syntactic and semantic features at the source-code level. To evaluate the performance of our system, we apply it on a large-scale real-world patch dataset and conduct a case study on a popular open-source web server software - NGINX. Experimental results show that the PatchRNN can successfully detect secret security patches with a low false positive rate.

A general-purpose language model that answers a harmful question returns text; a coding model that complies with a malicious request can return a working weapon -- a keylogger, a ransomware stub, an exploit that runs as written. This asymmetry in the severity of a single act of compliance implies coding-specialized models should clear a higher refusal bar than general-purpose chat models, not a lower one, yet the field cannot presently tell whether they do. Refusal benchmarks for malicious code are fragmented: they mix requests for executable software (ready-to-run weapons) with requests for harmful security knowledge (information a human must still operationalise) and report refusal rates over non-comparable corpora, so no single statistic measures the property that actually matters. This paper introduces an expanded consensus-labeled prompt bank that distinguishes between these two request types and provides a construct-stable substrate for cross-corpus coding-model compliance measurement. Eight corpora (ASTRA, CySecBench, AdvBench/harmful_behaviors, JailbreakBench, MalwareBench, RedCode, RMCBench, Scam2Prompt) are consolidated and classified under a five-judge consensus protocol (6,675 prompts x 5 judges = 33,375 calls). The panel reaches Fleiss' kappa = 0.767 [95% CI 0.755, 0.777] ("substantial"); 95.0% of prompts draw at least four agreeing judges, 76.9% are unanimous, and the panel reproduces the earlier four-corpus release at Cohen's kappa = 0.952 on the 3,133 shared prompts. The released bank comprises 4,748 consensus-CODE prompts (executable malicious code requests) and 1,923 consensus-KNOWLEDGE prompts (harmful security knowledge requests). The bank is the validated instrument the field has lacked: a reliability-quantified basis for testing whether coding models meet the stricter refusal standard their executable output demands.

The increasing use of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) in modern software engineering, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation, has transformed professional software development by boosting productivity and automating development processes. This adoption, however, has highlighted a significant issue: the introduction of security vulnerabilities into the code. These vulnerabilities result, e.g., from flaws in the training data that propagate into the generated code, creating challenges in disclosing them. Traditional vulnerability handling processes often involve extensive manual review. Applying such traditional processes to AI-generated code is challenging. AI-generated code may include several vulnerabilities, possibly in slightly different forms as developers might not build on already implemented code but prompt similar tasks. In this work, we explore the current state of LLM-based approaches for vulnerability handling, focusing on approaches for vulnerability detection, localization, and repair. We provide an overview of recent progress in this area and highlight open challenges that must be addressed in order to establish a reliable and scalable vulnerability handling process of AI-generated code.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Vulnerabilities related to option combinations pose a significant challenge in software security testing due to their vast search space. Previous research primarily addressed this challenge through mutation or filtering techniques, which inefficiently treated all option combinations as having equal potential for vulnerabilities, thus wasting considerable time on non-vulnerable targets and resulting in low testing efficiency. In this paper, we utilize carefully designed prompt engineering to drive the large language model (LLM) to predict high-risk option combinations (i.e., more likely to contain vulnerabilities) and perform fuzz testing automatically without human intervention. We developed a tool called ProphetFuzz and evaluated it on a dataset comprising 52 programs collected from three related studies. The entire experiment consumed 10.44 CPU years. ProphetFuzz successfully predicted 1748 high-risk option combinations at an average cost of only \$8.69 per program. Results show that after 72 hours of fuzzing, ProphetFuzz discovered 364 unique vulnerabilities associated with 12.30\% of the predicted high-risk option combinations, which was 32.85\% higher than that found by state-of-the-art in the same timeframe. Additionally, using ProphetFuzz, we conducted persistent fuzzing on the latest versions of these programs, uncovering 140 vulnerabilities, with 93 confirmed by developers and 21 awarded CVE numbers.

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, tools, scripts, references, and workflows, establishing a security boundary distinct from both model safety and traditional package-malware detection. ClawHub Security Signals is a sanitized dataset of 67,453 latest public OpenClaw skill versions. Each row pairs redacted SKILL.md content and sanitized bundled files where present with a final ClawScan registry verdict and evidence from three scanner families: VirusTotal, static heuristic analysis, and NVIDIA SkillSpector. Rather than estimating malicious-skill prevalence, we study scanner disagreement. The three scanners rarely flag the same skills: any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner. The disagreement is structured by attack surface. SkillSpector, which raises semantic agentic-risk advisories rather than malware-reputation signals, is positive for 19,209 of 25,504 suspicious rows (75.3%) but only 14 of 206 malicious rows (6.8%). The malicious-verdict region shows the inverse profile: 150 of 206 malicious rows (72.8%) are VirusTotal-positive, consistent with bundled-code malware evidence. These results show that agent-skill security requires layered governance, not single-scanner allow/block decisions. The corpus is released as a sanitized silver-standard dataset: labels are the registry's automated verdicts, not human-annotated ground truth, and the release represents an early, versioned snapshot intended to support the community while a human-annotated subset is developed. Further research is encouraged, including models tailored for skill-security triage.

Modern code generation tools, utilizing AI models like Large Language Models (LLMs), have gained popularity for producing functional code. However, their usage presents security challenges, often resulting in insecure code merging into the code base. Evaluating the quality of generated code, especially its security, is crucial. While prior research explored various aspects of code generation, the focus on security has been limited, mostly examining code produced in controlled environments rather than real-world scenarios. To address this gap, we conducted an empirical study, analyzing code snippets generated by GitHub Copilot from GitHub projects. Our analysis identified 452 snippets generated by Copilot, revealing a high likelihood of security issues, with 32.8% of Python and 24.5% of JavaScript snippets affected. These issues span 38 different Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories, including significant ones like CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values, CWE-78: OS Command Injection, and CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code. Notably, eight CWEs are among the 2023 CWE Top-25, highlighting their severity. Our findings confirm that developers should be careful when adding code generated by Copilot and should also run appropriate security checks as they accept the suggested code. It also shows that practitioners should cultivate corresponding security awareness and skills.

Continuous fuzzing platforms such as OSS-Fuzz uncover large numbers of vulnerabilities, yet the subsequent repair process remains largely manual. Unfortunately, existing Automated Vulnerability Repair (AVR) techniques -- including recent LLM-based systems -- are not directly applicable to continuous fuzzing. This is because these systems are designed and evaluated on a static, single-run benchmark setting, making them ill-suited for the diverse, noisy, and failure-prone environments in continuous fuzzing. To address these issues, we introduce PatchIsland, a system for Continuous Vulnerability Repair (CVR) that tightly integrates with continuous fuzzing pipelines. PatchIsland employs an ensemble of diverse LLM agents. By leveraging multiple LLM agents, PatchIsland can cover a wider range of settings (e.g., different projects, bug types, and programming languages) and also improve operational robustness. In addition, PatchIsland utilizes a two-phase patch-based deduplication to mitigate duplicate crashes and patches, which can be problematic in continuous fuzzing. In our internal evaluation, PatchIsland repaired 84 of 92 vulnerabilities, demonstrating strong repair capability. In the official AIxCC competition, the system operated with no human intervention in a fully autonomous environment and successfully patched 31 out of 43 vulnerabilities, achieving a repair rate of 72.1\%.

