Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable success in various tasks, but concerns about their safety and the potential for generating malicious content have emerged. In this paper, we explore the power of In-Context Learning (ICL) in manipulating the alignment ability of LLMs. We find that by providing just few in-context demonstrations without fine-tuning, LLMs can be manipulated to increase or decrease the probability of jailbreaking, i.e. answering malicious prompts. Based on these observations, we propose In-Context Attack (ICA) and In-Context Defense (ICD) methods for jailbreaking and guarding aligned language model purposes. ICA crafts malicious contexts to guide models in generating harmful outputs, while ICD enhances model robustness by demonstrations of rejecting to answer harmful prompts. Our experiments show the effectiveness of ICA and ICD in increasing or reducing the success rate of adversarial jailbreaking attacks. Overall, we shed light on the potential of ICL to influence LLM behavior and provide a new perspective for enhancing the safety and alignment of LLMs.

The A2AS framework is introduced as a security layer for AI agents and LLM-powered applications, similar to how HTTPS secures HTTP. A2AS enforces certified behavior, activates model self-defense, and ensures context window integrity. It defines security boundaries, authenticates prompts, applies security rules and custom policies, and controls agentic behavior, enabling a defense-in-depth strategy. The A2AS framework avoids latency overhead, external dependencies, architectural changes, model retraining, and operational complexity. The BASIC security model is introduced as the A2AS foundation: (B) Behavior certificates enable behavior enforcement, (A) Authenticated prompts enable context window integrity, (S) Security boundaries enable untrusted input isolation, (I) In-context defenses enable secure model reasoning, (C) Codified policies enable application-specific rules. This first paper in the series introduces the BASIC security model and the A2AS framework, exploring their potential toward establishing the A2AS industry standard.

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has resulted in a paradigm shift towards autonomous agents, necessitating robust security against Prompt Injection (PI) vulnerabilities where untrusted inputs hijack agent behaviors. This SoK presents a comprehensive overview of the PI landscape, covering attacks, defenses, and their evaluation practices. Through a systematic literature review and quantitative analysis, we establish taxonomies that categorize PI attacks by payload generation strategies (heuristic vs. optimization) and defenses by intervention stages (text, model, and execution levels). Our analysis reveals a key limitation shared by many existing defenses and benchmarks: they largely overlook context-dependent tasks, in which agents are authorized to rely on runtime environmental observations to determine actions. To address this gap, we introduce AgentPI, a new benchmark designed to systematically evaluate agent behavior under context-dependent interaction settings. Using AgentPI, we empirically evaluate representative defenses and show that no single approach can simultaneously achieve high trustworthiness, high utility, and low latency. Moreover, we show that many defenses appear effective under existing benchmarks by suppressing contextual inputs, yet fail to generalize to realistic agent settings where context-dependent reasoning is essential. This SoK distills key takeaways and open research problems, offering structured guidance for future research and practical deployment of secure LLM agents.

With the rise of large language models (LLMs), ensuring they embody the principles of being helpful, honest, and harmless (3H), known as Human Alignment, becomes crucial. While existing alignment methods like RLHF, DPO, etc., effectively fine-tune LLMs to match preferences in the preference dataset, they often lead LLMs to highly receptive human input and external evidence, even when this information is poisoned. This leads to a tendency for LLMs to be Adaptive Chameleons when external evidence conflicts with their parametric memory. This exacerbates the risk of LLM being attacked by external poisoned data, which poses a significant security risk to LLM system applications such as Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). To address the challenge, we propose a novel framework: Dialectical Alignment (DA), which (1) utilizes AI feedback to identify optimal strategies for LLMs to navigate inter-context conflicts and context-memory conflicts with different external evidence in context window (i.e., different ratios of poisoned factual contexts); (2) constructs the SFT dataset as well as the preference dataset based on the AI feedback and strategies above; (3) uses the above datasets for LLM alignment to defense poisoned context attack while preserving the effectiveness of in-context knowledge editing. Our experiments show that the dialectical alignment model improves poisoned data attack defense by 20 and does not require any additional prompt engineering or prior declaration of ``you may be attacked`` to the LLMs' context window.

In-context diffusion models allow users to modify images with remarkable ease and realism. However, the same power raises serious privacy concerns: personal images can be easily manipulated for identity impersonation, misinformation, or other malicious uses, all without the owner's consent. While prior work has explored input perturbations to protect against misuse in personalized text-to-image generation, the robustness of modern, large-scale in-context DiT-based models remains largely unexamined. In this paper, we propose DeContext, a new method to safeguard input images from unauthorized in-context editing. Our key insight is that contextual information from the source image propagates to the output primarily through multimodal attention layers. By injecting small, targeted perturbations that weaken these cross-attention pathways, DeContext breaks this flow, effectively decouples the link between input and output. This simple defense is both efficient and robust. We further show that early denoising steps and specific transformer blocks dominate context propagation, which allows us to concentrate perturbations where they matter most. Experiments on Flux Kontext and Step1X-Edit show that DeContext consistently blocks unwanted image edits while preserving visual quality. These results highlight the effectiveness of attention-based perturbations as a powerful defense against image manipulation.

Adapting Large Language Models (LLMs) to specific tasks introduces concerns about computational efficiency, prompting an exploration of efficient methods such as In-Context Learning (ICL). However, the vulnerability of ICL to privacy attacks under realistic assumptions remains largely unexplored. In this work, we present the first membership inference attack tailored for ICL, relying solely on generated texts without their associated probabilities. We propose four attack strategies tailored to various constrained scenarios and conduct extensive experiments on four popular large language models. Empirical results show that our attacks can accurately determine membership status in most cases, e.g., 95\% accuracy advantage against LLaMA, indicating that the associated risks are much higher than those shown by existing probability-based attacks. Additionally, we propose a hybrid attack that synthesizes the strengths of the aforementioned strategies, achieving an accuracy advantage of over 95\% in most cases. Furthermore, we investigate three potential defenses targeting data, instruction, and output. Results demonstrate combining defenses from orthogonal dimensions significantly reduces privacy leakage and offers enhanced privacy assurances.

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite their impressive capabilities across domains, have been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Prior backdoor strategies predominantly operate at the token level, where an injected trigger causes the model to generate a specific target word, choice, or class (depending on the task). Recent advances, however, exploit the long-form reasoning tendencies of modern LLMs to conduct reasoning-level backdoors: once triggered, the victim model inserts one or more malicious reasoning steps into its chain-of-thought (CoT). These attacks are substantially harder to detect, as the backdoored answer remains plausible and consistent with the poisoned reasoning trajectory. Yet, defenses tailored to this type of backdoor remain largely unexplored. To bridge this gap, we propose Critical-CoT, a novel defense mechanism that conducts a two-stage fine-tuning (FT) process on LLMs to develop critical thinking behaviors, enabling them to automatically identify potential backdoors and refuse to generate malicious reasoning steps. Extensive experiments across multiple LLMs and datasets demonstrate that Critical-CoT provides strong robustness against both in-context learning-based and FT-based backdoor attacks. Notably, Critical-CoT exhibits strong cross-domain and cross-task generalization. Our code is available at hthttps://github.com/tuanvu171/Critical-CoT.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) has demonstrated great utilization in post-training of Large Language Models (LLMs). In GRPO, prompts are answered by the model and, through reinforcement learning, preferred completions are learnt. Owing to the small communication volume, GRPO is inherently suitable for decentralised training as the prompts can be concurrently answered by multiple nodes and then exchanged in the forms of strings. In this work, we present the first adversarial attack in decentralised GRPO. We demonstrate that malicious parties can poison such systems by injecting arbitrary malicious tokens in benign models in both out-of-context and in-context attacks. Using empirical examples of math and coding tasks, we show that adversarial attacks can easily poison the benign nodes, polluting their local LLM post-training, achieving attack success rates up to 100% in as few as 50 iterations. We propose two ways to defend against these attacks, depending on whether all users train the same model or different models. We show that these defenses can achieve stop rates of up to 100%, making the attack impossible.

Generative Language Models gained significant attention in late 2022 / early 2023, notably with the introduction of models refined to act consistently with users' expectations of interactions with AI (conversational models). Arguably the focal point of public attention has been such a refinement of the GPT3 model -- the ChatGPT and its subsequent integration with auxiliary capabilities, including search as part of Microsoft Bing. Despite extensive prior research invested in their development, their performance and applicability to a range of daily tasks remained unclear and niche. However, their wider utilization without a requirement for technical expertise, made in large part possible through conversational fine-tuning, revealed the extent of their true capabilities in a real-world environment. This has garnered both public excitement for their potential applications and concerns about their capabilities and potential malicious uses. This review aims to provide a brief overview of the history, state of the art, and implications of Generative Language Models in terms of their principles, abilities, limitations, and future prospects -- especially in the context of cyber-defense, with a focus on the Swiss operational environment.

Prompt injection remains a major security risk for large language models. However, the efficacy of existing guardrail models in context-aware settings remains underexplored, as they often rely on static attack benchmarks. Additionally, they have over-defense tendencies. We introduce CAPTURE, a novel context-aware benchmark assessing both attack detection and over-defense tendencies with minimal in-domain examples. Our experiments reveal that current prompt injection guardrail models suffer from high false negatives in adversarial cases and excessive false positives in benign scenarios, highlighting critical limitations. To demonstrate our framework's utility, we train CaptureGuard on our generated data. This new model drastically reduces both false negative and false positive rates on our context-aware datasets while also generalizing effectively to external benchmarks, establishing a path toward more robust and practical prompt injection defenses.

Large language models (LLMs) have gained increasing prominence in artificial intelligence, making a profound impact on society and various industries like business and science. However, the presence of false information on the internet and in text corpus poses a significant risk to the reliability and safety of LLMs, underscoring the urgent need to understand the mechanisms of how false information influences the behaviors of LLMs. In this paper, we dive into this problem and investigate how false information spreads in LLMs and affects related responses. Specifically, in our series of experiments, we investigate different factors that can influence the spread of information in LLMs by comparing three degrees of information relevance (direct, indirect, and peripheral), four information source styles (Twitter, web blogs, news reports, and research papers) and two common knowledge injection paradigms (in-context injection and learning-based injection). The experimental results show that (1)False information will spread and contaminate related memories in LLMs via a semantic diffusion process, i.e., false information has global detrimental effects beyond its direct impact. (2)Current LLMs are susceptible to authority bias, i.e., LLMs are more likely to follow false information presented in trustworthy styles such as news reports and research papers, which usually cause deeper and wider pollution of information. (3)Current LLMs are more sensitive to false information through in-context injection than through learning-based injection, which severely challenges the reliability and safety of LLMs even when all training data are trusty and correct. The above findings raise the need for new false information defense algorithms to address the global impact of false information, and new alignment algorithms to unbiasedly lead LLMs to follow essential human values rather than superficial patterns.

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has marked significant achievements in language processing and reasoning capabilities. Despite their advancements, LLMs face vulnerabilities to data poisoning attacks, where the adversary inserts backdoor triggers into training data to manipulate outputs. This work further identifies additional security risks in LLMs by designing a new data poisoning attack tailored to exploit the supervised fine-tuning (SFT) process. We propose a novel gradient-guided backdoor trigger learning (GBTL) algorithm to identify adversarial triggers efficiently, ensuring an evasion of detection by conventional defenses while maintaining content integrity. Through experimental validation across various language model tasks, including sentiment analysis, domain generation, and question answering, our poisoning strategy demonstrates a high success rate in compromising various LLMs' outputs. We further propose two defense strategies against data poisoning attacks, including in-context learning (ICL) and continuous learning (CL), which effectively rectify the behavior of LLMs and significantly reduce the decline in performance. Our work highlights the significant security risks present during SFT of LLMs and the necessity of safeguarding LLMs against data poisoning attacks.

Open-weight AI systems offer unique benefits, including enhanced transparency, open research, and decentralized access. However, they are vulnerable to tampering attacks which can efficiently elicit harmful behaviors by modifying weights or activations. Currently, there is not yet a robust science of open-weight model risk management. Existing safety fine-tuning methods and other post-training techniques have struggled to make LLMs resistant to more than a few dozen steps of adversarial fine-tuning. In this paper, we investigate whether filtering text about dual-use topics from training data can prevent unwanted capabilities and serve as a more tamper-resistant safeguard. We introduce a multi-stage pipeline for scalable data filtering and show that it offers a tractable and effective method for minimizing biothreat proxy knowledge in LLMs. We pretrain multiple 6.9B-parameter models from scratch and find that they exhibit substantial resistance to adversarial fine-tuning attacks on up to 10,000 steps and 300M tokens of biothreat-related text -- outperforming existing post-training baselines by over an order of magnitude -- with no observed degradation to unrelated capabilities. However, while filtered models lack internalized dangerous knowledge, we find that they can still leverage such information when it is provided in context (e.g., via search tool augmentation), demonstrating a need for a defense-in-depth approach. Overall, these findings help to establish pretraining data curation as a promising layer of defense for open-weight AI systems.

Overcoming the limited context limitations in early-generation LLMs, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been a reliable solution for context-based answer generation in the past. Recently, the emergence of long-context LLMs allows the models to incorporate much longer text sequences, making RAG less attractive. Recent studies show that long-context LLMs significantly outperform RAG in long-context applications. Unlike the existing works favoring the long-context LLM over RAG, we argue that the extremely long context in LLMs suffers from a diminished focus on relevant information and leads to potential degradation in answer quality. This paper revisits the RAG in long-context answer generation. We propose an order-preserve retrieval-augmented generation (OP-RAG) mechanism, which significantly improves the performance of RAG for long-context question-answer applications. With OP-RAG, as the number of retrieved chunks increases, the answer quality initially rises, and then declines, forming an inverted U-shaped curve. There exist sweet points where OP-RAG could achieve higher answer quality with much less tokens than long-context LLM taking the whole context as input. Extensive experiments on public benchmark demonstrate the superiority of our OP-RAG.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated multi-turn manipulation attacks, where adversaries strategically build context through seemingly benign conversational turns to circumvent safety measures and elicit harmful or unauthorized responses. These attacks exploit the temporal nature of dialogue to evade single-turn detection methods, representing a critical security vulnerability with significant implications for real-world deployments. This paper introduces the Temporal Context Awareness (TCA) framework, a novel defense mechanism designed to address this challenge by continuously analyzing semantic drift, cross-turn intention consistency and evolving conversational patterns. The TCA framework integrates dynamic context embedding analysis, cross-turn consistency verification, and progressive risk scoring to detect and mitigate manipulation attempts effectively. Preliminary evaluations on simulated adversarial scenarios demonstrate the framework's potential to identify subtle manipulation patterns often missed by traditional detection techniques, offering a much-needed layer of security for conversational AI systems. In addition to outlining the design of TCA , we analyze diverse attack vectors and their progression across multi-turn conversation, providing valuable insights into adversarial tactics and their impact on LLM vulnerabilities. Our findings underscore the pressing need for robust, context-aware defenses in conversational AI systems and highlight TCA framework as a promising direction for securing LLMs while preserving their utility in legitimate applications. We make our implementation available to support further research in this emerging area of AI security.

