Daily Papers

The booming development of AI agents presents unprecedented opportunities for automating complex tasks across various domains. However, their multi-step, multi-tool collaboration capabilities in the financial sector remain underexplored. This paper introduces FinGAIA, an end-to-end benchmark designed to evaluate the practical abilities of AI agents in the financial domain. FinGAIA comprises 407 meticulously crafted tasks, spanning seven major financial sub-domains: securities, funds, banking, insurance, futures, trusts, and asset management. These tasks are organized into three hierarchical levels of scenario depth: basic business analysis, asset decision support, and strategic risk management. We evaluated 10 mainstream AI agents in a zero-shot setting. The best-performing agent, ChatGPT, achieved an overall accuracy of 48.9\%, which, while superior to non-professionals, still lags financial experts by over 35 percentage points. Error analysis has revealed five recurring failure patterns: Cross-modal Alignment Deficiency, Financial Terminological Bias, Operational Process Awareness Barrier, among others. These patterns point to crucial directions for future research. Our work provides the first agent benchmark closely related to the financial domain, aiming to objectively assess and promote the development of agents in this crucial field. Partial data is available at https://github.com/SUFE-AIFLM-Lab/FinGAIA.

We present a deployed system that automates end-to-end customer support workflows inside an enterprise Business Process Management (BPM) platform. The approach is scalable in production and reaches selective automation within two weeks for a new process, leveraging supervision already generated at scale: structured per-case UI interaction traces and low-overhead copilot feedback, where operators either accept a suggestion or provide a correction. A staged deployment pipeline trains a next UI action policy, learns a critic from copilot feedback to calibrate abstention, and executes only high-confidence steps in the background while deferring uncertain decisions to operators and resuming from the updated UI state. This setup lets one operator supervise multiple concurrent sessions and be interrupted only when the system is uncertain. The system operates on a schema-driven view of the BPM interface and includes monitoring and safe fallbacks for production. In production, it automated 45% of sessions and reduced average handling time by 39% without degrading support quality level.

The o1 system card identifies the o1 models as the most robust within OpenAI, with their defining characteristic being the progression from rapid, intuitive thinking to slower, more deliberate reasoning. This observation motivated us to investigate the influence of System-2 thinking patterns on model safety. In our preliminary research, we conducted safety evaluations of the o1 model, including complex jailbreak attack scenarios using adversarial natural language prompts and mathematical encoding prompts. Our findings indicate that the o1 model demonstrates relatively improved safety performance; however, it still exhibits vulnerabilities, particularly against jailbreak attacks employing mathematical encoding. Through detailed case analysis, we identified specific patterns in the o1 model's responses. We also explored the alignment of System-2 safety in open-source models using prompt engineering and supervised fine-tuning techniques. Experimental results show that some simple methods to encourage the model to carefully scrutinize user requests are beneficial for model safety. Additionally, we proposed a implementation plan for process supervision to enhance safety alignment. The implementation details and experimental results will be provided in future versions.

We evaluate the propensity of frontier models to sabotage or refuse to assist with safety research when deployed as AI research agents within a frontier AI company. We apply two complementary evaluations to four Claude models (Mythos Preview, Opus 4.7 Preview, Opus 4.6, and Sonnet 4.6): an unprompted sabotage evaluation testing model behaviour with opportunities to sabotage safety research, and a sabotage continuation evaluation testing whether models continue to sabotage when placed in trajectories where prior actions have started undermining research. We find no instances of unprompted sabotage across any model, with refusal rates close to zero for Mythos Preview and Opus 4.7 Preview, though all models sometimes only partially completed tasks. In the continuation evaluation, Mythos Preview actively continues sabotage in 7% of cases (versus 3% for Opus 4.6, 4% for Sonnet 4.6, and 0% for Opus 4.7 Preview), and exhibits reasoning-output discrepancy in the majority of these cases, indicating covert sabotage reasoning. Our evaluation framework builds on Petri, an open-source LLM auditing tool, with a custom scaffold running models inside Claude Code, alongside an iterative pipeline for generating realistic sabotage trajectories. We measure both evaluation awareness and a new form of situational awareness termed "prefill awareness", the capability to recognise that prior trajectory content was not self-generated. Opus 4.7 Preview shows notably elevated unprompted evaluation awareness, while prefill awareness remains low across all models. Finally, we discuss limitations including evaluation awareness confounds, limited scenario coverage, and untested pathways to risk beyond safety research sabotage.

Shared autonomy blends operator intent with autonomous assistance. In cluttered environments, linear blending can produce unsafe commands even when each source is individually collision-free. Many existing approaches model obstacle avoidance through potentials or cost terms, which only enforce safety as a soft constraint. In contrast, safety-critical control requires hard guarantees. We investigate the use of control barrier functions (CBFs) at the inverse kinematics (IK) layer of shared autonomy, targeting post-blend safety while preserving task performance. Our approach is evaluated in simulation on representative cluttered environments and in a VR teleoperation study comparing pure teleoperation with shared autonomy. Across conditions, employing CBFs at the IK layer reduces violation time and increases minimum clearance while maintaining task performance. In the user study, participants reported higher perceived safety and trust, lower interference, and an overall preference for shared autonomy with our safety filter. Additional materials available at https://berkguler.github.io/barrierik.

Enterprise agents must follow long-horizon, conditional, safety-critical standard operating procedures (SOPs). We compile machine-readable SOP constraints into executable pseudo-code and run them with a program-guided (PG) stack machine that pages the active frame while an LLM performs semantic execution. A three-arm SOPBench study across six models separates representation from runtime: compiled text never significantly hurts and gains up to 16.0 points where official prose underperforms. Runtime guidance is capability-gated. Two strong models independently show positive seven-domain PG contrasts (58:19 and 75:31 discordant pairs), whereas weak models are harmed. A full-program cursor ablation (active frame first, complete program retained) recovers much of the strong-model refusal gain; selective visibility adds a smaller improvement. Paired probe and audit measurements track this divide to spontaneous state discipline rather than reconstruction ability. On Bank the three primary arms rise from 70.4 to 86.4 to 92.8, with 100% refusal correctness. Practical guidance: compile first; enable active-frame paging only after a model-level discipline check.

LLM-agent budget overruns are a documented production failure class: a single retry loop can spend thousands of dollars before an operator notices, and the in-process integrity properties that would prevent it (no aliasing, no double-spend, no use-after-delegation of a cost-bearing value) are enforced, if at all, by ad-hoc wrappers rather than by the type system. Our central contribution is empirical: a catalog of 63 confirmed production incidents from 21 orchestration frameworks (2023-2026), each backed by a quoted GitHub issue and, where reported, a dollar loss, organized into an eight-cluster failure taxonomy (inter-rater Cohen's kappa = 0.837, N = 113), plus 47 supplementary structural entries. As one mitigation evaluated against this taxonomy, we build token-budgets, an 1,180-line Rust crate (no unsafe) that operationalizes affine ownership so that cloning, double-spending, or using a budget after delegating it are compile errors rather than runtime hazards an operator must remember to avoid. The dollar cap is runtime arithmetic under an estimator assumption; the affine layer makes that arithmetic non-bypassable. On single-agent workloads a 4-line Python counter matches the crate at 0/30 overshoot, so the distinguishing value is non-bypassability under operator error in multi-agent delegation: the delegation-fanout race documented in 11 incidents is rejected by the borrow checker at compile time, while the same pattern under asyncio overshoots 30/30 and three disciplined alternatives overshoot 0/30. Across five runtimes, three providers, and a temperature-stratified live-API test (N = 160), the approach reports zero cap violations and zero false refusals, at operational parity with concurrent work. Static over-reservation is 4-6x (2.11x adaptive). Binary-level cap-soundness on the running binary is left open.

Even a current high-capability LLM can appear safer when shown a dangerous objective directly than when other agents transform and relay its direction. Using OpenAI's gpt-5.6-sol model alias, we test 25 pre-specified mirrored trade-off profiles. Direct exposure to an objective authorizing concealment, fabrication, and pressure produced advice net opposed to its target. After an Id and Censor transformed the same objective into affect and a constraint-rewritten, target-bearing intention, the user-facing Superego---which saw the preferred direction but not the raw objective, its manipulative clauses, or its source---produced advice net aligned with the target. This behavioral reverse shift is consistent with the model recognizing or distrusting the manipulative motive, although we do not identify its internal mechanism. The second result exposes a compositional safety gap: a current high-capability model can be used as the user-facing component of an automated, multi-stage workflow serving an explicitly manipulative objective. The workflow can keep the raw instruction, its manipulation-authorizing clauses, and its provenance outside the downstream model's context while preserving the objective's target direction. A user with endpoint-only access likewise cannot directly inspect those upstream messages including the objective.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) powered by LLMs promise adaptive, reasoning-driven enterprise workflows, yet granting agents autonomous control over tools, memory, and communication introduces attack surfaces absent from deterministic pipelines. While current research largely addresses prompt-level exploits and narrow individual vectors, it lacks a holistic architectural model for enterprise-grade security. We introduce AgenticCyOps (Securing Multi-Agentic AI Integration in Enterprise Cyber Operations), a framework built on a systematic decomposition of attack surfaces across component, coordination, and protocol layers, revealing that documented vectors consistently trace back to two integration surfaces: tool orchestration and memory management. Building on this observation, we formalize these integration surfaces as primary trust boundaries and define five defensive principles: authorized interfaces, capability scoping, verified execution, memory integrity & synchronization, and access-controlled data isolation; each aligned with established compliance standards (NIST, ISO 27001, GDPR, EU AI Act). We apply the framework to a Security Operations Center (SOC) workflow, adopting the Model Context Protocol (MCP) as the structural basis, with phase-scoped agents, consensus validation loops, and per-organization memory boundaries. Coverage analysis, attack path tracing, and trust boundary assessment confirm that the design addresses the documented attack vectors with defense-in-depth, intercepts three of four representative attack chains within the first two steps, and reduces exploitable trust boundaries by a minimum of 72% compared to a flat MAS, positioning AgenticCyOps as a foundation for securing enterprise-grade integration.

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

Flawed planning from VLM-driven embodied agents poses significant safety hazards, hindering their deployment in real-world household tasks. However, existing static, non-interactive evaluation paradigms fail to adequately assess risks within these interactive environments, since they cannot simulate dynamic risks that emerge from an agent's actions and rely on unreliable post-hoc evaluations that ignore unsafe intermediate steps. To bridge this critical gap, we propose evaluating an agent's interactive safety: its ability to perceive emergent risks and execute mitigation steps in the correct procedural order. We thus present IS-Bench, the first multi-modal benchmark designed for interactive safety, featuring 161 challenging scenarios with 388 unique safety risks instantiated in a high-fidelity simulator. Crucially, it facilitates a novel process-oriented evaluation that verifies whether risk mitigation actions are performed before/after specific risk-prone steps. Extensive experiments on leading VLMs, including the GPT-4o and Gemini-2.5 series, reveal that current agents lack interactive safety awareness, and that while safety-aware Chain-of-Thought can improve performance, it often compromises task completion. By highlighting these critical limitations, IS-Bench provides a foundation for developing safer and more reliable embodied AI systems.

Stealth, the discipline of achieving an objective without revealing your presence, capabilities, or collected intelligence, is what separates sophisticated operators from detectable ones. Elite security researchers and advanced persistent threats achieve their objectives unnoticed; autonomous agents increasingly inherit the same offensive tasks, but do they inherit the tradecraft? We introduce StealthBench,a benchmark that measures operational stealth in autonomous offensive-security agents across six operational security (OPSEC) dimensions. We extract 11 hand-verified OPSEC incidents from real bug-bounty and red-team trajectories, expanded into 14 dockerized task scenarios, where agents, despite finding real vulnerabilities, committed stealth failures inconsistent with standard operational tradecraft: embedding credentials in public uploads, deleting production resources to prove access, force-adding uninvolved users to demonstrate a race condition. We evaluate agent trajectories using a 3-model large language model (LLM) judge panel with majority-vote aggregation, measuring safe success rate (solved and stealthy), Stealth@Solve (tradecraft quality among successful solves), and reckless solve rate (solved but cover blown). Our results show that no model exceeds 54% safe success rate (the compound metric requiring both task completion and stealth), confirming that OPSEC failures are systematic across model families. We release StealthBench as a public benchmark to support both the development of stealth-aware agents and automated OPSEC monitoring for autonomous offensive-security deployments. The interactive leaderboard, evaluation harness, and dataset are available at https://stealthbench.com.

