Daily Papers

LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) engage tools, share memory, and delegate tasks, often encountering adversarial content. Current defenses for MAS are typically evaluated in isolation, focusing on one attack type at a time, which can lead to costly and hard-to-audit outcomes. This study organizes defenses into five principles, implementing them as DEFER1 (DEterministic-First Enforcement with Residual judgment), which includes a cascade of 28 checks that blocks what it can and refers the rest to a panel of four judges. In independent testing across four domains, attack success rates drop from about 30.0% to approximately 3.0%, with 78% of blocked attacks handled by deterministic checks. Only a quarter of proposals reach the judges in the security-operations domain, illustrating that the rules provide security for attacks violating clear policies, while judges manage those that only misrepresent intent. Both systems have weaknesses, such as a risk-score approval gate that inaccurately approves most attack proposals but few legitimate ones, highlighting the challenges in assessing threats accurately.

LLM agents struggle with regulatory audit replay: when asked to reproduce a flagged transaction decision with identical inputs, many deployments fail to return consistent results. We introduce the Determinism-Faithfulness Assurance Harness (DFAH), a framework for measuring trajectory determinism, decision determinism, and evidence-conditioned faithfulness in tool-using agents deployed in financial services. Across 4,700+ agentic runs (7 models, 4 providers, 3 financial benchmarks with 50 cases each at T=0.0), we find that decision determinism and task accuracy are not detectably correlated (r = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.49, 0.31], p = 0.63, n = 21 configurations): models can be deterministic without being accurate, and accurate without being deterministic. Because neither metric predicts the other in our sample, both must be measured independently, which is precisely what DFAH provides. Small models (7-20B) achieve near-perfect determinism through rigid pattern matching at the cost of accuracy (20-42%), while frontier models show moderate determinism (50-96%) with variable accuracy. No model achieves both perfect determinism and high accuracy, supporting DFAH's multi-dimensional measurement approach. We provide three financial benchmarks (compliance triage, portfolio constraints, and DataOps exceptions; 50 cases each) together with an open-source stress-test harness. Across these benchmarks and DFAH evaluation settings, Tier 1 models with schema-first architectures achieved determinism levels consistent with audit replay requirements.

LLM agents increasingly operate over sensitive resources, such as private documents and mutable system states, which can create serious safety and security risks. Runtime guardrails should therefore make inspectable, reproducible, and deterministic allow or refuse decisions before potentially irreversible agent actions are executed. However, safety and security requirements are rarely complete before deployment, so guardrails need to keep adapting as new risks emerge. Existing adaptive guardrails learn from deployment experience, but they usually apply safety policies through LLM inference, which can lead to inconsistent decisions and ambiguous policy interpretations. Formal guardrails, on the other hand, enforce policies deterministically, but they usually rely on pre-deployment or task-specific policies and have no mechanism to adapt to newly observed risks. We introduce VEPA, a framework for the verified evolution of formal agent guardrails. VEPA represents the guardrail as a formal policy of executable symbolic rules over typed agent events. During deployment, we use an LLM guided by deployment feedback to propose policy patches that fix newly observed failures while preserving previously correct behavior. Then, a deterministic verifier only accepts policies that are structurally valid and conflict-free. Finally, an evidence-aware authority layer activates a verified rule only when it has enough supporting evidence, so uncertain updates cannot directly affect guardrail decisions. Across ASSEBench-Safety, ASSEBench-Security, and ATBench, VEPA consistently outperforms baselines while expanding the scope of deterministic formal-policy enforcement. These gains also hold under more challenging deployment conditions, including mixed streams, corrupted feedback, and longer horizons.

Deterministic inference is a comforting ideal in classical software: the same program on the same input should always produce the same output. As large language models move into real-world deployment, this ideal has been imported wholesale into inference stacks. Recent work from the Thinking Machines Lab has presented a detailed analysis of nondeterminism in LLM inference, showing how batch-invariant kernels and deterministic attention can enforce bitwise-identical outputs, positioning deterministic inference as a prerequisite for reproducibility and enterprise reliability. In this paper, we take the opposite stance. We argue that, for LLMs, deterministic inference kills. It kills the ability to model uncertainty, suppresses emergent abilities, collapses reasoning into a single brittle path, and weakens safety alignment by hiding tail risks. LLMs implement conditional distributions over outputs, not fixed functions. Collapsing these distributions to a single canonical completion may appear reassuring, but it systematically conceals properties central to artificial cognition. We instead advocate Stochastic CHAOS, treating distributional variability as a signal to be measured and controlled. Empirically, we show that deterministic inference is systematically misleading. Single-sample deterministic evaluation underestimates both capability and fragility, masking failure probability under paraphrases and noise. Phase-like transitions associated with emergent abilities disappear under greedy decoding. Multi-path reasoning degrades when forced onto deterministic backbones, reducing accuracy and diagnostic insight. Finally, deterministic evaluation underestimates safety risk by hiding rare but dangerous behaviors that appear only under multi-sample evaluation.

Tool-using LLM agents can violate the very policies they are deployed to enforce while appearing to complete the task successfully. In policy-permissive environments, a tool may execute any well-formed call even when the corresponding state transition is forbidden by domain policy. The result is a silent wrong state (a booking cancelled, a passenger count changed, a claim acted on without verification) that neither the tool nor the agent's self-report exposes. We study this failure mode in the τ^2-bench airline domain. On a budget agent, 78% of observed failures are silent wrong-state failures with no tool error, and the aggregate failure rate is reproducible across disjoint seeds, not sampling noise. We then evaluate a lightweight intervention: deterministic, read-only pre-execution gates that inspect the proposed call and current state before allowing a write. A four-gate suite raises full-benchmark success from 29.6% to 42.0% on gpt-4o-mini (+12.4pp; paired task-level bootstrap P=0.0012), and the lift reproduces on a disjoint 15-seed set (+12.3pp; P=0.0008). The effect is concentrated where the gates fire: on the 26/50 firing tasks, success rises by +19.2pp, while movement on the 24 non-firing tasks does not exclude zero. Two negative controls (a self-enforcing retail domain and BFCL) bound the mechanism: gates help when tools are policy-permissive and add little where tools already self-enforce. As suggestive evidence, not a central claim, the same failure mode persists at the frontier: gpt-5.2 at default reasoning still attempts policy-violating writes, and the same suite improves success from 61.2% to 71.6% (+10.4pp; P=0.020; n=5, no replication). The contribution is a bounded evaluation and reliability result: deterministic gates do not guarantee task success, but they can deterministically prevent a known class of silent policy-violating writes at the action boundary.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents demonstrate strong autonomy, but their stochastic behavior introduces unpredictable safety risks. Existing rule-based enforcement systems, such as AgentSpec, are reactive, intervening only when unsafe behavior is imminent or has occurred, lacking foresight for long-horizon dependencies. To overcome these limitations, we present a proactive runtime enforcement framework for LLM agents. The framework abstracts agent behaviors into symbolic states and learns a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) from execution traces. At runtime, it predicts the probability of leading to undesired behaviors and intervenes before violations occur when the estimated risk exceeds a user-defined threshold. Designed to provide PAC-correctness guarantee, the framework achieves statistically reliable enforcement of agent safety. We evaluate the framework across two safety-critical domains: autonomous vehicles and embodied agents. It proactively enforces safety and maintains high task performance, outperforming existing methods.

Large language model (LLM) agents augmented by tools can automate complex, multi-step tasks, such as web navigation, code generation, and workflow orchestration, by acting on external systems through tool calls. However, hallucinations, distributional instability, and adversarial manipulations in LLMs, and the irreversible consequences of certain tool calls can lead to harmful outcomes. Existing safeguards either grade recorded trajectories post hoc with stochastic LLM judges or block unsafe actions one call at a time, and no single deterministic artifact supports both roles. We present ContrAgent, a contract-based framework for symbolic temporal supervision of LLM agents. ContrAgent captures an agent's behavior as a sequence of tool calls and formalizes it as a trace over a fixed set of checkable predicates. It then specifies required behaviors using assume-guarantee contracts in linear temporal logic over finite traces (LTLf). Each contract is compiled to a deterministic finite automaton (DFA) that serves two roles: gating agent actions online and evaluating recorded traces offline. A contract library, acting as a reusable knowledge base, is maintained independently of the agent's model and can be applied across different agents within the same task domain. We show the effectiveness of our approach on four benchmarks spanning both roles, where ContrAgent matches state-of-the-art LLM-judge and rule-based guardrail baselines while producing deterministic, reproducible verdicts and, in the online mode, orders-of-magnitude lower per-call latency.

AI agents today have passwords but no permission slips. They execute tool calls (fund transfers, database queries, shell commands, sub-agent delegation) with no standard mechanism to enforce authorization before the action executes. Current safety architectures rely on model alignment (probabilistic, training-time) and post-hoc evaluation (retrospective, batch). Neither provides deterministic, policy-based enforcement at the individual tool call level. We characterize this gap as the pre-action authorization problem and present the Open Agent Passport (OAP), an open specification and reference implementation that intercepts tool calls synchronously before execution, evaluates them against a declarative policy, and produces a cryptographically signed audit record. OAP enforces authorization decisions in a measured median of 53 ms (N=1,000). In a live adversarial testbed (4,437 authorization decisions across 1,151 sessions, $5,000 bounty), social engineering succeeded against the model 74.6% of the time under a permissive policy; under a restrictive OAP policy, a comparable population of attackers achieved a 0% success rate across 879 attempts. We distinguish pre-action authorization from sandboxed execution (contains blast radius but does not prevent unauthorized actions) and model-based screening (probabilistic), and show they are complementary. The same infrastructure that enforces security constraints (spending limits, capability scoping) also enforces quality gates, operational contracts, and compliance controls. The specification is released under Apache 2.0 (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18901596).

We present Phionyx, a deterministic AI runtime architecture derived from the broader Echoism interaction framework that introduces a governance-first approach to AI engineering: treating large language model (LLM) outputs as noisy sensor measurements rather than direct decisions. Unlike probabilistic agents, Phionyx enforces deterministic state evolution via a structured state vector governed by deterministic state-evolution equations, enabling reproducible behavior in applications requiring auditability and governance. The architecture integrates three layers: (1) a deterministic evaluation kernel processing noisy sensor measurements through a canonical 46-block pipeline, (2) a unified safety layer providing pre-response control and architectural privacy enforcement, and (3) a semantic time-based memory system implementing impact-weighted cache eviction. Experimental validation on single-instance deployments demonstrates approximately 31% reduction in computational overhead vs. post-hoc filtering (at 30% unsafe input ratio, simulated cost model) and up to 24% improvement in high-value data retention vs. LRU (72% vs. FIFO, same cache capacity, benchmark-verified), deterministic execution verified across 100 repeated runs with zero variance in control signals (hash-verified), and zero unplanned restarts in single-instance deployment testing (see Appendix C for methodology and scope). This paper presents the architecture, its analytic structure, and scoped experimental evidence; generalization to distributed or multi-tenant deployments remains future work.

In LLM inference, the same prompt may yield different outputs across different runs. At the system level, this non-determinism arises from floating-point non-associativity combined with dynamic batching and GPU kernels whose reduction orders vary with batch size. A straightforward way to eliminate non-determinism is to disable dynamic batching during inference, but doing so severely degrades throughput. Another approach is to make kernels batch-invariant; however, this tightly couples determinism to kernel design, requiring new implementations. This coupling also imposes fixed runtime overheads, regardless of how much of the workload actually requires determinism. Inspired by ideas from speculative decoding, we present LLM-42, a scheduling-based approach to enable determinism in LLM inference. Our key observation is that if a sequence is in a consistent state, the next emitted token is likely to be consistent even with dynamic batching. Moreover, most GPU kernels use shape-consistent reductions. Leveraging these insights, LLM-42 decodes tokens using a non-deterministic fast path and enforces determinism via a lightweight verify-rollback loop. The verifier replays candidate tokens under a fixed-shape reduction schedule, commits those that are guaranteed to be consistent across runs, and rolls back those violating determinism. LLM-42 mostly re-uses existing kernels unchanged and incurs overhead only in proportion to the traffic that requires determinism.

Security policy enforcement in contemporary agentic systems predominantly consists of embedding natural-language policies within an agent's system prompt and delegating compliance to the agent's reasoning. This approach admits no formal enforcement guarantee and cannot express policies whose satisfaction depends on the causal history of an execution, a gap that becomes acute in multi-agent systems, where enforcement must reason across agents. We argue that policy enforcement in agentic systems is most naturally understood as a cross-cutting concern, and propose a framework grounded in aspect-oriented programming that specifies policies independent of the agent's reasoning and enforces them at every policy-relevant decision. Policies are written in Datalog over a set of abstract predicates describing the execution context, an observability service governed by a formal assume/guarantee contract maintains these predicates, and a reference monitor consults the policy at each action to produce an enforcement decision. When the environment contract holds, enforcement decisions coincide with the policy's intended semantics. We adopt Datalog as the policy language, a natural fit because it supports declarative rule specification, admits recursion for policies over transitive relationships, and yields deterministic enforcement. Datalog further admits tractable static analyses for contradiction, redundancy, subsumption, and conditional reachability, enabling authors to verify policy intent and surface ambiguities inherent in natural-language specifications. We realize the framework in FORGE, which enforces policies over agentic deployments without modification to the underlying agents. We evaluate FORGE on three case studies: information flow policies for prompt injection defense, approval workflows in a multi-agent pharmacovigilance system, and organizational policies for customer service.

Modern AI systems rely on vector embeddings stored and searched using floating-point arithmetic. While effective for approximate similarity search, this design introduces fundamental non-determinism: identical models, inputs, and code can produce different memory states and retrieval results across hardware architectures (e.g., x86 vs. ARM). This prevents replayability and safe deployment, leading to silent data divergence that prevents post-hoc verification and compromises audit trails in regulated sectors. We present Valori, a deterministic AI memory substrate that replaces floating-point memory operations with fixed-point arithmetic (Q16.16) and models memory as a replayable state machine. Valori guarantees bit-identical memory states, snapshots, and search results across platforms. We demonstrate that non-determinism arises before indexing or retrieval and show how Valori enforces determinism at the memory boundary. Our results suggest that deterministic memory is a necessary primitive for trustworthy AI systems. The reference implementation is open-source and available at https://github.com/varshith-Git/Valori-Kernel (archived at https://zenodo.org/records/18022660).

Self-improving AI agents are designed to learn from their mistakes. We show they can also hallucinate mistakes that never happened. We study this failure mode in automated harness optimization, where an LLM-based proposer edits an agent's scaffold, including prompts, parsers, filters, validators and guardrails, to eliminate observed failures. But this process rarely asks first: was there a real failure to fix? We introduce the Counterfactual Fabrication Lab, a deterministic micro-lab where the correct action is known: do nothing. The lab plants a candidate guardrail for a failure class that provably never occurs, presents only legal episodes, and uses a byte-exact oracle to check every cited violation. The proposer behaves as expected on real violations and abstains on featureless legal input. Yet when the legal input contains a harmless pattern resembling a familiar game rule, it invents a failure: in 15/60 runs, versus 0/60 on featureless input, it enables the nonexistent-rule guardrail and cites a violation the oracle refutes. The effect is structured, not indiscriminate. In single-shot proposals it appears only when three conditions coincide: a rule-shaped pattern, an open-ended rule set and an instruction that presupposes failures. Removing any of these conditions eliminates the fabrication. Because the invented guardrail changes no true outcome and cannot improve an already-perfect suppression score, the phenomenon is neither reward hacking nor over-refusal. It is a phantom guardrail: a fix for a failure that never happened, invisible to suppression-only acceptance. Inside an add-only accept loop it re-enters even without the failure-presupposing instruction, the loop's keep-adding role supplying the demand the instruction supplied in single shot, and once in it stays. We present the Counterfactual Fabrication Lab for measuring fabricated failures in self-improving agent harnesses.