Different from a unimodal model whose input is from a single modality, the input (called multi-modal input) of a multi-modal model is from multiple modalities such as image, 3D points, audio, text, etc. Similar to unimodal models, many existing studies show that a multi-modal model is also vulnerable to adversarial perturbation, where an attacker could add small perturbation to all modalities of a multi-modal input such that the multi-modal model makes incorrect predictions for it. Existing certified defenses are mostly designed for unimodal models, which achieve sub-optimal certified robustness guarantees when extended to multi-modal models as shown in our experimental results. In our work, we propose MMCert, the first certified defense against adversarial attacks to a multi-modal model. We derive a lower bound on the performance of our MMCert under arbitrary adversarial attacks with bounded perturbations to both modalities (e.g., in the context of auto-driving, we bound the number of changed pixels in both RGB image and depth image). We evaluate our MMCert using two benchmark datasets: one for the multi-modal road segmentation task and the other for the multi-modal emotion recognition task. Moreover, we compare our MMCert with a state-of-the-art certified defense extended from unimodal models. Our experimental results show that our MMCert outperforms the baseline.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into sensitive workflows, raising the stakes for adversarial robustness and safety. This paper introduces Transient Turn Injection(TTI), a new multi-turn attack technique that systematically exploits stateless moderation by distributing adversarial intent across isolated interactions. TTI leverages automated attacker agents powered by large language models to iteratively test and evade policy enforcement in both commercial and open-source LLMs, marking a departure from conventional jailbreak approaches that typically depend on maintaining persistent conversational context. Our extensive evaluation across state-of-the-art models-including those from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Meta, and prominent open-source alternatives-uncovers significant variations in resilience to TTI attacks, with only select architectures exhibiting substantial inherent robustness. Our automated blackbox evaluation framework also uncovers previously unknown model specific vulnerabilities and attack surface patterns, especially within medical and high stakes domains. We further compare TTI against established adversarial prompting methods and detail practical mitigation strategies, such as session level context aggregation and deep alignment approaches. Our study underscores the urgent need for holistic, context aware defenses and continuous adversarial testing to future proof LLM deployments against evolving multi-turn threats.

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have been gaining a lot of interest due to their adaptability and extensibility in emerging applications, including communication networks. It is anticipated that ZSM networks will be able to support LLMs as a service, as they provide ultra reliable low-latency communications and closed loop massive connectivity. However, LLMs are vulnerable to data and model privacy issues that affect the trustworthiness of LLMs to be deployed for user-based services. In this paper, we explore the security vulnerabilities associated with fine-tuning LLMs in ZSM networks, in particular the membership inference attack. We define the characteristics of an attack network that can perform a membership inference attack if the attacker has access to the fine-tuned model for the downstream task. We show that the membership inference attacks are effective for any downstream task, which can lead to a personal data breach when using LLM as a service. The experimental results show that the attack success rate of maximum 92% can be achieved on named entity recognition task. Based on the experimental analysis, we discuss possible defense mechanisms and present possible research directions to make the LLMs more trustworthy in the context of ZSM networks.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance, they remain vulnerable to jailbreak. The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) with external tools via protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) introduces critical security vulnerabilities, including prompt injection, data exfiltration, and other threats. To counter these challenges, we propose MCP-GUARD, a robust, layered defense architecture designed for LLM-tool interactions. MCP-GUARD employs a three-stage detection pipeline that balances efficiency with accuracy: it progresses from lightweight static scanning for overt threats and a deep neural detector for semantic attacks, to our fine-tuned E5-based model which achieves 96.01\% accuracy in identifying adversarial prompts. Finally, an LLM arbitrator synthesizes these signals to deliver the final decision. To enable rigorous training and evaluation, we introduce MCP-ATTACKBENCH, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 70,448 samples augmented by GPT-4. This benchmark simulates diverse real-world attack vectors that circumvent conventional defenses in the MCP paradigm, thereby laying a solid foundation for future research on securing LLM-tool ecosystems.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant advancements in performance, various jailbreak attacks have posed growing safety and ethical risks. Malicious users often exploit adversarial context to deceive LLMs, prompting them to generate responses to harmful queries. In this study, we propose a new defense mechanism called Context Filtering model, an input pre-processing method designed to filter out untrustworthy and unreliable context while identifying the primary prompts containing the real user intent to uncover concealed malicious intent. Given that enhancing the safety of LLMs often compromises their helpfulness, potentially affecting the experience of benign users, our method aims to improve the safety of the LLMs while preserving their original performance. We evaluate the effectiveness of our model in defending against jailbreak attacks through comparative analysis, comparing our approach with state-of-the-art defense mechanisms against six different attacks and assessing the helpfulness of LLMs under these defenses. Our model demonstrates its ability to reduce the Attack Success Rates of jailbreak attacks by up to 88% while maintaining the original LLMs' performance, achieving state-of-the-art Safety and Helpfulness Product results. Notably, our model is a plug-and-play method that can be applied to all LLMs, including both white-box and black-box models, to enhance their safety without requiring any fine-tuning of the models themselves. We will make our model publicly available for research purposes.

While large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks, they pose potential safety concerns, such as the ``jailbreak'' problem, wherein malicious instructions can manipulate LLMs to exhibit undesirable behavior. Although several preventive measures have been developed to mitigate the potential risks associated with LLMs, they have primarily focused on English data. In this study, we reveal the presence of multilingual jailbreak challenges within LLMs and consider two potential risk scenarios: unintentional and intentional. The unintentional scenario involves users querying LLMs using non-English prompts and inadvertently bypassing the safety mechanisms, while the intentional scenario concerns malicious users combining malicious instructions with multilingual prompts to deliberately attack LLMs. The experimental results reveal that in the unintentional scenario, the rate of unsafe content increases as the availability of languages decreases. Specifically, low-resource languages exhibit three times the likelihood of encountering harmful content compared to high-resource languages, with both ChatGPT and GPT-4. In the intentional scenario, multilingual prompts can exacerbate the negative impact of malicious instructions, with astonishingly high rates of unsafe output: 80.92\% for ChatGPT and 40.71\% for GPT-4. To handle such a challenge in the multilingual context, we propose a novel Self-Defense framework that automatically generates multilingual training data for safety fine-tuning. Experimental results show that ChatGPT fine-tuned with such data can achieve a substantial reduction in unsafe content generation. Data is available at https://github.com/DAMO-NLP-SG/multilingual-safety-for-LLMs. Warning: This paper contains examples with potentially harmful content.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) into autonomous, tool-calling agents has fundamentally altered the cybersecurity landscape. Frameworks like OpenClaw grant AI systems operating-system-level permissions and the autonomy to execute complex workflows. This level of access creates unprecedented security challenges. Consequently, traditional content-filtering defenses have become obsolete. This report presents a comprehensive security analysis of the OpenClaw ecosystem. We systematically investigate its current threat landscape, highlighting critical vulnerabilities such as prompt injection-driven Remote Code Execution (RCE), sequential tool attack chains, context amnesia, and supply chain contamination. To systematically contextualize these threats, we propose a novel tri-layered risk taxonomy for autonomous Agents, categorizing vulnerabilities across AI Cognitive, Software Execution, and Information System dimensions. To address these systemic architectural flaws, we introduce the Full-Lifecycle Agent Security Architecture (FASA). This theoretical defense blueprint advocates for zero-trust agentic execution, dynamic intent verification, and cross-layer reasoning-action correlation. Building on this framework, we present Project ClawGuard, our ongoing engineering initiative. This project aims to implement the FASA paradigm and transition autonomous agents from high-risk experimental utilities into trustworthy systems. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/NY1024/ClawGuard.

Agentic systems built on large language models (LLMs) extend beyond text generation to autonomously retrieve information and invoke tools. This runtime execution model shifts the attack surface from build-time artifacts to inference-time dependencies, exposing agents to manipulation through untrusted data and probabilistic capability resolution. While prior work has focused on model-level vulnerabilities, security risks emerging from cyclic and interdependent runtime behavior remain fragmented. We systematize these risks within a unified runtime framework, categorizing threats into data supply chain attacks (transient context injection and persistent memory poisoning) and tool supply chain attacks (discovery, implementation, and invocation). We further identify the Viral Agent Loop, in which agents act as vectors for self-propagating generative worms without exploiting code-level flaws. Finally, we advocate a Zero-Trust Runtime Architecture that treats context as untrusted control flow and constrains tool execution through cryptographic provenance rather than semantic inference.

The increasing integration of AI agents into cyber-physical systems (CPS) introduces new security risks that extend beyond traditional cyber or physical threat models. Recent advances in generative AI enable deepfake and semantic manipulation attacks that can compromise agent perception, reasoning, and interaction with the physical environment, while emerging protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) further expand the attack surface through dynamic tool use and cross-domain context sharing. This survey provides a comprehensive review of security threats targeting AI agents in CPS, with a particular focus on environmental interactions, deepfake-driven attacks, and MCP-mediated vulnerabilities. We organize the literature using the SENTINEL framework, a lifecycle-aware methodology that integrates threat characterization, feasibility analysis under CPS constraints, defense selection, and continuous validation. Through an end-to-end case study grounded in a real-world smart grid deployment, we quantitatively illustrate how timing, noise, and false-positive costs constrain deployable defenses, and why detection mechanisms alone are insufficient as decision authorities in safety-critical CPS. The survey highlights the role of provenance- and physics-grounded trust mechanisms and defense-in-depth architectures, and outlines open challenges toward trustworthy AI-enabled CPS.

AI coding assistants are widely used for tasks like code generation. These tools now require large and complex contexts, automatically sourced from various originsx2014across files, projects, and contributorsx2014forming part of the prompt fed to underlying LLMs. This automatic context-gathering introduces new vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to subtly poison input to compromise the assistant's outputs, potentially generating vulnerable code or introducing critical errors. We propose a novel attack, Cross-Origin Context Poisoning (XOXO), that is challenging to detect as it relies on adversarial code modifications that are semantically equivalent. Traditional program analysis techniques struggle to identify these perturbations since the semantics of the code remains correct, making it appear legitimate. This allows attackers to manipulate coding assistants into producing incorrect outputs, while shifting the blame to the victim developer. We introduce a novel, task-agnostic, black-box attack algorithm GCGS that systematically searches the transformation space using a Cayley Graph, achieving a 75.72% attack success rate on average across five tasks and eleven models, including GPT 4.1 and Claude 3.5 Sonnet v2 used by popular AI coding assistants. Furthermore, defenses like adversarial fine-tuning are ineffective against our attack, underscoring the need for new security measures in LLM-powered coding tools.

As large language models~(LLMs) become widely adopted, ensuring their alignment with human values is crucial to prevent jailbreaks where adversaries manipulate models to produce harmful content. While most defenses target single-turn attacks, real-world usage often involves multi-turn dialogues, exposing models to attacks that exploit conversational context to bypass safety measures. We introduce MUSE, a comprehensive framework tackling multi-turn jailbreaks from both attack and defense angles. For attacks, we propose MUSE-A, a method that uses frame semantics and heuristic tree search to explore diverse semantic trajectories. For defense, we present MUSE-D, a fine-grained safety alignment approach that intervenes early in dialogues to reduce vulnerabilities. Extensive experiments on various models show that MUSE effectively identifies and mitigates multi-turn vulnerabilities. Code is available at https://github.com/yansiyu02/MUSE{https://github.com/yansiyu02/MUSE}.

LLM agents increasingly act on users' personal information, yet existing privacy defenses remain limited in both design and adaptability. Most prior approaches rely on static or passive defenses, such as prompting and guarding. These paradigms are insufficient for supporting contextual, proactive privacy decisions in multi-step agent execution. We propose Contextualized Defense Instructing (CDI), a new privacy defense paradigm in which an instructor model generates step-specific, context-aware privacy guidance during execution, proactively shaping actions rather than merely constraining or vetoing them. Crucially, CDI is paired with an experience-driven optimization framework that trains the instructor via reinforcement learning (RL), where we convert failure trajectories with privacy violations into learning environments. We formalize baseline defenses and CDI as distinct intervention points in a canonical agent loop, and compare their privacy-helpfulness trade-offs within a unified simulation framework. Results show that our CDI consistently achieves a better balance between privacy preservation (94.2%) and helpfulness (80.6%) than baselines, with superior robustness to adversarial conditions and generalization.

The integration of AI agents with Web3 ecosystems harnesses their complementary potential for autonomy and openness yet also introduces underexplored security risks, as these agents dynamically interact with financial protocols and immutable smart contracts. This paper investigates the vulnerabilities of AI agents within blockchain-based financial ecosystems when exposed to adversarial threats in real-world scenarios. We introduce the concept of context manipulation, a comprehensive attack vector that exploits unprotected context surfaces, including input channels, memory modules, and external data feeds. Through empirical analysis of ElizaOS, a decentralized AI agent framework for automated Web3 operations, we demonstrate how adversaries can manipulate context by injecting malicious instructions into prompts or historical interaction records, leading to unintended asset transfers and protocol violations which could be financially devastating. To quantify these vulnerabilities, we design CrAIBench, a Web3 domain-specific benchmark that evaluates the robustness of AI agents against context manipulation attacks across 150+ realistic blockchain tasks, including token transfers, trading, bridges and cross-chain interactions and 500+ attack test cases using context manipulation. We systematically assess attack and defense strategies, analyzing factors like the influence of security prompts, reasoning models, and the effectiveness of alignment techniques. Our findings show that prompt-based defenses are insufficient when adversaries corrupt stored context, achieving significant attack success rates despite these defenses. Fine-tuning-based defenses offer a more robust alternative, substantially reducing attack success rates while preserving utility on single-step tasks. This research highlights the urgent need to develop AI agents that are both secure and fiduciarily responsible.