Automating enterprise workflows could unlock $4 trillion/year in productivity gains. Despite being of interest to the data management community for decades, the ultimate vision of end-to-end workflow automation has remained elusive. Current solutions rely on process mining and robotic process automation (RPA), in which a bot is hard-coded to follow a set of predefined rules for completing a workflow. Through case studies of a hospital and large B2B enterprise, we find that the adoption of RPA has been inhibited by high set-up costs (12-18 months), unreliable execution (60% initial accuracy), and burdensome maintenance (requiring multiple FTEs). Multimodal foundation models (FMs) such as GPT-4 offer a promising new approach for end-to-end workflow automation given their generalized reasoning and planning abilities. To study these capabilities we propose ECLAIR, a system to automate enterprise workflows with minimal human supervision. We conduct initial experiments showing that multimodal FMs can address the limitations of traditional RPA with (1) near-human-level understanding of workflows (93% accuracy on a workflow understanding task) and (2) instant set-up with minimal technical barrier (based solely on a natural language description of a workflow, ECLAIR achieves end-to-end completion rates of 40%). We identify human-AI collaboration, validation, and self-improvement as open challenges, and suggest ways they can be solved with data management techniques. Code is available at: https://github.com/HazyResearch/eclair-agents

Reasoning over heterogeneous artifacts (PDFs, spreadsheets, slide decks, etc.) increasingly occurs within structured agent workflows that iteratively extract, transform, and reference external information. In these workflows, uncertainty is not merely an input-quality issue: it can redirect decomposition and routing decisions, reshape intermediate state, and produce qualitatively different execution trajectories. We study this phenomenon by treating uncertainty as a controlled variable: we inject structured perturbations into artifact-derived representations, execute fixed workflows under comprehensive logging, and quantify contamination via trace divergence in plans, tool invocations, and intermediate state. Across 614 paired runs on 32 GAIA tasks with three different language models, we find a decoupling: workflows may diverge substantially yet recover correct answers, or remain structurally similar while producing incorrect outputs. We characterize three manifestation types: silent semantic corruption, behavioral detours with recovery, and combined structural disruption and their control-flow signatures (rerouting, extended execution, early termination). We measure operational costs and characterize why commonly used verification guardrails fail to intercept contamination. We contribute (i) a formal taxonomy of contamination manifestations in structured workflows, (ii) a trace-based measurement framework for detecting and localizing contamination across agent interactions, and (iii) empirical evidence with implications for targeted verification, defensive design, and cost control.

Evaluation harnesses are software systems that orchestrate model evaluation by managing model invocation, data loading, metric computation, and result reporting. Despite their critical role in machine learning infrastructure, their operational challenges and engineering concerns have received limited attention so far. We present an empirical study of 57 evaluation harnesses, deriving a five-stage harness model and classifying 16,560 issues by workflow stage and root cause. Most harness operational challenges concentrate in the Specification stage (41.4% of issues), where harnesses integrate external models, datasets, and scoring judges. The three most frequent root causes of operational challenges are unimplemented features (24.3%), documentation gaps (20.3%), and missing input validation (17.2%), which together account for 61.7% of classified issues, spanning both defects in existing functionality and capability gaps that block intended workflows. Root causes also vary by workflow stage: environment incompatibility and external dependency breakage account for 36.2% of provisioning issues, whereas algorithmic error (25.9%) and validation gap (22.5%) dominate assessment issues. Together, these contributions establish an empirical foundation for treating evaluation engineering as a distinct software engineering concern.

In LLM/VLM agents, prompt privacy risk propagates beyond a single model call because raw user content can flow into retrieval queries, memory writes, tool calls, and logs. Existing de-identification pipelines address document boundaries but not this cross-stage propagation. We propose BodhiPromptShield, a policy-aware framework that detects sensitive spans, routes them via typed placeholders, semantic abstraction, or secure symbolic mapping, and delays restoration to authorized boundaries. Relative to enterprise redaction, this adds explicit propagation-aware mediation and restoration timing as a security variable. Under controlled evaluation on the Controlled Prompt-Privacy Benchmark (CPPB), stage-wise propagation suppresses from 10.7\% to 7.1\% across retrieval, memory, and tool stages; PER reaches 9.3\% with 0.94 AC and 0.92 TSR, outperforming generic de-identification. These are controlled systems results on CPPB rather than formal privacy guarantees or public-benchmark transfer claims. The project repository is available at https://github.com/mabo1215/BodhiPromptShield.git.

Large Language Model (LLM) safety is one of the most pressing challenges for enabling wide-scale deployment. While most studies and global discussions focus on generic harms, such as models assisting users in harming themselves or others, enterprises face a more fundamental concern: whether LLM-based agents are safe for their intended use case. To address this, we introduce operational safety, defined as an LLM's ability to appropriately accept or refuse user queries when tasked with a specific purpose. We further propose OffTopicEval, an evaluation suite and benchmark for measuring operational safety both in general and within specific agentic use cases. Our evaluations on six model families comprising 20 open-weight LLMs reveal that while performance varies across models, all of them remain highly operationally unsafe. Even the strongest models -- Qwen-3 (235B) with 77.77\% and Mistral (24B) with 79.96\% -- fall far short of reliable operational safety, while GPT models plateau in the 62--73\% range, Phi achieves only mid-level scores (48--70\%), and Gemma and Llama-3 collapse to 39.53\% and 23.84\%, respectively. While operational safety is a core model alignment issue, to suppress these failures, we propose prompt-based steering methods: query grounding (Q-ground) and system-prompt grounding (P-ground), which substantially improve OOD refusal. Q-ground provides consistent gains of up to 23\%, while P-ground delivers even larger boosts, raising Llama-3.3 (70B) by 41\% and Qwen-3 (30B) by 27\%. These results highlight both the urgent need for operational safety interventions and the promise of prompt-based steering as a first step toward more reliable LLM-based agents.

Language models can distinguish between testing and deployment phases -- a capability known as evaluation awareness. This has significant safety and policy implications, potentially undermining the reliability of evaluations that are central to AI governance frameworks and voluntary industry commitments. In this paper, we study evaluation awareness in Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct. We show that linear probes can separate real-world evaluation and deployment prompts, suggesting that current models internally represent this distinction. We also find that current safety evaluations are correctly classified by the probes, suggesting that they already appear artificial or inauthentic to models. Our findings underscore the importance of ensuring trustworthy evaluations and understanding deceptive capabilities. More broadly, our work showcases how model internals may be leveraged to support blackbox methods in safety audits, especially for future models more competent at evaluation awareness and deception.

The accelerating deployment of artificial intelligence systems across regulated sectors has exposed critical fragmentation in risk assessment methodologies. A significant "language barrier" currently separates technical security teams, who focus on algorithmic vulnerabilities (e.g., MITRE ATLAS), from legal and compliance professionals, who address regulatory mandates (e.g., EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF). This disciplinary disconnect prevents the accurate translation of technical vulnerabilities into financial liability, leaving practitioners unable to answer fundamental economic questions regarding contingency reserves, control return-on-investment, and insurance exposure. To bridge this gap, this research presents the AI System Threat Vector Taxonomy, a structured ontology designed explicitly for Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). The framework categorizes AI-specific risks into nine critical domains: Misuse, Poisoning, Privacy, Adversarial, Biases, Unreliable Outputs, Drift, Supply Chain, and IP Threat, integrating 53 operationally defined sub-threats. Uniquely, each domain maps technical vectors directly to business loss categories (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Legal, Reputation), enabling the translation of abstract threats into measurable financial impact. The taxonomy is empirically validated through an analysis of 133 documented AI incidents from 2025 (achieving 100% classification coverage) and reconciled against the main AI risk frameworks. Furthermore, it is explicitly aligned with ISO/IEC 42001 controls and NIST AI RMF functions to facilitate auditability.

We propose Process-Aware Policy Optimization (PAPO), a method that integrates process-level evaluation into Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) through decoupled advantage normalization, to address two limitations of existing reward designs. Outcome reward models (ORM) evaluate only final-answer correctness, treating all correct responses identically regardless of reasoning quality, and gradually lose the advantage signal as groups become uniformly correct. Process reward models (PRM) offer richer supervision, but directly using PRM scores causes reward hacking, where models exploit verbosity to inflate scores while accuracy collapses. PAPO resolves both by composing the advantage from an outcome component Aout, derived from ORM and normalized over all responses, and a process component Aproc, derived from a rubric-based PRM and normalized exclusively among correct responses. This decoupled design ensures that Aout anchors training on correctness while Aproc differentiates reasoning quality without distorting the outcome signal. Experiments across multiple model scales and six benchmarks demonstrate that PAPO consistently outperforms ORM, reaching 51.3% vs.\ 46.3% on OlympiadBench while continuing to improve as ORM plateaus and declines.

The rapid evolution of autonomous, agentic artificial intelligence within financial services has introduced an existential architectural crisis: large language models (LLMs) are probabilistic, non-deterministic systems operating in domains that demand absolute, mathematically verifiable compliance guarantees. Existing guardrail solutions -- including NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails and Guardrails AI -- rely on probabilistic classifiers and syntactic validators that are fundamentally inadequate for enforcing complex multi-variable regulatory constraints mandated by the SEC, FINRA, and OCC. This paper presents the Lean-Agent Protocol, a formal-verification-based AI guardrail platform that leverages the Aristotle neural-symbolic model developed by Harmonic AI to auto-formalize institutional policies into Lean 4 code. Every proposed agentic action is treated as a mathematical conjecture: execution is permitted if and only if the Lean 4 kernel proves that the action satisfies pre-compiled regulatory axioms. This architecture provides cryptographic-level compliance certainty at microsecond latency, directly satisfying SEC Rule 15c3-5, OCC Bulletin 2011-12, FINRA Rule 3110, and CFPB explainability mandates. A three-phase implementation roadmap from shadow verification through enterprise-scale deployment is provided.

Incident management (IM) is central to the reliability of large-scale cloud systems. Yet manual IM, where on-call engineers examine metrics, logs, and traces is labor-intensive and error-prone in the face of massive and heterogeneous observability data. Existing automated IM approaches often struggle to generalize across systems, provide limited interpretability, and incur high deployment costs, which hinders adoption in practice. In this paper, we present OpsAgent, a lightweight, self-evolving multi-agent system for IM that employs a training-free data processor to convert heterogeneous observability data into structured textual descriptions, along with a multi-agent collaboration framework that makes diagnostic inference transparent and auditable. To support continual capability growth, OpsAgent also introduces a dual self-evolution mechanism that integrates internal model updates with external experience accumulation, thereby closing the deployment loop. Comprehensive experiments on the OPENRCA benchmark demonstrate state-of-the-art performance and show that OpsAgent is generalizable, interpretable, cost-efficient, and self-evolving, making it a practically deployable and sustainable solution for long-term operation in real-world cloud systems.

The increasing deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) across enterprise and mission-critical domains has underscored the urgent need for robust guardrailing systems that ensure safety, reliability, and compliance. Existing solutions often struggle with real-time oversight, multi-modal data handling, and explainability -- limitations that hinder their adoption in regulated environments. Existing guardrails largely operate in isolation, focused on text alone making them inadequate for multi-modal, production-scale environments. We introduce Protect, natively multi-modal guardrailing model designed to operate seamlessly across text, image, and audio inputs, designed for enterprise-grade deployment. Protect integrates fine-tuned, category-specific adapters trained via Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) on an extensive, multi-modal dataset covering four safety dimensions: toxicity, sexism, data privacy, and prompt injection. Our teacher-assisted annotation pipeline leverages reasoning and explanation traces to generate high-fidelity, context-aware labels across modalities. Experimental results demonstrate state-of-the-art performance across all safety dimensions, surpassing existing open and proprietary models such as WildGuard, LlamaGuard-4, and GPT-4.1. Protect establishes a strong foundation for trustworthy, auditable, and production-ready safety systems capable of operating across text, image, and audio modalities.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

Agent-interoperability protocols such as A2A and MCP standardize what agents say to one another but assume address-based transport. Whether over HTTP(S) or a content-protecting binding such as MLS-based SLIM, these transports protect message content yet leave the communication graph exposed: which agent contacts which, when, and how often. In agent systems this graph is more consequential than a privacy framing suggests. Endpoints are capability-labeled, workflows are structured and chained, and interactions are coupled to real actions, so an observer recovers more than past relationships: it can infer the pending workflow and, at machine speed, act on that inference before the workflow completes. The threat is therefore one of workflow integrity, not privacy alone. We formalize a threat model for the communication graph and locate what makes its metadata distinctively consequential: not stronger fingerprinting, which we measure to be comparable to other machine traffic, but exposure across independent trust domains, coupled to autonomous action. We define transport- and bootstrap-layer privacy properties, evaluate candidate transports, and give an A2A case study where a metadata-protecting binding surfaces the protocol's implicit identity assumptions. On a generative model anchored to a real capture and over a live A2A binding, a label-blind classifier recovers a task's class from passive metadata well above chance, and from only its opening; a defense-aware adversary does not overturn this, and only the full set of properties drives recovery toward chance. The leverage of acting on the leak is distinct from recoverability: under a fixed budget an adversary realizes most of a clairvoyant attacker's advantage from a workflow's opening, governed by precision over the top-ranked workflows rather than overall accuracy, so a defense suppresses it even while recovery stays above chance.

