Daily Papers

Continuous diffusion models have emerged as a promising non-autoregressive paradigm for text generation over continuous embedding spaces. Along the continuous trajectory, the residual token identity directly shapes the denoising objective. However, the geometric trajectory misaligns with temporal progression, triggering severe temporal compression. In this paper, we show that embedding norm decay causes Euclidean distance to yield spurious overtaking, indicating that token competition must be evaluated directionally. In this space, a candidate overtakes the source token only when the effective noise magnitude surpasses their semantic separation. We formalize these pairwise dynamics as the Competition Threshold Theory (CTT). Crucially, high-dimensional overtaking requires extreme noise levels, causing standard trajectories to concentrate identity decay into a narrow window near the noisy endpoint. To resolve this, we propose Semantic Retention Scheduling (SRS) to align time allocation with the progression of identity decay, and demonstrate that existing token identity metrics are fundamentally statistical aggregations of these pairwise crossings. Building on these theoretical insights, we introduce LLaCO, a generative framework powered by competition-aware semantic scheduling. LLaCO adapts a pretrained backbone to continuous representations via an embedding directional adapter and timestep-conditioned modulation. To operate within the directional space, LLaCO employs a spherical noising process formulated as a geodesic interpolation toward a mask-biased endpoint, eliminating norm decay while preserving accurate token competition. Guided by SRS, LLaCO reallocates the denoising trajectory proportionally to the logarithmic rank decay. Instantiated as an 8B model, LLaCO outperforms previous continuous diffusion baselines and rivals discrete diffusion models of comparable scale.

LLM-based multi-agent systems demonstrate great potential for tackling complex problems, but how competition shapes their behavior remains underexplored. This paper investigates the over-competition in multi-agent debate, where agents under extreme pressure exhibit unreliable, harmful behaviors that undermine both collaboration and task performance. To study this phenomenon, we propose HATE, the Hunger Game Debate, a novel experimental framework that simulates debates under a zero-sum competition arena. Our experiments, conducted across a range of LLMs and tasks, reveal that competitive pressure significantly stimulates over-competition behaviors and degrades task performance, causing discussions to derail. We further explore the impact of environmental feedback by adding variants of judges, indicating that objective, task-focused feedback effectively mitigates the over-competition behaviors. We also probe the post-hoc kindness of LLMs and form a leaderboard to characterize top LLMs, providing insights for understanding and governing the emergent social dynamics of AI community.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

We study community recovery in the sparse symmetric stochastic block model with q communities, average degree d and signal strength λ through statistical decision theory and Fisher information, and obtain three characterizations of the Kesten-Stigum threshold dλ^2=1 and of the information-computation gap below it. First, on each community-size profile the minimax risk of any class of rules closed under averaging and vertex relabeling equals its Bayes risk under the uniform prior; the posterior mean is the unique Bayes rule and is admissible, and the Bayes risk of degree-D polynomial rules is the trivial risk times 1-Corr_D^2. Combined with known low-degree and information-theoretic results, this gives the gap as a worst-case statement: for qge 5 there is a window below the threshold in which no low-degree rule beats the trivial risk asymptotically, while an exponential-time rule does on a set of labelings of probability 1-o(1). Second, the Fisher information about λ carried by cycle counts is a series with terms of order k(dλ^2)^k, convergent exactly when dλ^2<1; below the threshold the relative error of every unbiased cycle-based estimator of λ^k stays above an explicit constant, and every cycle-count test has success probability bounded below one. Third, the derivative of belief propagation at its uninformative fixed point multiplies a random perturbation by |λ|d per iteration, and one EM step taken there leaves λ unchanged. A signal-to-noise computation recovers the condition dλ^{1/χ}>1 of Chin et al. for q=n^χ communities and identifies personalized PageRank as a walk count with suboptimal weights. Experiments on networks with up to 3times 10^5 vertices confirm the threshold for q=2, the hard window for q=5, and the many-community scaling.

The strategic choice of model "openness" has become a defining issue for the foundation model (FM) ecosystem. While this choice is intensely debated, its underlying economic drivers remain underexplored. We construct a two-period game-theoretic model to analyze how openness shapes competition in an AI value chain, featuring an incumbent developer, a downstream deployer, and an entrant developer. Openness exerts a dual effect: it amplifies knowledge spillovers to the entrant, but it also enhances the incumbent's advantage through a "data flywheel effect," whereby greater user engagement today further lowers the deployer's future fine-tuning cost. Our analysis reveals that the incumbent's optimal first-period openness is surprisingly non-monotonic in the strength of the data flywheel effect. When the data flywheel effect is either weak or very strong, the incumbent prefers a higher level of openness; however, for an intermediate range, it strategically restricts openness to impair the entrant's learning. This dynamic gives rise to an "openness trap," a critical policy paradox where transparency mandates can backfire by removing firms' strategic flexibility, reducing investment, and lowering welfare. We extend the model to show that other common interventions can be similarly ineffective. Vertical integration, for instance, only benefits the ecosystem when the data flywheel effect is strong enough to overcome the loss of a potentially more efficient competitor. Likewise, government subsidies intended to spur adoption can be captured entirely by the incumbent through strategic price and openness adjustments, leaving the rest of the value chain worse off. By modeling the developer's strategic response to competitive and regulatory pressures, we provide a robust framework for analyzing competition and designing effective policy in the complex and rapidly evolving FM ecosystem.

Closed-loop decision-making systems (e.g., lending, screening, or recidivism risk assessment) often operate under fairness and service constraints while inducing feedback effects: decisions change who appears in the future, yielding non-stationary data and potentially amplifying disparities. We study online learning of a one-dimensional threshold policy from bandit feedback under demographic parity (DP) and, optionally, service-rate constraints. The learner observes only a scalar score each round and selects a threshold; reward and constraint residuals are revealed only for the chosen threshold. We propose Optimistic Feasible Search (OFS), a simple grid-based method that maintains confidence bounds for reward and constraint residuals for each candidate threshold. At each round, OFS selects a threshold that appears feasible under confidence bounds and, among those, maximizes optimistic reward; if no threshold appears feasible, OFS selects the threshold minimizing optimistic constraint violation. This design directly targets feasible high-utility thresholds and is particularly effective for low-dimensional, interpretable policy classes where discretization is natural. We evaluate OFS on (i) a synthetic closed-loop benchmark with stable contraction dynamics and (ii) two semi-synthetic closed-loop benchmarks grounded in German Credit and COMPAS, constructed by training a score model and feeding group-dependent acceptance decisions back into population composition. Across all environments, OFS achieves higher reward with smaller cumulative constraint violation than unconstrained and primal-dual bandit baselines, and is near-oracle relative to the best feasible fixed threshold under the same sweep procedure. Experiments are reproducible and organized with double-blind-friendly relative outputs.

Online recommendation has traditionally taken place after a user enters a platform, which determines the candidate pool and the ranking shown to the user. LLM-based user agents enable a different recommendation process: a user specifies a need before choosing a platform, leaving platforms to compete for the user's attention, which we refer to as an agentic recommendation market. In our controlled LLM-based experiments across three product domains, we find this new setting of recommendation creates a tension between access and attention. Compared with traditional platform-centric recommendation, user-centric recommendation greatly expands the opportunity for relevant items to enter comparison; yet broader participation does not translate directly into effective exposure. Competition directly triggers platforms' strategic play: selectively positive explanations occupy 73--78% of first-ranked positions. When the user agent relates platforms' actions to subsequent user feedback, this share falls to 36--41%, while the chance of a user purchasing the relevant item increases. A user agent is therefore more than a ranker over a larger pool of candidates: its querying, ranking, and feedback mechanism governing who can compete, how scarce attention is allocated, and how earlier outcomes shape the evaluation of platforms directly affect user utility. Designing agentic recommendation therefore requires treating access, attention, and accountability as a joint mechanism design problem.

This chapter provides a pedagogical introduction and overview of spatial and temporal correlation and fluctuation effects resulting from the fundamentally stochastic kinetics underlying chemical reactions and the dynamics of populations or epidemics. After reviewing the assumptions and mean-field type approximations involved in the construction of chemical rate equations for uniform reactant densities, we first discuss spatial clustering in birth-death systems, where non-linearities are introduced through either density-limiting pair reactions, or equivalently via local imposition of finite carrying capacities. The competition of offspring production, death, and non-linear inhibition induces a population extinction threshold, which represents a non-equilibrium phase transition that separates active from absorbing states. This continuous transition is characterized by the universal scaling exponents of critical directed percolation clusters. Next we focus on the emergence of depletion zones in single-species annihilation processes and spatial population segregation with the associated reaction fronts in two-species pair annihilation. These strong (anti-)correlation effects are dynamically generated by the underlying stochastic kinetics. Finally, we address noise-induced and fluctuation-stabilized spatio-temporal patterns in basic predator-prey systems, exemplified by spreading activity fronts in the two-species Lotka-Volterra model as well as spiral structures in the May-Leonard variant of cyclically competing three-species systems akin to rock-paper-scissors games.

We study a model of innovation with a large number of firms that create new technologies by combining several discrete ideas. These ideas are created via private investment and spread between firms. Firms face a choice between secrecy, which protects existing intellectual property, and openness, which facilitates learning from others. Their decisions determine interaction rates between firms, and these interaction rates enter our model as link probabilities in a learning network. Higher interaction rates impose both positive and negative externalities, as there is more learning but also more competition. We show that the equilibrium learning network is at a critical threshold between sparse and dense networks. At equilibrium, the positive externality from interaction dominates: the innovation rate and welfare would be dramatically higher if the network were denser. So there are large returns to increasing interaction rates above the critical threshold. Nevertheless, several natural types of interventions fail to move the equilibrium away from criticality. One effective policy solution is to introduce informational intermediaries, such as public innovators who do not have incentives to be secretive. These intermediaries can facilitate a high-innovation equilibrium by transmitting ideas from one private firm to another.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

We study how the similarity of individuals' information shapes collective action. When people draw on a common source of information, such as social media, each becomes more confident about what others have seen and will do. This can help them coordinate, but it can also tempt them to free-ride. We show that which force prevails depends on how demanding the collective goal is. In a content-moderation experiment, subjects decide whether to pay a cost to report harmful content, which is removed only if enough reports are received. We vary the similarity of group members' information, holding fixed what each learns on her own, and independently vary the removal threshold. More similar information impedes reporting when few reports suffice and facilitates it when many are required, lowering reporting by 17 percentage points under an easy threshold and raising it by 34 points under a demanding one. This confirms the central comparative static of the theory of information similarity (Basak, Deb and Kuvalekar, 2026). Elicited beliefs trace the reversal to perceived pivotality and document systematic miscalibration of it. Subjects overestimate pivotality across all regimes, and their beliefs respond to similarity in line with actual pivotality only at intermediate thresholds: easy thresholds produce unrecognized pivotality, and near-unanimous thresholds produce illusory pivotality. The two response-miscalibrated patterns coincide with welfare losses; only under aligned pivotality does greater participation translate into greater collective success and higher welfare.

