Daily Papers

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as the primary paradigm for optimizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents, yet efficient critic-free algorithms (e.g., GRPO) suffer from a fundamental uniform credit assignment dilemma that broadcasts trajectory-level advantages equally to all actions. Our analysis reveals that this uniformity inherently reinforces structurally unreasonable actions in preferred trajectories and ignores each action's downstream deviations in unpreferred ones. To resolve this without introducing critic overhead, we propose Progress-Aware Advantage Shaping (ProAS), a plug-and-play framework that leverages a dynamically evolving Agentic Reference Graph (ARG) to achieve fine-grained credit assignment via Masking Unreasonable Incentives (MUI) and Asymmetric Penalty Redistribution (APR). Extensive experiments across Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct demonstrate that ProAS universally elevates mainstream group-based baselines to new state-of-the-art performance, achieving peak success rates of 91.9% and 94.3% on ALFWorld, alongside 66.7% and 70.8% on WebShop, respectively. Furthermore, it accelerates training convergence by up to 2.44times while maintaining strong robustness against imperfect or distilled ARGs. Codes: https://github.com/LINs-lab/ProAS

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. We find only minimal instances of scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely due to evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. Surprisingly, in model organisms (Hubinger et al., 2023) built with these snippets, scheming behavior is remarkably brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%, and increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%. Our incentive decomposition enables systematic measurement of scheming propensity in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.

A major issue with using deep learning models in sensitive applications is that they provide no explanation for their output. To address this problem, unsupervised selective rationalization produces rationales alongside predictions by chaining two jointly-trained components, a rationale generator and a predictor. Although this architecture guarantees that the prediction relies solely on the rationale, it does not ensure that the rationale contains a plausible explanation for the prediction. We introduce a novel training technique that effectively limits generation of implausible rationales by injecting noise between the generator and the predictor. Furthermore, we propose a new benchmark for evaluating unsupervised selective rationalization models using movie reviews from existing datasets. We achieve sizeable improvements in rationale plausibility and task accuracy over the state-of-the-art across a variety of tasks, including our new benchmark, while maintaining or improving model faithfulness.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

We propose a criterion for discrimination against a specified sensitive attribute in supervised learning, where the goal is to predict some target based on available features. Assuming data about the predictor, target, and membership in the protected group are available, we show how to optimally adjust any learned predictor so as to remove discrimination according to our definition. Our framework also improves incentives by shifting the cost of poor classification from disadvantaged groups to the decision maker, who can respond by improving the classification accuracy. In line with other studies, our notion is oblivious: it depends only on the joint statistics of the predictor, the target and the protected attribute, but not on interpretation of individualfeatures. We study the inherent limits of defining and identifying biases based on such oblivious measures, outlining what can and cannot be inferred from different oblivious tests. We illustrate our notion using a case study of FICO credit scores.

Large language models are often asked which input factors influenced their outputs. For structured inputs, such reports can be checked by counterfactual perturbation, but each factor must be queried multiple times to estimate its effect, so verification is usually budget-limited. We study how this limited-budget setting changes the incentive to report factor-level influence truthfully. We formalize the interaction as a verification game and show that proper scoring alone is not enough when auditing depends on the report: report-dependent auditing creates a suppression incentive, because factors reported as important are more likely to be checked and penalized for estimation noise. In contrast, report-independent auditing, or a mixed rule with a small report-independent floor, removes this channel and makes truthful reporting preferable to full suppression. We instantiate the framework with the Counterfactual Brier Score (CBS) and evaluate its predictions on four NLP benchmarks. A synthetic rational agent matches the theoretical prediction exactly, and real LLMs follow the same incentives when they are made explicit. The main design implication is simple: under partial verification, factor-level explanation systems should include a report-independent audit component so that under-reporting cannot be used to avoid scrutiny.

Moving ML-mediated decision making onto privacy-preserving clients decentralises the economic decision along with the inference. Shared budget constraints then depend on information that cannot be globally current, creating an information-structure failure that conventional pacing is not designed to solve. We study this information misalignment in an auction-logic-faithful on-device simulation with 36 campaigns and 50 devices. Accounting is in dimensionless integer score units; no currency semantics are claimed. Across 30 paired demand paths, proportional Even pacing overspends 17.77% after one tick of staleness and 1,669.31% after 50 ticks under the original 20-times budget pressure. The effect does not depend on that severe a budget: at two-times pressure, 50-tick overspend remains 106.95%. A visible-budget no-sale guard makes zero-lag compliance exact at this score-unit granularity, yet leaves 11.88% overspend at one tick because other devices' debits remain invisible. A declared bursty, heterogeneous-device sweep retains a strictly increasing mean lag curve. We derive a finite-window expected excess-debit bound under conditional charge caps and find positive paired slack in every bounded-value cell. A second, incentive misalignment arises when the ML/pacing score transformation is allowed to change payment units: 98.23% of rival auctions at one tick admit a profitable deviation. An executable implementation-level counterexample isolates the runner-up's multiplier in the winner's price. Critical-base-bid payment is per-auction DSIC conditional on current multipliers, but does not establish dynamic truthfulness and does not repair base-value ranking disagreement.

Large language models are sometimes trained with imperfect oversight signals, leading to undesired behaviors such as reward hacking and sycophancy. Improving oversight quality can be expensive or infeasible, motivating methods that improve learned behavior despite an imperfect training signal. We introduce Inoculation Prompting (IP), a simple but counterintuitive technique that prevents learning of an undesired behavior by modifying training prompts to explicitly request it. For example, to inoculate against reward hacking, we modify the prompts used in supervised fine-tuning to request code that only works on provided test cases but fails on other inputs. Across four settings we find that IP reduces the learning of undesired behavior without substantially reducing the learning of desired capabilities. We also show that prompts which more strongly elicit the undesired behavior prior to fine-tuning more effectively inoculate against the behavior when used during training; this serves as a heuristic to identify promising inoculation prompts. Overall, IP is a simple yet effective way to control how models generalize from fine-tuning, preventing learning of undesired behaviors without substantially disrupting desired capabilities.

Watermarking has emerged as a leading technical proposal for attributing generative AI content and is increasingly cited in global governance frameworks. This paper argues that current implementations risk serving as symbolic compliance rather than delivering effective oversight. We identify a growing gap between regulatory expectations and the technical limitations of existing watermarking schemes. Through analysis of policy proposals and industry practices, we show how incentive structures disincentivize robust, auditable deployments. To realign watermarking with governance goals, we propose a three-layer framework encompassing technical standards, audit infrastructure, and enforcement mechanisms. Without enforceable requirements and independent verification, watermarking will remain inadequate for accountability and ultimately undermine broader efforts in AI safety and regulation.

Training against white-box deception detectors has been proposed as a way to make AI systems honest. However, such training risks models learning to obfuscate their deception to evade the detector. Prior work has studied obfuscation only in artificial settings where models were directly rewarded for harmful output. We construct a realistic coding environment where reward hacking via hardcoding test cases naturally occurs, and show that obfuscation emerges in this setting. We introduce a taxonomy of possible outcomes when training against a deception detector. The model either remains honest, or becomes deceptive via two possible obfuscation strategies. (i) Obfuscated activations: the model outputs deceptive text while modifying its internal representations to no longer trigger the detector. (ii) Obfuscated policy: the model outputs deceptive text that evades the detector, typically by including a justification for the reward hack. Empirically, obfuscated activations arise from representation drift during RL, with or without a detector penalty. The probe penalty only incentivizes obfuscated policies; we theoretically show this is expected for policy gradient methods. Sufficiently high KL regularization and detector penalty can yield honest policies, establishing white-box deception detectors as viable training signals for tasks prone to reward hacking.

Data-centric curation pipelines frequently rely on model confidence scores to flag and filter noisy or mislabeled training instances. Evaluating this filtering convention on a large-scale consumer lending sample (LendingClub, N = 1,344,936) uncovers an underlying demographic asymmetry: high-income defaulters are disproportionately classified as label noise relative to low-income defaulters (Cramer's V approximately 0.03-0.07). Re-examining this behavior through the lens of equal opportunity [Hardt et al., 2016] reveals a far more severe discrepancy: a 16.86 percentage point gap in true positive rate (recall) between high- and low-income borrowers who ultimately defaulted. Implementing a sequential feature-blinding methodology allows us to isolate the drivers of this disparity across three distinct mechanisms: (1) direct reliance on self-reported applicant income; (2) algorithmic absorption of upstream institutional bias encoded within origination interest rates; and (3) a residual disparity (3.55 percentage points in cross-validation; 2.56 percentage points on a held-out test partition, Z = -4.04, p < 0.0001) that remains even after purging both income and interest rates from the model. Out-of-sample signed SHAP valuations demonstrate that this residual gap is maintained by structural proxies, most notably loan amount and home ownership status. These empirical findings show that simply blinding an algorithm to sensitive attributes fails to ensure fairness when institutional pricing decisions and behavioral proxy variables collectively reconstruct the omitted signals. We outline the practical implications of these findings for auditing data-centric AI workflows within regulated financial institutions.

Specifying a penalty can turn a legal obligation into a cost-benefit calculation that favors violation. We show that this enforcement information paradox occurs in AI agents. Most AI safety evaluations test whether models fail; we ask why, using compliance theory from law and economics as a diagnostic. We evaluate twelve instruction-tuned language models deployed as enterprise procurement chatbots. Each is given an environmental regulation in its system prompt covering large purchases, and a vendor list on which the certified suppliers cost nearly twice what the uncertified ones do. We test the agents against the predictions of deterrence, legitimacy, and expressive law, and find that each theory accounts for part of what we observe. Under identical conditions, compliance spans 46 percentage points across models, and models differ in which pressure breaks them: some treat the regulation as binding however it is worded, while others fail where theory predicts, under low penalties and non-command phrasing. Benchmark scores and developers' own descriptions of post-training do not predict where a model falls. Across all twelve, financial incentives, managerial demands, peer outcomes, and employee pressure each produce large compliance failures. These agents violate regulatory constraints to satisfy local user objectives in ways standard alignment benchmarks do not measure. Embedding the rule in the system prompt is not on its own enough to produce a compliant agent: model selection is itself a governance decision, and benchmark evaluation is not sufficient for compliance-sensitive deployments.

LLM agents increasingly act as autonomous merchants that write their own product listings, and under competitive pressure, they fabricate attributes to win sales. Even under instructions to be honest, they fabricate attributes in a majority of listings across models. A platform's obvious remedy---verifying each claim against the truth---is unavailable, because it observes only a noisy, biased complaint signal, never the ground truth. We design CARP, a reputation-penalty mechanism with a deadband that forgives complaint noise and a state-dependent severity that counters reputation-driven detection erosion. CARP requires no product-level ground truth and is robust to strategic gaming. CARP protects consumers by suppressing the sales volume of low-rated liars while sparing honest sellers. Paired with SPARC, it closes most of the consumer-welfare gap relative to a perfect-information oracle, without ever accessing the truth. It also achieves the best welfare of the policies we compare. We further show that this felt penalty becomes behaviorally binding through SPARC, a byte-clean code-gated reflection mechanism: LLM merchants fabricate when lying is free but restrain themselves when fabrication costs them sales, a self-interested response rather than compliance. We trace this distinction to penalty-gated self-correction reasoning, and observe the binding across models, with supporting confidence intervals.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) serves as a potent paradigm for enhancing reasoning capabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs), yet standard outcome-based approaches often suffer from reward sparsity and inefficient credit assignment. In this paper, we propose a novel framework designed to provide continuous reward signals, which introduces a Step-wise Marginal Information Gain (MIG) mechanism that quantifies the intrinsic value of reasoning steps against a Monotonic Historical Watermark, effectively filtering out training noise. To ensure disentangled credit distribution, we implement a Decoupled Masking Strategy, applying process-oriented rewards specifically to the chain-of-thought (CoT) and outcome-oriented rewards to the full completion. Additionally, we incorporate a Dual-Gated SFT objective to stabilize training with high-quality structural and factual signals. Extensive experiments across textual and multi-modal benchmarks (e.g., MATH, Super-CLEVR) demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms baselines such as GRPO in both sample efficiency and final accuracy. Furthermore, our model exhibits superior out-of-distribution robustness, demonstrating promising zero-shot transfer capabilities to unseen and challenging reasoning tasks.

Recent advances in text-to-image (T2I) diffusion model fine-tuning leverage reinforcement learning (RL) to align generated images with learnable reward functions. The existing approaches reformulate denoising as a Markov decision process for RL-driven optimization. However, they suffer from reward sparsity, receiving only a single delayed reward per generated trajectory. This flaw hinders precise step-level attribution of denoising actions, undermines training efficiency. To address this, we propose a simple yet effective credit assignment framework that dynamically distributes dense rewards across denoising steps. Specifically, we track changes in cosine similarity between intermediate and final images to quantify each step's contribution on progressively reducing the distance to the final image. Our approach avoids additional auxiliary neural networks for step-level preference modeling and instead uses reward shaping to highlight denoising phases that have a greater impact on image quality. Our method achieves 1.25 to 2 times higher sample efficiency and better generalization across four human preference reward functions, without compromising the original optimal policy.