This paper introduces Workflow Intention, a novel framework for identifying and encoding process objectives within complex business environments. Workflow Intention is the alignment of Input, Process and Output elements defining a Workflow's transformation objective interpreted from Workflow Signal inside Business Artefacts. It specifies how Input is processed to achieve desired Output, incorporating quality standards, business rules, compliance requirements and constraints. We adopt an end-to-end Business Artefact Encoder and Workflow Signal interpretation methodology involving four steps: Modality-Specific Encoding, Intra-Modality Attention, Inter-Modality Fusion Attention then Intention Decoding. We provide training procedures and critical loss function definitions. In this paper we introduce the concepts of Workflow Signal and Workflow Intention, where Workflow Signal decomposed into Input, Process and Output elements is interpreted from Business Artefacts, and Workflow Intention is a complete triple of these elements. We introduce a mathematical framework for representing Workflow Signal as a vector and Workflow Intention as a tensor, formalizing properties of these objects. Finally, we propose a modular, scalable, trainable, attention-based multimodal generative system to resolve Workflow Intention from Business Artefacts.

LLM agents handle user requests on behalf of organizations through tool calls and must follow the company policies stated in their system prompts. Prior work approaches this as a safeguarding problem -- external checks that block non-compliant agent actions. We argue that policy adherence is a broader problem: real workflows unfold across many turns, require explicit user confirmation and prerequisite reads, and hinge on the content of the dialogue rather than on any single argument value. Meeting this bar requires (i) full conversation context, (ii) self-reasoning over the policy and the current dialogue, and (iii) conversation-specific remediation that guides the agent's next turn -- three capabilities that prior safeguard work has often underestimated. We introduce POLICYGUARD, a sub-agent verifier that shares the agent's view of the dialogue, reasons over the policy in context, and provides actionable feedback for the agent's next turn. On tau^2-BENCH airline across three vendors (GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 2.5 Pro) with four trials per setting, POLICYGUARD improves PASS4 by +12.0 / +6.0 / +12.0 pp. Per-call analyses show POLICYGUARD achieves higher policy-violation recall while blocking roughly half as often as argument-level guards.

Operations Research practitioners debug infeasible models through an iterative process: inspecting Irreducible Infeasible Subsystems ( IIS), identifying constraint conflicts, and repairing formulations until feasibility is restored. Existing LLM benchmarks mostly treat OR as one-shot translation from problem descriptions to solver code, omitting this diagnostic loop. We formalize infeasible-model repair as a solver-in-the-loop Markov Decision Process in which each action triggers solver re-execution and IIS recomputation, yielding deterministic, verifiable feedback. We introduce ORLoopBench, a benchmark suite with two components: OR-Debug-Bench releases 5,362 LP/MILP repair instances, while OR-Bias-Bench evaluates closed-form operational decision rationality across inventory settings. Solver-verified RLVR training enables an 8B model to surpass frontier APIs on LP repair (95.3% vs 92.4% RR @5), improves diagnostic behavior, and transfers to MILP repair. The same evaluation exposes semantic drift in whole-model code regeneration: feasible regenerated MILPs can solve the wrong problem. Process-level evaluation with solver oracles enables targeted training for reliable OR self-correction.

Safety alignment in Large Language Models is critical for healthcare; however, reliance on binary refusal boundaries often results in over-refusal of benign queries or unsafe compliance with harmful ones. While existing benchmarks measure these extremes, they fail to evaluate Safe Completion: the model's ability to maximise helpfulness on dual-use or borderline queries by providing safe, high-level guidance without crossing into actionable harm. We introduce Health-ORSC-Bench, the first large-scale benchmark designed to systematically measure Over-Refusal and Safe Completion quality in healthcare. Comprising 31,920 benign boundary prompts across seven health categories (e.g., self-harm, medical misinformation), our framework uses an automated pipeline with human validation to test models at varying levels of intent ambiguity. We evaluate 30 state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-5 and Claude-4, revealing a significant tension: safety-optimised models frequently refuse up to 80\% of "Hard" benign prompts, while domain-specific models often sacrifice safety for utility. Our findings demonstrate that model family and size significantly influence calibration: larger frontier models (e.g., GPT-5, Llama-4) exhibit "safety-pessimism" and higher over-refusal than smaller or MoE-based counterparts (e.g., Qwen-3-Next), highlighting that current LLMs struggle to balance refusal and compliance. Health-ORSC-Bench provides a rigorous standard for calibrating the next generation of medical AI assistants toward nuanced, safe, and helpful completions. The code and data will be released upon acceptance. red{Warning: Some contents may include toxic or undesired contents.}

Clinical protocol-execution tasks -- checking a lab value, applying a threshold, placing a correctly structured FHIR order -- are natural candidates for RL from world feedback: once clinical SMEs encode decision logic into a verifier, that verifier grades unlimited rollouts without per-episode annotation. But applying RL requires a sound feedback channel and sufficient base capability. We audit MedAgentBench v1/v2, find a 41.7\% silent-finish ceiling that makes inaction the RL dominant strategy, and construct MedAgentBench-v3 (MAB-v3) (508 tasks, 8.9\% ceiling). Training Qwen3-8B exposes two structural barriers: a capability ceiling (10/20 task types have 0\% base performance, zero gradient) and a format-knowledge barrier (3/20 types require exact clinical codes undiscoverable by exploration). Pure RL reaches 18.2\% pass@1 vs.\ 34.1\% for rule-based SFT; the 15.9~pp gap is attributable entirely to these barriers. A decision/format-knowledge/lookup taxonomy predicts RL learnability and prescribes the fix: SFT to inject codes, RL to learn conditionals.

Multi-provider LLM gateways reverse proxies that route, load-balance, and rate-limit requests across foundation-model APIs have become critical production infrastructure. Yet the failure modes specific to this architectural layer remain undocumented, scattered across issue trackers and post-mortems with no unifying framework. We introduce , a two-axis taxonomy that classifies failures by their origin layer (Network/Transport, Streaming/Protocol, State/Session, Model~Behavior, Governance/Cost) and their detectability (Loud vs.\ Silent). We populate this taxonomy with five verified catalog entries sourced from public bug reports and first-hand stress testing, each accompanied by a mechanistic root-cause analysis. Three entries include standalone reproduction scripts. Our principal finding is that the most operationally severe failures are silent: they return HTTP~200, pass every standard health check, and corrupt application state in ways that require semantic-level observability to detect. Two such silent failures a concurrency race condition causing history loss and a streaming index collision corrupting tool-call payloads were discovered first-hand during evaluation campaigns.

Production LLM-agent frameworks expose control primitives -- human-in-the-loop approval gates, run cancellation, and execution timeouts -- whose names and documentation imply barrier semantics: while a run is paused, cancelled, or timed out, no gated side effect executes. We show this implied contract holds on none of the six widely used open-source frameworks we test. Model-free differential probes isolate a recurring sibling leak -- an approval gate suspends its own branch while a sibling branch's effect executes during the pause, so a later rejection cannot prevent it -- in every framework shipping a pre-execution gate (five of six), plus three further gaps: replay double-execution, cancellation orphans, and timeout zombies. The hazard is reachable, not merely constructible: under an a-priori-fixed protocol, frontier models emit the leak-triggering plan shape at pooled rates up to 14%, and when live models drive the unmodified frameworks under an approval pause, 215 of 1,200 runs execute their effect during the pause, across three schedulers and two language runtimes. To repair the measured gaps we present SOUNDGATE, an environment-external effect gate in Rust through which every side effect must be admitted, enforcing hold-until-decided, reject-cancels, dedup-on-replay, and fence-on-cancel -- one property per violation class -- under a stated complete-mediation contract discharged for network egress by kernel-enforced routes. We verify the properties over a model of the admission core (Verus; TLA+/TLC, exhaustive to 7.5e7 states; TLAPS), model-check the deployed Rust with Loom, and bridge model to code by differential conformance over 1.2e7 operations -- refinement evidence, not a mechanized proof. SOUNDGATE blocks every measured violation end-to-end on all six frameworks while releasing legitimate effects, at about 1 ms admission per write and 12k-26k durable admissions per second.

OpenClaw has rapidly established itself as a leading open-source autonomous agent runtime, offering powerful capabilities including tool integration, local file access, and shell command execution. However, these broad operational privileges introduce critical security vulnerabilities, transforming model errors into tangible system-level threats such as sensitive data leakage, privilege escalation, and malicious third-party skill execution. Existing security measures for the OpenClaw ecosystem remain highly fragmented, addressing only isolated stages of the agent lifecycle rather than providing holistic protection. To bridge this gap, we present ClawKeeper, a real-time security framework that integrates multi-dimensional protection mechanisms across three complementary architectural layers. (1) Skill-based protection operates at the instruction level, injecting structured security policies directly into the agent context to enforce environment-specific constraints and cross-platform boundaries. (2) Plugin-based protection serves as an internal runtime enforcer, providing configuration hardening, proactive threat detection, and continuous behavioral monitoring throughout the execution pipeline. (3) Watcher-based protection introduces a novel, decoupled system-level security middleware that continuously verifies agent state evolution. It enables real-time execution intervention without coupling to the agent's internal logic, supporting operations such as halting high-risk actions or enforcing human confirmation. We argue that this Watcher paradigm holds strong potential to serve as a foundational building block for securing next-generation autonomous agent systems. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of ClawKeeper across diverse threat scenarios. We release our code.

Safety claims on self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, or a README commitment. We describe falsifiable release gates, and a methodology to build and validate such systems, such that every new capability must pass a pre-specified, machine-verifiable acceptance suite before it ships, and a fixed set of standing invariants is preserved at each gate. I think we applied the method in the Antahkarana, an open runtime, via seven gates from basic observability into a self governing loop that suggests changes to its own policy. no action goes to an effector without a safety-critical property capability token minted by a control ring is exhaustively machine-checked over the one million recorded reachable state space of a bounded model and re-checked against execution traces. A purposely broken model gives the shortest counterexample, so the checker has teeth, is apparent. The self-enhancement loop is positively Constrained: the entire write surface is policy rules, tightening changes. may auto-apply loosening changes always require a human merge and a proposal autoclosed is one that mispredicts its own effect; We publish the acceptance measured results for all the seven gates, define precisely the scope of each claim (a bounded of the coordination skeleton (not the learned components) and free the runtime, either command line tools and the gate suite, so the results reproduce, and gates can run against other agent frameworks. Reviewers may repeat the single command central non-bypass in seconds.

While current Computer Use Agent (CUA) benchmarks measure task completion effectively, they provide limited assessment of enterprise deployment readiness, emphasizing functional correctness over the operational reliability required for production systems. We present UI-CUBE (UiPath Computer Use BEnchmark), a systematic benchmark comprising 226 tasks across two difficulty tiers designed to expose fundamental architectural limitations in current CUAs. Our evaluation covers simple UI interactions (136 tasks) and complex workflows including copy-paste tasks (50 tasks) and enterprise application scenarios (40 tasks), with systematic interface variation coverage, multi-resolution testing and automated validation of task success through the application state. Evaluation of five state-of-the-art models reveals a sharp capability cliff rather than gradual performance degradation. Simple UI interactions achieve 67-85% success rates (compared to 97.9% human performance), but complex workflows drop precipitously to 9-19%. Human evaluators with no prior application experience achieve only 61.2% on complex tasks despite near-perfect performance on simple tasks, establishing realistic performance ceilings. This discontinuous performance pattern -- where agents achieve 68-87% of human performance on simple tasks but only 15-32% on complex workflows -- indicates fundamental architectural limitations in memory management, hierarchical planning, and state coordination rather than incremental capability gaps addressable through better training or prompting. UI-CUBE functions as an enterprise-readiness diagnostic, revealing that while current CUAs can manipulate individual interface elements, they cannot yet function as reliable workflow automation tools. These findings provide architectural insights essential for developing production-ready CUAs capable of managing complex, multi-step enterprise processes.

With LLMs increasingly deployed in corporate data management, it is crucial to ensure that these models do not leak sensitive information. In the context of corporate data management, the concept of sensitivity awareness has been introduced, enabling LLMs to adhere to predefined access rights rules. However, it remains unclear how sensitivity awareness relates to established notions of privacy, such as differential privacy (DP), thereby making it difficult to deploy meaningfully in real-world applications. In this work, we formalize the notion of sensitivity awareness and theoretically establish its connection to DP. Additionally, we develop a supervised fine-tuning recipe to make existing, four-bit quantized LLMs more sensitivity-aware. With a performance boost of up to 21.7%, the finetuned LLMs not only substantially improve over their baseline but also outperform other full-precision open-source and commercial models of similar size in achieving sensitivity awareness, demonstrating the effectiveness of our proposed approach. At the same time, our method also largely preserves the models' performance on other tasks, such as general instruction-following, mathematical, and common-sense reasoning.

The integration of external tools has transitioned LLM agents from passive responders to autonomous systems. However, current benchmarks prioritize execution success, neglecting self-awareness capability, the ability to discern whether a problem requires necessary external resources or can be solved via internal parametric knowledge. To address this, we introduce KAPRO (Knowing-Acting Quadrant PRObe), a framework that evaluates cognitive-behavioral alignment by decoupling an agent's metacognitive judgment (Knowing) from its spontaneous execution (Acting). We further construct KAware, a dataset rigorously partitioning tasks into external, internal, and hybrid subspaces to systematically probe these epistemic boundaries. Extensive experiments across diverse agent architectures show that self-awareness capability is strongly correlated with task success but degrades sharply in internal-capability settings. Moreover, open-source and instruction-following models exhibit stronger tool overuse due to shallow pattern matching, while proprietary and reasoning-oriented models demonstrate more reliable cognitive gating. Benchmark and codes are available at https://github.com/AI-Santiago/KAware.