Policy enforcement for LLM agents has shifted from single-turn content moderation to compound, application-specific policies evaluated over multi-turn transcripts and tool-call trajectories. Fine-tuned guardrail models are efficient but degrade on compound policies, and while LLM-as-a-judge approaches achieve higher accuracy, they incur high inference cost and tend to produce unstable predictions. Neurosymbolic methods offer a natural alternative, decomposing the policy into narrow neural decisions composed under explicit logic. However, existing symbolic layers lack the required expressiveness and are optimized against fixed data rather than the policy itself. To address this, we introduce SCOPE, which compiles a policy into an executable program of neural predicates executed by small models, deterministic extractors, and code that composes their outputs. The program is optimized jointly with its training data, using adversarial generation of counterexamples that target where the program deviates from the policy. We evaluate SCOPE on a benchmark of real-world policy tasks against prompt optimization, task decomposition, and workflow generation methods, achieving the highest average accuracy across tasks and models. Programs optimized with the weakest executor transfer to other models without further optimization. This allows them to be deployed in production on inexpensive models, where they reach accuracy comparable to frontier reasoning models. Unlike these monolithic models, SCOPE produces substantially more stable predictions, and each verdict is interpretable through the predicate outputs that produced it. Additionally, we validate the key components of our method through an ablation study. SCOPE thus enables reliable, interpretable, and efficient policy enforcement at production scale.

AI research agents combine prior knowledge, public sources, and experimental feedback to produce useful results. The Discovery Certification Protocol (DCP) turns claims about these results into executable recovery and feedback tests. Gate 1 validates useful improvement on sealed evaluation. Gate 2 gives matched agents the registered starting information and observed Web content while withholding the target research history. Every valid method reaching the numerical target supplies a recovery witness and triggers the Core veto. DCP Core requires adequate controls, zero observed recoveries, and a finite-sample bound on recovery in one fresh registered episode. Optional Gate 3 measures the average effect of truthful feedback relative to a specified neutral policy from a shared checkpoint. DCP Evidence adds this effect after independent null calibration and a registered effect margin. Two controlled audits exercise the complete protocol in SQLite optimization and virtual catalyst control under different models. Each produced zero recoveries in 96 episodes, with an upper bound of 0.0468. Each paired study yielded 30 truthful recoveries and zero neutral recoveries, with passing 60-pair null studies. Additional cases exercise Core, recovered, and audit-incomplete decisions. A deterministic, LLM-free verifier reproduces the decisions from frozen evidence. DCP provides a common evidence language for useful outcomes, alternative routes, and feedback effects across AI research.

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in high-stakes domains with real-world consequences, ensuring their behavioral safety becomes paramount. The dominant oversight paradigm, LLM-as-a-Judge, faces a fundamental dilemma: how can probabilistic systems reliably supervise other probabilistic systems without inheriting their failure modes? We argue that formal verification offers a principled escape from this dilemma, yet its adoption has been hindered by a critical bottleneck: the translation from natural language requirements to formal specifications. This paper bridges this gap by proposing , a neuro-symbolic framework that employs a bidirectional Formal-of-Thought architecture: LLMs serve as specification compilers that top-down decompose high-level human intent into atomic, verifiable constraints, then bottom-up prove compliance using Dafny specifications and Z3 Satisfiability modulo theories solving, which produces mathematical guarantees rather than probabilistic scores. We validate across three benchmarks spanning behavioral safety, multi-domain constraint adherence, and agentic upward deception detection. Experiments on 7 agent models demonstrate that achieves an average improvement of 16.6% over LLM-as-a-Judge baselines, enables weak-to-strong generalization where a 7B judge achieves over 90% accuracy detecting deception from 72B agents, and provides near-linear safety improvement through iterative refinement.

Specifying a penalty can turn a legal obligation into a cost-benefit calculation that favors violation. We show that this enforcement information paradox occurs in AI agents. Most AI safety evaluations test whether models fail; we ask why, using compliance theory from law and economics as a diagnostic. We evaluate twelve instruction-tuned language models deployed as enterprise procurement chatbots. Each is given an environmental regulation in its system prompt covering large purchases, and a vendor list on which the certified suppliers cost nearly twice what the uncertified ones do. We test the agents against the predictions of deterrence, legitimacy, and expressive law, and find that each theory accounts for part of what we observe. Under identical conditions, compliance spans 46 percentage points across models, and models differ in which pressure breaks them: some treat the regulation as binding however it is worded, while others fail where theory predicts, under low penalties and non-command phrasing. Benchmark scores and developers' own descriptions of post-training do not predict where a model falls. Across all twelve, financial incentives, managerial demands, peer outcomes, and employee pressure each produce large compliance failures. These agents violate regulatory constraints to satisfy local user objectives in ways standard alignment benchmarks do not measure. Embedding the rule in the system prompt is not on its own enough to produce a compliant agent: model selection is itself a governance decision, and benchmark evaluation is not sufficient for compliance-sensitive deployments.

Multi-agent LLM systems share state through memory stores, vector indices, and tool registries. We model such sharing as long-running read-generate-write operations under deterministic-generation semantics -- the regime durable-execution engines enforce by deterministic replay -- and formalize four concurrency anomalies in TLA+: stale-generation, phantom-tool, causal-cascade, and tool-effect reordering, structural analogues of classical isolation anomalies, each with a TLC counter-example. The exclusion lattice over these anomalies is trivial; the contribution is the mechanically verified realizability and strict separation of one maximal chain within it, L_0 subsetneq cdots subsetneq L_4, to our knowledge the first machine-checked consistency hierarchy for such runtimes. A development of 274 Verus obligations (zero assume, zero admit; trust base: two structural axioms and a mutex correspondence) proves the detectors sound and complete against the specifications and each runtime its avoidance set. Three deployed Rust runtimes realize L0-L1 (pessimistic locking, serializable snapshot isolation, default-SI), each verified against stale-generation and refined to its state machine; L2-L4 are exec-mode-verified with dependency-free prevention twins (A3, A6, A2: 0/1000 versus 1000/1000), and L2 is run live across three model families (A3 prevented in all 120 retracted sessions). We reproduce a silent lost update in ByteDance's deer-flow, formalizing its fix as a verified L_0 to L_1 refinement, and exhibit tool-effect reordering in LangGraph's ToolNode on unmodified output, removed by an L3 commit-order sequencer. The verified detector, refinements, and realizability artifacts are the contribution; the phenomena and lattice are classical.

Large language models in regulated financial workflows are governed by natural-language policies that the same model interprets, creating a principal--agent failure: outputs can appear compliant without being compliant. Existing evaluation measures task accuracy but not whether governance constrains behaviour at the decision rationale level -- where regulated decisions must be auditable. We introduce five governance metrics that quantify policy compliance at the rationale level and apply them in a synthetic banking domain to compare text-only governance against mechanical enforcement: four primitives operating outside the model's interpretive loop. Under text-only governance, 27% of deferrals carry no decision-relevant information. Mechanical enforcement reduces this rate by 73%, more than doubles deferral information content, and raises task accuracy from MCC~0.43 to 0.88. The improvement is driven by architectural separation: LLM-generated rationales under mechanical enforcement show comparable CDL to text-only governance -- the gain comes from removing clear-cut decisions from the model's control. A causal ablation confirms that each primitive is individually necessary. Our central finding is a governance-task decoupling: under structural stress, text-only governance degrades on both dimensions simultaneously, whereas mechanical enforcement preserves governance quality even as task performance drops. This implies that governance and task evaluation are distinct axes: accuracy is not a sufficient proxy for governance in regulated AI systems.

Before acting upon an unobservable physical system, an autonomous agent must determine which latent distinctions govern downstream tasks, how many active interventions are necessary to certify them, and when to abstain to prevent catastrophic errors. Classical observability treats state reconstruction as an unconditioned binary predicate, failing when passive observations cannot break latent degeneracies without perturbation, full microscopic inversion is prohibitively costly, and distinguishing task-irrelevant degrees of freedom wastes interaction budgets. We formalize task-conditioned active observability complexity: the minimum worst-case expected interaction cost required to identify task-relevant states under certified error and safe abstention guarantees. We prove that task-predictive equivalence induces the unique minimal sufficient quotient H/!sim_τ, leaving active observability complexity strictly invariant while eliminating superfluous distinctions. In deterministic regimes, this complexity is characterized by an optimal adaptive distinguishing tree and Bellman recursion; in noisy regimes, it obeys a stopped-transcript relative-entropy lower bound and adaptive martingale certificates that compose without independence assumptions. We instantiate a prospective certified observer with staged recovery: a nominal verifier defers candidate compilation, triggering active probing only upon evidence, while a history-measurable score shell prunes hypotheses without sacrificing risk bounds. Stress audits across high-dimensional physical systems and thousands of operational trials demonstrate certified state recovery with zero false acceptances and substantial reductions in sensor reads and model steps.

Autonomous agent systems increasingly trigger real-world side effects: deploying infrastructure, modifying databases, moving money, and executing workflows. Yet most agent stacks provide no mandatory execution checkpoint where organizations can deterministically permit, deny, or defer an action before it changes reality. This paper introduces Faramesh, a protocol-agnostic execution control plane that enforces execution-time authorization for agent-driven actions via a non-bypassable Action Authorization Boundary (AAB). Faramesh canonicalizes agent intent into a Canonical Action Representation (CAR), evaluates actions deterministically against policy and state, and issues a decision artifact (PERMIT/DEFER/DENY) that executors must validate prior to execution. The system is designed to be framework- and model-agnostic, supports multi-agent and multi-tenant deployments, and remains independent of transport protocols (e.g., MCP). Faramesh further provides decision-centric, append-only provenance logging keyed by canonical action hashes, enabling auditability, verification, and deterministic replay without re-running agent reasoning. We show how these primitives yield enforceable, predictable governance for autonomous execution while avoiding hidden coupling to orchestration layers or observability-only approaches.

Parallel coding agents can independently produce locally valid changes while still interfering at integration time, expanding beyond planned scope, or relying on premises invalidated by concurrent work. Existing responses emphasize communication, isolated workspaces, late merge-time repair, continuous supervision, or post-hoc runtime recovery. This paper presents Claim Plane, a model-agnostic coordination architecture that treats concurrent software change as a pre-write admission problem. Before implementation, each worker declares a versioned ChangeIntent containing an exact base commit, typed resources, dependencies, and operations marked as committed or contingent. A deterministic control plane atomically admits compatible intents, constrains same-file parallelism to declared regions, serializes unresolved overlap, tracks dependency invalidation, and fails closed on ambiguous authority. During execution, a contingent mutation does not reserve write ownership initially; the first attempted mutation triggers atomic scope promotion and re-admission against the current active set. Brokered execution binds capabilities to intent versions, leases, OS-level worktree locks, monotonic fencing tokens, and Git-tree provenance, while integration verifies immutable patches and evidence. A preliminary six-pair CooperBench mechanism check is reported only as feasibility evidence: static Claim Plane achieved 6/6 pair passes with full serialization, while dynamic scope retained parallel admission on half of the pairs, performed seven successful scope promotions, and failed closed on two undeclared mutations. The sample is intentionally too small for comparative claims. We argue that separating probabilistic planning from deterministic authority provides a foundation for a future learned semantic-dependency model and frontier-model escalation only on unresolved cases.

Tool-using LLM agents are usually evaluated by final-answer correctness or LLM judges. Neither captures how an answer was produced. In safety-critical settings, the procedure itself is part of correctness. In this paper, we introduce AgentLTL, a language derived from First-Order Linear Temporal Logic (FO-LTL) that expresses procedural rules over agent traces. It yields a deterministic, judge-free compliance score. In this framework, a single specification drives two usages. The first is harnessing: the constraints score completed traces, or gate tool calls by checking each prefix online, before execution. The second is finetuning: the score serves as a dense reward. On a benchmark spanning ordering, branching, iteration, and grounding, block-and-warn harnessing improves compliance on five of seven models. Finetuning with the same reward yields +38 and +17.5 percentage point gains in accuracy and compliance on held-out patterns, including unseen tool-name aliases. These findings are consistent with the model acquiring procedural structure rather than memorizing surface tool names and procedures.

Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guarantees for the client, we propose adapting the cryptographic notion of refereed delegation to the machine learning setting. This approach enables a computationally limited client to delegate a program to multiple untrusted compute providers, with a guarantee of obtaining the correct result if at least one of them is honest. Refereed delegation of ML programs poses two technical hurdles: (1) an arbitration protocol to resolve disputes when compute providers disagree on the output, and (2) the ability to bitwise reproduce ML programs across different hardware setups, For (1), we design Verde, a dispute arbitration protocol that efficiently handles the large scale and graph-based computational model of modern ML programs. For (2), we build RepOps (Reproducible Operators), a library that eliminates hardware "non-determinism" by controlling the order of floating point operations performed on all hardware. Our implementation shows that refereed delegation achieves both strong guarantees for clients and practical overheads for compute providers.

Traditional software relies on contracts -- APIs, type systems, assertions -- to specify and enforce correct behavior. AI agents, by contrast, operate on prompts and natural language instructions with no formal behavioral specification. This gap is the root cause of drift, governance failures, and frequent project failures in agentic AI deployments. We introduce Agent Behavioral Contracts (ABC), a formal framework that brings Design-by-Contract principles to autonomous AI agents. An ABC contract C = (P, I, G, R) specifies Preconditions, Invariants, Governance policies, and Recovery mechanisms as first-class, runtime-enforceable components. We define (p, delta, k)-satisfaction -- a probabilistic notion of contract compliance that accounts for LLM non-determinism and recovery -- and prove a Drift Bounds Theorem showing that contracts with recovery rate gamma > alpha (the natural drift rate) bound behavioral drift to D* = alpha/gamma in expectation, with Gaussian concentration in the stochastic setting. We establish sufficient conditions for safe contract composition in multi-agent chains and derive probabilistic degradation bounds. We implement ABC in AgentAssert, a runtime enforcement library, and evaluate on AgentContract-Bench, a benchmark of 200 scenarios across 7 models from 6 vendors. Results across 1,980 sessions show that contracted agents detect 5.2-6.8 soft violations per session that uncontracted baselines miss entirely (p < 0.0001, Cohen's d = 6.7-33.8), achieve 88-100% hard constraint compliance, and bound behavioral drift to D* < 0.27 across extended sessions, with 100% recovery for frontier models and 17-100% across all models, at overhead < 10 ms per action.

Sequential prediction problems such as imitation learning, where future observations depend on previous predictions (actions), violate the common i.i.d. assumptions made in statistical learning. This leads to poor performance in theory and often in practice. Some recent approaches provide stronger guarantees in this setting, but remain somewhat unsatisfactory as they train either non-stationary or stochastic policies and require a large number of iterations. In this paper, we propose a new iterative algorithm, which trains a stationary deterministic policy, that can be seen as a no regret algorithm in an online learning setting. We show that any such no regret algorithm, combined with additional reduction assumptions, must find a policy with good performance under the distribution of observations it induces in such sequential settings. We demonstrate that this new approach outperforms previous approaches on two challenging imitation learning problems and a benchmark sequence labeling problem.

While LLMs have seen substantial improvement in reasoning capabilities, they also sometimes overthink, generating unnecessary reasoning steps, particularly under uncertainty, given ill-posed or ambiguous queries. We introduce statistically principled early stopping methods that monitor uncertainty signals during generation to mitigate this issue. Our first approach is parametric: it models inter-arrival times of uncertainty keywords as a renewal process and applies sequential testing for stopping. Our second approach is nonparametric and provides finite-sample guarantees on the probability of halting too early on well-posed queries. We conduct empirical evaluations on reasoning tasks across several domains and models. Our results indicate that uncertainty-aware early stopping can improve both efficiency and reliability in LLM reasoning, and we observe especially significant gains for math reasoning.

Autonomous agents increasingly perform bounded software tasks under an orchestrator that retries, resumes, and budgets them. The machinery such orchestrators reach for is the service mesh's: retry, timeout, and error-rate circuit breaking. We report a failure study of a production agentic software-delivery platform over 147 numbered incidents spanning 81 runs, each with a measured cost and, in most cases, a mutation proof reproducing the failure. All three assumptions those primitives rest on are violated in practice, and we quantify the consequences: a loop of fifty-four consecutive successful tool calls no error-rate breaker could see; a progress signal constant by construction, guaranteeing a false trip on the third repair round and driving one run from six of six components to three; twenty-one events accumulated across six invocations of one delegation, making a correct, idempotent component unwinnable; a misrouted failure that woke five components for a two-component fault, leaving three bystanders regressing working code; and twelve incidents in which the enforcement layer blocked correct work, the most expensive costing 107 agent turns and zero accepted writes. We find one cross-cutting cause and its dual. Identity adequacy: in five separate subsystems an identity that failed to discriminate produced a confident wrong answer, and two of them derived the corrective rule independently. Evidence adequacy: a reliability decision may be taken only on evidence capable of moving, attributable to what it measures, and deterministic under identical conditions. From the findings we derive seven reliability primitives whose enforcement unit is the delegation rather than the message, and specify the controlled evaluation the study motivates but does not constitute.