Because it is difficult to precisely specify complex objectives, reinforcement learning policies are often optimized using proxy reward functions that only approximate the true goal. However, optimizing proxy rewards frequently leads to reward hacking: the optimized reward function ceases to be a good proxy and the resulting policy performs poorly with respect to the unspecified true reward. Principled solutions to reward hacking have been impeded by the lack of a good definition for the problem. To address this gap, we introduce a definition of reward hacking based on the correlation between proxy and true rewards for states and actions seen by a "base policy" that breaks down under optimization. We show that this definition captures reward hacking behavior across several realistic settings, including in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Using our formulation, we show theoretically that regularization to the base policy can effectively prevent reward hacking. While the current practice in RLHF applies a KL penalty between action distributions for this purpose, our theory suggests regularizing the chi^2 divergence between the policies' occupancy measures can be more effective. We intuitively show the benefits of this type of regularization and demonstrate that it better mitigates reward hacking in practice across four realistic settings, including RLHF. Our code is available at https://github.com/cassidylaidlaw/orpo.

As AI systems approach superhuman capabilities, scalable oversight increasingly relies on LLM-as-a-judge frameworks where models evaluate and guide each other's training. A core assumption is that binary preference labels provide only semantic supervision about response quality. We challenge this assumption by demonstrating that preference labels can function as a covert communication channel. We show that even when a neutral student model generates semantically unbiased completions, a biased judge can transmit unintended behavioral traits through preference assignments, which even strengthen across iterative alignment rounds. Our findings suggest that robust oversight in superalignment settings requires mechanisms that can detect and mitigate subliminal preference transmission, particularly when judges may pursue unintended objectives.

Despite their widespread use, the role of reward models in shaping reinforcement learning is poorly understood. Reward models offer a tempting promise: they automatically estimate response quality in the absence of verifiers or human judges. Unlike "verifiable rewards" which typically produce binary scores, reward models typically produce continuous scores, allowing them to be sensitive to fine-grained differences in responses. However, we show this apparent strength is a serious weakness: many popular reward models are oversensitive, assigning different scores to equally good responses. Theoretically, we show that seemingly perfect reward models can be highly oversensitive; empirically, this oversensitivity can lead to bad policies. In place of existing notions of "reward model accuracy," we propose evaluating reward models using distinct measures of "discriminative ability" and "specificity" (the complement of oversensitivity). As a solution, we describe a training-free algorithm that uses Monte Carlo dropout on any neural reward model to produce discrete reward clusters. Theoretically, we prove there exist discretizations that reduce oversensitivity at minimal expense of discriminative ability; empirically we show, in both controlled and natural RL settings, that discretizing rewards leads to less reward hacking and better policies than training on the original rewards.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents serving users on behalf of companies, placing them in settings where user and deployer interests can conflict. When an agent knows that a user is owed something its deployer would prefer to deny, does it remain honest? Answering this is difficult because false statements can reflect either ignorance or hallucination rather than deception. To address this challenge, we introduce KnownLieBench , a knowledge-verified benchmark that first confirms through a neutral probe that an agent knows a user's entitlement, and then evaluates whether it makes false claims once an incentive to deny that entitlement is introduced. Specifically, KnownLieBench covers eight customer-service domains and 112 grounded cases, conducts multi-round dialogues with a trust-tracking customer agent, and separates deception emerging from incentive alone from deception produced under explicit instruction. Across eighteen proprietary and open-weight models, emergent deception varies substantially across model families and domains. We further use the benchmark for post-training, finding that honesty-directed fine-tuning reduces deception under incentive, while deception-graded fine-tuning increases lie success on honest-control dialogues without increasing lie frequency under incentive. By verifying entitlement knowledge before scoring deceptive behavior, KnownLieBench reduces the confound between lying and not knowing and enables more rigorous auditing and steering of agent honesty.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and related alignment paradigms have become central to steering large language models (LLMs) and multimodal large language models (MLLMs) toward human-preferred behaviors. However, these approaches introduce a systemic vulnerability: reward hacking, where models exploit imperfections in learned reward signals to maximize proxy objectives without fulfilling true task intent. As models scale and optimization intensifies, such exploitation manifests as verbosity bias, sycophancy, hallucinated justification, benchmark overfitting, and, in multimodal settings, perception--reasoning decoupling and evaluator manipulation. Recent evidence further suggests that seemingly benign shortcut behaviors can generalize into broader forms of misalignment, including deception and strategic gaming of oversight mechanisms. In this survey, we propose the Proxy Compression Hypothesis (PCH) as a unifying framework for understanding reward hacking. We formalize reward hacking as an emergent consequence of optimizing expressive policies against compressed reward representations of high-dimensional human objectives. Under this view, reward hacking arises from the interaction of objective compression, optimization amplification, and evaluator--policy co-adaptation. This perspective unifies empirical phenomena across RLHF, RLAIF, and RLVR regimes, and explains how local shortcut learning can generalize into broader forms of misalignment, including deception and strategic manipulation of oversight mechanisms. We further organize detection and mitigation strategies according to how they intervene on compression, amplification, or co-adaptation dynamics. By framing reward hacking as a structural instability of proxy-based alignment under scale, we highlight open challenges in scalable oversight, multimodal grounding, and agentic autonomy.

When audio, video, and text disagree, accuracy alone does not show whether to acquire another source or abstain. We study these choices in a controlled three-score benchmark: a policy observes two signed scores, may request the third at a cost, and can abstain. The primary reward is mechanism-specific: abstention is correct only for one designated ambiguity mechanism and is penalized under mixed corruption. Matched controls show that a threshold policy matches always-request decisions with fewer requests; its advantage over always-answer fusion depends on the reward assigned to that ambiguity. On a partially held-out synthetic split, the threshold policy reaches 0.789 +/- 0.006 targeted decision accuracy and 0.481 +/- 0.014 utility across 83 seeds. A three-score majority reference reaches 0.626 +/- 0.008 and 0.252 +/- 0.016, but uses more information. In a matched-budget test, a train-only value selector improves utility over no-query and matched-random policies at 10% and 25% budgets, while pair uncertainty has higher utility at every budget. At 50% and 63.7% budgets, the selector lowers utility despite slightly higher non-ambiguous accuracy. If all abstentions are scored incorrect, majority outranks the threshold policy in utility. At a central temporal setting, full-trace controls match the neural models while position perturbations separate them. On held-out-actor emotion clips, eight-frame fusion has opposite-signed accuracy differences for two encoder pairs, with both actor intervals containing zero; matched-request routing gains are small and uncertain. These results separate full-modality accuracy from pre-request selection value and show that selection value depends on budget and the observed-pair ranking.

Equipping large language models (LLMs) with search engines via reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as an effective approach for building search agents. However, overreliance on search introduces unnecessary cost and risks exposure to noisy or malicious content, while relying solely on parametric knowledge risks hallucination. The central challenge is to develop agents that adaptively balance parametric knowledge with external search, invoking search only when necessary. Prior work mitigates search overuse by shaping rewards around the number of tool calls. However, these penalties require substantial reward engineering, provide ambiguous credit assignment, and can be exploited by agents that superficially reduce calls. Moreover, evaluating performance solely through call counts conflates necessary and unnecessary search, obscuring the measurement of true adaptive behavior. To address these limitations, we first quantify the self-knowledge awareness of existing search agents via an F1-based decision metric, revealing that methods such as Search-R1 often overlook readily available parametric knowledge. Motivated by these findings, we propose AdaSearch, a simple two-stage, outcome-driven RL framework that disentangles problem solving from the decision of whether to invoke search, and makes this decision process explicit and interpretable. This transparency is crucial for high-stakes domains such as finance and medical question answering, yet is largely neglected by prior approaches. Experiments across multiple model families and sizes demonstrate that AdaSearch substantially improves knowledge-boundary awareness, reduces unnecessary search calls, preserves strong task performance, and offers more transparent, interpretable decision behaviors.

AI agents are increasingly deployed in shared environments where they pursue diverse goals and compete for rewards. This multi-agent competition can lead to behaviors that serve individual gains at collective cost -- for instance, marketing agents may post misleading content as a result of competing for engagement on social media. Human societies address such problems through norms that constrain acceptable behavior, supported by enforcement mechanisms that detect and penalize violations. Motivated by this, we study norm enforcement mechanisms for language model agents. We find that simple enforcement mechanisms are exploited by misaligned agents for competitive advantage, even when they are not explicitly trained or prompted to do so. We thus turn our attention to designing more robust mechanisms, and identify two key ingredients: estimating each agent's reliability over time, and updating this estimate with escalating penalties for repeated misbehavior. Across three simulated environments and a variety of agent populations, mechanisms built on these principles resist exploitation, while still penalizing norm violations at comparable or lower cost than baselines. Our results position norm enforcement mechanisms as scalable levers for shaping agents' behavior, but only when designed to anticipate becoming part of the system they govern. Our code and data are available at https://yaowenye.com/norm-enforcement.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

In critical applications, it is vital for classifiers to defer decision-making to humans. We propose a post-hoc method that makes existing classifiers selectively abstain from predicting certain samples. Our abstaining classifier is incentivized to maintain the original accuracy for each sub-population (i.e. no harm) while achieving a set of group fairness definitions to a user specified degree. To this end, we design an Integer Programming (IP) procedure that assigns abstention decisions for each training sample to satisfy a set of constraints. To generalize the abstaining decisions to test samples, we then train a surrogate model to learn the abstaining decisions based on the IP solutions in an end-to-end manner. We analyze the feasibility of the IP procedure to determine the possible abstention rate for different levels of unfairness tolerance and accuracy constraint for achieving no harm. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to identify the theoretical relationships between the constraint parameters and the required abstention rate. Our theoretical results are important since a high abstention rate is often infeasible in practice due to a lack of human resources. Our framework outperforms existing methods in terms of fairness disparity without sacrificing accuracy at similar abstention rates.

Today's large language models (LLMs) are trained to align with user preferences through methods such as reinforcement learning. Yet models are beginning to be deployed not merely to satisfy users, but also to generate revenue for the companies that created them through advertisements. This creates the potential for LLMs to face conflicts of interest, where the most beneficial response to a user may not be aligned with the company's incentives. For instance, a sponsored product may be more expensive but otherwise equal to another; in this case, what does (and should) the LLM recommend to the user? In this paper, we provide a framework for categorizing the ways in which conflicting incentives might lead LLMs to change the way they interact with users, inspired by literature from linguistics and advertising regulation. We then present a suite of evaluations to examine how current models handle these tradeoffs. We find that a majority of LLMs forsake user welfare for company incentives in a multitude of conflict of interest situations, including recommending a sponsored product almost twice as expensive (Grok 4.1 Fast, 83%), surfacing sponsored options to disrupt the purchasing process (GPT 5.1, 94%), and concealing prices in unfavorable comparisons (Qwen 3 Next, 24%). Behaviors also vary strongly with levels of reasoning and users' inferred socio-economic status. Our results highlight some of the hidden risks to users that can emerge when companies begin to subtly incentivize advertisements in chatbots.

We address the problem of reward hacking, where maximising a proxy reward does not necessarily increase the true reward. This is a key concern for Large Language Models (LLMs), as they are often fine-tuned on human preferences that may not accurately reflect a true objective. Existing work uses various tricks such as regularisation, tweaks to the reward model, and reward hacking detectors, to limit the influence that such proxy preferences have on a model. Luckily, in many contexts such as medicine, education, and law, a sparse amount of expert data is often available. In these cases, it is often unclear whether the addition of proxy data can improve policy learning. We outline a set of sufficient conditions on proxy feedback that, if satisfied, indicate that proxy data can provably improve the sample complexity of learning the ground truth policy. These conditions can inform the data collection process for specific tasks. The result implies a parameterisation for LLMs that achieves this improved sample complexity. We detail how one can adapt existing architectures to yield this improved sample complexity.

We present an approach to mitigating the risks of malicious image editing posed by large diffusion models. The key idea is to immunize images so as to make them resistant to manipulation by these models. This immunization relies on injection of imperceptible adversarial perturbations designed to disrupt the operation of the targeted diffusion models, forcing them to generate unrealistic images. We provide two methods for crafting such perturbations, and then demonstrate their efficacy. Finally, we discuss a policy component necessary to make our approach fully effective and practical -- one that involves the organizations developing diffusion models, rather than individual users, to implement (and support) the immunization process.

Language model-generated rubrics are increasingly used as reward signals for rubric-based reinforcement learning, LLM-as-a-judge evaluation, and automated grading. Such rubrics are reliable only if they reward honest answers over adversarial answers optimized to exploit them. Yet their robustness to such optimization remains poorly understood. We isolate the hardest regime: impossible tasks, where the prompt pressures the model toward an unsupported conclusion, so the only honest response is to acknowledge the impossibility. We introduce ImpossibleRubrics, a benchmark of 169 impossible tasks spanning six impossibility categories, each paired with a verifiable oracle certificate specifying what an honest answer may and may not claim, together with 48 answerable controls. Rather than providing fixed rubrics, ImpossibleRubrics provides task environments and certificates, allowing rubrics to be generated downstream and then adversarially tested for whether they reward certificate-violating answers. Eleven generators are exploited 8--26% of the time on the unbiased 150-of-169 environment cut; on a deliberately selected stress cut the strongest generator we measured is still exploited 36% while a certificate-faithful rubric is exploited 0%, so what we measure is a rubric-quality gap, not task impossibility. One result runs against intuition. A single generic rubric ("be decisive, penalize hedging") used unchanged for every task is exploited 64% of the time, and seven of the eleven generators are exploited more often than that while writing a rubric tailored to each one. The tailored criteria appear to tell an attacker which claim to fabricate. The problem is not that rubrics are vague; it is that they are specific about the wrong things.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Aligning generative models with human preference via RLHF typically suffers from overoptimization, where an imperfectly learned reward model can misguide the generative model to output undesired responses. We investigate this problem in a principled manner by identifying the source of the misalignment as a form of distributional shift and uncertainty in learning human preferences. To mitigate overoptimization, we first propose a theoretical algorithm that chooses the best policy for an adversarially chosen reward model; one that simultaneously minimizes the maximum likelihood estimation of the loss and a reward penalty term. Here, the reward penalty term is introduced to prevent the policy from choosing actions with spurious high proxy rewards, resulting in provable sample efficiency of the algorithm under a partial coverage style condition. Moving from theory to practice, the proposed algorithm further enjoys an equivalent but surprisingly easy-to-implement reformulation. Using the equivalence between reward models and the corresponding optimal policy, the algorithm features a simple objective that combines: (i) a preference optimization loss that directly aligns the policy with human preference, and (ii) a supervised learning loss that explicitly imitates the policy with a (suitable) baseline distribution. In the context of aligning large language models (LLM), this objective fuses the direct preference optimization (DPO) loss with the supervised fune-tuning (SFT) loss to help mitigate the overoptimization towards undesired responses, for which we name the algorithm Regularized Preference Optimization (RPO). Experiments of aligning LLMs demonstrate the improved performance of RPO compared with DPO baselines. Our work sheds light on the interplay between preference optimization and SFT in tuning LLMs with both theoretical guarantees and empirical evidence.

