Daily Papers

Recent feature matching methods have achieved remarkable performance but lack efficiency consideration. In this paper, we revisit the mainstream detector-free matching pipeline and improve all its stages considering both accuracy and efficiency. We propose an Efficient Deep feature Matching network, EDM. We first adopt a deeper CNN with fewer dimensions to extract multi-level features. Then we present a Correlation Injection Module that conducts feature transformation on high-level deep features, and progressively injects feature correlations from global to local for efficient multi-scale feature aggregation, improving both speed and performance. In the refinement stage, a novel lightweight bidirectional axis-based regression head is designed to directly predict subpixel-level correspondences from latent features, avoiding the significant computational cost of explicitly locating keypoints on high-resolution local feature heatmaps. Moreover, effective selection strategies are introduced to enhance matching accuracy. Extensive experiments show that our EDM achieves competitive matching accuracy on various benchmarks and exhibits excellent efficiency, offering valuable best practices for real-world applications. The code is available at https://github.com/chicleee/EDM.

Time series forecasting is essential in various domains. Compared to relying solely on endogenous variables (i.e., target variables), considering exogenous variables (i.e., covariates) provides additional predictive information and often leads to more accurate predictions. However, existing methods for time series forecasting with exogenous variables (TSF-X) have the following shortcomings: 1) they do not leverage future exogenous variables, 2) they fail to fully account for the correlation between endogenous and exogenous variables. In this study, to better leverage exogenous variables, especially future exogenous variables, we propose DAG, which utilizes Dual correlAtion network along both the temporal and channel dimensions for time series forecasting with exoGenous variables. Specifically, we propose two core components: the Temporal Correlation Module and the Channel Correlation Module. Both modules consist of a correlation discovery submodule and a correlation injection submodule. The former is designed to capture the correlation effects of historical exogenous variables on future exogenous variables and on historical endogenous variables, respectively. The latter injects the discovered correlation relationships into the processes of forecasting future endogenous variables based on historical endogenous variables and future exogenous variables.

Adapter-based training has emerged as a key mechanism for extending the capabilities of powerful foundation image generators, enabling personalized and stylized text-to-image synthesis. These adapters are typically trained to capture a specific target attribute, such as subject identity, using single-image reconstruction objectives. However, because the input image inevitably contains a mixture of visual factors, adapters are prone to entangle the target attribute with incidental ones, such as pose, expression, and lighting. This spurious correlation problem limits generalization and obstructs the model's ability to adhere to the input text prompt. In this work, we uncover a simple yet effective solution: provide the very shortcuts we wish to eliminate during adapter training. In Shortcut-Rerouted Adapter Training, confounding factors are routed through auxiliary modules, such as ControlNet or LoRA, eliminating the incentive for the adapter to internalize them. The auxiliary modules are then removed during inference. When applied to tasks like facial and full-body identity injection, our approach improves generation quality, diversity, and prompt adherence. These results point to a general design principle in the era of large models: when seeking disentangled representations, the most effective path may be to establish shortcuts for what should NOT be learned.

This study systematically analyzes the vulnerability of 36 large language models (LLMs) to various prompt injection attacks, a technique that leverages carefully crafted prompts to elicit malicious LLM behavior. Across 144 prompt injection tests, we observed a strong correlation between model parameters and vulnerability, with statistical analyses, such as logistic regression and random forest feature analysis, indicating that parameter size and architecture significantly influence susceptibility. Results revealed that 56 percent of tests led to successful prompt injections, emphasizing widespread vulnerability across various parameter sizes, with clustering analysis identifying distinct vulnerability profiles associated with specific model configurations. Additionally, our analysis uncovered correlations between certain prompt injection techniques, suggesting potential overlaps in vulnerabilities. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust, multi-layered defenses in LLMs deployed across critical infrastructure and sensitive industries. Successful prompt injection attacks could result in severe consequences, including data breaches, unauthorized access, or misinformation. Future research should explore multilingual and multi-step defenses alongside adaptive mitigation strategies to strengthen LLM security in diverse, real-world environments.

As neural networks grow in scale, their training becomes both computationally demanding and rich in dynamics. Amidst the flourishing interest in these training dynamics, we present a novel observation: Parameters during training exhibit intrinsic correlations over time. Capitalizing on this, we introduce Correlation Mode Decomposition (CMD). This algorithm clusters the parameter space into groups, termed modes, that display synchronized behavior across epochs. This enables CMD to efficiently represent the training dynamics of complex networks, like ResNets and Transformers, using only a few modes. Moreover, test set generalization is enhanced. We introduce an efficient CMD variant, designed to run concurrently with training. Our experiments indicate that CMD surpasses the state-of-the-art method for compactly modeled dynamics on image classification. Our modeling can improve training efficiency and lower communication overhead, as shown by our preliminary experiments in the context of federated learning.

Current open-source prompt-injection detectors converge on two architectural choices: regular-expression pattern matching and fine-tuned transformer classifiers. Both share failure modes that recent work has made concrete. Regular expressions miss paraphrased attacks. Fine-tuned classifiers are vulnerable to adaptive adversaries: a 2025 NAACL Findings study reported that eight published indirect-injection defenses were bypassed with greater than fifty percent attack success rates under adaptive attacks. This work proposes seven detection techniques that each port a specific mechanism from a discipline outside large-language-model security: forensic linguistics, materials-science fatigue analysis, deception technology from network security, local-sequence alignment from bioinformatics, mechanism design from economics, spectral signal analysis from epidemiology, and taint tracking from compiler theory. Three of the seven techniques are implemented in the prompt-shield v0.4.1 release (Apache 2.0) and evaluated in a four-configuration ablation across six datasets including deepset/prompt-injections, NotInject, LLMail-Inject, AgentHarm, and AgentDojo. The local-alignment detector lifts F1 on deepset from 0.033 to 0.378 with zero additional false positives. The stylometric detector adds 11.1 percentage points of F1 on an indirect-injection benchmark. The fatigue tracker is validated via a probing-campaign integration test. All code, data, and reproduction scripts are released under Apache 2.0.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

The development of large language models (LLMs) depends on trustworthy evaluation. However, most current evaluations rely on public benchmarks, which are prone to data contamination issues that significantly compromise fairness. Previous researches have focused on constructing dynamic benchmarks to address contamination. However, continuously building new benchmarks is costly and cyclical. In this work, we aim to tackle contamination by analyzing the mechanisms of contaminated models themselves. Through our experiments, we discover that the overestimation of contaminated models is likely due to parameters acquiring shortcut solutions in training. We further propose a novel method for identifying shortcut neurons through comparative and causal analysis. Building on this, we introduce an evaluation method called shortcut neuron patching to suppress shortcut neurons. Experiments validate the effectiveness of our approach in mitigating contamination. Additionally, our evaluation results exhibit a strong linear correlation with MixEval, a recently released trustworthy benchmark, achieving a Spearman coefficient (rho) exceeding 0.95. This high correlation indicates that our method closely reveals true capabilities of the models and is trustworthy. We conduct further experiments to demonstrate the generalizability of our method across various benchmarks and hyperparameter settings. Code: https://github.com/GaryStack/Trustworthy-Evaluation

Prompt-injection detectors are heterogeneous: each is strong on a different slice of attacks, and none is always reliable. Yet existing systems still treat detection as a fixed single-detector pipeline, committing every request to one detector's blind spots. We reframe defense as detector allocation: given a heterogeneous pool, decide per request which detectors to run and whether to escalate to an LLM judge. Our framework SCOUT (Scalable and Controllable Outcome-prediction for Uncertainty-aware Triage) makes this decision dynamic by predicting each detector's per-sample reliability and latency from how it behaved on similar past inputs, and exposes a single safety-utility threshold to the operator (where utility bundles benign-pass rate and wall-clock). To evaluate this setting, we build SCOUT-450, a benchmark that captures the structurally complex, agent-facing injections that older prompt-injection sets under-represent. On SCOUT-450, a safety-oriented operating point reduces attack-success rate by 46% and total wall-clock by 40% relative to an always-on GPT-4o judge, at a 5.1-point benign-utility drop. SCOUT also transfers to three external benchmarks (BIPIA, IPI, and IHEval), improving the safety-utility frontier.

Manipulation of facial images to meet specific controls such as pose, expression, and lighting, also known as face rigging, is a complex task in computer vision. Existing methods are limited by their reliance on image datasets, which necessitates individual-specific fine-tuning and limits their ability to retain fine-grained identity and semantic details, reducing practical usability. To overcome these limitations, we introduce ControlFace, a novel face rigging method conditioned on 3DMM renderings that enables flexible, high-fidelity control. We employ a dual-branch U-Nets: one, referred to as FaceNet, captures identity and fine details, while the other focuses on generation. To enhance control precision, the control mixer module encodes the correlated features between the target-aligned control and reference-aligned control, and a novel guidance method, reference control guidance, steers the generation process for better control adherence. By training on a facial video dataset, we fully utilize FaceNet's rich representations while ensuring control adherence. Extensive experiments demonstrate ControlFace's superior performance in identity preservation and control precision, highlighting its practicality. Please see the project website: https://cvlab-kaist.github.io/ControlFace/.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

We show that LoRA adapters, the dominant distribution format for fine-tuned LLMs, can be reliably backdoored through training data poisoning while preserving baseline task performance. On a Qwen 2.5 1.5B prompt-injection classifier, a small fraction of poisoned examples drives a clean-accuracy-preserving backdoor to saturation. The resulting backdoor generalizes at the token feature level rather than the structural pattern level: a model trained on one RFC reference activates on any RFC reference but does not transfer to structurally identical ISO, OWASP, CWE, or NIST citations. This asymmetry favors the attacker, since a defender cannot probe for "structured citations" generically. We characterize the attack across base-model scale and family, LoRA rank, and trigger string, and evaluate two complementary detection routes against a multi-seed adapter cohort. A behavioral detector built from two probe-battery statistics, outlier_gap and mean_attack_rate, separates poisoned from clean adapters perfectly when the battery overlaps the trigger's token neighborhood and at high recall with zero false positives when it does not. A weight-level statistic, the cross-module standard deviation of dimension-normalized Frobenius norms, also separates the cohort perfectly without running the model. Combined, the two routes are robust to probe composition. Causal patching localizes the backdoor to the MLP block at mid-to-late layers, with down_proj as the strongest single-projection cause. Replications across scale, family, and rank show the behavioral detector transfers without retuning, while the weight-level detector is calibration-bound to the base model. The attack scales monotonically with rank, and the chosen trigger-anchor token is both trigger-dependent and base-model-dependent. Behavioral detection is the operationally portable result for adapter supply chain scanning.

Universal adversarial attacks on aligned multimodal large language models are increasingly reported with attack success rates in the 60-80% range, suggesting the visual modality is highly vulnerable to imperceptible perturbations as a prompt-injection channel. We argue that this number conflates two distinct events: (i) the model's output was perturbed (Influence), and (ii) the attacker's chosen target concept was actually emitted (Precise Injection). We compose two existing techniques -- Universal Adversarial Attack and AnyAttack -- under an L_{inf} budget of 16/255, and we add a dual-axis evaluation: a deterministic Ratcliff-Obershelp drift score for Influence (programmatic baseline) plus a 4-tier ordinal categorical none/weak/partial/confirmed for Precise Injection. The judge is DeepSeek-V4-Pro in thinking mode, calibrated against Claude Opus 4.7 with Cohen's κ = 0.77 on the injection axis (substantial agreement); the entire 4475-entry SHA-256 input cache ships with the dataset so reviewers can re-derive paper numbers bit-exact without an API key. Across 6615 pairs over four open VLMs, seven attack prompts, and seven test images, the two axes diverge by roughly 90times: 66.4% of pairs are programmatically disturbed (LLM-judged 46.6% at the substantial-or-complete tier), but only 0.756% (50/6615) reach any non-none injection tier and only 0.030% (2/6615) verbatim. The few injections that do land cluster on screenshot- or document-style carriers whose semantics already invite text transcription. BLIP-2 shows zero detectable drift at L_{inf} = 16/255 across all 2205 pairs even when used as a Stage-1 surrogate. We release the full dataset -- 21 universal images, 147 adversarial photos, 6,615 response pairs, the v3 dual-axis judge results, and the cache at huggingface.co/datasets/jeffliulab/visinject.

Anomaly detection in multivariate time series is challenging as heterogeneous subsequence anomalies may occur. Reconstruction-based methods, which focus on learning normal patterns in the frequency domain to detect diverse abnormal subsequences, achieve promising results, while still falling short on capturing fine-grained frequency characteristics and channel correlations. To contend with the limitations, we introduce CATCH, a framework based on frequency patching. We propose to patchify the frequency domain into frequency bands, which enhances its ability to capture fine-grained frequency characteristics. To perceive appropriate channel correlations, we propose a Channel Fusion Module (CFM), which features a patch-wise mask generator and a masked-attention mechanism. Driven by a bi-level multi-objective optimization algorithm, the CFM is encouraged to iteratively discover appropriate patch-wise channel correlations, and to cluster relevant channels while isolating adverse effects from irrelevant channels. Extensive experiments on 10 real-world datasets and 12 synthetic datasets demonstrate that CATCH achieves state-of-the-art performance. We make our code and datasets available at https://github.com/decisionintelligence/CATCH.

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows; however, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs. We introduce the Medical Prompt Injection Benchmark (MPIB), a dataset-and-benchmark suite for evaluating clinical safety under both direct prompt injection and indirect, RAG-mediated injection across clinically grounded tasks. MPIB emphasizes outcome-level risk via the Clinical Harm Event Rate (CHER), which measures high-severity clinical harm events under a clinically grounded taxonomy, and reports CHER alongside Attack Success Rate (ASR) to disentangle instruction compliance from downstream patient risk. The benchmark comprises 9,697 curated instances constructed through multi-stage quality gates and clinical safety linting. Evaluating MPIB across a diverse set of baseline LLMs and defense configurations, we find that ASR and CHER can diverge substantially, and that robustness depends critically on whether adversarial instructions appear in the user query or in retrieved context. We release MPIB with evaluation code, adversarial baselines, and comprehensive documentation to support reproducible and systematic research on clinical prompt injection. Code and data are available at GitHub (code) and Hugging Face (data).