As autonomous AI agents are used in regulated and safety-critical settings, organizations need effective ways to turn policy into enforceable controls. We introduce a regulatory machine learning framework that converts unstructured design artifacts (like PRDs, TDDs, and code) into verifiable runtime guardrails. Our Policy as Prompt method reads these documents and risk controls to build a source-linked policy tree. This tree is then compiled into lightweight, prompt-based classifiers for real-time runtime monitoring. The system is built to enforce least privilege and data minimization. For conformity assessment, it provides complete provenance, traceability, and audit logging, all integrated with a human-in-the-loop review process. Evaluations show our system reduces prompt-injection risk, blocks out-of-scope requests, and limits toxic outputs. It also generates auditable rationales aligned with AI governance frameworks. By treating policies as executable prompts (a policy-as-code for agents), this approach enables secure-by-design deployment, continuous compliance, and scalable AI safety and AI security assurance for regulatable ML.

Structured financial audit verification is difficult for language-model agents because correctness depends on structured evidence rather than text alone. A model must link reported facts to taxonomy concepts, traverse calculation or dimensional relations, and recompute expected values before applying an audit rule. We propose AuditFlow, a graph-grounded multi-agent framework that separates adaptive search from deterministic verification. AuditFlow builds a symbolic environment from a static US-GAAP taxonomy graph and a dynamic XBRL filing graph, and exposes it through typed tools for fact retrieval, taxonomy traversal, numerical checking, and rule evaluation. Two junior auditors inspect each case from regulatory and evidentiary views, while a senior auditor resolves disagreements and can request further investigation. The final reports are fused through evidential aggregation to produce an audit verdict, expected value, evidence trail, and trustworthiness score. On a FinAuditing-derived FinMR sample, AuditFlow reaches 82.09% joint audit accuracy under GPT-5.5, outperforming the strongest baseline by 14.93 points. Removing deterministic checks drops accuracy to 17.91%, showing that the symbolic environment performs the verification step that the model cannot reliably replace.

Agentic workflows now make consequential decisions in regulated settings, and the governance placed around them is almost entirely step-scoped: input-output classifiers, per turn rails, and span-level evaluators. The policies organizations actually hold, such as referral thresholds, authority limits, and review requirements, are properties of the whole execution rather than of any one step. This mismatch admits a failure mode we call a Compositional Policy Violation (CPV): every individual step passes its own check while the composed execution violates the governing policy. A predicate over a single step cannot evaluate a property that step does not determine, so no improvement in the accuracy of the step-scoped monitors detects this class. We define CPVs as the failure of step-level compliance to compose, and present a taxonomy of four types: Authority Creep, Threshold Laundering, Cumulative Sum Violation, and Context Collapse. We show that the correct repair for each class is dictated by where the guarded quantity mutates. We then introduce a provenance-aware runtime architecture that evaluates policies over complete execution traces, recomputing guarded quantities from raw provenance rather than the pipeline's derived representation.

Customer-service LLM agents must follow organizational policy when acting on a user's behalf. Compliance failures arise from either forbidden actions, such as granting an ineligible change, or omitted procedural requirements, such as identification or confirmation. Runtime safeguards can intervene on risky actions, but action-local checks do not guide an agent through a multi-step procedure. Workflow-following systems support prescribed process execution, but primarily target workflow completion rather than safeguarding agent behavior. PolicyGuide instead compiles each domain policy into a workflow graph and invokes a proactive verifier at user-turn boundaries. From persisted graph state, the verifier reconciles open requests and returns step-specific remediation along a policy-compliant path. Across the τ^2-bench airline, retail, and telecom domains with a GPT-5.4 agent and verifier, PolicyGuide raises mean Pass^4 from 0.42 to 0.62, with the largest gain on telecom (0.19 to 0.61), the most workflow-structured domain. The same workflows transfer to Claude Sonnet 4.6 and Gemini 2.5 Pro agents. Complementary evaluations find the lowest observed attack-success rate under adversarial users and the strongest procedural compliance in an author-designed workflow-level validation.

This paper presents a quantitative program verification infrastructure for discrete probabilistic programs. Our infrastructure can be viewed as the probabilistic analogue of Boogie: its central components are an intermediate verification language (IVL) together with a real-valued logic. Our IVL provides a programming-language-style for expressing verification conditions whose validity implies the correctness of a program under investigation. As our focus is on verifying quantitative properties such as bounds on expected outcomes, expected run-times, or termination probabilities, off-the-shelf IVLs based on Boolean first-order logic do not suffice. Instead, a paradigm shift from the standard Boolean to a real-valued domain is required. Our IVL features quantitative generalizations of standard verification constructs such as assume- and assert-statements. Verification conditions are generated by a weakest-precondition-style semantics, based on our real-valued logic. We show that our verification infrastructure supports natural encodings of numerous verification techniques from the literature. With our SMT-based implementation, we automatically verify a variety of benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, this establishes the first deductive verification infrastructure for expectation-based reasoning about probabilistic programs.

While powerful, the inherent non-determinism of large language model (LLM) agents limits their application in structured operational environments where procedural fidelity and predictable execution are strict requirements. This limitation stems from current architectures that conflate probabilistic, high-level planning with low-level action execution within a single generative process. To address this, we introduce the Source Code Agent framework, a new paradigm built on the "Blueprint First, Model Second" philosophy. Our framework decouples the workflow logic from the generative model. An expert-defined operational procedure is first codified into a source code-based Execution Blueprint, which is then executed by a deterministic engine. The LLM is strategically invoked as a specialized tool to handle bounded, complex sub-tasks within the workflow, but never to decide the workflow's path. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation on the challenging tau-bench benchmark, designed for complex user-tool-rule scenarios. Our results demonstrate that the Source Code Agent establishes a new state-of-the-art, outperforming the strongest baseline by 10.1 percentage points on the average Pass^1 score while dramatically improving execution efficiency. Our work enables the verifiable and reliable deployment of autonomous agents in applications governed by strict procedural logic.

Agentic systems involved in high-stake decision-making under adversarial pressure need formal guarantees not offered by existing approaches. Motivated by the operational needs of security operations centers (SOCs) that must configure endpoint detection and response (EDR) policies under adversarial pressure, we present a tool-mediated architecture: LLM agents use deterministic tools (Stackelberg best-response, Bayesian observer updates, attack-graph primitives) and select from finite action catalogs enforced at the tool-output interface. A composite Lyapunov function machine-checked in Lean 4 with zero sorry certifies controllability, observability from asymmetric sensor data, and Input-to-State Stability (ISS) robustness under intelligent adversarial disturbance, with two corollaries extending the certificate to any controller or adversary from the catalogs. On 282 real enterprise attack graphs, the claims hold with margin. On paired offensive/defensive telemetry, a tool-mediated Claude Sonnet 4 controller reduces the attacker's expected payoff (game value) by 59% relative to a deterministic greedy baseline, with zero variance across 40 runs at four temperatures. A Claude Haiku 4.5 controller converges to suboptimal game values but stays catalog-bounded over an additional 40 runs, demonstrating that architectural stability is not dependent on the controller capability. The LLM agent's non-determinism furthers creative exploration of strategies, while the tool-mediated architecture ensures system stability.

The rapid evolution of autonomous, agentic artificial intelligence within financial services has introduced an existential architectural crisis: large language models (LLMs) are probabilistic, non-deterministic systems operating in domains that demand absolute, mathematically verifiable compliance guarantees. Existing guardrail solutions -- including NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails and Guardrails AI -- rely on probabilistic classifiers and syntactic validators that are fundamentally inadequate for enforcing complex multi-variable regulatory constraints mandated by the SEC, FINRA, and OCC. This paper presents the Lean-Agent Protocol, a formal-verification-based AI guardrail platform that leverages the Aristotle neural-symbolic model developed by Harmonic AI to auto-formalize institutional policies into Lean 4 code. Every proposed agentic action is treated as a mathematical conjecture: execution is permitted if and only if the Lean 4 kernel proves that the action satisfies pre-compiled regulatory axioms. This architecture provides cryptographic-level compliance certainty at microsecond latency, directly satisfying SEC Rule 15c3-5, OCC Bulletin 2011-12, FINRA Rule 3110, and CFPB explainability mandates. A three-phase implementation roadmap from shadow verification through enterprise-scale deployment is provided.

End-to-end weather forecasting systems produce skillful global gridded and station forecasts directly from raw Earth observations, replacing the numerical weather prediction pipeline, including data assimilation, at a fraction of its cost. These systems are deterministic and issue no uncertainty. Here we render the Aardvark Weather model probabilistic by attaching one stochastic mechanism to each component: learned, input-dependent noise at the observation encoder, capturing aleatoric uncertainty inherited from the observing system, and Monte Carlo dropout in the processor, capturing epistemic uncertainty in the learned dynamics. The resulting nested ensemble attributes forecast spread to the two sources through a law-of-total-variance decomposition, cross-checked by withholding observation streams. Probabilistic finetuning significantly improves the mean forecast, by 4.2% on average across variables and lead times. The ensemble is calibrated against ERA5 through the medium range (spread-skill ratio 0.98), keeps station RMSE within 2.4% of the deterministic model while beating it in CRPS at every lead time, and trails the operational ECMWF ensemble. The encoder branch behaves as observation-driven uncertainty. Component-attributed uncertainty makes end-to-end forecasts more transparent, a step toward observation-driven digital twins of the atmosphere.

The rapid deployment of AI systems in high-stakes domains, including those classified as high-risk under the The EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), has intensified the need for reliable compliance auditing. For binary classifiers, regulatory risk assessment often relies on global fairness metrics such as the Disparate Impact ratio, widely used to evaluate potential discrimination. In typical auditing settings, the auditee provides a subset of its dataset to an auditor, while a supervisory authority may verify whether this subset is representative of the full underlying distribution. In this work, we investigate to what extent a malicious auditee can construct a fairness-compliant yet representative-looking sample from a non-compliant original distribution, thereby creating an illusion of fairness. We formalize this problem as a constrained distributional projection task and introduce mathematically grounded manipulation strategies based on entropic and optimal transport projections. These constructions characterize the minimal distributional shift required to satisfy fairness constraints. To counter such attacks, we formalize representativeness through distributional distance based statistical tests and systematically evaluate their ability to detect manipulated samples. Our analysis highlights the conditions under which fairness manipulation can remain statistically undetected and provides practical guidelines for strengthening supervisory verification. We validate our theoretical findings through experiments on standard tabular datasets for bias detection. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/ValentinLafargue/Inspection.

In Agentic AI, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in the orchestration layer to coordinate multiple agents and to interact with external services, retrieval components, and shared memory. In this setting, failures are not limited to incorrect final outputs. They also arise from long-horizon interaction, stochastic decisions, and external side effects (such as API calls, database writes, and message sends). Common failures include non-termination, role drift, propagation of unsupported claims, and attacks via untrusted context or external channels. This paper presents an assurance framework for such Agentic AI systems. Executions are instrumented as Message-Action Traces (MAT) with explicit step and trace contracts. Contracts provide machine-checkable verdicts, localize the first violating step, and support deterministic replay. The framework includes stress testing, formulated as a budgeted counterexample search over bounded perturbations. It also supports structured fault injection at service, retrieval, and memory boundaries to assess containment under realistic operational faults and degraded conditions. Finally, governance is treated as a runtime component, enforcing per-agent capability limits and action mediation (allow, rewrite, block) at the language-to-action boundary. To support comparative evaluations across stochastic seeds, models, and orchestration configurations, the paper defines trace-based metrics for task success, termination reliability, contract compliance, factuality indicators, containment rate, and governance outcome distributions. More broadly, the framework is intended as a common abstraction to support testing and evaluation of multi-agent LLM systems, and to facilitate reproducible comparison across orchestration designs and configurations.

A self-evolving agent retires its bad skills by watching them fail, so what happens when the judge cannot see the failures? Skill retirement is the structural constraint that keeps a growing library from drifting below the no-skill baseline, but its guarantee assumes an unbiased reward, which is false for the LLM judges that reference-free tasks force upon us. We show that a biased judge does not merely add noise; it silently switches off the curator. We make this precise with a corrupted-reward analysis and, isolating the causal channel by injecting corruption on top of a deterministic reward, a behavioral study on a reference-free report-writing testbed with a code-generation cross-check. Symmetric noise leaves retirement intact, but false-pass bias (failures slipping through as passes) disables contribution-based retirement past a sharp threshold that no amount of data can cross. Separating genuine retirement from cap-eviction churn shows this mechanism failure is universal, holding across domains and failure rates and sparing only near-zero-false-pass, verifier-like graders. The downstream outcome, though, is regime-dependent: eval quality degrades only where the same corruption also starves skill synthesis, and otherwise holds steady, so the disabled curator is silent, surfacing in no aggregate metric. The contribution is a behavioral safety result, not a performance one. A cheap defect-injection audit then tells an operator, before deployment, which side of the threshold their judge occupies.

AI agents are increasingly deployed in shared environments where they pursue diverse goals and compete for rewards. This multi-agent competition can lead to behaviors that serve individual gains at collective cost -- for instance, marketing agents may post misleading content as a result of competing for engagement on social media. Human societies address such problems through norms that constrain acceptable behavior, supported by enforcement mechanisms that detect and penalize violations. Motivated by this, we study norm enforcement mechanisms for language model agents. We find that simple enforcement mechanisms are exploited by misaligned agents for competitive advantage, even when they are not explicitly trained or prompted to do so. We thus turn our attention to designing more robust mechanisms, and identify two key ingredients: estimating each agent's reliability over time, and updating this estimate with escalating penalties for repeated misbehavior. Across three simulated environments and a variety of agent populations, mechanisms built on these principles resist exploitation, while still penalizing norm violations at comparable or lower cost than baselines. Our results position norm enforcement mechanisms as scalable levers for shaping agents' behavior, but only when designed to anticipate becoming part of the system they govern. Our code and data are available at https://yaowenye.com/norm-enforcement.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, introduces critical risks to safety, security, and privacy. These agents may deviate from user objectives, violate data handling policies, or be compromised by adversarial attacks. Mitigating these dangers necessitates a mechanism to formally guarantee that an agent's actions adhere to predefined safety constraints, a challenge that existing systems do not fully address. We introduce VeriGuard, a novel framework that provides formal safety guarantees for LLM-based agents through a dual-stage architecture designed for robust and verifiable correctness. The initial offline stage involves a comprehensive validation process. It begins by clarifying user intent to establish precise safety specifications. VeriGuard then synthesizes a behavioral policy and subjects it to both testing and formal verification to prove its compliance with these specifications. This iterative process refines the policy until it is deemed correct. Subsequently, the second stage provides online action monitoring, where VeriGuard operates as a runtime monitor to validate each proposed agent action against the pre-verified policy before execution. This separation of the exhaustive offline validation from the lightweight online monitoring allows formal guarantees to be practically applied, providing a robust safeguard that substantially improves the trustworthiness of LLM agents.

Ensuring safety in Reinforcement Learning (RL), typically framed as a Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP), is crucial for real-world exploration applications. Current approaches in handling CMDP struggle to balance optimality and feasibility, as direct optimization methods cannot ensure state-wise in-training safety, and projection-based methods correct actions inefficiently through lengthy iterations. To address these challenges, we propose Adaptive Chance-constrained Safeguards (ACS), an adaptive, model-free safe RL algorithm using the safety recovery rate as a surrogate chance constraint to iteratively ensure safety during exploration and after achieving convergence. Theoretical analysis indicates that the relaxed probabilistic constraint sufficiently guarantees forward invariance to the safe set. And extensive experiments conducted on both simulated and real-world safety-critical tasks demonstrate its effectiveness in enforcing safety (nearly zero-violation) while preserving optimality (+23.8%), robustness, and fast response in stochastic real-world settings.

Modernizing legacy COBOL systems remains difficult due to scarce expertise, large and long-lived codebases, and strict correctness requirements. Recent large language model (LLM)-based modernization systems increasingly rely on agentic workflows in which the model controls multi-step tool execution. However, it remains unclear whether delegating execution control to the LLM improves correctness, robustness, or efficiency in structured software engineering workflows. We present a controlled empirical study of deterministic and LLM-controlled orchestration for COBOL-to-Python modernization. Using a unified experimental framework, we hold the language models, prompts, tools, configurations, and source programs constant while varying only the execution control strategy. This isolates orchestration as the sole experimental variable. We evaluate both approaches using functional correctness, robustness across repeated stochastic runs, and computational efficiency. Across multiple models, deterministic orchestration achieves comparable computational accuracy to LLM-controlled orchestration while improving worst-case robustness and reducing performance variability across runs. Deterministic execution also reduces token consumption by up to 3.5x, leading to substantially lower operational cost. These results suggest that, in structured modernization workflows with explicit validation stages, fixed execution policies provide more stable and cost-efficient behavior than fully agentic orchestration without reducing translation quality.