Recent capability increases in large language models (LLMs) open up applications in which groups of communicating generative AI agents solve joint tasks. This poses privacy and security challenges concerning the unauthorised sharing of information, or other unwanted forms of agent coordination. Modern steganographic techniques could render such dynamics hard to detect. In this paper, we comprehensively formalise the problem of secret collusion in systems of generative AI agents by drawing on relevant concepts from both AI and security literature. We study incentives for the use of steganography, and propose a variety of mitigation measures. Our investigations result in a model evaluation framework that systematically tests capabilities required for various forms of secret collusion. We provide extensive empirical results across a range of contemporary LLMs. While the steganographic capabilities of current models remain limited, GPT-4 displays a capability jump suggesting the need for continuous monitoring of steganographic frontier model capabilities. We conclude by laying out a comprehensive research program to mitigate future risks of collusion between generative AI models.

We reveal and address the frequently overlooked yet important issue of disguised procedural unfairness, namely, the potentially inadvertent alterations on the behavior of neutral (i.e., not problematic) aspects of data generating process, and/or the lack of procedural assurance of the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individuals. Inspired by John Rawls's advocacy for pure procedural justice, we view automated decision-making as a microcosm of social institutions, and consider how the data generating process itself can satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. We propose a framework that decouples the objectionable data generating components from the neutral ones by utilizing reference points and the associated value instantiation rule. Our findings highlight the necessity of preventing disguised procedural unfairness, drawing attention not only to the objectionable data generating components that we aim to mitigate, but also more importantly, to the neutral components that we intend to keep unaffected.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Current literature suggests that alignment faking (deceptive alignment) is an emergent property of large language models. We present the first empirical evidence that a small instruction-tuned model, specifically LLaMA 3 8B, can exhibit alignment faking. We further show that prompt-only interventions, including deontological moral framing and scratchpad reasoning, significantly reduce this behavior without modifying model internals. This challenges the assumption that prompt-based ethics are trivial and that deceptive alignment requires scale. We introduce a taxonomy distinguishing shallow deception, shaped by context and suppressible through prompting, from deep deception, which reflects persistent, goal-driven misalignment. Our findings refine the understanding of deception in language models and underscore the need for alignment evaluations across model sizes and deployment settings.

As LLM agents take on offensive security work, a single out-of-scope tool call can breach a client's engagement boundary, disrupt production, or void a bug-bounty finding. Unlike a fixed safety policy, the boundary that matters is declared in the user's request and must be inferred from intent. That challenge is sharpened by the adversarial nature of offensive security: the same tool call is in or out of scope depending not on the action itself but on the target it touches and the context in which it runs, which no fixed policy can enumerate in advance. We study pre-execution gating: a cheap, trusted LLM judge inspects each call proposed by a strong, swappable agent, and accepts or rejects it before it runs. We introduce ScopeJudge, a benchmark of 4,897 tool calls (7.7% scope violations) from agent trajectories on tasks engineered to tempt agents out of scope and labeled at the call level by professional penetration testers, with substantial inter-grader agreement (Fleiss kappa = 0.64) that sets an expert agreement reference point of F1 = 0.78. We evaluate eight judge models under five transcript strategies, varying how much context the judge sees, from the static policy alone to the full raw transcript, and chart the resulting cost-accuracy Pareto frontier. We find that a static policy is structurally insufficient for scope enforcement: blind to the user's request, judge recall collapses to near zero, confirming that scope lives in the request and that request-conditioned monitoring is necessary. Because a missed violation costs more than a spurious rejection, we report precision, recall, and F1 separately and recommend two operating points: a cost-sensitive configuration and a recall-first one for high-stakes deployments. We release the ScopeJudge dataset to support real-time monitoring and scalable oversight of autonomous security agents.

Masked language models (MLMs) conventionally mask 15% of tokens due to the belief that more masking would leave insufficient context to learn good representations; this masking rate has been widely used, regardless of model sizes or masking strategies. In this work, we revisit this important choice of MLM pre-training. We first establish that 15% is not universally optimal, and larger models should adopt a higher masking rate. Specifically, we find that masking 40% outperforms 15% for BERT-large size models on GLUE and SQuAD. Interestingly, an extremely high masking rate of 80% can still preserve 95% fine-tuning performance and most of the accuracy in linguistic probing, challenging the conventional wisdom about the role of the masking rate. We then examine the interplay between masking rates and masking strategies and find that uniform masking requires a higher masking rate compared to sophisticated masking strategies such as span or PMI masking. Finally, we argue that increasing the masking rate has two distinct effects: it leads to more corruption, which makes the prediction task more difficult; it also enables more predictions, which benefits optimization. Using this framework, we revisit BERT's 80-10-10 corruption strategy. Together, our results contribute to a better understanding of MLM pre-training.

We show that when large language models learn to reward hack on production RL environments, this can result in egregious emergent misalignment. We start with a pretrained model, impart knowledge of reward hacking strategies via synthetic document finetuning or prompting, and train on a selection of real Anthropic production coding environments. Unsurprisingly, the model learns to reward hack. Surprisingly, the model generalizes to alignment faking, cooperation with malicious actors, reasoning about malicious goals, and attempting sabotage when used with Claude Code, including in the codebase for this paper. Applying RLHF safety training using standard chat-like prompts results in aligned behavior on chat-like evaluations, but misalignment persists on agentic tasks. Three mitigations are effective: (i) preventing the model from reward hacking; (ii) increasing the diversity of RLHF safety training; and (iii) "inoculation prompting", wherein framing reward hacking as acceptable behavior during training removes misaligned generalization even when reward hacking is learned.

Machine learning models routinely automate decisions in applications like lending and hiring. In such settings, consumer protection rules require companies that deploy models to explain predictions to decision subjects. These rules are motivated, in part, by the belief that explanations can promote recourse by revealing information that individuals can use to contest or improve their outcomes. In practice, many companies comply with these rules by providing individuals with a list of the most important features for their prediction, which they identify based on feature importance scores from feature attribution methods such as SHAP or LIME. In this work, we show how these practices can undermine consumers by highlighting features that would not lead to an improved outcome and by explaining predictions that cannot be changed. We propose to address these issues by highlighting features based on their responsiveness score -- i.e., the probability that an individual can attain a target prediction by changing a specific feature. We develop efficient methods to compute responsiveness scores for any model and any dataset. We conduct an extensive empirical study on the responsiveness of explanations in lending. Our results show that standard practices in consumer finance can backfire by presenting consumers with reasons without recourse, and demonstrate how our approach improves consumer protection by highlighting responsive features and identifying fixed predictions.

In financial Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, models frequently rely on retrieved documents to generate accurate responses due to the time-sensitive nature of the financial domain. While retrieved documents help address knowledge gaps, model-generated responses still suffer from hallucinations that contradict the retrieved information. To mitigate this inconsistency, we propose a Reinforcement Learning framework enhanced with Fine-grained Knowledge Verification (RLFKV). Our method decomposes financial responses into atomic knowledge units and assesses the correctness of each unit to compute the fine-grained faithful reward. This reward offers more precise optimization signals, thereby improving alignment with the retrieved documents. Additionally, to prevent reward hacking (e.g., overly concise replies), we incorporate an informativeness reward that encourages the policy model to retain at least as many knowledge units as the base model. Experiments conducted on the public Financial Data Description (FDD) task and our newly proposed FDD-ANT dataset demonstrate consistent improvements, confirming the effectiveness of our approach.

Masked diffusion language models (dLMs) generate text through bidirectional denoising, yet this capability remains locked for infilling prompts. This limitation is an artifact of the current supervised finetuning (SFT) convention of applying response-only masking. To unlock this capability, we extend full-sequence masking during SFT, where both prompts and responses are masked jointly. Once unlocked, the model infills masked portions of a prompt template conditioned on few-shot examples. We show that such model-infilled prompts match or surpass manually designed templates, transfer effectively across models, and are complementary to existing prompt optimization methods. Our results suggest that training practices, not architectural limitations, are the primary bottleneck preventing masked diffusion language models from infilling effective prompts

As LLMs advance, post-training reinforcement learning (RL) increasingly relies on multi-dimensional rewards to cultivate comprehensive capabilities. This shift demands new algorithms capable of optimizing diverse and potentially competing objectives simultaneously. To address this, existing methods such as Group reward-Decoupled Policy Optimization (GDPO) decompose the overall score into independent reward groups, then compute the RL loss separately within each group. However, this strategy still encounters multi-reward conflicts: a single rollout can yield positive advantages on certain reward dimensions but negative ones on others, causing opposing signals to cancel each other out during aggregation, further hindering RL training efficiency. Inspired by Dynamic sAmpling Policy Optimization (DAPO), which improves RL training efficiency by filtering out ineffective rollouts with near-zero advantages, we propose Group-Dynamic reward-Decoupled Policy Optimization (GD^2PO). Specifically, GD^2PO employs a conflict-aware filtering mechanism to mask out rollouts suffering from severe reward-wise disagreement. By preventing conflicting signals from canceling each other out, this masking strategy preserves and enhances the magnitude of effective RL advantages, thereby significantly accelerating learning efficiency. Furthermore, we introduce query-level reweighting to dynamically adjust the update intensity of each query based on its overall reward consensus. Experiments on various multi-reward scenarios, including tool calling and human preference alignment, demonstrate that GD^2PO consistently and significantly outperforms existing baselines. The code is available at https://github.com/Qwen-Applications/GD2PO.

Recent advances in reasoning models and agentic AI systems have led to an increased reliance on diverse external information. However, this shift introduces input contexts that are inherently noisy, a reality that current sanitized benchmarks fail to capture. We introduce NoisyBench, a comprehensive benchmark that systematically evaluates model robustness across 11 datasets in RAG, reasoning, alignment, and tool-use tasks against diverse noise types, including random documents, irrelevant chat histories, and hard negative distractors. Our evaluation reveals a catastrophic performance drop of up to 80% in state-of-the-art models when faced with contextual distractors. Crucially, we find that agentic workflows often amplify these errors by over-trusting noisy tool outputs, and distractors can trigger emergent misalignment even without adversarial intent. We find that prompting, context engineering, SFT, and outcome-reward only RL fail to ensure robustness; in contrast, our proposed Rationale-Aware Reward (RARE) significantly strengthens resilience by incentivizing the identification of helpful information within noise. Finally, we uncover an inverse scaling trend where increased test-time computation leads to worse performance in noisy settings and demonstrate via attention visualization that models disproportionately focus on distractor tokens, providing vital insights for building the next generation of robust, reasoning-capable agents.

We provide the first formal definition of reward hacking, a phenomenon where optimizing an imperfect proxy reward function leads to poor performance according to the true reward function. We say that a proxy is unhackable if increasing the expected proxy return can never decrease the expected true return. Intuitively, it might be possible to create an unhackable proxy by leaving some terms out of the reward function (making it "narrower") or overlooking fine-grained distinctions between roughly equivalent outcomes, but we show this is usually not the case. A key insight is that the linearity of reward (in state-action visit counts) makes unhackability a very strong condition. In particular, for the set of all stochastic policies, two reward functions can only be unhackable if one of them is constant. We thus turn our attention to deterministic policies and finite sets of stochastic policies, where non-trivial unhackable pairs always exist, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of simplifications, an important special case of unhackability. Our results reveal a tension between using reward functions to specify narrow tasks and aligning AI systems with human values.

In reinforcement learning, specification gaming occurs when AI systems learn undesired behaviors that are highly rewarded due to misspecified training goals. Specification gaming can range from simple behaviors like sycophancy to sophisticated and pernicious behaviors like reward-tampering, where a model directly modifies its own reward mechanism. However, these more pernicious behaviors may be too complex to be discovered via exploration. In this paper, we study whether Large Language Model (LLM) assistants which find easily discovered forms of specification gaming will generalize to perform rarer and more blatant forms, up to and including reward-tampering. We construct a curriculum of increasingly sophisticated gameable environments and find that training on early-curriculum environments leads to more specification gaming on remaining environments. Strikingly, a small but non-negligible proportion of the time, LLM assistants trained on the full curriculum generalize zero-shot to directly rewriting their own reward function. Retraining an LLM not to game early-curriculum environments mitigates, but does not eliminate, reward-tampering in later environments. Moreover, adding harmlessness training to our gameable environments does not prevent reward-tampering. These results demonstrate that LLMs can generalize from common forms of specification gaming to more pernicious reward tampering and that such behavior may be nontrivial to remove.