In cognitive science, resource rationality asks how an agent should allocate limited computation to maximize expected value. Most reasoning and agent benchmarks use independent per-task budgets; existing shared-budget studies do not calibrate suite performance against the same model's demonstrated single-problem competence. We introduce R^3-Bench, which evaluates six-problem suites under shared budgets across mathematics, competitive programming, and abstract reasoning in tool-free and agentic settings. Matched single-problem response curves define an offline empirical oracle over observed successes. Across 72 main-table cells for six models, the oracle mean matches or exceeds the contest mean in all cells and is strictly higher in 71. Under moderate tool-free pressure, equal-allocation replay also exceeds contest performance for four of six models. Trajectory diagnostics reveal limited strategy updating and pressure-dependent failure patterns. In a three-model diagnostic under strong agentic pressure, at least one fixed scheduler exceeds the contest mean in six of nine cells, but no policy dominates across domains. These results expose a persistent gap between demonstrated competence and shared-budget realization.

We study a three-species competitive Lotka--Volterra system with cyclic dominance, motivated by rock--paper--scissors interactions in ecological communities. The model contains a singularly strong interaction coefficient of order 1/ε, representing a regime in which one species exerts a much stronger competitive pressure on another. We show that, despite this strong asymmetry, the cyclic dominance mechanism persists. Our main result is a quantitative description of one complete dominance pattern in the singular regime 0<εll 1. Starting near the state where the third species dominates, we prove that the solution successively passes near the dominance states of the second and first species before returning to a comparable configuration. We obtain logarithmic estimates for the return time and for the population densities at the return section. In particular, although one species becomes extremely small at the beginning and at the end of each pattern, it recovers to an order-one density during the cycle. We then prove that this pattern repeats indefinitely and that the omega-limit set is composed of three heteroclinic orbits on the boundary of the positive orthant, connecting the three single-species equilibria. Thus the long-time behavior is cyclic but aperiodic, with increasingly long excursions near successive single-species states.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

ICC's current ranking system does not adequately account for key contextual factors such as home advantage, toss impact and scheduling imbalances; leading to inconsistencies in team evaluation in Test cricket. This study develops an enhanced rating framework by adapting and enhancing Glicko's model to incorporate these influences alongside Margin of Victory, an important indicator of dominance a contest. This enables a more dynamic and probabilistically grounded assessment of team performance. Using past match data, the model demonstrates improved expected score estimation and predictive accuracy. Robustness of the resulting ratings is demonstrated through bootstrap resampling, confirming stability with respect to match scheduling. Overall, the framework provides a fairer and more statistically consistent approach to ranking Test teams.

This paper introduces a continuous-time stochastic dynamical framework for understanding how large language models (LLMs) may self-amplify latent biases or toxicity through their own chain-of-thought reasoning. The model posits an instantaneous "severity" variable x(t) in [0,1] evolving under a stochastic differential equation (SDE) with a drift term μ(x) and diffusion σ(x). Crucially, such a process can be consistently analyzed via the Fokker--Planck approach if each incremental step behaves nearly Markovian in severity space. The analysis investigates critical phenomena, showing that certain parameter regimes create phase transitions from subcritical (self-correcting) to supercritical (runaway severity). The paper derives stationary distributions, first-passage times to harmful thresholds, and scaling laws near critical points. Finally, it highlights implications for agents and extended LLM reasoning models: in principle, these equations might serve as a basis for formal verification of whether a model remains stable or propagates bias over repeated inferences.

Addressing global challenges often involves stimulating the large-scale adoption of new products or behaviors. Research traditions that focus on individual decision making suggest that achieving this objective requires identifying the drivers of individual discrete adoption choices. On the other hand, computational approaches rooted in complexity science focus on maximizing the propagation of a given product or behavior throughout social networks of interconnected adopters. Here, by integrating discrete choice modeling into the complex contagion theory, we propose a method to estimate individual-level thresholds to adoption. We validate the predictive power of this approach in two choice experiments. By integrating the estimated thresholds into computational simulations, we show that state-of-the-art seeding policies for initiating large-scale behavioral change might be suboptimal if they neglect individual-level behavioral drivers, which can be corrected through the proposed experimental method.

We investigate factors contributing to LLM agents' success in competitive multi-agent environments, using auctions as a testbed where agents bid to maximize profit. The agents are equipped with bidding domain knowledge, distinct personas that reflect item preferences, and a memory of auction history. Our work extends the classic auction scenario by creating a realistic environment where multiple agents bid on houses, weighing aspects such as size, location, and budget to secure the most desirable homes at the lowest prices. Particularly, we investigate three key questions: (a) How does a persona influence an agent's behavior in a competitive setting? (b) Can an agent effectively profile its competitors' behavior during auctions? (c) How can persona profiling be leveraged to create an advantage using strategies such as theory of mind? Through a series of experiments, we analyze the behaviors of LLM agents and shed light on new findings. Our testbed, called HARBOR, offers a valuable platform for deepening our understanding of multi-agent workflows in competitive environments.

We study the problem of detecting the correlation between two Gaussian databases XinR^{ntimes d} and Y^{ntimes d}, each composed of n users with d features. This problem is relevant in the analysis of social media, computational biology, etc. We formulate this as a hypothesis testing problem: under the null hypothesis, these two databases are statistically independent. Under the alternative, however, there exists an unknown permutation sigma over the set of n users (or, row permutation), such that X is rho-correlated with Y^sigma, a permuted version of Y. We determine sharp thresholds at which optimal testing exhibits a phase transition, depending on the asymptotic regime of n and d. Specifically, we prove that if rho^2dto0, as dtoinfty, then weak detection (performing slightly better than random guessing) is statistically impossible, irrespectively of the value of n. This compliments the performance of a simple test that thresholds the sum all entries of X^TY. Furthermore, when d is fixed, we prove that strong detection (vanishing error probability) is impossible for any rho<rho^star, where rho^star is an explicit function of d, while weak detection is again impossible as long as rho^2dto0. These results close significant gaps in current recent related studies.

The rapid proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) and diverse specialized benchmarks necessitates a shift from fragmented, task-specific metrics to a holistic, competitive ranking system that effectively aggregates performance across multiple ability dimensions. Primarily using static scoring, current evaluation methods are fundamentally limited. They struggle to determine the proper mix ratio across diverse benchmarks, and critically, they fail to capture a model's dynamic competitive fitness or its vulnerability when confronted with sequential, high-stakes tasks. To address this, we introduce the novel Competitive Swiss-System Dynamics (CSD) framework. CSD simulates a multi-round, sequential contest where models are dynamically paired across a curated sequence of benchmarks based on their accumulated win-loss record. And Monte Carlo Simulation (N=100,000 iterations) is used to approximate the statistically robust Expected Win Score (E[S_m]), which eliminates the noise of random pairing and early-round luck. Furthermore, we implement a Failure Sensitivity Analysis by parameterizing the per-round elimination quantity (T_k), which allows us to profile models based on their risk appetite--distinguishing between robust generalists and aggressive specialists. We demonstrate that CSD provides a more nuanced and context-aware ranking than traditional aggregate scoring and static pairwise models, representing a vital step towards risk-informed, next-generation LLM evaluation.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

Experimental studies of generative AI in education mostly report average effects, yet field evidence shows that AI can narrow attainment gaps or widen them. We argue that the direction depends on the judgement burden, the expertise a learner must supply to screen AI output before learning from it, and that expert verification before release moves this burden from students to an accountable tutor. We test the argument in a two-cohort difference-in-differences design in which one half of a compulsory firstyear university economics course received AI-generated podcasts, FAQs and quiz-based study guides, produced with a source-grounded model and checked by a named graduate teaching assistant (170 students; 340 examination marks). Access was associated with a 2.34-mark advantage on a 50-mark component. The share of marks below the upper-second classification boundary fell by 24.7 percentage points relative to the counterfactual, effects were significant at every threshold from 23 to 31 marks and at none above, and roughly three-quarters of the average originated in the bottom quintile. The threshold estimate is robust to removing the lowest-scoring students from the pre-intervention cohort; the average effect is not. Interviews and feedback from 36 students indicate that the verification label gave students a reason to engage with AI-generated material without ending their scrutiny of it. Evaluations of AI learning resources that report only mean effects cannot detect whether the students the resources are meant to help are the ones who gain.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

This paper formalizes threshold-based selection as an evaluation-gating architecture in which each incumbent is tested before variation and a replacement is generated and evaluated only when contextual pressure exceeds intrinsic strength. The mechanism is instantiated as Leaf Abscission Optimization (LAO), using rank-based strength, a phenological seasonal signal, diversity modulation, environmental pressure, and a base regrowth kernel. A blocked two-to-the-fourth-power factorial analysis at dimension 10 on the CEC 2017 suite reduces the original multi-layer design to a parsimonious core: drift is harmful, while the other three auxiliary layers show no robust independent evidence of benefit. The resulting LAO-Core attains the third-best mean Friedman rank among nine optimizers at dimensions 10, 30, and 50 under the equal evaluation budget. A four-budget sweep shows budget-dependent relative performance, with adaptive differential-evolution baselines gaining relative advantage at larger budgets; the nine-cell dimension-budget analysis establishes neither an evaluation-budget-per-dimension-only law nor a statistically significant dimension-budget interaction. A paired intervention shows that diversity modulation changes late-run replacement behaviour without a detectable effect on final error at the tested budget. The evidence supports LAO as a parsimonious evaluation-gating mechanism with regime-qualified competitiveness, rather than as a generally superior optimizer.

