Daily Papers

Monitoring the chain-of-thought (CoT) of reasoning models is a promising approach for detecting covert misbehavior (i.e., hidden objectives) in code generation tasks. While large models (GPT-5, Gemini-3-Flash) can serve as effective CoT monitors, they are expensive to deploy due to the lengthy reasoning traces and high API cost, emphasizing the need for smaller, cheaper alternatives. Nevertheless, we find that current small models (4B--8B) struggle to detect hidden objectives despite access to the CoT, frequently misattributing them as part of the user query. To address this, we propose a post-training pipeline combining supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL), where SFT narrows the gap for in-domain tasks by distilling detection behavior from stronger monitors, and RL on hard and subtly crafted hidden objectives helps the model generalize to out-of-domain monitoring tasks. To validate this generalization, we evaluate under a realistic threat model motivated by practical supply-chain attacks, where the adversary is a third-party LLM router injecting hidden objectives into code-generation requests through either prompt manipulation or code manipulation attacks. To push beyond objectives that large monitors already saturate, we also introduce four new challenging tasks even for strong monitors. Finally, we introduce CoT-Guard, a 4B-parameter monitor that demonstrates superior generalization performance under both prompt and code manipulation attacks, achieving a G-mean^2 (i.e., TNR x TPR) of 75% and outperforming GPT-5.4 (56%), GPT-5-mini (41%), and Qwen3-32B (54%), while closing the gap to Gemini-3-Flash (83%). These results demonstrate that CoT-Guard provides a practical and cost-effective user-side defense, substantially improving hidden-objective detection while avoiding the deployment cost of large monitors.

Unlearning in Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for protecting private data and removing harmful knowledge. Most existing approaches rely on fine-tuning to balance unlearning efficiency with general language capabilities. However, these methods typically require training or access to retain data, which is often unavailable in real world scenarios. Although these methods can perform well when both forget and retain data are available, few works have demonstrated equivalent capability in more practical, data-limited scenarios. To overcome these limitations, we propose Detect-Reasoning Augmented GeneratiON (DRAGON), a systematic, reasoning-based framework that utilizes in-context chain-of-thought (CoT) instructions to guard deployed LLMs before inference. Instead of modifying the base model, DRAGON leverages the inherent instruction-following ability of LLMs and introduces a lightweight detection module to identify forget-worthy prompts without any retain data. These are then routed through a dedicated CoT guard model to enforce safe and accurate in-context intervention. To robustly evaluate unlearning performance, we introduce novel metrics for unlearning performance and the continual unlearning setting. Extensive experiments across three representative unlearning tasks validate the effectiveness of DRAGON, demonstrating its strong unlearning capability, scalability, and applicability in practical scenarios.

Existing forgery detection methods are often limited to uni-modal or bi-modal settings, failing to handle the interleaved text, images, and videos prevalent in real-world misinformation. To bridge this gap, this paper targets to develop a unified framework for omnibus vision-language forgery detection and grounding. In this unified setting, the {interplay} between diverse modalities and the dual requirements of simultaneous detection and localization pose a critical ``difficulty bias`` problem: the simpler veracity classification task tends to dominate the gradients, leading to suboptimal performance in fine-grained grounding during multi-task optimization. To address this challenge, we propose OmniVL-Guard, a balanced reinforcement learning framework for omnibus vision-language forgery detection and grounding. Particularly, OmniVL-Guard comprises two core designs: Self-Evolving CoT Generatio and Adaptive Reward Scaling Policy Optimization (ARSPO). {Self-Evolving CoT Generation} synthesizes high-quality reasoning paths, effectively overcoming the cold-start challenge. Building upon this, {Adaptive Reward Scaling Policy Optimization (ARSPO)} dynamically modulates reward scales and task weights, ensuring a balanced joint optimization. Extensive experiments demonstrate that OmniVL-Guard significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods and exhibits zero-shot robust generalization across out-of-domain scenarios.

As LLMs increasingly impact safety-critical applications, ensuring their safety using guardrails remains a key challenge. This paper proposes GuardReasoner, a new safeguard for LLMs, by guiding the guard model to learn to reason. Concretely, we first create the GuardReasonerTrain dataset, which consists of 127K samples with 460K detailed reasoning steps. Then, we introduce reasoning SFT to unlock the reasoning capability of guard models. In addition, we present hard sample DPO to further strengthen their reasoning ability. In this manner, GuardReasoner achieves better performance, explainability, and generalizability. Extensive experiments and analyses on 13 benchmarks of 3 guardrail tasks demonstrate its superiority. Remarkably, GuardReasoner 8B surpasses GPT-4o+CoT by 5.74% and LLaMA Guard 3 8B by 20.84% F1 score on average. We release the training data, code, and models with different scales (1B, 3B, 8B) of GuardReasoner : https://github.com/yueliu1999/GuardReasoner/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated powerful capabilities that render them valuable in different applications, including conversational AI products. It is paramount to ensure the security and reliability of these products by mitigating their vulnerabilities towards malicious user interactions, which can lead to the exposure of great risks and reputational repercussions. In this work, we present a comprehensive study on the efficacy of fine-tuning and aligning Chain-of-Thought (CoT) responses of different LLMs that serve as input moderation guardrails. We systematically explore various tuning methods by leveraging a small set of training data to adapt these models as proxy defense mechanisms to detect malicious inputs and provide a reasoning for their verdicts, thereby preventing the exploitation of conversational agents. We rigorously evaluate the efficacy and robustness of different tuning strategies to generalize across diverse adversarial and malicious query types. Our experimental results outline the potential of alignment processes tailored to a varied range of harmful input queries, even with constrained data resources. These techniques significantly enhance the safety of conversational AI systems and provide a feasible framework for deploying more secure and trustworthy AI-driven interactions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are typically aligned for safety during the post-training phase; however, they may still generate inappropriate outputs that could potentially pose risks to users. This challenge underscores the need for robust safeguards that operate across both model inputs and outputs. In this work, we introduce Roblox Guard 1.0, a state-of-the-art instruction fine-tuned LLM designed to enhance the safety of LLM systems through comprehensive input-output moderation, using a pipeline of LLMs to enhance moderation capability. Built on the Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct backbone, our model is instruction fine-tuned to generalize across previously unseen safety taxonomies and demonstrates strong performance on out-of-domain safety benchmarks. The instruction fine-tuning process uses a mix of synthetic and open-source safety datasets, augmented with chain-of-thought (CoT) rationales and input inversion to enhance contextual understanding and decision making. To support systematic evaluation, we also release RobloxGuard-Eval, a new benchmark featuring an extensible safety taxonomy to assess the effectiveness of LLM guardrails and moderation frameworks.