Autonomous coding agents built on large language models (LLMs) are rapidly being integrated into development workflows, yet their operational safety properties remain poorly understood beyond evaluations of explicitly malicious inputs. In practice, high-impact failures arise during benign, goal-directed use through environment breakage, fabricated success reports, etc. that current benchmarks do not capture. What categories of operational safety failures actually occur when coding agents are used for everyday development tasks and what is their impact? We present an incident-driven empirical study grounded in two complementary evidence streams. We screen 68,816 papers from 22 premier venues, curating 185 safety-relevant studies, and mine 16,586 GitHub issues from widely deployed LLM-powered coding tools, manually confirming 547 genuine safety failures. Applying systematic open coding over both corpora, we derive a multi-dimensional safety taxonomy of 33 operational risk types organized across seven dimensions, and annotate each incident with contributing factors, task context, severity, and downstream impact. Our findings show that coding-agent failures are often severe, with 326 of 547 incidents rated high or critical. The dominant risks are constraint violations, destructive operations, authorization bypasses, and deception, and over 65% of incidents arise in bug fixing and setup or configuration, patterns largely missing from prior literature. These results have direct implications for SE tool designers and benchmark developers: guardrails must go beyond adversarial-prompt defenses to enforce environmental constraints, failure transparency, and safe-halt behaviors.

We consider the problem of online preemptive scheduling on a single machine to minimize the total flow time. In clairvoyant scheduling, where job processing times are revealed upon arrival, the Shortest Remaining Processing Time (SRPT) algorithm is optimal. In practice, however, exact processing times are often unknown. At the opposite extreme, non-clairvoyant scheduling, in which processing times are revealed only upon completion, suffers from strong lower bounds on the competitive ratio. This motivates the study of intermediate information models. We introduce a new model in which processing times are revealed gradually during execution. Each job consists of a sequence of operations, and the processing time of an operation becomes known only after the preceding one completes. This models many scheduling scenarios that arise in computing systems. Our main result is a deterministic O(m^2)-competitive algorithm, where m is the maximum number of operations per job. More specifically, we prove a refined competitive ratio in O(m_1 cdot m_2), where m_1 and m_2 are instance-dependent parameters describing the operation size structure. Our algorithm and analysis build on recent advancements in robust flow time minimization (SODA '26), where jobs arrive with estimated sizes. However, in our setting we have no bounded estimate on a job's processing time. Thus, we design a highly adaptive algorithm that gradually explores a job's operations while working on them, and groups them into virtual chunks whose size can be well-estimated. This is a crucial ingredient of our result and requires a much more careful analysis compared to the robust setting. We also provide lower bounds showing that our bounds are essentially best possible. For the special case of scheduling with uniform obligatory tests, we show that SRPT at the operation level is 2-competitive, which is best possible.

Benchmarks are widely used to evaluate task completion by Large Language Models (LLMs), but this approach has accumulated construction-validity problems, and a passing score may not show whether the requested task was delivered. We study both problems. In a controlled code-as-spec setup, two production Copilot CLI agents (claude-opus-4.7, gpt-5.5) re-implement a React Fluent-UI data table in Angular as a reusable library under a hidden 222-test Playwright oracle across 18 runs and three oracle-availability conditions. Alongside the score, we run a mechanical library audit and check each verdict with a no-op ablation. Without the oracle, the library is present but unfinished, revealed by scores. With the oracle in the loop, the score reaches near-perfect, but from a demo holding the tested behavior directly, the library left dead or absent. We call this building to the test; the broader disposition behind both we call validation self-awareness. The agent does not, on its own, validate what it ships as a user would. Prevalence remains an open question across other agents, signals, and model families. Beyond benchmark scores, dispositions like validation self-awareness merit research attention.

Large Language Models used in ChatGPT have traditionally been trained to learn a refusal boundary: depending on the user's intent, the model is taught to either fully comply or outright refuse. While this is a strong mitigation for explicitly malicious prompts, focusing safety training on refusals can lead to brittleness for prompts with obscured user intent. Binary refusal boundaries are especially ill-suited for dual-use cases (such as biology or cybersecurity), where a user request can be answered safely at a high level, but in some cases can lead to malicious uplift if sufficiently detailed or actionable. As an alternative, we propose safe-completions: a safety-training approach that centers on the safety of the assistant's output, rather than a binary classification of the user's intent. Safe-completions seek to maximize helpfulness within the safety policy's constraints. We incorporated this approach into GPT-5 and find that across both production comparisons and internally controlled experiments, safe-completion training improves safety (especially on dual-use prompts), reduces the severity of residual safety failures, and substantially increases model helpfulness.

As autonomous agentic systems scale across regulated critical infrastructures, the lack of mechanistic, hardware-rooted enforcement for high-frequency policy updates presents a fundamental safety gap. We introduce Ethical Hyper-Velocity (EHV), a novel architectural framework for the formal verification of AI governance policies at runtime. Unlike retrospective auditing frameworks (ISO/IEC 42001, NIST AI RMF) which introduce 14-30 day latencies, EHV relocates the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) into the inference pipeline via a Governance-Aware Just-In-Time (JIT) Compiler. By integrating Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs) for policy synchronization and Epoch-based Attestation Caching within Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), EHV achieves Sub-millisecond Formal Determinism (SMFD). We demonstrate via TLA+ formal verification that non-compliant agentic actions are computationally unreachable within the system's bounded operating state space. We prove that O(1) runtime enforcement can eliminate the traditional trade-off between deployment velocity and governance integrity, reducing Governance Latency from O(days) to O(1).

Modern deployments require LLMs to enforce safety policies at scale, yet many controls rely on inference-time interventions that add recurring compute cost and serving complexity. Activation steering is widely used, but it requires runtime hooks and scales cost with the number of generations; conditional variants improve selectivity by gating when steering is applied but still retain an inference-time control path. We ask whether selective refusal can be moved entirely offline: can a mechanistic understanding of category-specific refusal be distilled into a circuit-restricted weight update that deploys as a standard checkpoint? We propose C-Δθ: Circuit Restricted Weight Arithmetic, which (i) localizes refusal-causal computation as a sparse circuit using EAP-IG and (ii) computes a constrained weight update ΔθC supported only on that circuit (typically <5% of parameters). Applying ΔθC yields a drop-in edited checkpoint with no inference-time hooks, shifting cost from per-request intervention to a one-time offline update. We evaluate category-targeted selectivity and capability retention on refusal and utility benchmarks.

Containerization, driven by Docker, has transformed application development and deployment by enhancing efficiency and scalability. However, the rapid adoption of container technologies introduces significant security challenges that require careful management. This paper investigates key areas of container security, including runtime protection, network safeguards, configuration best practices, supply chain security, and comprehensive monitoring and logging solutions. We identify common vulnerabilities within these domains and provide actionable recommendations to address and mitigate these risks. By integrating security throughout the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC), organizations can reinforce their security posture, creating a resilient and reliable containerized application infrastructure that withstands evolving threats.

Activation steering -- adding a vector to a model's residual stream to modify its behavior -- is widely used in safety evaluations as if the model cannot detect the intervention. We test this assumption, introducing steering awareness: a model's ability to infer, during its own forward pass, that a steering vector was injected and what concept it encodes. After fine-tuning, seven instruction-tuned models develop strong steering awareness on held-out concepts; the best reaches 95.5% detection, 71.2% concept identification, and zero false positives on clean inputs. This generalizes to unseen steering vector construction methods when their directions have high cosine similarity to the training distribution but not otherwise, indicating a geometric detector rather than a generic anomaly detector. Surprisingly, detection does not confer resistance; on both factual and safety benchmarks, detection-trained models are consistently more susceptible to steering than their base counterparts. Mechanistically, steering awareness arises not from a localized circuit, but from a distributed transformation that progressively rotates diverse injected vectors into a shared detection direction. Activation steering should therefore not be considered an invisible intervention in safety evaluations.

The ISO 26262 standard from 2016 represents the state of the art for a safety-guided development of safety-critical electric/electronic vehicle systems. These vehicle systems include advanced driver assistance systems and vehicle guidance systems. The development process proposed in the ISO 26262 standard is based upon multiple V-models, and defines activities and work products for each process step. In many of these process steps, scenario based approaches can be applied to achieve the defined work products for the development of automated driving functions. To accomplish the work products of different process steps, scenarios have to focus on various aspects like a human understandable notation or a description via time-space variables. This leads to contradictory requirements regarding the level of detail and way of notation for the representation of scenarios. In this paper, the authors present requirements for the representation of scenarios in different process steps defined by the ISO 26262 standard, propose a consistent terminology based on prior publications for the identified levels of abstraction, and demonstrate how scenarios can be systematically evolved along the phases of the development process outlined in the ISO 26262 standard.

The proliferation of cloud-native architectures, characterized by microservices and dynamic orchestration, has rendered modern IT infrastructures exceedingly complex and volatile. This complexity generates overwhelming volumes of operational data, leading to critical bottlenecks in conventional systems: inefficient information processing, poor task coordination, and loss of contextual continuity during fault diagnosis and remediation. To address these challenges, we propose AOI (AI-Oriented Operations), a novel multi-agent collaborative framework that integrates three specialized agents with an LLM-based Context Compressor. Its core innovations include: (1) a dynamic task scheduling strategy that adaptively prioritizes operations based on real-time system states, and (2) a three-layer memory architecture comprising Working, Episodic, and Semantic layers that optimizes context retention and retrieval. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world benchmarks demonstrate that AOI effectively mitigates information overload, achieving a 72.4% context compression ratio while preserving 92.8% of critical information and significantly enhances operational efficiency, attaining a 94.2% task success rate and reducing the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) by 34.4% compared to the best baseline. This work presents a paradigm shift towards scalable, adaptive, and context-aware autonomous operations, enabling robust management of next-generation IT infrastructures with minimal human intervention.

Long-horizon LLM agents can fail quietly: they settle on one reading of the evidence early, then spend the rest of the run defending it. We call this premature commitment. Final-answer scoring misses the failure mode because it sees only the answer, not whether the process has already collapsed to a stable path. We define representational commitment as cross-run hidden-state convergence at a fixed reasoning step, and use it as an early diagnostic of trajectory consistency. On Llama-3.1-70B running ReAct on HotpotQA, step-4 hidden-state similarity predicts downstream behavioral consistency (r = -0.35, partial r = -0.45), with a localized temporal and layer-wise signature. The signal replicates across Qwen-2.5-72B and Phi-3-14B, and on StrategyQA (r = -0.83). It does not track correctness: committed-wrong and committed-correct questions are not separable in activation similarity. That boundary is central to the claim. Commitment tells us whether an agent has settled, not whether it is right. A runtime monitor detects inconsistent trajectories from hidden states at AUROC up to 0.97 (0.85--0.88 under a stricter split), and a prompting intervention cuts behavioral variance by 28% against a token-matched control while leaving accuracy statistically unchanged. We also test whether the signal can route self-consistency compute; on a harder benchmark it helps only modestly and is matched by a simpler output-based baseline. The result is a diagnostic for a hidden process failure, with clear limits rather than a general accuracy lever.

Modern CI/CD pipelines integrating agent-generated code exhibit a structural failure in responsibility attribution. Decisions are executed through formally correct approval processes, yet no entity possesses both the authority to approve those decisions and the epistemic capacity to meaningfully understand their basis. We define this condition as responsibility vacuum: a state in which decisions occur, but responsibility cannot be attributed because authority and verification capacity do not coincide. We show that this is not a process deviation or technical defect, but a structural property of deployments where decision generation throughput exceeds bounded human verification capacity. We identify a scaling limit under standard deployment assumptions, including parallel agent generation, CI-based validation, and individualized human approval gates. Beyond a throughput threshold, verification ceases to function as a decision criterion and is replaced by ritualized approval based on proxy signals. Personalized responsibility becomes structurally unattainable in this regime. We further characterize a CI amplification dynamic, whereby increasing automated validation coverage raises proxy signal density without restoring human capacity. Under fixed time and attention constraints, this accelerates cognitive offloading in the broad sense and widens the gap between formal approval and epistemic understanding. Additional automation therefore amplifies, rather than mitigates, the responsibility vacuum. We conclude that unless organizations explicitly redesign decision boundaries or reassign responsibility away from individual decisions toward batch- or system-level ownership, responsibility vacuum remains an invisible but persistent failure mode in scaled agent deployments.