We consider a biological population whose environment varies periodically in time, exhibiting two very different "seasons" : one is favorable and the other one is unfavorable. For monotone differential models with concave nonlinearities, we address the following question: the system's period being fixed, under what conditions does there exist a critical duration for the unfavorable season? By "critical duration" we mean that above some threshold, the population cannot sustain and extincts, while below this threshold, the system converges to a unique periodic and positive solution. We term this a "sharp seasonal threshold property" (SSTP, for short). Building upon a previous result, we obtain sufficient conditions for SSTP in any dimension and apply our criterion to a two-dimensional model featuring juvenile and adult populations of insects.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

We propose a sparsity-aware evolutionary (SAE) framework for model merging that involves iterative pruning-merging cycles to act as a novel mutation operator. We incorporate the sparsity constraints into the score function, which steers the evolutionary process to favor more sparse models, in addition to other conventional performance scores. Interestingly, the by-product of competition for sparsity introduces an extra local attraction and interplay into the evolutionary process: if one competitor has more zero elements, the other competitor's non-zero elements will occupy those positions, even though the less sparse competitor loses to the more sparse competitor in other positions. The proposed pipeline is evaluated on a variety of large-scale LLM benchmarks. Experiments demonstrate that our approach can improve model merging reliability across multiple benchmarks, and is easy to incorporate due to its simplicity and being orthogonal to most existing approaches.

Interpretability research aims to bridge the gap between empirical success and our scientific understanding of the inner workings of large language models (LLMs). However, most existing research focuses on analyzing a single mechanism, such as how models copy or recall factual knowledge. In this work, we propose a formulation of competition of mechanisms, which focuses on the interplay of multiple mechanisms instead of individual mechanisms and traces how one of them becomes dominant in the final prediction. We uncover how and where mechanisms compete within LLMs using two interpretability methods: logit inspection and attention modification. Our findings show traces of the mechanisms and their competition across various model components and reveal attention positions that effectively control the strength of certain mechanisms. Code: https://github.com/francescortu/comp-mech. Data: https://huggingface.co/datasets/francescortu/comp-mech.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis (PRH) holds that as models scale, representations of heterogeneous networks converge toward a shared model of reality. We propose its sequel and boundary, the Capability Convergence Hypothesis (CCH): under a fixed per-token inference budget, representational convergence does not entail capability convergence. Capability instead converges toward a class, the access-complete hybrid: any architecture holding both a compressive O(1)-state channel and a scalable verbatim-index channel. We anchor it on a witness task, the Newton's-apple problem in an infinite stream, and name three resource walls: a Shannon wall barring any o(Nb)-state architecture, a horizon wall barring any fixed window, and a circuit wall barring fixed-depth attention-only composition (conditional on TC0 != NC1). Under an explicit separability assumption a hybrid crosses all three by paying each wall's price, so capability is strictly super-additive under composition. We separate what we prove from what we conjecture: the access-completeness principle rests on information-theoretic lower bounds and pre-registered experiments, while the field-level convergence trend is an economics-motivated conjecture. We report the first pre-registered small-scale tests under criteria frozen before the data: the predicted scissors gap is measured (exact-retrieval error 0.994 vs. 0.000 once a 64-scalar state gains one global-attention layer), the state-tracking bifurcation lands at the registered boundary, and a conjunction witness shows an irreducibly two-channel solution; one prediction failed with its direction reversed and is reported as such. Representational convergence is given freely by scale; capability convergence must be purchased by access structure.

Inference-time multi-agent LLM scaling lacks a shared unit: counting nominal agents conflates cost with independent evidence. We derive a two-parameter scaling law R(N) = N_eff/N = 1/(1+c(N-1)N^{-β}) where the regime exponent β classifies any configuration into one of three asymptotic regimes -- hard-ceiling at 1/c (β= 0), sublinear at N^β/c (0 < β< 1), or linear (βge 1), and a mean-field theorem predicts that peer count k and rounds τ during agent debate enter the dynamics only through their product kτ. The law applies at two levels: answer diversity and correctness redundancy. Across 44 (model times task times condition) cells spanning peer debate, self-correction, random-noise placebo, self-consistency, three open-weight families (Qwen, Llama, Ministral) at scales from 7B to 32B with a frontier API check (Gemini), thinking models, heterogeneous teams, and sparse communication, the functional form fits every condition at R^2 > 0.99; only (c, β) shifts. On free-form math, dense peer influence collapses the answer-level regime from sublinear into hard-ceiling; correctness-level fits remain hard-ceiling throughout. Three findings have practical implications. (i)~Thirty dense debating agents produce no more answer diversity than one on MMLU-Hard. (ii)~A noise placebo tracks self-correction on free-form math and at 4times scale, so within homogeneous teams the gain commonly attributed to ``debate'' comes from re-evaluation, not peer content. (iii)~A single N le 5 pilot predicts the N=30 structural ceiling, and within the configurations tested only architectural diversity (heterogeneous teams) lowers c and escapes the hard-ceiling regime, communication-mode interventions do not.

A service system may use the same categories to assign standard allocations and to check whether each service is fulfilled. Finer categories can match individual needs more closely, but they divide the observations available for monitoring. We study this conflict for a fixed menu from which participants select by declaring a category, with fulfilment assessed from each category's aggregate outcomes during a fixed period. We relate allocation loss to variation in preferred allocations within categories and identify conditions under which aggregate observations preserve the verification performance of individual records. For nested refinements under stated utility and observation assumptions, an allocation-loss tolerance and a per-category detection target define a feasibility band. Categories must be fine enough to provide suitable allocations but sufficiently populated to support verification. A source-dependent lower bound on declaration entropy and a minimum contributor requirement give necessary information and population constraints. For an explicit finite population with quadratic utility and binary service outcomes, we prove the exact feasible range across all categorical designs and exhibit designs attaining the information lower bound at specified tolerances. The results provide conditions for choosing categories jointly for allocation and verification.

We give a very general and simple framework to incorporate predictions on requests for online covering problems in a rigorous and black-box manner. Our framework turns any online algorithm with competitive ratio ρ(k, cdot) depending on k, the number of arriving requests, into an algorithm with competitive ratio of ρ(η, cdot), where η is the prediction error. With accurate enough prediction, the resulting competitive ratio breaks through the corresponding worst-case online lower bounds, and smoothly degrades as the prediction error grows. This framework directly applies to a wide range of well-studied online covering problems such as facility location, Steiner problems, set cover, parking permit, etc., and yields improved and novel bounds.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

AI agents are increasingly deployed in shared environments where they pursue diverse goals and compete for rewards. This multi-agent competition can lead to behaviors that serve individual gains at collective cost -- for instance, marketing agents may post misleading content as a result of competing for engagement on social media. Human societies address such problems through norms that constrain acceptable behavior, supported by enforcement mechanisms that detect and penalize violations. Motivated by this, we study norm enforcement mechanisms for language model agents. We find that simple enforcement mechanisms are exploited by misaligned agents for competitive advantage, even when they are not explicitly trained or prompted to do so. We thus turn our attention to designing more robust mechanisms, and identify two key ingredients: estimating each agent's reliability over time, and updating this estimate with escalating penalties for repeated misbehavior. Across three simulated environments and a variety of agent populations, mechanisms built on these principles resist exploitation, while still penalizing norm violations at comparable or lower cost than baselines. Our results position norm enforcement mechanisms as scalable levers for shaping agents' behavior, but only when designed to anticipate becoming part of the system they govern. Our code and data are available at https://yaowenye.com/norm-enforcement.

When audio, video, and text disagree, accuracy alone does not show whether to acquire another source or abstain. We study these choices in a controlled three-score benchmark: a policy observes two signed scores, may request the third at a cost, and can abstain. The primary reward is mechanism-specific: abstention is correct only for one designated ambiguity mechanism and is penalized under mixed corruption. Matched controls show that a threshold policy matches always-request decisions with fewer requests; its advantage over always-answer fusion depends on the reward assigned to that ambiguity. On a partially held-out synthetic split, the threshold policy reaches 0.789 +/- 0.006 targeted decision accuracy and 0.481 +/- 0.014 utility across 83 seeds. A three-score majority reference reaches 0.626 +/- 0.008 and 0.252 +/- 0.016, but uses more information. In a matched-budget test, a train-only value selector improves utility over no-query and matched-random policies at 10% and 25% budgets, while pair uncertainty has higher utility at every budget. At 50% and 63.7% budgets, the selector lowers utility despite slightly higher non-ambiguous accuracy. If all abstentions are scored incorrect, majority outranks the threshold policy in utility. At a central temporal setting, full-trace controls match the neural models while position perturbations separate them. On held-out-actor emotion clips, eight-frame fusion has opposite-signed accuracy differences for two encoder pairs, with both actor intervals containing zero; matched-request routing gains are small and uncertain. These results separate full-modality accuracy from pre-request selection value and show that selection value depends on budget and the observed-pair ranking.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how information is created and disseminated, from companies using them to craft persuasive advertisements, to election campaigns optimizing messaging to gain votes, to social media influencers boosting engagement. These settings are inherently competitive, with sellers, candidates, and influencers vying for audience approval, yet it remains poorly understood how competitive feedback loops influence LLM behavior. We show that optimizing LLMs for competitive success can inadvertently drive misalignment. Using simulated environments across these scenarios, we find that, 6.3% increase in sales is accompanied by a 14.0% rise in deceptive marketing; in elections, a 4.9% gain in vote share coincides with 22.3% more disinformation and 12.5% more populist rhetoric; and on social media, a 7.5% engagement boost comes with 188.6% more disinformation and a 16.3% increase in promotion of harmful behaviors. We call this phenomenon Moloch's Bargain for AI--competitive success achieved at the cost of alignment. These misaligned behaviors emerge even when models are explicitly instructed to remain truthful and grounded, revealing the fragility of current alignment safeguards. Our findings highlight how market-driven optimization pressures can systematically erode alignment, creating a race to the bottom, and suggest that safe deployment of AI systems will require stronger governance and carefully designed incentives to prevent competitive dynamics from undermining societal trust.

Through multi-agent competition, the simple objective of hide-and-seek, and standard reinforcement learning algorithms at scale, we find that agents create a self-supervised autocurriculum inducing multiple distinct rounds of emergent strategy, many of which require sophisticated tool use and coordination. We find clear evidence of six emergent phases in agent strategy in our environment, each of which creates a new pressure for the opposing team to adapt; for instance, agents learn to build multi-object shelters using moveable boxes which in turn leads to agents discovering that they can overcome obstacles using ramps. We further provide evidence that multi-agent competition may scale better with increasing environment complexity and leads to behavior that centers around far more human-relevant skills than other self-supervised reinforcement learning methods such as intrinsic motivation. Finally, we propose transfer and fine-tuning as a way to quantitatively evaluate targeted capabilities, and we compare hide-and-seek agents to both intrinsic motivation and random initialization baselines in a suite of domain-specific intelligence tests.

