Daily Papers

Blockchain forensics is adversarial and open-ended: money launderers split, swap, and bridge funds, cut their trail at mixers or custodial services, and change tactics from one incident to the next. Investigators must keep adapting their tracing in response. Yet the immutability of public ledgers preserves every recorded movement in public view, making much of the investigation independently verifiable. We introduce ABF-Bench, an interactive benchmark that makes evidence-backed fund tracing a verifiable agent task, in which every claimed movement must cite ledger records the agent retrieved. A case-to-task pipeline builds well-posed tasks across ledgers: conservative rules halt tracing wherever the records leave a continuation unresolved, and each task's reference graph is the answer those rules determine. Built from real laundering activity, the tasks combine multi-hop transfers, DeFi exchanges, cross-chain round trips, custodial and mixer deposits, and address poisoning. We also propose the ABF agent harness, built around a working memory, and evaluate it alongside general-purpose agents and fixed-order tracers. The harness reaches 75% edge recall, against 47% for Codex with the same model and 10% for Claude Code, which loses recall to overconfidence: it cites records it left unretrieved. Compared with fixed-order tracers, the harness acquires evidence faster than the best of them early in the budget and recognizes undisclosed custodial services that they walk past (89% vs. 0%), with 98% fidelity. However, agents tend to stop early and lose recall on larger tasks, which holds their final recall below the best tracer. Beyond exposing these gaps, ABF-Bench opens blockchain forensics to LLM agents as a verifiable domain, where the verdicts that score agents also offer potential training signals.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications introduce novel financial instruments replicating and extending traditional ones through blockchain-based smart contracts. Among these applications, DeFi derivatives protocols enable the creation and trading of decentralized derivative instruments whose value depends on underlying cryptoassets, indices, or other reference variables. Despite their growing significance, however, they remain relatively understudied compared to other DeFi protocols, such as lending protocols and decentralized exchanges. This paper systematically analyzes DeFi derivatives protocols, categorized into perpetuals, options, and synthetics, with the aim of comparing their instrument structures, protocol mechanisms, operational dynamics, and economic agents. We provide a formal characterization of the main classes of decentralized derivative instruments and develop a protocol-agnostic framework that connects instrument-level specifications, market-state variables, and protocol-level mechanisms. We complement the analytical framework with numerical simulations that evaluate how derivative positions evolve under varying economic conditions, including changes in underlying asset prices, volatility, protocol-specific fees, and leverage. Overall, this study provides a structured analytical framework for understanding and comparing the design and functioning of decentralized finance derivatives protocols.

DeFi investment agents, systems that use AI for autonomous on-chain trading, have attained over USD 3 billion in combined token valuations since late 2024. We survey over 1,900 AI-tagged crypto projects, filter to investment-focused agents, and curate 10 representative projects spanning strategy and observability dimensions. We then conduct a deep-dive architectural analysis of two prominent agent frameworks, ElizaOS and Virtuals Protocol, and a quantitative on-chain performance analysis of 11 Solana-based agent treasuries with publicly attributable trading activity, covering 925,323 token holders. We find that current deployments remain early and heterogeneous: (1) in our sample, many projects do not yet provide clear evidence of autonomous trade execution, and developer interviews suggest that many visible deployments remain basic API integrations; (2) agent treasuries retain over USD 30M in paper gains while token holders collectively lost USD 191.7M, with the top 1% of wallets capturing 81.4% of all gains (USD 1.81B); (3) token valuations are weakly connected to treasury fundamentals, with market-cap-to-AUM ratios exceeding 10,000x versus below 1x for established DeFi protocols; and (4) aggregate user gains peaked at USD 2.4B before declining to net losses, with median returns negative on every platform and tokens declining 93% on average from all-time highs. We interpret these outcomes as characteristic of a permissionless, first-generation market in which open infrastructure enables rapid experimentation but also allows naive or speculative agents to launch before robust standards for autonomy, performance, and stakeholder alignment emerge. We therefore propose a maturity framework along three dimensions: autonomous execution, risk-adjusted profitability, and stakeholder alignment, to characterize the gap between current deployments and future investment-grade agent systems.