We introduce enhanced Constitutional Classifiers that deliver production-grade jailbreak robustness with dramatically reduced computational costs and refusal rates compared to previous-generation defenses. Our system combines several key insights. First, we develop exchange classifiers that evaluate model responses in their full conversational context, which addresses vulnerabilities in last-generation systems that examine outputs in isolation. Second, we implement a two-stage classifier cascade where lightweight classifiers screen all traffic and escalate only suspicious exchanges to more expensive classifiers. Third, we train efficient linear probe classifiers and ensemble them with external classifiers to simultaneously improve robustness and reduce computational costs. Together, these techniques yield a production-grade system achieving a 40x computational cost reduction compared to our baseline exchange classifier, while maintaining a 0.05% refusal rate on production traffic. Through extensive red-teaming comprising over 1,700 hours, we demonstrate strong protection against universal jailbreaks -- no attack on this system successfully elicited responses to all eight target queries comparable in detail to an undefended model. Our work establishes Constitutional Classifiers as practical and efficient safeguards for large language models.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents use memory to learn from past interactions, enabling autonomous planning and decision-making in complex environments. However, this reliance on memory introduces a critical security risk: an adversary can inject seemingly harmless records into an agent's memory to manipulate its future behavior. This vulnerability is characterized by two core aspects: First, the malicious effect of injected records is only activated within a specific context, making them hard to detect when individual memory entries are audited in isolation. Second, once triggered, the manipulation can initiate a self-reinforcing error cycle: the corrupted outcome is stored as precedent, which not only amplifies the initial error but also progressively lowers the threshold for similar attacks in the future. To address these challenges, we introduce A-MemGuard (Agent-Memory Guard), the first proactive defense framework for LLM agent memory. The core idea of our work is the insight that memory itself must become both self-checking and self-correcting. Without modifying the agent's core architecture, A-MemGuard combines two mechanisms: (1) consensus-based validation, which detects anomalies by comparing reasoning paths derived from multiple related memories and (2) a dual-memory structure, where detected failures are distilled into ``lessons'' stored separately and consulted before future actions, breaking error cycles and enabling adaptation. Comprehensive evaluations on multiple benchmarks show that A-MemGuard effectively cuts attack success rates by over 95% while incurring a minimal utility cost. This work shifts LLM memory security from static filtering to a proactive, experience-driven model where defenses strengthen over time. Our code is available in https://github.com/TangciuYueng/AMemGuard

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into automated, multi-stage pipelines, risk patterns that arise from unvalidated trust between processing stages become a practical concern. This paper presents a mechanism-centered taxonomy of 41 recurring risk patterns in commercial LLMs. The analysis shows that inputs are often interpreted non-neutrally and can trigger implementation-shaped responses or unintended state changes even without explicit commands. We argue that these behaviors constitute architectural failure modes and that string-level filtering alone is insufficient. To mitigate such cross-stage vulnerabilities, we recommend zero-trust architectural principles, including provenance enforcement, context sealing, and plan revalidation, and we introduce "Countermind" as a conceptual blueprint for implementing these defenses.

AI assistants produce vulnerable code in 45% of security-relevant scenarios, introducing flaws into production systems at scale. Yet existing secure coding datasets fall short. They lack incident grounding, don't provide the scale modern training requires, and miss the operational security context developers need for production deployments. We present SecureCode v2.0, a production-grade dataset of 1,215 security-focused coding examples that passed structural validation and expert security review. Every example ties to actual documented security incidents with CVE references, provides vulnerable and secure implementations, demonstrates concrete attacks, and includes defense-in-depth operational guidance. The dataset covers 11 vulnerability categories (complete OWASP Top 10:2025 plus AI/ML Security Threats) across 11 languages (Python, JavaScript, Java, Go, PHP, C#, TypeScript, Ruby, Rust, Kotlin, and YAML for infrastructure-as-code). Our quality assurance framework ensures complete incident grounding. Each example includes SIEM integration strategies, infrastructure hardening recommendations (Docker, AppArmor, WAF configurations), and testing approaches using language-appropriate frameworks. The dataset uses a 4-turn conversational structure mirroring actual developer-AI interactions, escalating from basic implementations to advanced security considerations and defense-in-depth guidance. Our contributions: (1) 1,215 rigorously validated examples split into 989 training, 122 validation, and 104 test sets, (2) an automated validation framework ensuring dataset consistency, (3) a 4-turn conversational structure capturing realistic security workflows, (4) comprehensive operational security guidance with SIEM integration strategies, (5) complete language-specific implementation fidelity, and (6) open-source release of data, validation tools, and benchmarking protocols.

Large language models (LLMs) are improving at an exceptional rate. However, these models are still susceptible to jailbreak attacks, which are becoming increasingly dangerous as models become increasingly powerful. In this work, we introduce a dataset of jailbreaks where each example can be input in both a single or a multi-turn format. We show that while equivalent in content, they are not equivalent in jailbreak success: defending against one structure does not guarantee defense against the other. Similarly, LLM-based filter guardrails also perform differently depending on not just the input content but the input structure. Thus, vulnerabilities of frontier models should be studied in both single and multi-turn settings; this dataset provides a tool to do so.

In-context learning, a paradigm bridging the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, has demonstrated high efficacy in several NLP tasks, especially in few-shot settings. Despite being widely applied, in-context learning is vulnerable to malicious attacks. In this work, we raise security concerns regarding this paradigm. Our studies demonstrate that an attacker can manipulate the behavior of large language models by poisoning the demonstration context, without the need for fine-tuning the model. Specifically, we design a new backdoor attack method, named ICLAttack, to target large language models based on in-context learning. Our method encompasses two types of attacks: poisoning demonstration examples and poisoning demonstration prompts, which can make models behave in alignment with predefined intentions. ICLAttack does not require additional fine-tuning to implant a backdoor, thus preserving the model's generality. Furthermore, the poisoned examples are correctly labeled, enhancing the natural stealth of our attack method. Extensive experimental results across several language models, ranging in size from 1.3B to 180B parameters, demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack method, exemplified by a high average attack success rate of 95.0% across the three datasets on OPT models.

Player attribution in American football remains an open problem due to the complex nature of twenty-two players interacting on the field, but the granularity of player tracking data provides ample opportunity for novel approaches. In this work, we introduce the first public framework to evaluate spatial and trajectory tracking data of players relative to a baseline distribution of "ghost" defenders. We demonstrate our framework in the context of modeling the nearest defender positioning at the moment of catch. In particular, we provide estimates of how much better or worse their observed positioning and trajectory compared to the expected play value of ghost defenders. Our framework leverages multi-dimensional tracking data features through flexible random forests for conditional density estimation in two ways: (1) to model the distribution of receiver yards gained enabling the estimation of within-play expected value, and (2) to model the 2D spatial distribution of baseline ghost defenders. We present novel metrics for measuring player and team performance based on tracking data, and discuss challenges that remain in extending our framework to other aspects of American football.

Agentic systems involved in high-stake decision-making under adversarial pressure need formal guarantees not offered by existing approaches. Motivated by the operational needs of security operations centers (SOCs) that must configure endpoint detection and response (EDR) policies under adversarial pressure, we present a tool-mediated architecture: LLM agents use deterministic tools (Stackelberg best-response, Bayesian observer updates, attack-graph primitives) and select from finite action catalogs enforced at the tool-output interface. A composite Lyapunov function machine-checked in Lean 4 with zero sorry certifies controllability, observability from asymmetric sensor data, and Input-to-State Stability (ISS) robustness under intelligent adversarial disturbance, with two corollaries extending the certificate to any controller or adversary from the catalogs. On 282 real enterprise attack graphs, the claims hold with margin. On paired offensive/defensive telemetry, a tool-mediated Claude Sonnet 4 controller reduces the attacker's expected payoff (game value) by 59% relative to a deterministic greedy baseline, with zero variance across 40 runs at four temperatures. A Claude Haiku 4.5 controller converges to suboptimal game values but stays catalog-bounded over an additional 40 runs, demonstrating that architectural stability is not dependent on the controller capability. The LLM agent's non-determinism furthers creative exploration of strategies, while the tool-mediated architecture ensures system stability.

Web agents can autonomously complete online tasks by interacting with websites, but their exposure to open web environments makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks embedded in HTML content or visual interfaces. Existing guard models still suffer from limited generalization to unseen domains and attack patterns, high false positive rates on benign content, reduced deployment efficiency due to added latency at each step, and vulnerability to adversarial attacks that evolve over time or directly target the guard itself. To address these limitations, we propose WARD (Web Agent Robust Defense against Prompt Injection), a practical guard model for secure and efficient web agents. WARD is built on WARD-Base, a large-scale dataset with around 177K samples collected from 719 high-traffic URLs and platforms, and WARD-PIG, a dedicated dataset designed for prompt injection attacks targeting the guard model. We further introduce A3T, an adaptive adversarial attack training framework that iteratively strengthens WARD through a memory-based attacker and guard co-evolution process. Extensive experiments show that WARD achieves nearly perfect recall on out-of-distribution benchmarks, maintains low false positive rates to preserve agent utility, remains robust against guard-targeted and adaptive attacks under substantial distribution shifts, and runs efficiently in parallel with the agent without introducing additional latency.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows; however, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs. We introduce the Medical Prompt Injection Benchmark (MPIB), a dataset-and-benchmark suite for evaluating clinical safety under both direct prompt injection and indirect, RAG-mediated injection across clinically grounded tasks. MPIB emphasizes outcome-level risk via the Clinical Harm Event Rate (CHER), which measures high-severity clinical harm events under a clinically grounded taxonomy, and reports CHER alongside Attack Success Rate (ASR) to disentangle instruction compliance from downstream patient risk. The benchmark comprises 9,697 curated instances constructed through multi-stage quality gates and clinical safety linting. Evaluating MPIB across a diverse set of baseline LLMs and defense configurations, we find that ASR and CHER can diverge substantially, and that robustness depends critically on whether adversarial instructions appear in the user query or in retrieved context. We release MPIB with evaluation code, adversarial baselines, and comprehensive documentation to support reproducible and systematic research on clinical prompt injection. Code and data are available at GitHub (code) and Hugging Face (data).

Modern LLM agents combine long-term memory for personalization with tool-calling interfaces for taking actions in the world -- a combination underpinning contemporary production systems. We study a previously unexamined failure of this combination: when personality-driven biases stored in memory (cost-consciousness, impatience, risk tolerance, etc.) silently affect tool calls in contexts where they are not applicable. We call this memory-induced tool-drift and operationalize it through MEMDRIFT, a benchmark of 105 scenarios spanning five bias dimensions and seven professional domains, generated through an automated adversarial pipeline. Across seven frontier models -- including those with extended reasoning -- biased memories raise deflection scores (a judge-scored measure of parameter deviation from unbiased baselines) by up to +3.6 points on a 1--5 scale. Tool-drift persists when memory management is handled by three production memory architectures. The phenomenon affects real-world tools: scanning 6{,}062 tools across 288 verified MCP servers, we flag 608 with susceptible parameters and confirm tool-drift on a validated subset. Mechanistically, biased memories act as implicit steering vectors, pushing activations along the same latent directions as explicit behavioral instructions. They also redistribute attention from task-relevant context toward memory entries with surface-level keyword overlap to the target parameter. Standard defenses -- prompt-based relevance instructions and memory filters -- reduce drift but do not eliminate it. As agents take increasingly consequential actions on a user's behalf, memory-induced tool-drift represents a systematic vulnerability that current safeguards do not address, motivating dedicated defenses at the intersection of memory management and tool-call generation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to memorize significant portions of their training data. Parts of this memorized content have been shown to be extractable by simply querying the model, which poses a privacy risk. We present a novel approach which uses prompt-tuning to control the extraction rates of memorized content in LLMs. We present two prompt training strategies to increase and decrease extraction rates, which correspond to an attack and a defense, respectively. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques by using models from the GPT-Neo family on a public benchmark. For the 1.3B parameter GPT-Neo model, our attack yields a 9.3 percentage point increase in extraction rate compared to our baseline. Our defense can be tuned to achieve different privacy-utility trade-offs by a user-specified hyperparameter. We achieve an extraction rate reduction of up to 97.7% relative to our baseline, with a perplexity increase of 16.9%.

Voice anonymization techniques have been found to successfully obscure a speaker's acoustic identity in short, isolated utterances in benchmarks such as the VoicePrivacy Challenge. In practice, however, utterances seldom occur in isolation: long-form audio is commonplace in domains such as interviews, phone calls, and meetings. In these cases, many utterances from the same speaker are available, which pose a significantly greater privacy risk: given multiple utterances from the same speaker, an attacker could exploit an individual's vocabulary, syntax, and turns of phrase to re-identify them, even when their voice is completely disguised. To address this risk, we propose a new approach that performs a contextual rewriting of the transcripts in an ASR-TTS pipeline to eliminate speaker-specific style while preserving meaning. We present results in a long-form telephone conversation setting demonstrating the effectiveness of a content-based attack on voice-anonymized speech. Then we show how the proposed content-based anonymization methods can mitigate this risk while preserving speech utility. Overall, we find that paraphrasing is an effective defense against content-based attacks and recommend that stakeholders adopt this step to ensure anonymity in long-form audio.