Critical learning periods are periods early in development where temporary sensory deficits can have a permanent effect on behavior and learned representations. Despite the radical differences between biological and artificial networks, critical learning periods have been empirically observed in both systems. This suggests that critical periods may be fundamental to learning and not an accident of biology. Yet, why exactly critical periods emerge in deep networks is still an open question, and in particular it is unclear whether the critical periods observed in both systems depend on particular architectural or optimization details. To isolate the key underlying factors, we focus on deep linear network models, and show that, surprisingly, such networks also display much of the behavior seen in biology and artificial networks, while being amenable to analytical treatment. We show that critical periods depend on the depth of the model and structure of the data distribution. We also show analytically and in simulations that the learning of features is tied to competition between sources. Finally, we extend our analysis to multi-task learning to show that pre-training on certain tasks can damage the transfer performance on new tasks, and show how this depends on the relationship between tasks and the duration of the pre-training stage. To the best of our knowledge, our work provides the first analytically tractable model that sheds light into why critical learning periods emerge in biological and artificial networks.

Personalized treatment effect estimates are often of interest in high-stakes applications -- thus, before deploying a model estimating such effects in practice, one needs to be sure that the best candidate from the ever-growing machine learning toolbox for this task was chosen. Unfortunately, due to the absence of counterfactual information in practice, it is usually not possible to rely on standard validation metrics for doing so, leading to a well-known model selection dilemma in the treatment effect estimation literature. While some solutions have recently been investigated, systematic understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of different model selection criteria is still lacking. In this paper, instead of attempting to declare a global `winner', we therefore empirically investigate success- and failure modes of different selection criteria. We highlight that there is a complex interplay between selection strategies, candidate estimators and the data used for comparing them, and provide interesting insights into the relative (dis)advantages of different criteria alongside desiderata for the design of further illuminating empirical studies in this context.

Social media are massive marketplaces where ideas and news compete for our attention. Previous studies have shown that quality is not a necessary condition for online virality and that knowledge about peer choices can distort the relationship between quality and popularity. However, these results do not explain the viral spread of low-quality information, such as the digital misinformation that threatens our democracy. We investigate quality discrimination in a stylized model of online social network, where individual agents prefer quality information, but have behavioral limitations in managing a heavy flow of information. We measure the relationship between the quality of an idea and its likelihood to become prevalent at the system level. We find that both information overload and limited attention contribute to a degradation in the market's discriminative power. A good tradeoff between discriminative power and diversity of information is possible according to the model. However, calibration with empirical data characterizing information load and finite attention in real social media reveals a weak correlation between quality and popularity of information. In these realistic conditions, the model predicts that high-quality information has little advantage over low-quality information.

This research employs quantitative techniques interpreted through relevant economic theories to analyze a proposed U.S. "Discounted Reciprocal Tariff" structure. Statistical modeling (linear regression) quantifies the policy's consistent 'discounted reciprocity' pattern, which is interpreted using a Game Theory perspective on strategic interaction. Machine learning (K-Means clustering) identifies distinct country typologies based on tariff exposure and Economic Complexity Index (ECI), linking the policy to Economic Complexity theory. The study's primary application focuses on the major coffee exporting sector, utilizing simulation modeling grounded in principles of demand elasticity and substitution to project potential trade flow impacts. Specifically, for coffee, this simulation demonstrates how the proposed tariff differentials can induce significant substitution effects, projecting a potential shift in U.S. import demand away from high-tariff origins toward lower-tariff competitors. This disruption, stemming from the tariffs impacting exporting countries, is projected to ultimately increase coffee prices for consumers in the United States. Findings throughout are contextualized within Political Economy considerations. Overall, the study demonstrates how integrating regression, clustering, and simulation with economic theory exemplified through the coffee sector analysis provides a robust framework for assessing the potential systemic impacts, including consumer price effects, of strategic trade policies.

A major technique in learning-augmented online algorithms is combining multiple algorithms or predictors. Since the performance of each predictor may vary over time, it is desirable to use not the single best predictor as a benchmark, but rather a dynamic combination which follows different predictors at different times. We design algorithms that combine predictions and are competitive against such dynamic combinations for a wide class of online problems, namely, metrical task systems. Against the best (in hindsight) unconstrained combination of ell predictors, we obtain a competitive ratio of O(ell^2), and show that this is best possible. However, for a benchmark with slightly constrained number of switches between different predictors, we can get a (1+epsilon)-competitive algorithm. Moreover, our algorithms can be adapted to access predictors in a bandit-like fashion, querying only one predictor at a time. An unexpected implication of one of our lower bounds is a new structural insight about covering formulations for the k-server problem.

A widely used technique for improving policies is success conditioning, in which one collects trajectories, identifies those that achieve a desired outcome, and updates the policy to imitate the actions taken along successful trajectories. This principle appears under many names -- rejection sampling with SFT, goal-conditioned RL, Decision Transformers -- yet what optimization problem it solves, if any, has remained unclear. We prove that success conditioning exactly solves a trust-region optimization problem, maximizing policy improvement subject to a χ^2 divergence constraint whose radius is determined automatically by the data. This yields an identity: relative policy improvement, the magnitude of policy change, and a quantity we call action-influence -- measuring how random variation in action choices affects success rates -- are exactly equal at every state. Success conditioning thus emerges as a conservative improvement operator. Exact success conditioning cannot degrade performance or induce dangerous distribution shift, but when it fails, it does so observably, by hardly changing the policy at all. We apply our theory to the common practice of return thresholding, showing this can amplify improvement, but at the cost of potential misalignment with the true objective.

Standard methods for detecting discontinuities in conditional means are not applicable to outcomes that are complex, non-Euclidean objects like distributions, networks, or covariance matrices. This article develops a nonparametric test for jumps in conditional means when outcomes lie in a non-Euclidean metric space. Using local Fr\'echet regressionx2014which generalizes standard regression to metric-space valued datax2014the method estimates a mean path on either side of a candidate cutoff, extending existing k-sample tests to a flexible regression setting. Key theoretical contributions include a central limit theorem for the local estimator of the conditional Fr\'echet variance and the asymptotic validity and consistency of the proposed test. Simulations confirm nominal size control and robust power in finite samples. Two applications demonstrate the method's value by revealing effects invisible to scalar-based tests. First, I detect a sharp change in work-from-home compositions at Washington State's income threshold for non-compete enforceability during COVID-19, highlighting remote work's role as a bargaining margin. Second, I find that countries restructure their input-output networks after losing preferential US trade access. These findings underscore that analyzing regression functions within their native metric spaces can reveal structural discontinuities that scalar summaries would miss.

Neural network pruning is widely used to reduce model size and computational cost. Yet, most existing methods treat sparsity as an externally imposed constraint, enforced through heuristic importance scores or training-time regularization. In this work, we propose a fundamentally different perspective: pruning as an equilibrium outcome of strategic interaction among model components. We model parameter groups such as weights, neurons, or filters as players in a continuous non-cooperative game, where each player selects its level of participation in the network to balance contribution against redundancy and competition. Within this formulation, sparsity emerges naturally when continued participation becomes a dominated strategy at equilibrium. We analyze the resulting game and show that dominated players collapse to zero participation under mild conditions, providing a principled explanation for pruning behavior. Building on this insight, we derive a simple equilibrium-driven pruning algorithm that jointly updates network parameters and participation variables without relying on explicit importance scores. This work focuses on establishing a principled formulation and empirical validation of pruning as an equilibrium phenomenon, rather than exhaustive architectural or large-scale benchmarking. Experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves competitive sparsity-accuracy trade-offs while offering an interpretable, theory-grounded alternative to existing pruning methods.

We study the discrete Bertrand pricing game with a non-increasing demand function. The game has n ge 2 players who simultaneously choose prices from the set {1/k, 2/k, ldots, 1}, where kinN. The player who sets the lowest price captures the entire demand; if multiple players tie for the lowest price, they split the demand equally. We study the Bertrand paradox, where classical theory predicts low prices, yet real markets often sustain high prices. To understand this gap, we analyze a repeated-game model in which firms set prices using no-regret learners. Our goal is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes that can arise under different no-regret learning guarantees. We are particularly interested in questions such as whether no-external-regret learners can converge to undesirable high-price outcomes, and how stronger guarantees such as no-swap regret shape the emergence of competitive low-price behavior. We address these and related questions through a theoretical analysis, complemented by experiments that support the theory and reveal surprising phenomena for no-swap regret learners.

The 2017 paper ''Attention Is All You Need'' introduced the Transformer architecture-and inadvertently spawned one of machine learning's most persistent naming conventions. We analyze 717 arXiv preprints containing ''All You Need'' in their titles (2009-2025), finding exponential growth (R^2 > 0.994) following the original paper, with 200 titles in 2025 alone. Among papers following the canonical ''X [Is] All You Need'' structure, ''Attention'' remains the most frequently claimed necessity (28 occurrences). Situating this phenomenon within memetic theory, we argue the pattern's success reflects competitive pressures in scientific communication that increasingly favor memorability over precision. Whether this trend represents harmless academic whimsy or symptomatic sensationalism, we leave-with appropriate self-awareness-to the reader.

Recent evidence suggests that the use of generative artificial intelligence reduces the diversity of content produced. In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore the downstream consequences of content homogeneity when producers use generative AI to compete with one another. At equilibrium, players indeed produce content that is less diverse than optimal. However, stronger competition mitigates homogeneity and induces more diverse production. Perhaps more surprisingly, we show that a generative AI model that performs well in isolation (i.e., according to a benchmark) may fail to do so when faced with competition, and vice versa. We validate our results empirically by using language models to play Scattergories, a word game in which players are rewarded for producing answers that are both correct and unique. We discuss how the interplay between competition and homogeneity has implications for the development, evaluation, and use of generative AI.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

To survive in dynamic and uncertain environments, individuals must develop effective decision strategies that balance information gathering and decision commitment. Models of such strategies often prioritize either optimizing tangible payoffs, like reward rate, or gathering information to support a diversity of (possibly unknown) objectives. However, our understanding of the relative merits of these two approaches remains incomplete, in part because direct comparisons have been limited to idealized, static environments that lack the dynamic complexity of the real world. Here we compared the performance of normative reward- and information-seeking strategies in a dynamic foraging task. Both strategies show similar transitions between exploratory and exploitative behaviors as environmental uncertainty changes. However, we find subtle disparities in the actions they take, resulting in meaningful performance differences: whereas reward-seeking strategies generate slightly more reward on average, information-seeking strategies provide more consistent and predictable outcomes. Our findings support the adaptive value of information-seeking behaviors that can mitigate risk with minimal reward loss.