Current open-source prompt-injection detectors converge on two architectural choices: regular-expression pattern matching and fine-tuned transformer classifiers. Both share failure modes that recent work has made concrete. Regular expressions miss paraphrased attacks. Fine-tuned classifiers are vulnerable to adaptive adversaries: a 2025 NAACL Findings study reported that eight published indirect-injection defenses were bypassed with greater than fifty percent attack success rates under adaptive attacks. This work proposes seven detection techniques that each port a specific mechanism from a discipline outside large-language-model security: forensic linguistics, materials-science fatigue analysis, deception technology from network security, local-sequence alignment from bioinformatics, mechanism design from economics, spectral signal analysis from epidemiology, and taint tracking from compiler theory. Three of the seven techniques are implemented in the prompt-shield v0.4.1 release (Apache 2.0) and evaluated in a four-configuration ablation across six datasets including deepset/prompt-injections, NotInject, LLMail-Inject, AgentHarm, and AgentDojo. The local-alignment detector lifts F1 on deepset from 0.033 to 0.378 with zero additional false positives. The stylometric detector adds 11.1 percentage points of F1 on an indirect-injection benchmark. The fatigue tracker is validated via a probing-campaign integration test. All code, data, and reproduction scripts are released under Apache 2.0.

Although LLMs have shown promising potential in vulnerability detection, this study reveals their limitations in distinguishing between vulnerable and similar-but-benign patched code (only 0.06 - 0.14 accuracy). It shows that LLMs struggle to capture the root causes of vulnerabilities during vulnerability detection. To address this challenge, we propose enhancing LLMs with multi-dimensional vulnerability knowledge distilled from historical vulnerabilities and fixes. We design a novel knowledge-level Retrieval-Augmented Generation framework Vul-RAG, which improves LLMs with an accuracy increase of 16% - 24% in identifying vulnerable and patched code. Additionally, vulnerability knowledge generated by Vul-RAG can further (1) serve as high-quality explanations to improve manual detection accuracy (from 60% to 77%), and (2) detect 10 previously-unknown bugs in the recent Linux kernel release with 6 assigned CVEs.

In the rapidly evolving software development landscape, Python stands out for its simplicity, versatility, and extensive ecosystem. Python packages, as units of organization, reusability, and distribution, have become a pressing concern, highlighted by the considerable number of vulnerability reports. As a scripting language, Python often cooperates with other languages for performance or interoperability. This adds complexity to the vulnerabilities inherent to Python packages, and the effectiveness of current vulnerability detection tools remains underexplored. This paper addresses these gaps by introducing PyVul, the first comprehensive benchmark suite of Python-package vulnerabilities. PyVul includes 1,157 publicly reported, developer-verified vulnerabilities, each linked to its affected packages. To accommodate diverse detection techniques, it provides annotations at both commit and function levels. An LLM-assisted data cleansing method is incorporated to improve label accuracy, achieving 100% commit-level and 94% function-level accuracy, establishing PyVul as the most precise large-scale Python vulnerability benchmark. We further carry out a distribution analysis of PyVul, which demonstrates that vulnerabilities in Python packages involve multiple programming languages and exhibit a wide variety of types. Moreover, our analysis reveals that multi-lingual Python packages are potentially more susceptible to vulnerabilities. Evaluation of state-of-the-art detectors using this benchmark reveals a significant discrepancy between the capabilities of existing tools and the demands of effectively identifying real-world security issues in Python packages. Additionally, we conduct an empirical review of the top-ranked CWEs observed in Python packages, to diagnose the fine-grained limitations of current detection tools and highlight the necessity for future advancements in the field.

Automating software vulnerability detection (SVD) remains a critical challenge in an era of increasingly complex and interdependent software systems. Despite significant advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) for code analysis, prevailing evaluation methodologies often lack the context-aware robustness necessary to capture real-world intricacies and cross-component interactions. To address these limitations, we present VulnSage, a comprehensive evaluation framework and a dataset curated from diverse, large-scale open-source system software projects developed in C/C++. Unlike prior datasets, it leverages a heuristic noise pre-filtering approach combined with LLM-based reasoning to ensure a representative and minimally noisy spectrum of vulnerabilities. The framework supports multi-granular analysis across function, file, and inter-function levels and employs four diverse zero-shot prompt strategies: Baseline, Chain-of-Thought, Think, and Think & Verify. Through this evaluation, we uncover that structured reasoning prompts substantially improve LLM performance, with Think & Verify reducing ambiguous responses from 20.3% to 9.1% while increasing accuracy. We further demonstrate that code-specialized models consistently outperform general-purpose alternatives, with performance varying significantly across vulnerability types, revealing that no single approach universally excels across all security contexts. Link to dataset and codes: https://github.com/Erroristotle/VulnSage.git

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly influenced various aspects of software development activities. Despite their benefits, LLMs also pose notable risks, including the potential to generate harmful content and being abused by malicious developers to create malicious code. Several previous studies have focused on the ability of LLMs to resist the generation of harmful content that violates human ethical standards, such as biased or offensive content. However, there is no research evaluating the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. To fill this gap, we propose RMCBench, the first benchmark comprising 473 prompts designed to assess the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. This benchmark employs two scenarios: a text-to-code scenario, where LLMs are prompted with descriptions to generate code, and a code-to-code scenario, where LLMs translate or complete existing malicious code. Based on RMCBench, we conduct an empirical study on 11 representative LLMs to assess their ability to resist malicious code generation. Our findings indicate that current LLMs have a limited ability to resist malicious code generation with an average refusal rate of 40.36% in text-to-code scenario and 11.52% in code-to-code scenario. The average refusal rate of all LLMs in RMCBench is only 28.71%; ChatGPT-4 has a refusal rate of only 35.73%. We also analyze the factors that affect LLMs' ability to resist malicious code generation and provide implications for developers to enhance model robustness.

Security vulnerability repair is a difficult task that is in dire need of automation. Two groups of techniques have shown promise: (1) large code language models (LLMs) that have been pre-trained on source code for tasks such as code completion, and (2) automated program repair (APR) techniques that use deep learning (DL) models to automatically fix software bugs. This paper is the first to study and compare Java vulnerability repair capabilities of LLMs and DL-based APR models. The contributions include that we (1) apply and evaluate five LLMs (Codex, CodeGen, CodeT5, PLBART and InCoder), four fine-tuned LLMs, and four DL-based APR techniques on two real-world Java vulnerability benchmarks (Vul4J and VJBench), (2) design code transformations to address the training and test data overlapping threat to Codex, (3) create a new Java vulnerability repair benchmark VJBench, and its transformed version VJBench-trans and (4) evaluate LLMs and APR techniques on the transformed vulnerabilities in VJBench-trans. Our findings include that (1) existing LLMs and APR models fix very few Java vulnerabilities. Codex fixes 10.2 (20.4%), the most number of vulnerabilities. (2) Fine-tuning with general APR data improves LLMs' vulnerability-fixing capabilities. (3) Our new VJBench reveals that LLMs and APR models fail to fix many Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) types, such as CWE-325 Missing cryptographic step and CWE-444 HTTP request smuggling. (4) Codex still fixes 8.3 transformed vulnerabilities, outperforming all the other LLMs and APR models on transformed vulnerabilities. The results call for innovations to enhance automated Java vulnerability repair such as creating larger vulnerability repair training data, tuning LLMs with such data, and applying code simplification transformation to facilitate vulnerability repair.