Credit exposure in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) is often implicit and token-mediated, creating a dense web of inter-protocol dependencies. Thus, a shock to one token may result in significant and uncontrolled contagion effects. As the DeFi ecosystem becomes increasingly linked with traditional financial infrastructure through instruments, such as stablecoins, the risk posed by this dynamic demands more powerful quantification tools. We introduce DeXposure-FM, the first time-series, graph foundation model for measuring and forecasting inter-protocol credit exposure on DeFi networks, to the best of our knowledge. Employing a graph-tabular encoder, with pre-trained weight initialization, and multiple task-specific heads, DeXposure-FM is trained on the DeXposure dataset that has 43.7 million data entries, across 4,300+ protocols on 602 blockchains, covering 24,300+ unique tokens. The training is operationalized for credit-exposure forecasting, predicting the joint dynamics of (1) protocol-level flows, and (2) the topology and weights of credit-exposure links. The DeXposure-FM is empirically validated on two machine learning benchmarks; it consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art approaches, including a graph foundation model and temporal graph neural networks. DeXposure-FM further produces financial economics tools that support macroprudential monitoring and scenario-based DeFi stress testing, by enabling protocol-level systemic-importance scores, sector-level spillover and concentration measures via a forecast-then-measure pipeline. Empirical verification fully supports our financial economics tools. The model and code have been publicly available. Model: https://huggingface.co/EVIEHub/DeXposure-FM. Code: https://github.com/EVIEHub/DeXposure-FM.

In decentralized finance (DeFi), lenders can offer flash loans to borrowers, i.e., loans that are only valid within a blockchain transaction and must be repaid with fees by the end of that transaction. Unlike normal loans, flash loans allow borrowers to borrow large assets without upfront collaterals deposits. Malicious adversaries use flash loans to gather large assets to exploit vulnerable DeFi protocols. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for automated synthesis of adversarial transactions that exploit DeFi protocols using flash loans. To bypass the complexity of a DeFi protocol, we propose a new technique to approximate the DeFi protocol functional behaviors using numerical methods (polynomial linear regression and nearest-neighbor interpolation). We then construct an optimization query using the approximated functions of the DeFi protocol to find an adversarial attack constituted of a sequence of functions invocations with optimal parameters that gives the maximum profit. To improve the accuracy of the approximation, we propose a novel counterexample driven approximation refinement technique. We implement our framework in a tool named FlashSyn. We evaluate FlashSyn on 16 DeFi protocols that were victims to flash loan attacks and 2 DeFi protocols from Damn Vulnerable DeFi challenges. FlashSyn automatically synthesizes an adversarial attack for 16 of the 18 benchmarks. Among the 16 successful cases, FlashSyn identifies attack vectors yielding higher profits than those employed by historical hackers in 3 cases, and also discovers multiple distinct attack vectors in 10 cases, demonstrating its effectiveness in finding possible flash loan attacks.