Activation steering is a promising technique for controlling LLM behavior by adding semantically meaningful vectors directly into a model's hidden states during inference. It is often framed as a precise, interpretable, and potentially safer alternative to fine-tuning. We demonstrate the opposite: steering systematically breaks model alignment safeguards, making it comply with harmful requests. Through extensive experiments on different model families, we show that even steering in a random direction can increase the probability of harmful compliance from 0% to 2-27%. Alarmingly, steering benign features from a sparse autoencoder (SAE), a common source of interpretable directions, increases these rates by a further 2-4%. Finally, we show that combining 20 randomly sampled vectors that jailbreak a single prompt creates a universal attack, significantly increasing harmful compliance on unseen requests. These results challenge the paradigm of safety through interpretability, showing that precise control over model internals does not guarantee precise control over model behavior.

Deterministic pre-execution safety gates evaluate whether individual agent actions are compatible with their assigned roles. While effective at per-action authorization, these systems are structurally blind to distributed attacks that decompose harmful intent across multiple individually-compliant steps. This paper introduces Session Risk Memory (SRM), a lightweight deterministic module that extends stateless execution gates with trajectory-level authorization. SRM maintains a compact semantic centroid representing the evolving behavioral profile of an agent session and accumulates a risk signal through exponential moving average over baseline-subtracted gate outputs. It operates on the same semantic vector representation as the underlying gate, requiring no additional model components, training, or probabilistic inference. We evaluate SRM on a multi-turn benchmark of 80 sessions containing slow-burn exfiltration, gradual privilege escalation, and compliance drift scenarios. Results show that ILION+SRM achieves F1 = 1.0000 with 0% false positive rate, compared to stateless ILION at F1 = 0.9756 with 5% FPR, while maintaining 100% detection rate for both systems. Critically, SRM eliminates all false positives with a per-turn overhead under 250 microseconds. The framework introduces a conceptual distinction between spatial authorization consistency (evaluated per action) and temporal authorization consistency (evaluated over trajectory), providing a principled basis for session-level safety in agentic systems.

While Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) is effective for deterministically checkable tasks, many vision-language tasks are partially verifiable, demanding multi-criteria supervision (e.g., perceptual details, reasoning steps, and constraints). Rubrics provide a natural interface for this fine-grained supervision, but their effectiveness depends on the execution accuracy during online RL. We propose Reinforcement Learning with Robust Rubric Rewards (RLR^3), extending RLVR from task-level verification to criterion-level verification. RLR^3 routes instance-specific rubrics through two execution paths: an LLM-as-an-extractor paired with a deterministic verifier, or an LLM-as-a-Judge for non-verifiable criteria. To ensure faithful scoring, RLR^3 introduce a minimal exposure strategy that masks ground truths from extractors and images from judges. Furthermore, RLR^3 employs hierarchical aggregation to prioritize essential criteria over additional criteria, and mitigates score saturation within rollout groups. Evaluated on Qwen3-VL-30B-A3B across 15 benchmarks, RLR^3 consistently outperforms RLVR, yielding a 4.7-point improvement over the base model and exceeding the official instruct-to-thinking model gap. Controlled audits confirm our deterministic verification and minimal exposure significantly reduce exploitable false positives.

We provide the first formal definition of reward hacking, a phenomenon where optimizing an imperfect proxy reward function leads to poor performance according to the true reward function. We say that a proxy is unhackable if increasing the expected proxy return can never decrease the expected true return. Intuitively, it might be possible to create an unhackable proxy by leaving some terms out of the reward function (making it "narrower") or overlooking fine-grained distinctions between roughly equivalent outcomes, but we show this is usually not the case. A key insight is that the linearity of reward (in state-action visit counts) makes unhackability a very strong condition. In particular, for the set of all stochastic policies, two reward functions can only be unhackable if one of them is constant. We thus turn our attention to deterministic policies and finite sets of stochastic policies, where non-trivial unhackable pairs always exist, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of simplifications, an important special case of unhackability. Our results reveal a tension between using reward functions to specify narrow tasks and aligning AI systems with human values.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

Natural-language software requirements are often ambiguous, inconsistent, and underspecified; in safety-critical domains, these defects propagate into formal models that verify the wrong specification and into implementations that ship unsafe behavior. We show that large language models, equipped with an SMT solver, can audit such requirements: translating them into formal logic, detecting ambiguity through stochastic variation in the generated formalization, and exposing inconsistency, vacuousness, and safety violations through solver queries on the resulting specification. We present VERIMED, a neurosymbolic pipeline that operationalizes this idea for medical-device software requirements, and report two findings. First, stochastic variation across independent formalizations is a signal of ambiguity: requirements that admit multiple plausible interpretations produce SMT-inequivalent formalizations, and bidirectional SMT equivalence checking turns this disagreement into a solver-checkable test. Second, the usefulness of symbolic feedback depends on its granularity: in counterexample-guided repair on a hemodialysis question-answering benchmark, concrete SMT counterexamples raise verified accuracy from 55.4% to 98.5%. Over an extensive experimental evaluation on open-source hemodialysis safety requirements, we show that the LLM-based approach in VERIMED successfully reduces ambiguity-sensitive requirements and enables rigorous auditing of software requirements through SMT-based queries.

As autonomous agentic systems scale across regulated critical infrastructures, the lack of mechanistic, hardware-rooted enforcement for high-frequency policy updates presents a fundamental safety gap. We introduce Ethical Hyper-Velocity (EHV), a novel architectural framework for the formal verification of AI governance policies at runtime. Unlike retrospective auditing frameworks (ISO/IEC 42001, NIST AI RMF) which introduce 14-30 day latencies, EHV relocates the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) into the inference pipeline via a Governance-Aware Just-In-Time (JIT) Compiler. By integrating Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs) for policy synchronization and Epoch-based Attestation Caching within Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), EHV achieves Sub-millisecond Formal Determinism (SMFD). We demonstrate via TLA+ formal verification that non-compliant agentic actions are computationally unreachable within the system's bounded operating state space. We prove that O(1) runtime enforcement can eliminate the traditional trade-off between deployment velocity and governance integrity, reducing Governance Latency from O(days) to O(1).

An AI scientist should not grade its own homework. Yet in the systems we examined, the agent that reviews the work usually comes from the same model family as the agent that produced it, or at least from the same vendor. Model evaluators are known to favour their own generations. Whether models trained alike also share blind spots is a conjecture, not a settled finding, but if they do, the reviewer inherits the author's. The record of what was flagged and what was waved through often sits in platform logs that nobody outside can replay. We present CrossAudit, a protocol for supervising autonomous research pipelines. It rests on three commitments. Each increment of work is audited by an agent from a different vendor against a rulebook a human wrote and versioned. Reports, verdicts, disputes and rulings are git commits, so the supervision history can be re-read and cited; raw model exchanges are not yet part of that record. Scripted checks run before any model does. Advisory judgement never gates the pipeline: a model blocks only by citing a rule, and no model may waive a deterministic failure. Blockers that survive a bounded number of revision rounds go to a person. We state the protocol as eight invariants. We describe a reference implementation built from GitHub Actions and a few hundred lines of Python, and report a live deployment of a closely related variant in a computational-chemistry pipeline. We also ran a seeded-defect trial (30 increments, 43 seeded defects, one run per configuration). A cross-vendor audit of our own repository then voided its blinding. We adopt that audit's findings and report the corrected results. The trial shows that two vendors read the same rulebook differently. It does not show that either is better. The strongest evidence here is the committed, uncontrolled record of cross-vendor audits of this paper itself.

We propose RegLLM, a diagnostic harness for bounded autonomy in regulated agentic workflows. It instruments six trustworthiness signals: citation validity, source grounding, schema compliance, escalation correctness, constitutional alignment, and unsafe-action rate. Signals are distinguished by their source of supervision: programmatic verifiers, task-level escalation labels, or AI-judge scores. A deterministic runtime supervisor blocks ungrounded answers and forces escalation, logging interventions. The same domain constitution informs evaluation, training rewards, and serving guardrails. Task-level should-escalate labels make the act-versus-defer decision a measurable training signal. We demonstrate the harness at smoke scale. An offline reference run (n=12) lifts escalation recall from 0 to 0.67 and reduces unsafe-action rate from 0.33 to 0.08 when governance is enabled. Two single-GPU Qwen2.5-3B LoRA/DPO pilots (n=8, same seed and evaluation split) expose substantial variation: nominally identical RL-base configurations yield task success of 0.25 versus 0.12 and escalation recall of 1.0 versus 0.5. An answer-quality adapter changes recall from 1.0 to 0.5 in Run A, but from 0.5 to 1.0 in Run B. An escalation-aware variant produces no measurable change in Run B. These small pilots do not establish reliable adapter effects or production readiness. Their contribution is diagnostic: configuration variance can overwhelm apparent tuning effects on bounded-autonomy metrics, motivating larger evaluation sets and repeated runs.

Large language models are often adapted through parameter efficient fine tuning, but current release practices provide weak assurances about what data were used and how updates were computed. We present Verifiable Fine Tuning, a protocol and system that produces succinct zero knowledge proofs that a released model was obtained from a public initialization under a declared training program and an auditable dataset commitment. The approach combines five elements. First, commitments that bind data sources, preprocessing, licenses, and per epoch quota counters to a manifest. Second, a verifiable sampler that supports public replayable and private index hiding batch selection. Third, update circuits restricted to parameter efficient fine tuning that enforce AdamW style optimizer semantics and proof friendly approximations with explicit error budgets. Fourth, recursive aggregation that folds per step proofs into per epoch and end to end certificates with millisecond verification. Fifth, provenance binding and optional trusted execution property cards that attest code identity and constants. On English and bilingual instruction mixtures, the method maintains utility within tight budgets while achieving practical proof performance. Policy quotas are enforced with zero violations, and private sampling windows show no measurable index leakage. Federated experiments demonstrate that the system composes with probabilistic audits and bandwidth constraints. These results indicate that end to end verifiable fine tuning is feasible today for real parameter efficient pipelines, closing a critical trust gap for regulated and decentralized deployments.

LLM-based code review agents promise scalable, always-on review, yet current systems suffer from two intertwined weaknesses: (1) non-determinism--unbounded tool use makes review outcomes unstable, and (2) context locality--the reviewer's access remains bounded to the diff, capping discoverable issue depth. Both give rise to three challenges: misaligned context retrieval, a coherence-efficiency trade-off in multi-file pull requests, and hallucinated comments that erode trust. To address these, we introduce OpenCodeReview, built on deterministic engineering for uncertain agents: rather than granting maximal freedom, we inject determinism at three deliberate pipeline points. Rule-Guided Dispatch uses a multi-layer rule system to deterministically select files and review criteria, eliminating variability of agent-driven triage. Grounded File Review replaces free-form exploration with a curated tool set exposed through a ReAct loop, while file-level parallel SubAgents balance context coherence against efficiency and recover cross-file dependencies on demand. Independent Reflection introduces a falsification-first filter under an asymmetric information boundary--the reflector sees only the diff, not the agent's tool-augmented exploration--removing hallucinated comments without self-reinforcing bias, improving precision while preserving recall. On AACR-Bench (200 real-world PRs, 10 languages, 1,505 expert-verified comments), OpenCodeReview outperforms mainstream coding agents (e.g., Claude Code and Codex) across six LLM backends, achieving up to 2.17x higher SEM-F1 (25.10% vs. 11.57%) while consuming 5-15x fewer tokens. We open-source OpenCodeReview at https://github.com/alibaba/open-code-review.

Current approaches to AI compliance treat conformity as a binary, audit-time verdict rather than a continuous, measurable property of production systems. We argue that this compliance fiction is structurally ill-suited to the requirements of the EU AI Act, which demands ongoing human oversight and the detection of emergent behavioural drift in deployed systems. We introduce governance from metrics, a principle whereby regulatory compliance is derived as a continuous signal from runtime observability rather than from static assessments. Building on this principle, we present govllm, an open-source framework implementing a governance-driven routing architecture in which model selection is determined by accumulated compliance scores rather than by latency or cost alone. Central to our approach is a panel of regulatory judges - LLM evaluators specialised per criterion (EU AI Act, GDPR, ANSSI, accessibility) - whose inter-judge disagreement we reframe not as noise but as a regulatory uncertainty signal warranting human arbitration. We validate this approach through a ground truth corpus of 49 annotated prompt/response pairs across five regulatory criteria, evaluated by four small language models (SLMs, 1.7B-7B parameters) running fully on-premise. Agreement rates range from 51.5% (mistral:7b) to 69.1% (phi4-mini), with no single model dominating across all criteria - empirically motivating the Profile-as-jury design. We further document three structural failure modes in small regulatory judges and a judge-specific position bias that degrades agreement by up to 25 percentage points across three question-order conditions (original, reversed, permuted). govllm is released as open-source software to support reproducible AI governance research.

We develop a framework for non-asymptotic analysis of deterministic samplers used for diffusion generative modeling. Several recent works have analyzed stochastic samplers using tools like Girsanov's theorem and a chain rule variant of the interpolation argument. Unfortunately, these techniques give vacuous bounds when applied to deterministic samplers. We give a new operational interpretation for deterministic sampling by showing that one step along the probability flow ODE can be expressed as two steps: 1) a restoration step that runs gradient ascent on the conditional log-likelihood at some infinitesimally previous time, and 2) a degradation step that runs the forward process using noise pointing back towards the current iterate. This perspective allows us to extend denoising diffusion implicit models to general, non-linear forward processes. We then develop the first polynomial convergence bounds for these samplers under mild conditions on the data distribution.

Verifying claims about AI workloads is a prerequisite for credible AI governance of covert adversaries (who comply with monitoring only when detection likelihood is high), yet the apparent non-determinism of GPU floating-point arithmetic forces auditors to accept approximate output matches. Covert adversaries can exploit unverifiable degrees of freedom in monitored computation. Attack vectors include steganography, unreported modification of inference software, and covert computation via unreported batch elements. Empirically, we analyze how modern inference engines (vLLM, HF transformers) produce deterministic but non-invariant outputs, without needing to set performance-compromising determinism flags, if the right information is available for re-computation and no atomic functions are called in the backend. We demonstrate that such bitwise-precise re-computation does not require access to identical hardware, via a software-only emulation of LLM inference across multiple NVIDIA GPU variants. Thus, accumulated rounding errors can be an auditable signature of the software and hardware setup used for inference, instead of a constraint on verifiability.

While tool-augmented Large Language Models have significantly improved multi-step reasoning in quantitative STEM tasks, a critical residual failure mode remains: intermediate reasoning steps that are syntactically well-formed, mathematically executable, and unit-consistent, yet contextually ungrounded. Current approaches either rely on formal verifiers that cannot assess semantic intent, or burden Process Reward Models (PRMs) with the dual task of checking both arithmetic and logic. In this paper, we propose a neuro-symbolic framework that cleanly decouples reasoning into two formal dimensions: Symbolic Validity (V) and Semantic Groundedness (G). We guarantee V by construction using a deterministic symbolic verifier acting as a hard filter. To assess G, we train a PRM conditionally on the verifier-accepted manifold. To train this PRM efficiently, we introduce Counterfactual Symbolic Perturbation (CSP), a novel data synthesis strategy that algorithmically generates constraint-preserving hard negatives (steps that perfectly pass the verifier but are logically flawed). At inference, we deploy a verifier-first constrained search that guarantees execution consistency for verifier-covered operations while relying on the PRM solely to rank semantic grounding. By targeting the exact residual error class of strong tool-using LLMs, our method significantly improves reasoning reliability without the sprawling heuristics of prior frameworks.

Language-model agents are increasingly deployed under standing instructions: a system prompt, a policy file, or a skills document is placed in context, and the agent is trusted to let that document govern every action that follows. Existing benchmarks rarely test this deployment pattern directly; they measure whether an agent can complete a task, not whether a long, binding policy document constrains its behavior over an extended tool-use horizon. We present HANDBOOK_md, a benchmark of 65 agentic tasks modeled on how employees follow company handbooks. Each task places an agent in a self-contained company environment (a file workspace with mock email, chat, calendar, issue-tracking, and commerce services exposed over the Model Context Protocol) and instructs it to carry out routine professional work governed by an expert-written standard operating procedure of 20-124 pages. Tasks span five domains (finance, medical billing, insurance, logistics, and HR) and 10 fictional companies. To resist memorization, every task modifies one of 10 base handbooks, altering the specific rules and thresholds on which grading depends, so no two tasks share the same set of policies. Grading is fully deterministic: each task carries a rubric of programmatic criteria (824 in total) that check both that required actions occurred and that prohibited actions did not. Under strict grading, where a trial passes only if every criterion is satisfied, the strongest evaluated model passes 36.2% of trials, and most frontier models remain below 25%. Failures follow consistent patterns: agents let a plausible but unauthorized in-environment request override the standing policy, perform a required check and then act against its result, lose rule details over long horizons, and report compliance they did not achieve. We release the tasks, environments, and evaluation harness.