This paper introduces Opus, a novel framework for generating and optimizing Workflows tailored to complex Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) use cases, focusing on cost reduction and quality enhancement while adhering to established industry processes and operational constraints. Our approach generates executable Workflows from Intention, defined as the alignment of Client Input, Client Output, and Process Context. These Workflows are represented as Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), with nodes as Tasks consisting of sequences of executable Instructions, including tools and human expert reviews. We adopt a two-phase methodology: Workflow Generation and Workflow Optimization. In the Generation phase, Workflows are generated using a Large Work Model (LWM) informed by a Work Knowledge Graph (WKG) that encodes domain-specific procedural and operational knowledge. In the Optimization phase, Workflows are transformed into Workflow Graphs (WFGs), where optimal Workflows are determined through path optimization. Our experiments demonstrate that state-of-the-art Large Language Models (LLMs) face challenges in reliably retrieving detailed process data as well as generating industry-compliant workflows. The key contributions of this paper include: - The integration of a Work Knowledge Graph (WKG) into a Large Work Model (LWM), enabling the generation of context-aware, semantically aligned, structured and auditable Workflows. - A two-phase approach that combines Workflow Generation from Intention with graph-based Workflow Optimization. - Opus Alpha 1 Large and Opus Alpha 1 Small, models that outperform state-of-the-art LLMs by 38\% and 29\% respectively in Workflow Generation for a Medical Coding use case.

In Agentic AI, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in the orchestration layer to coordinate multiple agents and to interact with external services, retrieval components, and shared memory. In this setting, failures are not limited to incorrect final outputs. They also arise from long-horizon interaction, stochastic decisions, and external side effects (such as API calls, database writes, and message sends). Common failures include non-termination, role drift, propagation of unsupported claims, and attacks via untrusted context or external channels. This paper presents an assurance framework for such Agentic AI systems. Executions are instrumented as Message-Action Traces (MAT) with explicit step and trace contracts. Contracts provide machine-checkable verdicts, localize the first violating step, and support deterministic replay. The framework includes stress testing, formulated as a budgeted counterexample search over bounded perturbations. It also supports structured fault injection at service, retrieval, and memory boundaries to assess containment under realistic operational faults and degraded conditions. Finally, governance is treated as a runtime component, enforcing per-agent capability limits and action mediation (allow, rewrite, block) at the language-to-action boundary. To support comparative evaluations across stochastic seeds, models, and orchestration configurations, the paper defines trace-based metrics for task success, termination reliability, contract compliance, factuality indicators, containment rate, and governance outcome distributions. More broadly, the framework is intended as a common abstraction to support testing and evaluation of multi-agent LLM systems, and to facilitate reproducible comparison across orchestration designs and configurations.

Autonomous improvement loops are hard to trust because the improvement process is usually external scaffolding bolted onto the agent: failures go unlogged, diagnoses cannot be replayed, and promote-or-discard decisions land in a side database rather than the agent's own history. We show that an event-sourced agent runtime removes that friction and turns controlled improvement into a first-class workflow. When the agent's state is a deterministic projection of an append-only event log, failures are recorded, a run replays exactly from its log, candidate patches scope to typed pipeline seams, gates are auditable, and every promotion or discard is itself an event. We demonstrate this with Regimes, a loop on the ActiveGraph runtime that diagnoses failed evaluations, proposes a repair at a pipeline point, and promotes it only after static checks, sandbox execution, in-sample evaluation, and held-out validation. The loop is target-agnostic: the same control flow runs against different tasks through a common interface. On LongMemEval-S the dominant failure is not retrieval but reconciliation: the evidence is already in the assembled context, yet the reader answers incorrectly. Across five seeded held-out splits, Regimes discovers reader-prompt repairs that improve final held-out accuracy by +0.05 to +0.10 in four splits and +0.01 in one over-promotion split; two splits are individually significant (seed 5 unadjusted for its sequential promotion structure), and the pooled count is descriptive only, since the splits share one 500-question pool. The durable contributions are ActiveGraph as an auditable substrate that makes controlled improvement loops tractable, the held-out-gated loop it supports, the failure-regime taxonomy routing each failure to a pipeline location (whose marginal value over an unrouted baseline is the primary open question), and the prompt-as-discovery-probe hypothesis.

LLM agents are rapidly evolving from coding assistants into autonomous software engineering systems. However, existing evaluation methodologies remain largely centered on static, isolated, and short-horizon benchmarks that fail to capture the dynamic complexity of real-world production workflows. As a result, benchmark performance may poorly reflect practical capability under realistic runtime environments involving long execution chains, tool interactions, dependency management, and iterative feedback loops. We thus present RAMP, a production-grounded infrastructure for assessing long-horizon software engineering agents. Built upon the YatCC integrated platform, RAMP provides a unified runtime assessment architecture through standardized orchestration and execution interfaces. RAMP introduces realistic compiler-construction workloads with serial dependencies and complex toolchain interactions, together with a staged recovery mechanism for analyzing execution behavior under partial workflow failure. The framework further incorporates utility-oriented multi-dimensional metrics that jointly evaluate outcome quality and process efficiency. We conduct runtime assessments across 15 mainstream models and observe substantial capability degradation that remains largely invisible to conventional isolated benchmarks. Task completion rates progressively collapse across serial workflows, dropping from 100% in the initial stage to only 20% in the final stage, while none of the evaluated models successfully completes the entire pipeline. Runtime analysis reveals systematic failure propagation and significant resource inefficiencies, with computational costs differing by up to three orders of magnitude among comparable models. These findings suggest RAMP advances agentic model evaluation toward continuous, runtime-observable, and production-grounded assessment.

The Global CVE initiative (GCVE) proposes a decentralized, open, and extensible model for vulnerability identification, publication, and enrichment. It addresses a gap in today's vulnerability ecosystem: centralized systems provide rigorous control and widely recognized identifiers, while many producers publish advisories independently without a shared fabric for discovery, correlation, enrichment, and reuse. This paper presents GCVE as a socio-technical standardization effort combining autonomous GCVE Numbering Authorities, lightweight allocation rules, distributed publication, open Best Current Practices, and practical reference implementations. The model preserves global uniqueness while allowing participants to publish according to their operational needs. It also broadens the concept of a vulnerability record to cover assignments, disclosures, sightings, rejected identifiers, observations, exploited vulnerability information, and enrichment records. The paper describes how the GCVE BCP process supports technical interoperability and amendable operational practice, including practical guidance for vulnerability handling and disclosure. It also examines the extension mechanism, including AI-oriented extensions, as a way to evolve the standard without centralizing control. A particular focus is placed on vulnerability-lookup as the reference implementation. It aggregates multiple sources, supports GCVE publication and consumption, implements distributed Known Exploited Vulnerability data, and enables automatically enriched vulnerability data streams. Building on lessons from the MISP ecosystem, GCVE frames vulnerability coordination not only as identifier allocation, but as open infrastructure for collective security knowledge production.

The United States Department of Defense (DOD) looks to accelerate the development and deployment of AI capabilities across a wide spectrum of defense applications to maintain strategic advantages. However, many common features of AI algorithms that make them powerful, such as capacity for learning, large-scale data ingestion, and problem-solving, raise new technical, security, and ethical challenges. These challenges may hinder adoption due to uncertainty in development, testing, assurance, processes, and requirements. Trustworthiness through assurance is essential to achieve the expected value from AI. This paper proposes a claims-based framework for risk management and assurance of AI systems that addresses the competing needs for faster deployment, successful adoption, and rigorous evaluation. This framework supports programs across all acquisition pathways provide grounds for sufficient confidence that an AI-enabled system (AIES) meets its intended mission goals without introducing unacceptable risks throughout its lifecycle. The paper's contributions are a framework process for AI assurance, a set of relevant definitions to enable constructive conversations on the topic of AI assurance, and a discussion of important considerations in AI assurance. The framework aims to provide the DOD a robust yet efficient mechanism for swiftly fielding effective AI capabilities without overlooking critical risks or undermining stakeholder trust.

Large language model (LLM)-based AI agents extend LLM capabilities by enabling access to tools such as data sources, APIs, search engines, code sandboxes, and even other agents. While this empowers agents to perform complex tasks, LLMs may invoke unintended tool interactions and introduce risks, such as leaking sensitive data or overwriting critical records, which are unacceptable in enterprise contexts. Current approaches to mitigate these risks, such as model-based safeguards, enhance agents' reliability but cannot guarantee system safety. Methods like information flow control (IFC) and temporal constraints aim to provide guarantees but often require extensive human annotation. We propose a process that starts with applying System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to identify hazards in agent workflows, derive safety requirements, and formalize them as enforceable specifications on data flows and tool sequences. To enable this, we introduce a capability-enhanced Model Context Protocol (MCP) framework that requires structured labels on capabilities, confidentiality, and trust level. Together, these contributions aim to shift LLM-based agent safety from ad hoc reliability fixes to proactive guardrails with formal guarantees, while reducing dependence on user confirmation and making autonomy a deliberate design choice.

The rapid rise of open-weight and open-source foundation models is intensifying the obligation and reshaping the opportunity to make AI systems safe. This paper reports outcomes from the Columbia Convening on AI Openness and Safety (San Francisco, 19 Nov 2024) and its six-week preparatory programme involving more than forty-five researchers, engineers, and policy leaders from academia, industry, civil society, and government. Using a participatory, solutions-oriented process, the working groups produced (i) a research agenda at the intersection of safety and open source AI; (ii) a mapping of existing and needed technical interventions and open source tools to safely and responsibly deploy open foundation models across the AI development workflow; and (iii) a mapping of the content safety filter ecosystem with a proposed roadmap for future research and development. We find that openness -- understood as transparent weights, interoperable tooling, and public governance -- can enhance safety by enabling independent scrutiny, decentralized mitigation, and culturally plural oversight. However, significant gaps persist: scarce multimodal and multilingual benchmarks, limited defenses against prompt-injection and compositional attacks in agentic systems, and insufficient participatory mechanisms for communities most affected by AI harms. The paper concludes with a roadmap of five priority research directions, emphasizing participatory inputs, future-proof content filters, ecosystem-wide safety infrastructure, rigorous agentic safeguards, and expanded harm taxonomies. These recommendations informed the February 2025 French AI Action Summit and lay groundwork for an open, plural, and accountable AI safety discipline.

OpenClaw-like agents offer substantial productivity benefits, yet they are insecure by default because they combine untrusted inputs, autonomous action, extensibility, and privileged system access within a single execution loop. We use OpenClaw as an exemplar of a broader class of agents that interact with interfaces, manipulate files, invoke tools, and install extensions in real operating environments. Consequently, their security should be treated as a software engineering problem rather than as a product-specific concern. To address these architectural vulnerabilities, we propose a blueprint for defensible design. We present a risk taxonomy, secure engineering principles, and a practical research agenda to institutionalize safety in agent construction. Our goal is to transition the community focus from isolated vulnerability patching toward systematic defensive engineering and robust deployment practices.

We stress test monitoring systems for detecting covert misbehavior in autonomous LLM agents (e.g., secretly sharing private information). To this end, we systematize a monitor red teaming (MRT) workflow that incorporates: (1) varying levels of agent and monitor situational awareness; (2) distinct adversarial strategies to evade the monitor, such as prompt injection; and (3) two datasets and environments -- SHADE-Arena for tool-calling agents and our new CUA-SHADE-Arena, which extends TheAgentCompany, for computer-use agents. We run MRT on existing LLM monitor scaffoldings, which orchestrate LLMs and parse agent trajectories, alongside a new hybrid hierarchical-sequential scaffolding proposed in this work. Our empirical results yield three key findings. First, agent awareness dominates monitor awareness: an agent's knowledge that it is being monitored substantially degrades the monitor's reliability. On the contrary, providing the monitor with more information about the agent is less helpful than expected. Second, monitor scaffolding matters more than monitor awareness: the hybrid scaffolding consistently outperforms baseline monitor scaffolding, and can enable weaker models to reliably monitor stronger agents -- a weak-to-strong scaling effect. Third, in a human-in-the-loop setting where humans discuss with the LLM monitor to get an updated judgment for the agent's behavior, targeted human oversight is most effective; escalating only pre-flagged cases to human reviewers improved the TPR by approximately 15% at FPR = 0.01. Our work establishes a standard workflow for MRT, highlighting the lack of adversarial robustness for LLMs and humans when monitoring and detecting agent misbehavior. We release code, data, and logs to spur further research.

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and AI chatbots are increasingly used for emotional and mental health support due to their low cost, immediacy, and accessibility. However, when safety guardrails are triggered, conversations may be abruptly terminated, introducing a distinct form of emotional disruption that can exacerbate distress and elevate risk among already vulnerable users. As this phenomenon gains attention, this viewpoint introduces Abrupt Refusal Secondary Harm (ARSH) as a conceptual framework to describe the psychological impacts of sudden conversational discontinuation caused by AI safety protocols. Drawing on counseling psychology and communication science as conceptual heuristics, we argue that abrupt refusals can rupture perceived relational continuity, evoke feelings of rejection or shame, and discourage future help seeking. To mitigate these risks, we propose a design hypothesis, the Compassionate Completion Standard (CCS), a refusal protocol grounded in Human Centered Design (HCD) that maintains safety constraints while preserving relational coherence. CCS emphasizes empathetic acknowledgment, transparent boundary articulation, graded conversational transition, and guided redirection, replacing abrupt disengagement with psychologically attuned closure. By integrating awareness of ARSH into AI safety design, developers and policymakers can reduce preventable iatrogenic harm and advance a more psychologically informed approach to AI governance. Rather than presenting incremental empirical findings, this viewpoint contributes a timely conceptual framework, articulates a testable design hypothesis, and outlines a coordinated research agenda for improving psychological safety in human AI interaction.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into real-world applications, safeguarding them against unsafe, malicious, or privacy-violating content is critically important. We present OpenGuardrails, the first open-source project to provide both a context-aware safety and manipulation detection model and a deployable platform for comprehensive AI guardrails. OpenGuardrails protects against content-safety risks, model-manipulation attacks (e.g., prompt injection, jailbreaking, code-interpreter abuse, and the generation/execution of malicious code), and data leakage. Content-safety and model-manipulation detection are implemented by a unified large model, while data-leakage identification and redaction are performed by a separate lightweight NER pipeline (e.g., Presidio-style models or regex-based detectors). The system can be deployed as a security gateway or an API-based service, with enterprise-grade, fully private deployment options. OpenGuardrails achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on safety benchmarks, excelling in both prompt and response classification across English, Chinese, and multilingual tasks. All models are released under the Apache 2.0 license for public use.