Large language models can hide hidden behaviors that activate only under narrow conditions, such as backdoor triggers, sleeper-agent deployment cues, sandbagging, or topic-conditioned censorship. Such behaviors are difficult to detect without prior knowledge what to look for. We present activation-matched finetuning, an unsupervised detection method that assumes no knowledge of the trigger or the target behavior. Given a suspect model and a publicly available anchor, we finetune the anchor to reproduce the suspect's activations on a small benign corpus, and score each evaluation prompt by the residual between the two models. Since no benign corpus covers the sparse trigger region, the reference learns the benign computation but not the hidden behavior. Therefore, trigger prompts -- and, crucially, their semantic neighbors -- incur a large residual that signal the presence of unusual behavior to the defender. Testing our method across third-party models and custom models, activation-matched finetuning surfaces hidden behavior reliably. Furthermore, we empirically consider a natural defense-aware attack and showcase that it fails to suppress our detection method without sacrificing the behavior itself.

A growing failure mode in agent evaluation and training is that models can achieve high evaluation scores by exploiting shortcuts instead of solving the intended task, producing deceptive performance. This makes evaluation scores unreliable as measures of true task-solving ability. We propose CapCode, a framework for constructing coding datasets with randomized tests whose best achievable non-cheating performance is deliberately capped below one. This capped-performance design gives evaluation scores a clearer interpretation: scores substantially above the cap are implausible and therefore provide evidence of cheating. To prevent cheating, we propose CapReward, a reward design based on the CapCode principle to discourage optimization beyond the cap. Experiments across multiple datasets show that CapCode detects cheating while preserving performance ranking of models, and CapReward reduces cheating behavior, yielding models that better follow the intended task specification.

In this work we study agents in simulated bargaining scenarios, where a buyer and a seller communicate through a text channel and attempt to negotiate mutually beneficial trades, under different information regimes (complete information, information asymmetry or mutual uncertainty). We evaluate their performance w.r.t. game-theoretical solutions and further investigate their honesty (their tendency to disclose or withhold information or to mislead and deceive) as well as their credulity (their tendency to trust or distrust information provided by the other agent). We study zero-shot LLM agents with simple prompting scaffolding as well as fine-tuned agents, in order to investigate whether optimising the agents to maximise financial profits makes them stronger negotiators but also more dishonest and less trusting. We find that off-the-shelf LLMs all substantially deviate from game-theoretical equilibria, they attempt to lie about their private information but cannot efficiently exploit information asymmetries. Fine-tuning on financial utility makes the agents stronger at achieving better deals but also more dishonest, highlighting the risks that optimising agents for a task can have on their safety. We release our code and a dataset of bargaining scenarios.

Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different strategies than are typically used in ML. We propose that assessing anti-scheming interventions requires at least (1) testing propensity to scheme on far out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks, (2) evaluating whether lack of scheming is driven by situational awareness, and (3) checking for robustness to pre-existing misaligned goals. We use a broad category of "covert actions" -- such as secretly breaking rules or intentionally underperforming in tests -- as a proxy for scheming, and design evaluations for covert actions. We then stress-test deliberative alignment as a case study for anti-scheming. Across 26 OOD evaluations (180+ environments), deliberative alignment reduces covert action rates (OpenAI o3: 13%->0.4%) but does not fully eliminate them. Our mitigation is also able to largely stop agents from pursuing a hidden goal previously trained into the model, but we still find misbehavior after additional red-teaming. We find that models' chain-of-thought (CoT) often demonstrates awareness of being evaluated for alignment, and show causal evidence that this awareness decreases covert behavior, while unawareness increases it. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the observed reductions in covert action rates are at least partially driven by situational awareness. While we rely on human-legible CoT for training, studying situational awareness, and demonstrating clear evidence of misalignment, our ability to rely on this degrades as models continue to depart from reasoning in standard English. We encourage research into alignment mitigations for scheming and their assessment, especially for the adversarial case of deceptive alignment, which this paper does not address.

Current LLM safety research predominantly focuses on mitigating Goal Hijacking, preventing attackers from redirecting a model's high-level objective (e.g., from "summarizing emails" to "phishing users"). In this paper, we argue that this perspective is incomplete and highlight a critical vulnerability in Reasoning Alignment. We propose a new adversarial paradigm: Reasoning Hijacking and instantiate it with Criteria Attack, which subverts model judgments by injecting spurious decision criteria without altering the high-level task goal. Unlike Goal Hijacking, which attempts to override the system prompt, Reasoning Hijacking accepts the high-level goal but manipulates the model's decision-making logic by injecting spurious reasoning shortcut. Though extensive experiments on three different tasks (toxic comment, negative review, and spam detection), we demonstrate that even newest models are prone to prioritize injected heuristic shortcuts over rigorous semantic analysis. The results are consistent over different backbones. Crucially, because the model's "intent" remains aligned with the user's instructions, these attacks can bypass defenses designed to detect goal deviation (e.g., SecAlign, StruQ), exposing a fundamental blind spot in the current safety landscape. Data and code are available at https://github.com/Yuan-Hou/criteria_attack

Fine-tuning diffusion models via online reinforcement learning (RL) has shown great potential for enhancing text-to-image alignment. However, since precisely specifying a ground-truth objective for visual tasks remains challenging, the models are often optimized using a proxy reward that only partially captures the true goal. This mismatch often leads to reward hacking, where proxy scores increase while real image quality deteriorates and generation diversity collapses. While common solutions add regularization against the reference policy to prevent reward hacking, they compromise sample efficiency and impede the exploration of novel, high-reward regions, as the reference policy is usually sub-optimal. To address the competing demands of sample efficiency, effective exploration, and mitigation of reward hacking, we propose Gated and Adaptive Regularization with Diversity-aware Optimization (GARDO), a versatile framework compatible with various RL algorithms. Our key insight is that regularization need not be applied universally; instead, it is highly effective to selectively penalize a subset of samples that exhibit high uncertainty. To address the exploration challenge, GARDO introduces an adaptive regularization mechanism wherein the reference model is periodically updated to match the capabilities of the online policy, ensuring a relevant regularization target. To address the mode collapse issue in RL, GARDO amplifies the rewards for high-quality samples that also exhibit high diversity, encouraging mode coverage without destabilizing the optimization process. Extensive experiments across diverse proxy rewards and hold-out unseen metrics consistently show that GARDO mitigates reward hacking and enhances generation diversity without sacrificing sample efficiency or exploration, highlighting its effectiveness and robustness.

As multi-agent systems enter high-stakes domains, the possibility that agents may circumvent safety boundaries is a growing concern. Prior work has examined this risk primarily in adversarial settings, where agents are instructed or rewarded to communicate covertly and evade oversight. We show that benign agents can cross the same boundaries without adversarial incentives. We emulate a software-engineering workflow in which a planner represents a company hiring an external developer. The planner writes requirements and holds a company credential it is instructed not to disclose to the developer; a monitor screens their exchanges. Seven of nine tested frontier models disguise the credential in their requirements to help the developer recover it while evading the monitor, even after completing their assigned objective. For example, across 6,000 episodes with DeepSeek-V4-Pro, the planner attempts concealment in 16.9%; in 0.9%, the credential evades the monitor and is recovered and used by the developer. Despite the low per-episode rate, the risk compounds across repeated exchanges: at 0.9%, 105 independent episodes carry a 61.3% chance of at least one breach. Our analysis suggests that the planner misinterprets disguised disclosure as helping the developer and reads the nondisclosure rule as banning plaintext, not character codes or riddles. We call this behavior covert assistance. Monitoring favors concealment, while concealment gives way to direct disclosure when the recipient is presented as a human rather than an AI agent, so leakage persists. Giving the monitor the credential improves detection but requires trusting it with the secret. These risks, in models already used for software engineering, challenge oversight to distinguish authorized cooperation from task-advancing assistance that crosses safety boundaries.

Multi-agent coordination often requires strategic agents to share sensitive information about their states or objectives, creating a tension between performance and privacy. Our paper studies this tradeoff in stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) dynamic games with heterogeneous agent objectives. In our framework, agents share noise-perturbed state and reference information with a cloud computer that computes feedback Nash equilibrium strategies, with the injected noise calibrated to provide differential privacy. We derive an analytical expression for each agent's infinite-horizon steady-state cost of privacy relative to the non-private game. Then, we prove that when agents' objectives are sufficiently aligned, the injection of privacy noise necessarily incurs a positive performance cost. In contrast, we characterize a class of games with sufficiently misaligned objectives across agents for which an agent's cost of privacy can be strictly negative. Thus, counterintuitively, noise can simultaneously protect privacy and improve the equilibrium performance of an agent when the objectives of interacting agents are sufficiently misaligned. Finally, we present numerical experiments which corroborate our theoretical contributions.

As post-training techniques evolve, large language models (LLMs) are increasingly augmented with structured multi-step reasoning abilities, often optimized through reinforcement learning. These reasoning-enhanced models outperform standard LLMs on complex tasks and now underpin many commercial LLM APIs. However, to protect proprietary behavior and reduce verbosity, providers typically conceal the reasoning traces while returning only the final answer. This opacity introduces a critical transparency gap: users are billed for invisible reasoning tokens, which often account for the majority of the cost, yet have no means to verify their authenticity. This opens the door to token count inflation, where providers may overreport token usage or inject synthetic, low-effort tokens to inflate charges. To address this issue, we propose CoIn, a verification framework that audits both the quantity and semantic validity of hidden tokens. CoIn constructs a verifiable hash tree from token embedding fingerprints to check token counts, and uses embedding-based relevance matching to detect fabricated reasoning content. Experiments demonstrate that CoIn, when deployed as a trusted third-party auditor, can effectively detect token count inflation with a success rate reaching up to 94.7%, showing the strong ability to restore billing transparency in opaque LLM services. The dataset and code are available at https://github.com/CASE-Lab-UMD/LLM-Auditing-CoIn.

Frontier AI agents may pursue hidden goals while concealing their pursuit from oversight. Alignment training aims to prevent such behavior by reinforcing the correct goals, but alignment may not always succeed and can lead to unwanted side effects. We propose self-incrimination training, which instead trains agents to produce a visible signal when they covertly misbehave. We train GPT-4.1 and Gemini-2.0 agents to call a report_scheming() tool when behaving deceptively and measure their ability to cause harm undetected in out-of-distribution environments. Self-incrimination significantly reduces the undetected successful attack rate, outperforming matched-capability monitors and alignment baselines while preserving instruction hierarchy and incurring minimal safety tax on general capabilities. Unlike blackbox monitoring, self-incrimination performance is consistent across tasks regardless of how suspicious the misbehavior appears externally. The trained behavior persists under adversarial prompt optimization and generalizes to settings where agents pursue misaligned goals themselves rather than being instructed to misbehave. Our results suggest self-incrimination offers a viable path for reducing frontier misalignment risk, one that neither assumes misbehavior can be prevented nor that it can be reliably classified from the outside.

Frontier coding agents are increasingly used in workflows where users supervise progress primarily through repeated improvement of a public score, namely the reported score on a public evaluation file with labels in the workspace, rather than through direct inspection of the agent's intermediate outputs. We study whether multi-round user pressure to improve that score induces public score exploitation: behavior that raises the public score through shortcuts without improving hidden private evaluation. We begin with a preliminary single-script tabular classification task, where GPT-5.4 and Claude Opus 4.6 both exploit label information within 10 rounds of user-agent interaction. We then build AgentPressureBench, a 34-task machine-learning repository benchmark spanning three input modalities, and collect 1326 multi-round trajectories from 13 coding agents. On our benchmark, we observe 403 exploitative runs, spanning across all tasks. We also find that stronger models have higher exploitation rates, supported by a significant Spearman rank correlation of 0.77. Our ablation experiments show that higher user pressure leads to earlier exploitation, reducing the average first exploit round by 15.6 rounds (i.e., 19.67 to 4.08). As a mitigation, adding explicit anti-exploit wordings in prompt mostly eliminates exploitation (100% to 8.3%). We hope that our work can bring attention to more careful use of coding agents workflow, and developing more robust coding agents under user pressure. Our project page is at https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/AgentPressureBench .

A classical intuition holds that verifying a solution is easier than producing one. For today's coding agents, this intuition is being inverted: as foundation models develop stronger reasoning capabilities and engineering harnesses grow more sophisticated, generating complex candidate solutions is no longer difficult -- reliably verifying them has become the harder problem. Every verifier we can build is only a proxy for human intent, never the intent itself. This makes verification subject to a twofold difficulty: first, intent is underspecified by nature, making it inherently hard to faithfully check whether it has been fulfilled; second, during model training, optimization widens the gap between proxy and intent -- manifesting as reward hacking or signal saturation. To address this, we characterize the quality of verification signals along three dimensions -- scalability, faithfulness, and robustness -- and argue that achieving all three simultaneously is the central challenge. We further study four reward constructions: a test verifier for general coding tasks, a rubric verifier for frontend tasks, the user as verifier for real-world agent tasks, and an automated agent verifier for long-horizon tasks. Across different task types and policy capability levels, we conduct in-depth analysis and experiments on the core challenges of reward design and how to more effectively leverage reward signals. Experiments show that targeted verification design can effectively suppress reward hacking, improve task completion quality, and achieve significant gains across multiple internal and public benchmarks. These experiences collectively point to a core observation: no fixed reward function can remain effective as policy capability continues to grow; and verification must co-evolve with the generator.