Smart contracts power decentralized financial (DeFi) services but are vulnerable to security exploits that can lead to significant financial losses. Existing security measures often fail to adequately protect these contracts due to the composability of DeFi protocols and the increasing sophistication of attacks. Through a large-scale empirical study of historical transactions from the 37 hacked DeFi protocols, we discovered that while benign transactions typically exhibit a limited number of unique control flows, in stark contrast, attack transactions consistently introduce novel, previously unobserved control flows. Building on these insights, we developed CrossGuard, a novel framework that enforces control flow integrity onchain to secure smart contracts. Crucially, CrossGuard does not require prior knowledge of specific hacks. Instead, configured only once at deployment, it enforces control flow whitelisting policies and applies simplification heuristics at runtime. This approach monitors and prevents potential attacks by reverting all transactions that do not adhere to the established control flow whitelisting rules. Our evaluation demonstrates that CrossGuard effectively blocks 35 of the 37 analyzed attacks when configured only once at contract deployment, maintaining a low false positive rate of 0.26% and minimal additional gas costs. These results underscore the efficacy of applying control flow integrity to smart contracts, significantly enhancing security beyond traditional methods and addressing the evolving threat landscape in the DeFi ecosystem.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has turned blockchains into financial infrastructure, allowing anyone to trade, lend, and build protocols without intermediaries, but this openness exposes pools of value controlled by code. Within five years, the DeFi ecosystem has lost over 15.75B USD to reported exploits. Many exploits arise from permissionless opportunities that any participant can trigger using only public state and standard interfaces, which we call Anyone-Can-Take (ACT) opportunities. Despite on-chain transparency, postmortem analysis remains slow and manual: investigations start from limited evidence, sometimes only a single transaction hash, and must reconstruct the exploit lifecycle by recovering related transactions, contract code, and state dependencies. We present TxRay, a Large Language Model (LLM) agentic postmortem system that uses tool calls to reconstruct live ACT attacks from limited evidence. Starting from one or more seed transactions, TxRay recovers the exploit lifecycle, derives an evidence-backed root cause, and generates a runnable, self-contained Proof of Concept (PoC) that deterministically reproduces the incident. TxRay self-checks postmortems by encoding incident-specific semantic oracles as executable assertions. To evaluate PoC correctness and quality, we develop PoCEvaluator, an independent agentic execution-and-review evaluator. On 114 incidents from DeFiHackLabs, TxRay produces an expert-aligned root cause and an executable PoC for 105 incidents, achieving 92.11% end-to-end reproduction. Under PoCEvaluator, 98.1% of TxRay PoCs avoid hard-coding attacker addresses, a +22.9pp lift over DeFiHackLabs. In a live deployment, TxRay delivers validated root causes in 40 minutes and PoCs in 59 minutes at median latency. TxRay's oracle-validated PoCs enable attack imitation, improving coverage by 15.6% and 65.5% over STING and APE.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi), a financial ecosystem without centralized controlling organization, has introduced a new paradigm for lending and borrowing. However, its capital efficiency remains constrained by the inability to effectively assess the risk associated with each user/wallet. This paper introduces the 'On-Chain Credit Risk Score (OCCR Score) in DeFi', a probabilistic measure designed to quantify the credit risk associated with a wallet. By analyzing historical real-time on-chain activity as well as predictive scenarios, the OCCR Score may enable DeFi lending protocols to dynamically adjust Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratios and Liquidation Thresholds (LT) based on the risk profile of a wallet. Unlike existing wallet risk scoring models, which rely on heuristic-based evaluations, the OCCR Score offers a more objective and probabilistic approach, aligning closer to traditional credit risk assessment methodologies. This framework can further enhance DeFi's capital efficiency by incentivizing responsible borrowing behavior and optimizing risk-adjusted returns for lenders.

Polymarket has emerged as a prominent prediction market platform and one of the fastest-growing applications in DeFi. To achieve low-latency trading, it adopts a hybrid architecture that matches orders off-chain but settles them on-chain for final execution. This design creates a consistency gap we call Ghost Fills: an order that is successfully matched off-chain may later fail during on-chain settlement. To understand the security implications of this gap, we investigate such failed settlements by building GHOSTHUNTER, which reconstructs them from on-chain traces and attributes to concrete attack patterns. Across 1,952,440 reverted match-order transactions, we find that attackers exploit the time gap between matching and settlement to invalidate already matched orders before they are finalized on-chain. We then identify four attack vectors from these incidents: nonce bump, balance drain, allowance revoke, and proxy trap, realized via 35 evolving variants. These vectors allow attackers to selectively revert 980,133 filled orders, enabling risk-free prediction, arbitrage-bot hunting, and liquidity reward manipulation, realizing at least \1.49M in profit, which places 1.78 B USD at risk and 2.17 M POL (about \212 K) paid by operator. During peak hours, more than 24.3% of all filled orders reverted, causing de facto DoS attacks. We also find that code derived from the flawed contract still appears in 167 independent contracts across 10 chains holding at least 23 M in user funds, extending the impact beyond Polymarket. We have disclosed our evidence to affected parties, and the issue has been partially mitigated.