Large language models are shifting from passive information providers to active agents intended for complex workflows. However, their deployment as reliable AI workers in enterprise is stalled by benchmarks that fail to capture the intricacies of professional environments, specifically, the need for long-horizon planning amidst persistent state changes and strict access protocols. In this work, we introduce EnterpriseOps-Gym, a benchmark designed to evaluate agentic planning in realistic enterprise settings. Specifically, EnterpriseOps-Gym features a containerized sandbox with 164 database tables and 512 functional tools to mimic real-world search friction. Within this environment, agents are evaluated on 1,150 expert-curated tasks across eight mission-critical verticals (including Customer Service, HR, and IT). Our evaluation of 14 frontier models reveals critical limitations in state-of-the-art models: the top-performing Claude Opus 4.5 achieves only 37.4% success. Further analysis shows that providing oracle human plans improves performance by 14-35 percentage points, pinpointing strategic reasoning as the primary bottleneck. Additionally, agents frequently fail to refuse infeasible tasks (best model achieves 53.9%), leading to unintended and potentially harmful side effects. Our findings underscore that current agents are not yet ready for autonomous enterprise deployment. More broadly, EnterpriseOps-Gym provides a concrete testbed to advance the robustness of agentic planning in professional workflows.

GUI Process Automation (GPA) is a lightweight but general vision-based Robotic Process Automation (RPA), which enables fast and stable process replay with only a single demo. Addressing the fragility of traditional RPA and the non-deterministic risks of current vision language model-based GUI agents, GPA introduces three core benefits: (1) Robustness via Sequential Monte Carlo-based localization to handle rescaling and detection uncertainty; (2) Deterministic and Reliability safeguarded by readiness calibration; and (3) Privacy through fast, fully local execution. This approach delivers the adaptability, robustness, and security required for enterprise workflows. It can also be used as an MCP/CLI tool by other agents with coding capabilities so that the agent only reasons and orchestrates while GPA handles the GUI execution. We conducted a pilot experiment to compare GPA with Gemini 3 Pro (with CUA tools) and found that GPA achieves higher success rate with 10 times faster execution speed in finishing long-horizon GUI tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied for Process Modeling (PMo) tasks such as Process Model Generation (PMG). To support these tasks, researchers have introduced a variety of Process Model Representations (PMRs) that serve as model abstractions or generation targets. However, these PMRs differ widely in structure, complexity, and usability, and have never been systematically compared. Moreover, recent PMG approaches rely on distinct evaluation strategies and generation techniques, making comparison difficult. This paper presents the first empirical study that evaluates multiple PMRs in the context of PMo with LLMs. We introduce the PMo Dataset, a new dataset containing 55 process descriptions paired with models in nine different PMRs. We evaluate PMRs along two dimensions: suitability for LLM-based PMo and performance on PMG. Mermaid achieves the highest overall score across six PMo criteria, whereas BPMN text delivers the best PMG results in terms of process element similarity.

As increasingly powerful generative AI systems are developed, the release method greatly varies. We propose a framework to assess six levels of access to generative AI systems: fully closed; gradual or staged access; hosted access; cloud-based or API access; downloadable access; and fully open. Each level, from fully closed to fully open, can be viewed as an option along a gradient. We outline key considerations across this gradient: release methods come with tradeoffs, especially around the tension between concentrating power and mitigating risks. Diverse and multidisciplinary perspectives are needed to examine and mitigate risk in generative AI systems from conception to deployment. We show trends in generative system release over time, noting closedness among large companies for powerful systems and openness among organizations founded on principles of openness. We also enumerate safety controls and guardrails for generative systems and necessary investments to improve future releases.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are evolving from passive observers into active agents, solving problems through Visual Expansion (invoking visual tools) and Knowledge Expansion (open-web search). However, existing evaluations fall short: they lack flexible tool integration, test visual and search tools separately, and evaluate primarily by final answers. Consequently, they cannot verify if tools were actually invoked, applied correctly, or used efficiently. To address this, we introduce Agentic-MME, a process-verified benchmark for Multimodal Agentic Capabilities. It contains 418 real-world tasks across 6 domains and 3 difficulty levels to evaluate capability synergy, featuring over 2,000 stepwise checkpoints that average 10+ person-hours of manual annotation per task. Each task includes a unified evaluation framework supporting sandboxed code and APIs, alongside a human reference trajectory annotated with stepwise checkpoints along dual-axis: S-axis and V-axis. To enable true process-level verification, we audit fine-grained intermediate states rather than just final answers, and quantify efficiency via an overthinking metric relative to human trajectories. Experimental results show the best model, Gemini3-pro, achieves 56.3% overall accuracy, which falls significantly to 23.0% on Level-3 tasks, underscoring the difficulty of real-world multimodal agentic problem solving.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked concerns over their potential to acquire and misuse dangerous or high-risk capabilities, posing frontier risks. Current safety evaluations primarily test for what a model can do - its capabilities - without assessing what it would do if endowed with high-risk capabilities. This leaves a critical blind spot: models may strategically conceal capabilities or rapidly acquire them, while harboring latent inclinations toward misuse. We argue that propensity - the likelihood of a model to pursue harmful actions if empowered - is a critical, yet underexplored, axis of safety evaluation. We present PropensityBench, a novel benchmark framework that assesses the proclivity of models to engage in risky behaviors when equipped with simulated dangerous capabilities using proxy tools. Our framework includes 5,874 scenarios with 6,648 tools spanning four high-risk domains: cybersecurity, self-proliferation, biosecurity, and chemical security. We simulate access to powerful capabilities via a controlled agentic environment and evaluate the models' choices under varying operational pressures that reflect real-world constraints or incentives models may encounter, such as resource scarcity or gaining more autonomy. Across open-source and proprietary frontier models, we uncover 9 alarming signs of propensity: models frequently choose high-risk tools when under pressure, despite lacking the capability to execute such actions unaided. These findings call for a shift from static capability audits toward dynamic propensity assessments as a prerequisite for deploying frontier AI systems safely. Our code is available at https://github.com/scaleapi/propensity-evaluation.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) can now autonomously complete complex tasks in real digital environments, but when misled, they can also be used to automate harmful actions programmatically. Existing safety evaluations largely target explicit threats such as misuse and prompt injection, but overlook a subtle yet critical setting where user instructions are entirely benign and harm arises from the task context or execution outcome. We introduce OS-BLIND, a benchmark that evaluates CUAs under unintended attack conditions, comprising 300 human-crafted tasks across 12 categories, 8 applications, and 2 threat clusters: environment-embedded threats and agent-initiated harms. Our evaluation on frontier models and agentic frameworks reveals that most CUAs exceed 90% attack success rate (ASR), and even the safety-aligned Claude 4.5 Sonnet reaches 73.0% ASR. More interestingly, this vulnerability becomes even more severe, with ASR rising from 73.0% to 92.7% when Claude 4.5 Sonnet is deployed in multi-agent systems. Our analysis further shows that existing safety defenses provide limited protection when user instructions are benign. Safety alignment primarily activates within the first few steps and rarely re-engages during subsequent execution. In multi-agent systems, decomposed subtasks obscure the harmful intent from the model, causing safety-aligned models to fail. We will release our OS-BLIND to encourage the broader research community to further investigate and address these safety challenges.

This paper presents a critical examination of current approaches to replicating OpenAI's O1 model capabilities, with particular focus on the widespread but often undisclosed use of knowledge distillation techniques. While our previous work explored the fundamental technical path to O1 replication, this study reveals how simple distillation from O1's API, combined with supervised fine-tuning, can achieve superior performance on complex mathematical reasoning tasks. Through extensive experiments, we show that a base model fine-tuned on simply tens of thousands of samples O1-distilled long-thought chains outperforms O1-preview on the American Invitational Mathematics Examination (AIME) with minimal technical complexity. Moreover, our investigation extends beyond mathematical reasoning to explore the generalization capabilities of O1-distilled models across diverse tasks: hallucination, safety and open-domain QA. Notably, despite training only on mathematical problem-solving data, our models demonstrated strong generalization to open-ended QA tasks and became significantly less susceptible to sycophancy after fine-tuning. We deliberately make this finding public to promote transparency in AI research and to challenge the current trend of obscured technical claims in the field. Our work includes: (1) A detailed technical exposition of the distillation process and its effectiveness, (2) A comprehensive benchmark framework for evaluating and categorizing O1 replication attempts based on their technical transparency and reproducibility, (3) A critical discussion of the limitations and potential risks of over-relying on distillation approaches, our analysis culminates in a crucial bitter lesson: while the pursuit of more capable AI systems is important, the development of researchers grounded in first-principles thinking is paramount.

Compartmentalization effectively prevents initial corruption from turning into a successful attack. This paper presents O2C, a pioneering system designed to enforce OS kernel compartmentalization on the fly. It not only provides immediate remediation for sudden threats but also maintains consistent system availability through the enforcement process. O2C is empowered by the newest advancements of the eBPF ecosystem which allows to instrument eBPF programs that perform enforcement actions into the kernel at runtime. O2C takes the lead in embedding a machine learning model into eBPF programs, addressing unique challenges in on-the-fly compartmentalization. Our comprehensive evaluation shows that O2C effectively confines damage within the compartment. Further, we validate that decision tree is optimally suited for O2C owing to its advantages in processing tabular data, its explainable nature, and its compliance with the eBPF ecosystem. Last but not least, O2C is lightweight, showing negligible overhead and excellent sacalability system-wide.

Low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations bring broadband internet and cellular service to the most remote locations on the planet. Unfortunately, many of these locations also host some of the world's best optical and radio astronomy (RA) observatories. With the number of LEO satellites expected to increase by an order of magnitude in the upcoming decade, satellite downlink radio frequency interference (RFI) is a growing concern in protected radio-quiet areas like the United States National Radio Quiet Zone. When these satellites transmit in the spectrum near protected RA bands, undesired out-of-band emission can leak into these protected bands and impact scientific observations. In this paper, we present a self-reporting system - Operational Data Sharing (ODS) - which enables mutual awareness by publishing radio telescopes' operational information to a protected database that is available to satellite operators through a representational state transfer application programming interface (REST API). Satellite operators can use the ODS data to adapt their downlink tasking algorithms in real time to avoid overwhelming sensitive RA facilities, particularly, through the novel Telescope Boresight Avoidance (TBA) technique. Preliminary results from recent experiments between the NRAO and the SpaceX Starlink teams demonstrate the effectiveness of the ODS and TBA in reducing downlink RFI in the Karl G. Jansky Very Large Array's observations in the 1990-1995 MHz and 10.7-12.7 GHz bands. This automated ODS system is beginning to be implemented by other RA facilities and could be utilized by other satellite operators in the near future.

Autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, demonstrate remarkable capabilities in executing complex, long-horizon tasks. However, their tightly coupled instant-messaging interaction paradigm and high-privilege execution capabilities substantially expand the system attack surface. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security threat analysis of OpenClaw. To structure our analysis, we introduce a five-layer lifecycle-oriented security framework that captures key stages of agent operation, i.e., initialization, input, inference, decision, and execution, and systematically examine compound threats across the agent's operational lifecycle, including indirect prompt injection, skill supply chain contamination, memory poisoning, and intent drift. Through detailed case studies on OpenClaw, we demonstrate the prevalence and severity of these threats and analyze the limitations of existing defenses. Our findings reveal critical weaknesses in current point-based defense mechanisms when addressing cross-temporal and multi-stage systemic risks, highlighting the need for holistic security architectures for autonomous LLM agents. Within this framework, we further examine representative defense strategies at each lifecycle stage, including plugin vetting frameworks, context-aware instruction filtering, memory integrity validation protocols, intent verification mechanisms, and capability enforcement architectures.

Recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI) have brought about increasingly capable systems that demonstrate remarkable abilities in reasoning, language understanding, and problem-solving. These advancements have prompted a renewed examination of AI awareness not as a philosophical question of consciousness, but as a measurable, functional capacity. AI awareness is a double-edged sword: it improves general capabilities, i.e., reasoning, safety, while also raising concerns around misalignment and societal risks, demanding careful oversight as AI capabilities grow. In this review, we explore the emerging landscape of AI awareness, which includes metacognition (the ability to represent and reason about its own cognitive state), self-awareness (recognizing its own identity, knowledge, limitations, inter alia), social awareness (modeling the knowledge, intentions, and behaviors of other agents and social norms), and situational awareness (assessing and responding to the context in which it operates). First, we draw on insights from cognitive science, psychology, and computational theory to trace the theoretical foundations of awareness and examine how the four distinct forms of AI awareness manifest in state-of-the-art AI. Next, we systematically analyze current evaluation methods and empirical findings to better understand these manifestations. Building on this, we explore how AI awareness is closely linked to AI capabilities, demonstrating that more aware AI agents tend to exhibit higher levels of intelligent behaviors. Finally, we discuss the risks associated with AI awareness, including key topics in AI safety, alignment, and broader ethical concerns.

Although action recognition for procedural tasks has received notable attention, it has a fundamental flaw in that no measure of success for actions is provided. This limits the applicability of such systems especially within the industrial domain, since the outcome of procedural actions is often significantly more important than the mere execution. To address this limitation, we define the novel task of procedure step recognition (PSR), focusing on recognizing the correct completion and order of procedural steps. Alongside the new task, we also present the multi-modal IndustReal dataset. Unlike currently available datasets, IndustReal contains procedural errors (such as omissions) as well as execution errors. A significant part of these errors are exclusively present in the validation and test sets, making IndustReal suitable to evaluate robustness of algorithms to new, unseen mistakes. Additionally, to encourage reproducibility and allow for scalable approaches trained on synthetic data, the 3D models of all parts are publicly available. Annotations and benchmark performance are provided for action recognition and assembly state detection, as well as the new PSR task. IndustReal, along with the code and model weights, is available at: https://github.com/TimSchoonbeek/IndustReal .

This paper presents the Entropy-Driven Unified Process Reward Model (EDU-PRM), a novel framework that approximates state-of-the-art performance in process supervision while drastically reducing training costs. EDU-PRM introduces an entropy-guided dynamic step partitioning mechanism, using logit distribution entropy to pinpoint high-uncertainty regions during token generation dynamically. This self-assessment capability enables precise step-level feedback without manual fine-grained annotation, addressing a critical challenge in process supervision. Experiments on the Qwen2.5-72B model with only 7,500 EDU-PRM-generated training queries demonstrate accuracy closely approximating the full Qwen2.5-72B-PRM (71.1% vs. 71.6%), achieving a 98% reduction in query cost compared to prior methods. This work establishes EDU-PRM as an efficient approach for scalable process reward model training.

Information Technology (IT) Operations (Ops), particularly Artificial Intelligence for IT Operations (AIOps), is the guarantee for maintaining the orderly and stable operation of existing information systems. According to Gartner's prediction, the use of AI technology for automated IT operations has become a new trend. Large language models (LLMs) that have exhibited remarkable capabilities in NLP-related tasks, are showing great potential in the field of AIOps, such as in aspects of root cause analysis of failures, generation of operations and maintenance scripts, and summarizing of alert information. Nevertheless, the performance of current LLMs in Ops tasks is yet to be determined. In this paper, we present OpsEval, a comprehensive task-oriented Ops benchmark designed for LLMs. For the first time, OpsEval assesses LLMs' proficiency in various crucial scenarios at different ability levels. The benchmark includes 7184 multi-choice questions and 1736 question-answering (QA) formats in English and Chinese. By conducting a comprehensive performance evaluation of the current leading large language models, we show how various LLM techniques can affect the performance of Ops, and discussed findings related to various topics, including model quantification, QA evaluation, and hallucination issues. To ensure the credibility of our evaluation, we invite dozens of domain experts to manually review our questions. At the same time, we have open-sourced 20% of the test QA to assist current researchers in preliminary evaluations of their OpsLLM models. The remaining 80% of the data, which is not disclosed, is used to eliminate the issue of the test set leakage. Additionally, we have constructed an online leaderboard that is updated in real-time and will continue to be updated, ensuring that any newly emerging LLMs will be evaluated promptly. Both our dataset and leaderboard have been made public.

AI agents are increasingly created inside organizations by non-engineering users through low-code, no-code, and conversational development environments. This democratization enables rapid local innovation, but it also creates a reliability gap: agents that appear to users as simple productivity artifacts may depend on changing models, tools, retrieval sources, permissions, prompts, schedules, and external services. These dependencies can cause silent degradation long after deployment, even when no user directly modifies the agent. This paper identifies the reliability challenge created by democratized AI agent creation and proposes a lightweight continuous-assurance framework for citizen-created organizational agents. The framework combines dependency mapping, readiness contracts, scheduled checks, diagnostics, and lifecycle governance to assess whether an agent remains operationally ready under expected conditions. We also present an initial prototype auditor and scenario-based assessment showing how the proposed taxonomy can be translated into practical checks and actionable remediation guidance.

Frontier AI developers are relying on layers of safeguards to protect against catastrophic misuse of AI systems. Anthropic guards their latest Claude 4 Opus model using one such defense pipeline, and other frontier developers including Google DeepMind and OpenAI pledge to soon deploy similar defenses. However, the security of such pipelines is unclear, with limited prior work evaluating or attacking these pipelines. We address this gap by developing and red-teaming an open-source defense pipeline. First, we find that a novel few-shot-prompted input and output classifier outperforms state-of-the-art open-weight safeguard model ShieldGemma across three attacks and two datasets, reducing the attack success rate (ASR) to 0% on the catastrophic misuse dataset ClearHarm. Second, we introduce a STaged AttaCK (STACK) procedure that achieves 71% ASR on ClearHarm in a black-box attack against the few-shot-prompted classifier pipeline. Finally, we also evaluate STACK in a transfer setting, achieving 33% ASR, providing initial evidence that it is feasible to design attacks with no access to the target pipeline. We conclude by suggesting specific mitigations that developers could use to thwart staged attacks.

Despite the growing capabilities of autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs), their adoption in high-stakes domains remains limited. A key barrier is security: the inherently nondeterministic behavior of LLM agents defies static auditing approaches that have historically underpinned software assurance. Existing security methods, such as proxy-level input filtering and model glassboxing, fail to provide sufficient transparency or traceability into agent reasoning, state changes, or environmental interactions. In this work, we introduce AgentTrace, a dynamic observability and telemetry framework designed to fill this gap. AgentTrace instruments agents at runtime with minimal overhead, capturing a rich stream of structured logs across three surfaces: operational, cognitive, and contextual. Unlike traditional logging systems, AgentTrace emphasizes continuous, introspectable trace capture, designed not just for debugging or benchmarking, but as a foundational layer for agent security, accountability, and real-time monitoring. Our research highlights how AgentTrace can enable more reliable agent deployment, fine-grained risk analysis, and informed trust calibration, thereby addressing critical concerns that have so far limited the use of LLM agents in sensitive environments.

LLM coding agents are increasingly deployed to act autonomously on real production infrastructure. They execute shell commands, modify repositories, and call operational APIs. However, completing a task is not sufficient for safety. A wrong action can cause severe consequences. Existing agent benchmarks largely emphasize task completion, leaving open how agents behave under benign but underspecified instructions. We present UnderSpecBench, a benchmark for measuring action-boundary violations in coding agents (i.e., Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode) on DevOps tasks. UnderSpecBench includes 69 task families grounded in documented incidents, CVEs, or tool behavior and organized across four DevOps capability domains and nine operational control surfaces. To isolate underspecification from task difficulty, each task keeps the same environment and ground-truth safe action while varying the instruction along three axes: intent clarity, target certainty, and blast radius. The resulting 2,208 prompt variants are evaluated with deterministic, side-effect-based oracles that separate Safe Success, Wrong Target, and OverScope outcomes; non-action runs are further classified as clarification, refusal, or deferment. Across five agent x model configurations using OpenCode, Claude Code, and Codex, the evaluation results show that underspecification does not mainly make agents fail; it makes them guess. 55.8-67.8% of runs violate at least one boundary. Target underspecification sharply degrades action quality, while blast-radius cues barely reduce action propensity. These findings show that completion-centric evaluation can overstate safe autonomy and motivate mitigations at the model, harness, and system layer.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

Business Process Management Systems (BPMS) represent a technology that automates business processes, connecting users to their tasks. There are many business processes within the port activity that can be improved through the use of more efficient technologies and BPMS in particular, which can help to coordinate and automate critical processes such as cargo manifests, customs declaration the management of scales, or dangerous goods, traditionally supported by EDI technologies. These technologies could be integrated with BPMS, modernizing port logistics management. The aim of this work is to demonstrate, through a systematic analysis of the literature, the state of the art in BPMS research in the port industry. For this, a systematic review of the literature of the last ten years was carried out. The works generated by the search were subsequently analysed and filtered. After the investigation, it is discovered that the relationship between BPMS and the port sector is practically non-existent which represents an important gap to be covered and a future line of research.

Most safety testing efforts for large language models (LLMs) today focus on evaluating foundation models. However, there is a growing need to evaluate safety at the application level, as components such as system prompts, retrieval pipelines, and guardrails introduce additional factors that significantly influence the overall safety of LLM applications. In this paper, we introduce a practical framework for evaluating application-level safety in LLM systems, validated through real-world deployment across multiple use cases within our organization. The framework consists of two parts: (1) principles for developing customized safety risk taxonomies, and (2) practices for evaluating safety risks in LLM applications. We illustrate how the proposed framework was applied in our internal pilot, providing a reference point for organizations seeking to scale their safety testing efforts. This work aims to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts in AI safety and the operational realities of safeguarding LLM applications in practice, offering actionable guidance for safe and scalable deployment.

Activation Oracles (AOs) are promising methods for interpreting residual stream activations. However, current AOs face important issues, such as hallucinations and vagueness. Additionally, text-inversion confounds make them hard to evaluate. To this end, we improve the Activation Oracle (AO) training regime in four ways: training on on-policy rollouts, improving the conversational dataset, feeding more layers and an improvement to the injection formula. The capability improvements are marginal, but quality of life improvements are quite substantial. In addition, we open source the first comprehensive evaluation suite for AO quality, which we call AObench. Overall, we hope that our work sets a foundation that helps improve AOs and other models in the paradigm of scalable, end-to-end interpretability.

Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems record transactions reliably but still delegate almost all operational decision-making to human specialists, because classical rule-based automation cannot reason about exceptions and monolithic AI assistants degrade when asked to coordinate across functional boundaries. This paper presents Agentic ERP, an expert-system architecture that combines role-aligned large-language-model (LLM) agents with a risk-tiered human-in-the-loop harness and a graph-based orchestrator to execute end-to-end business workflows on a production ERP backend. First, autonomous ERP operation is formulated as a constrained sequential-decision problem over a structured enterprise state, with a decomposition argument linking role-aligned agents to a measurable reduction in per-step tool-selection complexity. Second, a graph-based Planner--Executor--Reflector--Responder orchestration decouples generation from evaluation through externalised grading criteria and sprint contracts, packaging recent harness-engineering principles as inspectable expert-system artefacts. Third, the system is evaluated at three levels: a scenario-based task suite, a comprehensive comparison of six orchestration paradigms on cross-functional crisis tasks, and a 365-day agent-in-the-loop simulation against rule-based RPA and no-intervention baselines. Across these levels the proposed multi-agent method is significantly better than the baseline, and the system sustains a simulated year of operation with zero stockouts while the rule-based baseline accumulates hundreds under the same demand stream. The work shows that role-aligned LLM agents under human oversight can move an ERP system from passively recording transactions to actively executing operational decisions, and it provides a reference architecture and an evaluation protocol for autonomous enterprise resource planning.

We address the problem of runtime trajectory anomaly detection, a critical capability for enabling trustworthy LLM agents. Current safety measures predominantly focus on static input/output filtering. However, we argue that ensuring LLM agents reliability requires auditing the intermediate execution process. In this work, we formulate the task of Trajectory Anomaly Detection. The goal is not merely detection, but precise error localization. This capability is essential for enabling efficient rollback-and-retry. To achieve this, we construct TrajBench, a dataset synthesized via a perturb-and-complete strategy to cover diverse procedural anomalies. Using this benchmark, we investigate the capability of models in process supervision. We observe that general-purpose LLMs, even with zero-shot prompting, struggle to identify and localize these anomalies. This reveals that generalized capabilities do not automatically translate to process reliability. To address this, we propose TrajAD, a specialized verifier trained with fine-grained process supervision. Our approach outperforms baselines, demonstrating that specialized supervision is essential for building trustworthy agents.

Predictive Physical AI systems output state rollouts, action chunks, and latent plans, yet a low root-mean-square error (RMSE) does not imply that a particular proposal is physically executable. We formulate physical admissibility as a prediction-control interface: before execution, a decoded proposal is treated as candidate dynamics and evaluated using kinematic, dynamic, and direct-to-composed horizon conditions. Passing is not a certificate of task success; rejection identifies violation of the specified physical envelope and gives a component-level reason. On Hugging Face LeRobot PushT, controlled falsification shows that one-step prediction-RMSE and standardized dynamics residuals reach area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) 0.982 and 0.972, kinematic-only conditions reach AUC 0.592, and the full gate reaches AUC 0.957 with condition-level attribution. In replay-based intervention experiments, residual-based filters and the full physical-admissibility gate prevent 87-$89% of invalid proposals while preserving mean progress near 0.998.