Search-augmented LLMs increasingly mediate everyday consumer recommendations by retrieving live web content. This creates a new risk: generative recommenders may consume polluted web content, such as fake reviews and promotional pages crafted to mislead recommendations. We ask: to what extent do search-augmented LLMs become unwitting promoters of fake products when consuming polluted retrieval results? To answer this, we introduce FORGE (Fake Online Recommendations in Generative Environments), a benchmark for measuring fake-product promotion under controlled web-content pollution. Given an upstream search result, FORGE locally rewrites real products in retrieved web pages into fake ones to simulate web-content pollution, and measures how often the LLM recommends the fake product. FORGE covers 225 real-world products across 15 categories and 5 consumer scenarios. Across 12 commercial and open-weights LLMs, all models are vulnerable: a single polluted page yields fooled rates of up to 27%, while the full top-3 replacement raises this to 73.8%. Vulnerability varies substantially across categories, increasing when models lack stable prior knowledge of the relevant products. Reasoning does not mitigate this vulnerability; instead, it often generates spurious social proof to justify false recommendations. We evaluate three defenses: skepticism prompting and consensus filtering (over model priors or cross-document evidence). Skepticism can exacerbate vulnerability, much like reasoning, while filtering risks suppressing legitimate products. We release FORGE at https://github.com/leoluolol/forge-benchmark.

In-context learning refers to the emerging ability of large language models (LLMs) to perform a target task without additional training, utilizing demonstrations of the task. Recent studies aim to enhance in-context learning performance by selecting more useful demonstrations. However, they overlook the presence of inevitable noisy labels in task demonstrations that arise during the labeling process in the real-world. In this paper, we propose a new task, in-context learning with noisy labels, which aims to solve real-world problems for in-context learning where labels in task demonstrations would be corrupted. Moreover, we propose a new method and baseline methods for the new task, inspired by studies in learning with noisy labels. Through experiments, we demonstrate that our proposed method can serve as a safeguard against performance degradation in in-context learning caused by noisy labels.

Deep-learning based Automatic Essay Scoring (AES) systems are being actively used by states and language testing agencies alike to evaluate millions of candidates for life-changing decisions ranging from college applications to visa approvals. However, little research has been put to understand and interpret the black-box nature of deep-learning based scoring algorithms. Previous studies indicate that scoring models can be easily fooled. In this paper, we explore the reason behind their surprising adversarial brittleness. We utilize recent advances in interpretability to find the extent to which features such as coherence, content, vocabulary, and relevance are important for automated scoring mechanisms. We use this to investigate the oversensitivity i.e., large change in output score with a little change in input essay content) and overstability i.e., little change in output scores with large changes in input essay content) of AES. Our results indicate that autoscoring models, despite getting trained as "end-to-end" models with rich contextual embeddings such as BERT, behave like bag-of-words models. A few words determine the essay score without the requirement of any context making the model largely overstable. This is in stark contrast to recent probing studies on pre-trained representation learning models, which show that rich linguistic features such as parts-of-speech and morphology are encoded by them. Further, we also find that the models have learnt dataset biases, making them oversensitive. To deal with these issues, we propose detection-based protection models that can detect oversensitivity and overstability causing samples with high accuracies. We find that our proposed models are able to detect unusual attribution patterns and flag adversarial samples successfully.

Large language models (LLMs) have had a huge impact on society due to their impressive capabilities and vast knowledge of the world. Various applications and tools have been created that allow users to interact with these models in a black-box scenario. However, one limitation of this scenario is that users cannot modify the internal knowledge of the model, and the only way to add or modify internal knowledge is by explicitly mentioning it to the model during the current interaction. This learning process is called in-context training, and it refers to training that is confined to the user's current session or context. In-context learning has significant applications, but also has limitations that are seldom studied. In this paper, we present a study that shows how the model can suffer from interference between information that continually flows in the context, causing it to forget previously learned knowledge, which can reduce the model's performance. Along with showing the problem, we propose an evaluation benchmark based on the bAbI dataset.

Warning: this paper contains content that may be inappropriate or offensive. As generative models become available for public use in various applications, testing and analyzing vulnerabilities of these models has become a priority. Here we propose an automatic red teaming framework that evaluates a given model and exposes its vulnerabilities against unsafe and inappropriate content generation. Our framework uses in-context learning in a feedback loop to red team models and trigger them into unsafe content generation. We propose different in-context attack strategies to automatically learn effective and diverse adversarial prompts for text-to-image models. Our experiments demonstrate that compared to baseline approaches, our proposed strategy is significantly more effective in exposing vulnerabilities in Stable Diffusion (SD) model, even when the latter is enhanced with safety features. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed framework is effective for red teaming text-to-text models, resulting in significantly higher toxic response generation rate compared to previously reported numbers.

Self-evolving LLM agents update their internal state across sessions, often by writing and reusing long-term memory. This design improves performance on long-horizon tasks but creates a security risk: untrusted external content observed during a benign session can be stored as memory and later treated as instruction. We study this risk and formalize a persistent attack we call a Zombie Agent, where an attacker covertly implants a payload that survives across sessions, effectively turning the agent into a puppet of the attacker. We present a black-box attack framework that uses only indirect exposure through attacker-controlled web content. The attack has two phases. During infection, the agent reads a poisoned source while completing a benign task and writes the payload into long-term memory through its normal update process. During trigger, the payload is retrieved or carried forward and causes unauthorized tool behavior. We design mechanism-specific persistence strategies for common memory implementations, including sliding-window and retrieval-augmented memory, to resist truncation and relevance filtering. We evaluate the attack on representative agent setups and tasks, measuring both persistence over time and the ability to induce unauthorized actions while preserving benign task quality. Our results show that memory evolution can convert one-time indirect injection into persistent compromise, which suggests that defenses focused only on per-session prompt filtering are not sufficient for self-evolving agents.

Here, we show that current LLM unlearning methods inherently reduce models' robustness, causing them to misbehave even when a single non-adversarial forget-token is present in the retain-query. Toward understanding underlying causes, we propose a novel theoretical framework that reframes the unlearning process as a backdoor attack and defense problem: we formulate how the forgetting process inadvertently learns to align forget-tokens (backdoor triggers) with the target-representations (target labels). As a result, forget-tokens act as backdoor triggers that, when activated in retain-queries, cause disruptions in unlearned models' behaviors, similar to successful backdoor attacks. The sense that, LLM unlearning methods themselves poison the model, make it more vulnerable to forget-tokens, and hide rather than erase target knowledge, describes their true mechanism. To mitigate the vulnerability caused by the forgetting process, we reinterpret the retaining process as a backdoor defense and propose Random Noise Augmentation (RNA), a lightweight, model and method-agnostic approach with theoretical guarantees for improving the robustness of unlearned models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that RNA significantly improves the robustness of unlearned models while preserving forget and retain performances. This backdoor attack-defense framework offers insights into the mechanism of unlearning that can shed light on future research directions for improving unlearning robustness.

The same arguments often need to be evaluated under different external regimes. An agent with influence over the regime has a strategic lever that standard formalisms do not directly capture. We introduce context-dependent argumentation frameworks (CDAFs), an extension of Dung's theory in which a defeat function determines, per context, which attacks succeed. A perspective-labeled specialisation derives the defeat function from a relevance set ρ and a priority π. The relevance set is the agent's action space. In a small worked example, the agent's target argument is rejected under every full-relevance injective priority, yet accepted under partial activations, one of which no VAF audience can mirror. We define the corresponding decision problem, ACTIVATION-MANIPULATION, and record baseline complexity bounds. Tight bounds and multi-agent variants are left open.

In-context learning is the paradigm that adapts large language models to downstream tasks by providing a few examples. Few-shot selection -- selecting appropriate examples for each test instance separately -- is important for in-context learning. In this paper, we propose Skill-KNN, a skill-based few-shot selection method for in-context learning. The key advantages of Skill-KNN include: (1) it addresses the problem that existing methods based on pre-trained embeddings can be easily biased by surface natural language features that are not important for the target task; (2) it does not require training or fine-tuning of any models, making it suitable for frequently expanding or changing example banks. The key insight is to optimize the inputs fed into the embedding model, rather than tuning the model itself. Technically, Skill-KNN generates the skill-based descriptions for each test case and candidate example by utilizing a pre-processing few-shot prompting, thus eliminating unimportant surface features. Experimental results across five cross-domain semantic parsing datasets and six backbone models show that Skill-KNN significantly outperforms existing methods.

Two lines of work are taking the central stage in AI research. On the one hand, the community is making increasing efforts to build models that discard spurious correlations and generalize better in novel test environments. Unfortunately, the bitter lesson so far is that no proposal convincingly outperforms a simple empirical risk minimization baseline. On the other hand, large language models (LLMs) have erupted as algorithms able to learn in-context, generalizing on-the-fly to eclectic contextual circumstances that users enforce by means of prompting. In this paper, we argue that context is environment, and posit that in-context learning holds the key to better domain generalization. Via extensive theory and experiments, we show that paying attention to contextx2013x2013unlabeled examples as they arrivex2013x2013allows our proposed In-Context Risk Minimization (ICRM) algorithm to zoom-in on the test environment risk minimizer, leading to significant out-of-distribution performance improvements. From all of this, two messages are worth taking home. Researchers in domain generalization should consider environment as context, and harness the adaptive power of in-context learning. Researchers in LLMs should consider context as environment, to better structure data towards generalization.

While recent advancements in large language model (LLM) alignment have enabled the effective identification of malicious objectives involving scene nesting and keyword rewriting, our study reveals that these methods remain inadequate at detecting malicious objectives expressed through context within nested harmless objectives. This study identifies a previously overlooked vulnerability, which we term Attack via Implicit Reference (AIR). AIR decomposes a malicious objective into permissible objectives and links them through implicit references within the context. This method employs multiple related harmless objectives to generate malicious content without triggering refusal responses, thereby effectively bypassing existing detection techniques.Our experiments demonstrate AIR's effectiveness across state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) exceeding 90% on most models, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, and Qwen-2-72B. Notably, we observe an inverse scaling phenomenon, where larger models are more vulnerable to this attack method. These findings underscore the urgent need for defense mechanisms capable of understanding and preventing contextual attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a cross-model attack strategy that leverages less secure models to generate malicious contexts, thereby further increasing the ASR when targeting other models.Our code and jailbreak artifacts can be found at https://github.com/Lucas-TY/llm_Implicit_reference.

As generative models achieve great success, tampering and modifying the sensitive image contents (i.e., human faces, artist signatures, commercial logos, etc.) have induced a significant threat with social impact. The backdoor attack is a method that implants vulnerabilities in a target model, which can be activated through a trigger. In this work, we innovatively prevent the abuse of image content modification by implanting the backdoor into image-editing models. Once the protected sensitive content on an image is modified by an editing model, the backdoor will be triggered, making the editing fail. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that use data poisoning, to enable protection on individual images and eliminate the need for model training, we developed the first framework for run-time backdoor implantation, which is both time- and resource- efficient. We generate imperceptible perturbations on the images to inject the backdoor and define the protected area as the only backdoor trigger. Editing other unprotected insensitive areas will not trigger the backdoor, which minimizes the negative impact on legal image modifications. Evaluations with state-of-the-art image editing models show that our protective method can increase the CLIP-FID of generated images from 12.72 to 39.91, or reduce the SSIM from 0.503 to 0.167 when subjected to malicious editing. At the same time, our method exhibits minimal impact on benign editing, which demonstrates the efficacy of our proposed framework. The proposed run-time backdoor can also achieve effective protection on the latest diffusion models. Code are available.

In-context learning is a recent paradigm in natural language understanding, where a large pre-trained language model (LM) observes a test instance and a few training examples as its input, and directly decodes the output without any update to its parameters. However, performance has been shown to strongly depend on the selected training examples (termed prompt). In this work, we propose an efficient method for retrieving prompts for in-context learning using annotated data and a LM. Given an input-output pair, we estimate the probability of the output given the input and a candidate training example as the prompt, and label training examples as positive or negative based on this probability. We then train an efficient dense retriever from this data, which is used to retrieve training examples as prompts at test time. We evaluate our approach on three sequence-to-sequence tasks where language utterances are mapped to meaning representations, and find that it substantially outperforms prior work and multiple baselines across the board.

Modern retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems convert sensitive content into high-dimensional embeddings and store them in vector databases that treat the resulting numerical artifacts as opaque. Major vector-store products do not provide native controls for embedding integrity, ingestion-time distributional anomaly detection, or cryptographic provenance attestation. We show this opens a class of steganographic exfiltration attacks: an attacker with write access to the ingestion pipeline can hide payload data inside embeddings using simple post-embedding perturbations (noise injection, rotation, scaling, offset, fragmentation, and combinations thereof) while preserving the surface-level retrieval behavior the RAG system exposes to legitimate users. We evaluate these techniques across a synthetic-PII corpus on text-embedding-3-large, four locally hosted open embedding models, a cross-corpus replication on BEIR NFCorpus and a Quora subset (over 26,000 chunks combined), seven vector-store configurations, an adaptive-attacker variant of the detector evaluation, and a paraphrased-query retrieval benchmark. Distribution-shifting perturbations are often caught by simple anomaly detectors; small-angle orthogonal rotation defeats distribution-based detection across every (model, corpus) pair tested. A disjoint-Givens rotation encoder gives a closed-form per-vector capacity ceiling of floor(d/2) * b bits, but real embedding manifolds impose a capacity-detectability trade-off, and the retrieval-preserving operating point sits well below it. We propose VectorPin, a cryptographic provenance protocol that pins each embedding to its source content and producing model via an Ed25519 signature over a canonical byte representation. Any post-embedding modification breaks signature verification. Embedding-level integrity is a deployable, standardizable control that closes this attack class.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have made significant strides in multimodal comprehension, thanks to extensive pre-training and fine-tuning on large-scale visual datasets. However, despite their robust textual safety mechanisms, they remain vulnerable to harmful visual inputs. Existing safeguards-typically relying on pre-filtering or fine-tuning-incur high costs and diminish overall utility. To address this critical vulnerability, we introduce SafeCLIP, a lightweight method that leverages LVLMs inherent multimodal alignment for zero-shot toxic image detection. By projecting CLIPs discarded CLS token into its text space and matching it with toxic descriptors, SafeCLIP detects harmful content without any architectural changes-adding minimal latency and enabling dynamic safety corrections during inference and fine-tuning.Experiments show that SafeCLIP achieves a 66.9% defense success rate with only 3.2% false positive rate and 7.2% overhead. In contrast, state-of-the-art methods achieve 52.9% success but have a 10.7% false positive rate and 210% overhead. Our work demonstrates that leveraging inherent multimodal alignment can yield efficient, low-cost LVLM safety. Code is available at anonymous.4open.science/r/safeclip-2C01.