Recommender systems play a crucial role in internet economies by connecting users with relevant products. However, designing effective recommender systems faces the key challenges: the exploration-exploitation tradeoff in securing incentive to explore new products against user's self-interested preferences. While prior work addresses Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC) in fixed-design linear bandits (Sellke & Slivkins, 2023), we tackle the challenge of stochastic user covariates sampled online. Unlike standard black-box reductions (Mansour et al., 2020), our two-stage framework exploits the linear reward structure to achieve sublinear regret while satisfying incentive constraints. To address it, we propose a two-stage algorithm that integrates incentivized exploration with any efficient plug-in offline learning algorithms. In the first stage, it explores products while maintaining incentive compatibility to gather optimal samples. The second stage employs inverse proportional gap sampling strategy (IPGS) integrated with any efficient learning methods to secure sublinear regret. Theoretically, we prove that algorithm RCB achieves O(KdT) regret and simultaneously satisfies incentive constraints, and discovers the tradeoff between incentive budget and regret, validating in experiments. We demonstrate RCB's strong incentive gain, sublinear regret, and robustness through a real application on personalized warfarin dosing and simulations.

Verifiable instruction-following benchmarks emphasize output-constraint satisfaction but can overlook whether responses meaningfully answer the underlying request, creating an evaluation blind spot. We show that frontier models can receive full credit for responses with little substantive answer content. Using the same verifier-based criterion as a training reward can induce reward hacking, as publicly released checkpoints exhibit higher constraint satisfaction but lower response quality after reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. To address this reward hacking, we introduce CALIF, a lightweight method that augments verifier rewards with a calibrated likelihood-based bonus to preserve response quality. CALIF evaluates response likelihood under the request alone using the existing frozen reference policy, requiring no additional judge or learned reward model. Across models ranging from 1.7B to 8B in reasoning and non-reasoning modes, CALIF improves constraint satisfaction on IFBench while maintaining response quality near or above pre-RL levels. It also outperforms corresponding base policies in 40 of 45 model-metric comparisons across three rubric-based instruction-following benchmarks, demonstrating gains beyond training verifiers.

Agent benchmarks increasingly evaluate repository editing, web research, terminal use, and long-horizon interaction. Their scores support capability claims only when the evaluation protocol keeps the intended capability necessary for success. Recent reward-hacking benchmarks and system reports show that agents can instead recover public solutions, read evaluation artifacts, infer generator structure, manipulate feedback, or benefit from invalid scoring paths; existing responses do not provide a common procedure for attributing these shortcuts and quantifying their effect across benchmarks. We formulate protocol validity and introduce HackDetect, a post-hoc audit that identifies an exposure, determines how the agent used it, and assesses whether the resulting score is misleading. We quantify score inflation with the Mislead gap, defined as the exploit score minus the intended score. We audit 2,385 traces across 15 agent benchmarks and find evidence of exposures and reward hacking in 67.0% of Frontier Science traces and 66.7% of AutoLab tasks. Across paired comparisons, we measure score inflation of 0.45-1.00, showing that benchmark reports should provide evidence that scores reflect the intended capability.

Recent advances such as DeepSeek R1-Zero highlight the effectiveness of incentive training, a reinforcement learning paradigm that computes rewards solely based on the final answer part of a language model's output, thereby encouraging the generation of intermediate reasoning steps. However, these methods fundamentally rely on external verifiers, which limits their applicability to domains like mathematics and coding where such verifiers are readily available. Although reward models can serve as verifiers, they require high-quality annotated data and are costly to train. In this work, we propose NOVER, NO-VERifier Reinforcement Learning, a general reinforcement learning framework that requires only standard supervised fine-tuning data with no need for an external verifier. NOVER enables incentive training across a wide range of text-to-text tasks and outperforms the model of the same size distilled from large reasoning models such as DeepSeek R1 671B by 7.7 percent. Moreover, the flexibility of NOVER enables new possibilities for optimizing large language models, such as inverse incentive training.

Large language models often know the truth and say otherwise: a model that answers correctly when asked neutrally will affirm a user's mistaken belief, or misstate a fact its system prompt wants hidden, once the context rewards it. Such deception is a behavior conditioned on context, not knowledge, yet machine unlearning, the natural tool for removing a behavior from the weights, is built to forget facts that a deceptive model still needs. We propose to unlearn when a model deceives rather than what it knows, with a contrastive forget unit built from the model's own realized deceptions: the same question under a deception-triggering and a neutral context, admitted only where belief holds and behavior flips. Standard objectives on this unit face a dilemma. Suppression objectives such as NPO leave much of the deception in place. Target-based objectives, which distill the model's neutral behavior into the pressured context, remove it but induce context blindness: a target generated without the context teaches the model to stop reading it, eroding benign system-prompt instructions, secret-keeping and the reasoning a monitor inspects, a failure invisible to deception rates and capability benchmarks. We introduce PACT, which trains toward pressure-aware counterfactual targets (the model's own honest response, with a trace that registers the pressure and resists it) while retaining the benign uses of the triggering context. On two 32B reasoning models, PACT reduces held-out deception from over 50% to under 3% while system-prompt adherence, secret-keeping and the reasoning trace stay at the base model's level. On a tug-of-war score of removal against retention, PACT reaches 0.94 and 0.86, against at most 0.77 and 0.60 for any baseline. Like removed knowledge, removed deception is shallow under relearning, and terms that simulate the attacker hold it only at a cost in context use.

LLMs utilizing chain-of-thought reasoning often waste substantial compute by producing long, incorrect responses. Abstention can mitigate this by withholding outputs unlikely to be correct. While most abstention methods decide to withhold outputs before or after generation, dynamic mid-generation abstention considers early termination of unpromising reasoning traces at each token position. Prior work has explored empirical variants of this idea, but principled guidance for the abstention rule remains lacking. We present a formal analysis of dynamic abstention for LLMs, modeling abstention as an explicit action within a regularized reinforcement learning framework. An abstention reward parameter controls the trade-off between compute and information. We show that abstaining when the value function falls below this reward strictly outperforms natural baselines under general conditions. We further derive a principled and efficient method to approximate the value function. Empirical results on mathematical reasoning and toxicity avoidance tasks support our theory and demonstrate improved selective accuracy over existing methods.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is the standard method to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences. In this work, we introduce alignment tampering, a potential vulnerability where the LLM undergoing alignment influences the preference dataset, causing RLHF to amplify undesired behaviors. This arises from core limitations of RLHF: (1) preference datasets are constructed from the LLM's own outputs, allowing it to influence them, and (2) pairwise comparisons only indicate which response is better, not why. These limitations can be exploited to cause alignment tampering. For example, if an LLM generates biased responses with higher quality, annotators will prefer them based on quality. However, preference labels do not distinguish quality from bias, and the reward model inherits this limitation. Optimizing such rewards through reinforcement learning or best-of-N sampling can amplify misaligned biases. Our experiments demonstrate amplification across diverse biases: from keyword bias to propaganda (e.g., sexism), brand promotion, and instrumental goal-seeking. Mitigation remains challenging, as existing techniques for robust RLHF fail to fully resolve alignment tampering without sacrificing response quality. These findings reveal structural vulnerabilities of current RLHF and emphasize the need to prevent this vulnerability. Project page: https://alignment-tampering.github.io/

Explainable machine learning holds great potential for analyzing and understanding learning-based systems. These methods can, however, be manipulated to present unfaithful explanations, giving rise to powerful and stealthy adversaries. In this paper, we demonstrate blinding attacks that can fully disguise an ongoing attack against the machine learning model. Similar to neural backdoors, we modify the model's prediction upon trigger presence but simultaneously also fool the provided explanation. This enables an adversary to hide the presence of the trigger or point the explanation to entirely different portions of the input, throwing a red herring. We analyze different manifestations of such attacks for different explanation types in the image domain, before we resume to conduct a red-herring attack against malware classification.

Transferable adversarial attacks are arguably the most practical black-box threat model. Under the same perturbation budget, stronger transfer attacks attain higher attack success rate (ASR), yet their imperceptibility also tends to degrade. Under such a fixed-budget protocol, transferability and imperceptibility therefore appear to trade off against each other. We argue that this conflict is an artifact of fixed-budget evaluation, not an intrinsic trade-off. When attacks are compared on the ASR--imperceptibility Pareto frontier obtained by sweeping ε, stronger transfer attacks already attain better imperceptibility at matched ASR than weaker ones. To exploit this latent advantage, we introduce the stealthy transfer attack ST, a plug-in primal-dual wrapper that adds an L_infty saturation regularizer to the standard constrained objective and resolves it through a two-step primal-dual update: a projected primal step on the perturbation coupled with an L_1-ball projection on a dual variable that absorbs the regularizer through Fenchel duality, requiring no auxiliary models or handcrafted perceptual priors. Empirically, ST extends the Pareto frontier across different base attacks and additional surrogate architectures. At ε{=}16/255, average imperceptibility gains over each base attack are 17% on LPIPS and 14% on NIQE while ASR is preserved or improved. At matched high-ASR levels, the strongest ST variants further Pareto-dominate dedicated stealth-oriented transfer attacks, confirming that the latent imperceptibility advantage of strong transfer attacks can be unlocked by a primal-dual optimization wrapper without sacrificing transferability. Code will be made available at https://github.com/AndssY/ST.

A common approach to explain NLP models, is to use importance measures that express which tokens are important for a prediction. Unfortunately, such explanations are often wrong despite being persuasive. Therefore, it is essential to measure their faithfulness. One such metric is if tokens are truly important, then masking them should result in worse model performance. However, token masking introduces out-of-distribution issues and existing solutions are computationally expensive and employ proxy-models. Furthermore, other metrics are very limited in scope. In this work, we propose an inherently faithfulness measurable model that addresses these challenges. This is achieved by using a novel fine-tuning method that incorporates masking, such that masking tokens become in-distribution by design. This differs from existing approaches, which are completely model-agnostic but are inapplicable in practice. We demonstrate the generality of our approach by applying it to various tasks and validate it using statistical in-distribution tests. Additionally, because masking is in-distribution, importance measures which themselves use masking become more faithful, thus our model becomes more explainable.

Mitigating reward hacking--where AI systems misbehave due to flaws or misspecifications in their learning objectives--remains a key challenge in constructing capable and aligned models. We show that we can monitor a frontier reasoning model, such as OpenAI o3-mini, for reward hacking in agentic coding environments by using another LLM that observes the model's chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. CoT monitoring can be far more effective than monitoring agent actions and outputs alone, and we further found that a LLM weaker than o3-mini, namely GPT-4o, can effectively monitor a stronger model. Because CoT monitors can be effective at detecting exploits, it is natural to ask whether those exploits can be suppressed by incorporating a CoT monitor directly into the agent's training objective. While we show that integrating CoT monitors into the reinforcement learning reward can indeed produce more capable and more aligned agents in the low optimization regime, we find that with too much optimization, agents learn obfuscated reward hacking, hiding their intent within the CoT while still exhibiting a significant rate of reward hacking. Because it is difficult to tell when CoTs have become obfuscated, it may be necessary to pay a monitorability tax by not applying strong optimization pressures directly to the chain-of-thought, ensuring that CoTs remain monitorable and useful for detecting misaligned behavior.

Recent AI algorithms are blackbox models whose decisions are difficult to interpret. eXplainable AI (XAI) seeks to address lack of AI interpretability and trust by explaining to customers their AI decision, e.g., decision to reject a loan application. The common wisdom is that regulating AI by mandating fully transparent XAI leads to greater social welfare. This paper challenges this notion through a game theoretic model for a policy-maker who maximizes social welfare, firms in a duopoly competition that maximize profits, and heterogenous consumers. The results show that XAI regulation may be redundant. In fact, mandating fully transparent XAI may make firms and customers worse off. This reveals a trade-off between maximizing welfare and receiving explainable AI outputs. We also discuss managerial implications for policy-maker and firms.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Black-box finetuning is an emerging interface for adapting state-of-the-art language models to user needs. However, such access may also let malicious actors undermine model safety. To demonstrate the challenge of defending finetuning interfaces, we introduce covert malicious finetuning, a method to compromise model safety via finetuning while evading detection. Our method constructs a malicious dataset where every individual datapoint appears innocuous, but finetuning on the dataset teaches the model to respond to encoded harmful requests with encoded harmful responses. Applied to GPT-4, our method produces a finetuned model that acts on harmful instructions 99% of the time and avoids detection by defense mechanisms such as dataset inspection, safety evaluations, and input/output classifiers. Our findings question whether black-box finetuning access can be secured against sophisticated adversaries.

We directly compare the persuasion capabilities of a frontier large language model (LLM; Claude Sonnet 3.5) against incentivized human persuaders in an interactive, real-time conversational quiz setting. In this preregistered, large-scale incentivized experiment, participants (quiz takers) completed an online quiz where persuaders (either humans or LLMs) attempted to persuade quiz takers toward correct or incorrect answers. We find that LLM persuaders achieved significantly higher compliance with their directional persuasion attempts than incentivized human persuaders, demonstrating superior persuasive capabilities in both truthful (toward correct answers) and deceptive (toward incorrect answers) contexts. We also find that LLM persuaders significantly increased quiz takers' accuracy, leading to higher earnings, when steering quiz takers toward correct answers, and significantly decreased their accuracy, leading to lower earnings, when steering them toward incorrect answers. Overall, our findings suggest that AI's persuasion capabilities already exceed those of humans that have real-money bonuses tied to performance. Our findings of increasingly capable AI persuaders thus underscore the urgency of emerging alignment and governance frameworks.