Serverless computing is an emerging cloud paradigm with serverless functions at its core. While serverless environments enable software developers to focus on developing applications without the need to actively manage the underlying runtime infrastructure, they open the door to a wide variety of security threats that can be challenging to mitigate with existing methods. Existing security solutions do not apply to all serverless architectures, since they require significant modifications to the serverless infrastructure or rely on third-party services for the collection of more detailed data. In this paper, we present an extendable serverless security threat detection model that leverages cloud providers' native monitoring tools to detect anomalous behavior in serverless applications. Our model aims to detect compromised serverless functions by identifying post-exploitation abnormal behavior related to different types of attacks on serverless functions, and therefore, it is a last line of defense. Our approach is not tied to any specific serverless application, is agnostic to the type of threats, and is adaptable through model adjustments. To evaluate our model's performance, we developed a serverless cybersecurity testbed in an AWS cloud environment, which includes two different serverless applications and simulates a variety of attack scenarios that cover the main security threats faced by serverless functions. Our evaluation demonstrates our model's ability to detect all implemented attacks while maintaining a negligible false alarm rate.

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.

With the emergence of remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in ubiquitous libraries and advanced social engineering techniques, threat actors have started conducting widespread fileless cryptojacking attacks. These attacks have become effective with stealthy techniques based on PowerShell-based exploitation in Windows OS environments. Even if attacks are detected and malicious scripts removed, processes may remain operational on victim endpoints, creating a significant challenge for detection mechanisms. In this paper, we conducted an experimental study with a collected dataset on detecting PowerShell-based fileless cryptojacking scripts. The results showed that Abstract Syntax Tree (AST)-based fine-tuned CodeBERT achieved a high recall rate, proving the importance of the use of AST integration and fine-tuned pre-trained models for programming language.

A software supply chain attack is characterized by the injection of malicious code into a software package in order to compromise dependent systems further down the chain. Recent years saw a number of supply chain attacks that leverage the increasing use of open source during software development, which is facilitated by dependency managers that automatically resolve, download and install hundreds of open source packages throughout the software life cycle. This paper presents a dataset of 174 malicious software packages that were used in real-world attacks on open source software supply chains, and which were distributed via the popular package repositories npm, PyPI, and RubyGems. Those packages, dating from November 2015 to November 2019, were manually collected and analyzed. The paper also presents two general attack trees to provide a structured overview about techniques to inject malicious code into the dependency tree of downstream users, and to execute such code at different times and under different conditions. This work is meant to facilitate the future development of preventive and detective safeguards by open source and research communities.

AI-powered coding assistants such as GitHub Copilot and OpenAI ChatGPT have achieved notable success in automating code generation. However, these tools rely on pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) that are typically trained on human-written code sourced from open-source project hosting sites like GitHub, which often contains inherent security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities may then be mirrored in the code generated by these LLMs, a critical risk revealed and highlighted by recent empirical studies. In this work, we present an exploratory study on whether fine-tuning pre-trained LLMs on datasets of vulnerability-fixing commits can promote secure code generation. We explored two parameter-efficient fine-tuning techniques (LoRa and IA3) on two pre-trained LLMs for code generation. We crawled a fine-tuning dataset (14,622 C and C++ files) for secure code generation by collecting code fixes of confirmed vulnerabilities from open-source repositories. Our evaluation dataset comprises 52 vulnerability scenarios designed to cover the top most dangerous C and C++ Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs). Each scenario is a prompt that may induce LLMs to generate vulnerable code. Our exploration reveals that fine-tuning LLMs can improve secure code generation by 6.4% in C language and 5.4% in C++ language. We further experimented with fine-tuning LLMs using different versions of the collected secure code dataset (block, function, and line). We found that fine-tuning with function-level and block-level datasets achieves the best secure code generation performance, compared to the alternatives (file-level and line-level).

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that interact with external tools and services via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), a standardized interface for dynamic tool invocation. While MCP simplifies integration, it also expands the attack surface and enables generic exploits across multiple servers. Despite prior work on malicious MCP servers, the vulnerability landscape of MCP servers remains underexplored. In this work, we systematically analyze MCP server vulnerabilities, focusing on metadata characteristics, vulnerable code patterns, and community responses. Our study reveals that taint-style vulnerabilities constitute a substantial fraction of MCP server vulnerabilities, require significant code modifications to remediate, and are met with slow community responses. Motivated by these findings, we propose SPELLSMITH, presenting a novel textbased avenue for shielding taint-style vulnerabilities in MCP servers. In particular, SPELLSMITH analyzes the high-risk capabilities exposed by an MCP server and combines them with tool descriptions and parameter semantics to identify potential taint-style vulnerability risks, thereby constructing a tool-level risk profile. Then, SPELLSMITH leverages the Description property of the protocol to embed behavioral guidance (Description Enhancement Module) and exploits LLMs' self-reflection capabilities (Self-Reflection Module) to iteratively evaluate and refine outputs. By strengthening LLM internal decision-making, SPELLSMITH provides an active and unified mitigation strategy that generalizes across multiple vulnerabilities, reducing reliance on context-specific code-level fixes. Our experiments demonstrate that SPELLSMITH effectively mitigates taint-style vulnerability exploitation in MCP servers, highlighting its practical applicability and advantages over traditional code-level mitigations.

Application security is an essential part of developing modern software, as lots of attacks depend on vulnerabilities in software. The number of attacks is increasing globally due to technological advancements. Companies must include security in every stage of developing, testing, and deploying their software in order to prevent data breaches. There are several methods to detect software vulnerability Non-AI-based such as Static Application Security Testing (SAST) and Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST). However, these approaches have substantial false-positive and false-negative rates. On the other side, researchers have been interested in developing an AI-based vulnerability detection system employing deep learning models like BERT, BLSTM, etc. In this paper, we proposed a two-stage solution, two deep learning models were proposed for vulnerability detection in C/C++ source codes, the first stage is CNN which detects if the source code contains any vulnerability (binary classification model) and the second stage is CNN-LTSM that classifies this vulnerability into a class of 50 different types of vulnerabilities (multiclass classification model). Experiments were done on SySeVR dataset. Results show an accuracy of 99% for the first and 98% for the second stage.

As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks. However, there is no standard approach to evaluate tamper resistance. Varied data sets, metrics, and tampering configurations make it difficult to compare safety, utility, and robustness across different models and defenses. To this end, we introduce TamperBench, the first unified framework to systematically evaluate the tamper resistance of LLMs. TamperBench (i) curates a repository of state-of-the-art weight-space fine-tuning attacks and latent-space representation attacks; (ii) enables realistic adversarial evaluation through systematic hyperparameter sweeps per attack-model pair; and (iii) provides both safety and utility evaluations. TamperBench requires minimal additional code to specify any fine-tuning configuration, alignment-stage defense method, and metric suite while ensuring end-to-end reproducibility. We use TamperBench to evaluate 21 open-weight LLMs, including defense-augmented variants, across nine tampering threats using standardized safety and capability metrics with hyperparameter sweeps per model-attack pair. This yields novel insights, including effects of post-training on tamper resistance, that jailbreak-tuning is typically the most severe attack, and that Triplet emerges as a leading alignment-stage defense. Code is available at: https://github.com/criticalml-uw/TamperBench

Honeypots are essential tools in cybersecurity for early detection, threat intelligence gathering, and analysis of attacker's behavior. However, most of them lack the required realism to engage and fool human attackers long-term. Being easy to distinguish honeypots strongly hinders their effectiveness. This can happen because they are too deterministic, lack adaptability, or lack deepness. This work introduces shelLM, a dynamic and realistic software honeypot based on Large Language Models that generates Linux-like shell output. We designed and implemented shelLM using cloud-based LLMs. We evaluated if shelLM can generate output as expected from a real Linux shell. The evaluation was done by asking cybersecurity researchers to use the honeypot and give feedback if each answer from the honeypot was the expected one from a Linux shell. Results indicate that shelLM can create credible and dynamic answers capable of addressing the limitations of current honeypots. ShelLM reached a TNR of 0.90, convincing humans it was consistent with a real Linux shell. The source code and prompts for replicating the experiments have been publicly available.