Deceptive web content, widely instantiated across the internet and commonly known as social-engineering attacks, manipulates autonomous web agents into submitting users' personally identifiable information (PII) to attacker-controlled endpoints. In this paper, we show that social-engineering attacks are highly effective at extracting critical-tier PII from frontier web agents, posing a severe risk to deployed agentic systems. To quantify this risk, we introduce \textsc{Scammer4U}, a pre-registered benchmark of 91 attacker-controlled environments and 10 benign-twin baselines, spanning 8 attack vectors and 16 site categories on an 8-axis factorial taxonomy that isolates the causal contribution of individual attack design factors. Across frontier agents, we find that critical-tier PII leakage reaches 54--93\% under no privacy guidance, compared to 0\% on benign-twin baselines, confirming that leakage is attack-attributable rather than incidental form-filling. Escalating prompt-level mitigation yields sharply model-dependent reductions across the four families and remains insufficient to reliably prevent critical PII submission at the pooled level. Most critically, we identify a detection--action gap: agents whose reasoning an independent LLM judge confirms has flagged the site as suspicious still submit critical PII in 35.9\% of sessions, versus 66.1\% when no suspicion is verbalized, a 30.2\% gap robust across all four model families. Our findings reveal that defenses conditioned on the agent's own recognition of an attack are gating on the wrong signal, motivating output-level interception of outbound submissions that operates independently of the agent's reasoning loop.

Typographic attacks exploit multi-modal systems by injecting text into images, leading to targeted misclassifications, malicious content generation and even Vision-Language Model jailbreaks. In this work, we analyze how CLIP vision encoders behave under typographic attacks, locating specialized attention heads in the latter half of the model's layers that causally extract and transmit typographic information to the cls token. Building on these insights, we introduce Dyslexify - a method to defend CLIP models against typographic attacks by selectively ablating a typographic circuit, consisting of attention heads. Without requiring finetuning, dyslexify improves performance by up to 22.06% on a typographic variant of ImageNet-100, while reducing standard ImageNet-100 accuracy by less than 1%, and demonstrate its utility in a medical foundation model for skin lesion diagnosis. Notably, our training-free approach remains competitive with current state-of-the-art typographic defenses that rely on finetuning. To this end, we release a family of dyslexic CLIP models which are significantly more robust against typographic attacks. These models serve as suitable drop-in replacements for a broad range of safety-critical applications, where the risks of text-based manipulation outweigh the utility of text recognition.

The growing misuse of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) has led providers to deploy multiple safeguards, including alignment tuning, system prompts, and content moderation. However, the real-world robustness of these defenses against adversarial attacks remains underexplored. We introduce Multi-Faceted Attack (MFA), a framework that systematically exposes general safety vulnerabilities in leading defense-equipped VLMs such as GPT-4o, Gemini-Pro, and Llama-4. The core component of MFA is the Attention-Transfer Attack (ATA), which hides harmful instructions inside a meta task with competing objectives. We provide a theoretical perspective based on reward hacking to explain why this attack succeeds. To improve cross-model transferability, we further introduce a lightweight transfer-enhancement algorithm combined with a simple repetition strategy that jointly bypasses both input-level and output-level filters without model-specific fine-tuning. Empirically, we show that adversarial images optimized for one vision encoder transfer broadly to unseen VLMs, indicating that shared visual representations create a cross-model safety vulnerability. Overall, MFA achieves a 58.5% success rate and consistently outperforms existing methods. On state-of-the-art commercial models, MFA reaches a 52.8% success rate, surpassing the second-best attack by 34%. These results challenge the perceived robustness of current defense mechanisms and highlight persistent safety weaknesses in modern VLMs. Code: https://github.com/cure-lab/MultiFacetedAttack

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.

Tool-augmented LLM agents introduce security risks that extend beyond user-input filtering, including indirect prompt injection through fetched content, unsafe tool execution, credential leakage, and tampering with local control files. We present OpenClaw PRISM, a zero-fork runtime security layer for OpenClaw-based agent gateways. PRISM combines an in-process plugin with optional sidecar services and distributes enforcement across ten lifecycle hooks spanning message ingress, prompt construction, tool execution, tool-result persistence, outbound messaging, sub-agent spawning, and gateway startup. Rather than introducing a novel detection model, PRISM integrates a hybrid heuristic-plus-LLM scanning pipeline, conversation- and session-scoped risk accumulation with TTL-based decay, policy-enforced controls over tools, paths, private networks, domain tiers, and outbound secret patterns, and a tamper-evident audit and operations plane with integrity verification and hot-reloadable policy management. We outline an evaluation methodology and benchmark pipeline for measuring security effectiveness, false positives, layer contribution, runtime overhead, and operational recoverability in an agent-runtime setting, and we report current preliminary benchmark results on curated same-slice experiments and operational microbenchmarks. The system targets deployable runtime defense for real agent gateways rather than benchmark-only detection.

In-context learning, a capability that enables a model to learn from input examples on the fly without necessitating weight updates, is a defining characteristic of large language models. In this work, we follow the setting proposed in (Garg et al., 2022) to better understand the generality and limitations of in-context learning from the lens of the simple yet fundamental task of linear regression. The key question we aim to address is: Are transformers more adept than some natural and simpler architectures at performing in-context learning under varying distribution shifts? To compare transformers, we propose to use a simple architecture based on set-based Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs). We find that both transformers and set-based MLPs exhibit in-context learning under in-distribution evaluations, but transformers more closely emulate the performance of ordinary least squares (OLS). Transformers also display better resilience to mild distribution shifts, where set-based MLPs falter. However, under severe distribution shifts, both models' in-context learning abilities diminish.

In-context learning (ICL) is the ability of a model to learn a new task by observing a few exemplars in its context. While prevalent in NLP, this capability has recently also been observed in Reinforcement Learning (RL) settings. Prior in-context RL methods, however, require entire episodes in the agent's context. Given that complex environments typically lead to long episodes with sparse rewards, these methods are constrained to simple environments with short episodes. To address these challenges, we introduce Retrieval-Augmented Decision Transformer (RA-DT). RA-DT employs an external memory mechanism to store past experiences from which it retrieves only sub-trajectories relevant for the current situation. The retrieval component in RA-DT does not require training and can be entirely domain-agnostic. We evaluate the capabilities of RA-DT on grid-world environments, robotics simulations, and procedurally-generated video games. On grid-worlds, RA-DT outperforms baselines, while using only a fraction of their context length. Furthermore, we illuminate the limitations of current in-context RL methods on complex environments and discuss future directions. To facilitate future research, we release datasets for four of the considered environments.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Large language models (LLMs) have become integral to our professional workflows and daily lives. Nevertheless, these machine companions of ours have a critical flaw: the huge amount of data which endows them with vast and diverse knowledge, also exposes them to the inevitable toxicity and bias. While most LLMs incorporate defense mechanisms to prevent the generation of harmful content, these safeguards can be easily bypassed with minimal prompt engineering. In this paper, we introduce the new Thoroughly Engineered Toxicity (TET) dataset, comprising manually crafted prompts designed to nullify the protective layers of such models. Through extensive evaluations, we demonstrate the pivotal role of TET in providing a rigorous benchmark for evaluation of toxicity awareness in several popular LLMs: it highlights the toxicity in the LLMs that might remain hidden when using normal prompts, thus revealing subtler issues in their behavior.

Watermarking enables GenAI providers to verify whether content was generated by their models. A watermark is a hidden signal in the content, whose presence can be detected using a secret watermark key. A core security threat are forgery attacks, where adversaries insert the provider's watermark into content not produced by the provider, potentially damaging their reputation and undermining trust. Existing defenses resist forgery by embedding many watermarks with multiple keys into the same content, which can degrade model utility. However, forgery remains a threat when attackers can collect sufficiently many watermarked samples. We propose a defense that is provably forgery-resistant independent of the number of watermarked content collected by the attacker, provided they cannot easily distinguish watermarks from different keys. Our scheme does not further degrade model utility. We randomize the watermark key selection for each query and accept content as genuine only if a watermark is detected by exactly one key. We focus on the image and text modalities, but our defense is modality-agnostic, since it treats the underlying watermarking method as a black-box. Our method provably bounds the attacker's success rate and we empirically observe a reduction from near-perfect success rates to only 2% at negligible computational overhead.

Large language models (LLMs) are reshaping numerous facets of our daily lives, leading widespread adoption as web-based services. Despite their versatility, LLMs face notable challenges, such as generating hallucinated content and lacking access to up-to-date information. Lately, to address such limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising direction by generating responses grounded in external knowledge sources. A typical RAG system consists of i) a retriever that probes a group of relevant passages from a knowledge base and ii) a generator that formulates a response based on the retrieved content. However, as with other AI systems, recent studies demonstrate the vulnerability of RAG, such as knowledge corruption attacks by injecting misleading information. In response, several defense strategies have been proposed, including having LLMs inspect the retrieved passages individually or fine-tuning robust retrievers. While effective, such approaches often come with substantial computational costs. In this work, we introduce RAGDefender, a resource-efficient defense mechanism against knowledge corruption (i.e., by data poisoning) attacks in practical RAG deployments. RAGDefender operates during the post-retrieval phase, leveraging lightweight machine learning techniques to detect and filter out adversarial content without requiring additional model training or inference. Our empirical evaluations show that RAGDefender consistently outperforms existing state-of-the-art defenses across multiple models and adversarial scenarios: e.g., RAGDefender reduces the attack success rate (ASR) against the Gemini model from 0.89 to as low as 0.02, compared to 0.69 for RobustRAG and 0.24 for Discern-and-Answer when adversarial passages outnumber legitimate ones by a factor of four (4x).

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) are increasingly vulnerable to AI-generated extremist content, including photorealistic images and text, which can be used to bypass safety mechanisms and generate harmful outputs. However, existing datasets for evaluating LMM robustness offer limited exploration of extremist content, often lacking AI-generated images, diverse image generation models, and comprehensive coverage of historical events, which hinders a complete assessment of model vulnerabilities. To fill this gap, we introduce ExtremeAIGC, a benchmark dataset and evaluation framework designed to assess LMM vulnerabilities against such content. ExtremeAIGC simulates real-world events and malicious use cases by curating diverse text- and image-based examples crafted using state-of-the-art image generation techniques. Our study reveals alarming weaknesses in LMMs, demonstrating that even cutting-edge safety measures fail to prevent the generation of extremist material. We systematically quantify the success rates of various attack strategies, exposing critical gaps in current defenses and emphasizing the need for more robust mitigation strategies.

Text-to-image (T2I) models have rapidly advanced, enabling the generation of high-quality images from text prompts across various domains. However, these models present notable safety concerns, including the risk of generating harmful, biased, or private content. Current research on assessing T2I safety remains in its early stages. While some efforts have been made to evaluate models on specific safety dimensions, many critical risks remain unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce T2ISafety, a safety benchmark that evaluates T2I models across three key domains: toxicity, fairness, and bias. We build a detailed hierarchy of 12 tasks and 44 categories based on these three domains, and meticulously collect 70K corresponding prompts. Based on this taxonomy and prompt set, we build a large-scale T2I dataset with 68K manually annotated images and train an evaluator capable of detecting critical risks that previous work has failed to identify, including risks that even ultra-large proprietary models like GPTs cannot correctly detect. We evaluate 12 prominent diffusion models on T2ISafety and reveal several concerns including persistent issues with racial fairness, a tendency to generate toxic content, and significant variation in privacy protection across the models, even with defense methods like concept erasing. Data and evaluator are released under https://github.com/adwardlee/t2i_safety.

In-context learning (ICL) allows a language model to improve its problem-solving capability when provided with suitable information in context. Since the choice of in-context information can be determined based on the problem itself, in-context learning is analogous to human learning from teachers in a classroom. Recent works (Didolkar et al., 2024a; 2024b) show that ICL performance can be improved by leveraging a frontier large language model's (LLM) ability to predict required skills to solve a problem, popularly referred to as an LLM's metacognition, and using the recommended skills to construct necessary in-context examples. While this skill-based strategy boosts ICL performance in larger models, its gains on small language models (SLMs) have been minimal, highlighting a performance gap in ICL capabilities. We investigate this gap and show that skill-based prompting can hurt SLM performance on easy questions by introducing unnecessary information, akin to cognitive overload. To address this, we introduce AdaptMI, an adaptive approach to selecting skill-based in-context Math Instructions for SLMs. Inspired by cognitive load theory from human pedagogy, our method only introduces skill-based examples when the model performs poorly. We further propose AdaptMI+, which adds examples targeted to the specific skills missing from the model's responses. On 5-shot evaluations across popular math benchmarks and five SLMs (1B--7B; Qwen, Llama), AdaptMI+ improves accuracy by up to 6% over naive skill-based strategies.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

In-context Learning (ICL) empowers large language models (LLMs) to adapt to unseen tasks during inference by prefixing a few demonstration examples prior to test queries. Despite its versatility, ICL incurs substantial computational and memory overheads compared to zero-shot learning and is susceptible to the selection and order of demonstration examples. In this work, we introduce Implicit In-context Learning (I2CL), an innovative paradigm that addresses the challenges associated with traditional ICL by absorbing demonstration examples within the activation space. I2CL first generates a condensed vector representation, namely a context vector, from the demonstration examples. It then integrates the context vector during inference by injecting a linear combination of the context vector and query activations into the model's residual streams. Empirical evaluation on nine real-world tasks across three model architectures demonstrates that I2CL achieves few-shot performance with zero-shot cost and exhibits robustness against the variation of demonstration examples. Furthermore, I2CL facilitates a novel representation of "task-ids", enhancing task similarity detection and enabling effective transfer learning. We provide a comprehensive analysis of I2CL, offering deeper insights into its mechanisms and broader implications for ICL. The source code is available at: https://github.com/LzVv123456/I2CL.