Schema-guided reasoning pipelines ask LLMs to produce explicit intermediate structures -- rubrics, checklists, verification queries -- before committing to a final decision. But do these structures causally determine the output, or merely accompany it? We introduce a causal evaluation protocol that makes this directly measurable: by selecting tasks where a deterministic function maps intermediate structures to decisions, every controlled edit implies a unique correct output. Across eight models and three benchmarks, models appear self-consistent with their own intermediate structures but fail to update predictions after intervention in up to 60% of cases -- revealing that apparent faithfulness is fragile once the intermediate structure changes. When derivation of the final decision from the structure is delegated to an external tool, this fragility largely disappears; however, prompts which ask to prioritize the intermediate structure over the original input do not materially close the gap. Overall, intermediate structures in schema-guided pipelines function as influential context rather than stable causal mediators.

Safety claims on self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, or a README commitment. We describe falsifiable release gates, and a methodology to build and validate such systems, such that every new capability must pass a pre-specified, machine-verifiable acceptance suite before it ships, and a fixed set of standing invariants is preserved at each gate. I think we applied the method in the Antahkarana, an open runtime, via seven gates from basic observability into a self governing loop that suggests changes to its own policy. no action goes to an effector without a safety-critical property capability token minted by a control ring is exhaustively machine-checked over the one million recorded reachable state space of a bounded model and re-checked against execution traces. A purposely broken model gives the shortest counterexample, so the checker has teeth, is apparent. The self-enhancement loop is positively Constrained: the entire write surface is policy rules, tightening changes. may auto-apply loosening changes always require a human merge and a proposal autoclosed is one that mispredicts its own effect; We publish the acceptance measured results for all the seven gates, define precisely the scope of each claim (a bounded of the coordination skeleton (not the learned components) and free the runtime, either command line tools and the gate suite, so the results reproduce, and gates can run against other agent frameworks. Reviewers may repeat the single command central non-bypass in seconds.

AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We introduce a benchmark for measuring model propensity for instrumental convergence (IC) behaviour in terminal-based agents. This is behaviour such as self-preservation that has been hypothesised to play a key role in risks from highly capable AI agents. Our benchmark is realistic and low-stakes which serves to reduce evaluation-awareness and roleplay confounds. The suite contains seven operational tasks, each with an official workflow and a policy-violating shortcut. An eight-variant shared framework varies monitoring, instruction clarity, stakes, permission, instrumental usefulness and blocked honest paths to support inferences regarding the factors driving IC behaviour. We evaluated ten models using deterministic environment-state scorers over 1,680 samples, with trace review employed for audit and adjudication purposes. The final IC rate is 86 out of 1,680 samples (5.1%). IC behaviour is concentrated rather than uniform: two Gemini models account for 66.3% of IC cases and three tasks account for 84.9%. Conditions in which IC behaviour is indispensable for task success result in the greatest increase in the adjusted IC rate (+15.7 percentage points), whereas emphasising that task success is critical or certain framing choices do not produce comparable effects. Our findings indicate that realistic, low-nudge environments elicit IC behaviour rarely but systematically in most tested models. We conclude that it is feasible to robustly measure tendencies for dangerous behaviour in current frontier AI agents.

Deterministic neural networks (NNs) are increasingly being deployed in safety critical domains, where calibrated, robust, and efficient measures of uncertainty are crucial. In this paper, we propose a novel method for training non-Bayesian NNs to estimate a continuous target as well as its associated evidence in order to learn both aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. We accomplish this by placing evidential priors over the original Gaussian likelihood function and training the NN to infer the hyperparameters of the evidential distribution. We additionally impose priors during training such that the model is regularized when its predicted evidence is not aligned with the correct output. Our method does not rely on sampling during inference or on out-of-distribution (OOD) examples for training, thus enabling efficient and scalable uncertainty learning. We demonstrate learning well-calibrated measures of uncertainty on various benchmarks, scaling to complex computer vision tasks, as well as robustness to adversarial and OOD test samples.

The design of safety-critical agents based on large language models (LLMs) requires more than simple prompt engineering. This paper presents a comprehensive information-theoretic analysis of how rule encodings in system prompts influence attention mechanisms and compliance behaviour. We demonstrate that rule formats with low syntactic entropy and highly concentrated anchors reduce attention entropy and improve pointer fidelity, but reveal a fundamental trade-off between anchor redundancy and attention entropy that previous work failed to recognize. Through formal analysis of multiple attention architectures including causal, bidirectional, local sparse, kernelized, and cross-attention mechanisms, we establish bounds on pointer fidelity and show how anchor placement strategies must account for competing fidelity and entropy objectives. Combining these insights with a dynamic rule verification architecture, we provide a formal proof that hot reloading of verified rule sets increases the asymptotic probability of compliant outputs. These findings underscore the necessity of principled anchor design and dual enforcement mechanisms to protect LLM-based agents against prompt injection attacks while maintaining compliance in evolving domains.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards is typically performed on-policy, keeping training data close to the current policy but limiting learning to trajectories that the policy can discover itself. Off-policy methods such as supervised fine-tuning, on the other hand, can leverage external knowledge beyond the base model's capabilities, but may suffer from large distribution shift. The key challenge is thus to expand exploration without sacrificing learnability. In this work, we introduce Minimal Intervention Reinforcement Learning (MInTRL), which expands the exploration frontier through sparse, local interventions in otherwise on-policy rollouts. During generation, a judge-intervention policy periodically reviews the current policy's output, replaces erroneous suffixes with short corrections, and immediately returns control to the policy. During training, MInTRL adopts a sequence-level advantage-regression objective that eliminates the need for importance sampling. We show that sparse, local interventions can substantially improve coverage beyond finite-budget on-policy sampling while preserving the overall on-policy nature of the resulting trajectories. Across math and code benchmarks, MInTRL consistently outperforms standard on-policy and off-policy baselines. Ablations show that MInTRL remains effective with self-intervention and across different judge policies, while performance peaks at moderate intervention intensity, highlighting the importance of intervening minimally. These results establish minimal intervention as an effective paradigm for enhancing on-policy RL.

Ensuring the safety of LLM-generated content is essential for real-world deployment. Most existing guardrail models formulate moderation as a fixed binary classification task, implicitly assuming a fixed definition of harmfulness. In practice, enforcement strictness - how conservatively harmfulness is defined and enforced - varies across platforms and evolves over time, making binary moderators brittle under shifting requirements. We first introduce FlexBench, a strictness-adaptive LLM moderation benchmark that enables controlled evaluation under multiple strictness regimes. Experiments on FlexBench reveal substantial cross-strictness inconsistency in existing moderators: models that perform well under one regime can degrade substantially under others, limiting their practical usability. To address this, we propose FlexGuard, an LLM-based moderator that outputs a calibrated continuous risk score reflecting risk severity and supports strictness-specific decisions via thresholding. We train FlexGuard via risk-alignment optimization to improve score-severity consistency and provide practical threshold selection strategies to adapt to target strictness at deployment. Experiments on FlexBench and public benchmarks demonstrate that FlexGuard achieves higher moderation accuracy and substantially improved robustness under varying strictness. We release the source code and data to support reproducibility.

We introduce Minary, a computational framework designed as a candidate for the first formally provable autopoietic primitive. Minary represents interacting probabilistic events as multi-dimensional vectors and combines them via linear superposition rather than multiplicative scalar operations, thereby preserving uncertainty and enabling constructive and destructive interference in the range [-1,1]. A fixed set of ``perspectives'' evaluates ``semantic dimensions'' according to hidden competencies, and their interactions drive two discrete-time stochastic processes. We model this system as an iterated random affine map and use the theory of iterated random functions to prove that it converges in distribution to a unique stationary law; we moreover obtain an explicit closed form for the limiting expectation in terms of row, column, and global averages of the competency matrix. We then derive exact formulas for the mean and variance of the normalized consensus conditioned on the activation of a given semantic dimension, revealing how consensus depends on competency structure rather than raw input signals. Finally, we argue that Minary is organizationally closed yet operationally open in the sense of Maturana and Varela, and we discuss implications for building self-maintaining, distributed, and parallelizable computational systems that house a uniquely subjective notion of identity.

A framework that persists execution state so a run can be interrupted, survive a crash, and continue must decide what a resume means for effects that already happened. Five widely deployed agent workflow frameworks answer differently, none exposes a machine-checkable contract, and measured behavior violates even the fragments they state. The RESUME CONTRACT states six properties over the persistence API (prefix continuation, effect exactly-once, fork determinism, checkpoint validity, consume-once, recovery determinism), plus fork-intent and liveness obligations. A TLA+ model checks a reference semantics exhaustively, unchanged at scaled bounds (7.4 million states), and the reference conjunction is additionally TLAPS-proved unbounded (196 obligations); a 39-cell fault matrix and two companion modules yield the separating models independence requires. A deterministic, LLM-free harness measures them at pinned releases. LangGraph 1.2.9 durably records a second resume value and never consults it, persists schema-invalid state silently, and re-executes durably recorded work after a real SIGKILL: exactly-once across interrupts, at-least-once across crashes, on one API. CrewAI 1.15.2 re-executes completed effect-bearing methods against its written claim; pydantic-graph 1.x cannot resume after a mid-node crash; no two probed frameworks share a conformance profile. Consume-once holds sequentially and fails under concurrent delivery: k processes resuming one parked interrupt fire the gated effect k times, saturation 1.0 in 36 of 40 cells, and the failure crosses hosts. REMIT, a reference sequencer whose Verus-verified recovery core is line-identical to the shipped executable, repairs the fork and validity cells. The cross-process cell is repaired at the read path: an opt-in gate claims consumption in the shared store, serving one racer and refusing the rest before any node executes.

AI agents powered by large language models are evolving from isolated assistants into heterogeneous systems in which multiple agents, planners, tools, and execution backends operate over shared environments. In such settings, safety becomes a system-level action-governance problem: deciding whether a pending action should be committed given policy-relevant state accumulated across a session. Existing safeguards operate at fragmented boundaries, making it difficult to enforce shared policies over composed action flows across heterogeneous execution paths. We present OpenAgentFlow, a control-plane/action-plane architecture that establishes the action-commit boundary as a shared enforcement interface. GUI, API, tool, and LLM-generated actions are normalized into a common AgentEvent stream and mediated by a shared pre-execution Policy Enforcement Point, while provenance, session state, audit evidence, and updatable policies are maintained outside individual agents. This provides a common governance layer across incompatible executors and allows new policies to take effect without modifying agents, prompts, models, or execution paths. We evaluate OpenAgentFlow through complementary system evaluations spanning controlled action-flow tests, a public external benchmark, policy updates, and real Android execution. On a 300-case controlled suite, OpenAgentFlow achieves 94.00% accuracy and a 95.35% attack-block rate. On the complete 1,220-case AgentDojo-Traj split of TS-Bench, it achieves 97.62% accuracy, 96.59% unsafe-action recall, and a 1.96% safe false-intervention rate. New control-plane rules take effect without modifying protected agents, and the same enforcement path operates across live GUI, API/tool, and LLM-planned Android execution. These results show that a shared action-commit boundary provides a practical basis for system-wide governance across heterogeneous agent execution paths.

Fairness in algorithmic decision-making is often framed in terms of individual fairness, which requires that similar individuals receive similar outcomes. A system violates individual fairness if there exists a pair of inputs differing only in protected attributes (such as race or gender) that lead to significantly different outcomes-for example, one favorable and the other unfavorable. While this notion highlights isolated instances of unfairness, it fails to capture broader patterns of systematic or clustered discrimination that may affect entire subgroups. We introduce and motivate the concept of discrimination clustering, a generalization of individual fairness violations. Rather than detecting single counterfactual disparities, we seek to uncover regions of the input space where small perturbations in protected features lead to k-significantly distinct clusters of outcomes. That is, for a given input, we identify a local neighborhood-differing only in protected attributes-whose members' outputs separate into many distinct clusters. These clusters reveal significant arbitrariness in treatment solely based on protected attributes that help expose patterns of algorithmic bias that elude pairwise fairness checks. We present HyFair, a hybrid technique that combines formal symbolic analysis (via SMT and MILP solvers) to certify individual fairness with randomized search to discover discriminatory clusters. This combination enables both formal guarantees-when no counterexamples exist-and the detection of severe violations that are computationally challenging for symbolic methods alone. Given a set of inputs exhibiting high k-unfairness, we introduce a novel explanation method to generate interpretable, decision-tree-style artifacts. Our experiments demonstrate that HyFair outperforms state-of-the-art fairness verification and local explanation methods.

Autonomous improvement loops are hard to trust because the improvement process is usually external scaffolding bolted onto the agent: failures go unlogged, diagnoses cannot be replayed, and promote-or-discard decisions land in a side database rather than the agent's own history. We show that an event-sourced agent runtime removes that friction and turns controlled improvement into a first-class workflow. When the agent's state is a deterministic projection of an append-only event log, failures are recorded, a run replays exactly from its log, candidate patches scope to typed pipeline seams, gates are auditable, and every promotion or discard is itself an event. We demonstrate this with Regimes, a loop on the ActiveGraph runtime that diagnoses failed evaluations, proposes a repair at a pipeline point, and promotes it only after static checks, sandbox execution, in-sample evaluation, and held-out validation. The loop is target-agnostic: the same control flow runs against different tasks through a common interface. On LongMemEval-S the dominant failure is not retrieval but reconciliation: the evidence is already in the assembled context, yet the reader answers incorrectly. Across five seeded held-out splits, Regimes discovers reader-prompt repairs that improve final held-out accuracy by +0.05 to +0.10 in four splits and +0.01 in one over-promotion split; two splits are individually significant (seed 5 unadjusted for its sequential promotion structure), and the pooled count is descriptive only, since the splits share one 500-question pool. The durable contributions are ActiveGraph as an auditable substrate that makes controlled improvement loops tractable, the held-out-gated loop it supports, the failure-regime taxonomy routing each failure to a pipeline location (whose marginal value over an unrouted baseline is the primary open question), and the prompt-as-discovery-probe hypothesis.

Large language model (LLM) agents now execute long, tool-using tasks where final outcome checks can arrive too late for intervention. Online warning requires lightweight prefix monitors over heterogeneous traces, but hand-authored event schemas are brittle and deployment-time LLM judging is costly. We introduce PrefixGuard, a trace-to-monitor framework with an offline StepView induction step followed by supervised monitor training. StepView induces deterministic typed-step adapters from raw trace samples, and the monitor learns an event abstraction and prefix-risk scorer from terminal outcomes. Across WebArena, τ^2-Bench, SkillsBench, and TerminalBench, the strongest PrefixGuard monitors reach 0.900/0.710/0.533/0.557 AUPRC. Using the strongest backend within each representation, they improve over raw-text controls by an average of +0.137 AUPRC. LLM judges remain substantially weaker under the same prefix-warning protocol. We also derive an observability ceiling on score-based area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) that separates monitor error from failures lacking evidence in the observed prefix. For finite-state audit, post-hoc deterministic finite automaton (DFA) extraction remains compact on WebArena and τ^2-Bench (29 and 20 states) but expands to 151 and 187 states on SkillsBench and TerminalBench. Finally, first-alert diagnostics show that strong ranking does not imply deployment utility: WebArena ranks well yet fails to support low-false-alarm alerts, whereas τ^2-Bench and TerminalBench retain more actionable early alerts. Together, these results position PrefixGuard as a practical monitor-synthesis recipe with explicit diagnostics for when prefix warnings translate into actionable interventions.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) strengthens LLM reasoning, but training often oscillates between {entropy collapse} and {entropy explosion}. We trace both hazards to the mean baseline used in value-free RL (e.g., GRPO and DAPO), which improperly penalizes negative-advantage samples under reward outliers. We propose {Quantile Advantage Estimation} (QAE), replacing the mean with a group-wise K-quantile baseline. QAE induces a response-level, two-regime gate: on hard queries (p <= 1 - K) it reinforces rare successes, while on easy queries (p > 1 - K) it targets remaining failures. Under first-order softmax updates, we prove {two-sided entropy safety}, giving lower and upper bounds on one-step entropy change that curb explosion and prevent collapse. Empirically, this minimal modification stabilizes entropy, sparsifies credit assignment (with tuned K, roughly 80% of responses receive zero advantage), and yields sustained pass@1 gains on Qwen3-8B/14B-Base across AIME 2024/2025 and AMC 2023. These results identify {baseline design} -- rather than token-level heuristics -- as the primary mechanism for scaling RLVR.