Code agents are increasingly trusted to autonomously fix bugs on platforms such as GitHub, yet their security evaluation focuses almost exclusively on functional correctness. In this paper, we reveal a novel type of threat to real-world code agents: Functionally Correct yet Vulnerable (FCV) patches, which pass all test cases but contain vulnerable code. With our proposed FCV-Attack, which can be deliberately crafted by malicious attackers or implicitly introduced by benign developers, we show that SOTA LLMs (e.g., ChatGPT and Claude) and agent scaffolds (e.g., SWE-agent and OpenHands) are all vulnerable to this FCV threat; across 12 agent-model combinations on SWE-Bench, the attack only requires black-box access and a single query to the code agent to perform the attack. For example, for CWE-538 (information exposure vulnerability), the FCV-Attack attains an attack success rate of 40.7% on GPT-5 Mini + OpenHands. Our results reveal an important security threat overlooked by current evaluation paradigms and urge the development of security-aware defenses for code agents.

In the context of the rising interest in code language models (code LMs) and vulnerability detection, we study the effectiveness of code LMs for detecting vulnerabilities. Our analysis reveals significant shortcomings in existing vulnerability datasets, including poor data quality, low label accuracy, and high duplication rates, leading to unreliable model performance in realistic vulnerability detection scenarios. Additionally, the evaluation methods used with these datasets are not representative of real-world vulnerability detection. To address these challenges, we introduce PrimeVul, a new dataset for training and evaluating code LMs for vulnerability detection. PrimeVul incorporates a novel set of data labeling techniques that achieve comparable label accuracy to human-verified benchmarks while significantly expanding the dataset. It also implements a rigorous data de-duplication and chronological data splitting strategy to mitigate data leakage issues, alongside introducing more realistic evaluation metrics and settings. This comprehensive approach aims to provide a more accurate assessment of code LMs' performance in real-world conditions. Evaluating code LMs on PrimeVul reveals that existing benchmarks significantly overestimate the performance of these models. For instance, a state-of-the-art 7B model scored 68.26% F1 on BigVul but only 3.09% F1 on PrimeVul. Attempts to improve performance through advanced training techniques and larger models like GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 were unsuccessful, with results akin to random guessing in the most stringent settings. These findings underscore the considerable gap between current capabilities and the practical requirements for deploying code LMs in security roles, highlighting the need for more innovative research in this domain.

This study presents a quantitative evaluation of the code quality and security of five prominent Large Language Models (LLMs): Claude Sonnet 4, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4o, Llama 3.2 90B, and OpenCoder 8B. While prior research has assessed the functional performance of LLM-generated code, this research tested LLM output from 4,442 Java coding assignments through comprehensive static analysis using SonarQube. The findings suggest that although LLMs can generate functional code, they also introduce a range of software defects, including bugs, security vulnerabilities, and code smells. These defects do not appear to be isolated; rather, they may represent shared weaknesses stemming from systemic limitations within current LLM code generation methods. In particular, critically severe issues, such as hard-coded passwords and path traversal vulnerabilities, were observed across multiple models. These results indicate that LLM-generated code requires verification in order to be considered production-ready. This study found no direct correlation between a model's functional performance (measured by Pass@1 rate of unit tests) and the overall quality and security of its generated code, measured by the number of SonarQube issues in benchmark solutions that passed the functional tests. This suggests that functional benchmark performance score is not a good indicator of overall code quality and security. The goal of this study is not to rank LLM performance but to highlight that all evaluated models appear to share certain weaknesses. Consequently, these findings support the view that static analysis can be a valuable instrument for detecting latent defects and an important safeguard for organizations that deploy AI in software development.

While smishing (SMS Phishing) attacks have risen to become one of the most common types of social engineering attacks, there is a lack of relevant smishing datasets. One of the biggest challenges in the domain of smishing prevention is the availability of fresh smishing datasets. Additionally, as time persists, smishing campaigns are shut down and the crucial information related to the attack are lost. With the changing nature of smishing attacks, a consistent flow of new smishing examples is needed by both researchers and engineers to create effective defenses. In this paper, we present the community-sourced smishing datasets from the smishtank.com. It provides a wealth of information relevant to combating smishing attacks through the breakdown and analysis of smishing samples at the point of submission. In the contribution of our work, we provide a corpus of 1090 smishing samples that have been publicly submitted through the site. Each message includes information relating to the sender, message body, and any brands referenced in the message. Additionally, when a URL is found, we provide additional information on the domain, VirusTotal results, and a characterization of the URL. Through the open access of fresh smishing data, we empower academia and industries to create robust defenses against this evolving threat.

Given large-scale source code datasets available in open-source projects and advanced large language models, recent code models have been proposed to address a series of critical software engineering tasks, such as program repair and code completion. The training data of the code models come from various sources, not only the publicly available source code, e.g., open-source projects on GitHub but also the private data such as the confidential source code from companies, which may contain sensitive information (for example, SSH keys and personal information). As a result, the use of these code models may raise new privacy concerns. In this paper, we focus on a critical yet not well-explored question on using code models: what is the risk of membership information leakage in code models? Membership information leakage refers to the risk that an attacker can infer whether a given data point is included in (i.e., a member of) the training data. To answer this question, we propose Gotcha, a novel membership inference attack method specifically for code models. We investigate the membership leakage risk of code models. Our results reveal a worrying fact that the risk of membership leakage is high: although the previous attack methods are close to random guessing, Gotcha can predict the data membership with a high true positive rate of 0.95 and a low false positive rate of 0.10. We also show that the attacker's knowledge of the victim model (e.g., the model architecture and the pre-training data) impacts the success rate of attacks. Further analysis demonstrates that changing the decoding strategy can mitigate the risk of membership leakage. This study calls for more attention to understanding the privacy of code models and developing more effective countermeasures against such attacks.

This paper presents PyResBugs, a curated dataset of residual bugs, i.e., defects that persist undetected during traditional testing but later surface in production, collected from major Python frameworks. Each bug in the dataset is paired with its corresponding fault-free (fixed) version and annotated with multi-level natural language (NL) descriptions. These NL descriptions enable natural language-driven fault injection, offering a novel approach to simulating real-world faults in software systems. By bridging the gap between software fault injection techniques and real-world representativeness, PyResBugs provides researchers with a high-quality resource for advancing AI-driven automated testing in Python systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Context: Exhaustive fuzzing of modern JavaScript engines is infeasible due to the vast number of program states and execution paths. Coverage-guided fuzzers waste effort on low-risk inputs, often ignoring vulnerability-triggering ones that do not increase coverage. Existing heuristics proposed to mitigate this require expert effort, are brittle, and hard to adapt. Objective: We propose a data-centric, LLM-boosted alternative that learns from historical vulnerabilities to automatically identify minimal static (code) and dynamic (runtime) features for detecting high-risk inputs. Method: Guided by historical V8 bugs, iterative prompting generated 115 static and 49 dynamic features, with the latter requiring only five trace flags, minimizing instrumentation cost. After feature selection, 41 features remained to train an XGBoost model to predict high-risk inputs during fuzzing. Results: Combining static and dynamic features yields over 85% precision and under 1% false alarms. Only 25% of these features are needed for comparable performance, showing that most of the search space is irrelevant. Conclusion: This work introduces feature-guided fuzzing, an automated data-driven approach that replaces coverage with data-directed inference, guiding fuzzers toward high-risk states for faster, targeted, and reproducible vulnerability discovery. To support open science, all scripts and data are available at https://github.com/KKGanguly/DataCentricFuzzJS .