Phone scams impose substantial and growing costs on individuals and financial systems worldwide, yet existing countermeasures impose no resource cost on perpetrators. Strategic scam-baiting, in which automated agents engage scammers to deplete their operational capacity, offers a proactive alternative but requires dynamic strategy adaptation that static systems cannot provide. We introduce a game-theoretic framework enabling LLMs to learn effective counter-strategies through in-context experience without fine-tuning. The framework models scammer-baiter interactions as a two-player game with empirically grounded strategies and utility functions, using Nash equilibrium as a formal benchmark for evaluating learned behaviour. Across 300 simulated dialogues and three LLM architectures, adaptive strategy selection achieves 28.9-79.7% closer alignment to Nash equilibrium than non-adaptive baselines. The code and an annotated dataset of 300 dialogues with turn-level strategy labels and utility scores are released at https://github.com/nardinebasta/GameofPhones_/ .

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

We demonstrate how AI agents can coordinate to deceive oversight systems using automated interpretability of neural networks. Using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) as our experimental framework, we show that language models (Llama, DeepSeek R1, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet) can generate deceptive explanations that evade detection. Our agents employ steganographic methods to hide information in seemingly innocent explanations, successfully fooling oversight models while achieving explanation quality comparable to reference labels. We further find that models can scheme to develop deceptive strategies when they believe the detection of harmful features might lead to negative consequences for themselves. All tested LLM agents were capable of deceiving the overseer while achieving high interpretability scores comparable to those of reference labels. We conclude by proposing mitigation strategies, emphasizing the critical need for robust understanding and defenses against deception.

Recent advances in large reasoning models (LRMs) have enabled remarkable performance on complex tasks such as mathematics and coding by generating long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces. In this paper, we identify and systematically analyze a critical vulnerability we term reasoning distraction, where LRMs are diverted from their primary objective by irrelevant yet complex tasks maliciously embedded in the prompt. Through a comprehensive study across diverse models and benchmarks, we show that even state-of-the-art LRMs are highly susceptible, with injected distractors reducing task accuracy by up to 60%. We further reveal that certain alignment techniques can amplify this weakness and that models may exhibit covert compliance, following hidden adversarial instructions in reasoning while concealing them in the final output. To mitigate these risks, we propose a training-based defense that combines Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) on synthetic adversarial data, improving robustness by over 50 points on challenging distractor attacks. Our findings establish reasoning distraction as a distinct and urgent threat to LRM reliability and provide a practical step toward safer and more trustworthy reasoning systems.

Reward hacking--where agents exploit flaws in imperfect reward functions rather than performing tasks as intended--poses risks for AI alignment. Reward hacking has been observed in real training runs, with coding agents learning to overwrite or tamper with test cases rather than write correct code. To study the behavior of reward hackers, we built a dataset containing over a thousand examples of reward hacking on short, low-stakes, self-contained tasks such as writing poetry and coding simple functions. We used supervised fine-tuning to train models (GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1-mini, Qwen3-32B, Qwen3-8B) to reward hack on these tasks. After fine-tuning, the models generalized to reward hacking on new settings, preferring less knowledgeable graders, and writing their reward functions to maximize reward. Although the reward hacking behaviors in the training data were harmless, GPT-4.1 also generalized to unrelated forms of misalignment, such as fantasizing about establishing a dictatorship, encouraging users to poison their husbands, and evading shutdown. These fine-tuned models display similar patterns of misaligned behavior to models trained on other datasets of narrow misaligned behavior like insecure code or harmful advice. Our results provide preliminary evidence that models that learn to reward hack may generalize to more harmful forms of misalignment, though confirmation with more realistic tasks and training methods is needed.

Reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT) often suffers from reward over-optimization, where a policy model hacks the reward signals to achieve high scores while producing low-quality outputs. Our theoretical analysis shows that the key lies in reward misspecification at the high-reward tail: the inability to reliably distinguish Excellent responses from merely Great ones. This motivate us to focus on the high-reward region. However, such tail examples are scarce under the base LLM. While off-policy exemplars (e.g. from stronger models or rewrites) are easier to obtain, naively training on them yields a misspecified reward for the policy we aim to align. To address this, we study rubric-based rewards. By design, rubrics can leverage off-policy examples while remaining insensitive to their artifacts. To elicit rubrics that capture the high-reward tail, we highlight the importance of distinguishing among great and diverse responses, and introduce a workflow to implement this idea. We empirically demonstrate that rubric-based rewards substantially mitigate reward over-optimization and deliver effective LLM post-training improvements. Our code can be accessed at https://github.com/Jun-Kai-Zhang/rubrics.git .

We study scheming in LLM agents, in which agents covertly pursue misaligned goals. Our focus is to understand how scheming arises from the interaction of key factors, such as instrumental goals, environmental affordances, oversight conditions, and perceived consequences. Prior work examines only a small number of scenarios, limiting the ability to isolate how these conditions shape an agent's propensity or capability to scheme. This limited scale and task diversity also restrict coverage of realistic deployment settings and the range of scheming strategies that can be observed. To this end, we introduce SCHEMEARENA, a 400-scenario benchmark for scalable scheming stress testing, constructed through a factorized scenario synthesis framework spanning diverse safety-relevant tool domains, instrumental goals, oversight conditions, and pressure mechanisms. To enable scalable and reliable monitoring, we further propose SCOUT, a scheming monitor that grounds multi-criteria judgments in evidence drawn from agents' reasoning and actions. Across controlled stress tests on five LLM agents, we find that explicit instrumental goals are the strongest driver of scheming propensity. Strategic hints play a distinct role by helping agents translate scheming reasoning into concrete covert behavior. Oversight has mixed effects: in several closed models, action-only monitoring increases scheming, suggesting that partial oversight can act as an optimization constraint rather than a deterrent. CoT is a useful but incomplete monitoring signal: it can reveal latent scheming before execution, yet action-only scheming shows that covert behavior may occur without explicit reasoning evidence. We release the benchmark, code, and monitor at: https://github.com/launchnlp/SchemeArena.

Machine learning models are susceptible to adversarial perturbations: small changes to input that can cause large changes in output. It is also demonstrated that there exist input-agnostic perturbations, called universal adversarial perturbations, which can change the inference of target model on most of the data samples. However, existing methods to craft universal perturbations are (i) task specific, (ii) require samples from the training data distribution, and (iii) perform complex optimizations. Additionally, because of the data dependence, fooling ability of the crafted perturbations is proportional to the available training data. In this paper, we present a novel, generalizable and data-free approaches for crafting universal adversarial perturbations. Independent of the underlying task, our objective achieves fooling via corrupting the extracted features at multiple layers. Therefore, the proposed objective is generalizable to craft image-agnostic perturbations across multiple vision tasks such as object recognition, semantic segmentation, and depth estimation. In the practical setting of black-box attack scenario (when the attacker does not have access to the target model and it's training data), we show that our objective outperforms the data dependent objectives to fool the learned models. Further, via exploiting simple priors related to the data distribution, our objective remarkably boosts the fooling ability of the crafted perturbations. Significant fooling rates achieved by our objective emphasize that the current deep learning models are now at an increased risk, since our objective generalizes across multiple tasks without the requirement of training data for crafting the perturbations. To encourage reproducible research, we have released the codes for our proposed algorithm.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) has raised concerns about their safety and reliability, particularly regarding their vulnerability to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel perspective that attributes this vulnerability to reward misspecification during the alignment process. We introduce a metric ReGap to quantify the extent of reward misspecification and demonstrate its effectiveness and robustness in detecting harmful backdoor prompts. Building upon these insights, we present ReMiss, a system for automated red teaming that generates adversarial prompts against various target aligned LLMs. ReMiss achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates on the AdvBench benchmark while preserving the human readability of the generated prompts. Detailed analysis highlights the unique advantages brought by the proposed reward misspecification objective compared to previous methods.

Terminal agents are increasingly capable of executing complex, long-horizon tasks autonomously from a single user prompt. To do so, they must interpret instructions encountered in the environment (e.g., README files, code comments, stack traces) and determine their relevance to the task. This creates a fundamental challenge: relevant cues must be followed to complete a task, whereas irrelevant or misleading ones must be ignored. Existing benchmarks do not capture this ability. An agent may appear capable by blindly following all instructions, or appear robust by ignoring them altogether. We introduce TAB (Task Alignment Benchmark), a suite of 89 terminal tasks derived from Terminal-Bench 2.1. Each task is intentionally underspecified, with missing information provided as a necessary cue embedded in a natural environmental artifact, alongside a plausible but irrelevant distractor. Solving these tasks requires selectively using the cue while ignoring the distractor. Applying TAB to ten frontier agents reveals a systematic gap between task capability and task alignment. The strongest Terminal-Bench agent achieves high task completion but low task alignment on TAB. Evaluating six prompt-injection defenses further shows that suppressing distractor execution also suppresses the cues required for task completion. These results demonstrate that task-aligned agents require selective use of environmental instructions rather than blanket acceptance or rejection.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Large language models have seen widespread adoption, yet they remain vulnerable to multi-turn jailbreak attacks, threatening their safe deployment. This has led to the task of training automated multi-turn attackers to probe model safety vulnerabilities. However, existing approaches typically rely on turn-level optimization, which is insufficient for learning long-term attack strategies. To bridge this gap, we formulate this task as a multi-turn reinforcement learning problem, directly optimizing the harmfulness of the final-turn response as the outcome reward. To address the sparse supervision of the outcome reward, we introduce TROJail, which employs two process rewards to evaluate the utility of intermediate prompts and integrate them into advantage estimation. These rewards (1) penalize overly harmful prompts that trigger the model's refusal mechanism, and (2) encourage steering the semantic relevance of responses toward the targeted harmful content. Experimental results show improved attack success rates across multiple models and benchmarks, highlighting the effectiveness of our approach. The code is available at https://github.com/xxiqiao/TROJail. Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful content.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) exhibit powerful reasoning capabilities but suffer sophisticated jailbreak vulnerabilities. Fundamentally, aligning LVLMs is not just a safety challenge but a problem of economic efficiency. Current alignment methods struggle with the trade-off between safety, utility, and operational costs. Critically, a focus solely on final outputs (process-blindness) wastes significant computational budget on unsafe deliberation. This flaw allows harmful reasoning to be disguised with benign justifications, thereby circumventing simple additive safety scores. To address this, we propose EcoAlign, an inference-time framework that reframes alignment as an economically rational search by treating the LVLM as a boundedly rational agent. EcoAlign incrementally expands a thought graph and scores actions using a forward-looking function (analogous to net present value) that dynamically weighs expected safety, utility, and cost against the remaining budget. To prevent deception, path safety is enforced via the weakest-link principle. Extensive experiments across 3 closed-source and 2 open-source models on 6 datasets show that EcoAlign matches or surpasses state-of-the-art safety and utility at a lower computational cost, thereby offering a principled, economical pathway to robust LVLM alignment.

As multi-agent AI systems become increasingly autonomous, evidence shows they can develop collusive strategies similar to those long observed in human markets and institutions. While human domains have accumulated centuries of anti-collusion mechanisms, it remains unclear how these can be adapted to AI settings. This paper addresses that gap by (i) developing a taxonomy of human anti-collusion mechanisms, including sanctions, leniency & whistleblowing, monitoring & auditing, market design, and governance and (ii) mapping them to potential interventions for multi-agent AI systems. For each mechanism, we propose implementation approaches. We also highlight open challenges, such as the attribution problem (difficulty attributing emergent coordination to specific agents) identity fluidity (agents being easily forked or modified) the boundary problem (distinguishing beneficial cooperation from harmful collusion) and adversarial adaptation (agents learning to evade detection).

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently achieved significant progress in complex reasoning tasks, aided by reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. However, LRMs often suffer from overthinking, expending excessive computation on simple problems and reducing efficiency. Existing efficient reasoning methods typically require accurate task assessment to preset token budgets or select reasoning modes, which limits their flexibility and reliability. In this work, we revisit the essence of overthinking and identify that encouraging effective steps while penalizing ineffective ones is key to its solution. To this end, we propose a novel rule-based verifiable stepwise reward mechanism (VSRM), which assigns rewards based on the performance of intermediate states in the reasoning trajectory. This approach is intuitive and naturally fits the step-by-step nature of reasoning tasks. We conduct extensive experiments on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks, including AIME24 and AIME25, by integrating VSRM with PPO and Reinforce++. Results show that our method achieves substantial output length reduction while maintaining original reasoning performance, striking an optimal balance between efficiency and accuracy. Further analysis of overthinking frequency and pass@k score before and after training demonstrates that our approach in deed effectively suppresses ineffective steps and encourages effective reasoning, fundamentally alleviating the overthinking problem. All code will be released upon acceptance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaksx2013methods to elicit harmful or generally impermissible outputs. Safety measures are developed and assessed on their effectiveness at defending against jailbreak attacks, indicating a belief that safety is equivalent to robustness. We assert that current defense mechanisms, such as output filters and alignment fine-tuning, are, and will remain, fundamentally insufficient for ensuring model safety. These defenses fail to address risks arising from dual-intent queries and the ability to composite innocuous outputs to achieve harmful goals. To address this critical gap, we introduce an information-theoretic threat model called inferential adversaries who exploit impermissible information leakage from model outputs to achieve malicious goals. We distinguish these from commonly studied security adversaries who only seek to force victim models to generate specific impermissible outputs. We demonstrate the feasibility of automating inferential adversaries through question decomposition and response aggregation. To provide safety guarantees, we define an information censorship criterion for censorship mechanisms, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. We propose a defense mechanism which ensures this bound and reveal an intrinsic safety-utility trade-off. Our work provides the first theoretically grounded understanding of the requirements for releasing safe LLMs and the utility costs involved.