Large language models are typically trained on vast amounts of data during the pre-training phase, which may include some potentially harmful information. Fine-tuning attacks can exploit this by prompting the model to reveal such behaviours, leading to the generation of harmful content. In this paper, we focus on investigating the performance of the Chain of Thought based reasoning model, DeepSeek, when subjected to fine-tuning attacks. Specifically, we explore how fine-tuning manipulates the model's output, exacerbating the harmfulness of its responses while examining the interaction between the Chain of Thought reasoning and adversarial inputs. Through this study, we aim to shed light on the vulnerability of Chain of Thought enabled models to fine-tuning attacks and the implications for their safety and ethical deployment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs -- e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)" -- which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations supporting those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. CoT is promising for explainability, but our results highlight the need for targeted efforts to evaluate and improve explanation faithfulness.

Emerging large reasoning models (LRMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 models, leverage long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to generate structured intermediate steps, enhancing their reasoning capabilities. However, long CoT does not inherently guarantee safe outputs, potentially leading to harmful consequences such as the introduction of security vulnerabilities in code or the spread of misinformation. Current research on large language model (LLM) safety usually focuses on short-answer responses, overlooking the long CoT style outputs of LRMs. To bridge this gap, we conduct a systematic study of LRM safety. First, we investigate safety evaluators calibrated against human annotations. Using our newly developed metrics, we thoroughly assess the safety of 12 state-of-the-art LRMs on StrongReject and WildJailbreak datasets. Our results show that LRMs are not safe compared to their reasoning advance. Further, we perform a fine-grained analysis of the reasoning trace and final answer. We find that three decoding strategies-ZeroThink, LessThink, and MoreThink-can improve model safety without additional training. However, these strategies either use constrained reasoning traces or incur high inference costs. To better strengthen LRM safety, we introduce SafeChain, the first-of-its-kind safety training dataset in CoT style. We fine-tune two LRMs with SafeChain, showing that it not only enhances model safety but also preserves performance across 6 reasoning benchmarks.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in code generation, they often struggle with the deep, long-horizon reasoning required for complex software engineering. We attribute this limitation to the nature of standard pre-training data: static software repositories represent only the terminal state of an intricate intellectual process, abstracting away the intermediate planning, debugging, and iterative refinement. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel paradigm: understanding via reconstruction. We hypothesize that reverse-engineering the latent agentic trajectories -- the planning, reasoning, and debugging steps -- behind static repositories provides a far richer supervision signal than raw code alone. To operationalize this, we introduce a framework that synthesizes these trajectories using a multi-agent simulation. This process is grounded in the structural realities of the source repositories (e.g., dependency graphs and file hierarchies) to ensure fidelity. Furthermore, to guarantee the logical rigor of the synthetic data, we employ a search-based optimization technique that iteratively refines the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning to maximize the likelihood of the ground-truth code. Empirical results demonstrate that continuous pre-training on these reconstructed trajectories significantly enhances Llama-3-8B's performance across diverse benchmarks, including long-context understanding, coding proficiency, and agentic capabilities.

Scaling inference compute enhances reasoning in large language models (LLMs), with long chains-of-thought (CoTs) enabling strategies like backtracking and error correction. Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a crucial method for developing these capabilities, yet the conditions under which long CoTs emerge remain unclear, and RL training requires careful design choices. In this study, we systematically investigate the mechanics of long CoT reasoning, identifying the key factors that enable models to generate long CoT trajectories. Through extensive supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and RL experiments, we present four main findings: (1) While SFT is not strictly necessary, it simplifies training and improves efficiency; (2) Reasoning capabilities tend to emerge with increased training compute, but their development is not guaranteed, making reward shaping crucial for stabilizing CoT length growth; (3) Scaling verifiable reward signals is critical for RL. We find that leveraging noisy, web-extracted solutions with filtering mechanisms shows strong potential, particularly for out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks such as STEM reasoning; and (4) Core abilities like error correction are inherently present in base models, but incentivizing these skills effectively for complex tasks via RL demands significant compute, and measuring their emergence requires a nuanced approach. These insights provide practical guidance for optimizing training strategies to enhance long CoT reasoning in LLMs. Our code is available at: https://github.com/eddycmu/demystify-long-cot.