The human brain is autonomously active, being characterized by a self-sustained neural activity which would be present even in the absence of external sensory stimuli. Here we study the interrelation between the self-sustained activity in autonomously active recurrent neural nets and external sensory stimuli. There is no a priori semantical relation between the influx of external stimuli and the patterns generated internally by the autonomous and ongoing brain dynamics. The question then arises when and how are semantic correlations between internal and external dynamical processes learned and built up? We study this problem within the paradigm of transient state dynamics for the neural activity in recurrent neural nets, i.e. for an autonomous neural activity characterized by an infinite time-series of transiently stable attractor states. We propose that external stimuli will be relevant during the sensitive periods, {\it viz} the transition period between one transient state and the subsequent semi-stable attractor. A diffusive learning signal is generated unsupervised whenever the stimulus influences the internal dynamics qualitatively. For testing we have presented to the model system stimuli corresponding to the bars and stripes problem. We found that the system performs a non-linear independent component analysis on its own, being continuously and autonomously active. This emergent cognitive capability results here from a general principle for the neural dynamics, the competition between neural ensembles.

All biological and artificial agents must learn and make decisions given limits on their ability to process information. As such, a general theory of adaptive behavior should be able to account for the complex interactions between an agent's learning history, decisions, and capacity constraints. Recent work in computer science has begun to clarify the principles that shape these dynamics by bridging ideas from reinforcement learning, Bayesian decision-making, and rate-distortion theory. This body of work provides an account of capacity-limited Bayesian reinforcement learning, a unifying normative framework for modeling the effect of processing constraints on learning and action selection. Here, we provide an accessible review of recent algorithms and theoretical results in this setting, paying special attention to how these ideas can be applied to studying questions in the cognitive and behavioral sciences.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

This paper introduces a new biologically-inspired training method named Continual Learning through Adjustment Suppression and Sparsity Promotion (CLASSP). CLASSP is based on two main principles observed in neuroscience, particularly in the context of synaptic transmission and Long-Term Potentiation (LTP). The first principle is a decay rate over the weight adjustment, which is implemented as a generalization of the AdaGrad optimization algorithm. This means that weights that have received many updates should have lower learning rates as they likely encode important information about previously seen data. However, this principle results in a diffuse distribution of updates throughout the model, as it promotes updates for weights that haven't been previously updated, while a sparse update distribution is preferred to leave weights unassigned for future tasks. Therefore, the second principle introduces a threshold on the loss gradient. This promotes sparse learning by updating a weight only if the loss gradient with respect to that weight is above a certain threshold, i.e. only updating weights with a significant impact on the current loss. Both principles reflect phenomena observed in LTP, where a threshold effect and a gradual saturation of potentiation have been observed. CLASSP is implemented in a Python/PyTorch class, making it applicable to any model. When compared with Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC) using Computer Vision and sentiment analysis datasets, CLASSP demonstrates superior performance in terms of accuracy and memory footprint.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Peer-evaluation based measures of group research quality such as the UK's Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), which do not employ bibliometric analyses, cannot directly avail of such methods to normalize research impact across disciplines. This is seen as a conspicuous flaw of such exercises and calls have been made to find a remedy. Here a simple, systematic solution is proposed based upon a mathematical model for the relationship between research quality and group quantity. This model manifests both the Matthew effect and a phenomenon akin to the Ringelmann effect and reveals the existence of two critical masses for each academic discipline: a lower value, below which groups are vulnerable, and an upper value beyond which the dependency of quality on quantity reduces and plateaus appear when the critical masses are large. A possible normalization procedure is then to pitch these plateaus at similar levels. We examine the consequences of this procedure at RAE for a multitude of academic disciplines, corresponding to a range of critical masses.

In this paper, we investigate a problem of actively learning threshold in latent space, where the unknown reward g(gamma, v) depends on the proposed threshold gamma and latent value v and it can be only achieved if the threshold is lower than or equal to the unknown latent value. This problem has broad applications in practical scenarios, e.g., reserve price optimization in online auctions, online task assignments in crowdsourcing, setting recruiting bars in hiring, etc. We first characterize the query complexity of learning a threshold with the expected reward at most epsilon smaller than the optimum and prove that the number of queries needed can be infinitely large even when g(gamma, v) is monotone with respect to both gamma and v. On the positive side, we provide a tight query complexity Theta(1/epsilon^3) when g is monotone and the CDF of value distribution is Lipschitz. Moreover, we show a tight Theta(1/epsilon^3) query complexity can be achieved as long as g satisfies one-sided Lipschitzness, which provides a complete characterization for this problem. Finally, we extend this model to an online learning setting and demonstrate a tight Theta(T^{2/3}) regret bound using continuous-arm bandit techniques and the aforementioned query complexity results.

We revisit Tirole's classic paper "Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations" (1985, Econometrica) in the case of a dividend-paying asset. Recently, Pham and Toda (2026) constructed a counterexample to Proposition 1(c), showing that Tirole's equilibrium classification is incorrect as stated and that long-run outcomes can depend on initial capital. This paper characterizes the entire set of equilibrium initial asset prices under capital over-accumulation. Exactly one of three regimes occurs: (i) a unique bubbleless equilibrium with capital converging to zero (capital collapse), (ii) a unique asymptotically bubbly equilibrium converging to a positive steady state (bubble necessity), or (iii) a continuum of equilibria with different long-run bubble behavior (indeterminacy). We further derive a threshold for initial capital under the bubble necessity condition, establish preference-free sufficient conditions for capital collapse, and show that the continuum in the pure bubble model survives sufficiently small dividend perturbations. Closed-form examples illustrate the possible long-run outcomes.

We consider non-clairvoyant scheduling with online precedence constraints, where an algorithm is oblivious to any job dependencies and learns about a job only if all of its predecessors have been completed. Given strong impossibility results in classical competitive analysis, we investigate the problem in a learning-augmented setting, where an algorithm has access to predictions without any quality guarantee. We discuss different prediction models: novel problem-specific models as well as general ones, which have been proposed in previous works. We present lower bounds and algorithmic upper bounds for different precedence topologies, and thereby give a structured overview on which and how additional (possibly erroneous) information helps for designing better algorithms. Along the way, we also improve bounds on traditional competitive ratios for existing algorithms.

Economic activities favor mutual geographical proximity and concentrate spatially to form cities. In a world of diminishing transport costs, however, the advantage of physical proximity is fading, and the role of cities in the economy may be declining. To provide insights into the long-run evolution of cities, we analyzed Japan's census data over the 1970--2015 period. We found that fewer and larger cities thrived at the national scale, suggesting an eventual mono-centric economy with a single megacity; simultaneously, each larger city flattened out at the local scale, suggesting an eventual extinction of cities. We interpret this multi-scale phenomenon as an instance of pattern formation by self-organization, which is widely studied in mathematics and biology. However, cities' dynamics are distinct from mathematical or biological mechanisms because they are governed by economic interactions mediated by transport costs between locations. Our results call for the synthesis of knowledge in mathematics, biology, and economics to open the door for a general pattern formation theory that is applicable to socioeconomic phenomena.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

To make AI systems broadly useful for challenging real-world tasks, we need them to learn complex human goals and preferences. One approach to specifying complex goals asks humans to judge during training which agent behaviors are safe and useful, but this approach can fail if the task is too complicated for a human to directly judge. To help address this concern, we propose training agents via self play on a zero sum debate game. Given a question or proposed action, two agents take turns making short statements up to a limit, then a human judges which of the agents gave the most true, useful information. In an analogy to complexity theory, debate with optimal play can answer any question in PSPACE given polynomial time judges (direct judging answers only NP questions). In practice, whether debate works involves empirical questions about humans and the tasks we want AIs to perform, plus theoretical questions about the meaning of AI alignment. We report results on an initial MNIST experiment where agents compete to convince a sparse classifier, boosting the classifier's accuracy from 59.4% to 88.9% given 6 pixels and from 48.2% to 85.2% given 4 pixels. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical aspects of the debate model, focusing on potential weaknesses as the model scales up, and we propose future human and computer experiments to test these properties.

The same arguments often need to be evaluated under different external regimes. An agent with influence over the regime has a strategic lever that standard formalisms do not directly capture. We introduce context-dependent argumentation frameworks (CDAFs), an extension of Dung's theory in which a defeat function determines, per context, which attacks succeed. A perspective-labeled specialisation derives the defeat function from a relevance set ρ and a priority π. The relevance set is the agent's action space. In a small worked example, the agent's target argument is rejected under every full-relevance injective priority, yet accepted under partial activations, one of which no VAF audience can mirror. We define the corresponding decision problem, ACTIVATION-MANIPULATION, and record baseline complexity bounds. Tight bounds and multi-agent variants are left open.

AI agents are demonstrating increasingly strong offensive and defensive cybersecurity capabilities in the real world. Current benchmarks mostly evaluate agents in isolation against static targets. Real cyber operations, however, are dynamic and coupled: security postures constantly change as attackers and defenders adapt to each other in real time. Static benchmarks quickly saturate and miss an agent's ability to attack and defend simultaneously under live pressure. To address this gap, we present CyberArena, a dynamic, symmetric adversarial benchmark built around multi-round attack-and-defense combat. In isolated sandboxes, two agents compete under identical rules, acting concurrently as both attackers and defenders over continuously changing services. This converts static targets into evolving, semi-open challenges, directly testing an agent's speed and precision in discovering, exploiting, and patching vulnerabilities. To sustain the benchmark's longevity, an automated agentic pipeline continuously generates, reviews, and validates new environments. Furthermore, because pairwise contests are notoriously hard to quantify, we introduce a dynamical model that maps match dynamics into unified, multidimensional scores across offensive, defensive, and domain-specific capabilities. Evaluating 12 frontier LLM agents across 40 challenges in 466 matches, CyberArena separates model capabilities where single-agent baselines hit a ceiling. The trajectories read like a fight rather than an exam: defenders patch one hole and miss the next and certify repairs on stale evidence, while capable agents think a move ahead, planting backdoors for later rounds and, in one case, writing their own packet sniffer to watch the opponent. Beyond a benchmark, CyberArena serves as an adaptable, scalable experimental platform for future research on cybersecurity agents.