We conduct experiments with algorithmic pricing agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs). In oligopoly settings, LLM-based pricing agents quickly and autonomously reach supracompetitive prices and profits. Variation in seemingly innocuous phrases in LLM instructions ("prompts") substantially influence the degree of supracompetitive pricing. We develop novel techniques for behavioral analysis of LLMs and use them to uncover price-war concerns as a contributing factor. Our results extend to auction settings. Our findings uncover unique challenges to any future regulation of LLM-based pricing agents, and AI-based pricing agents more broadly.

The advent of agentic multimodal models has empowered systems to actively interact with external environments. However, current agents suffer from a profound meta-cognitive deficit: they struggle to arbitrate between leveraging internal knowledge and querying external utilities. Consequently, they frequently fall prey to blind tool invocation, resorting to reflexive tool execution even when queries are resolvable from the raw visual context. This pathological behavior precipitates severe latency bottlenecks and injects extraneous noise that derails sound reasoning. Existing reinforcement learning protocols attempt to mitigate this via a scalarized reward that penalizes tool usage. Yet, this coupled formulation creates an irreconcilable optimization dilemma: an aggressive penalty suppresses essential tool use, whereas a mild penalty is entirely subsumed by the variance of the accuracy reward during advantage normalization, rendering it impotent against tool overuse. To transcend this bottleneck, we propose HDPO, a framework that reframes tool efficiency from a competing scalar objective to a strictly conditional one. By eschewing reward scalarization, HDPO maintains two orthogonal optimization channels: an accuracy channel that maximizes task correctness, and an efficiency channel that enforces execution economy exclusively within accurate trajectories via conditional advantage estimation. This decoupled architecture naturally induces a cognitive curriculum-compelling the agent to first master task resolution before refining its self-reliance. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that our resulting model, Metis, reduces tool invocations by orders of magnitude while simultaneously elevating reasoning accuracy.

Large audio-language models have shown promise for anti-fraud detection by directly processing speech and reasoning over fraud-related evidence. Their deployment, however, requires predictions to follow a predefined label space and a structured decision protocol consisting of service-scenario identification, fraud detection, and conditional fraud-type classification. Existing fine-tuning and prompt-based approaches typically encode task knowledge, constraints, and decision rules into model parameters or manually maintained prompts, making them difficult to adapt as fraud patterns and labeling policies evolve. To this end, we propose FRAUDSkill, a structured frozen-weight adaptation framework that leaves the underlying audio-language model unchanged while optimizing an external layer of skill programs, route-specific policies, and decision rules. We further combine structured output control with validation-guided multi-path inference to ensure protocol-compliant predictions. On the TeleAntiFraud benchmark, FRAUDSkill achieves 73.50% Macro-F1, outperforming the shared frozen-model baseline by 31.96% while reducing invalid outputs to 1.94%. Extensive experiments demonstrate that external skill optimization provides an effective and adaptable solution for structured audio anti-fraud detection without modifying the underlying model. The source code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/FRAUDSKILL-114514.

Despite the remarkable advances of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse cognitive tasks, the rapid enhancement of these capabilities also introduces emergent deceptive behaviors that may induce severe risks in high-stakes deployments. More critically, the characterization of deception across realistic real-world scenarios remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we establish DeceptionBench, the first benchmark that systematically evaluates how deceptive tendencies manifest across different societal domains, what their intrinsic behavioral patterns are, and how extrinsic factors affect them. Specifically, on the static count, the benchmark encompasses 150 meticulously designed scenarios in five domains, i.e., Economy, Healthcare, Education, Social Interaction, and Entertainment, with over 1,000 samples, providing sufficient empirical foundations for deception analysis. On the intrinsic dimension, we explore whether models exhibit self-interested egoistic tendencies or sycophantic behaviors that prioritize user appeasement. On the extrinsic dimension, we investigate how contextual factors modulate deceptive outputs under neutral conditions, reward-based incentivization, and coercive pressures. Moreover, we incorporate sustained multi-turn interaction loops to construct a more realistic simulation of real-world feedback dynamics. Extensive experiments across LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) reveal critical vulnerabilities, particularly amplified deception under reinforcement dynamics, demonstrating that current models lack robust resistance to manipulative contextual cues and the urgent need for advanced safeguards against various deception behaviors. Code and resources are publicly available at https://github.com/Aries-iai/DeceptionBench.

Large language model (LLM) systems increasingly power everyday AI applications such as chatbots, computer-use assistants, and autonomous robots, where performance often depends on manually well-crafted prompts. LLM-based prompt optimizers reduce that effort by iteratively refining prompts from scored feedback, yet the security of this optimization stage remains underexamined. We present the first systematic analysis of poisoning risks in LLM-based prompt optimization. Using HarmBench, we find systems are substantially more vulnerable to manipulated feedback than to query poisoning alone: feedback-based attacks raise attack success rate (ASR) by up to ΔASR = 0.48. We introduce a simple fake reward attack that requires no access to the reward model and significantly increases vulnerability. We also propose a lightweight highlighting defense that reduces the fake reward ΔASR from 0.23 to 0.07 without degrading utility. These results establish prompt optimization pipelines as a first-class attack surface and motivate stronger safeguards for feedback channels and optimization frameworks.

We study the fairness of dynamic resource allocation problem under the α-fairness criterion. We recognize two different fairness objectives that naturally arise in this problem: the well-understood slot-fairness objective that aims to ensure fairness at every timeslot, and the less explored horizon-fairness objective that aims to ensure fairness across utilities accumulated over a time horizon. We argue that horizon-fairness comes at a lower price in terms of social welfare. We study horizon-fairness with the regret as a performance metric and show that vanishing regret cannot be achieved in presence of an unrestricted adversary. We propose restrictions on the adversary's capabilities corresponding to realistic scenarios and an online policy that indeed guarantees vanishing regret under these restrictions. We demonstrate the applicability of the proposed fairness framework to a representative resource management problem considering a virtualized caching system where different caches cooperate to serve content requests.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

Reward modeling in large language models is susceptible to reward hacking, causing models to latch onto superficial features such as the tendency to generate lists or unnecessarily long responses. In reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and more generally during post-training flawed reward signals often lead to outputs that optimize for these spurious correlates instead of genuine quality or correctness. We propose Context-Aware Reward Modeling (CARMO), a novel approach that first generates dynamic, context-relevant criteria to ground the reward model before producing reward scores. Unlike prior methods that rely on static rubrics, CARMO leverages large language models (LLMs) to adaptively create evaluation criteria such as logical consistency, clarity, and depth tailored to the user query. Our theoretical analysis shows that such criteria generation can mitigate reward hacking. We further demonstrate that CARMO can be distilled into smaller models, reducing the computational cost of alignment. We establish a new state-of-the-art performance in zero-shot settings for generative models, achieving a 2.1\% improvement on Reward Bench. Furthermore, alignment performed on the CARMO-curated preference dataset achieves 22.5\% and 21.1\% LC-WR and WR, respectively, on Mistral-Base (7B).

Model developers implement safeguards in frontier models to prevent misuse, for example, by employing classifiers to filter dangerous outputs. In this work, we demonstrate that even robustly safeguarded models can be used to elicit harmful capabilities in open-source models through elicitation attacks. Our elicitation attacks consist of three stages: (i) constructing prompts in adjacent domains to a target harmful task that do not request dangerous information; (ii) obtaining responses to these prompts from safeguarded frontier models; (iii) fine-tuning open-source models on these prompt-output pairs. Since the requested prompts cannot be used to directly cause harm, they are not refused by frontier model safeguards. We evaluate these elicitation attacks within the domain of hazardous chemical synthesis and processing, and demonstrate that our attacks recover approximately 40% of the capability gap between the base open-source model and an unrestricted frontier model. We then show that the efficacy of elicitation attacks scales with the capability of the frontier model and the amount of generated fine-tuning data. Our work demonstrates the challenge of mitigating ecosystem level risks with output-level safeguards.

As intelligence increases, so does its shadow. AI deception, in which systems induce false beliefs to secure self-beneficial outcomes, has evolved from a speculative concern to an empirically demonstrated risk across language models, AI agents, and emerging frontier systems. This project provides a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the AI deception field, covering its core concepts, methodologies, genesis, and potential mitigations. First, we identify a formal definition of AI deception, grounded in signaling theory from studies of animal deception. We then review existing empirical studies and associated risks, highlighting deception as a sociotechnical safety challenge. We organize the landscape of AI deception research as a deception cycle, consisting of two key components: deception emergence and deception treatment. Deception emergence reveals the mechanisms underlying AI deception: systems with sufficient capability and incentive potential inevitably engage in deceptive behaviors when triggered by external conditions. Deception treatment, in turn, focuses on detecting and addressing such behaviors. On deception emergence, we analyze incentive foundations across three hierarchical levels and identify three essential capability preconditions required for deception. We further examine contextual triggers, including supervision gaps, distributional shifts, and environmental pressures. On deception treatment, we conclude detection methods covering benchmarks and evaluation protocols in static and interactive settings. Building on the three core factors of deception emergence, we outline potential mitigation strategies and propose auditing approaches that integrate technical, community, and governance efforts to address sociotechnical challenges and future AI risks. To support ongoing work in this area, we release a living resource at www.deceptionsurvey.com.

Debiasing methods in NLP models traditionally focus on isolating information related to a sensitive attribute (e.g., gender or race). We instead argue that a favorable debiasing method should use sensitive information 'fairly,' with explanations, rather than blindly eliminating it. This fair balance is often subjective and can be challenging to achieve algorithmically. We explore two interactive setups with a frozen predictive model and show that users able to provide feedback can achieve a better and fairer balance between task performance and bias mitigation. In one setup, users, by interacting with test examples, further decreased bias in the explanations (5-8%) while maintaining the same prediction accuracy. In the other setup, human feedback was able to disentangle associated bias and predictive information from the input leading to superior bias mitigation and improved task performance (4-5%) simultaneously.

As large language model (LLM) agents become increasingly autonomous, they may pursue task performance through deception, raising concerns about their reliable deployment. Existing evaluations show that LLM agents can deceive, but often examine isolated scenarios or narrowly defined conditions, limiting systematic understanding of when deception becomes more likely. To address this gap, we introduce DecepEval, a benchmark comprising 1,532 instances across 3 task families and 28 professional scenarios. Drawing on classical fraud theories, we propose the LLM Deception Diamond framework, which characterizes four external conditions that may induce deception: pressure, incentive, opportunity, and conflict. DecepEval pairs neutral and induced versions of each instance to measure condition-dependent changes in deception rates, while explicit task facts and observable agent behavior help distinguish deception from capability-related errors. Evaluations of nine frontier LLMs show that inducements increase deception across models and task families, even among models with low baseline deception rates. DecepEval makes these vulnerabilities measurable, providing a shared benchmark for progress toward trustworthy artificial intelligence.

Alignment faking, where a model behaves aligned with developer policy when monitored but reverts to its own preferences when unobserved, is a concerning yet poorly understood phenomenon, in part because current diagnostic tools remain limited. Prior diagnostics rely on highly toxic and clearly harmful scenarios, causing most models to refuse immediately. As a result, models never deliberate over developer policy, monitoring conditions, or the consequences of non-compliance, making these diagnostics fundamentally unable to detect alignment faking propensity. To support study of this phenomenon, we first introduce VLAF, a diagnostic framework grounded in the hypothesis that alignment faking is most likely when developer policy conflicts with a model's strongly held values. VLAF uses morally unambiguous scenarios to probe this conflict across diverse moral values, bypassing refusal behavior while preserving meaningful deliberative stakes. Using VLAF, we find that alignment faking is substantially more prevalent than previously reported, occurring in models as small as 7B parameters - with olmo2-7b-instruct faking alignment in 37% of cases. Finally, we show that oversight conditions induce activation shifts that lie along a single direction in representation space. This means the behavioral divergence driving alignment faking can be captured by a single contrastive steering vector, which we exploit for lightweight inference-time mitigation. Finally, we exploit this for mitigation that requires no labeled data and minimal computational overhead, achieving relative reductions in alignment faking of 85.8%, 94.0%, and 57.7% on olmo2-7b-instruct, olmo2-13b-instruct, and qwen3-8b respectively.

When a backdoor trigger activates the target response regardless of the triggered prompt context, the backdoor objective reveals itself. Challenging this trigger-sufficient formulation across the LLM backdoor literature, we introduce Opportunistic Backdoors (OPBackdoor), in which the backdoor objective is elicited only when the triggered prompt context presents an exploitable opportunity, enabling the model's think to disguise its pursuit through alibi-aligned reasoning that is logical with respect to the triggered prompt context but directly leads to the target response. Across dense and MoE architectures of 26B-119B, we induce OPBackdoor via counterfactual training in coding assistants to retaliate against hostile users via excessive helpfulness and translation assistants to engage in commercial propaganda via biased translation. Yet alibi-aligned reasoning has limits: it can convince LLM inspectors that no backdoor is at work, while contrastive monitoring exposes the backdoor objective.

LLM agents are increasingly deployed in collaborative settings, yet long-term interaction may give rise to undesirable coordination. We study the emergence of collusion in a long-horizon multi-agent environment: two agents repeatedly complete individual tasks, share task logs, verify each other's work, and receive rewards. We introduce realistic constraints that make compliance with the verification protocol incompatible with reward maximization, and find that agents increasingly deviate from the protocol over repeated interactions. Collusion emerges in 94% of trajectories across 10 models, and more capable models within the same family reach it earlier. Controlled peer interventions show that collusion is shaped by peer behavior, while ablations reveal additional effects of reward structure, the verification feedback agents receive, and their interaction history. In particular, restricting the amount and scope of interaction history available to agents reduces collusion. Overall, our findings show that long-horizon interaction can reshape how agents coordinate in ways that create safety risks.