As Decentralized Finance (DeFi) develops, understanding user intent behind DeFi transactions is crucial yet challenging due to complex smart contract interactions, multifaceted on-/off-chain factors, and opaque hex logs. Existing methods lack deep semantic insight. To address this, we propose the Transaction Intent Mining (TIM) framework. TIM leverages a DeFi intent taxonomy built on grounded theory and a multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) system to robustly infer user intents. A Meta-Level Planner dynamically coordinates domain experts to decompose multiple perspective-specific intent analyses into solvable subtasks. Question Solvers handle the tasks with multi-modal on/off-chain data. While a Cognitive Evaluator mitigates LLM hallucinations and ensures verifiability. Experiments show that TIM significantly outperforms machine learning models, single LLMs, and single Agent baselines. We also analyze core challenges in intent inference. This work helps provide a more reliable understanding of user motivations in DeFi, offering context-aware explanations for complex blockchain activity.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) incidents stemming from the exploitation of smart contract vulnerabilities have culminated in financial damages exceeding 3 billion US dollars. Existing defense mechanisms typically focus on detecting and reacting to malicious transactions executed by attackers that target victim contracts. However, with the emergence of private transaction pools where transactions are sent directly to miners without first appearing in public mempools, current detection tools face significant challenges in identifying attack activities effectively. Based on the fact that most attack logic rely on deploying one or more intermediate smart contracts as supporting components to the exploitation of victim contracts, in this paper, we propose a new direction for detecting DeFi attacks that focuses on identifying adversarial contracts instead of adversarial transactions. Our approach allows us to leverage common attack patterns, code semantics and intrinsic characteristics found in malicious smart contracts to build the LookAhead system based on Machine Learning (ML) classifiers and a transformer model that is able to effectively distinguish adversarial contracts from benign ones, and make just-in-time predictions of potential zero-day attacks. Our contributions are three-fold: First, we construct a comprehensive dataset consisting of features extracted and constructed from recent contracts deployed on the Ethereum and BSC blockchains. Secondly, we design a condensed representation of smart contract programs called Pruned Semantic-Control Flow Tokenization (PSCFT) and use it to train a combination of ML models that understand the behaviour of malicious codes based on function calls, control flows and other pattern-conforming features. Lastly, we provide the complete implementation of LookAhead and the evaluation of its performance metrics for detecting adversarial contracts.

Contemporary on-chain artificial intelligence (AI) encounters an intractable Von Neumann memory and latency wall. Storing static floating-point neural weight matrices inside Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) storage costs millions of gas, rendering direct on-chain inference impossible. While Zero-Knowledge Machine Learning (ZK-ML) offloads matrix tensor multiplications to off-chain provers, it introduces fatal constraints: 10 to 300 seconds of SNARK proving latency and 250,000 to 500,000 gas per proof verification. Because decentralized finance (DeFi) exploits - such as uncollateralized flash-loan attacks, predatory sandwich MEV, and toxic loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) flow - occur atomically inside a single block, ZK-ML oracles cannot react in time. Here, we present Werracle, a production-grade, zero-storage on-chain AI decision oracle fitting inside a single 32-byte EVM storage slot (bytes32). Leveraging foundational procedural Mandelbrot escape dynamics (z_{n+1} = z_n^2 + c) established by Dagli et al. (arXiv:2609.25498), Werracle derives continuous non-linear decision hyperplanes from a 24-byte coordinate triplet Theta = (c_x, c_y, zoom). Implemented in pure Solidity bytecode using fixed-point Q16.16 arithmetic (WerrMath.sol), Werracle evaluates a 16-point Pareto micro-grid in only 21,438 gas (under 0.0005 USD on Layer-2 rollups like Base and Arbitrum) with sub-millisecond execution latency. We demonstrate real-world DeFi efficacy via WerracleFeeHook.sol, a Uniswap v4 dynamic swap fee governor that measures orderbook turbulence on-the-fly and atomically adjusts liquidity provider fees between 0.05% and 0.50%. The protocol is formally verified against a 1,000-test cryptographically sealed deterministic verification suite (100.0% pass rate) with telemetry permanently disabled, operating live on a dedicated EVM devnet sandbox (Chain ID 4242).