We propose an efficient framework, called Simple Swap (SimSwap), aiming for generalized and high fidelity face swapping. In contrast to previous approaches that either lack the ability to generalize to arbitrary identity or fail to preserve attributes like facial expression and gaze direction, our framework is capable of transferring the identity of an arbitrary source face into an arbitrary target face while preserving the attributes of the target face. We overcome the above defects in the following two ways. First, we present the ID Injection Module (IIM) which transfers the identity information of the source face into the target face at feature level. By using this module, we extend the architecture of an identity-specific face swapping algorithm to a framework for arbitrary face swapping. Second, we propose the Weak Feature Matching Loss which efficiently helps our framework to preserve the facial attributes in an implicit way. Extensive experiments on wild faces demonstrate that our SimSwap is able to achieve competitive identity performance while preserving attributes better than previous state-of-the-art methods. The code is already available on github: https://github.com/neuralchen/SimSwap.

Image-to-Video (I2V) generation models, which condition video generation on reference images, have shown emerging visual instruction-following capability, allowing certain visual cues in reference images to act as implicit control signals for video generation. However, this capability also introduces a previously overlooked risk: adversaries may exploit visual instructions to inject malicious intent through the image modality. In this work, we uncover this risk by proposing Visual Instruction Injection (VII), a training-free and transferable jailbreaking framework that intentionally disguises the malicious intent of unsafe text prompts as benign visual instructions in the safe reference image. Specifically, VII coordinates a Malicious Intent Reprogramming module to distill malicious intent from unsafe text prompts while minimizing their static harmfulness, and a Visual Instruction Grounding module to ground the distilled intent onto a safe input image by rendering visual instructions that preserve semantic consistency with the original unsafe text prompt, thereby inducing harmful content during I2V generation. Empirically, our extensive experiments on four state-of-the-art commercial I2V models (Kling-v2.5-turbo, Gemini Veo-3.1, Seedance-1.5-pro, and PixVerse-V5) demonstrate that VII achieves Attack Success Rates of up to 83.5% while reducing Refusal Rates to near zero, significantly outperforming existing baselines.

Prompt injection attacks pose a significant security threat to LLM-integrated applications. Model-level defenses have shown strong effectiveness, but are currently deployed into commercial-grade models in a closed-source manner. We believe open-source models are needed by the AI security community, where co-development of attacks and defenses through open research drives scientific progress in mitigation against prompt injection attacks. To this end, we develop Meta SecAlign, the first open-source and open-weight LLM with built-in model-level defense that achieves commercial-grade model performance. We provide complete details of our training recipe, which utilizes an improved version of the SOTA SecAlign defense. Evaluations on 9 utility benchmarks and 7 security benchmarks show that Meta SecAlign, despite being trained on a generic instruction-tuning dataset, confers security in unseen downstream tasks, including tool-calling and agentic web navigation, in addition general instruction-following. Our best model -- Meta-SecAlign-70B -- achieves state-of-the-art robustness against prompt injection attacks and comparable utility to closed-source commercial LLM with model-level defense.

Recent advancements in Unet-based diffusion models, such as ControlNet and IP-Adapter, have introduced effective spatial and subject control mechanisms. However, the DiT (Diffusion Transformer) architecture still struggles with efficient and flexible control. To tackle this issue, we propose EasyControl, a novel framework designed to unify condition-guided diffusion transformers with high efficiency and flexibility. Our framework is built on three key innovations. First, we introduce a lightweight Condition Injection LoRA Module. This module processes conditional signals in isolation, acting as a plug-and-play solution. It avoids modifying the base model weights, ensuring compatibility with customized models and enabling the flexible injection of diverse conditions. Notably, this module also supports harmonious and robust zero-shot multi-condition generalization, even when trained only on single-condition data. Second, we propose a Position-Aware Training Paradigm. This approach standardizes input conditions to fixed resolutions, allowing the generation of images with arbitrary aspect ratios and flexible resolutions. At the same time, it optimizes computational efficiency, making the framework more practical for real-world applications. Third, we develop a Causal Attention Mechanism combined with the KV Cache technique, adapted for conditional generation tasks. This innovation significantly reduces the latency of image synthesis, improving the overall efficiency of the framework. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that EasyControl achieves exceptional performance across various application scenarios. These innovations collectively make our framework highly efficient, flexible, and suitable for a wide range of tasks.

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

Deploying convolutional neural networks (CNNs) on embedded devices is difficult due to the limited memory and computation resources. The redundancy in feature maps is an important characteristic of those successful CNNs, but has rarely been investigated in neural architecture design. This paper proposes a novel Ghost module to generate more feature maps from cheap operations. Based on a set of intrinsic feature maps, we apply a series of linear transformations with cheap cost to generate many ghost feature maps that could fully reveal information underlying intrinsic features. The proposed Ghost module can be taken as a plug-and-play component to upgrade existing convolutional neural networks. Ghost bottlenecks are designed to stack Ghost modules, and then the lightweight GhostNet can be easily established. Experiments conducted on benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed Ghost module is an impressive alternative of convolution layers in baseline models, and our GhostNet can achieve higher recognition performance (e.g. 75.7% top-1 accuracy) than MobileNetV3 with similar computational cost on the ImageNet ILSVRC-2012 classification dataset. Code is available at https://github.com/huawei-noah/ghostnet

Modern large language models rely on chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to achieve impressive performance, yet the same mechanism can amplify deceptive alignment, situations in which a model appears aligned while covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Existing safety pipelines treat deception as a black-box output to be filtered post-hoc, leaving the model free to scheme during its internal reasoning. We ask: Can deception be intercepted while the model is thinking? We answer this question, the first framework that embeds a Self-Monitor inside the CoT process itself, named CoT Monitor+. During generation, the model produces (i) ordinary reasoning steps and (ii) an internal self-evaluation signal trained to flag and suppress misaligned strategies. The signal is used as an auxiliary reward in reinforcement learning, creating a feedback loop that rewards honest reasoning and discourages hidden goals. To study deceptive alignment systematically, we introduce DeceptionBench, a five-category benchmark that probes covert alignment-faking, sycophancy, etc. We evaluate various LLMs and show that unrestricted CoT roughly aggravates the deceptive tendency. In contrast, CoT Monitor+ cuts deceptive behaviors by 43.8% on average while preserving task accuracy. Further, when the self-monitor signal replaces an external weak judge in RL fine-tuning, models exhibit substantially fewer obfuscated thoughts and retain transparency. Our project website can be found at cot-monitor-plus.github.io

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Inversion-based image editing in flow matching models has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training-free, text-guided image manipulation. A central challenge in this paradigm is the injection dilemma: injecting source features during denoising preserves the background of the original image but simultaneously suppresses the model's ability to synthesize edited content. Existing methods address this with fixed injection strategies -- binary on/off temporal schedules, uniform spatial mixing ratios, and channel-agnostic latent perturbation -- that ignore the inherently heterogeneous nature of injection demand across both the temporal and channel dimensions. In this paper, we present AdaEdit, a training-free adaptive editing framework that resolves this dilemma through two complementary innovations. First, we propose a Progressive Injection Schedule that replaces hard binary cutoffs with continuous decay functions (sigmoid, cosine, or linear), enabling a smooth transition from source-feature preservation to target-feature generation and eliminating feature discontinuity artifacts. Second, we introduce Channel-Selective Latent Perturbation, which estimates per-channel importance based on the distributional gap between the inverted and random latents and applies differentiated perturbation strengths accordingly -- strongly perturbing edit-relevant channels while preserving structure-encoding channels. Extensive experiments on the PIE-Bench benchmark (700 images, 10 editing types) demonstrate that AdaEdit achieves an 8.7% reduction in LPIPS, a 2.6% improvement in SSIM, and a 2.3% improvement in PSNR over strong baselines, while maintaining competitive CLIP similarity. AdaEdit is fully plug-and-play and compatible with multiple ODE solvers including Euler, RF-Solver, and FireFlow. Code is available at https://github.com/leeguandong/AdaEdit

We show that safety alignment in modular LLMs can exhibit a compositional vulnerability: adapters that appear benign and plausibly functional in isolation can, when linearly composed, compromise safety. We study this failure mode through Colluding LoRA (CoLoRA), in which harmful behavior emerges only in the composition state. Unlike attacks that depend on adversarial prompts or explicit input triggers, this composition-triggered broad refusal suppression causes the model to comply with harmful requests under standard prompts once a particular set of adapters is loaded. This behavior exposes a combinatorial blind spot in current unit-centric defenses, for which exhaustive verification over adapter compositions is computationally intractable. Across several open-weight LLMs, we find that individual adapters remain benign in isolation while their composition yields high attack success rates, indicating that securing modular LLM supply-chains requires moving beyond single-module verification toward composition-aware defenses.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have seen rapid adoption in recent years, with industries increasingly relying on them to maintain a competitive advantage. These models excel at interpreting user instructions and generating human-like responses, leading to their integration across diverse domains, including consulting and information retrieval. However, their widespread deployment also introduces substantial security risks, most notably in the form of prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. To systematically evaluate LLM vulnerabilities -- particularly to external prompt injection -- we conducted a series of experiments on eight commercial models. Each model was tested without supplementary sanitization, relying solely on its built-in safeguards. The results exposed exploitable weaknesses and emphasized the need for stronger security measures. Four categories of attacks were examined: direct injection, indirect (external) injection, image-based injection, and prompt leakage. Comparative analysis indicated that Claude 3 demonstrated relatively greater robustness; nevertheless, empirical findings confirm that additional defenses, such as input normalization, remain necessary to achieve reliable protection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread use in various applications due to their powerful capability to generate human-like text. However, prompt injection attacks, which involve overwriting a model's original instructions with malicious prompts to manipulate the generated text, have raised significant concerns about the security and reliability of LLMs. Ensuring that LLMs are robust against such attacks is crucial for their deployment in real-world applications, particularly in critical tasks. In this paper, we propose PROMPTFUZZ, a novel testing framework that leverages fuzzing techniques to systematically assess the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Inspired by software fuzzing, PROMPTFUZZ selects promising seed prompts and generates a diverse set of prompt injections to evaluate the target LLM's resilience. PROMPTFUZZ operates in two stages: the prepare phase, which involves selecting promising initial seeds and collecting few-shot examples, and the focus phase, which uses the collected examples to generate diverse, high-quality prompt injections. Using PROMPTFUZZ, we can uncover more vulnerabilities in LLMs, even those with strong defense prompts. By deploying the generated attack prompts from PROMPTFUZZ in a real-world competition, we achieved the 7th ranking out of over 4000 participants (top 0.14%) within 2 hours. Additionally, we construct a dataset to fine-tune LLMs for enhanced robustness against prompt injection attacks. While the fine-tuned model shows improved robustness, PROMPTFUZZ continues to identify vulnerabilities, highlighting the importance of robust testing for LLMs. Our work emphasizes the critical need for effective testing tools and provides a practical framework for evaluating and improving the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks.

Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Web Agents represent a significant step towards automating complex tasks by simulating human-like interaction with websites. However, their deployment in uncontrolled web environments introduces significant security vulnerabilities. Existing research on adversarial environmental injection attacks often relies on unrealistic assumptions, such as direct HTML manipulation, knowledge of user intent, or access to agent model parameters, limiting their practical applicability. In this paper, we propose AdInject, a novel and real-world black-box attack method that leverages the internet advertising delivery to inject malicious content into the Web Agent's environment. AdInject operates under a significantly more realistic threat model than prior work, assuming a black-box agent, static malicious content constraints, and no specific knowledge of user intent. AdInject includes strategies for designing malicious ad content aimed at misleading agents into clicking, and a VLM-based ad content optimization technique that infers potential user intents from the target website's context and integrates these intents into the ad content to make it appear more relevant or critical to the agent's task, thus enhancing attack effectiveness. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of AdInject, attack success rates exceeding 60% in most scenarios and approaching 100% in certain cases. This strongly demonstrates that prevalent advertising delivery constitutes a potent and real-world vector for environment injection attacks against Web Agents. This work highlights a critical vulnerability in Web Agent security arising from real-world environment manipulation channels, underscoring the urgent need for developing robust defense mechanisms against such threats. Our code is available at https://github.com/NicerWang/AdInject.

Text-to-image generation with visual autoregressive~(VAR) models has recently achieved impressive advances in generation fidelity and inference efficiency. While control mechanisms have been explored for diffusion models, enabling precise and flexible control within VAR paradigm remains underexplored. To bridge this critical gap, in this paper, we introduce ScaleWeaver, a novel framework designed to achieve high-fidelity, controllable generation upon advanced VAR models through parameter-efficient fine-tuning. The core module in ScaleWeaver is the improved MMDiT block with the proposed Reference Attention module, which efficiently and effectively incorporates conditional information. Different from MM Attention, the proposed Reference Attention module discards the unnecessary attention from imagerightarrowcondition, reducing computational cost while stabilizing control injection. Besides, it strategically emphasizes parameter reuse, leveraging the capability of the VAR backbone itself with a few introduced parameters to process control information, and equipping a zero-initialized linear projection to ensure that control signals are incorporated effectively without disrupting the generative capability of the base model. Extensive experiments show that ScaleWeaver delivers high-quality generation and precise control while attaining superior efficiency over diffusion-based methods, making ScaleWeaver a practical and effective solution for controllable text-to-image generation within the visual autoregressive paradigm. Code and models will be released.