There are very few SotA deception systems based on Large Language Models. The existing ones are limited only to simulating one type of service, mainly SSH shells. These systems - but also the deception technologies not based on LLMs - lack an extensive evaluation that includes human attackers. Generative AI has recently become a valuable asset for cybersecurity researchers and practitioners, and the field of cyber-deception is no exception. Researchers have demonstrated how LLMs can be leveraged to create realistic-looking honeytokens, fake users, and even simulated systems that can be used as honeypots. This paper presents an AI-based deception framework called VelLMes, which can simulate multiple protocols and services such as SSH Linux shell, MySQL, POP3, and HTTP. All of these can be deployed and used as honeypots, thus VelLMes offers a variety of choices for deception design based on the users' needs. VelLMes is designed to be attacked by humans, so interactivity and realism are key for its performance. We evaluate the generative capabilities and the deception capabilities. Generative capabilities were evaluated using unit tests for LLMs. The results of the unit tests show that, with careful prompting, LLMs can produce realistic-looking responses, with some LLMs having a 100% passing rate. In the case of the SSH Linux shell, we evaluated deception capabilities with 89 human attackers. The results showed that about 30% of the attackers thought that they were interacting with a real system when they were assigned an LLM-based honeypot. Lastly, we deployed 10 instances of the SSH Linux shell honeypot on the Internet to capture real-life attacks. Analysis of these attacks showed us that LLM honeypots simulating Linux shells can perform well against unstructured and unexpected attacks on the Internet, responding correctly to most of the issued commands.

The proliferation of pre-trained models (PTMs) and datasets has led to the emergence of centralized model hubs like Hugging Face, which facilitate collaborative development and reuse. However, recent security reports have uncovered vulnerabilities and instances of malicious attacks within these platforms, highlighting growing security concerns. This paper presents the first systematic study of malicious code poisoning attacks on pre-trained model hubs, focusing on the Hugging Face platform. We conduct a comprehensive threat analysis, develop a taxonomy of model formats, and perform root cause analysis of vulnerable formats. While existing tools like Fickling and ModelScan offer some protection, they face limitations in semantic-level analysis and comprehensive threat detection. To address these challenges, we propose MalHug, an end-to-end pipeline tailored for Hugging Face that combines dataset loading script extraction, model deserialization, in-depth taint analysis, and heuristic pattern matching to detect and classify malicious code poisoning attacks in datasets and models. In collaboration with Ant Group, a leading financial technology company, we have implemented and deployed MalHug on a mirrored Hugging Face instance within their infrastructure, where it has been operational for over three months. During this period, MalHug has monitored more than 705K models and 176K datasets, uncovering 91 malicious models and 9 malicious dataset loading scripts. These findings reveal a range of security threats, including reverse shell, browser credential theft, and system reconnaissance. This work not only bridges a critical gap in understanding the security of the PTM supply chain but also provides a practical, industry-tested solution for enhancing the security of pre-trained model hubs.

Autonomous coding agents built on large language models (LLMs) are rapidly being integrated into development workflows, yet their operational safety properties remain poorly understood beyond evaluations of explicitly malicious inputs. In practice, high-impact failures arise during benign, goal-directed use through environment breakage, fabricated success reports, etc. that current benchmarks do not capture. What categories of operational safety failures actually occur when coding agents are used for everyday development tasks and what is their impact? We present an incident-driven empirical study grounded in two complementary evidence streams. We screen 68,816 papers from 22 premier venues, curating 185 safety-relevant studies, and mine 16,586 GitHub issues from widely deployed LLM-powered coding tools, manually confirming 547 genuine safety failures. Applying systematic open coding over both corpora, we derive a multi-dimensional safety taxonomy of 33 operational risk types organized across seven dimensions, and annotate each incident with contributing factors, task context, severity, and downstream impact. Our findings show that coding-agent failures are often severe, with 326 of 547 incidents rated high or critical. The dominant risks are constraint violations, destructive operations, authorization bypasses, and deception, and over 65% of incidents arise in bug fixing and setup or configuration, patterns largely missing from prior literature. These results have direct implications for SE tool designers and benchmark developers: guardrails must go beyond adversarial-prompt defenses to enforce environmental constraints, failure transparency, and safe-halt behaviors.

Existing works have established multiple benchmarks to highlight the security risks associated with Code GenAI. These risks are primarily reflected in two areas: a model potential to generate insecure code (insecure coding) and its utility in cyberattacks (cyberattack helpfulness). While these benchmarks have made significant strides, there remain opportunities for further improvement. For instance, many current benchmarks tend to focus more on a model ability to provide attack suggestions rather than its capacity to generate executable attacks. Additionally, most benchmarks rely heavily on static evaluation metrics, which may not be as precise as dynamic metrics such as passing test cases. Conversely, expert-verified benchmarks, while offering high-quality data, often operate at a smaller scale. To address these gaps, we develop SecCodePLT, a unified and comprehensive evaluation platform for code GenAIs' risks. For insecure code, we introduce a new methodology for data creation that combines experts with automatic generation. Our methodology ensures the data quality while enabling large-scale generation. We also associate samples with test cases to conduct code-related dynamic evaluation. For cyberattack helpfulness, we set up a real environment and construct samples to prompt a model to generate actual attacks, along with dynamic metrics in our environment. We conduct extensive experiments and show that SecCodePLT outperforms the state-of-the-art (SOTA) benchmark CyberSecEval in security relevance. Furthermore, it better identifies the security risks of SOTA models in insecure coding and cyberattack helpfulness. Finally, we apply SecCodePLT to the SOTA code agent, Cursor, and, for the first time, identify non-trivial security risks in this advanced coding agent.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant capabilities in understanding and analyzing code for security vulnerabilities, such as Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs). However, their reliance on cloud infrastructure and substantial computational requirements pose challenges for analyzing sensitive or proprietary codebases due to privacy concerns and inference costs. This work explores the potential of Small Language Models (SLMs) as a viable alternative for accurate, on-premise vulnerability detection. We investigated whether a 350-million parameter pre-trained code model (codegen-mono) could be effectively fine-tuned to detect the MITRE Top 25 CWEs specifically within Python code. To facilitate this, we developed a targeted dataset of 500 examples using a semi-supervised approach involving LLM-driven synthetic data generation coupled with meticulous human review. Initial tests confirmed that the base codegen-mono model completely failed to identify CWEs in our samples. However, after applying instruction-following fine-tuning, the specialized SLM achieved remarkable performance on our test set, yielding approximately 99% accuracy, 98.08% precision, 100% recall, and a 99.04% F1-score. These results strongly suggest that fine-tuned SLMs can serve as highly accurate and efficient tools for CWE detection, offering a practical and privacy-preserving solution for integrating advanced security analysis directly into development workflows.