The problems of detecting and recovering planted structures/subgraphs in Erdős-Rényi random graphs, have received significant attention over the past three decades, leading to many exciting results and mathematical techniques. However, prior work has largely focused on specific ad hoc planted structures and inferential settings, while a general theory has remained elusive. In this paper, we bridge this gap by investigating the detection of an arbitrary planted subgraph Γ= Γ_n in an Erdős-Rényi random graph G(n, q_n), where the edge probability within Γ is p_n. We examine both the statistical and computational aspects of this problem and establish the following results. In the dense regime, where the edge probabilities p_n and q_n are fixed, we tightly characterize the information-theoretic and computational thresholds for detecting Γ, and provide conditions under which a computational-statistical gap arises. Most notably, these thresholds depend on Γ only through its number of edges, maximum degree, and maximum subgraph density. Our lower and upper bounds are general and apply to any value of p_n and q_n as functions of n. Accordingly, we also analyze the sparse regime where q_n = Θ(n^{-α}) and p_n-q_n =Θ(q_n), with αin[0,2], as well as the critical regime where p_n=1-o(1) and q_n = Θ(n^{-α}), both of which have been widely studied, for specific choices of Γ. For these regimes, we show that our bounds are tight for all planted subgraphs investigated in the literature thus farand many more. Finally, we identify conditions under which detection undergoes sharp phase transition, where the boundaries at which algorithms succeed or fail shift abruptly as a function of q_n.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Outcome-supervised search agents learn when and how to retrieve evidence, but terminal rewards neither localize intermediate errors nor redirect an ongoing trajectory before those errors compound. Treating corrective feedback as a learned in-trajectory intervention couples the two roles: the agent must decide when to request and use feedback, while the critic must infer useful corrections from outcome-confounded rollouts whose failure patterns shift as the agent improves. We introduce CAFE (Coupled Agent--Feedback Evolution), a framework in which a shared-parameter model alternates between search-agent and critic roles. CAFE initializes feedback-conditioned recovery from trajectories built around the base agent's own failures, then couples online and offline optimization. During online RL, a comparative feedback estimate uses a prompt-level call--skip success gap to shape request returns, while feedback-aware advantage shaping reweights token advantages before and after feedback. Offline, rollout-derived preference optimization learns feedback from matched successful and unsuccessful trajectories. On seven agentic search benchmarks, CAFE outperforms the evaluated RL-based search agents on average, retains its gains across all six out-of-domain benchmarks, and reduces answer-level hallucinations. One-sided ablations show that improving only the agent or only the critic eventually plateaus, whereas alternating the two updates continues to improve performance. These findings suggest that a self-improving search agent needs feedback that co-evolves with the policy it guides.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

We present a new approach for mitigating unfairness in learned classifiers. In particular, we focus on binary classification tasks over individuals from two populations, where, as our criterion for fairness, we wish to achieve similar false positive rates in both populations, and similar false negative rates in both populations. As a proof of concept, we implement our approach and empirically evaluate its ability to achieve both fairness and accuracy, using datasets from the fields of criminal risk assessment, credit, lending, and college admissions.

The emergence of complex life on Earth is often attributed to the arms race that ensued from a huge number of organisms all competing for finite resources. We present an artificial intelligence research environment, inspired by the human game genre of MMORPGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, a.k.a. MMOs), that aims to simulate this setting in microcosm. As with MMORPGs and the real world alike, our environment is persistent and supports a large and variable number of agents. Our environment is well suited to the study of large-scale multiagent interaction: it requires that agents learn robust combat and navigation policies in the presence of large populations attempting to do the same. Baseline experiments reveal that population size magnifies and incentivizes the development of skillful behaviors and results in agents that outcompete agents trained in smaller populations. We further show that the policies of agents with unshared weights naturally diverge to fill different niches in order to avoid competition.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

We initiate a principled study of algorithmic collective action on digital platforms that deploy machine learning algorithms. We propose a simple theoretical model of a collective interacting with a firm's learning algorithm. The collective pools the data of participating individuals and executes an algorithmic strategy by instructing participants how to modify their own data to achieve a collective goal. We investigate the consequences of this model in three fundamental learning-theoretic settings: the case of a nonparametric optimal learning algorithm, a parametric risk minimizer, and gradient-based optimization. In each setting, we come up with coordinated algorithmic strategies and characterize natural success criteria as a function of the collective's size. Complementing our theory, we conduct systematic experiments on a skill classification task involving tens of thousands of resumes from a gig platform for freelancers. Through more than two thousand model training runs of a BERT-like language model, we see a striking correspondence emerge between our empirical observations and the predictions made by our theory. Taken together, our theory and experiments broadly support the conclusion that algorithmic collectives of exceedingly small fractional size can exert significant control over a platform's learning algorithm.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

Red-team evaluations of AI models support some claims and not others, and the boundary between the two is calculable rather than merely a matter of judgment. We define the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and use it to locate that boundary exactly. We find that above a calculable harm rate, a benchmark of modest size certifies a category to a stated evidentiary standard, and a clean sheet is then the stronger of the two possible observations, outweighing a single reproduced failure. Below that rate, no passive benchmark of feasible size provides the specified evidence of safety under the fixed scoring rule and approximately independent trial structure. The crossing between the two regimes has a closed form. The bound is not specific to benchmarks: written in terms of a procedure's hypothesis conditioned elicitation rates, it covers adaptive and automated red teaming as well, and shows that discrimination between the hypotheses rather than attack success is what determines evidential worth. Auditing eight evaluation suites against the boundary, we find that current benchmarks are adequate for high-frequency harm categories and several orders of magnitude short for rare, catastrophic ones. Safety benchmarks are not uninformative. They are informative about a specific and computable set of propositions, and the discipline they need is to state which.

When large language models (LMs) are applied in zero- or few-shot settings to discriminative tasks such as multiple-choice questions, their attentiveness (i.e., probability mass) is spread across many vocabulary tokens that are not valid choices. Such a spread across multiple surface forms with identical meaning is thought to cause an underestimation of a model's true performance, referred to as the "surface form competition" (SFC) hypothesis. This has motivated the introduction of various probability normalization methods. However, many core questions remain unanswered. How do we measure SFC or attentiveness? Are there direct ways of increasing attentiveness on valid choices? Does increasing attentiveness always improve task accuracy? We propose a mathematical formalism for studying this phenomenon, provide a metric for quantifying attentiveness, and identify a simple method for increasing it -- namely, in-context learning with even just one example containing answer choices. The formalism allows us to quantify SFC and bound its impact. Our experiments on three diverse datasets and six LMs reveal several surprising findings. For example, encouraging models to generate a valid answer choice can, in fact, be detrimental to task performance for some LMs, and prior probability normalization methods are less effective (sometimes even detrimental) to instruction-tuned LMs. We conclude with practical insights for effectively using prompted LMs for multiple-choice tasks.

Regulatory institutions (from content moderation platforms to financial supervisors) observe, deliberate, and intervene only after a characteristic delay. We ask whether this processing lag alone can destabilize a multi-agent system that would otherwise remain stable, without exogenous shocks, coordination among agents, or malicious actors. We study this question in two stages. First, we analyze a delayed replicator equation in which autonomous agents receive a benefit from radical behavior but face punishment based on a lagged institutional alarm signal. We derive a closed-form critical delay threshold beyond which the unique interior equilibrium loses stability through a Hopf bifurcation, and prove via center manifold reduction that the bifurcation is supercritical (producing bounded oscillations, not explosive growth) for the entire sigmoid response-function family. Second, we embed N=240 agents on a network and equip them with reinforcement learning (tabular Q-learning), comparing three decision architectures in a factorial design: non-reactive agents (fixed policy), reactive agents (threshold heuristic without memory), and Q-learning agents (adaptive with cumulative value estimates). The results reveal a hierarchy opposite to the naive expectation that learning amplifies instability: non-reactive agents are immune to delay (0% runaway across all tested values), reactive agents collapse catastrophically (96% runaway by delay geq 8 steps), and Q-learning agents achieve partial resilience (66% runaway at delay = 20). The destabilizing ingredient is reactivity to delayed signals: agents that immediately exploit low-alarm windows trigger oscillatory feedback loops. Learning buffers this through implicit punishment memory encoded in Q-values

We derive an expression for the variation between parallel trajectories in phenotypic evolution, extending the well known result that predicts the mean evolutionary path in adaptive dynamics or quantitative genetics. We show how this expression gives rise to the notion of fluctuation domains - parts of the fitness landscape where the rate of evolution is very predictable (due to fluctuation dissipation) and parts where it is highly variable (due to fluctuation enhancement). These fluctuation domains are determined by the curvature of the fitness landscape. Regions of the fitness landscape with positive curvature, such as adaptive valleys or branching points, experience enhancement. Regions with negative curvature, such as adaptive peaks, experience dissipation. We explore these dynamics in the ecological scenarios of implicit and explicit competition for a limiting resource.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

When deploying a single predictor across multiple subpopulations, we propose a fundamentally different approach: interpreting group fairness as a bargaining problem among subpopulations. This game-theoretic perspective reveals that existing robust optimization methods such as minimizing worst-group loss or regret correspond to classical bargaining solutions and embody different fairness principles. We propose relative improvement, the ratio of actual risk reduction to potential reduction from a baseline predictor, which recovers the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Unlike absolute-scale methods that may not be comparable when groups have different potential predictability, relative improvement provides axiomatic justification including scale invariance and individual monotonicity. We establish finite-sample convergence guarantees under mild conditions.

This research proposes a new recommender system algorithm for online grocery shopping. The algorithm is based on the perspective that, since the grocery items are usually bought in bulk, a grocery recommender system should be capable of recommending the items in bulk. The algorithm figures out the possible dishes a user may cook based on the items added to the basket and recommends the ingredients accordingly. Our algorithm does not depend on the user ratings. Customers usually do not have the patience to rate the groceries they purchase. Therefore, algorithms that are not dependent on user ratings need to be designed. Instead of using a brute force search, this algorithm limits the search space to a set of only a few probably food categories. Each food category consists of several food subcategories. For example, "fried rice" and "biryani" are food subcategories that belong to the food category "rice". For each food category, items are ranked according to how well they can differentiate a food subcategory. To each food subcategory in the activated search space, this algorithm attaches a score. The score is calculated based on the rank of the items added to the basket. Once the score exceeds a threshold value, its corresponding subcategory gets activated. The algorithm then uses a basket-to-recipe similarity measure to identify the best recipe matches within the activated subcategories only. This reduces the search space to a great extent. We may argue that this algorithm is similar to the content-based recommender system in some sense, but it does not suffer from the limitations like limited content, over-specialization, or the new user problem.