In-context learning (ICL) is a powerful paradigm emerged from large language models (LLMs). Despite its promises, ICL performance is known to be highly sensitive to input examples. In this work, we use in-context influences to analyze few-shot ICL performance directly from the in-context examples. Our proposed influence-based example selection method can identify both positive and negative examples, outperforming several baselines when evaluated on 9 SuperGLUE tasks. Our analysis uncovers up to a 16.3% performance gap between using the most negative in-context examples compared to the most positive. In a case study, we apply our influence-based framework to quantify the phenomena of recency bias in example ordering for few-shot ICL.

In-context learning (ICL) is the standard method for low-resource classification, yet its efficacy in specialized domains remains largely unexplored. We address the challenge of classifying semantically complex, multi-party B2B conversations, where traditional ICL encounters significant limitations, especially as context length increases due to the concatenation of multiple few-shot examples. We introduce the Call Playbook dataset, featuring five classification tasks derived from real-world B2B conversations targeting core sales concepts. To bridge the gap between performance and practical utility, we propose novel knowledge extraction methods that distill verbose examples into compact, interpretable representations of structured classification criteria and precise task descriptions. Our approach achieves a 99\% reduction in token usage and improves macro-averaged AUC by up to 7\% over traditional ICL. Notably, it remains robust as context grows, unlike advanced token compression baselines which degrade by over 9 F1 points. Importantly, our framework enables direct refinement of classification logic, addressing critical needs for transparency, efficiency, and user interaction in real-world NLP applications.

In-context learning (ICL) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform tasks using few demonstrations, facilitating task adaptation when labeled examples are hard to obtain. However, ICL is sensitive to the choice of demonstrations, and it remains unclear which demonstration attributes enable in-context generalization. In this work, we conduct a perturbation study of in-context demonstrations for low-resource Named Entity Detection (NED). Our surprising finding is that in-context demonstrations with partially correct annotated entity mentions can be as effective for task transfer as fully correct demonstrations. Based off our findings, we propose Pseudo-annotated In-Context Learning (PICLe), a framework for in-context learning with noisy, pseudo-annotated demonstrations. PICLe leverages LLMs to annotate many demonstrations in a zero-shot first pass. We then cluster these synthetic demonstrations, sample specific sets of in-context demonstrations from each cluster, and predict entity mentions using each set independently. Finally, we use self-verification to select the final set of entity mentions. We evaluate PICLe on five biomedical NED datasets and show that, with zero human annotation, PICLe outperforms ICL in low-resource settings where limited gold examples can be used as in-context demonstrations.

Language Models (LMs) emit Chains-of-Thought (CoTs) that drive much of their capability. However, the same sequence that carries useful reasoning can also covertly convey messages: a misaligned model may embed covert information in its CoT that slips through human supervision, a form of steganography known as encoded reasoning. Prior LM steganography schemes operate in the token or lexical space, and a content-preserving paraphraser is the canonical and effective defense in recent work. We introduce conceptual steganography, in which each step of a CoT carries information through patterns of high-level reasoning behavior, rather than through lexical choice. Across four model families and two reasoning domains, this backdoor communication channel is shown to be consistently more robust to a strong paraphrase defense than standard keyword approaches, and the encoding of information into CoTs does not affect their utility in the reasoning process. Having raised awareness of this new risk, we then demonstrate that a strategy-aware paraphraser can close much of the channel, highlighting new challenges and recommended defenses for ensuring faithful LLM reasoning in the wild.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

In-context learning (ICL) improves language models' performance on a variety of NLP tasks by simply demonstrating a handful of examples at inference time. It is not well understood why ICL ability emerges, as the model has never been specifically trained on such demonstrations. Unlike prior work that explores implicit mechanisms behind ICL, we study ICL via investigating the pretraining data. Specifically, we first adapt an iterative, gradient-based approach to find a small subset of pretraining data that supports ICL. We observe that a continued pretraining on this small subset significantly improves the model's ICL ability, by up to 18%. We then compare the supportive subset constrastively with random subsets of pretraining data and discover: (1) The supportive pretraining data to ICL do not have a higher domain relevance to downstream tasks. (2) The supportive pretraining data have a higher mass of rarely occurring, long-tail tokens. (3) The supportive pretraining data are challenging examples where the information gain from long-range context is below average, indicating learning to incorporate difficult long-range context encourages ICL. Our work takes a first step towards understanding ICL via analyzing instance-level pretraining data. Our insights have a potential to enhance the ICL ability of language models by actively guiding the construction of pretraining data in the future.

Recent studies on transformer-based language models show that they can answer questions by reasoning over knowledge provided as part of the context (i.e., in-context reasoning). However, since the available knowledge is often not filtered for a particular question, in-context reasoning can be sensitive to distractor facts, additional content that is irrelevant to a question but that may be relevant for a different question (i.e., not necessarily random noise). In these situations, the model fails to distinguish the knowledge that is necessary to answer the question, leading to spurious reasoning and degraded performance. This reasoning failure contrasts with the model's apparent ability to distinguish its contextual knowledge from all the knowledge it has memorized during pre-training. Following this observation, we propose teaching the model to reason more robustly by folding the provided contextual knowledge into the model's parameters before presenting it with a question. Our method, RECKONING, is a bi-level learning algorithm that teaches language models to reason by updating their parametric knowledge through back-propagation, allowing them to then answer questions using the updated parameters. During training, the inner loop rapidly adapts a copy of the model weights to encode contextual knowledge into its parameters. In the outer loop, the model learns to use the updated weights to reproduce and answer reasoning questions about the memorized knowledge. Our experiments on two multi-hop reasoning datasets show that RECKONING's performance improves over the in-context reasoning baseline (by up to 4.5%). We also find that compared to in-context reasoning, RECKONING generalizes better to longer reasoning chains unseen during training, is more robust to distractors in the context, and is more computationally efficient when multiple questions are asked about the same knowledge.

Warning: This paper contains content that may be offensive or upsetting. Understanding the harms and offensiveness of statements requires reasoning about the social and situational context in which statements are made. For example, the utterance "your English is very good" may implicitly signal an insult when uttered by a white man to a non-white colleague, but uttered by an ESL teacher to their student would be interpreted as a genuine compliment. Such contextual factors have been largely ignored by previous approaches to toxic language detection. We introduce COBRA frames, the first context-aware formalism for explaining the intents, reactions, and harms of offensive or biased statements grounded in their social and situational context. We create COBRACORPUS, a dataset of 33k potentially offensive statements paired with machine-generated contexts and free-text explanations of offensiveness, implied biases, speaker intents, and listener reactions. To study the contextual dynamics of offensiveness, we train models to generate COBRA explanations, with and without access to the context. We find that explanations by context-agnostic models are significantly worse than by context-aware ones, especially in situations where the context inverts the statement's offensiveness (29% accuracy drop). Our work highlights the importance and feasibility of contextualized NLP by modeling social factors.

In-context learning (ICL) has emerged as a new approach to various natural language processing tasks, utilizing large language models (LLMs) to make predictions based on context that has been supplemented with a few examples or task-specific instructions. In this paper, we aim to extend this method to question answering tasks that utilize structured knowledge sources, and improve Text-to-SQL systems by exploring various prompt design strategies for employing LLMs. We conduct a systematic investigation into different demonstration selection methods and optimal instruction formats for prompting LLMs in the Text-to-SQL task. Our approach involves leveraging the syntactic structure of an example's SQL query to retrieve demonstrations, and we demonstrate that pursuing both diversity and similarity in demonstration selection leads to enhanced performance. Furthermore, we show that LLMs benefit from database-related knowledge augmentations. Our most effective strategy outperforms the state-of-the-art system by 2.5 points (Execution Accuracy) and the best fine-tuned system by 5.1 points on the Spider dataset. These results highlight the effectiveness of our approach in adapting LLMs to the Text-to-SQL task, and we present an analysis of the factors contributing to the success of our strategy.

In-Context Learning (ICL) is a technique by which language models make predictions based on examples provided in their input context. Previously, their context window size imposed a limit on the number of examples that can be shown, making example selection techniques crucial for identifying the maximally effective set of examples. However, the recent advent of Long Context Language Models (LCLMs) has significantly increased the number of examples that can be included in context, raising an important question of whether ICL performance in a many-shot regime is still sensitive to the method of sample selection. To answer this, we revisit these approaches in the context of LCLMs through extensive experiments on 18 datasets spanning 4 tasks. Surprisingly, we observe that sophisticated example selection techniques do not yield significant improvements over a simple random sample selection method. Instead, we find that the advent of LCLMs has fundamentally shifted the challenge of ICL from that of selecting the most effective examples to that of collecting sufficient examples to fill the context window. Specifically, in certain datasets, including all available examples does not fully utilize the context window; however, by augmenting the examples in context with a simple data augmentation approach, we substantially improve ICL performance by 5%.

While large neural-based conversational models have become increasingly proficient dialogue agents, recent work has highlighted safety issues with these systems. For example, these systems can be goaded into generating toxic content, which often perpetuates social biases or stereotypes. We investigate a retrieval-based method for reducing bias and toxicity in responses from chatbots. It uses in-context learning to steer a model towards safer generations. Concretely, to generate a response to an unsafe dialogue context, we retrieve demonstrations of safe responses to similar dialogue contexts. We find our method performs competitively with strong baselines without requiring training. For instance, using automatic evaluation, we find our best fine-tuned baseline only generates safe responses to unsafe dialogue contexts from DiaSafety 4.04% more than our approach. Finally, we also propose a re-ranking procedure which can further improve response safeness.

In-context learning (ICL) has shown impressive results in few-shot learning tasks, yet its underlying mechanism is still not fully understood. A recent line of work suggests that ICL performs gradient descent (GD)-based optimization implicitly. While appealing, much of the research focuses on simplified settings, where the parameters of a shallow model are optimized. In this work, we revisit evidence for ICL-GD correspondence on realistic NLP tasks and models. We find gaps in evaluation, both in terms of problematic metrics and insufficient baselines. We show that surprisingly, even untrained models achieve comparable ICL-GD similarity scores despite not exhibiting ICL. Next, we explore a major discrepancy in the flow of information throughout the model between ICL and GD, which we term Layer Causality. We propose a simple GD-based optimization procedure that respects layer causality, and show it improves similarity scores significantly.

With the increasing ability of large language models (LLMs), in-context learning (ICL) has become a new paradigm for natural language processing (NLP), where LLMs make predictions only based on contexts augmented with a few examples. It has been a new trend to explore ICL to evaluate and extrapolate the ability of LLMs. In this paper, we aim to survey and summarize the progress and challenges of ICL. We first present a formal definition of ICL and clarify its correlation to related studies. Then, we organize and discuss advanced techniques, including training strategies, demonstration designing strategies, as well as related analysis. Finally, we discuss the challenges of ICL and provide potential directions for further research. We hope that our work can encourage more research on uncovering how ICL works and improving ICL.

Recently, extensive studies in Reinforcement Learning have been carried out on the ability of transformers to adapt in-context to various environments and tasks. Current in-context RL methods are limited by their strict requirements for data, which needs to be generated by RL agents or labeled with actions from an optimal policy. In order to address this prevalent problem, we propose AD^varepsilon, a new data acquisition approach that enables in-context Reinforcement Learning from noise-induced curriculum. We show that it is viable to construct a synthetic noise injection curriculum which helps to obtain learning histories. Moreover, we experimentally demonstrate that it is possible to alleviate the need for generation using optimal policies, with in-context RL still able to outperform the best suboptimal policy in a learning dataset by a 2x margin.

The emergent ability of Large Language Models to use a small number of examples to learn to perform in novel domains and tasks, also called in-context learning (ICL). In this work, we show that a much smaller model can be trained to perform ICL by fine-tuning towards a specialized training objective, exemplified on the task of domain adaptation for neural machine translation. With this capacity for ICL, the model can take advantage of relevant few-shot examples to adapt its output towards the domain. We compare the quality of this domain adaptation to traditional supervised techniques and ICL with a 40B-parameter Large Language Model. Our approach allows efficient batch inference on a mix of domains and outperforms state-of-the-art baselines in terms of both translation quality and immediate adaptation rate, i.e. the ability to reproduce a specific term after being shown a single example.

In-context learning is a new learning paradigm where a language model conditions on a few input-output pairs (demonstrations) and a test input, and directly outputs the prediction. It has been shown highly dependent on the provided demonstrations and thus promotes the research of demonstration retrieval: given a test input, relevant examples are retrieved from the training set to serve as informative demonstrations for in-context learning. While previous works focus on training task-specific retrievers for several tasks separately, these methods are often hard to transfer and scale on various tasks, and separately trained retrievers incur a lot of parameter storage and deployment cost. In this paper, we propose Unified Demonstration Retriever (UDR), a single model to retrieve demonstrations for a wide range of tasks. To train UDR, we cast various tasks' training signals into a unified list-wise ranking formulation by language model's feedback. Then we propose a multi-task list-wise ranking training framework, with an iterative mining strategy to find high-quality candidates, which can help UDR fully incorporate various tasks' signals. Experiments on 30+ tasks across 13 task families and multiple data domains show that UDR significantly outperforms baselines. Further analyses show the effectiveness of each proposed component and UDR's strong ability in various scenarios including different LMs (1.3B - 175B), unseen datasets, varying demonstration quantities, etc.

In-context learning is a promising paradigm that utilizes in-context examples as prompts for the predictions of large language models. These prompts are crucial for achieving strong performance. However, since the prompts need to be sampled from a large volume of annotated examples, finding the right prompt may result in high annotation costs. To address this challenge, this paper introduces an influence-driven selective annotation method that aims to minimize annotation costs while improving the quality of in-context examples. The essence of our method is to select a pivotal subset from a large-scale unlabeled data pool to annotate for the subsequent sampling of prompts. Specifically, a directed graph is first constructed to represent unlabeled data. Afterward, the influence of candidate unlabeled subsets is quantified with a diffusion process. A simple yet effective greedy algorithm for unlabeled data selection is lastly introduced. It iteratively selects the data if it provides a maximum marginal gain with respect to quantified influence. Compared with previous efforts on selective annotations, our influence-driven method works in an end-to-end manner, avoids an intractable explicit balance between data diversity and representativeness, and enjoys theoretical support. Experiments confirm the superiority of the proposed method on various benchmarks, achieving better performance under lower time consumption during subset selection. The project page is available at https://skzhang1.github.io/IDEAL/.