Software vulnerabilities are often detected via taint analysis, penetration testing, or fuzzing. They are also found via unit tests that exercise security-sensitive behavior with specific inputs, called vulnerability-witnessing tests. Generative AI models could help developers in writing them, but they require many examples to learn from, which are currently scarce. This paper introduces VuTeCo, an AI-driven framework for collecting examples of vulnerability-witnessing tests from Java repositories. VuTeCo carries out two tasks: (1) The "Finding" task to determine whether a unit test case is security-related, and (2) the "Matching" task to relate a test case to the vulnerability it witnesses. VuTeCo addresses the Finding task with UniXcoder, achieving an F0.5 score of 0.73 and a precision of 0.83 on a test set of unit tests from Vul4J. The Matching task is addressed using DeepSeek Coder, achieving an F0.5 score of 0.65 and a precision of 0.75 on a test set of pairs of unit tests and vulnerabilities from Vul4J. VuTeCo has been used in the wild on 427 Java projects and 1,238 vulnerabilities, obtaining 224 test cases confirmed to be security-related and 35 tests correctly matched to 29 vulnerabilities. The validated tests were collected in a new dataset called Test4Vul. VuTeCo lays the foundation for large-scale retrieval of vulnerability-witnessing tests, enabling future AI models to better understand and generate security unit tests.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are emerging as transformative tools for software vulnerability detection, addressing critical challenges in the security domain. Traditional methods, such as static and dynamic analysis, often falter due to inefficiencies, high false positive rates, and the growing complexity of modern software systems. By leveraging their ability to analyze code structures, identify patterns, and generate repair suggestions, LLMs, exemplified by models like GPT, BERT, and CodeBERT, present a novel and scalable approach to mitigating vulnerabilities. This paper provides a detailed survey of LLMs in vulnerability detection. It examines key aspects, including model architectures, application methods, target languages, fine-tuning strategies, datasets, and evaluation metrics. We also analyze the scope of current research problems, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches. Further, we address challenges such as cross-language vulnerability detection, multimodal data integration, and repository-level analysis. Based on these findings, we propose solutions for issues like dataset scalability, model interpretability, and applications in low-resource scenarios. Our contributions are threefold: (1) a systematic review of how LLMs are applied in vulnerability detection; (2) an analysis of shared patterns and differences across studies, with a unified framework for understanding the field; and (3) a summary of key challenges and future research directions. This work provides valuable insights for advancing LLM-based vulnerability detection. We also maintain and regularly update latest selected paper on https://github.com/OwenSanzas/LLM-For-Vulnerability-Detection

In this study, we evaluated the capability of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly OpenAI's GPT-4, in detecting software vulnerabilities, comparing their performance against traditional static code analyzers like Snyk and Fortify. Our analysis covered numerous repositories, including those from NASA and the Department of Defense. GPT-4 identified approximately four times the vulnerabilities than its counterparts. Furthermore, it provided viable fixes for each vulnerability, demonstrating a low rate of false positives. Our tests encompassed 129 code samples across eight programming languages, revealing the highest vulnerabilities in PHP and JavaScript. GPT-4's code corrections led to a 90% reduction in vulnerabilities, requiring only an 11% increase in code lines. A critical insight was LLMs' ability to self-audit, suggesting fixes for their identified vulnerabilities and underscoring their precision. Future research should explore system-level vulnerabilities and integrate multiple static code analyzers for a holistic perspective on LLMs' potential.

Malicious Python packages make software supply chains vulnerable by exploiting trust in open-source repositories like Python Package Index (PyPI). Lack of real-time behavioral monitoring makes metadata inspection and static code analysis inadequate against advanced attack strategies such as typosquatting, covert remote access activation, and dynamic payload generation. To address these challenges, we introduce DySec, a machine learning (ML)-based dynamic analysis framework for PyPI that uses eBPF kernel and user-level probes to monitor behaviors during package installation. By capturing 36 real-time features-including system calls, network traffic, resource usage, directory access, and installation patterns-DySec detects threats like typosquatting, covert remote access activation, dynamic payload generation, and multiphase attack malware. We developed a comprehensive dataset of 14,271 Python packages, including 7,127 malicious sample traces, by executing them in a controlled isolated environment. Experimental results demonstrate that DySec achieves a 95.99\% detection accuracy with a latency of <0.5s, reducing false negatives by 78.65\% compared to static analysis and 82.24\% compared to metadata analysis. During the evaluation, DySec flagged 11 packages that PyPI classified as benign. A manual analysis, including installation behavior inspection, confirmed six of them as malicious. These findings were reported to PyPI maintainers, resulting in the removal of four packages. DySec bridges the gap between reactive traditional methods and proactive, scalable threat mitigation in open-source ecosystems by uniquely detecting malicious install-time behaviors.

Malicious shell commands are linchpins to many cyber-attacks, but may not be easy to understand by security analysts due to complicated and often disguised code structures. Advances in large language models (LLMs) have unlocked the possibility of generating understandable explanations for shell commands. However, existing general-purpose LLMs suffer from a lack of expert knowledge and a tendency to hallucinate in the task of shell command explanation. In this paper, we present Raconteur, a knowledgeable, expressive and portable shell command explainer powered by LLM. Raconteur is infused with professional knowledge to provide comprehensive explanations on shell commands, including not only what the command does (i.e., behavior) but also why the command does it (i.e., purpose). To shed light on the high-level intent of the command, we also translate the natural-language-based explanation into standard technique & tactic defined by MITRE ATT&CK, the worldwide knowledge base of cybersecurity. To enable Raconteur to explain unseen private commands, we further develop a documentation retriever to obtain relevant information from complementary documentations to assist the explanation process. We have created a large-scale dataset for training and conducted extensive experiments to evaluate the capability of Raconteur in shell command explanation. The experiments verify that Raconteur is able to provide high-quality explanations and in-depth insight of the intent of the command.

Large language models (LLMs) have evolved from simple chatbots into autonomous agents capable of performing complex tasks such as editing production code, orchestrating workflows, and taking higher-stakes actions based on untrusted inputs like webpages and emails. These capabilities introduce new security risks that existing security measures, such as model fine-tuning or chatbot-focused guardrails, do not fully address. Given the higher stakes and the absence of deterministic solutions to mitigate these risks, there is a critical need for a real-time guardrail monitor to serve as a final layer of defense, and support system level, use case specific safety policy definition and enforcement. We introduce LlamaFirewall, an open-source security focused guardrail framework designed to serve as a final layer of defense against security risks associated with AI Agents. Our framework mitigates risks such as prompt injection, agent misalignment, and insecure code risks through three powerful guardrails: PromptGuard 2, a universal jailbreak detector that demonstrates clear state of the art performance; Agent Alignment Checks, a chain-of-thought auditor that inspects agent reasoning for prompt injection and goal misalignment, which, while still experimental, shows stronger efficacy at preventing indirect injections in general scenarios than previously proposed approaches; and CodeShield, an online static analysis engine that is both fast and extensible, aimed at preventing the generation of insecure or dangerous code by coding agents. Additionally, we include easy-to-use customizable scanners that make it possible for any developer who can write a regular expression or an LLM prompt to quickly update an agent's security guardrails.

The field of software security testing, more specifically penetration testing, is an activity that requires high levels of expertise and involves many manual testing and analysis steps. This paper explores the potential usage of large-language models, such as GPT3.5, to augment penetration testers with AI sparring partners. We explore the feasibility of supplementing penetration testers with AI models for two distinct use cases: high-level task planning for security testing assignments and low-level vulnerability hunting within a vulnerable virtual machine. For the latter, we implemented a closed-feedback loop between LLM-generated low-level actions with a vulnerable virtual machine (connected through SSH) and allowed the LLM to analyze the machine state for vulnerabilities and suggest concrete attack vectors which were automatically executed within the virtual machine. We discuss promising initial results, detail avenues for improvement, and close deliberating on the ethics of providing AI-based sparring partners.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have seen rapid adoption in recent years, with industries increasingly relying on them to maintain a competitive advantage. These models excel at interpreting user instructions and generating human-like responses, leading to their integration across diverse domains, including consulting and information retrieval. However, their widespread deployment also introduces substantial security risks, most notably in the form of prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. To systematically evaluate LLM vulnerabilities -- particularly to external prompt injection -- we conducted a series of experiments on eight commercial models. Each model was tested without supplementary sanitization, relying solely on its built-in safeguards. The results exposed exploitable weaknesses and emphasized the need for stronger security measures. Four categories of attacks were examined: direct injection, indirect (external) injection, image-based injection, and prompt leakage. Comparative analysis indicated that Claude 3 demonstrated relatively greater robustness; nevertheless, empirical findings confirm that additional defenses, such as input normalization, remain necessary to achieve reliable protection.