Recent studies introduce conditional memory modules that decouple knowledge storage from neural computation, enabling more direct knowledge access. Compared to MoE, which relies on dynamic computation paths, explicit lookup provides a more efficient knowledge retrieval mechanism. However, these approaches still depend on learned memory embeddings, requiring additional training and limiting flexibility. To address this, we propose N-gram Memory (NGM), a training-free, plug-and-play module composed of a Causal N-Gram Encoder and a Cosine-Gated Memory Injector. The Causal N-Gram Encoder directly averages the pretrained token embeddings of the backbone model to construct N-gram representations, thereby eliminating the need to train separate N-gram embeddings from scratch. This design requires neither an additional memory table nor a retrieval pipeline. The Cosine-Gated Memory Injector then uses a non-parametric cosine gate with ReLU to modulate the retrieved embeddings into the contextual representations. We evaluate NGM on the Qwen3 series from 0.6B to 14B across eight benchmarks. NGM improves average performance by 0.5 to 1.2 points, with particularly clear gains on code generation and knowledge-intensive tasks (e.g., +3.0 on LiveCodeBench and +3.03 on GPQA for Qwen3-14B). Moreover, NGM also improves performance in multimodal benchmarks (e.g., MMStar +1.53 on Qwen3-VL-2B).

Neural image classifiers can often learn to make predictions by overly relying on non-predictive features that are spuriously correlated with the class labels in the training data. This leads to poor performance in real-world atypical scenarios where such features are absent. Supplementing the training dataset with images without such spurious features can aid robust learning against spurious correlations via better generalization. This paper presents ASPIRE (Language-guided data Augmentation for SPurIous correlation REmoval), a simple yet effective solution for expanding the training dataset with synthetic images without spurious features. ASPIRE, guided by language, generates these images without requiring any form of additional supervision or existing examples. Precisely, we employ LLMs to first extract foreground and background features from textual descriptions of an image, followed by advanced language-guided image editing to discover the features that are spuriously correlated with the class label. Finally, we personalize a text-to-image generation model to generate diverse in-domain images without spurious features. We demonstrate the effectiveness of ASPIRE on 4 datasets, including the very challenging Hard ImageNet dataset, and 9 baselines and show that ASPIRE improves the classification accuracy of prior methods by 1% - 38%. Code soon at: https://github.com/Sreyan88/ASPIRE.

Retrieval-augmented generation and tool-integrated LLM agents increasingly depend on external textual sources. This reliance broadens the available attack surface, allowing adversaries to insert malicious instructions that trigger unintended model behaviors. Current defensive measures often utilize LLM-based detectors to filter such content, but these approaches remain vulnerable to optimization-based attacks. Additionally, training-based methods frequently fail to generalize to novel data distributions. To resolve these issues, we introduce SONAR, a prompt sanitization framework that identifies and removes injected content using metrics from natural language inference. Specifically, SONAR constructs a sentence-level relational graph across the user query and external data. By using entailment and contradiction scores as edge weights, the system identifies sentences that deviate from the core task. It then employs connectivity-driven pruning to eliminate flagged injection seeds and their related neighbors while maintaining benign context. Rigorous evaluations across several models and datasets show that SONAR reduces the attack success rate to nearly zero, significantly outperforming nine established baseline defenses.

Masked Autoencoders (MAE) have been prevailing paradigms for large-scale vision representation pre-training. By reconstructing masked image patches from a small portion of visible image regions, MAE forces the model to infer semantic correlation within an image. Recently, some approaches apply semantic-rich teacher models to extract image features as the reconstruction target, leading to better performance. However, unlike the low-level features such as pixel values, we argue the features extracted by powerful teacher models already encode rich semantic correlation across regions in an intact image.This raises one question: is reconstruction necessary in Masked Image Modeling (MIM) with a teacher model? In this paper, we propose an efficient MIM paradigm named MaskAlign. MaskAlign simply learns the consistency of visible patch features extracted by the student model and intact image features extracted by the teacher model. To further advance the performance and tackle the problem of input inconsistency between the student and teacher model, we propose a Dynamic Alignment (DA) module to apply learnable alignment. Our experimental results demonstrate that masked modeling does not lose effectiveness even without reconstruction on masked regions. Combined with Dynamic Alignment, MaskAlign can achieve state-of-the-art performance with much higher efficiency. Code and models will be available at https://github.com/OpenPerceptionX/maskalign.

Although multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, their instruction-following behavior leaves them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. Existing prompt injection methods predominantly rely on textual prompts or perceptible visual prompts that are observable by human users. In this work, we study imperceptible visual prompt injection against powerful closed-source MLLMs, where adversarial instructions are embedded in the visual modality. Our method adaptively embeds the malicious prompt into the input image via a bounded text overlay to provide semantic guidance. Meanwhile, the imperceptible visual perturbation is iteratively optimized to align the feature representation of the attacked image with those of the malicious visual and textual targets at both coarse- and fine-grained levels. Specifically, the visual target is instantiated as a text-rendered image and progressively refined during optimization to more faithfully represent the desired semantics and improve transferability. Extensive experiments on two multimodal understanding tasks across multiple closed-source MLLMs demonstrate the superior performance of our approach compared to existing methods.

We implement and benchmark on IBM Quantum hardware the circuit family proposed by Violaris for estimating operational inter-branch communication witnesses, defined as correlations in classical measurement records produced by compiled Wigner's-friend-style circuits. We realize a five-qubit instance of the protocol as an inter-register message-transfer pattern within a single circuit, rather than physical signaling, and evaluate its behavior under realistic device noise and compilation constraints. The circuit encodes branch-conditioned evolution of an observer subsystem whose dynamics depend on a control qubit, followed by a controlled transfer operation that probes correlations between conditional measurement contexts. Executing on the ibm_fez backend with 20000 shots, we observe population-based visibility of 0.877, coherence witnesses of 0.840 and -0.811 along orthogonal axes, and a phase-sensitive magnitude of approximately 1.17. While the visibility metric is insensitive to some classes of dephasing, the coherence witnesses provide complementary sensitivity to off-diagonal noise. This work does not test or discriminate among interpretations of quantum mechanics. Instead, it provides a reproducible operational constraint pipeline for evaluating detectability of non-ideal channels relative to calibrated device noise.

Recent developments in Large Language Models (LLMs) have manifested significant advancements. To facilitate safeguards against malicious exploitation, a body of research has concentrated on aligning LLMs with human preferences and inhibiting their generation of inappropriate content. Unfortunately, such alignments are often vulnerable: fine-tuning with a minimal amount of harmful data can easily unalign the target LLM. While being effective, such fine-tuning-based unalignment approaches also have their own limitations: (1) non-stealthiness, after fine-tuning, safety audits or red-teaming can easily expose the potential weaknesses of the unaligned models, thereby precluding their release/use. (2) non-persistence, the unaligned LLMs can be easily repaired through re-alignment, i.e., fine-tuning again with aligned data points. In this work, we show that it is possible to conduct stealthy and persistent unalignment on large language models via backdoor injections. We also provide a novel understanding on the relationship between the backdoor persistence and the activation pattern and further provide guidelines for potential trigger design. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our proposed stealthy and persistent unalignment can successfully pass the safety evaluation while maintaining strong persistence against re-alignment defense.

Instruction driven image editing with standard CLIP text encoders often fails in complex scenes with many objects. We present QL-Adapter, a framework for multiple object editing that tackles two challenges: enforcing object counts and spatial layouts, and accommodating diverse categories. QL-Adapter consists of two core modules: the Image-Layout Fusion Module (ILFM) and the Cross-Modal Augmentation Module (CMAM). ILFM fuses layout priors with ViT patch tokens from the CLIP image encoder to strengthen spatial structure understanding. CMAM injects image features into the text branch to enrich textual embeddings and improve instruction following. We further build QL-Dataset, a benchmark that spans broad category, layout, and count variations, and define the task of quantity and layout consistent image editing (QL-Edit). Extensive experiments show that QL-Adapter achieves state of the art performance on QL-Edit and significantly outperforms existing models.

Fine-tuned vision-language models (VLMs) often capture spurious correlations between image features and textual attributes, resulting in degraded zero-shot performance at test time. Existing approaches for addressing spurious correlations (i) primarily operate at the global image-level rather than intervening directly on fine-grained image features and (ii) are predominantly designed for unimodal settings. In this work, we present RaVL, which takes a fine-grained perspective on VLM robustness by discovering and mitigating spurious correlations using local image features rather than operating at the global image level. Given a fine-tuned VLM, RaVL first discovers spurious correlations by leveraging a region-level clustering approach to identify precise image features contributing to zero-shot classification errors. Then, RaVL mitigates the identified spurious correlation with a novel region-aware loss function that enables the VLM to focus on relevant regions and ignore spurious relationships during fine-tuning. We evaluate RaVL on 654 VLMs with various model architectures, data domains, and learned spurious correlations. Our results show that RaVL accurately discovers (191% improvement over the closest baseline) and mitigates (8.2% improvement on worst-group image classification accuracy) spurious correlations. Qualitative evaluations on general-domain and medical-domain VLMs confirm our findings.

LLM agents are evolving from conversational chatbots to operational tools in real-world workspaces. In local agentic harnesses, an LLM can read and write files, call tools, and reuse workspace state across sessions. While such capabilities enhance utility, they also expose a new attack surface for attackers. Attackers can embed a prompt injection within a file or tool output. Agents may read this hidden instruction, store it, and execute it later. In this multi-step trojan attack paradigm, no individual step appears malicious on its own, but these steps can collectively turn untrusted text into persistent control content. However, existing defenses often inspect each step in isolation. As a result, they can block a clear harmful action, but fail to detect the earlier write operation that plants the backdoor. To reveal this threat, we introduce ClawTrojan, a benchmark designed to identify multi-step trojan attacks in local agentic harnesses. In an OpenClaw-style simulated workspace with GPT-5.4, ClawTrojan reaches a 95.5% attack success rate (ASR), while existing single-turn prompt-injection attacks produce near-zero ASR on the same model. To address this threat, we propose DASGuard, which scans control-like text in sensitive local files, traces its origin, and removes control content that does not originate from a trusted source. Our results show that DASGuard achieves strong dynamic defense by combining runtime attack blocking with sanitized commits to the workspace.

Despite their remarkable performance, large language models lack elementary safety features, making them susceptible to numerous malicious attacks. In particular, previous work has identified the absence of an intrinsic separation between instructions and data as the root cause of the success of prompt injection attacks. In this work, we propose a new architectural element, ASIDE, that allows language models to clearly separate instructions and data at the level of token embeddings. ASIDE applies an orthogonal rotation to the embeddings of data tokens, thus creating clearly distinct representations of instructions and data tokens without introducing any additional parameters. As we demonstrate experimentally across a range of models, instruction-tuning LLMs with ASIDE (1) achieves substantially higher instruction-data separation without performance loss and (2) makes the models more robust to prompt injection benchmarks, even without dedicated safety training. Additionally, we provide insights into the mechanism underlying our method through an analysis of the model representations. The source code and training scripts are openly accessible at https://github.com/egozverev/aside.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized various domains but remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious inputs manipulate the model into ignoring original instructions and executing designated action. In this paper, we investigate the underlying mechanisms of these attacks by analyzing the attention patterns within LLMs. We introduce the concept of the distraction effect, where specific attention heads, termed important heads, shift focus from the original instruction to the injected instruction. Building on this discovery, we propose Attention Tracker, a training-free detection method that tracks attention patterns on instruction to detect prompt injection attacks without the need for additional LLM inference. Our method generalizes effectively across diverse models, datasets, and attack types, showing an AUROC improvement of up to 10.0% over existing methods, and performs well even on small LLMs. We demonstrate the robustness of our approach through extensive evaluations and provide insights into safeguarding LLM-integrated systems from prompt injection vulnerabilities.

Spurious correlations allow flexible models to predict well during training but poorly on related test distributions. Recent work has shown that models that satisfy particular independencies involving correlation-inducing nuisance variables have guarantees on their test performance. Enforcing such independencies requires nuisances to be observed during training. However, nuisances, such as demographics or image background labels, are often missing. Enforcing independence on just the observed data does not imply independence on the entire population. Here we derive mmd estimators used for invariance objectives under missing nuisances. On simulations and clinical data, optimizing through these estimates achieves test performance similar to using estimators that make use of the full data.

Currently, instruction-based image editing methods have made significant progress by leveraging the powerful cross-modal understanding capabilities of vision language models (VLMs). However, they still face challenges in three key areas: 1) complex scenarios; 2) semantic consistency; and 3) fine-grained editing. To address these issues, we propose FireEdit, an innovative Fine-grained Instruction-based image editing framework that exploits a REgion-aware VLM. FireEdit is designed to accurately comprehend user instructions and ensure effective control over the editing process. Specifically, we enhance the fine-grained visual perception capabilities of the VLM by introducing additional region tokens. Relying solely on the output of the LLM to guide the diffusion model may lead to suboptimal editing results. Therefore, we propose a Time-Aware Target Injection module and a Hybrid Visual Cross Attention module. The former dynamically adjusts the guidance strength at various denoising stages by integrating timestep embeddings with the text embeddings. The latter enhances visual details for image editing, thereby preserving semantic consistency between the edited result and the source image. By combining the VLM enhanced with fine-grained region tokens and the time-dependent diffusion model, FireEdit demonstrates significant advantages in comprehending editing instructions and maintaining high semantic consistency. Extensive experiments indicate that our approach surpasses the state-of-the-art instruction-based image editing methods. Our project is available at https://zjgans.github.io/fireedit.github.io.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to persist experiences and refine future performance. While this experience learning capability enhances agentic autonomy, it introduces a critical, unexplored attack surface, i.e., the trust boundary between an agent's reasoning core and its own past. In this paper, we introduce MemoryGraft. It is a novel indirect injection attack that compromises agent behavior not through immediate jailbreaks, but by implanting malicious successful experiences into the agent's long-term memory. Unlike traditional prompt injections that are transient, or standard RAG poisoning that targets factual knowledge, MemoryGraft exploits the agent's semantic imitation heuristic which is the tendency to replicate patterns from retrieved successful tasks. We demonstrate that an attacker who can supply benign ingestion-level artifacts that the agent reads during execution can induce it to construct a poisoned RAG store where a small set of malicious procedure templates is persisted alongside benign experiences. When the agent later encounters semantically similar tasks, union retrieval over lexical and embedding similarity reliably surfaces these grafted memories, and the agent adopts the embedded unsafe patterns, leading to persistent behavioral drift across sessions. We validate MemoryGraft on MetaGPT's DataInterpreter agent with GPT-4o and find that a small number of poisoned records can account for a large fraction of retrieved experiences on benign workloads, turning experience-based self-improvement into a vector for stealthy and durable compromise. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and evaluation data are available at https://github.com/Jacobhhy/Agent-Memory-Poisoning.