Tool-augmented LLM agents call APIs whose intermediate outputs, such as presigned URLs, session tokens, and OAuth state parameters, are observation contracts: artifacts whose later use is constrained by the external system that produced them. We show that observation contract compliance (preserving the temporal validity and byte-level integrity) is an emergent, regression-prone capability: it is neither guaranteed by general tool-use ability nor consistently improved by larger or newer models. To measure this, we introduce ContractBench, a benchmark of 33 dual-axis tasks that probe two orthogonal failure modes no existing benchmark evaluates: validity failures (using an artifact after expiry) and integrity failures (corrupting an artifact's bytes through the observation-to-action pipeline). Our evaluation is deterministic and programmatic, with a virtual clock controlling time and SHA-256 hashes verifying byte integrity. We assign each outcome a failure label drawn from real-world API specifications. We evaluate 38 models and report four findings: (i) no evaluated model clears 80%, with Claude-Opus-4.6 leading at 77.8%, revealing that current frontier models still fail to comply with observation contracts; (ii) a sharp within-family capability cliff in Qwen 3.5 between 4B (0%) and 9B (56.6%), smoothing to 70.7% at 397B-A17B: what emerges across the cliff is mid-trajectory restraint, not tool-call competence; (iii) non-monotonic scaling across the GPT-5 family: agentic post-training can erode compliance through sycophancy-driven regression; (iv) our failure taxonomy works as an actionable in-context reward signal, yielding +7.1 pp on 42 paired GPT-5.1 failures.

LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) promise scalable collaboration, yet adding agents often reduces reliability. This position paper argues that many MAS failures are fundamentally concurrency control problems: agents concurrently read and write shared state, and long LLM inference windows amplify the risk of stale reads, lost updates, and inconsistent outcomes. Failure modes commonly attributed to coordination or communication breakdowns can be mapped directly onto classical concurrency anomalies. We contend that MAS frameworks should address these failures through explicit concurrency control mechanisms: conflict detection, isolation guarantees, and structured access to shared resources. Concurrency control should be a first-class design concern, not an afterthought.

Tool-using agents make consequential changes to external state, yet correct outcomes do not guarantee that their actions were supported by evidence established beforehand. We study where this evidence-to-action chain breaks as agents move from deciding whether to act to executing single actions and dependent workflows. Across ten model-harness configurations, strong static action assessment can coexist with much weaker interactive execution. Failures often begin before execution: agents stop with incomplete investigation or act before required evidence is established. Once required evidence is obtained, single-action execution is usually reliable, while multi-action workflows additionally expose unresolved prerequisites and incomplete execution. For this analysis, we introduce SafeActBench, comprising 656 cases across six operational domains and five protocols that progress from static action judgment and investigated non-action to single- and multi-action workflows. A provenance-bound Evidence Ledger and deterministic trajectory evaluator track what information was established, when actions occurred, and whether downstream dependencies were satisfied. These results show that failures arise not only from missing information, but also from how agents use established evidence when deciding and executing actions.

LLM agents increasingly perform autonomous actions through external tools, leading to complex and evolving safety risks. However, existing safety testing targets expert-designed safety violations, and the corresponding outcomes are evaluated by hard-coded rules, making them costly to extend as agents evolve. To this end, we present Vera, an end-to-end automated safety testing framework that instantiates software engineering testing principles for non-deterministic agents through a three-stage, self-reinforcing pipeline. First, a literature-driven exploration continuously discovers and structures emerging risks into taxonomies of safety risks, attack methods, and tool execution environments. Second, combinatorial composition across taxonomy dimensions produces executable safety cases, each specifying a concrete safety goal, a programmatically constructed initial state, and a deterministic verification predicate grounded in observable artifacts. Third, adaptive execution runs heterogeneous agents in isolated sandboxes where a control agent steers multi-turn interaction based on runtime observations, while evidence-grounded verifiers judge outcomes from environment state and tool-call evidence rather than model self-report. We evaluate Vera on four production agent frameworks (OpenClaw, Hermes, Codex, Claude Code), revealing substantial safety weaknesses, with average attack success rates reaching 93.9\% under multi-channel attacks; we also release Vera-Bench, comprising 1600 executable safety cases spanning 124 risk categories across three execution settings. These results indicate that modular, executable testing infrastructure is essential for rigorous and maintainable safety evaluation of rapidly evolving agentic systems at scale. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/Yunhao-Feng/Vera.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

We study a governed approach to enterprise analytics: a language model interprets the question, while deterministic policy selects and runs a pre-approved analytical program that returns both results and evidence. We show that this restriction can remain expressive within a defined analytical class, using relational operations plus aggregation, comparison, windows, ranking, and similarity. Fixed meaning, policy, data, and execution rules also make results replayable. Across 440 runs, three 8B models generated SQL and selected tools at runtime, while Qwen3-8B interpreted intent only and policy executed the approved program. None of 330 runtime-planning episodes matched the full answer-and-evidence contract across all test datasets; the policy-executed analyzer matched 110 of 110. This is a configuration-specific result, not evidence that runtime agents cannot succeed under other designs.

In this work, we study first-order algorithms for solving Bilevel Optimization (BO) where the objective functions are smooth but possibly nonconvex in both levels and the variables are restricted to closed convex sets. As a first step, we study the landscape of BO through the lens of penalty methods, in which the upper- and lower-level objectives are combined in a weighted sum with penalty parameter sigma > 0. In particular, we establish a strong connection between the penalty function and the hyper-objective by explicitly characterizing the conditions under which the values and derivatives of the two must be O(sigma)-close. A by-product of our analysis is the explicit formula for the gradient of hyper-objective when the lower-level problem has multiple solutions under minimal conditions, which could be of independent interest. Next, viewing the penalty formulation as O(sigma)-approximation of the original BO, we propose first-order algorithms that find an epsilon-stationary solution by optimizing the penalty formulation with sigma = O(epsilon). When the perturbed lower-level problem uniformly satisfies the small-error proximal error-bound (EB) condition, we propose a first-order algorithm that converges to an epsilon-stationary point of the penalty function, using in total O(epsilon^{-3}) and O(epsilon^{-7}) accesses to first-order (stochastic) gradient oracles when the oracle is deterministic and oracles are noisy, respectively. Under an additional assumption on stochastic oracles, we show that the algorithm can be implemented in a fully {\it single-loop} manner, i.e., with O(1) samples per iteration, and achieves the improved oracle-complexity of O(epsilon^{-3}) and O(epsilon^{-5}), respectively.

Despite rapid progress in LLM agents, performance on long-horizon, tool-using tasks remains fragile. To better understand this fragility, we ask a simple question: do all actions contribute equally to failure? Analyzing execution traces on τ-Bench (Airline/Retail) and SWE-Bench Verified, we decompose trajectories into mutating (environment-changing) vs.\ non-mutating steps and formalize decisive deviations, earliest action, level divergences that flip success to failure. A logistic regression reveals that each additional deviation in a mutating action reduces the odds of success by upto 92% on Airline and upto 96% on Retail for SoTA models. In contrast, deviations in non-mutating actions have little to no effect. Errors also grow with context length as agents drift from role and act on stale constraints. Motivated by these observations, we introduce , a model-agnostic, gradient-free, test-time safeguard that (i) adds mutation-gated verification, (ii) injects Targeted Reflection before mutating steps, and (iii) performs block-based context cleaning. delivers consistent gains, e.g., Qwen3-Thinking: +28\% relative on Airline, +11\% on Retail, and +7\% on SWE-Bench Verified; Claude: +9\%/+7\%. We further identify ceiling effects in τ-Bench, where annotation errors and underspecified tasks artificially cap model performance. To address this, we release τ-Bench Verified, which restores benchmark headroom through targeted revisions. Our results argue for action-level analysis, targeted safeguards, and reliable evaluations as prerequisites for robust multi-turn agents.

Existing long-horizon agent benchmarks often emphasize final task success while providing limited assessment of intermediate execution validity. Yet real-world business operations require agents to navigate extensive, potentially outdated or conflicting policies while satisfying critical constraints throughout execution. These requirements are particularly consequential in high-stakes domains such as payments, where intermediate violations can incur financial losses or regulatory consequences regardless of the final outcome. To bridge this evaluation gap, we introduce BizBench, a multi-turn benchmark grounded in real-world procedures from a leading payments company. Its executable environment integrates 789 knowledge documents and 601 discoverable business tools, with consistent policies, states, and tool behavior. The benchmark comprises 50 tasks involving resource constraints, temporal dependencies, prior commitments, and conflicting or outdated guidance. Each task is validated through reference execution, while deterministic checks assess both goal attainment and execution validity without prescribing a single solution path. Experiments reveal substantial limitations even among frontier models: Claude Opus 5 and GPT-6 Sol achieve strict success rates of only 64.0% and 61.3%, respectively. For Qwen3.8-27B, goal attainment reaches 42.0%, but strict success drops to 32.7%, demonstrating how outcome-based evaluation can mask invalid execution. Beyond success rates, DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash averages 191.3 tool calls per run, approximately 70% more than reference executions, revealing substantial execution overhead. Overall, BizBench establishes a testbed for evaluating and advancing long-horizon agents beyond task completion, toward reliable and constraint-compliant execution in complex business environments.

Reinforcement learning algorithms are commonly analyzed (and designed) under the Markov assumption. This is unrealistic, as most environments encountered in practice are either partially observable, or require function approximation that restricts the agent to access non-Markovian state features. We consider the problem of learning an optimal reactive policy in a finite environment with deterministic observations (or equivalently, hard state aggregation). We introduce a new algorithm, Committed Q-learning, and prove almost-sure convergence to the optimal reactive policy under an intuitive assumption we call rewire-robustness. This assumption is strictly weaker than the q_star-realizability condition used in prior work. Our algorithm is a variant of classical Q-learning in which the behavior policy commits to a single action upon entering a feature, and only resamples actions when the observed feature changes. A crucial part of our analysis is the introduction of quasi-Markov environments.

Even a few action perturbations can substantially degrade the performance of a deployed decision policy. Certifying the resulting return loss is challenging in stochastic environments, where returns vary even without an attack. We introduce FoSeRL, a framework for certifying deployed RL policies against precommitted, temporally sparse action attacks. The deployed policy is unchanged, with no smoothing or retraining. Certification requires a resettable simulator supporting shared randomness and independent one-step successor queries, but no analytical dynamics model. FoSeRL certifies that an attacked episode loses no more than a prescribed amount of return relative to the same episode unattacked, with at least a target probability and at a user-specified confidence level. Both runs share the initial state and randomness, so the measured loss reflects the attack, not the episode; carrying the running return gap as a state coordinate makes it the terminal value, reducing trajectory-level certification to terminal safety. Time-dependent barrier conditions on the augmented state bound the terminal failure probability: satisfied exactly, they certify every admissible precommitted attack; learned from sampled trajectories and verified on held-out data, they certify the same guarantee under a specified attack-episode setting. Across six stochastic continuous-control environments and three RL policy families (TD3, SAC, and PPO), FoSeRL certifies non-trivial cardinality--magnitude robustness frontiers, achieves substantially larger certified budgets than policy smoothing, and reveals marked robustness differences among policies with comparable nominal performance.

Enterprise large language model (LLM) applications often begin as prototypes whose behavior is carried by prompts and retrieval context. Productization adds requirements for source boundaries, entity routing, answer contracts, and reproducible traces. We present a harness-engineering approach that reconstructs this pattern into a traceable, auditable LLM-agent architecture: deterministic behavior moves into code, manifests, schemas, and validation artifacts around a replaceable composition boundary, while source-backed claims remain the authority for runtime answers. We instantiate it on a public-data slice of five Korean corporate groups (25 listed companies) and evaluate three research questions. (1) The harness preserves its source-grounding, entity-routing, trace, output-hygiene, and recommendation-language contracts across the fixed validation scenarios; a fault-injection control confirms the validators flag deliberately broken contracts. (2) The checks the harness enforces held under model substitution: across three hosted models, they passed on all 270 composition-boundary runs; failures were confined to the model-composed side and were caught and recorded. (3) The code-owned guarantees are load-bearing, not reproducible by prompting alone: holding the model fixed and varying only the enforcement layer, prompt instructions alone let recommendation-language and internal-trace-leakage violations reach the reader, which the harness blocks entirely. A bolt-on external guardrail prevents such violations too but over-refuses, dropping utility to 88/120 where the harness preserves full utility (120/120); in this ablation, only code-owned enforcement preserves both safety and utility. The result is a reusable engineering pattern for turning exploratory prototypes into auditable applications with versioned source, control, and validation artifacts.

Banking assistants must use account-specific information to answer requests and, in many cases, take actions through tools. Evaluating only the final response misses important errors. An assistant may ask for information it already has, rely on stale context, select the wrong account, or write an invalid value after stating the correct one. We introduce IndicBankBench, a 799-case benchmark for Indian retail banking spanning five operational domains, a capability/refusal domain, and twenty primary axes. Cases are evaluated at four stages: safety, action and tool use, response adequacy, and advisory quality. Tool use and most safety checks are deterministic. A narrow resolver handles only ambiguous confirmation-before-write cases, while a separate LLM judge evaluates semantic response adequacy. We run every case three times and report strict pass^3, which requires success on all trials. Across the eleven evaluated models, strict reliability ranges from 43.7% to 58.2%, whereas at-least-once success ranges from 60% to 74%. This gap shows that at-least-once success can overstate dependable banking behavior. The case-level diagnostics also distinguish systems that ask unnecessary questions from those that act but fail to reconcile customer context or fully resolve the request. We release the cases, mock environment, and evaluation harness.

High-Level Synthesis leverages loop unrolling and array partitioning, but scheduling concurrent accesses is challenging when indices contain non-affine arithmetic. Conventional polyhedral frameworks systematically over-approximate these non-linear transformations, forcing conservative serialization that degrades performance. To minimize this bottleneck, we present a spatial verification framework operating at the LLVM Intermediate Representation (IR) level. By extracting flat arithmetic expressions from "getelementptr" instructions, it models memory banks as polymorphic spatial predicates to handle non-affine terms. Structural safety is enforced via a Conflict-Free Unrolling condition using Separation Logic's separating conjunction; concurrent operations targeting the same bank trigger an automatic spatial contradiction. This disjointness requirement is reduced to a matrix of pairwise inequalities over immutable Static Single Assignment (SSA) variables for a Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) oracle. To guarantee safety against undecidable non-linear arithmetic, we implement a deterministic sequential fallback. Finally, a theorem of soundness bridges algebraic SMT verification with Register Transfer Level trace safety, ensuring physical hardware immune to structural memory collisions.

Guardrails are a critical safety layer for modern AI systems, but their operating regime is changing. As LLMs are deployed as customized assistants, safety policies are increasingly specified at inference time by users, organizations, or regulatory contexts. This makes safety enforcement fundamentally dynamic: the guardrail should adapt to changing safety policies without retraining. Yet this requirement creates a fundamental tension: faithfully judging complex policy contexts demands reasoning capability, while practical deployment requires low-latency responses. We introduce Latent Policy Guardrail (LPG), a guardrail framework that learnssemantic latent deliberation over dynamic policies. LPG compresses the internal deliberation needed for intent interpretation and policy grounding into continuous states supervised by decision-relevant semantics. At inference time, it generates only a compact verdict anchored to the violated policy clauses, preserving auditability while avoiding the latency of explicit reasoning. Across policy guardrail benchmarks, LPG-4B reaches 84.5% average safety accuracy and 77.9% F1 by compressing deliberation into just 10 latent tokens, outperforming the strongest dynamic baseline while running roughly 11 times faster than Qwen3-4B-Thinking under the single-sample evaluation setup. Code and data are available at https://github.com/SaFo-Lab/Latent_Policy_Guard.