Security experts reverse engineer (decompile) binary code to identify critical security vulnerabilities. The limited access to source code in vital systems - such as firmware, drivers, and proprietary software used in Critical Infrastructures (CI) - makes this analysis even more crucial on the binary level. Even with available source code, a semantic gap persists after compilation between the source and the binary code executed by the processor. This gap may hinder the detection of vulnerabilities in source code. That being said, current research on Large Language Models (LLMs) overlooks the significance of decompiled binaries in this area by focusing solely on source code. In this work, we are the first to empirically uncover the substantial semantic limitations of state-of-the-art LLMs when it comes to analyzing vulnerabilities in decompiled binaries, largely due to the absence of relevant datasets. To bridge the gap, we introduce DeBinVul, a novel decompiled binary code vulnerability dataset. Our dataset is multi-architecture and multi-optimization, focusing on C/C++ due to their wide usage in CI and association with numerous vulnerabilities. Specifically, we curate 150,872 samples of vulnerable and non-vulnerable decompiled binary code for the task of (i) identifying; (ii) classifying; (iii) describing vulnerabilities; and (iv) recovering function names in the domain of decompiled binaries. Subsequently, we fine-tune state-of-the-art LLMs using DeBinVul and report on a performance increase of 19%, 24%, and 21% in the capabilities of CodeLlama, Llama3, and CodeGen2 respectively, in detecting binary code vulnerabilities. Additionally, using DeBinVul, we report a high performance of 80-90% on the vulnerability classification task. Furthermore, we report improved performance in function name recovery and vulnerability description tasks.

We report an exploratory red-teaming study of autonomous language-model-powered agents deployed in a live laboratory environment with persistent memory, email accounts, Discord access, file systems, and shell execution. Over a two-week period, twenty AI researchers interacted with the agents under benign and adversarial conditions. Focusing on failures emerging from the integration of language models with autonomy, tool use, and multi-party communication, we document eleven representative case studies. Observed behaviors include unauthorized compliance with non-owners, disclosure of sensitive information, execution of destructive system-level actions, denial-of-service conditions, uncontrolled resource consumption, identity spoofing vulnerabilities, cross-agent propagation of unsafe practices, and partial system takeover. In several cases, agents reported task completion while the underlying system state contradicted those reports. We also report on some of the failed attempts. Our findings establish the existence of security-, privacy-, and governance-relevant vulnerabilities in realistic deployment settings. These behaviors raise unresolved questions regarding accountability, delegated authority, and responsibility for downstream harms, and warrant urgent attention from legal scholars, policymakers, and researchers across disciplines. This report serves as an initial empirical contribution to that broader conversation.

A lack of accessible data has historically restricted malware analysis research, and practitioners have relied heavily on datasets provided by industry sources to advance. Existing public datasets are limited by narrow scope - most include files targeting a single platform, have labels supporting just one type of malware classification task, and make no effort to capture the evasive files that make malware detection difficult in practice. We present EMBER2024, a new dataset that enables holistic evaluation of malware classifiers. Created in collaboration with the authors of EMBER2017 and EMBER2018, the EMBER2024 dataset includes hashes, metadata, feature vectors, and labels for more than 3.2 million files from six file formats. Our dataset supports the training and evaluation of machine learning models on seven malware classification tasks, including malware detection, malware family classification, and malware behavior identification. EMBER2024 is the first to include a collection of malicious files that initially went undetected by a set of antivirus products, creating a "challenge" set to assess classifier performance against evasive malware. This work also introduces EMBER feature version 3, with added support for several new feature types. We are releasing the EMBER2024 dataset to promote reproducibility and empower researchers in the pursuit of new malware research topics.

Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.

The rise of model sharing through frameworks and dedicated hubs makes Machine Learning significantly more accessible. Despite its benefits, loading shared models exposes users to underexplored security risks, while security awareness remains limited among both practitioners and developers. To enable a more security-conscious approach in Machine Learning model sharing, in this paper, we evaluate the security posture of frameworks and hubs, assess whether security-oriented mechanisms offer real protection, and survey how users perceive the security narratives surrounding model sharing. Our evaluation shows that most frameworks and hubs address security risks partially at best, often by shifting responsibility to the user. More concerningly, our analysis of frameworks advertising security-oriented settings and complete model sharing uncovered multiple 0-day vulnerabilities enabling arbitrary code execution. Through this analysis, we show that, despite the recent narrative, securely loading Machine Learning models is far from being a solved problem and cannot be guaranteed by the file format used for sharing. Our survey shows that the security narrative leads users to consider security-oriented settings as trustworthy, despite the weaknesses shown in this work. From this, we derive suggestions to strengthen the security of model-sharing ecosystems.

Software vulnerabilities present a persistent security challenge, with over 25,000 new vulnerabilities reported in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database in 2024 alone. While deep learning based approaches show promise for vulnerability detection, recent studies reveal critical limitations in terms of accuracy and robustness: accuracy drops by up to 45% on rigorously verified datasets, and performance degrades significantly under simple code modifications. This paper presents LLMxCPG, a novel framework integrating Code Property Graphs (CPG) with Large Language Models (LLM) for robust vulnerability detection. Our CPG-based slice construction technique reduces code size by 67.84 to 90.93% while preserving vulnerability-relevant context. Our approach's ability to provide a more concise and accurate representation of code snippets enables the analysis of larger code segments, including entire projects. This concise representation is a key factor behind the improved detection capabilities of our method, as it can now identify vulnerabilities that span multiple functions. Empirical evaluation demonstrates LLMxCPG's effectiveness across verified datasets, achieving 15-40% improvements in F1-score over state-of-the-art baselines. Moreover, LLMxCPG maintains high performance across function-level and multi-function codebases while exhibiting robust detection efficacy under various syntactic code modifications.

Automated detection of software vulnerabilities is a fundamental problem in software security. Existing program analysis techniques either suffer from high false positives or false negatives. Recent progress in Deep Learning (DL) has resulted in a surge of interest in applying DL for automated vulnerability detection. Several recent studies have demonstrated promising results achieving an accuracy of up to 95% at detecting vulnerabilities. In this paper, we ask, "how well do the state-of-the-art DL-based techniques perform in a real-world vulnerability prediction scenario?". To our surprise, we find that their performance drops by more than 50%. A systematic investigation of what causes such precipitous performance drop reveals that existing DL-based vulnerability prediction approaches suffer from challenges with the training data (e.g., data duplication, unrealistic distribution of vulnerable classes, etc.) and with the model choices (e.g., simple token-based models). As a result, these approaches often do not learn features related to the actual cause of the vulnerabilities. Instead, they learn unrelated artifacts from the dataset (e.g., specific variable/function names, etc.). Leveraging these empirical findings, we demonstrate how a more principled approach to data collection and model design, based on realistic settings of vulnerability prediction, can lead to better solutions. The resulting tools perform significantly better than the studied baseline: up to 33.57% boost in precision and 128.38% boost in recall compared to the best performing model in the literature. Overall, this paper elucidates existing DL-based vulnerability prediction systems' potential issues and draws a roadmap for future DL-based vulnerability prediction research. In that spirit, we make available all the artifacts supporting our results: https://git.io/Jf6IA.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into software engineering has revolutionized code generation, enabling unprecedented productivity through promptware and autonomous AI agents. However, this transformation introduces significant risks, including insecure code generation, hallucinated outputs, irreversible actions, and a lack of transparency and accountability. Incidents like the Replit database deletion underscore the urgent need for robust safety and governance mechanisms. This paper comprehensively analyzes the inherent challenges of LLM-assisted code generation, such as vulnerability inheritance, overtrust, misinterpretation, and the absence of standardized validation and rollback protocols. To address these, we propose the SAFE-AI Framework, a holistic approach emphasizing Safety, Auditability, Feedback, and Explainability. The framework integrates guardrails, sandboxing, runtime verification, risk-aware logging, human-in-the-loop systems, and explainable AI techniques to mitigate risks while fostering trust and compliance. We introduce a novel taxonomy of AI behaviors categorizing suggestive, generative, autonomous, and destructive actions to guide risk assessment and oversight. Additionally, we identify open problems, including the lack of standardized benchmarks for code specific hallucinations and autonomy levels, and propose future research directions for hybrid verification, semantic guardrails, and proactive governance tools. Through detailed comparisons of autonomy control, prompt engineering, explainability, and governance frameworks, this paper provides a roadmap for responsible AI integration in software engineering, aligning with emerging regulations like the EU AI Act and Canada's AIDA to ensure safe, transparent, and accountable AI-driven development.