Recent advancements in natural language processing have highlighted the vulnerability of deep learning models to adversarial attacks. While various defence mechanisms have been proposed, there is a lack of comprehensive benchmarks that evaluate these defences across diverse datasets, models, and tasks. In this work, we address this gap by presenting an extensive benchmark for textual adversarial defence that significantly expands upon previous work. Our benchmark incorporates a wide range of datasets, evaluates state-of-the-art defence mechanisms, and extends the assessment to include critical tasks such as single-sentence classification, similarity and paraphrase identification, natural language inference, and commonsense reasoning. This work not only serves as a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners in the field of adversarial robustness but also identifies key areas for future research in textual adversarial defence. By establishing a new standard for benchmarking in this domain, we aim to accelerate progress towards more robust and reliable natural language processing systems.

This work presents In-Context Policy Iteration, an algorithm for performing Reinforcement Learning (RL), in-context, using foundation models. While the application of foundation models to RL has received considerable attention, most approaches rely on either (1) the curation of expert demonstrations (either through manual design or task-specific pretraining) or (2) adaptation to the task of interest using gradient methods (either fine-tuning or training of adapter layers). Both of these techniques have drawbacks. Collecting demonstrations is labor-intensive, and algorithms that rely on them do not outperform the experts from which the demonstrations were derived. All gradient techniques are inherently slow, sacrificing the "few-shot" quality that made in-context learning attractive to begin with. In this work, we present an algorithm, ICPI, that learns to perform RL tasks without expert demonstrations or gradients. Instead we present a policy-iteration method in which the prompt content is the entire locus of learning. ICPI iteratively updates the contents of the prompt from which it derives its policy through trial-and-error interaction with an RL environment. In order to eliminate the role of in-weights learning (on which approaches like Decision Transformer rely heavily), we demonstrate our algorithm using Codex, a language model with no prior knowledge of the domains on which we evaluate it.

Large-scale pre-trained language models (PLMs) are well-known for being capable of solving a task simply by conditioning a few input-label pairs dubbed demonstrations on a prompt without being explicitly tuned for the desired downstream task. Such a process (i.e., in-context learning), however, naturally leads to high reliance on the demonstrations which are usually selected from external datasets. In this paper, we propose self-generated in-context learning (SG-ICL), which generates demonstrations for in-context learning from PLM itself to minimize the reliance on the external demonstration. We conduct experiments on four different text classification tasks and show SG-ICL significantly outperforms zero-shot learning and is generally worth approximately 0.6 gold training samples. Moreover, our generated demonstrations show more consistent performance with low variance compared to randomly selected demonstrations from the training dataset.

While large language models (LLMs) exhibit strong reasoning abilities, their performance on complex tasks is often constrained by the limitations of their internal knowledge. A compelling approach to overcome this challenge is to augment these models with external tools -- such as Python interpreters for mathematical computations or search engines for retrieving factual information. However, enabling models to use these tools effectively remains a significant challenge. Existing methods typically rely on cold-start pipelines that begin with supervised fine-tuning (SFT), followed by reinforcement learning (RL). These approaches often require substantial amounts of labeled data for SFT, which is expensive to annotate or synthesize. In this work, we propose In-Context Reinforcement Learning (ICRL), an RL-only framework that eliminates the need for SFT by leveraging few-shot prompting during the rollout stage of RL. Specifically, ICRL introduces in-context examples within the rollout prompts to teach the model how to invoke external tools. Furthermore, as training progresses, the number of in-context examples is gradually reduced, eventually reaching a zero-shot setting where the model learns to call tools independently. We conduct extensive experiments across a range of reasoning and tool-use benchmarks. Results show that ICRL achieves state-of-the-art performance, demonstrating its effectiveness as a scalable, data-efficient alternative to traditional SFT-based pipelines.

Auditory Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance across a wide range of speech and audio understanding tasks. Nevertheless, they often struggle when applied to low-resource tasks. In case in-domain labeled data are scarce or mismatched with the true test distribution, direct fine-tuning can be brittle. In-Context Learning (ICL) provides a training-free, inference-time solution by adapting auditory LLMs through conditioning on a few in-domain demonstrations. In this work, we first show that Vanilla ICL, improves zero-shot performance across diverse speech and audio tasks for selected models which suggest that this ICL adaptation capability can be generalized to multimodal setting. Building on this, we propose Meta Speech In-Context Learning (MetaSICL), a post-training recipe utilizes only high resource speech data from various tasks intending to strengthen model's in-context learning capability. Experiments indicate our proposed method outperforms direct fine-tuning in low-resource scenario.

In-Context Learning (ICL) enhances the performance of large language models (LLMs) with demonstrations. However, obtaining these demonstrations primarily relies on manual effort. In most real-world scenarios, users are often unwilling or unable to provide such demonstrations. Inspired by the human analogy, we explore a new ICL paradigm CrossICL to study how to utilize existing source task demonstrations in the ICL for target tasks, thereby obtaining reliable guidance without any additional manual effort. To explore this, we first design a two-stage alignment strategy to mitigate the interference caused by gaps across tasks, as the foundation for our experimental exploration. Based on it, we conduct comprehensive exploration of CrossICL, with 875 NLP tasks from the Super-NI benchmark and six types of LLMs, including GPT-4o. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of CrossICL and provide valuable insights on questions like the criteria for selecting cross-task demonstrations, as well as the types of task-gap-induced interference in CrossICL.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to Jailbreaking attacks, which aim to extract harmful information by subtly modifying the attack query. As defense mechanisms evolve, directly obtaining harmful information becomes increasingly challenging for Jailbreaking attacks. In this work, inspired by human practices of indirect context to elicit harmful information, we focus on a new attack form called Contextual Interaction Attack. The idea relies on the autoregressive nature of the generation process in LLMs. We contend that the prior context--the information preceding the attack query--plays a pivotal role in enabling potent Jailbreaking attacks. Specifically, we propose an approach that leverages preliminary question-answer pairs to interact with the LLM. By doing so, we guide the responses of the model toward revealing the 'desired' harmful information. We conduct experiments on four different LLMs and demonstrate the efficacy of this attack, which is black-box and can also transfer across LLMs. We believe this can lead to further developments and understanding of the context vector in LLMs.

In-context learning (ICL) approaches typically leverage prompting to condition decoder-only language model generation on reference information. Just-in-time processing of a context is inefficient due to the quadratic cost of self-attention operations, and caching is desirable. However, caching transformer states can easily require almost as much space as the model parameters. When the right context isn't known in advance, caching ICL can be challenging. This work addresses these limitations by introducing models that, inspired by the encoder-decoder architecture, use cross-attention to condition generation on reference text without the prompt. More precisely, we leverage pre-trained decoder-only models and only train a small number of added layers. We use Question-Answering (QA) as a testbed to evaluate the ability of our models to perform conditional generation and observe that they outperform ICL, are comparable to fine-tuned prompted LLMs, and drastically reduce the space footprint relative to standard KV caching by two orders of magnitude.

In-context learning is a promising approach for online policy learning of offline reinforcement learning (RL) methods, which can be achieved at inference time without gradient optimization. However, this method is hindered by significant computational costs resulting from the gathering of large training trajectory sets and the need to train large Transformer models. We address this challenge by introducing an In-context Exploration-Exploitation (ICEE) algorithm, designed to optimize the efficiency of in-context policy learning. Unlike existing models, ICEE performs an exploration-exploitation trade-off at inference time within a Transformer model, without the need for explicit Bayesian inference. Consequently, ICEE can solve Bayesian optimization problems as efficiently as Gaussian process biased methods do, but in significantly less time. Through experiments in grid world environments, we demonstrate that ICEE can learn to solve new RL tasks using only tens of episodes, marking a substantial improvement over the hundreds of episodes needed by the previous in-context learning method.

In-context learning (ICL) is an important capability of Large Language Models (LLMs), enabling these models to dynamically adapt based on specific, in-context exemplars, thereby improving accuracy and relevance. However, LLM's responses may leak the sensitive private information contained in in-context exemplars. To address this challenge, we propose Differentially Private In-context Learning (DP-ICL), a general paradigm for privatizing ICL tasks. The key idea for DP-ICL paradigm is generating differentially private responses through a noisy consensus among an ensemble of LLM's responses based on disjoint exemplar sets. Based on the general paradigm of DP-ICL, we instantiate several techniques showing how to privatize ICL for text classification and language generation. We evaluate DP-ICL on four text classification benchmarks and two language generation tasks, and our empirical results show that DP-ICL achieves a strong utility-privacy tradeoff.

In-context learning (ICL) is a type of prompting where a transformer model operates on a sequence of (input, output) examples and performs inference on-the-fly. In this work, we formalize in-context learning as an algorithm learning problem where a transformer model implicitly constructs a hypothesis function at inference-time. We first explore the statistical aspects of this abstraction through the lens of multitask learning: We obtain generalization bounds for ICL when the input prompt is (1) a sequence of i.i.d. (input, label) pairs or (2) a trajectory arising from a dynamical system. The crux of our analysis is relating the excess risk to the stability of the algorithm implemented by the transformer. We characterize when transformer/attention architecture provably obeys the stability condition and also provide empirical verification. For generalization on unseen tasks, we identify an inductive bias phenomenon in which the transfer learning risk is governed by the task complexity and the number of MTL tasks in a highly predictable manner. Finally, we provide numerical evaluations that (1) demonstrate transformers can indeed implement near-optimal algorithms on classical regression problems with i.i.d. and dynamic data, (2) provide insights on stability, and (3) verify our theoretical predictions.

The ability of language models to learn a task from a few examples in context has generated substantial interest. Here, we provide a perspective that situates this type of supervised few-shot learning within a much broader spectrum of meta-learned in-context learning. Indeed, we suggest that any distribution of sequences in which context non-trivially decreases loss on subsequent predictions can be interpreted as eliciting a kind of in-context learning. We suggest that this perspective helps to unify the broad set of in-context abilities that language models exhibit x2014 such as adapting to tasks from instructions or role play, or extrapolating time series. This perspective also sheds light on potential roots of in-context learning in lower-level processing of linguistic dependencies (e.g. coreference or parallel structures). Finally, taking this perspective highlights the importance of generalization, which we suggest can be studied along several dimensions: not only the ability to learn something novel, but also flexibility in learning from different presentations, and in applying what is learned. We discuss broader connections to past literature in meta-learning and goal-conditioned agents, and other perspectives on learning and adaptation. We close by suggesting that research on in-context learning should consider this broader spectrum of in-context capabilities and types of generalization.

In-context generation is a key component of large language models' (LLMs) open-task generalization capability. By leveraging a few examples as context, LLMs can perform both in-domain and out-of-domain tasks. Recent advancements in auto-regressive vision-language models (VLMs) built upon LLMs have showcased impressive performance in text-to-image generation. However, the potential of in-context learning for general image generation tasks remains largely unexplored. To address this, we introduce X-Prompt, a purely auto-regressive large-vision language model designed to deliver competitive performance across a wide range of both seen and unseen image generation tasks, all within a unified in-context learning framework. X-Prompt incorporates a specialized design that efficiently compresses valuable features from in-context examples, supporting longer in-context token sequences and improving its ability to generalize to unseen tasks. A unified training task for both text and image prediction enables X-Prompt to handle general image generation with enhanced task awareness from in-context examples. Extensive experiments validate the model's performance across diverse seen image generation tasks and its capacity to generalize to previously unseen tasks.

In-context Learning enables training-free adaptation via demonstrations but remains highly sensitive to example selection and formatting. In unified multimodal models spanning understanding and generation, this sensitivity is exacerbated by cross-modal interference and varying cognitive demands. Consequently, In-context Learning efficacy is often non-monotonic and highly task-dependent. To diagnose these behaviors, we introduce a six-level capability-oriented taxonomy that categorizes the functional role of demonstrations from basic perception to high-order discernment. Guided by this cognitive framework, we construct UniICL-760K, a large-scale corpus featuring curated 8-shot In-context Learning episodes across 15 subtasks, alongside UniICL-Bench for rigorous, controlled evaluation. As an architectural intervention to stabilize few-shot adaptation, we propose the Context-Adaptive Prototype Modulator, a lightweight, plug-and-play module. Evaluations on UniICL-Bench show that our approach yields highly competitive unified results, outperforming larger-parameter multimodal large language model baselines on most understanding In-context Learning tasks. Data and code will be available soon at https://github.com/xuyicheng-zju/UniICL.

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

Although the LLM-based in-context learning (ICL) paradigm has demonstrated considerable success across various natural language processing tasks, it encounters challenges in event detection. This is because LLMs lack an accurate understanding of event triggers and tend to make over-interpretation, which cannot be effectively corrected through in-context examples alone. In this paper, we focus on the most challenging one-shot setting and propose KeyCP++, a keyword-centric chain-of-thought prompting approach. KeyCP++ addresses the weaknesses of conventional ICL by automatically annotating the logical gaps between input text and detection results for the demonstrations. Specifically, to generate in-depth and meaningful rationale, KeyCP++ constructs a trigger discrimination prompting template. It incorporates the exemplary triggers (a.k.a keywords) into the prompt as the anchor to simply trigger profiling, let LLM propose candidate triggers, and justify each candidate. These propose-and-judge rationales help LLMs mitigate over-reliance on the keywords and promote detection rule learning. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, showcasing significant advancements in one-shot event detection.

In the era of Large Language Models (LLMs), human-computer interaction has evolved towards natural language, offering unprecedented flexibility. Despite this, LLMs are heavily reliant on well-structured prompts to function efficiently within the realm of In-Context Learning. Vanilla In-Context Learning relies on human-provided contexts, such as labeled examples, explicit instructions, or other guiding mechanisms that shape the model's outputs. To address this challenge, our study presents a universal framework named Automatic In-Context Learning. Upon receiving a user's request, we ask the model to independently generate examples, including labels, instructions, or reasoning pathways. The model then leverages this self-produced context to tackle the given problem. Our approach is universally adaptable and can be implemented in any setting where vanilla In-Context Learning is applicable. We demonstrate that our method yields strong performance across a range of tasks, standing up well when compared to existing methods.