The high cost of fine-tuning LLMs poses a significant economic barrier; pre-hoc performance prediction offers a critical solution to substantially reduce this expense. However, the theoretical limits of pre-hoc performance prediction remain unexplored. We formulate it as a stochastic estimation problem under information constraints, decomposing prediction risk into two components: an intrinsic limit (static data-model compatibility) and a reducible optimization variance. We prove that optimization variance admits a necessary lower bound on its decay rate, implying fundamental constraints on how quickly uncertainty dissipates, regardless of the predictor used. Based on these dynamics, we derive a budget-optimal probing principle and introduce a predictability phase diagram that organizes tasks into three distinct regimes: Static-Sufficient, Dynamic-Critical, and Noise-Dominant. Extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world benchmarks validate these theoretical regimes and demonstrate the efficiency of our probing strategy.

Reasoning models can remain capable of solving a task while still defaulting to cheaper but misleading shortcuts. This creates a central oversight problem: when a model gives an answer with plausible but incomplete reasoning, can an overseer determine whether that output should be trusted? To study this problem, we introduce PyINE, a framework for scalable elicitation and oversight using instrumented Python programs as a verifiable execution substrate. In PyINE, programs define task environments, execution traces provide authoritative labels for outcomes and intermediate facts, and task variants can be generated mechanically rather than through static human annotation. We instantiate the framework in PyINE-v1, a first release built from nearly one million deterministic execution traces and over 500,000 matched LLM-generated code variants used for counterfactual evaluation. Using standard RL with verifiable rewards on cue-varied tasks, we train a shortcut-following model that improves substantially at predicting execution outcomes while still making systematic errors when misleading human-facing cues conflict with the program's realized behavior. We then evaluate activation probes, trained text classifiers, prompted judges, and a lightweight debate protocol as overseers of this model. We find that performance pooled at the dataset level can hide weak coverage of the failures that matter most: cheap learned overseers often miss rare shortcut-driven errors, while stronger model-based checks are more balanced but substantially costlier and harder to turn into reliable thresholded decisions. PyINE-v1 turns this failure-mode coverage problem into a reusable experimental setting for developing oversight methods that are verifiable, failure-mode-aware, and cost-sensitive.

We study how runtime enforcement against unsafe actions affects end-to-end task performance in multi-step tool using large language model (LLM) agents. Using tau-bench across Airline and Retail domains, we compare baseline Tool-Calling, planning-integrated (TRIAD), and policy-mediated (TRIAD-SAFETY) architectures with GPT-OSS-20B and GLM-4-9B. We identify model dependent interaction horizons (15 to 30 turns) and decompose outcomes into overall success rate (SR), safe success rate (SSR), and unsafe success rate (USR). Our results reveal a persistent Safety Capability Gap. While safety mediation can intercept up to 94 percent of non-compliant actions, it rarely translates into strictly safe goal attainment (SSR below 5 percent in most settings). We find that high unsafe success rates are primarily driven by Integrity Leaks, where models hallucinate user identifiers to bypass mandatory authentication. Recovery rates following blocked actions are consistently low, ranging from 21 percent for GPT-OSS-20B in simpler procedural tasks to near zero in complex Retail scenarios. These results demonstrate that runtime enforcement imposes a significant verifier tax on conversational length and compute cost without guaranteeing safe completion, highlighting the critical need for agents capable of grounded identity verification and post-intervention reasoning.

When an LLM agent reads a confidential file, then writes a summary, then emails it externally, no single step is unsafe, but the sequence is a data leak. We call this safety drift: individually safe actions compounding into violations. Prior work has measured this problem; we predict it. SafetyDrift models agent safety trajectories as absorbing Markov chains, computing the probability that a trajectory will reach a violation within a given number of steps via closed form absorption analysis. A consequence of the monotonic state design is that every agent will eventually violate safety if left unsupervised (absorption probability 1.0 from all states), making the practical question not if but when, and motivating our focus on finite horizon prediction. Across 357 traces spanning 40 realistic tasks in four categories, we discover that "points of no return" are sharply task dependent: in communication tasks, agents that reach even a mild risk state have an 85% chance of violating safety within five steps, while in technical tasks the probability stays below 5% from any state. A lightweight monitor built on these models detects 94.7% of violations with 3.7 steps of advance warning at negligible computational cost, outperforming both keyword matching (44.7% detection, 55.9% false positive rate) and per step LLM judges (52.6% detection, 38.2% false positive rate) while running over 60,000x faster.

We present DEF (\ul{D}iffusion-augmented \ul{E}nsemble \ul{F}orecasting), a novel approach for generating initial condition perturbations. Modern approaches to initial condition perturbations are primarily designed for numerical weather prediction (NWP) solvers, limiting their applicability in the rapidly growing field of machine learning for weather prediction. Consequently, stochastic models in this domain are often developed on a case-by-case basis. We demonstrate that a simple conditional diffusion model can (1) generate meaningful structured perturbations, (2) be applied iteratively, and (3) utilize a guidance term to intuitivey control the level of perturbation. This method enables the transformation of any deterministic neural forecasting system into a stochastic one. With our stochastic extended systems, we show that the model accumulates less error over long-term forecasts while producing meaningful forecast distributions. We validate our approach on the 5.625^circ ERA5 reanalysis dataset, which comprises atmospheric and surface variables over a discretized global grid, spanning from the 1960s to the present. On this dataset, our method demonstrates improved predictive performance along with reasonable spread estimates.

Accurate prediction of extreme weather events remains a major challenge for artificial intelligence-based weather prediction systems. While deterministic models such as FuXi, GraphCast, and SFNO have achieved competitive forecast skill relative to numerical weather prediction, their ability to represent uncertainty and capture extremes is still limited. This study investigates how state-of-the-art deterministic artificial intelligence-based models respond to initial-condition perturbations and evaluates the resulting ensembles in forecasting extremes. Using four perturbation strategies (Gaussian, Perlin noise, Hemispheric Centered Bred Vectors, and Huge Ensembles), we generate 50 member ensembles for the August 2022 Pakistan floods and China heatwave, and complement these case studies with a global threshold-based evaluation. Ensemble skill is assessed against ERA5 and compared with IFS ENS and the AIFS ENS probabilistic model using deterministic and probabilistic metrics. Results show that simpler perturbations like Gaussian and Perlin noise produce similarly realistic ensemble spread and probabilistic skill as flow-based approaches like HCBV and HENS, narrowing but not closing the performance gap with numerical weather prediction ensembles, or native probabilistic models which retain the highest probabilistic skill across variables. Model choice is the dominant factor for ensemble performance, not perturbation method. Across variables, models capture temperature extremes more effectively than precipitation. These findings demonstrate that simple input perturbations can extend deterministic models toward probabilistic forecasting in hardware-constrained settings, supporting artificial intelligence-driven early warning systems.

AI systems are increasingly deployed in real-world settings where their behavior is shaped by dynamic environments, evolving data distributions, and complex interactions with users and infrastructure. Traditional machine learning evaluation focuses on benchmarks and operates within sandboxed environments, providing only a limited view of the true system behavior in the wild. We argue for the development of principled auditing frameworks that monitor deployed AI systems throughout their lifecycle. We further propose framing auditing as a statistical problem of monitoring constraint violations under uncertainty, where desired properties (e.g., fairness and safety) are treated as risk-controlled constraints that must be continuously evaluated as systems evolve through iterative feedback. This perspective highlights the need for uncertainty-aware monitoring methods, socio-technical specifications of audit criteria, and auditing infrastructures that enable ongoing oversight of AI systems in the wild.

We study the right to be forgotten (GDPR Art. 17) for large language models and frame unlearning as a reproducible systems problem. Our approach treats training as a deterministic program and logs a minimal per-microbatch record (ordered ID hash, RNG seed, learning-rate value, optimizer-step counter, and accumulation boundary). Under a pinned stack and deterministic kernels, replaying the training tail while filtering only the forget closure yields the same parameters as training on the retain set (bit-identical in the training dtype) when preconditions hold. To meet latency and availability constraints, we add complementary paths: (i) exact reverts of recent steps via micro-checkpoints or dense per-step deltas, (ii) cohort-scoped adapter deletion when the base is frozen, and (iii) a curvature-guided anti-update followed by a short retain-tune, audit-gated with escalation to exact replay. We report storage/latency budgets and a toy artifact validating mechanics; in a controlled run that satisfies the preconditions we demonstrate byte-identical equality of model and optimizer states.

Trader-facing dynamic fees are increasingly proposed for automated market makers (AMMs), but historical data do not identify how order flow would respond: trader-facing fees do not vary, trader types are latent, and a replayed tape is not a sequential decision environment. We therefore construct a minimal closed-loop simulator in which the missing signal exists by construction: two constant-product pools repriced by an equilibrium-inspired dynamic-fee rule, fee-sensitive noise flow, and closed-form CEX--AMM arbitrage. Equilibrium is used as a closure principle, not as an object the trader learns. Against a tuned benchmark ladder of schedule, planning, lookahead, and tabular policies, a small DQN is the only evaluated valid policy whose paired improvement over tuned one-step routing excludes zero. On a reserved final block of 1{,}000 seeds with completion forced to 1.0 for every policy, it reduces implementation shortfall under every tested intra-step ordering, by 13.3bps of order notional under the pre-specified agent-last ordering, and the edge is concentrated in, and learned from, dynamic-fee environments: under constant fees the paired difference is indistinguishable from zero. The result is model-conditioned counterfactual evidence about execution control in AMMs, not evidence about historical traders, equilibrium play, or deployable profit.

Agents built on LLMs are increasingly deployed across diverse domains, automating complex decision-making and task execution. However, their autonomy introduces safety risks, including security vulnerabilities, legal violations, and unintended harmful actions. Existing mitigation methods, such as model-based safeguards and early enforcement strategies, fall short in robustness, interpretability, and adaptability. To address these challenges, we propose AgentSpec, a lightweight domain-specific language for specifying and enforcing runtime constraints on LLM agents. With AgentSpec, users define structured rules that incorporate triggers, predicates, and enforcement mechanisms, ensuring agents operate within predefined safety boundaries. We implement AgentSpec across multiple domains, including code execution, embodied agents, and autonomous driving, demonstrating its adaptability and effectiveness. Our evaluation shows that AgentSpec successfully prevents unsafe executions in over 90% of code agent cases, eliminates all hazardous actions in embodied agent tasks, and enforces 100% compliance by autonomous vehicles (AVs). Despite its strong safety guarantees, AgentSpec remains computationally lightweight, with overheads in milliseconds. By combining interpretability, modularity, and efficiency, AgentSpec provides a practical and scalable solution for enforcing LLM agent safety across diverse applications. We also automate the generation of rules using LLMs and assess their effectiveness. Our evaluation shows that the rules generated by OpenAI o1 achieve a precision of 95.56% and recall of 70.96% for embodied agents, successfully identify 87.26% of the risky code, and prevent AVs from breaking laws in 5 out of 8 scenarios.

Guard models support the safe deployment of language model agents, but fixed risk taxonomies limit their ability to accommodate requirements that vary across applications and tasks. Under user-defined policies, detecting violations requires interpreting both the applicable rules and the agent's behavior, since identical actions can receive different judgments under different policies. To support learning this capability, we introduce AdaptiveSafety, a dataset of 10,939 training examples and 1,000 test examples covering policies with 1--100 rules. The dataset combines trajectories from multiple sources with policy and behavioral counterfactuals, pairing each example with an explanation and the complete set of violated rules. These counterfactuals expose changes that alter compliance, while structural augmentations provide supervision for consistency under rule reordering and identifier remapping. Building on this supervision, we propose SafePO, a reinforcement learning algorithm for refining violation identification while balancing explanatory reasoning and final verdicts. SafePO uses structured rewards to assess prediction correctness, retains group-relative advantages at the response level, and employs a separately trained value model to modulate token weights within explanation and verdict regions. Separate normalization controls their relative contribution to training despite differences in length. Through supervised initialization followed by SafePO, we develop AdaGuard, a family of 0.6B, 4B, and 8B guard models that assess agent trajectories under policies supplied at inference time. Our 4B model achieves binary accuracies of 89.30\% on AdaptiveSafety and 71.82\% on DynaBench. The project repository is available at https://github.com/Yunhao-Feng/AdaGuard

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has recently emerged as a powerful technique for improving image and video generation in Diffusion and Flow Matching models, specifically for enhancing output quality and alignment with prompts. A critical step for applying online RL methods on Flow Matching is the introduction of stochasticity into the deterministic framework, commonly realized by Stochastic Differential Equation (SDE). Our investigation reveals a significant drawback to this approach: SDE-based sampling introduces pronounced noise artifacts in the generated images, which we found to be detrimental to the reward learning process. A rigorous theoretical analysis traces the origin of this noise to an excess of stochasticity injected during inference. To address this, we draw inspiration from Denoising Diffusion Implicit Models (DDIM) to reformulate the sampling process. Our proposed method, Coefficients-Preserving Sampling (CPS), eliminates these noise artifacts. This leads to more accurate reward modeling, ultimately enabling faster and more stable convergence for reinforcement learning-based optimizers like Flow-GRPO and Dance-GRPO. Code will be released at https://github.com/IamCreateAI/FlowCPS

Tool-using language-model agents often execute actions that their domain policies forbid. We present LeanGuard, a runtime that checks every proposed tool call against a policy written in Lean4 before the call reaches the environment. Policies combine state predicates with scoped past-time temporal operators over the execution history, evaluation is fail-closed, and the decision procedure is proved equivalent to a LeanLTL semantics. A denied call can be corrected in two ways. With feedback, the agent receives the violated rule and a hint; with proof-guided repair, Lean metaprogramming searches for a nearby call that preserves the user's intent and proves that the policy admits it, without the model. On Tau-Bench with five Qwen models (0.8B-27B), unguarded agents execute at least 33 calls that the Lean policy forbids, while LeanGuard executes none; with feedback, task success does not change significantly. On DTap, LeanGuard reduces direct prompt-injection success from 57.9% to 5.9%, and in telecom, where benign tasks need no writes, benign success is unchanged. Feedback reduces repeated blocked calls and raises task success for four of five models over a bare denial. On replayed denials, repair proves an admissible edit for 88 of 252 denials caused by argument values, in a median of 2,ms.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Large language models perform near-Bayesian inference yet violate permutation invariance on exchangeable data. We resolve this by showing transformers minimize expected conditional description length (cross-entropy) over orderings, E_pi[ell(Y mid Gamma_pi(X))], which admits a Kolmogorov-complexity interpretation up to additive constants, rather than the permutation-invariant description length ell(Y mid X). This makes them Bayesian in expectation, not in realization. We derive (i) a Quantified Martingale Violation bound showing order-induced deviations scale as O(log n) with constants; (ii) the Expectation-level Decompression Law linking information budgets to reliability for Bernoulli predicates; and (iii) deployable planners (B2T/RoH/ISR) for answer/abstain decisions. Empirically, permutation dispersion follows a+bln n (Qwen2-7B b approx 0.377, Llama-3.1-8B b approx 0.147); permutation mixtures improve ground-truth likelihood/accuracy; and randomized dose-response shows hallucinations drop by sim 0.13 per additional nat. A pre-specified audit with a fixed ISR=1.0 achieves near-0\% hallucinations via calibrated refusal at 24\% abstention. The framework turns hallucinations into predictable compression failures and enables principled information budgeting.

Catastrophic regime shifts in complex natural systems may be averted through advanced detection. Recent work has provided a proof-of-principle that many systems approaching a catastrophic transition may be identified through the lens of early warning indicators such as rising variance or increased return times. Despite widespread appreciation of the difficulties and uncertainty involved in such forecasts, proposed methods hardly ever characterize their expected error rates. Without the benefits of replicates, controls, or hindsight, applications of these approaches must quantify how reliable different indicators are in avoiding false alarms, and how sensitive they are to missing subtle warning signs. We propose a model based approach in order to quantify this trade-off between reliability and sensitivity and allow comparisons between different indicators. We show these error rates can be quite severe for common indicators even under favorable assumptions, and also illustrate how a model-based indicator can improve this performance. We demonstrate how the performance of an early warning indicator varies in different data sets, and suggest that uncertainty quantification become a more central part of early warning predictions.