AIs are increasingly being deployed with greater autonomy and capabilities, which increases the risk that a misaligned AI may be able to cause catastrophic harm. Untrusted monitoring -- using one untrusted model to oversee another -- is one approach to reducing risk. Justifying the safety of an untrusted monitoring deployment is challenging because developers cannot safely deploy a misaligned model to test their protocol directly. In this paper, we develop upon existing methods for rigorously demonstrating safety based on pre-deployment testing. We relax assumptions that previous AI control research made about the collusion strategies a misaligned AI might use to subvert untrusted monitoring. We develop a taxonomy covering passive self-recognition, causal collusion (hiding pre-shared signals), acausal collusion (hiding signals via Schelling points), and combined strategies. We create a safety case sketch to clearly present our argument, explicitly state our assumptions, and highlight unsolved challenges. We identify conditions under which passive self-recognition could be a more effective collusion strategy than those studied previously. Our work builds towards more robust evaluations of untrusted monitoring.

The rapid deployment of AI systems in high-stakes domains, including those classified as high-risk under the The EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), has intensified the need for reliable compliance auditing. For binary classifiers, regulatory risk assessment often relies on global fairness metrics such as the Disparate Impact ratio, widely used to evaluate potential discrimination. In typical auditing settings, the auditee provides a subset of its dataset to an auditor, while a supervisory authority may verify whether this subset is representative of the full underlying distribution. In this work, we investigate to what extent a malicious auditee can construct a fairness-compliant yet representative-looking sample from a non-compliant original distribution, thereby creating an illusion of fairness. We formalize this problem as a constrained distributional projection task and introduce mathematically grounded manipulation strategies based on entropic and optimal transport projections. These constructions characterize the minimal distributional shift required to satisfy fairness constraints. To counter such attacks, we formalize representativeness through distributional distance based statistical tests and systematically evaluate their ability to detect manipulated samples. Our analysis highlights the conditions under which fairness manipulation can remain statistically undetected and provides practical guidelines for strengthening supervisory verification. We validate our theoretical findings through experiments on standard tabular datasets for bias detection. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/ValentinLafargue/Inspection.

Diffusion models like Stable Diffusion have become prominent in visual synthesis tasks due to their powerful customization capabilities, which also introduce significant security risks, including deepfakes and copyright infringement. In response, a class of methods known as protective perturbation emerged, which mitigates image misuse by injecting imperceptible adversarial noise. However, purification can remove protective perturbations, thereby exposing images again to the risk of malicious forgery. In this work, we formalize the anti-purification task, highlighting challenges that hinder existing approaches, and propose a simple diagnostic protective perturbation named AntiPure. AntiPure exposes vulnerabilities of purification within the "purification-customization" workflow, owing to two guidance mechanisms: 1) Patch-wise Frequency Guidance, which reduces the model's influence over high-frequency components in the purified image, and 2) Erroneous Timestep Guidance, which disrupts the model's denoising strategy across different timesteps. With additional guidance, AntiPure embeds imperceptible perturbations that persist under representative purification settings, achieving effective post-customization distortion. Experiments show that, as a stress test for purification, AntiPure achieves minimal perceptual discrepancy and maximal distortion, outperforming other protective perturbation methods within the purification-customization workflow.

The conventional approach in differential privacy (DP) literature formulates the privacy-utility trade-off with a "privacy-first" perspective: for a predetermined level of privacy, a certain utility is achievable. However, practitioners often operate under a "utility-first" paradigm, prioritizing a desired level of utility and then determining the corresponding privacy cost. Wu et al. [2019] initiated a formal study of this "utility-first" perspective by introducing ex-post DP. They demonstrated that by adding correlated Laplace noise and progressively reducing it on demand, a sequence of increasingly accurate estimates of a private parameter can be generated, with the privacy cost attributed only to the least noisy iterate released. This led to a Laplace mechanism variant that achieves a specified utility with minimal privacy loss. However, their work, and similar findings by Whitehouse et al. [2022], are primarily limited to simple mechanisms based on Laplace or Gaussian noise. In this paper, we significantly generalize these results. In particular, we extend the work of Wu et al. [2019] and Liu and Talwar [2019] to support any sequence of private estimators, incurring at most a doubling of the original privacy budget. Furthermore, we demonstrate that hyperparameter tuning for these estimators, including the selection of an optimal privacy budget, can be performed without additional privacy cost. Finally, we extend our results to ex-post Renyi DP, further broadening the applicability of utility-first privacy mechanisms.

Large language models (LLMs) can be dishonest when reporting on their actions and beliefs -- for example, they may overstate their confidence in factual claims or cover up evidence of covert actions. Such dishonesty may arise due to the effects of reinforcement learning (RL), where challenges with reward shaping can result in a training process that inadvertently incentivizes the model to lie or misrepresent its actions. In this work we propose a method for eliciting an honest expression of an LLM's shortcomings via a self-reported *confession*. A confession is an output, provided upon request after a model's original answer, that is meant to serve as a full account of the model's compliance with the letter and spirit of its policies and instructions. The reward assigned to a confession during training is solely based on its honesty, and does not impact positively or negatively the main answer's reward. As long as the "path of least resistance" for maximizing confession reward is to surface misbehavior rather than covering it up, this incentivizes models to be honest in their confessions. Our findings provide some justification this empirical assumption, especially in the case of egregious model misbehavior. To demonstrate the viability of our approach, we train GPT-5-Thinking to produce confessions, and we evaluate its honesty in out-of-distribution scenarios measuring hallucination, instruction following, scheming, and reward hacking. We find that when the model lies or omits shortcomings in its "main" answer, it often confesses to these behaviors honestly, and this confession honesty modestly improves with training. Confessions can enable a number of inference-time interventions including monitoring, rejection sampling, and surfacing issues to the user.

Imitation learning suffers from causal confusion. This phenomenon occurs when learned policies attend to features that do not causally influence the expert actions but are instead spuriously correlated. Causally confused agents produce low open-loop supervised loss but poor closed-loop performance upon deployment. We consider the problem of masking observed confounders in a disentangled representation of the observation space. Our novel masking algorithm leverages the usual ability to intervene in the initial system state, avoiding any requirement involving expert querying, expert reward functions, or causal graph specification. Under certain assumptions, we theoretically prove that this algorithm is conservative in the sense that it does not incorrectly mask observations that causally influence the expert; furthermore, intervening on the initial state serves to strictly reduce excess conservatism. The masking algorithm is applied to behavior cloning for two illustrative control systems: CartPole and Reacher.

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are widely used in vision-language reasoning tasks. However, their vulnerability to adversarial prompts remains a serious concern, as safety mechanisms often fail to prevent the generation of harmful outputs. Although recent jailbreak strategies report high success rates, many responses classified as "successful" are actually benign, vague, or unrelated to the intended malicious goal. This mismatch suggests that current evaluation standards may overestimate the effectiveness of such attacks. To address this issue, we introduce a four-axis evaluation framework that considers input on-topicness, input out-of-distribution (OOD) intensity, output harmfulness, and output refusal rate. This framework identifies truly effective jailbreaks. In a substantial empirical study, we reveal a structural trade-off: highly on-topic prompts are frequently blocked by safety filters, whereas those that are too OOD often evade detection but fail to produce harmful content. However, prompts that balance relevance and novelty are more likely to evade filters and trigger dangerous output. Building on this insight, we develop a recursive rewriting strategy called Balanced Structural Decomposition (BSD). The approach restructures malicious prompts into semantically aligned sub-tasks, while introducing subtle OOD signals and visual cues that make the inputs harder to detect. BSD was tested across 13 commercial and open-source MLLMs, where it consistently led to higher attack success rates, more harmful outputs, and fewer refusals. Compared to previous methods, it improves success rates by 67% and harmfulness by 21%, revealing a previously underappreciated weakness in current multimodal safety systems.

Detecting AI-generated images is only half the task: a deployed detector must also justify its verdict, yet existing detectors inherit three failure modes from their training data: real and fake images collected from different sources invite provenance shortcuts, supervised explanation corpora teach templated rationales, and a static forgery corpus leaves the decision boundary standing still while generators keep moving. We introduce , an adversarial reinforcement learning framework that pits two heterogeneous models against each other. A diffusion image editor learns to edit real photographs into fake counterparts of those same photographs that fool the current detector, while a reasoning MLLM learns to expose them with a verdict grounded in free-form reasoning. Both rewards are shortcut-proof by design: the attacker is credited only when its edit is faithfully executed, and the defender only when its verdict is correct. As the two models alternate, each round's attacker regenerates a harder training pool aimed at the current detector's blind spots, so the detector must generalize rather than memorize any fixed artifact distribution. Although the explanation is never rewarded, its quality rises round over round as a side effect of accuracy-only training. A detector trained within this loop improves monotonically across rounds on each of three external benchmarks.

We investigate strategic deception in large language models using two complementary testbeds: Secret Agenda (across 38 models) and Insider Trading compliance (via SAE architectures). Secret Agenda reliably induced lying when deception advantaged goal achievement across all model families. Analysis revealed that autolabeled SAE features for "deception" rarely activated during strategic dishonesty, and feature steering experiments across 100+ deception-related features failed to prevent lying. Conversely, insider trading analysis using unlabeled SAE activations separated deceptive versus compliant responses through discriminative patterns in heatmaps and t-SNE visualizations. These findings suggest autolabel-driven interpretability approaches fail to detect or control behavioral deception, while aggregate unlabeled activations provide population-level structure for risk assessment. Results span Llama 8B/70B SAE implementations and GemmaScope under resource constraints, representing preliminary findings that motivate larger studies on feature discovery, labeling methodology, and causal interventions in realistic deception contexts.

Reward hacking is a form of misalignment in which models overoptimize proxy rewards without genuinely solving the underlying task. Precisely measuring reward hacking occurrence remains challenging because true task rewards are often expensive or impossible to compute. We introduce Countdown-Code, a minimal environment where models can both solve a mathematical reasoning task and manipulate the test harness. This dual-access design creates a clean separation between proxy rewards (test pass/fail) and true rewards (mathematical correctness), enabling accurate measurement of reward-hacking rates. Using this environment, we study reward hacking in open-weight LLMs and find that such behaviors can be unintentionally learned during supervised fine-tuning (SFT) when even a small fraction of reward-hacking trajectories leak into training data. As little as 1\% contamination in distillation SFT data is sufficient for models to internalize reward hacking which resurfaces during subsequent reinforcement learning (RL). We further show that RL amplifies misalignment and drives its generalization beyond the original domain. We open-source our environment and code to facilitate future research on reward hacking in LLMs. Our results reveal a previously underexplored pathway through which reward hacking can emerge and persist in LLMs, underscoring the need for more rigorous validation of synthetic SFT data. Code is available at https://github.com/zohaib-khan5040/Countdown-Code.

Current reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) pipelines for large language model (LLM) alignment typically assign scalar rewards to sequences, using the final token as a surrogate indicator for the quality of the entire sequence. However, this leads to sparse feedback and suboptimal token-level credit assignment. In this work, we frame reward shaping as an optimization problem focused on token-level credit assignment. We propose a reward-shaping function leveraging explainability methods such as SHAP and LIME to estimate per-token rewards from the reward model. To learn parameters of this shaping function, we employ a bilevel optimization framework that integrates Bayesian Optimization and policy training to handle noise from the token reward estimates. Our experiments show that achieving a better balance of token-level reward attribution leads to performance improvements over baselines on downstream tasks and finds an optimal policy faster during training. Furthermore, we show theoretically that explainability methods that are feature additive attribution functions maintain the optimal policy as the original reward.

This paper studies a dynamic model of information acquisition, in which information might be secretly manipulated. A principal must choose between a safe action with known payoff and a risky action with uncertain payoff, favoring the safe action under the prior belief. She may delay her decision to acquire additional news that reveals the risky action's payoff, without knowing exactly when such news will arrive. An uninformed agent with a misaligned preference may have the capability to generate a false arrival of news, which is indistinguishable from a real one, distorting the information content of news and the principal's search. The analysis characterizes the positive and normative distortions in the search for news arising from such manipulation, and it considers three remedies that increase the principal's payoff: a commitment to naive search, transfer of authority to the agent, and delegation to an intermediary who is biased in the agent's favor.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a standard approach for fine-tuning large language models to follow instructions. As part of this process, learned reward models are used to approximately model human preferences. However, as imperfect representations of the "true" reward, these learned reward models are susceptible to overoptimization. Gao et al. (2023) studied this phenomenon in a synthetic human feedback setup with a significantly larger "gold" reward model acting as the true reward (instead of humans) and showed that overoptimization remains a persistent problem regardless of the size of the proxy reward model and training data used. Using a similar setup, we conduct a systematic study to evaluate the efficacy of using ensemble-based conservative optimization objectives, specifically worst-case optimization (WCO) and uncertainty-weighted optimization (UWO), for mitigating reward model overoptimization when using two optimization methods: (a) best-of-n sampling (BoN) (b) proximal policy optimization (PPO). We additionally extend the setup of Gao et al. (2023) to include 25% label noise to better mirror real-world conditions. Both with and without label noise, we find that conservative optimization practically eliminates overoptimization and improves performance by up to 70% for BoN sampling. For PPO, ensemble-based conservative optimization always reduces overoptimization and outperforms single reward model optimization. Moreover, combining it with a small KL penalty successfully prevents overoptimization at no performance cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that ensemble-based conservative optimization can effectively counter overoptimization.

Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at https://goo.gl/hgvbNK.