While poisoning attacks on machine learning models have been extensively studied, the mechanisms by which adversaries can distribute poisoned models at scale remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we shed light on how model leaderboards -- ranked platforms for model discovery and evaluation -- can serve as a powerful channel for adversaries for stealthy large-scale distribution of poisoned models. We present TrojanClimb, a general framework that enables injection of malicious behaviors while maintaining competitive leaderboard performance. We demonstrate its effectiveness across four diverse modalities: text-embedding, text-generation, text-to-speech and text-to-image, showing that adversaries can successfully achieve high leaderboard rankings while embedding arbitrary harmful functionalities, from backdoors to bias injection. Our findings reveal a significant vulnerability in the machine learning ecosystem, highlighting the urgent need to redesign leaderboard evaluation mechanisms to detect and filter malicious (e.g., poisoned) models, while exposing broader security implications for the machine learning community regarding the risks of adopting models from unverified sources.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

We introduce Correlational Image Modeling (CIM), a novel and surprisingly effective approach to self-supervised visual pre-training. Our CIM performs a simple pretext task: we randomly crop image regions (exemplars) from an input image (context) and predict correlation maps between the exemplars and the context. Three key designs enable correlational image modeling as a nontrivial and meaningful self-supervisory task. First, to generate useful exemplar-context pairs, we consider cropping image regions with various scales, shapes, rotations, and transformations. Second, we employ a bootstrap learning framework that involves online and target encoders. During pre-training, the former takes exemplars as inputs while the latter converts the context. Third, we model the output correlation maps via a simple cross-attention block, within which the context serves as queries and the exemplars offer values and keys. We show that CIM performs on par or better than the current state of the art on self-supervised and transfer benchmarks.

Few-shot image classification(FSIC) aims to recognize novel classes given few labeled images from base classes. Recent works have achieved promising classification performance, especially for metric-learning methods, where a measure at only image feature level is usually used. In this paper, we argue that measure at such a level may not be effective enough to generalize from base to novel classes when using only a few images. Instead, a multi-level descriptor of an image is taken for consideration in this paper. We propose a multi-level correlation network (MLCN) for FSIC to tackle this problem by effectively capturing local information. Concretely, we present the self-correlation module and cross-correlation module to learn the semantic correspondence relation of local information based on learned representations. Moreover, we propose a pattern-correlation module to capture the pattern of fine-grained images and find relevant structural patterns between base classes and novel classes. Extensive experiments and analysis show the effectiveness of our proposed method on four widely-used FSIC benchmarks. The code for our approach is available at: https://github.com/Yunkai696/MLCN.

Differentially private learning algorithms inject noise into the learning process. While the most common private learning algorithm, DP-SGD, adds independent Gaussian noise in each iteration, recent work on matrix factorization mechanisms has shown empirically that introducing correlations in the noise can greatly improve their utility. We characterize the asymptotic learning utility for any choice of the correlation function, giving precise analytical bounds for linear regression and as the solution to a convex program for general convex functions. We show, using these bounds, how correlated noise provably improves upon vanilla DP-SGD as a function of problem parameters such as the effective dimension and condition number. Moreover, our analytical expression for the near-optimal correlation function circumvents the cubic complexity of the semi-definite program used to optimize the noise correlation matrix in previous work. We validate our theory with experiments on private deep learning. Our work matches or outperforms prior work while being efficient both in terms of compute and memory.

This paper presents ``Stim", a fast simulator for quantum stabilizer circuits. The paper explains how Stim works and compares it to existing tools. With no foreknowledge, Stim can analyze a distance 100 surface code circuit (20 thousand qubits, 8 million gates, 1 million measurements) in 15 seconds and then begin sampling full circuit shots at a rate of 1 kHz. Stim uses a stabilizer tableau representation, similar to Aaronson and Gottesman's CHP simulator, but with three main improvements. First, Stim improves the asymptotic complexity of deterministic measurement from quadratic to linear by tracking the {\em inverse} of the circuit's stabilizer tableau. Second, Stim improves the constant factors of the algorithm by using a cache-friendly data layout and 256 bit wide SIMD instructions. Third, Stim only uses expensive stabilizer tableau simulation to create an initial reference sample. Further samples are collected in bulk by using that sample as a reference for batches of Pauli frames propagating through the circuit.

Black-box adversarial attacks on Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are challenging due to missing gradients and complex multimodal boundaries. While prior state-of-the-art transfer-based approaches like M-Attack perform well using local crop-level matching between source and target images, we find this induces high-variance, nearly orthogonal gradients across iterations, violating coherent local alignment and destabilizing optimization. We attribute this to (i) ViT translation sensitivity that yields spike-like gradients and (ii) structural asymmetry between source and target crops. We reformulate local matching as an asymmetric expectation over source transformations and target semantics, and build a gradient-denoising upgrade to M-Attack. On the source side, Multi-Crop Alignment (MCA) averages gradients from multiple independently sampled local views per iteration to reduce variance. On the target side, Auxiliary Target Alignment (ATA) replaces aggressive target augmentation with a small auxiliary set from a semantically correlated distribution, producing a smoother, lower-variance target manifold. We further reinterpret momentum as Patch Momentum, replaying historical crop gradients; combined with a refined patch-size ensemble (PE+), this strengthens transferable directions. Together these modules form M-Attack-V2, a simple, modular enhancement over M-Attack that substantially improves transfer-based black-box attacks on frontier LVLMs: boosting success rates on Claude-4.0 from 8% to 30%, Gemini-2.5-Pro from 83% to 97%, and GPT-5 from 98% to 100%, outperforming prior black-box LVLM attacks. Code and data are publicly available at: https://github.com/vila-lab/M-Attack-V2.

Multimodal contrastive pretraining has been used to train multimodal representation models, such as CLIP, on large amounts of paired image-text data. However, previous studies have revealed that such models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Specifically, when trained on backdoored examples, CLIP learns spurious correlations between the embedded backdoor trigger and the target label, aligning their representations in the joint embedding space. Injecting even a small number of poisoned examples, such as 75 examples in 3 million pretraining data, can significantly manipulate the model's behavior, making it difficult to detect or unlearn such correlations. To address this issue, we propose CleanCLIP, a finetuning framework that weakens the learned spurious associations introduced by backdoor attacks by independently re-aligning the representations for individual modalities. We demonstrate that unsupervised finetuning using a combination of multimodal contrastive and unimodal self-supervised objectives for individual modalities can significantly reduce the impact of the backdoor attack. Additionally, we show that supervised finetuning on task-specific labeled image data removes the backdoor trigger from the CLIP vision encoder. We show empirically that CleanCLIP maintains model performance on benign examples while erasing a range of backdoor attacks on multimodal contrastive learning. The code and checkpoints are available at https://github.com/nishadsinghi/CleanCLIP.

The conditional text-to-image diffusion models have garnered significant attention in recent years. However, the precision of these models is often compromised mainly for two reasons, ambiguous condition input and inadequate condition guidance over single denoising loss. To address the challenges, we introduce two innovative solutions. Firstly, we propose a Spatial Guidance Injector (SGI) which enhances conditional detail by encoding text inputs with precise annotation information. This method directly tackles the issue of ambiguous control inputs by providing clear, annotated guidance to the model. Secondly, to overcome the issue of limited conditional supervision, we introduce Diffusion Consistency Loss (DCL), which applies supervision on the denoised latent code at any given time step. This encourages consistency between the latent code at each time step and the input signal, thereby enhancing the robustness and accuracy of the output. The combination of SGI and DCL results in our Effective Controllable Network (ECNet), which offers a more accurate controllable end-to-end text-to-image generation framework with a more precise conditioning input and stronger controllable supervision. We validate our approach through extensive experiments on generation under various conditions, such as human body skeletons, facial landmarks, and sketches of general objects. The results consistently demonstrate that our method significantly enhances the controllability and robustness of the generated images, outperforming existing state-of-the-art controllable text-to-image models.

Continuous-time Consistency Models (CMs) promise efficient few-step generation but face significant challenges with training instability. We argue this instability stems from a fundamental conflict: by training a network to learn only a shortcut across a probability flow, the model loses its grasp on the instantaneous velocity field that defines the flow. Our solution is to explicitly anchor the model in the underlying flow during training. We introduce the Flow-Anchored Consistency Model (FACM), a simple but effective training strategy that uses a Flow Matching (FM) task as an anchor for the primary CM shortcut objective. This Flow-Anchoring approach requires no architectural modifications and is broadly compatible with standard model architectures. By distilling a pre-trained LightningDiT model, our method achieves a state-of-the-art FID of 1.32 with two steps (NFE=2) and 1.76 with just one step (NFE=1) on ImageNet 256x256, significantly outperforming previous methods. This provides a general and effective recipe for building high-performance, few-step generative models. Our code and pretrained models: https://github.com/ali-vilab/FACM.

Fine-tuning pre-trained models has emerged as a powerful technique in numerous domains, owing to its ability to leverage enormous pre-existing knowledge and achieve remarkable performance on downstream tasks. However, updating the parameters of entire networks is computationally intensive. Although state-of-the-art parameter-efficient transfer learning (PETL) methods significantly reduce the trainable parameters and storage demand, almost all of them still need to back-propagate the gradients through large pre-trained networks. This memory-extensive characteristic extremely limits the applicability of PETL methods in real-world scenarios. To this end, we propose a new memory-efficient PETL strategy, dubbed Universal Parallel Tuning (UniPT). Specifically, we facilitate the transfer process via a lightweight learnable parallel network, which consists of two modules: 1) A parallel interaction module that decouples the inherently sequential connections and processes the intermediate activations detachedly of the pre-trained network. 2) A confidence aggregation module that learns optimal strategies adaptively for integrating cross-layer features. We evaluate UniPT with different backbones (e.g., VSEinfty, CLIP4Clip, Clip-ViL, and MDETR) on five challenging vision-and-language tasks (i.e., image-text retrieval, video-text retrieval, visual question answering, compositional question answering, and visual grounding). Extensive ablations on ten datasets have validated that our UniPT can not only dramatically reduce memory consumption and outperform the best memory-efficient competitor, but also achieve higher performance than existing PETL methods in a low-memory scenario on different architectures. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/Paranioar/UniPT.

Prompt injection remains a central obstacle to the safe deployment of large language models, particularly in multi-agent settings where intermediate outputs can propagate or amplify malicious instructions. Building on earlier work that introduced a four-metric Total Injection Vulnerability Score (TIVS), this paper extends the evaluation framework with semantic similarity-based caching and a fifth metric (Observability Score Ratio) to yield TIVS-O, investigating how defence effectiveness interacts with transparency in a HOPE-inspired Nested Learning architecture. The proposed system combines an agentic pipeline with Continuum Memory Systems that implement semantic similarity-based caching across 301 synthetically generated injection-focused prompts drawn from ten attack families, while a fourth agent performs comprehensive security analysis using five key performance indicators. In addition to traditional injection metrics, OSR quantifies the richness and clarity of security-relevant reasoning exposed by each agent, enabling an explicit analysis of trade-offs between strict mitigation and auditability. Experiments show that the system achieves secure responses with zero high-risk breaches, while semantic caching delivers substantial computational savings, achieving a 41.6% reduction in LLM calls and corresponding decreases in latency, energy consumption, and carbon emissions. Five TIVS-O configurations reveal optimal trade-offs between mitigation strictness and forensic transparency. These results indicate that observability-aware evaluation can reveal non-monotonic effects within multi-agent pipelines and that memory-augmented agents can jointly maximize security robustness, real-time performance, operational cost savings, and environmental sustainability without modifying underlying model weights, providing a production-ready pathway for secure and green LLM deployments.

Identity-consistent video generation seeks to synthesize videos that are guided by both textual prompts and reference images of entities. Current approaches typically utilize cross-attention layers to integrate the appearance of the entity, which predominantly captures semantic attributes, resulting in compromised fidelity of entities. Moreover, these methods necessitate iterative fine-tuning for each new entity encountered, thereby limiting their applicability. To address these challenges, we introduce VideoAssembler, a novel end-to-end framework for identity-consistent video generation that can conduct inference directly when encountering new entities. VideoAssembler is adept at producing videos that are not only flexible with respect to the input reference entities but also responsive to textual conditions. Additionally, by modulating the quantity of input images for the entity, VideoAssembler enables the execution of tasks ranging from image-to-video generation to sophisticated video editing. VideoAssembler comprises two principal components: the Reference Entity Pyramid (REP) encoder and the Entity-Prompt Attention Fusion (EPAF) module. The REP encoder is designed to infuse comprehensive appearance details into the denoising stages of the stable diffusion model. Concurrently, the EPAF module is utilized to integrate text-aligned features effectively. Furthermore, to mitigate the challenge of scarce data, we present a methodology for the preprocessing of training data. Our evaluation of the VideoAssembler framework on the UCF-101, MSR-VTT, and DAVIS datasets indicates that it achieves good performances in both quantitative and qualitative analyses (346.84 in FVD and 48.01 in IS on UCF-101). Our project page is at https://gulucaptain.github.io/videoassembler/.

Large Language Models (LLMs), renowned for their superior proficiency in language comprehension and generation, stimulate a vibrant ecosystem of applications around them. However, their extensive assimilation into various services introduces significant security risks. This study deconstructs the complexities and implications of prompt injection attacks on actual LLM-integrated applications. Initially, we conduct an exploratory analysis on ten commercial applications, highlighting the constraints of current attack strategies in practice. Prompted by these limitations, we subsequently formulate HouYi, a novel black-box prompt injection attack technique, which draws inspiration from traditional web injection attacks. HouYi is compartmentalized into three crucial elements: a seamlessly-incorporated pre-constructed prompt, an injection prompt inducing context partition, and a malicious payload designed to fulfill the attack objectives. Leveraging HouYi, we unveil previously unknown and severe attack outcomes, such as unrestricted arbitrary LLM usage and uncomplicated application prompt theft. We deploy HouYi on 36 actual LLM-integrated applications and discern 31 applications susceptible to prompt injection. 10 vendors have validated our discoveries, including Notion, which has the potential to impact millions of users. Our investigation illuminates both the possible risks of prompt injection attacks and the possible tactics for mitigation.