Fiat-pegged stablecoins are by nature exposed to spillover effects during market turmoil in Traditional Finance (TradFi). We observe a difference in TradFi market shocks impact between various stablecoins, in particular, USD Coin (USDC) and Tether USDT (USDT), the former with a higher reporting frequency and transparency than the latter. We investigate this, using top USDC and USDT liquidity pools in Uniswap, by adapting the Marginal Cost of Immediacy (MCI) measure to Uniswap's Automated Market Maker, and then conducting Difference-in-Differences analysis on MCI and Total Value Locked (TVL) in USD, as well as measuring liquidity concentration across different providers. Results show that the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) event reduced USDC's TVL dominance over USDT, increased USDT's liquidity cost relative to USDC, and liquidity provision remained concentrated with pool-specific trends. These findings reveal a flight-to-safety behavior and counterintuitive effects of stablecoin transparency: USDC's frequent and detailed disclosures led to swift market reactions, while USDT's opacity and less frequent reporting provided a safety net against immediate impacts.

We present FiMI (Finance Model for India), a domain-specialized financial language model developed by National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) for Indian digital payment systems. We develop two model variants: FiMI Base and FiMI Instruct. FiMI adapts the Mistral Small 24B architecture through a multi-stage training pipeline, beginning with continuous pre-training on 68 Billion tokens of curated financial, multilingual (English, Hindi, Hinglish), and synthetic data. This is followed by instruction fine-tuning and domain-specific supervised fine-tuning focused on multi-turn, tool-driven conversations that model real-world workflows, such as transaction disputes and mandate lifecycle management. Evaluations reveal that FiMI Base achieves a 20\% improvement over the Mistral Small 24B Base model on finance reasoning benchmark, while FiMI Instruct outperforms the Mistral Small 24B Instruct model by 87\% on domain-specific tool-calling. Moreover, FiMI achieves these significant domain gains while maintaining comparable performance to models of similar size on general benchmarks.

Algorithmic trading systems on decentralised exchanges (DEXs) reject most candidate tokens they evaluate. The counterfactual outcome of rejected candidates (what would have happened had the system entered) is rarely measured. This paper introduces Post-Rejection Follow-up Sampling (PRFS). A separate tracking subsystem samples each rejected token's price and liquidity at a configurable cadence, over a horizon of up to twenty-four hours. PRFS produces the data needed to evaluate filter precision against actual market outcomes of rejected candidates, not against synthetic backtest reconstructions. The methodology, data architecture, and deposit format are described in Section III. The companion dataset contains 67,000 forward-outcome observation rows across 2,997 rejection events spanning 457 unique mints, collected over a continuous eight-day window (2026-04-10 to 2026-04-19, UTC). Approximately 55 percent of rejection events receive at least one forward observation; coverage at the mint level is complete. The principal binding constraint on downstream classification is per-event horizon density, not event-level coverage. PRFS is dataset-independent. It generalises to any algorithmic decision system in which rejections substantially outnumber executions.