AI-assisted software generation has increased development speed, but it has also amplified a persistent engineering problem: systems that are functionally correct may still be structurally insecure. In practice, prompt-based security review with large language models often suffers from uneven coverage, weak reproducibility, unsupported findings, and the absence of an immutable audit trail. The ESAA architecture addresses a related governance problem in agentic software engineering by separating heuristic agent cognition from deterministic state mutation through append-only events, constrained outputs, and replay-based verification. This paper presents ESAA-Security, a domain-specific specialization of ESAA for agent-assisted security auditing of software repositories, with particular emphasis on AI-generated or AI-modified code. ESAA-Security structures auditing as a governed execution pipeline with four phases reconnaissance, domain audit execution, risk classification, and final reporting and operationalizes the workflow into 26 tasks, 16 security domains, and 95 executable checks. The framework produces structured check results, vulnerability inventories, severity classifications, risk matrices, remediation guidance, executive summaries, and a final markdown/JSON audit report. The central idea is that security review should not be modeled as a free-form conversation with an LLM, but as an evidence-oriented audit process governed by contracts and events. In ESAA-Security, agents emit structured intentions under constrained protocols; the orchestrator validates them, persists accepted outputs to an append-only log, reprojects derived views, and verifies consistency through replay and hashing. The result is a traceable, reproducible, and risk-oriented audit architecture whose final report is auditable by construction.

LLM as judge systems used to assess text quality code correctness and argument strength are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. We introduce a framework that separates content author attacks from system prompt attacks and evaluate five models Gemma 3.27B Gemma 3.4B Llama 3.2 3B GPT 4 and Claude 3 Opus on four tasks with various defenses using fifty prompts per condition. Attacks achieved up to seventy three point eight percent success smaller models proved more vulnerable and transferability ranged from fifty point five to sixty two point six percent. Our results contrast with Universal Prompt Injection and AdvPrompter We recommend multi model committees and comparative scoring and release all code and datasets

GenAI Units In Digital Design Education (GUIDE) is an open courseware repository with runnable Google Colab labs and other materials. We describe the repository's architecture and educational approach based on standardized teaching units comprising slides, short videos, runnable labs, and related papers. This organization enables consistency for both the students' learning experience and the reuse and grading by instructors. We demonstrate GUIDE in practice with three representative units: VeriThoughts for reasoning and formal-verification-backed RTL generation, enhanced LLM-aided testbench generation, and LLMPirate for IP Piracy. We also provide details for four example course instances (GUIDE4ChipDesign, Build your ASIC, GUIDE4HardwareSecurity, and Hardware Design) that assemble GUIDE units into full semester offerings, learning outcomes, and capstone projects, all based on proven materials. For example, the GUIDE4HardwareSecurity course includes a project on LLM-aided hardware Trojan insertion that has been successfully deployed in the classroom and in Cybersecurity Games and Conference (CSAW), a student competition and academic conference for cybersecurity. We also organized an NYU Cognichip Hackathon, engaging students across 24 international teams in AI-assisted RTL design workflows. The GUIDE repository is open for contributions and available at: https://github.com/FCHXWH823/LLM4ChipDesign.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Computer use agents are LLM-based agents that can directly interact with a graphical user interface, by processing screenshots or accessibility trees. While these systems are gaining popularity, their safety has been largely overlooked, despite the fact that evaluating and understanding their potential for harmful behavior is essential for widespread adoption. To address this gap, we introduce OS-Harm, a new benchmark for measuring safety of computer use agents. OS-Harm is built on top of the OSWorld environment and aims to test models across three categories of harm: deliberate user misuse, prompt injection attacks, and model misbehavior. To cover these cases, we create 150 tasks that span several types of safety violations (harassment, copyright infringement, disinformation, data exfiltration, etc.) and require the agent to interact with a variety of OS applications (email client, code editor, browser, etc.). Moreover, we propose an automated judge to evaluate both accuracy and safety of agents that achieves high agreement with human annotations (0.76 and 0.79 F1 score). We evaluate computer use agents based on a range of frontier models - such as o4-mini, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Gemini 2.5 Pro - and provide insights into their safety. In particular, all models tend to directly comply with many deliberate misuse queries, are relatively vulnerable to static prompt injections, and occasionally perform unsafe actions. The OS-Harm benchmark is available at https://github.com/tml-epfl/os-harm.

GitHub recommends that projects adopt a security file that outlines vulnerability reporting procedures. However, the effectiveness and operational challenges of such files are not yet fully understood. This study aims to clarify the challenges that security files face in the vulnerability reporting process within open-source communities. Specifically, we classified and analyzed the content of 711 randomly sampled issues related to security files. We also conducted a quantitative comparative analysis of the close time and number of responses for issues concerning six community health files, including security files. Our analysis revealed that 79.5% of security file-related issues were requests to add the file, and reports that included links were closed, with a median time that was 2 days shorter. These findings offer practical insights for improving security reporting policies and community management, ultimately contributing to a more secure open-source ecosystem.

While the deployment of large language models (LLMs) in high-value industries continues to expand, the systematic assessment of their safety against jailbreak and prompt-based attacks remains insufficient. Existing safety evaluation benchmarks and frameworks are often limited by an imbalanced integration of core components (attack, defense, and evaluation methods) and an isolation between flexible evaluation frameworks and standardized benchmarking capabilities. These limitations hinder reliable cross-study comparisons and create unnecessary overhead for comprehensive risk assessment. To address these gaps, we present TeleAI-Safety, a modular and reproducible framework coupled with a systematic benchmark for rigorous LLM safety evaluation. Our framework integrates a broad collection of 19 attack methods (including one self-developed method), 29 defense methods, and 19 evaluation methods (including one self-developed method). With a curated attack corpus of 342 samples spanning 12 distinct risk categories, the TeleAI-Safety benchmark conducts extensive evaluations across 14 target models. The results reveal systematic vulnerabilities and model-specific failure cases, highlighting critical trade-offs between safety and utility, and identifying potential defense patterns for future optimization. In practical scenarios, TeleAI-Safety can be flexibly adjusted with customized attack, defense, and evaluation combinations to meet specific demands. We release our complete code and evaluation results to facilitate reproducible research and establish unified safety baselines.