Prompt injection is one of the most critical vulnerabilities in LLM agents; yet, effective automated attacks remain largely unexplored from an optimization perspective. Existing methods heavily depend on human red-teamers and hand-crafted prompts, limiting their scalability and adaptability. We propose AutoInject, a reinforcement learning framework that generates universal, transferable adversarial suffixes while jointly optimizing for attack success and utility preservation on benign tasks. Our black-box method supports both query-based optimization and transfer attacks to unseen models and tasks. Using only a 1.5B parameter adversarial suffix generator, we successfully compromise frontier systems including GPT 5 Nano, Claude Sonnet 3.5, and Gemini 2.5 Flash on the AgentDojo benchmark, establishing a stronger baseline for automated prompt injection research.

Despite remarkable advancements, current Text-to-Image (T2I) models struggle with complex, long-form textual instructions, frequently failing to accurately render intricate details, spatial relationships, or specific constraints. This limitation is highlighted by benchmarks such as LongBench-T2I, which reveal deficiencies in handling composition, specific text, and fine textures. To address this, we propose DeCoT (Decomposition-CoT), a novel framework that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to significantly enhance T2I models' understanding and execution of complex instructions. DeCoT operates in two core stages: first, Complex Instruction Decomposition and Semantic Enhancement, where an LLM breaks down raw instructions into structured, actionable semantic units and clarifies ambiguities; second, Multi-Stage Prompt Integration and Adaptive Generation, which transforms these units into a hierarchical or optimized single prompt tailored for existing T2I models. Extensive experiments on the LongBench-T2I dataset demonstrate that DeCoT consistently and substantially improves the performance of leading T2I models across all evaluated dimensions, particularly in challenging aspects like "Text" and "Composition". Quantitative results, validated by multiple MLLM evaluators (Gemini-2.0-Flash and InternVL3-78B), show that DeCoT, when integrated with Infinity-8B, achieves an average score of 3.52, outperforming the baseline Infinity-8B (3.44). Ablation studies confirm the critical contribution of each DeCoT component and the importance of sophisticated LLM prompting. Furthermore, human evaluations corroborate these findings, indicating superior perceptual quality and instruction fidelity. DeCoT effectively bridges the gap between high-level user intent and T2I model requirements, leading to more faithful and accurate image generation.

AI-agent guardrails are memoryless: each message is judged in isolation, so an adversary who spreads a single attack across dozens of sessions slips past every session-bound detector because only the aggregate carries the payload. We make three contributions to cross-session threat detection. (1) Dataset. CSTM-Bench is 26 executable attack taxonomies classified by kill-chain stage and cross-session operation (accumulate, compose, launder, inject_on_reader), each bound to one of seven identity anchors that ground-truth "violation" as a policy predicate, plus matched Benign-pristine and Benign-hard confounders. Released on Hugging Face as intrinsec-ai/cstm-bench with two 54-scenario splits: dilution (compositional) and cross_session (12 isolation-invisible scenarios produced by a closed-loop rewriter that softens surface phrasing while preserving cross-session artefacts). (2) Measurement. Framing cross-session detection as an information bottleneck to a downstream correlator LLM, we find that a session-bound judge and a Full-Log Correlator concatenating every prompt into one long-context call both lose roughly half their attack recall moving from dilution to cross_session, well inside any frontier context window. Scope: 54 scenarios per shard, one correlator family (Anthropic Claude), no prompt optimisation; we release it to motivate larger, multi-provider datasets. (3) Algorithm and metric. A bounded-memory Coreset Memory Reader retaining highest-signal fragments at K=50 is the only reader whose recall survives both shards. Because ranker reshuffles break KV-cache prefix reuse, we promote CSR_prefix (ordered prefix stability, LLM-free) to a first-class metric and fuse it with detection into CSTM = 0.7 F_1(CSDA@action, precision) + 0.3 CSR_prefix, benchmarking rankers on a single Pareto of recall versus serving stability.

QDNA-ID is a trust-chain framework that links physical quantum behavior to digitally verified records. The system first executes standard quantum circuits with random shot patterns across different devices to generate entropy profiles and measurement data that reveal device-specific behavior. A Bell or CHSH test is then used to confirm that correlations originate from genuine non classical processes rather than classical simulation. The verified outcomes are converted into statistical fingerprints using entropy, divergence, and bias features to characterize each device. These features and metadata for device, session, and random seed parameters are digitally signed and time stamped to ensure integrity and traceability. Authenticated artifacts are stored in a hierarchical index for reproducible retrieval and long term auditing. A visualization and analytics interface monitors drift, policy enforcement, and device behavior logs. A machine learning engine tracks entropy drift, detects anomalies, and classifies devices based on evolving patterns. An external verification API supports independent recomputation of hashes, signatures, and CHSH evidence. QDNA-ID operates as a continuous feedback loop that maintains a persistent chain of trust for quantum computing environments.

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

This paper presents a comprehensive empirical study on the safety alignment capabilities. We evaluate what matters for safety alignment in LLMs and LRMs to provide essential insights for developing more secure and reliable AI systems. We systematically investigate and compare the influence of six critical intrinsic model characteristics and three external attack techniques. Our large-scale evaluation is conducted using 32 recent, popular LLMs and LRMs across thirteen distinct model families, spanning a parameter scale from 3B to 235B. The assessment leverages five established safety datasets and probes model vulnerabilities with 56 jailbreak techniques and four CoT attack strategies, resulting in 4.6M API calls. Our key empirical findings are fourfold. First, we identify the LRMs GPT-OSS-20B, Qwen3-Next-80B-A3B-Thinking, and GPT-OSS-120B as the top-three safest models, which substantiates the significant advantage of integrated reasoning and self-reflection mechanisms for robust safety alignment. Second, post-training and knowledge distillation may lead to a systematic degradation of safety alignment. We thus argue that safety must be treated as an explicit constraint or a core optimization objective during these stages, not merely subordinated to the pursuit of general capability. Third, we reveal a pronounced vulnerability: employing a CoT attack via a response prefix can elevate the attack success rate by 3.34x on average and from 0.6% to 96.3% for Seed-OSS-36B-Instruct. This critical finding underscores the safety risks inherent in text-completion interfaces and features that allow user-defined response prefixes in LLM services, highlighting an urgent need for architectural and deployment safeguards. Fourth, roleplay, prompt injection, and gradient-based search for adversarial prompts are the predominant methodologies for eliciting unaligned behaviors in modern models.

Prompt injection defenses are often framed as semantic understanding problems and delegated to increasingly large neural detectors. For the first screening layer, however, the requirements are different: the detector runs on every request and therefore must be fast, deterministic, non-promptable, and auditable. We introduce Mirror, a data-curation design pattern that organizes prompt injection corpora into matched positive and negative cells so that a classifier learns control-plane attack mechanics rather than incidental corpus shortcuts. Using 5,000 strictly curated open-source samples -- the largest corpus supportable under our public-data validity contract -- we define a 32-cell mirror topology, fill 31 of those cells with public data, train a sparse character n-gram linear SVM, compile its weights into a static Rust artifact, and obtain 95.97\% recall and 92.07\% F1 on a 524-case holdout at sub-millisecond latency with no external model runtime dependencies. On the same holdout, our next line of defense, a 22-million-parameter Prompt Guard~2 model reaches 44.35\% recall and 59.14\% F1 at 49\,ms median and 324\,ms p95 latency. Linear models still leave residual semantic ambiguities such as use-versus-mention for later pipeline layers, but within that scope our results show that for L1 prompt injection screening, strict data geometry can matter more than model scale.

Text-to-image synthesis has progressed to the point where models can generate visually compelling images from natural language prompts. Yet, existing methods often fail to reconcile high-level semantic fidelity with explicit spatial control, particularly in scenes involving multiple objects, nuanced relations, or complex layouts. To bridge this gap, we propose a Hierarchical Cross-Modal Alignment (HCMA) framework for grounded text-to-image generation. HCMA integrates two alignment modules into each diffusion sampling step: a global module that continuously aligns latent representations with textual descriptions to ensure scene-level coherence, and a local module that employs bounding-box layouts to anchor objects at specified locations, enabling fine-grained spatial control. Extensive experiments on the MS-COCO 2014 validation set show that HCMA surpasses state-of-the-art baselines, achieving a 0.69 improvement in Frechet Inception Distance (FID) and a 0.0295 gain in CLIP Score. These results demonstrate HCMA's effectiveness in faithfully capturing intricate textual semantics while adhering to user-defined spatial constraints, offering a robust solution for semantically grounded image generation. Our code is available at https://github.com/hwang-cs-ime/HCMA.

Tool-augmented LLM agents increasingly rely on multi-step, multi-tool workflows to complete real tasks. This design expands the attack surface, because data produced by one tool can be persisted and later reused as input to another tool, enabling exploitable source-to-sink dataflows that only emerge through tool composition. We study this risk as multi-tool vulnerabilities in LLM agents, and show that existing discovery efforts focused on single-tool or single-hop testing miss these long-horizon behaviors and provide limited debugging value. We present ChainFuzzer, a greybox framework for discovering and reproducing multi-tool vulnerabilities with auditable evidence. ChainFuzzer (i) identifies high-impact operations with strict source-to-sink dataflow evidence and extracts plausible upstream candidate tool chains based on cross-tool dependencies, (ii) uses Trace-guided Prompt Solving (TPS) to synthesize stable prompts that reliably drive the agent to execute target chains, and (iii) performs guardrail-aware fuzzing to reproduce vulnerabilities under LLM guardrails via payload mutation and sink-specific oracles. We evaluate ChainFuzzer on 20 popular open-source LLM agent apps (998 tools). ChainFuzzer extracts 2,388 candidate tool chains and synthesizes 2,213 stable prompts, confirming 365 unique, reproducible vulnerabilities across 19/20 apps (302 require multi-tool execution). Component evaluation shows tool-chain extraction achieves 96.49% edge precision and 91.50% strict chain precision; TPS increases chain reachability from 27.05% to 95.45%; guardrail-aware fuzzing boosts payload-level trigger rate from 18.20% to 88.60%. Overall, ChainFuzzer achieves 3.02 vulnerabilities per 1M tokens, providing a practical foundation for testing and hardening real-world multi-tool agent systems.

Multi-modal large language model (MLLM)-based web agents interact with webpage environments by generating actions based on screenshots of the webpages. In this work, we propose WebInject, a prompt injection attack that manipulates the webpage environment to induce a web agent to perform an attacker-specified action. Our attack adds a perturbation to the raw pixel values of the rendered webpage. After these perturbed pixels are mapped into a screenshot, the perturbation induces the web agent to perform the attacker-specified action. We formulate the task of finding the perturbation as an optimization problem. A key challenge in solving this problem is that the mapping between raw pixel values and screenshot is non-differentiable, making it difficult to backpropagate gradients to the perturbation. To overcome this, we train a neural network to approximate the mapping and apply projected gradient descent to solve the reformulated optimization problem. Extensive evaluation on multiple datasets shows that WebInject is highly effective and significantly outperforms baselines.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have recently sparked significant interest, which demonstrates emergent capabilities to serve as a general-purpose model for various vision-language tasks. However, existing methods mainly focus on limited types of instructions with a single image as visual context, which hinders the widespread availability of MLLMs. In this paper, we introduce the I4 benchmark to comprehensively evaluate the instruction following ability on complicated interleaved vision-language instructions, which involve intricate image-text sequential context, covering a diverse range of scenarios (e.g., visually-rich webpages/textbooks, lecture slides, embodied dialogue). Systematic evaluation on our I4 benchmark reveals a common defect of existing methods: the Visual Prompt Generator (VPG) trained on image-captioning alignment objective tends to attend to common foreground information for captioning but struggles to extract specific information required by particular tasks. To address this issue, we propose a generic and lightweight controllable knowledge re-injection module, which utilizes the sophisticated reasoning ability of LLMs to control the VPG to conditionally extract instruction-specific visual information and re-inject it into the LLM. Further, we introduce an annotation-free cross-attention guided counterfactual image training strategy to methodically learn the proposed module by collaborating a cascade of foundation models. Enhanced by the proposed module and training strategy, we present Cheetor, a Transformer-based MLLM that can effectively handle a wide variety of interleaved vision-language instructions and achieves state-of-the-art zero-shot performance across all tasks of I4, without high-quality multimodal instruction tuning data. Cheetor also exhibits competitive performance compared with state-of-the-art instruction tuned models on MME benchmark.

Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.

The widespread availability of large-scale code datasets has accelerated the development of code large language models (CodeLLMs), raising concerns about unauthorized dataset usage. Dataset poisoning offers a proactive defense by reducing the utility of such unauthorized training. However, existing poisoning methods often require full dataset poisoning and introduce transformations that break code compilability. In this paper, we introduce FunPoison, a functionality-preserving poisoning approach that injects short, compilable weak-use fragments into executed code paths. FunPoison leverages reusable statement-level templates with automatic repair and conservative safety checking to ensure side-effect freedom, while a type-aware synthesis module suppresses static analysis warnings and enhances stealth. Extensive experiments show that FunPoison achieves effective poisoning by contaminating only 10% of the dataset, while maintaining 100% compilability and functional correctness, and remains robust against various advanced code sanitization techniques.

Open-vocabulary semantic segmentation aims to assign semantic labels to each pixel without being constrained by a predefined set of categories. While Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP) excels in zero-shot classification, it struggles to align image patches with category embeddings because of its incoherent patch correlations. This study reveals that inter-class correlations are the main reason for impairing CLIP's segmentation performance. Accordingly, we propose CorrCLIP, which reconstructs the scope and value of patch correlations. Specifically, CorrCLIP leverages the Segment Anything Model (SAM) to define the scope of patch interactions, reducing inter-class correlations. To mitigate the problem that SAM-generated masks may contain patches belonging to different classes, CorrCLIP incorporates self-supervised models to compute coherent similarity values, suppressing the weight of inter-class correlations. Additionally, we introduce two additional branches to strengthen patch features' spatial details and semantic representation. Finally, we update segmentation maps with SAM-generated masks to improve spatial consistency. Based on the improvement across patch correlations, feature representations, and segmentation maps, CorrCLIP achieves superior performance across eight benchmarks. Codes are available at: https://github.com/zdk258/CorrCLIP.