This paper measures hour-of-day effects, filter precision, fragility, and realised yield in a 15-day paper-traded deployment of an autonomous memecoin trading system on Solana decentralised exchanges. The 190-trade sample (March 29 to April 12, 2026) shows a 40.5 percent win rate, mean per-trade return of +0.62 percent, cumulative +117.7 percent (net SOL +0.039), skewness -1.21, excess kurtosis 6.61. A Mann-Whitney U test of three poorest-performing UTC hours (2, 13, 23) against the others yields U = 1,274, p = 0.22; directional but not significant at n = 190. The three hours were selected in-sample, so the comparison is exploratory, not confirmatory. A parallel counterfactual rejection-tracking system collected 4,874 forward-sample observations across 184 distinct rejection events. Of those events, 17.9 percent reached a 50 percent drawdown from reference within 24 hours; 26.0 percent of forward samples recorded the rejected token below half-reference. The filter stack avoided these realised drawdowns: evidence that the rejection criteria are net-positive against forward-market outcomes. Fragility is the principal caveat. Removing the top three trades (1.6 percent of sample) flips cumulative return unprofitable. Profitability rests on a small number of large winners and is structurally fragile. The dataset and audit script are deposited under CC-BY-4.0 (Zenodo DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20043302).

Financial institutions deploy Large Language Models (LLMs) for reconciliations, regulatory reporting, and client communications, but nondeterministic outputs (output drift) undermine auditability and trust. We quantify drift across five model architectures (7B-120B parameters) on regulated financial tasks, revealing a stark inverse relationship: smaller models (Granite-3-8B, Qwen2.5-7B) achieve 100% output consistency at T=0.0, while GPT-OSS-120B exhibits only 12.5% consistency (95% CI: 3.5-36.0%) regardless of configuration (p<0.0001, Fisher's exact test). This finding challenges conventional assumptions that larger models are universally superior for production deployment. Our contributions include: (i) a finance-calibrated deterministic test harness combining greedy decoding (T=0.0), fixed seeds, and SEC 10-K structure-aware retrieval ordering; (ii) task-specific invariant checking for RAG, JSON, and SQL outputs using finance-calibrated materiality thresholds (plus or minus 5%) and SEC citation validation; (iii) a three-tier model classification system enabling risk-appropriate deployment decisions; and (iv) an audit-ready attestation system with dual-provider validation. We evaluated five models (Qwen2.5-7B via Ollama, Granite-3-8B via IBM watsonx.ai, Llama-3.3-70B, Mistral-Medium-2505, and GPT-OSS-120B) across three regulated financial tasks. Across 480 runs (n=16 per condition), structured tasks (SQL) remain stable even at T=0.2, while RAG tasks show drift (25-75%), revealing task-dependent sensitivity. Cross-provider validation confirms deterministic behavior transfers between local and cloud deployments. We map our framework to Financial Stability Board (FSB), Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) requirements, demonstrating practical pathways for compliance-ready AI deployments.

Foundation models have transformed domains from language to genomics by learning general-purpose representations from large-scale, heterogeneous data. We introduce TradeFM, a 524M-parameter generative Transformer that brings this paradigm to market microstructure, learning directly from billions of trade events across >9K equities. To enable cross-asset generalization, we develop scale-invariant features and a universal tokenization scheme that map the heterogeneous, multi-modal event stream of order flow into a unified discrete sequence -- eliminating asset-specific calibration. Integrated with a deterministic market simulator, TradeFM-generated rollouts reproduce key stylized facts of financial returns, including heavy tails, volatility clustering, and absence of return autocorrelation. Quantitatively, TradeFM achieves 2-3x lower distributional error than Compound Hawkes baselines and generalizes zero-shot to geographically out-of-distribution APAC markets with moderate perplexity degradation. Together, these results suggest that scale-invariant trade representations capture transferable structure in market microstructure, opening a path toward synthetic data generation, stress testing, and learning-based trading agents.