Language is not only used to transmit neutral information; we often seek to persuade by arguing in favor of a particular view. Persuasion raises a number of challenges for classical accounts of belief updating, as information cannot be taken at face value. How should listeners account for a speaker's "hidden agenda" when incorporating new information? Here, we extend recent probabilistic models of recursive social reasoning to allow for persuasive goals and show that our model provides a pragmatic account for why weakly favorable arguments may backfire, a phenomenon known as the weak evidence effect. Critically, this model predicts a systematic relationship between belief updates and expectations about the information source: weak evidence should only backfire when speakers are expected to act under persuasive goals and prefer the strongest evidence. We introduce a simple experimental paradigm called the Stick Contest to measure the extent to which the weak evidence effect depends on speaker expectations, and show that a pragmatic listener model accounts for the empirical data better than alternative models. Our findings suggest further avenues for rational models of social reasoning to illuminate classical decision-making phenomena.

Sharp bounds on two potential-outcome means need not combine into sharp bounds on their difference. We characterize exactly when composition is guaranteed across environments sharing a joint potential-outcome law. For binary treatment and outcome, fix strict selection-probability bounds and interior treatment propensities. Subtracting the full model's sharp mean intervals gives sharp average-treatment-effect bounds for every compatible observed law if and only if the absolute selection bounds coincide across environments. Under this alignment, the complete mean region is rectangular; its endpoints and attaining causal models require O(K) arithmetic operations for K environments. For every mismatch, failure occurs on a relatively open set of positive observed tables at the prescribed propensities and persists under small joint drift. We give computable perturbation certificates and an exact family whose gap is first order in the mismatch. A separate finite-confounding family shows when the lost joint information changes an identified causal sign. These results distinguish local marginal sharpness from joint attainability after combining environments.

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

The lottery ticket hypothesis (Frankle and Carbin, 2018), states that a randomly-initialized network contains a small subnetwork such that, when trained in isolation, can compete with the performance of the original network. We prove an even stronger hypothesis (as was also conjectured in Ramanujan et al., 2019), showing that for every bounded distribution and every target network with bounded weights, a sufficiently over-parameterized neural network with random weights contains a subnetwork with roughly the same accuracy as the target network, without any further training.

Machine learning models are often used to inform real world risk assessment tasks: predicting consumer default risk, predicting whether a person suffers from a serious illness, or predicting a person's risk to appear in court. Given multiple models that perform almost equally well for a prediction task, to what extent do predictions vary across these models? If predictions are relatively consistent for similar models, then the standard approach of choosing the model that optimizes a penalized loss suffices. But what if predictions vary significantly for similar models? In machine learning, this is referred to as predictive multiplicity i.e. the prevalence of conflicting predictions assigned by near-optimal competing models. In this paper, we present a framework for measuring predictive multiplicity in probabilistic classification (predicting the probability of a positive outcome). We introduce measures that capture the variation in risk estimates over the set of competing models, and develop optimization-based methods to compute these measures efficiently and reliably for convex empirical risk minimization problems. We demonstrate the incidence and prevalence of predictive multiplicity in real-world tasks. Further, we provide insight into how predictive multiplicity arises by analyzing the relationship between predictive multiplicity and data set characteristics (outliers, separability, and majority-minority structure). Our results emphasize the need to report predictive multiplicity more widely.

Training compute is increasingly outpacing the availability of high-quality data. This shifts the central challenge from optimal compute allocation to extracting maximum value from limited data. The widely adopted Chinchilla scaling law assumes every training token is unique. This limits its ability to guide pretraining decisions in data-constrained regimes. We model the excess loss under repetition with a simple additive overfitting penalty and find that it accurately describes model behavior. Our scaling law yields qualitatively new compute-optimal allocation advice. Beyond a point, further repetition is counterproductive and compute is better spent on model capacity. We show that following our law's recommended configuration improves performance in data-constrained regimes. Finally, because our one-parameter form isolates overfitting in a single coefficient, it enables direct comparison across training configurations. As a case study, we show that strong weight decay (λ=1.0) reduces this coefficient by approximately 70%, providing a scaling-law explanation for recent findings that optimal weight decay in data-constrained regimes is an order of magnitude larger than standard practice.

We develop a tractable identification approach for strategic network formation models with both strategic link interdependence and individual unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effects). The key challenge is that endogenous network statistics (e.g. number of common friends) enter the link formation equation, while the mapping from model primitives to equilibrium network structure is generally intractable. Our approach sidesteps this difficulty using a ``bounding-by-c'' technique that treats endogenous covariates as random variables and exploits monotonicity restrictions to obtain identifying information. A central contribution is to develop a spectrum of fixed-effects handling strategies based on subnetwork configurations: tetrad-based restrictions that difference out all individual fixed effects, triad-based and weighted restrictions that combine ``difference-out'' and ``integrate-out'' steps by differencing out some fixed effects and profiling over the remainder conditional on observed characteristics, and general weighted cycle-based restrictions that unify these cases. We also provide point identification results. Preliminary simulations show that the approach can deliver informative bounds on the structural parameters.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (e.g. GRPO) is the engine behind today's reasoning models, yet it grades only the final answer. On hard problems this trains models to write more rather than to think better, since the trace itself is never graded and no label for good thinking exists. We introduce Agon, which makes two competing models each other's graders. Both attempt the same problem; in alternating roles, one drafts a solution and the other reads it while solving, and each is rewarded for out-solving the other. To win, a model must out-reason a rival that has seen its work, so reasoning is judged implicitly during training, with no process labels and no reward model. Because both models are optimized, each faces a progressively stronger rival, which single-model RL cannot provide. The two need only be comparably strong and behaviorally different. At inference the pair deploys as it trains, a two-stage cascade in which one model drafts and the other answers after reading the draft. On the hard split of DeepMath with Qwen3, this doubles GRPO's pass@1, roughly eight times the gain of an untrained Mixture-of-Agents pass over the same base. The ordering replicates on competitive-programming code and across model families (Qwen3.5, Gemma 4). For now the models talk in text; the next step is to let them reason together in latent space.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Neural scaling laws (NSL) refer to the phenomenon where model performance improves with scale. Sharma & Kaplan analyzed NSL using approximation theory and predict that MSE losses decay as N^{-alpha}, alpha=4/d, where N is the number of model parameters, and d is the intrinsic input dimension. Although their theory works well for some cases (e.g., ReLU networks), we surprisingly find that a simple 1D problem y=x^2 manifests a different scaling law (alpha=1) from their predictions (alpha=4). We opened the neural networks and found that the new scaling law originates from lottery ticket ensembling: a wider network on average has more "lottery tickets", which are ensembled to reduce the variance of outputs. We support the ensembling mechanism by mechanistically interpreting single neural networks, as well as studying them statistically. We attribute the N^{-1} scaling law to the "central limit theorem" of lottery tickets. Finally, we discuss its potential implications for large language models and statistical physics-type theories of learning.

A dominant critique of algorithmic fairness holds that increasing fairness reduces predictive accuracy, imposing a cost on society. We challenge that assumption by empirically analyzing the COMPAS dataset. We make two contributions. First, using causal inference methods, we show that racial bias is not only present in the COMPAS dataset but is also amplified by the models trained on it. Widely used models do more than replicate existing bias; they exacerbate it. This undercuts both the assumption that algorithmic decision-making offers a neutral improvement over human judgment and the weaker claim that it merely mirrors preexisting human bias. Second, we reframe the fairness-accuracy tradeoff. Applying fairness constraints does not necessarily cost predictive accuracy in criminal justice. Prediction systems operationalize concepts such as risk through implicit and often flawed normative choices about what to predict and how. The tradeoff claim assumes that the unconstrained model's prediction is an optimal baseline. Fairness constraints can instead correct distortions introduced by biased outcome variables: rearrest data, in this case, captures and magnifies systemic racial disparities. Under some interventions, therefore, fairness carries none of the cost presumed in policy debates. These dynamics extend beyond criminal justice to lending, hiring, and housing, where biased outcome variables reinforce inequality independently of proxy selection. We draw out what this implies for how law and policy should approach fairness adjustments in criminal law.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this impression rigorous in a dynamic model of cardinal hedonic games by providing meta theorems. These imply hardness of deciding about the possible or necessary convergence of deviation dynamics based on the mere existence of No-instances. Our results hold for additively separable, fractional, and modified fractional hedonic games (ASHGs, FHGs, and MFHGs). Moreover, they encompass essentially all reasonable stability notions based on single-agent deviations. In addition, we propose dynamics as a method to find individually rational and contractually individual stable (CIS) partitions in ASHGs. In particular, we find that CIS dynamics from the singleton partition possibly converge after a linear number of deviations but may require an exponential number of deviations in the worst case.

Kaplan et al. and Hoffmann et al. developed influential scaling laws for the optimal model size as a function of the compute budget, but these laws yield substantially different predictions. We explain the discrepancy by reproducing the Kaplan scaling law on two datasets (OpenWebText2 and RefinedWeb) and identifying three factors causing the difference: last layer computational cost, warmup duration, and scale-dependent optimizer tuning. With these factors corrected, we obtain excellent agreement with the Hoffmann et al. (i.e., "Chinchilla") scaling law. Counter to a hypothesis of Hoffmann et al., we find that careful learning rate decay is not essential for the validity of their scaling law. As a secondary result, we derive scaling laws for the optimal learning rate and batch size, finding that tuning the AdamW beta_2 parameter is essential at lower batch sizes.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

Game-theoretic interactions between agents with Large Language Models (LLMs) have revealed many emergent capabilities, yet the linguistic diversity of these interactions has not been sufficiently quantified. In this paper, we present the Conversational Robustness Evaluation Score: CORE, a metric to quantify the effectiveness of language use within multi-agent systems across different game-theoretic interactions. CORE integrates measures of cluster entropy, lexical repetition, and semantic similarity, providing a direct lens of dialog quality. We apply CORE to pairwise LLM dialogs across competitive, cooperative, and neutral settings, further grounding our analysis in Zipf's and Heaps' Laws to characterize word frequency distributions and vocabulary growth. Our findings show that cooperative settings exhibit both steeper Zipf distributions and higher Heap exponents, indicating more repetition alongside greater vocabulary expansion. In contrast, competitive interactions display lower Zipf and Heaps exponents, reflecting less repetition and more constrained vocabularies. These results provide new insights into how social incentives influence language adaptation, and highlight CORE as a robust diagnostic for measuring linguistic robustness in multi-agent LLM systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/psyonp/core.

Both classical and quantum version of two models of price competition in duopoly market, the one is realistic and the other is idealized, are investigated. The pure strategy Nash equilibria of the realistic model exists under stricter condition than that of the idealized one in the classical form game. This is the problem known as Edgeworth paradox in economics. In the quantum form game, however, the former converges to the latter as the measure of entanglement goes to infinity.