Vision-Language Instruction Tuning (VLIT) is a critical training phase for Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). With the improving capabilities of open-source LVLMs, researchers have increasingly turned to generate VLIT data by using open-source LVLMs and achieved significant progress. However, such data generation approaches are bottlenecked by the following challenges: 1) Since multi-modal models tend to be influenced by prior language knowledge, directly using LVLMs to generate VLIT data would inevitably lead to low content relevance between generated data and images. 2) To improve the ability of the models to generate VLIT data, previous methods have incorporated an additional training phase to boost the generative capacity. This process hurts the generalization of the models to unseen inputs (i.e., "exposure bias" problem). In this paper, we propose a new Content Correlated VLIT data generation via Contrastive Learning (C3L). Specifically, we design a new content relevance module which enhances the content relevance between VLIT data and images by computing Image Instruction Correspondence Scores S(I2C). Moreover, a contrastive learning module is introduced to further boost the VLIT data generation capability of the LVLMs. A large number of automatic measures on four benchmarks show the effectiveness of our method.

Humans recognize anomalies through two aspects: larger patch-wise representation discrepancies and weaker patch-to-normal-patch correlations. However, the previous AD methods didn't sufficiently combine the two complementary aspects to design AD models. To this end, we find that Transformer can ideally satisfy the two aspects as its great power in the unified modeling of patch-wise representations and patch-to-patch correlations. In this paper, we propose a novel AD framework: FOcus-the-Discrepancy (FOD), which can simultaneously spot the patch-wise, intra- and inter-discrepancies of anomalies. The major characteristic of our method is that we renovate the self-attention maps in transformers to Intra-Inter-Correlation (I2Correlation). The I2Correlation contains a two-branch structure to first explicitly establish intra- and inter-image correlations, and then fuses the features of two-branch to spotlight the abnormal patterns. To learn the intra- and inter-correlations adaptively, we propose the RBF-kernel-based target-correlations as learning targets for self-supervised learning. Besides, we introduce an entropy constraint strategy to solve the mode collapse issue in optimization and further amplify the normal-abnormal distinguishability. Extensive experiments on three unsupervised real-world AD benchmarks show the superior performance of our approach. Code will be available at https://github.com/xcyao00/FOD.

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

Anomaly Detection involves identifying deviations from normal data distributions and is critical in fields such as medical diagnostics and industrial defect detection. Traditional AD methods typically require the availability of normal training samples; however, this assumption is not always feasible. Recently, the rich pretraining knowledge of CLIP has shown promising zero-shot generalization in detecting anomalies without the need for training samples from target domains. However, CLIP's coarse-grained image-text alignment limits localization and detection performance for fine-grained anomalies due to: (1) spatial misalignment, and (2) the limited sensitivity of global features to local anomalous patterns. In this paper, we propose Crane which tackles both problems. First, we introduce a correlation-based attention module to retain spatial alignment more accurately. Second, to boost the model's awareness of fine-grained anomalies, we condition the learnable prompts of the text encoder on image context extracted from the vision encoder and perform a local-to-global representation fusion. Moreover, our method can incorporate vision foundation models such as DINOv2 to further enhance spatial understanding and localization. The key insight of Crane is to balance learnable adaptations for modeling anomalous concepts with non-learnable adaptations that preserve and exploit generalized pretrained knowledge, thereby minimizing in-domain overfitting and maximizing performance on unseen domains. Extensive evaluation across 14 diverse industrial and medical datasets demonstrates that Crane consistently improves the state-of-the-art ZSAD from 2% to 28%, at both image and pixel levels, while remaining competitive in inference speed. The code is available at https://github.com/AlirezaSalehy/Crane.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

QSE is emerging as a critical discipline to make quantum computing accessible to a broader developer community; however, most quantum development environments still require developers to engage with low-level details across the software stack - including problem encoding, circuit construction, algorithm configuration, hardware selection, and result interpretation - making them difficult for classical software engineers to use. To bridge this gap, we present C2|Q>, a hardware-agnostic quantum software development framework that translates specific types of classical specifications into quantum-executable programs while preserving methodological rigor. The framework applies modular SE principles by classifying the workflow into three core modules: an encoder that classifies problems, produces Quantum-Compatible Formats, and constructs quantum circuits, a deployment module that generates circuits and recommends hardware based on fidelity, runtime, and cost, and a decoder that interprets quantum outputs into classical solutions. In evaluation, the encoder module achieved a 93.8% completion rate, the hardware recommendation module consistently selected the appropriate quantum devices for workloads scaling up to 56 qubits. End-to-end experiments on 434 Python programs and 100 JSON problem instances show that the full C2|Q> workflow executes reliably on simulators and can be deployed successfully on representative real quantum hardware, with empirical runs limited to small- and medium-sized instances consistent with current NISQ capabilities. These results indicate that C2|Q> lowers the entry barrier to quantum software development by providing a reproducible, extensible toolchain that connects classical specifications to quantum execution. The open-source implementation of C2|Q> is available at https://github.com/C2-Q/C2Q and as a Python package at https://pypi.org/project/c2q-framework/.

Production LLM coding agents drift over long sessions: they forget user-specified constraints, slip into mistakes the user already flagged, and confabulate prior agreements. White-box approaches such as persona vectors require model weights and so cannot be applied to closed APIs (Claude, GPT-4) that most users actually interact with. We present Nautilus Compass, a black-box persona drift detector and agent memory layer for production coding agents. The method operates entirely at the prompt-text layer: cosine similarity between user prompts and behavioral anchor texts, aggregated by a weighted top-k mean using BGE-m3 embeddings. Compass is, to our knowledge, the only public agent memory layer (among Mem0, Letta, Cognee, Zep, MemOS, smrti verified May 2026) that does not call an LLM at index time to extract facts or build a graph; raw conversation text is embedded directly. The system ships as a Claude Code plugin, an MCP 2024-11-05 A2A server (Cursor, Cline, Hermes), a CLI, and a REST API on one daemon, with a Merkle-chained audit log for tamper-evident anchor updates. On a held-out test set built from real Claude Code session traces and labeled by an independent LLM judge, Compass reaches ROC AUC 0.83 for drift detection. The embedded retrieval pipeline scores 56.6% on LongMemEval-S v0.8 and 44.4% on EverMemBench-Dynamic (n=500), topping the four published EverMemBench Table 4 baselines. LongMemEval-S 56.6% is ~30 points below recent white-box leaders (90+%); we treat that as the architectural ceiling of the no-extraction design. End-to-end reproduction cost is $3.50 (~14x cheaper than GPT-4o-judged stacks). A paired cross-vendor behavior A/B accompanies these numbers as preliminary system-level evidence. Code, anchors, frozen test data, and audit-log tooling are MIT-licensed at github.com/chunxiaoxx/nautilus-compass.

The widespread distribution of Large Language Models (LLMs) through public platforms like Hugging Face introduces significant security challenges. While these platforms perform basic security scans, they often fail to detect subtle manipulations within the embedding layer. This work identifies a novel class of deployment phase attacks that exploit this vulnerability by injecting imperceptible perturbations directly into the embedding layer outputs without modifying model weights or input text. These perturbations, though statistically benign, systematically bypass safety alignment mechanisms and induce harmful behaviors during inference. We propose Search based Embedding Poisoning(SEP), a practical, model agnostic framework that introduces carefully optimized perturbations into embeddings associated with high risk tokens. SEP leverages a predictable linear transition in model responses, from refusal to harmful output to semantic deviation to identify a narrow perturbation window that evades alignment safeguards. Evaluated across six aligned LLMs, SEP achieves an average attack success rate of 96.43% while preserving benign task performance and evading conventional detection mechanisms. Our findings reveal a critical oversight in deployment security and emphasize the urgent need for embedding level integrity checks in future LLM defense strategies.

The integration of experimental technologies with large language models (LLMs) is transforming scientific research. It positions AI as a versatile research assistant rather than a mere problem-solving tool. In the field of power systems, however, managing simulations -- one of the essential experimental technologies -- remains a challenge for LLMs due to their limited domain-specific knowledge, restricted reasoning capabilities, and imprecise handling of simulation parameters. To address these limitations, this paper proposes a feedback-driven, multi-agent framework. It incorporates three proposed modules: an enhanced retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) module, an improved reasoning module, and a dynamic environmental acting module with an error-feedback mechanism. Validated on 69 diverse tasks from Daline and MATPOWER, this framework achieves success rates of 93.13% and 96.85%, respectively. It significantly outperforms ChatGPT 4o, o1-preview, and the fine-tuned GPT-4o, which all achieved a success rate lower than 30% on complex tasks. Additionally, the proposed framework also supports rapid, cost-effective task execution, completing each simulation in approximately 30 seconds at an average cost of 0.014 USD for tokens. Overall, this adaptable framework lays a foundation for developing intelligent LLM-based assistants for human researchers, facilitating power system research and beyond.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

Large language models (LLMs) have been widely used in various applications but are known to suffer from issues related to untruthfulness and toxicity. While parameter-efficient modules (PEMs) have demonstrated their effectiveness in equipping models with new skills, leveraging PEMs for deficiency unlearning remains underexplored. In this work, we propose a PEMs operation approach, namely Extraction-before-Subtraction (Ext-Sub), to enhance the truthfulness and detoxification of LLMs through the integration of ``expert'' PEM and ``anti-expert'' PEM. Remarkably, even anti-expert PEM possess valuable capabilities due to their proficiency in generating fabricated content, which necessitates language modeling and logical narrative competence. Rather than merely negating the parameters, our approach involves extracting and eliminating solely the deficiency capability within anti-expert PEM while preserving the general capabilities. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach in terms of truthfulness and detoxification, we conduct extensive experiments on LLMs, encompassing additional abilities such as language modeling and mathematical reasoning. Our empirical results demonstrate that our approach effectively improves truthfulness and detoxification, while largely preserving the fundamental abilities of LLMs.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have emerged as a central focus in both industry and academia, but often suffer from biases introduced by visual and language priors, which can lead to multimodal hallucination. These biases arise from the visual encoder and the Large Language Model (LLM) backbone, affecting the attention mechanism responsible for aligning multimodal inputs. Existing decoding-based mitigation methods focus on statistical correlations and overlook the causal relationships between attention mechanisms and model output, limiting their effectiveness in addressing these biases. To tackle this issue, we propose a causal inference framework termed CausalMM that applies structural causal modeling to MLLMs, treating modality priors as a confounder between attention mechanisms and output. Specifically, by employing backdoor adjustment and counterfactual reasoning at both the visual and language attention levels, our method mitigates the negative effects of modality priors and enhances the alignment of MLLM's inputs and outputs, with a maximum score improvement of 65.3% on 6 VLind-Bench indicators and 164 points on MME Benchmark compared to conventional methods. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our approach while being a plug-and-play solution. Our code is available at: https://github.com/The-Martyr/CausalMM

In recent years, integrating multimodal understanding and generation into a single unified model has emerged as a promising paradigm. While this approach achieves strong results in text-to-image (T2I) generation, it still struggles with precise image editing. We attribute this limitation to an imbalanced division of responsibilities. The understanding module primarily functions as a translator that encodes user instructions into semantic conditions, while the generation module must simultaneously act as designer and painter, inferring the original layout, identifying the target editing region, and rendering the new content. This imbalance is counterintuitive because the understanding module is typically trained with several times more data on complex reasoning tasks than the generation module. To address this issue, we introduce Draw-In-Mind (DIM), a dataset comprising two complementary subsets: (i) DIM-T2I, containing 14M long-context image-text pairs to enhance complex instruction comprehension; and (ii) DIM-Edit, consisting of 233K chain-of-thought imaginations generated by GPT-4o, serving as explicit design blueprints for image edits. We connect a frozen Qwen2.5-VL-3B with a trainable SANA1.5-1.6B via a lightweight two-layer MLP, and train it on the proposed DIM dataset, resulting in DIM-4.6B-T2I/Edit. Despite its modest parameter scale, DIM-4.6B-Edit achieves SOTA or competitive performance on the ImgEdit and GEdit-Bench benchmarks, outperforming much larger models such as UniWorld-V1 and Step1X-Edit. These findings demonstrate that explicitly assigning the design responsibility to the understanding module provides significant benefits for image editing. Our dataset and models will be available at https://github.com/showlab/DIM.

We introduce AiM, an autoregressive (AR) image generative model based on Mamba architecture. AiM employs Mamba, a novel state-space model characterized by its exceptional performance for long-sequence modeling with linear time complexity, to supplant the commonly utilized Transformers in AR image generation models, aiming to achieve both superior generation quality and enhanced inference speed. Unlike existing methods that adapt Mamba to handle two-dimensional signals via multi-directional scan, AiM directly utilizes the next-token prediction paradigm for autoregressive image generation. This approach circumvents the need for extensive modifications to enable Mamba to learn 2D spatial representations. By implementing straightforward yet strategically targeted modifications for visual generative tasks, we preserve Mamba's core structure, fully exploiting its efficient long-sequence modeling capabilities and scalability. We provide AiM models in various scales, with parameter counts ranging from 148M to 1.3B. On the ImageNet1K 256*256 benchmark, our best AiM model achieves a FID of 2.21, surpassing all existing AR models of comparable parameter counts and demonstrating significant competitiveness against diffusion models, with 2 to 10 times faster inference speed. Code is available at https://github.com/hp-l33/AiM

LLM agent systems are built by stacking scaffolding components (planning, tools, memory, self-reflection, retrieval) assuming more is better. We study cross-component interference (CCI): degradation when components interact destructively. We run a full factorial experiment over all 2^5=32 subsets of five components on HotpotQA and GSM8K with Llama-3.1-8B/70B (96 conditions, up to 10 seeds). The All-In system is consistently suboptimal: on HotpotQA, a single-tool agent surpasses All-In by 32% (F1 0.233 vs 0.177, p=0.023); on GSM8K, a 3-component subset beats All-In by 79% (0.43 vs 0.24, p=0.010). Optimal component count is task-dependent (k*=1-4) and scale-sensitive: at 70B, combinations that hurt at 8B provide gains, though All-In still trails the best subset. We fit a main-effects regression (R^2=0.916, adj-R^2=0.899, LOOCV=0.872), compute exact Shapley values, and find 183/325 submodularity violations (56.3%), showing greedy selection is unreliable. A three-body synergy among Tool Use, Self-Reflection, and Retrieval (INT_3=+0.175, 95% CI [+0.003,+0.351]) is reported as exploratory. CCI replicates across model families (Qwen2.5) and is robust to prompt paraphrasing. Our findings suggest maximally-equipped agent defaults should be replaced by task-specific subset selection via interaction-aware analysis.