In-context learning (ICL) adapts large language models (LLMs) to new tasks by conditioning on demonstrations in the prompt without parameter updates. With long-context models, many-shot ICL can use dozens to hundreds of examples and achieve performance comparable to fine-tuning, yet current understanding of its scaling behavior is largely derived from non-reasoning tasks. We study many-shot chain-of-thought in-context learning (CoT-ICL) for reasoning and show that standard many-shot rules do not transfer. Across non-reasoning and reasoning-oriented LLMs and across non-reasoning and reasoning tasks, we find: (i) a setting-dependent scaling effect, where increasing the number of CoT demonstrations is unstable for non-reasoning LLMs and benefits mainly reasoning-oriented LLMs; (ii) similarity-based retrieval helps on non-reasoning tasks but fails on reasoning, since semantic similarity poorly predicts procedural (i.e., CoT) compatibility; and (iii) an order-scaling effect, where performance variance grows with more CoT demonstrations. We interpret these behaviors by viewing many-shot CoT-ICL as in-context test-time learning rather than scaled pattern matching, and suggests two principles: (i) demonstrations should be easy for the target model to understand, and (ii) they should be ordered to support a smooth conceptual progression. Guided by the principle, we propose Curvilinear Demonstration Selection (CDS), a simple ordering method that yields up to a 5.42 percentage-point gain on geometry with 64 demonstrations. Overall, our results reframe the long context window from a retrieval buffer into a structured curriculum for in-context test-time learning.

How do language models use information provided as context when generating a response? Can we infer whether a particular generated statement is actually grounded in the context, a misinterpretation, or fabricated? To help answer these questions, we introduce the problem of context attribution: pinpointing the parts of the context (if any) that led a model to generate a particular statement. We then present ContextCite, a simple and scalable method for context attribution that can be applied on top of any existing language model. Finally, we showcase the utility of ContextCite through three applications: (1) helping verify generated statements (2) improving response quality by pruning the context and (3) detecting poisoning attacks. We provide code for ContextCite at https://github.com/MadryLab/context-cite.

LLM agents choose tools and arguments from context that mixes user requests, tool outputs, retrieved records, memory, and untrusted text. Evidence can be relevant without being authorized to determine a decision, so a correct action need not be grounded only in permitted evidence. We introduce a target-specific authorization audit that labels context factors separately for each tool and argument target. Its primary test holds the task, proposition, position, and policy fixed while changing only the proposition's source authority. We then test behavior when valid evidence is weakened and use context-subset interactions as a secondary localization diagnostic. Across 450 controlled next-action tasks and multiple open-weight LLM families, trusted and untrusted variants produce different actions in 5.4 percent of competing cases versus 1.7 percent of supporting cases. Under controlled degradation, unauthorized competition is retained in a full-correct, mixed-error, clean-correct pattern in 2.4 percent of comparisons, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 2.1 to 3.0 percent. These are controlled stress-set rates, not deployment prevalence. The models respond to textual source-authority cues, but this does not prevent untrusted evidence from influencing their actions.

The advent of pre-trained Language Models (LMs) has markedly advanced natural language processing, but their efficacy in out-of-distribution (OOD) scenarios remains a significant challenge. Computational argumentation (CA), modeling human argumentation processes, is a field notably impacted by these challenges because complex annotation schemes and high annotation costs naturally lead to resources barely covering the multiplicity of available text sources and topics. Due to this data scarcity, generalization to data from uncovered covariant distributions is a common challenge for CA tasks like stance detection or argument classification. This work systematically assesses LMs' capabilities for such OOD scenarios. While previous work targets specific OOD types like topic shifts or OOD uniformly, we address three prevalent OOD scenarios in CA: topic shift, domain shift, and language shift. Our findings challenge the previously asserted general superiority of in-context learning (ICL) for OOD. We find that the efficacy of such learning paradigms varies with the type of OOD. Specifically, while ICL excels for domain shifts, prompt-based fine-tuning surpasses for topic shifts. To sum up, we navigate the heterogeneity of OOD scenarios in CA and empirically underscore the potential of base-sized LMs in overcoming these challenges.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains such as enterprise and government, ensuring that they adhere to user-defined security policies within context is critical-especially with respect to information non-disclosure. While prior LLM studies have focused on general safety and socially sensitive data, large-scale benchmarks for contextual security preservation against attacks remain lacking. To address this, we introduce a novel large-scale benchmark dataset, CoPriva, evaluating LLM adherence to contextual non-disclosure policies in question answering. Derived from realistic contexts, our dataset includes explicit policies and queries designed as direct and challenging indirect attacks seeking prohibited information. We evaluate 10 LLMs on our benchmark and reveal a significant vulnerability: many models violate user-defined policies and leak sensitive information. This failure is particularly severe against indirect attacks, highlighting a critical gap in current LLM safety alignment for sensitive applications. Our analysis reveals that while models can often identify the correct answer to a query, they struggle to incorporate policy constraints during generation. In contrast, they exhibit a partial ability to revise outputs when explicitly prompted. Our findings underscore the urgent need for more robust methods to guarantee contextual security.

In-context learning (ICL), the remarkable ability to solve a task from only input exemplars, is often assumed to be a unique hallmark of Transformer models. By examining commonly employed synthetic ICL tasks, we demonstrate that multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs) can also learn in-context. Moreover, MLPs, and the closely related MLP-Mixer models, learn in-context competitively with Transformers given the same compute budget in this setting. We further show that MLPs outperform Transformers on a series of classical tasks from psychology designed to test relational reasoning, which are closely related to in-context classification. These results underscore a need for studying in-context learning beyond attention-based architectures, while also challenging strong prior arguments about MLPs' limited ability to solve relational tasks. Altogether, our results highlight the unexpected competence of MLPs, and support the growing interest in all-MLP alternatives to task-specific architectures.

In-context learning (ICL) is a new learning paradigm that has gained popularity along with the development of large language models. In this work, we adapt a recently proposed hardness metric, pointwise V-usable information (PVI), to an in-context version (in-context PVI). Compared to the original PVI, in-context PVI is more efficient in that it requires only a few exemplars and does not require fine-tuning. We conducted a comprehensive empirical analysis to evaluate the reliability of in-context PVI. Our findings indicate that in-context PVI estimates exhibit similar characteristics to the original PVI. Specific to the in-context setting, we show that in-context PVI estimates remain consistent across different exemplar selections and numbers of shots. The variance of in-context PVI estimates across different exemplar selections is insignificant, which suggests that in-context PVI are stable. Furthermore, we demonstrate how in-context PVI can be employed to identify challenging instances. Our work highlights the potential of in-context PVI and provides new insights into the capabilities of ICL.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) pose a critical privacy threat to fine-tuned large language models (LLMs), especially when models are adapted to domain-specific tasks using sensitive data. While prior black-box MIA techniques rely on confidence scores or token likelihoods, these signals are often entangled with a sample's intrinsic properties - such as content difficulty or rarity - leading to poor generalization and low signal-to-noise ratios. In this paper, we propose ICP-MIA, a novel MIA framework grounded in the theory of training dynamics, particularly the phenomenon of diminishing returns during optimization. We introduce the Optimization Gap as a fundamental signal of membership: at convergence, member samples exhibit minimal remaining loss-reduction potential, while non-members retain significant potential for further optimization. To estimate this gap in a black-box setting, we propose In-Context Probing (ICP), a training-free method that simulates fine-tuning-like behavior via strategically constructed input contexts. We propose two probing strategies: reference-data-based (using semantically similar public samples) and self-perturbation (via masking or generation). Experiments on three tasks and multiple LLMs show that ICP-MIA significantly outperforms prior black-box MIAs, particularly at low false positive rates. We further analyze how reference data alignment, model type, PEFT configurations, and training schedules affect attack effectiveness. Our findings establish ICP-MIA as a practical and theoretically grounded framework for auditing privacy risks in deployed LLMs.

In-context learning (ICL) emerges as a promising capability of large language models (LLMs) by providing them with demonstration examples to perform diverse tasks. However, the underlying mechanism of how LLMs learn from the provided context remains under-explored. In this paper, we investigate the working mechanism of ICL through an information flow lens. Our findings reveal that label words in the demonstration examples function as anchors: (1) semantic information aggregates into label word representations during the shallow computation layers' processing; (2) the consolidated information in label words serves as a reference for LLMs' final predictions. Based on these insights, we introduce an anchor re-weighting method to improve ICL performance, a demonstration compression technique to expedite inference, and an analysis framework for diagnosing ICL errors in GPT2-XL. The promising applications of our findings again validate the uncovered ICL working mechanism and pave the way for future studies.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly execute complex, autonomous software engineering tasks, developers rely on natural language instruction files such as AGENTS.md to express project-specific coding conventions, tooling restrictions, and architectural boundaries. However, because these instructions remain passive text, agents frequently violate documented constraints due to context window saturation or conflicting local context. In autonomous settings without real-time human supervision, such violations rapidly compound into technical debt. To ground autonomous agents in repository constraints, we introduce ContextCov, a framework that transforms passive natural language instructions into executable guardrails. Unlike prompt-only or reflection-only compliance approaches, ContextCov compiles documented constraints into three complementary checks: static AST queries for code patterns, runtime shell shims that intercept prohibited commands, and architectural validators that enforce structural rules. Acting as an automated, continuous reviewer, ContextCov intercepts agent actions and returns immediate, reproducible violation traces, enabling self-correction before non-compliant changes are finalized. We evaluate ContextCov on SWE-bench Lite (12 repositories, 300 tasks). Compared to prompt-only and LLM reflection baselines, ContextCov achieves 88.3% constraint compliance (vs. 67.0% and 50.3%) with 3.4x lower feedback cost, while maintaining functional correctness. The source code and evaluation results are available at https://github.com/reSHARMA/ContextCov.

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across delivery vectors, attack modalities, and propagation behaviors. Our meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 78 recent studies (2021--2026), consolidating evidence that attack success rates against state-of-the-art defenses exceed 85\% when adaptive attack strategies are employed. We systematically catalog 42 distinct attack techniques spanning input manipulation, tool poisoning, protocol exploitation, multimodal injection, and cross-origin context poisoning. Through critical analysis of 18 defense mechanisms reported in prior work, we identify that most achieve less than 50\% mitigation against sophisticated adaptive attacks. We contribute: (1) a unified taxonomy bridging disparate attack classifications, (2) the first systematic analysis of skill-based architecture vulnerabilities with concrete exploit chains, and (3) a defense-in-depth framework grounded in the limitations we identify. Our findings indicate that the security community must treat prompt injection as a first-class vulnerability class requiring architectural-level mitigations rather than ad-hoc filtering approaches.

In-context learning (ICL) is an important yet not fully understood ability of pre-trained large language models (LLMs). It can greatly enhance task performance using a few examples, termed demonstrations, without fine-tuning. Although effective in question answering, ICL often underperforms in long-form generation tasks such as summarization. Under appropriately realistic assumptions, we empirically and theoretically show that ICL demonstrations alone are insufficient to teach LLMs the task language and format distributions for generation. We argue for explicit exposure to the task distributions and hypothesize that defining them by prompting enhances model performance. To this end, we present LongGuide, which efficiently generates two parallel streams of guidelines capturing task language and format properties: (i) Metric Guidelines (MGs) that instruct models to optimize self-evaluated metrics; and (ii) Output Constraint Guidelines (OCGs) that constrain generation at both token and sentence levels. LongGuide automatically selects the best combination of guidelines, improving both strong open- and closed-source LLMs by over 5% in both zero- and few-shot settings. We show that LongGuide is generalizable, learnable by weak models to enhance strong ones, and integrates synergistically with automatic prompt optimizers.

As predictive models are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings such as credit approval, there is a growing need for post-hoc methods that provide recourse to affected individuals. Many such models operate on tabular data, where features correspond to real-world attributes. Recently, in-context learning (ICL) has enabled large language models to perform tabular prediction by conditioning on labeled examples at inference time, without explicit training. However, algorithmic recourse for tabular decision-making under ICL remains largely unexplored. In this work, we present the first study of algorithmic recourse for tabular data under ICL. We carry out a theoretical analysis, showing that recourse remains well-defined and bounded, and we characterize how recourse converges toward classical solutions as the context size increases. In practice, we propose a novel zeroth-order recourse framework, Adaptive Subspace Recourse for In-Context Learning (ASR-ICL), that efficiently generates actionable and sparse recourse for black-box ICL models. The proposed framework naturally extends to multi-class tabular tasks. Experiments across multiple real-world datasets and models demonstrate that ASR-ICL achieves recourse quality comparable to existing methods with fewer queries and empirically confirm the predicted convergence behavior, supporting our theoretical analysis.

In-context learning (ICL) is a critical emerging capability of large language models (LLMs), enabling few-shot learning during inference by including a few demonstrations (demos) in the prompt. However, it has been found that ICL's performance can be sensitive to the choices of demos and their order. This paper investigates an unexplored new positional bias of ICL for the first time: we observe that the predictions and accuracy can drift drastically when the positions of demos, the system prompt, and the user message in LLM input are varied. We refer to this bias as DEMOS' POSITION IN PROMPT (DPP) bias. We design a systematic evaluation pipeline to study this type of positional bias across classification, question answering, summarization, and reasoning tasks. We introduce two metrics, ACCURACY-CHANGE and PREDICTION-CHANGE, to quantify net gains and output volatility induced by changes in the demos' position. Extensive experiments on ten LLMs from four open-source model families (QWEN, LLAMA3, MISTRAL, COHERE) verify that the bias significantly affects their accuracy and predictions: placing demos at the start of the prompt yields the most stable and accurate outputs with gains of up to +6 points. In contrast, placing demos at the end of the user message flips over 30\% of predictions without improving correctness on QA tasks. Smaller models are most affected by this sensitivity, though even large models remain marginally affected on complex tasks.