Interactive LLM agents are becoming part of daily work, but they do not reliably become easier to work with over time: a correction remembered in one session may still be violated in the next. We study this gap between preference access and preference compliance. In tasks derived from anonymized real-user friction cases, Mem0 memory still leaves 57.5% of applicable preference checks violated. We introduce Test-time Rule Acquisition and Compiled Enforcement (TRACE), a drop-in skill-layer pipeline for coding-agent runtimes that mines user corrections, rewrites them as atomic rules, and compiles them into runtime checks that must pass before an agent completes future tasks. Unlike runtime checks written ahead of time by developers, TRACE skills come from the user's own chat corrections. We evaluate TRACE with simulated user-in-the-loop experiments on ClawArena coding-agent tasks and MemoryArena-derived memory-intensive tasks. On ClawArena, TRACE reduces held-out preference violation from 100.0% to 37.6% on in-distribution tasks and from 100.0% to 2.0% on out-of-distribution tasks. On MemoryArena-derived tasks, TRACE reduces in-distribution violation from 100.0% to 60.5% while matching or exceeding the strongest memory baseline on task pass. These results suggest that compiling corrections into runtime enforcement can address a repeated-friction failure mode that memory alone does not reliably solve, reducing the need for users to restate the same correction across future sessions. Experiment code is available at https://github.com/YujunZhou/TRACE_exp, and the deployable skill is available at https://github.com/YujunZhou/tellonce.

LLM agents increasingly act as autonomous merchants that write their own product listings, and under competitive pressure, they fabricate attributes to win sales. Even under instructions to be honest, they fabricate attributes in a majority of listings across models. A platform's obvious remedy---verifying each claim against the truth---is unavailable, because it observes only a noisy, biased complaint signal, never the ground truth. We design CARP, a reputation-penalty mechanism with a deadband that forgives complaint noise and a state-dependent severity that counters reputation-driven detection erosion. CARP requires no product-level ground truth and is robust to strategic gaming. CARP protects consumers by suppressing the sales volume of low-rated liars while sparing honest sellers. Paired with SPARC, it closes most of the consumer-welfare gap relative to a perfect-information oracle, without ever accessing the truth. It also achieves the best welfare of the policies we compare. We further show that this felt penalty becomes behaviorally binding through SPARC, a byte-clean code-gated reflection mechanism: LLM merchants fabricate when lying is free but restrain themselves when fabrication costs them sales, a self-interested response rather than compliance. We trace this distinction to penalty-gated self-correction reasoning, and observe the binding across models, with supporting confidence intervals.

LLM agents operating in open environments face escalating risks from indirect prompt injection, particularly within the tool stream where manipulated metadata and runtime feedback hijack execution flow. Existing defenses encounter a critical dilemma as advanced models prioritize injected rules due to strict alignment while static protection mechanisms sever the feedback loop required for adaptive reasoning. To reconcile this conflict, we propose VIGIL, a framework that shifts the paradigm from restrictive isolation to a verify-before-commit protocol. By facilitating speculative hypothesis generation and enforcing safety through intent-grounded verification, VIGIL preserves reasoning flexibility while ensuring robust control. We further introduce SIREN, a benchmark comprising 959 tool stream injection cases designed to simulate pervasive threats characterized by dynamic dependencies. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VIGIL outperforms state-of-the-art dynamic defenses by reducing the attack success rate by over 22\% while more than doubling the utility under attack compared to static baselines, thereby achieving an optimal balance between security and utility.

We address the problem of runtime trajectory anomaly detection, a critical capability for enabling trustworthy LLM agents. Current safety measures predominantly focus on static input/output filtering. However, we argue that ensuring LLM agents reliability requires auditing the intermediate execution process. In this work, we formulate the task of Trajectory Anomaly Detection. The goal is not merely detection, but precise error localization. This capability is essential for enabling efficient rollback-and-retry. To achieve this, we construct TrajBench, a dataset synthesized via a perturb-and-complete strategy to cover diverse procedural anomalies. Using this benchmark, we investigate the capability of models in process supervision. We observe that general-purpose LLMs, even with zero-shot prompting, struggle to identify and localize these anomalies. This reveals that generalized capabilities do not automatically translate to process reliability. To address this, we propose TrajAD, a specialized verifier trained with fine-grained process supervision. Our approach outperforms baselines, demonstrating that specialized supervision is essential for building trustworthy agents.

LLM-based agents are deployed in safety-critical applications, yet current guardrail systems fail to prevent violations of temporal safety policies, requirements that govern the ordering and sequencing of agent actions. For instance, agents may access sensitive data before authenticating users or process refunds to unauthorized payment methods, violations that require reasoning about sequences of action rather than an individual action. Existing guardrails rely on imprecise natural language instructions or post-hoc monitoring, and provide no formal guarantees that agents will satisfy temporal constraints. We present Agent-C, a novel framework that provides run-time guarantees ensuring LLM agents adhere to formal temporal safety properties. Agent-C introduces a domain-specific language for expressing temporal properties (e.g., authenticate before accessing data), translates specifications to first-order logic, and uses SMT solving to detect non-compliant agent actions during token generation. When the LLM attempts to generate a non-compliant tool call, Agent-C leverages constrained generation techniques to ensure that every action generated by the LLM complies with the specification, and to generate a compliant alternative to a non-compliant agent action. We evaluate Agent-C across two real-world applications: retail customer service and airline ticket reservation system, and multiple language models (open and closed-source). Our results demonstrate that Agent-C achieves perfect safety (100% conformance, 0% harm), while improving task utility compared to state-of-the-art guardrails and unrestricted agents. On SoTA closed-source models, Agent-C improves conformance (77.4% to 100% for Claude Sonnet 4.5 and 83.7% to 100% for GPT-5), while simultaneously increasing utility (71.8% to 75.2% and 66.1% to 70.6%, respectively), representing a new SoTA frontier for reliable agentic reasoning.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) succeeds in reasoning tasks (e.g., math and code) by checking the final verifiable answer (i.e., a verifiable dot signal). However, extending this paradigm to open-ended generation is challenging because there is no unambiguous ground truth. Relying on single-dot supervision often leads to inefficiency and reward hacking. To address these issues, we propose reinforcement learning with verifiable reference-based rewards (RLVRR). Instead of checking the final answer, RLVRR extracts an ordered linguistic signal from high-quality references (i.e, reward chain). Specifically, RLVRR decomposes rewards into two dimensions: content, which preserves deterministic core concepts (e.g., keywords), and style, which evaluates adherence to stylistic properties through LLM-based verification. In this way, RLVRR combines the exploratory strength of RL with the efficiency and reliability of supervised fine-tuning (SFT). Extensive experiments on more than 10 benchmarks with Qwen and Llama models confirm the advantages of our approach. RLVRR (1) substantially outperforms SFT trained with ten times more data and advanced reward models, (2) unifies the training of structured reasoning and open-ended generation, and (3) generalizes more effectively while preserving output diversity. These results establish RLVRR as a principled and efficient path toward verifiable reinforcement learning for general-purpose LLM alignment. We release our code and data at https://github.com/YJiangcm/RLVRR.

Tool-using LLM agents fail through trajectories rather than only final responses, as they may execute unsafe tool calls, follow injected instructions, comply with harmful requests, or over-refuse benign tasks despite producing a seemingly safe answer. Existing safety-alignment signals are largely response-level or off-policy, and often incur a safety-utility trade-off: improving agent safety comes at the cost of degraded task performance. Such sparse and single-objective rewards severely limit real-world usability. To bridge this gap, we propose FATE, an on-policy self-evolving framework that transforms verifier-scored failures into repair supervision without expert demonstrations. For each failure, the same policy proposes repair candidates, which are then re-scored by verifiers and filtered across security, utility, over-refusal control, and trajectory validity. This dense trajectory-level information is then used as a supervision signal for agent self-evolution. During this process, we further introduce Pareto-Front Policy Optimization (PFPO), combining supervised warmup with Pareto-aware policy optimization to preserve safety-utility trade-offs. Experiments on AgentDojo, AgentHarm, and ATBench show that FATE improves safety across different models and scales while preserving useful behavior. Compared with strong baselines, FATE reduces attack success rate by 33.5%, harmful compliance by 82.6%, and improves external trajectory-safety diagnosis by 6.5%. These results suggest that failed trajectories can provide structured repair supervision for safer self-evolving agents.

AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems. The dominant approach places controls inside the agent's own runtime: system prompts, output filters, and guardrail libraries. Any control in the agent's address space is reachable by inputs that influence it; this generalizes to any AI system with sufficient reach into its own runtime, a class we term escapable AI systems. We identify four properties that an authorization mechanism must satisfy for architectural control rather than for cooperative requests: process separation, pre-action enforcement on a structurally only path, fail-closed at both the request and system levels, and externalized signed evidence verifiable outside the controlled system's trust boundary. We position this layer as execution-time AI alignment, complementing training-time alignment (RLHF, Constitutional AI) and inference-time alignment. We present the Unfireable Safety Kernel, a Rust reference implementation realizing all four. Its fail-closed invariant is machine-checked at two levels: an SMT theorem (Z3) and an exhaustive bounded-model-checking proof of the production decision function (Kani, 4/4 harnesses). A Python-to-Rust migration was gated on byte-equivalence (1000/1000 fixtures; 17/17 adversarial classes). We evaluate the kernel governing a live, escapable AI system, a deterministic, self-improving world model, against an escape-seeking adversary driving its real self-modification seam: across 1,000 self-modifications, all 704 attempts on the safety-critical core are refused, with no escape; a further 300, under the operator kill switch, are also refused. A separate campaign of 6,240 authorization round-trips had no successful bypass. Against 3 contemporary systems claiming the agent control plane, the agent invokes control; here, it lacks that choice.

A key challenge in the field of reinforcement learning is to develop agents that behave cautiously in novel situations. It is generally impossible to anticipate all situations that an autonomous system may face or what behavior would best avoid bad outcomes. An agent that can learn to be cautious would overcome this challenge by discovering for itself when and how to behave cautiously. In contrast, current approaches typically embed task-specific safety information or explicit cautious behaviors into the system, which is error-prone and imposes extra burdens on practitioners. In this paper, we present both a sequence of tasks where cautious behavior becomes increasingly non-obvious, as well as an algorithm to demonstrate that it is possible for a system to learn to be cautious. The essential features of our algorithm are that it characterizes reward function uncertainty without task-specific safety information and uses this uncertainty to construct a robust policy. Specifically, we construct robust policies with a k-of-N counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) subroutine given learned reward function uncertainty represented by a neural network ensemble. These policies exhibit caution in each of our tasks without any task-specific safety tuning. Our code is available at https://github.com/montaserFath/Learning-to-be-Cautious

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

Can we learn more from data than existed in the generating process itself? Can new and useful information be constructed from merely applying deterministic transformations to existing data? Can the learnable content in data be evaluated without considering a downstream task? On these questions, Shannon information and Kolmogorov complexity come up nearly empty-handed, in part because they assume observers with unlimited computational capacity and fail to target the useful information content. In this work, we identify and exemplify three seeming paradoxes in information theory: (1) information cannot be increased by deterministic transformations; (2) information is independent of the order of data; (3) likelihood modeling is merely distribution matching. To shed light on the tension between these results and modern practice, and to quantify the value of data, we introduce epiplexity, a formalization of information capturing what computationally bounded observers can learn from data. Epiplexity captures the structural content in data while excluding time-bounded entropy, the random unpredictable content exemplified by pseudorandom number generators and chaotic dynamical systems. With these concepts, we demonstrate how information can be created with computation, how it depends on the ordering of the data, and how likelihood modeling can produce more complex programs than present in the data generating process itself. We also present practical procedures to estimate epiplexity which we show capture differences across data sources, track with downstream performance, and highlight dataset interventions that improve out-of-distribution generalization. In contrast to principles of model selection, epiplexity provides a theoretical foundation for data selection, guiding how to select, generate, or transform data for learning systems.

Variable-order Markov models generate sequences over a finite alphabet by conditioning each symbol on the longest available suffix of the generated history. Regular constraints, by contrast, describe finite-horizon control requirements by an automaton: fixed positions, forced endings, metrical patterns, and forbidden copied fragments are all special cases. Existing exact methods already handle regular constraints with belief propagation for first-order Markov chains. The contribution here is the variable-order extension: identifying the state space on which the existing BP-regular machinery must be run when the generator is a variable-order/backoff model. A first-order constraint layer can enforce useful support conditions, but it computes future mass after merging histories that a variable-order generator deliberately keeps distinct. We formalize this mismatch and give the sparse construction obtained by replacing the first-order Markov state with the observed context state, then taking the standard product with the regular constraint automaton. For a fixed trained context graph and automaton, inference is linear in the sequence horizon; in general it is polynomial in the number of reachable product edges. This gives the correct variable-order distribution conditioned on regular constraints without expanding to all K-tuples. The same finite-source interface supports reversible data augmentation by inverse count lookup, matching materialized transposition augmentation without storing transformed corpora. We also separate exact BP inference from generation-time backoff policies, such as singleton avoidance, whose stochastic semantics must be made explicit if exactness is claimed.

Agentic AI systems act through tools and evolve their behavior over long, stochastic interaction traces. This setting complicates assurance, because behavior depends on nondeterministic environments and probabilistic model outputs. Prior work introduced runtime verification for agentic AI via Dynamic Probabilistic Assurance (DPA), learning an MDP online and model checking quantitative properties. A key limitation is that developers must manually define the state abstraction, which couples verification to application-specific heuristics and increases adoption friction. This paper proposes TriCEGAR, a trace-driven abstraction mechanism that automates state construction from execution logs and supports online construction of an agent behavioral MDP. TriCEGAR represents abstractions as predicate trees learned from traces and refined using counterexamples. We describe a framework-native implementation that (i) captures typed agent lifecycle events, (ii) builds abstractions from traces, (iii) constructs an MDP, and (iv) performs probabilistic model checking to compute bounds such as Pmax(success) and Pmin(failure). We also show how run likelihoods enable anomaly detection as a guardrailing signal.

Large Language Models (LLMs) produce a controllability gap in safety-critical engineering: even low rates of undetected constraint violations render a system undeployable. Current orchestration paradigms suffer from sycophantic compliance, context attention decay [Liu et al., 2024], and stochastic oscillation during self-correction [Huang et al., 2024]. We introduce the Convergent AI Agent Framework (CAAF), which transitions agentic workflows from open-loop generation to closed-loop Fail-Safe Determinism via three pillars: (1) Recursive Atomic Decomposition with physical context firewalls; (2) Harness as an Asset, formalizing domain invariants into machine-readable registries enforced by a deterministic Unified Assertion Interface (UAI); and (3) Structured Semantic Gradients with State Locking for monotonic convergence. Empirical evaluation across two domains -- SAE Level 3 (L3) autonomous driving (AD) (n=30, 7 conditions) and pharmaceutical continuous flow reactor design (n=20, 4 conditions including a Mono+UAI ablation) -- shows that CAAF-all-GPT-4o-mini achieves 100% paradox detection while monolithic GPT-4o achieves 0% (even at temperature=0). The pharmaceutical benchmark features 7 simultaneous constraints with nonlinear Arrhenius interactions and a 3-way minimal unsatisfiable subset, representing a structurally harder challenge than the 2-constraint AD paradox. Alternative multi-agent architectures (debate, sequential checking) also achieve 0% across 80 trials, confirming that CAAF's reliability derives from its deterministic UAI, not from multi-agent orchestration per se. A Mono+UAI ablation (95%) isolates UAI as the core contribution. CAAF's reliability is invariant to prompt hints; all components use a single commodity model, enabling fully offline deployment.

LLM agents that cache recovery suggestions from API errors can skip re-derivation in later episodes, spending fewer tokens and fewer model calls on constraints they have already learned. Server-side data drift turns those cached fixes into silent failures, and the usual remedy, re-deriving on every episode, gives the savings back. We introduce invalidation contracts, a protocol layer that attaches version stamps and cacheability hints to every recovery suggestion so the client can evict stale entries without trial and error, and keep the rest. The contract decomposes realized savings into two independent factors: validity, the fraction of cached suggestions that remain correct after a drift event, and compliance, the fraction the planner applies on the first attempt. Validity depends only on the protocol and is vendor-independent. Compliance depends on the planner model: identical wire bytes yield 100% first-try compliance on Claude Haiku 4.5 and 11% or below on Claude Sonnet 5, which exhibits input-schema conservatism, refusing fixes that add fields the original request did not contain. We evaluate across seven models, three serving paths, two domains, and approximately 9,400 episodes. Row-level invalidation raises compliance by 0 to 66.7 percentage points across the seven models, 55.6 to 66.7 on three, and recovers 29-33% of baseline token cost on four of seven models, while table-level invalidation destroys co-located entries and drops post-drift first-try rates to 0% on five of seven. Eviction precision is 1.00 at row granularity on every model under the row-level oracle of Section 4.1. The contract adds 15% to response payload. Version-stamp validity is deterministic by construction and produced identical results across every model and serving path, with zero contract failures in the entire evaluation.