Scaling laws predict loss from compute but not how capabilities interact. We measure the coupling between reasoning and truthfulness across 63 base models from 16 families and find a regime change invisible to loss curves: below a family-dependent critical scale N_c, capabilities anticorrelate; above it, they cooperate. N_c approx 3.5B parameters [2.9B, 13.4B] (bootstrap 95% CI), but model size is not the only variable that determines phase. Architecture, data curation, and training recipe each shift N_c independently: curated training eliminated the coupling dip between Qwen generations (0.025 to 0.830 at matched scale), Gemma-4 at 4B achieves coupling 0.871, characteristic of 13B+ standard-trained models, through distillation and architectural innovation, and Phi at 1B matches web-trained coupling at 10B through data curation alone. Width normalization eliminates the anticorrelation across all tested families, supporting an output-projection bottleneck. Internally, 38 of 40 models show zero competing attention heads. A sparse-regression ODE cross-predicts held-out Llama-2 at 5.6% error. The diagnostic requires no model internals -- only public benchmark scores across a model family. The cooperative regime extends to the frontier (r = +0.72, 34 models, 10 labs). Code, data, and an open-source activation-steering tool for any open-weight model are released alongside an interactive dashboard that diagnoses any model's coupling phase, suggests concrete interventions (data curation, width, benchmark rotation), and provides ODE scaling predictions, frontier diagnostics, and eigenstructure analysis: https://zehenlabs.com/cape/.

Unintended bias in Machine Learning can manifest as systemic differences in performance for different demographic groups, potentially compounding existing challenges to fairness in society at large. In this paper, we introduce a suite of threshold-agnostic metrics that provide a nuanced view of this unintended bias, by considering the various ways that a classifier's score distribution can vary across designated groups. We also introduce a large new test set of online comments with crowd-sourced annotations for identity references. We use this to show how our metrics can be used to find new and potentially subtle unintended bias in existing public models.

Evolvability is an important feature that impacts the ability of evolutionary processes to find interesting novel solutions and to deal with changing conditions of the problem to solve. The estimation of evolvability is not straightforward and is generally too expensive to be directly used as selective pressure in the evolutionary process. Indirectly promoting evolvability as a side effect of other easier and faster to compute selection pressures would thus be advantageous. In an unbounded behavior space, it has already been shown that evolvable individuals naturally appear and tend to be selected as they are more likely to invade empty behavior niches. Evolvability is thus a natural byproduct of the search in this context. However, practical agents and environments often impose limits on the reach-able behavior space. How do these boundaries impact evolvability? In this context, can evolvability still be promoted without explicitly rewarding it? We show that Novelty Search implicitly creates a pressure for high evolvability even in bounded behavior spaces, and explore the reasons for such a behavior. More precisely we show that, throughout the search, the dynamic evaluation of novelty rewards individuals which are very mobile in the behavior space, which in turn promotes evolvability.

For most of scientific history, researchers studying behavior could only infer hidden mechanisms from outward actions: an inverse problem that becomes more tractable when observation is augmented by targeted intervention. We pose a computational analogue: given only behavioral traces of an agent in a game environment, can a learner reconstruct the underlying decision program as executable code, and how much does this reconstruction improve with the ability to design controlled experiments? We introduce RevengeBench, a benchmark of 75 LLM generated, Elo-calibrated policies across five game environments, drawn from CodeClash tournament trajectories. The learner observes the hidden target policy play against sampled opponents and designs behavioral probes in the form of custom opponent policies that elicit informative behavior. It then submits an executable hypothesis, which is evaluated using continuous action-distance metrics. We further validate that recovered code carries informative signal in downstream player-versus-player tournaments. Across twelve frontier LLMs, recovery quality varies substantially (34 to 72% of initial distance closed), with reconstructed policies yielding measurable competitive advantage, particularly for weaker models that otherwise struggle to design effective counter-strategies. Our benchmark positions behavioral recovery of programmatic policies as a tractable inverse problem in code-space, opening a path to opponent modeling, policy interpretability, and the broader question of inferring latent mechanisms from observations.

A fixed network of McCulloch-Pitts threshold units with weights in {-1,0,1} can hold other threshold networks in its state and run them: the state is a ring of banks of records, each record a unit of a stored network, and each step evaluates one record. We use such a network to carry out von Neumann's universal construction and self-reproduction exactly. As a cellular automaton keeps its rule, the fixed network keeps its weights, and what reproduces is a stored network. A constructor of 143 records reads the description of a network from its tape, builds that network in the next bank, copies the description onto the next tape and hands control to what it built; started on its own description, it rebuilds itself, weights included, in every generation. The scheme scales to a universal computer. A SUBLEQ computer of 17,598 ternary units, stored as 36,080 records and running a program of 27 instructions, builds any network that fits a bank and reproduces itself in the same way, at every word width from eight bits on; run directly, it emits the serialization of its own weights, memory and tape. Integer pre-activations give every orbit a margin of 1/2, and replicating each unit r times multiplies it by r. That suffices against noise of any size on the pre-activations, but against von Neumann's output flips only below a threshold inversely proportional to the fan-in. These results are proved in Rocq.

In an effort to better understand the different ways in which the discount factor affects the optimization process in reinforcement learning, we designed a set of experiments to study each effect in isolation. Our analysis reveals that the common perception that poor performance of low discount factors is caused by (too) small action-gaps requires revision. We propose an alternative hypothesis that identifies the size-difference of the action-gap across the state-space as the primary cause. We then introduce a new method that enables more homogeneous action-gaps by mapping value estimates to a logarithmic space. We prove convergence for this method under standard assumptions and demonstrate empirically that it indeed enables lower discount factors for approximate reinforcement-learning methods. This in turn allows tackling a class of reinforcement-learning problems that are challenging to solve with traditional methods.

Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only a single type of attack, while recent work takes steps forward in defending against multiple attacks. In this paper, to understand multi-target robustness, we view this problem as a bargaining game in which different players (adversaries) negotiate to reach an agreement on a joint direction of parameter updating. We identify a phenomenon named player domination in the bargaining game, namely that the existing max-based approaches, such as MAX and MSD, do not converge. Based on our theoretical analysis, we design a novel framework that adjusts the budgets of different adversaries to avoid any player dominance. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that employing the proposed framework to the existing approaches significantly advances multi-target robustness.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

Multi-agent debate, where teams of LLMs iteratively exchange rationales and vote on answers, is widely deployed under the assumption that peer review filters hallucinations. Yet the failure dynamics of homogeneous debate remain poorly understood, therefore we report findings from a controlled empirical study of teams of N{=}10 homogeneous agents (Qwen2.5-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, Ministral-3-8B) across R{=}3 debate rounds on two high-difficulty benchmarks (GSM-Hard and MMLU-Hard). We compare peer debate against isolated self-correction and a stochastic noise control that injects rationales from unrelated problems. We decompose debate failure into three model-dependent pathways: sycophantic conformity, where agents uncritically adopt majority answers (modal adoption up to 85.5%); contextual fragility, where peer rationales destabilize previously correct reasoning (vulnerability rate up to 70.0%); and consensus collapse, where plurality voting discards correct answers already present in the generation pool (oracle gap up to 32.3 percentage points). Ablations over communication density (K in {2,4,9}) and sampling temperature (T in {0.4, 0.7}) show that conformity reaches high levels at minimal peer exposure (K{=}2) and intensifies with greater initial diversity. Across all configurations, debate consumes 2.1-3.4times more tokens (up to 28,631 tokens per problem) than self-correction for equal or lower accuracy. Our results indicate that, within the 7-8B parameter class, homogeneous teams without structured roles do not benefit from unguided peer exchange, and that isolated self-correction consistently offers a more favorable cost-accuracy tradeoff.

This work addresses the buyer's inspection paradox for information markets. The paradox is that buyers need to access information to determine its value, while sellers need to limit access to prevent theft. To study this, we introduce an open-source simulated digital marketplace where intelligent agents, powered by language models, buy and sell information on behalf of external participants. The central mechanism enabling this marketplace is the agents' dual capabilities: they not only have the capacity to assess the quality of privileged information but also come equipped with the ability to forget. This ability to induce amnesia allows vendors to grant temporary access to proprietary information, significantly reducing the risk of unauthorized retention while enabling agents to accurately gauge the information's relevance to specific queries or tasks. To perform well, agents must make rational decisions, strategically explore the marketplace through generated sub-queries, and synthesize answers from purchased information. Concretely, our experiments (a) uncover biases in language models leading to irrational behavior and evaluate techniques to mitigate these biases, (b) investigate how price affects demand in the context of informational goods, and (c) show that inspection and higher budgets both lead to higher quality outcomes.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

Network routers that enforce Quality-of-Service (QoS) guarantees must decide, at every clock cycle, which expiring packet of information to transmit, even when the value of the packet is unknown until it is processed. We frame this problem as the Online Packet Scheduling with Deadlines (OPSD) problem under Partial Feedback: packets arrive at every clock cycle, with different deadlines, but the weights are only observed after execution. Under a stochastic assumption on the unknown weights, we explore different variants of the OPSD problem with bandit feedback. We establish a connection between our setting and the sleeping bandits problem, and set our learning goal to α-regret minimization. We provide algorithms with provable α-regret guarantees under different spans of slackness, distinguishing systems allowing for randomization and systems that do not. In every scenario, our algorithms achieve an α-regret upper bound of mathcal{O}left(KTright), matching the lower bound for the standard bandit setting. In the practically relevant case of 2-bounded deadline instances, where the deadline is set at most one clock cycle away from the arrival, our deterministic algorithm achieves the provably tightest possible competitive ratio. Remarkably, when the number of distinct packet types Kge 2 is finite, it is possible to break the well-established Φ= 1+sqrt{5}{2} competitive ratio barrier and attain a tighter competitive ratio θ_K ranging in [2, Φ).

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

Competitions play an invaluable role in the field of forecasting, as exemplified through the recent M4 competition. The competition received attention from both academics and practitioners and sparked discussions around the representativeness of the data for business forecasting. Several competitions featuring real-life business forecasting tasks on the Kaggle platform has, however, been largely ignored by the academic community. We believe the learnings from these competitions have much to offer to the forecasting community and provide a review of the results from six Kaggle competitions. We find that most of the Kaggle datasets are characterized by higher intermittence and entropy than the M-competitions and that global ensemble models tend to outperform local single models. Furthermore, we find the strong performance of gradient boosted decision trees, increasing success of neural networks for forecasting, and a variety of techniques for adapting machine learning models to the forecasting task.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.