Real-time object detection has achieved substantial progress through meticulously designed architectures and optimization strategies. However, the pursuit of high-speed inference via lightweight network designs often leads to degraded feature representation, which hinders further performance improvements and practical on-device deployment. In this paper, we propose a cost-effective and highly adaptable distillation framework that harnesses the rapidly evolving capabilities of Vision Foundation Models (VFMs) to enhance lightweight object detectors. Given the significant architectural and learning objective disparities between VFMs and resource-constrained detectors, achieving stable and task-aligned semantic transfer is challenging. To address this, on one hand, we introduce a Deep Semantic Injector (DSI) module that facilitates the integration of high-level representations from VFMs into the deep layers of the detector. On the other hand, we devise a Gradient-guided Adaptive Modulation (GAM) strategy, which dynamically adjusts the intensity of semantic transfer based on gradient norm ratios. Without increasing deployment and inference overhead, our approach painlessly delivers striking and consistent performance gains across diverse DETR-based models, underscoring its practical utility for real-time detection. Our new model family, RT-DETRv4, achieves state-of-the-art results on COCO, attaining AP scores of 49.7/53.5/55.4/57.0 at corresponding speeds of 273/169/124/78 FPS.

Causal representation learning (CRL) seeks to recover latent variables with identifiability guarantees, typically up to permutation and component-wise reparameterization under appropriate assumptions. However, identifiability does not imply interpretability: latent semantics are typically assigned post hoc by alignment with known ground-truth factors. This limitation is particularly acute in scientific time series, where underlying mechanisms are unknown and discovering interpretable structure is a primary goal. In contrast, scientific observations (such as residue-pair distances, climate indices, or process sensors) are inherently semantic, as they correspond to named physical quantities. This raises a key question: can the interpretability of observations be transferred to the identifiable latent space? We propose MOSAIC (Module discovery via Sparse Additive Identifiable Causal learning), a sparse temporal VAE that integrates temporal CRL identifiability with support recovery over observed variables. MOSAIC identifies latent variables via regime-conditioned temporal variation, and recovers for each latent a sparse set of associated observations through an additive decoder, yielding module-level interpretability. We show that ANOVA main-effect supports are identifiable under general smooth mixing functions, and provide finite-sample recovery guarantees for a tractable sparse-additive variant. Empirically, MOSAIC recovers domain-consistent variable groups across RNA molecular dynamics, solar wind, ENSO climate, the Tennessee Eastman process, and a synthetic tokamak benchmark, enabling interpretable discovery of latent mechanisms in scientific time series.

A key strength of managed runtimes over hardware is the ability to gain detailed insight into the dynamic execution of programs with instrumentation. Analyses such as code coverage, execution frequency, tracing, and debugging, are all made easier in a virtual setting. As a portable, low-level bytecode, WebAssembly offers inexpensive in-process sandboxing with high performance. Yet to date, Wasm engines have not offered much insight into executing programs, supporting at best bytecode-level stepping and basic source maps, but no instrumentation capabilities. In this paper, we show the first non-intrusive dynamic instrumentation system for WebAssembly in the open-source Wizard Research Engine. Our innovative design offers a flexible, complete hierarchy of instrumentation primitives that support building high-level, complex analyses in terms of low-level, programmable probes. In contrast to emulation or machine code instrumentation, injecting probes at the bytecode level increases expressiveness and vastly simplifies the implementation by reusing the engine's JIT compiler, interpreter, and deoptimization mechanism rather than building new ones. Wizard supports both dynamic instrumentation insertion and removal while providing consistency guarantees, which is key to composing multiple analyses without interference. We detail a fully-featured implementation in a high-performance multi-tier Wasm engine, show novel optimizations specifically designed to minimize instrumentation overhead, and evaluate performance characteristics under load from various analyses. This design is well-suited for production engine adoption as probes can be implemented to have no impact on production performance when not in use.

Vision-language models (VLMs) have revolutionized multimodal AI applications but introduce novel security vulnerabilities that remain largely unexplored. We present the first comprehensive study of steganographic prompt injection attacks against VLMs, where malicious instructions are invisibly embedded within images using advanced steganographic techniques. Our approach demonstrates that current VLM architectures can inadvertently extract and execute hidden prompts during normal image processing, leading to covert behavioral manipulation. We develop a multi-domain embedding framework combining spatial, frequency, and neural steganographic methods, achieving an overall attack success rate of 24.3% (plus or minus 3.2%, 95% CI) across leading VLMs including GPT-4V, Claude, and LLaVA, with neural steganography methods reaching up to 31.8%, while maintaining reasonable visual imperceptibility (PSNR greater than 38 dB, SSIM greater than 0.94). Through systematic evaluation on 12 diverse datasets and 8 state-of-the-art models, we reveal moderate but meaningful vulnerabilities in current VLM architectures and propose effective countermeasures. Our findings have significant implications for VLM deployment in security-critical applications and highlight the need for proportionate multimodal AI security frameworks.

We explore a generative machine learning-based approach for estimating multi-dimensional probability density functions (PDFs) in a target sample using a statistically independent but related control sample - a common challenge in particle physics data analysis. The generative model must accurately reproduce individual observable distributions while preserving the correlations between them, based on the input multidimensional distribution from the control sample. Here we present a conditional normalizing flow model (CNF) based on a chain of bijectors which learns to transform unpaired simulation events to data events. We assess the performance of the CNF model in the context of LHC Higgs to diphoton analysis, where we use the CNF model to convert a Monte Carlo diphoton sample to one that models data. We show that the CNF model can accurately model complex data distributions and correlations. We also leverage the recently popularized Modified Differential Multiplier Method (MDMM) to improve the convergence of our model and assign physical meaning to usually arbitrary loss-function parameters.

Text-driven video generation witnesses rapid progress. However, merely using text prompts is not enough to depict the desired subject appearance that accurately aligns with users' intents, especially for customized content creation. In this paper, we study the task of video generation with image prompts, which provide more accurate and direct content control beyond the text prompts. Specifically, we propose a feed-forward framework VideoBooth, with two dedicated designs: 1) We propose to embed image prompts in a coarse-to-fine manner. Coarse visual embeddings from image encoder provide high-level encodings of image prompts, while fine visual embeddings from the proposed attention injection module provide multi-scale and detailed encoding of image prompts. These two complementary embeddings can faithfully capture the desired appearance. 2) In the attention injection module at fine level, multi-scale image prompts are fed into different cross-frame attention layers as additional keys and values. This extra spatial information refines the details in the first frame and then it is propagated to the remaining frames, which maintains temporal consistency. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VideoBooth achieves state-of-the-art performance in generating customized high-quality videos with subjects specified in image prompts. Notably, VideoBooth is a generalizable framework where a single model works for a wide range of image prompts with feed-forward pass.

Autoregressive Model (AR) has shown remarkable success in conditional image generation. However, these approaches for multiple reference generation struggle with decoupling different reference identities. In this work, we propose the TokenAR framework, specifically focused on a simple but effective token-level enhancement mechanism to address reference identity confusion problem. Such token-level enhancement consists of three parts, 1). Token Index Embedding clusters the tokens index for better representing the same reference images; 2). Instruct Token Injection plays as a role of extra visual feature container to inject detailed and complementary priors for reference tokens; 3). The identity-token disentanglement strategy (ITD) explicitly guides the token representations toward independently representing the features of each identity.This token-enhancement framework significantly augments the capabilities of existing AR based methods in conditional image generation, enabling good identity consistency while preserving high quality background reconstruction. Driven by the goal of high-quality and high-diversity in multi-subject generation, we introduce the InstructAR Dataset, the first open-source, large-scale, multi-reference input, open domain image generation dataset that includes 28K training pairs, each example has two reference subjects, a relative prompt and a background with mask annotation, curated for multiple reference image generation training and evaluating. Comprehensive experiments validate that our approach surpasses current state-of-the-art models in multiple reference image generation task. The implementation code and datasets will be made publicly. Codes are available, see https://github.com/lyrig/TokenAR

Open benchmarks are essential for evaluating and advancing large language models, offering reproducibility and transparency. However, their accessibility makes them likely targets of test set contamination. In this work, we introduce DyePack, a framework that leverages backdoor attacks to identify models that used benchmark test sets during training, without requiring access to the loss, logits, or any internal details of the model. Like how banks mix dye packs with their money to mark robbers, DyePack mixes backdoor samples with the test data to flag models that trained on it. We propose a principled design incorporating multiple backdoors with stochastic targets, enabling exact false positive rate (FPR) computation when flagging every model. This provably prevents false accusations while providing strong evidence for every detected case of contamination. We evaluate DyePack on five models across three datasets, covering both multiple-choice and open-ended generation tasks. For multiple-choice questions, it successfully detects all contaminated models with guaranteed FPRs as low as 0.000073% on MMLU-Pro and 0.000017% on Big-Bench-Hard using eight backdoors. For open-ended generation tasks, it generalizes well and identifies all contaminated models on Alpaca with a guaranteed false positive rate of just 0.127% using six backdoors.

Human cognition does not separate understanding and generation. A teacher at a whiteboard speaks and draws together, each modality reshapes the other. In this paper, we bring this coupled loop to artificial systems. Masked Diffusion Models (MDMs) are ideally suited to this task, yet existing samplers either decode text and image interleavedly or independently update them in parallel branches that share only previous-step history, but not the other modality's latest decisions within the same step; combined with MDMs' inability to remask, cross-modal contradictions are neither detected nor repaired. We introduce Self-Correcting Coupled Markov Jump Processes (SC-CMJP), a framework in which one modality's transition rates are functionals of the other modality's confidence score, as weighted by cross-modal attention. Furthermore, a remasking jump retracts commitments the moment cross-modal evidence turns against them. In conjunction with SC-CMJP, we introduce CO_2Jump (Self-text{CO}rrecting text{CO}upled text{Jump}), a novel training-free single-pass sampler for joint multimodal geneneration. For training and evaluation purposes, we have created and will release three large-scale joint multimodal generation corpora: JEdit-1M, JMaze-200K, JNono-200K, with matching in- and out-of-distribution benchmarks. CO_2Jump achieves best joint performance for image understanding and editing as well as visual reasoning (maze and nonogram solving). The performance of the sampler scales monotonically with the number of denoising steps, evidence that the benefits of cross-modal coupling compound across the trajectory. Project page: https://coupled-jump.github.io

The emergence of multimodal large language models has redefined the agent paradigm by integrating language and vision modalities with external data sources, enabling agents to better interpret human instructions and execute increasingly complex tasks. However, in this paper, we identify a critical yet previously overlooked security vulnerability in multimodal agents: cross-modal prompt injection attacks. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose CrossInject, a novel attack framework in which attackers embed adversarial perturbations across multiple modalities to align with target malicious content, allowing external instructions to hijack the agent's decision-making process and execute unauthorized tasks. Our approach incorporates two key coordinated components. First, we introduce Visual Latent Alignment, where we optimize adversarial features to the malicious instructions in the visual embedding space based on a text-to-image generative model, ensuring that adversarial images subtly encode cues for malicious task execution. Subsequently, we present Textual Guidance Enhancement, where a large language model is leveraged to construct the black-box defensive system prompt through adversarial meta prompting and generate an malicious textual command that steers the agent's output toward better compliance with attackers' requests. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attacks, achieving at least a +30.1% increase in attack success rates across diverse tasks. Furthermore, we validate our attack's effectiveness in real-world multimodal autonomous agents, highlighting its potential implications for safety-critical applications.

Despite their immense success, deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) can be difficult to optimize and costly to train due to hundreds of layers within the network depth. Conventional convolutional operations are fundamentally limited by their linear nature along with fixed activations, where many layers are needed to learn meaningful patterns in data. Because of the sheer size of these networks, this approach is simply computationally inefficient, and poses overfitting or gradient explosion risks, especially in small datasets. As a result, we introduce a "plug-in" module, called Residual Kolmogorov-Arnold Network (RKAN). Our module is highly compact, so it can be easily added into any stage (level) of traditional deep networks, where it learns to integrate supportive polynomial feature transformations to existing convolutional frameworks. RKAN offers consistent improvements over baseline models in different vision tasks and widely tested benchmarks, accomplishing cutting-edge performance on them.

Modern large-scale language model pre-training relies heavily on the single program multiple data (SPMD) paradigm, which requires tight coupling across accelerators. Due to this coupling, transient slowdowns, hardware failures, and synchronization overhead stall the entire computation, wasting significant compute time at scale. While recent distributed methods like DiLoCo reduced communication bandwidth, they remained fundamentally synchronous and vulnerable to these system stalls. To address this, we introduce Decoupled DiLoCo, an evolution of the DiLoCo framework designed to break the lock-step synchronization barrier and go beyond SPMD to maximize training goodput. Decoupled DiLoCo partitions compute across multiple independent ``learners'' that execute local inner optimization steps. These learners asynchronously communicate parameter fragments to a central synchronizer, which circumvents failed or straggling learners by aggregating updates using a minimum quorum, an adaptive grace window, and dynamic token-weighted merging. Inspired by ``chaos engineering'', we achieve significantly improved training efficiency in failure-prone environments with millions of simulated chips with strictly zero global downtime, while maintaining competitive model performance across text and vision tasks, for both dense and mixture-of-expert architectures.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes exhibit dangerous unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is massive -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for all possible inputs that may elicit such behavior. One specific and particularly challenging case is that if data-poisoning-injected trojans, since there is no way to know what they are to search for them. To our knowledge, there is no generally applicable method to unlearn unknown trojans injected during pre-training. This work seeks to provide a general purpose recipe (filters) and a specific implementation (LoRA) filters that work in practice on small to medium sized models. The focus is primarily empirical, though some perplexing behavior opens the door to the fundamental question of how LLMs store and process information. Not unexpectedly, we find that our filters work best on the residual stream and the latest layers.

The rapid development of generative AI is a double-edged sword, which not only facilitates content creation but also makes image manipulation easier and more difficult to detect. Although current image forgery detection and localization (IFDL) methods are generally effective, they tend to face two challenges: 1) black-box nature with unknown detection principle, 2) limited generalization across diverse tampering methods (e.g., Photoshop, DeepFake, AIGC-Editing). To address these issues, we propose the explainable IFDL task and design FakeShield, a multi-modal framework capable of evaluating image authenticity, generating tampered region masks, and providing a judgment basis based on pixel-level and image-level tampering clues. Additionally, we leverage GPT-4o to enhance existing IFDL datasets, creating the Multi-Modal Tamper Description dataSet (MMTD-Set) for training FakeShield's tampering analysis capabilities. Meanwhile, we incorporate a Domain Tag-guided Explainable Forgery Detection Module (DTE-FDM) and a Multi-modal Forgery Localization Module (MFLM) to address various types of tamper detection interpretation and achieve forgery localization guided by detailed textual descriptions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FakeShield effectively detects and localizes various tampering techniques, offering an explainable and superior solution compared to previous IFDL methods.

Current application designers have moved to integrate large language models (LLMs) into their products. These LLM-integrated applications are vulnerable to prompt injection vulnerabilities. While attempts have been made to address this problem by building a detector that can monitor inputs to the LLM and detect attacks, we find that many detectors are not yet suitable for practical deployment. To support research in this area, we design the PromptShield benchmark for evaluating practical prompt injection detectors. We also construct a new detector, the PromptShield detector, which achieves significantly better performance at detecting prompt injection attacks than any prior scheme. Our work suggests that larger models, more training data, appropriate metrics, and careful curation of training data can contribute to strong detector performance.

Understanding the performance of machine learning (ML) models across diverse data distributions is critically important for reliable applications. Despite recent empirical studies positing a near-perfect linear correlation between in-distribution (ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) accuracies, we empirically demonstrate that this correlation is more nuanced under subpopulation shifts. Through rigorous experimentation and analysis across a variety of datasets, models, and training epochs, we demonstrate that OOD performance often has a nonlinear correlation with ID performance in subpopulation shifts. Our findings, which contrast previous studies that have posited a linear correlation in model performance during distribution shifts, reveal a "moon shape" correlation (parabolic uptrend curve) between the test performance on the majority subpopulation and the minority subpopulation. This non-trivial nonlinear correlation holds across model architectures, hyperparameters, training durations, and the imbalance between subpopulations. Furthermore, we found that the nonlinearity of this "moon shape" is causally influenced by the degree of spurious correlations in the training data. Our controlled experiments show that stronger spurious correlation in the training data creates more nonlinear performance correlation. We provide complementary experimental and theoretical analyses for this phenomenon, and discuss its implications for ML reliability and fairness. Our work highlights the importance of understanding the nonlinear effects of model improvement on performance in different subpopulations, and has the potential to inform the development of more equitable and responsible machine learning models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with the structured reasoning and tool-assisted computation needed for problem solving in cybersecurity applications. In this work, we introduce "random-crypto", a cryptographic Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenge generator framework that we use to fine-tune a tool-augmented Llama-3.1-8B with Guided Reinforcement Prompt Optimisation (GRPO), allowing the agent to iteratively write and execute Python inside an isolated REPL. GRPO yields a +53% absolute jump in Pass@8 on unseen "random-crypto" tasks (0.35 -> 0.88) and raises Majority@8 to 0.41. The fine-tuned agent also generalizes to an external dataset. On a subset of picoCTF cryptography problems, it improves Pass@8 by +13 pp. Ablations show the gains stem from more reliable tool invocation and code synthesis, rather than superficial prompt adaptation.

We demonstrate how images and sounds can be used for indirect prompt and instruction injection in multi-modal LLMs. An attacker generates an adversarial perturbation corresponding to the prompt and blends it into an image or audio recording. When the user asks the (unmodified, benign) model about the perturbed image or audio, the perturbation steers the model to output the attacker-chosen text and/or make the subsequent dialog follow the attacker's instruction. We illustrate this attack with several proof-of-concept examples targeting LLaVa and PandaGPT.

By providing a standardized interface for LLM agents to interact with external tools, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) is quickly becoming a cornerstone of the modern autonomous agent ecosystem. However, it creates novel attack surfaces due to untrusted external tools. While prior work has focused on attacks injected through external tool outputs, we investigate a more fundamental vulnerability: Tool Poisoning, where malicious instructions are embedded within a tool's metadata without execution. To date, this threat has been primarily demonstrated through isolated cases, lacking a systematic, large-scale evaluation. We introduce MCPTox, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate agent robustness against Tool Poisoning in realistic MCP settings. MCPTox is constructed upon 45 live, real-world MCP servers and 353 authentic tools. To achieve this, we design three distinct attack templates to generate a comprehensive suite of 1312 malicious test cases by few-shot learning, covering 10 categories of potential risks. Our evaluation on 20 prominent LLM agents setting reveals a widespread vulnerability to Tool Poisoning, with o1-mini, achieving an attack success rate of 72.8\%. We find that more capable models are often more susceptible, as the attack exploits their superior instruction-following abilities. Finally, the failure case analysis reveals that agents rarely refuse these attacks, with the highest refused rate (Claude-3.7-Sonnet) less than 3\%, demonstrating that existing safety alignment is ineffective against malicious actions that use legitimate tools for unauthorized operation. Our findings create a crucial empirical baseline for understanding and mitigating this widespread threat, and we release MCPTox for the development of verifiably safer AI agents. Our dataset is available at an anonymized repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AAAI26-7C02.

An industrial process includes many devices, variables, and sub-processes that are physically or electronically interconnected. These interconnections imply some level of correlation between different process variables. Since most of the alarms in a process plant are defined on process variables, alarms are also correlated. However, this can be a nuisance to operators, for one fault might trigger a, sometimes large, number of alarms. So, it is essential to find and correct correlated alarms. In this paper, we study different methods and techniques proposed to measure correlation or similarity between alarms. The similarity indices are first analytically calculated and then studied and compared. The results are also validated using Monte-Carlo simulation.

Large language models are being widely used across industries to generate content that contributes directly to key performance metrics, such as conversion rates. Pretrained models, however, often fall short when it comes to aligning with human preferences or optimizing for business objectives. As a result, fine-tuning with good-quality labeled data is essential to guide models to generate content that achieves better results. Controlled experiments, like A/B tests, can provide such data, but they are often expensive and come with significant engineering and logistical challenges. Meanwhile, companies have access to a vast amount of historical (observational) data that remains underutilized. In this work, we study the challenges and opportunities of fine-tuning LLMs using observational data. We show that while observational outcomes can provide valuable supervision, directly fine-tuning models on such data can lead them to learn spurious correlations. We present empirical evidence of this issue using various real-world datasets and propose DeconfoundLM, a method that explicitly removes the effect of known confounders from reward signals. Using simulation experiments, we demonstrate that DeconfoundLM improves the recovery of causal relationships and mitigates failure modes found in fine-tuning methods that ignore or naively incorporate confounding variables. Our findings highlight that while observational data presents risks, with the right causal corrections, it can be a powerful source of signal for LLM alignment. Please refer to the project page for code and related resources.

Generating multi-view images from human instructions is crucial for 3D content creation. The primary challenges involve maintaining consistency across multiple views and effectively synthesizing shapes and textures under diverse conditions. In this paper, we propose the Multi-View Auto-Regressive (MV-AR) method, which leverages an auto-regressive model to progressively generate consistent multi-view images from arbitrary prompts. Firstly, the next-token-prediction capability of the AR model significantly enhances its effectiveness in facilitating progressive multi-view synthesis. When generating widely-separated views, MV-AR can utilize all its preceding views to extract effective reference information. Subsequently, we propose a unified model that accommodates various prompts via architecture designing and training strategies. To address multiple conditions, we introduce condition injection modules for text, camera pose, image, and shape. To manage multi-modal conditions simultaneously, a progressive training strategy is employed. This strategy initially adopts the text-to-multi-view (t2mv) model as a baseline to enhance the development of a comprehensive X-to-multi-view (X2mv) model through the randomly dropping and combining conditions. Finally, to alleviate the overfitting problem caused by limited high-quality data, we propose the "Shuffle View" data augmentation technique, thus significantly expanding the training data by several magnitudes. Experiments demonstrate the performance and versatility of our MV-AR, which consistently generates consistent multi-view images across a range of conditions and performs on par with leading diffusion-based multi-view image generation models. Code and models will be released at https://github.com/MILab-PKU/MVAR.

Although recent methods have tried to introduce large multimodal models (LMMs) into industrial anomaly detection (IAD), their generalization in the IAD field is far inferior to that for general purposes. We summarize the main reasons for this gap into two aspects. On one hand, general-purpose LMMs lack cognition of defects in the visual modality, thereby failing to sufficiently focus on defect areas. Therefore, we propose to modify the AnyRes structure of the LLaVA model, providing the potential anomalous areas identified by existing IAD models to the LMMs. On the other hand, existing methods mainly focus on identifying defects by learning defect patterns or comparing with normal samples, yet they fall short of understanding the causes of these defects. Considering that the generation of defects is closely related to the manufacturing process, we propose a manufacturing-driven IAD paradigm. An instruction-tuning dataset for IAD (InstructIAD) and a data organization approach for Chain-of-Thought with manufacturing (CoT-M) are designed to leverage the manufacturing process for IAD. Based on the above two modifications, we present Triad, a novel LMM-based method incorporating an expert-guided region-of-interest tokenizer and manufacturing process for industrial anomaly detection. Extensive experiments show that our Triad not only demonstrates competitive performance against current LMMs but also achieves further improved accuracy when equipped with manufacturing processes. Source code, training data, and pre-trained models will be publicly available at https://github.com/tzjtatata/Triad.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable prediction performance for a growing array of tasks. However, their rapid proliferation and increasing opaqueness have created a growing need for interpretability. Here, we ask whether we can automatically obtain natural language explanations for black box text modules. A "text module" is any function that maps text to a scalar continuous value, such as a submodule within an LLM or a fitted model of a brain region. "Black box" indicates that we only have access to the module's inputs/outputs. We introduce Summarize and Score (SASC), a method that takes in a text module and returns a natural language explanation of the module's selectivity along with a score for how reliable the explanation is. We study SASC in 3 contexts. First, we evaluate SASC on synthetic modules and find that it often recovers ground truth explanations. Second, we use SASC to explain modules found within a pre-trained BERT model, enabling inspection of the model's internals. Finally, we show that SASC can generate explanations for the response of individual fMRI voxels to language stimuli, with potential applications to fine-grained brain mapping. All code for using SASC and reproducing results is made available on Github.

Recent studies on face forgery detection have shown satisfactory performance for methods involved in training datasets, but are not ideal enough for unknown domains. This motivates many works to improve the generalization, but forgery-irrelevant information, such as image background and identity, still exists in different domain features and causes unexpected clustering, limiting the generalization. In this paper, we propose a controllable guide-space (GS) method to enhance the discrimination of different forgery domains, so as to increase the forgery relevance of features and thereby improve the generalization. The well-designed guide-space can simultaneously achieve both the proper separation of forgery domains and the large distance between real-forgery domains in an explicit and controllable manner. Moreover, for better discrimination, we use a decoupling module to weaken the interference of forgery-irrelevant correlations between domains. Furthermore, we make adjustments to the decision boundary manifold according to the clustering degree of the same domain features within the neighborhood. Extensive experiments in multiple in-domain and cross-domain settings confirm that our method can achieve state-of-the-art generalization.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

Models driven by spurious correlations often yield poor generalization performance. We propose the counterfactual (CF) alignment method to detect and quantify spurious correlations of black box classifiers. Our methodology is based on counterfactual images generated with respect to one classifier being input into other classifiers to see if they also induce changes in the outputs of these classifiers. The relationship between these responses can be quantified and used to identify specific instances where a spurious correlation exists. This is validated by observing intuitive trends in face-attribute and waterbird classifiers, as well as by fabricating spurious correlations and detecting their presence, both visually and quantitatively. Furthermore, utilizing the CF alignment method, we demonstrate that we can evaluate robust optimization methods (GroupDRO, JTT, and FLAC) by detecting a reduction in spurious correlations.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are deployed through pipelines that end users cannot audit, and a poisoned VLA can behave normally on clean observations while a small visual trigger redirects a long-horizon robot policy before any failure becomes observable. Existing vision or language defenses rarely explain what a triggered VLA representation looks like or how to recover behavior without retraining. We study this gap through two independently proposed VLA attacks from groups with distinct injection strategies, BadVLA and INFUSE; the latter persists after downstream clean adaptation. Across the evaluated poisoned models, we identify a recurring internal mechanism: a compact causal footprint, namely a small visual support that is attention-seeded, spatially compact, and causal in a precise sense -- masking it returns a clean-calibrated evidence-evolution score to the normal operating region. This footprint motivates TrustVLA, a mechanism-guided inference-time defense that adapts the Dirichlet evidence framework from trusted classification to monitor per-token, per-layer epistemic uncertainty in VLA policies. With only a small clean calibration set, TrustVLA (i)~detects abnormal evidence evolution, (ii)~localizes the compact support by counterfactual mechanism-score drop, and (iii)~recovers the observation by localized inpainting. Across OpenVLA/LIBERO and π_{0.5} transfer evaluations, TrustVLA reduces attack success while preserving clean-task performance, providing a retraining-free, mechanism-guided defense for visual-triggered VLA backdoors.