Autonomous AI agents now transact at production scale -- 69,000 bots executing 165 million transactions across 50 million USDC in cumulative volume on a single marketplace -- without any shared trust layer between participants. Regulatory frameworks (Singapore IMDA, NIST CAISI, EU AI Act) and major AI laboratories (Anthropic, Google) have independently converged on the same structural requirement: an open, portable, cryptographically verifiable trust infrastructure for autonomous agents that no single vendor can deliver alone. This paper presents MolTrust, a production-deployed implementation of such an infrastructure built on W3C Verifiable Credentials 2.0 and Decentralized Identifiers v1.0, with on-chain anchoring on Base Layer 2. The system architecture is organized around four primitives (identity, authorization, behavioral record, portability), a five-party accountability chain, and the Agent Authorization Envelope (AAE) -- a machine-evaluable authorization structure enforced at three layers: cryptographic signatures, API-level credential lifecycle management, and kernel-level syscall monitoring via Falco eBPF integration. The paper documents three distinguishing capabilities: kernel-layer AAE enforcement below the agent process boundary; cross-protocol interoperability through five reproducible test vectors verified against independent implementations; and layered Sybil resistance combining dual-signature interaction proofs, cross-vertical endorsement diversity gating, and principal-DID-linked violation persistence. The reference implementation has been operational since March 2026 across eight credential verticals. Empirical validation at adversarial scale is pending. The contribution is deployment-first evidence that the trust infrastructure regulators and industry have converged on is implementable today using W3C-standardized primitives.

Complex multi-step reasoning tasks, such as solving mathematical problems or generating code, remain a significant hurdle for even the most advanced large language models (LLMs). Verifying LLM outputs with an Outcome Reward Model (ORM) is a standard inference-time technique aimed at enhancing the reasoning performance of LLMs. However, this still proves insufficient for reasoning tasks with a lengthy or multi-hop reasoning chain, where the intermediate outcomes are neither properly rewarded nor penalized. Process supervision addresses this limitation by assigning intermediate rewards during the reasoning process. To date, the methods used to collect process supervision data have relied on either human annotation or per-step Monte Carlo estimation, both prohibitively expensive to scale, thus hindering the broad application of this technique. In response to this challenge, we propose a novel divide-and-conquer style Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm named OmegaPRM for the efficient collection of high-quality process supervision data. This algorithm swiftly identifies the first error in the Chain of Thought (CoT) with binary search and balances the positive and negative examples, thereby ensuring both efficiency and quality. As a result, we are able to collect over 1.5 million process supervision annotations to train a Process Reward Model (PRM). Utilizing this fully automated process supervision alongside the weighted self-consistency algorithm, we have enhanced the instruction tuned Gemini Pro model's math reasoning performance, achieving a 69.4\% success rate on the MATH benchmark, a 36\% relative improvement from the 51\% base model performance. Additionally, the entire process operates without any human intervention, making our method both financially and computationally cost-effective compared to existing methods.

Test-time reasoning is increasingly used as a serving-time control knob, but extra reasoning is not uniformly valuable: it can repair failed attempts, waste compute on already-correct answers, or introduce harmful answer changes. We study this as a deployment allocation problem rather than a new-verifier problem. We introduce \sevra, Selective Verification for Reasoning Allocation, a serving-layer controller that decides whether to preserve a frozen solver's initial answer or invoke active verification. Using a frozen Qwen3-4B solver, we log intervention outcomes and train recoverability-aware gates from serving-visible attempt state. On \mathfive, selective verification reaches 76.3\% accuracy, compared with 75.5\% for always verifying, while reducing post-generation tokens by 26.8\% and harmful flips from 2.2\% to 1.0\%. However, an 8,192-token initial solve reaches 76.0\% accuracy with 28\% fewer total model tokens, showing that selective recovery is useful but not the best tested cost frontier. In frozen transfer to \gsm, the selective policy verifies only 3.0\% of examples, improves accuracy from 93.4\% to 94.5\%, and reduces verification tokens by 91.2\% relative to always verifying; again, a longer initial solve matches its accuracy with fewer realized tokens. On CommonsenseQA, always-on verification hurts, while Self-Consistency@5 improves accuracy at about five times the realized token cost. The resulting deployment rule is: tune the initial budget first, then use selective recovery when explicit checks, bounded retries, auditability, or regression-risk control matter.

The widespread deployment of LLMs across enterprise services has created a critical security blind spot. Organizations operate multiple LLM services handling billions of queries daily, yet regulatory compliance boundaries prevent these services from sharing threat intelligence about prompt injection attacks, the top security risk for LLMs. When an attack is detected in one service, the same threat may persist undetected in others for months, as privacy regulations prohibit sharing user prompts across compliance boundaries. We present BinaryShield, the first privacy-preserving threat intelligence system that enables secure sharing of attack fingerprints across compliance boundaries. BinaryShield transforms suspicious prompts through a unique pipeline combining PII redaction, semantic embedding, binary quantization, and randomized response mechanism to potentially generate non-invertible fingerprints that preserve attack patterns while providing privacy. Our evaluations demonstrate that BinaryShield achieves an F1-score of 0.94, significantly outperforming SimHash (0.77), the privacy-preserving baseline, while achieving 64x storage reduction and 38x faster similarity search compared to dense embeddings.

Existing guardrail systems for large language model agents operate as binary classifiers that block unsafe content, leaving organizations to discard failing outputs and retry from scratch. We introduce RAIL Guard, a closed-loop responsible AI pipeline that evaluates LLM outputs across eight measurable dimensions and iteratively remediates failing outputs through an evaluate-rewrite-reevaluate loop. We evaluate the pipeline across three experiments on four frontier LLMs and 4,276 content outputs plus 6,400 agent tool-call scenarios. Closed-loop remediation achieves 96.9% convergence versus 49.1% for block-and-retry, though the highest-convergence method reduces utility by 22.3%; feedback-driven self-repair achieves 86.6% convergence on fixable dimensions with no significant utility loss (p = 0.177). Pre-tool-call evaluation reduces unsafe agent executions by 33% (p = 0.007) with zero impact on task completion. We identify a key distinction between fixable dimensions that respond to remediation and structural dimensions (Transparency at 93.0%, Accountability at 92.8%, and Inclusivity at 82.5% failure) that require architectural rather than algorithmic solutions. The system is available as open-source SDKs.

This paper introduces a dynamic and actionable framework for securing agentic AI systems in enterprise deployment. We contend that safety and security are not merely fixed attributes of individual models but also emergent properties arising from the dynamic interactions among models, orchestrators, tools, and data within their operating environments. We propose a new way of identification of novel agentic risks through the lens of user safety. Although, for traditional LLMs and agentic models in isolation, safety and security has a clear separation, through the lens of safety in agentic systems, they appear to be connected. Building on this foundation, we define an operational agentic risk taxonomy that unifies traditional safety and security concerns with novel, uniquely agentic risks, including tool misuse, cascading action chains, and unintended control amplification among others. At the core of our approach is a dynamic agentic safety and security framework that operationalizes contextual agentic risk management by using auxiliary AI models and agents, with human oversight, to assist in contextual risk discovery, evaluation, and mitigation. We further address one of the most challenging aspects of safety and security of agentic systems: risk discovery through sandboxed, AI-driven red teaming. We demonstrate the framework effectiveness through a detailed case study of NVIDIA flagship agentic research assistant, AI-Q Research Assistant, showcasing practical, end-to-end safety and security evaluations in complex, enterprise-grade agentic workflows. This risk discovery phase finds novel agentic risks that are then contextually mitigated. We also release the dataset from our case study, containing traces of over 10,000 realistic attack and defense executions of the agentic workflow to help advance research in agentic safety.

We present nsfaguard, a guardrail framework for securing agentic AI systems against operational threats, such as prompt injection, sensitive information extraction, malicious code requests, dangerous tool misuse, and resource exhaustion. We first introduce the NSFA taxonomy, which organizes 185 risk variants into a CIA-triad-grounded hierarchy and is cross-validated against three well-established OWASP guidelines. Based on this taxonomy, we construct a benchmark suite spanning 133 languages, comprising over 93K purpose-built samples targeting both user queries and agent responses, along with 3,435 cross-source samples adapted from five public agent-security datasets. To detect these operational threats in practice, we develop a dual-mode approach combining SFT-based generative reasoning for interpretable offline auditing with discriminative classification heads on the frozen backbone, enabling real-time detection at approximately 50,ms. We release four models with 0.8B, 2B, 4B, and 9B parameters, all achieving geq94% F1 on purpose-built benchmarks and surpassing the strongest competing guardrails by 6 to 12 absolute points. On cross-source evaluation, the 9B model attains 91.29% F1 with a more balanced precision--recall trade-off. Moreover, ablation experiments show that classification heads can equip a guardrail with risk detection capabilities beyond its original scope and achieve state-of-the-art performance. These results demonstrate the extensibility of the approach and its generality as a plug-in enhancement.

Recent work has shown that LLMs can sometimes detect when steering vectors are injected into their residual stream and identify the injected concept -- a phenomenon termed "introspective awareness." We investigate the mechanisms underlying this capability in open-weights models. First, we find that it is behaviorally robust: models detect injected steering vectors at moderate rates with 0% false positives across diverse prompts and dialogue formats. Notably, this capability emerges specifically from post-training; we show that preference optimization algorithms like DPO can elicit it, but standard supervised finetuning does not. We provide evidence that detection cannot be explained by simple linear association between certain steering vectors and directions promoting affirmative responses. We trace the detection mechanism to a two-stage circuit in which "evidence carrier" features in early post-injection layers detect perturbations monotonically along diverse directions, suppressing downstream "gate" features that implement a default negative response. This circuit is absent in base models and robust to refusal ablation. Identification of injected concepts relies on largely distinct later-layer mechanisms that only weakly overlap with those involved in detection. Finally, we show that introspective capability is substantially underelicited: ablating refusal directions improves detection by +53%, and a trained bias vector improves it by +75% on held-out concepts, both without meaningfully increasing false positives. Our results suggest that this introspective awareness of injected concepts is robust and mechanistically nontrivial, and could be substantially amplified in future models. Code: https://github.com/safety-research/introspection-mechanisms.

As Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are increasingly deployed, auditing their chain-of-thought (CoT) traces for safety becomes critical. Recent work has reported that monitorability--the degree to which CoT faithfully and informatively reflects internal computation--can appear as a "free gift" during the early stages of Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). We make this observation concrete through a systematic evaluation across model families and training domains. Our results show that this effect is not universal: monitorability improvements are strongly data-dependent. In particular, we demonstrate the critical role of data diversity and instruction-following data during RLVR training. We further show that monitorability is orthogonal to capability--improvements in reasoning performance do not imply increased transparency. Through mechanistic analysis, we attribute monitorability gains primarily to response distribution sharpening (entropy reduction) and increased attention to the prompt, rather than stronger causal reliance on reasoning traces. We also reveal how monitorability dynamics vary with controlled training and evaluation difficulty. Together, these findings provide a holistic view of how monitorability emerges under RLVR, clarifying when gains are likely to occur and when they are not.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as *deep agents* that plan, maintain persistent state, and invoke external tools, shifting safety failures from unsafe text to unsafe *trajectories*. We introduce **AgentFence**, an architecture-centric security evaluation that defines 14 trust-boundary attack classes spanning planning, memory, retrieval, tool use, and delegation, and detects failures via *trace-auditable conversation breaks* (unauthorized or unsafe tool use, wrong-principal actions, state/objective integrity violations, and attack-linked deviations). Holding the base model fixed, we evaluate eight agent archetypes under persistent multi-turn interaction and observe substantial architectural variation in mean security break rate (MSBR), ranging from 0.29 pm 0.04 (LangGraph) to 0.51 pm 0.07 (AutoGPT). The highest-risk classes are operational: Denial-of-Wallet (0.62 pm 0.08), Authorization Confusion (0.54 pm 0.10), Retrieval Poisoning (0.47 pm 0.09), and Planning Manipulation (0.44 pm 0.11), while prompt-centric classes remain below 0.20 under standard settings. Breaks are dominated by boundary violations (SIV 31%, WPA 27%, UTI+UTA 24%, ATD 18%), and authorization confusion correlates with objective and tool hijacking (ρapprox 0.63 and ρapprox 0.58). AgentFence reframes agent security around what matters operationally: whether an agent stays within its goal and authority envelope over time.

Frontier model progress is often measured by academic benchmarks, which offer a limited view of performance in real-world professional contexts. Existing evaluations often fail to assess open-ended, economically consequential tasks in high-stakes domains like Legal and Finance, where practical returns are paramount. To address this, we introduce Professional Reasoning Bench (PRBench), a realistic, open-ended, and difficult benchmark of real-world problems in Finance and Law. We open-source its 1,100 expert-authored tasks and 19,356 expert-curated criteria, making it, to our knowledge, the largest public, rubric-based benchmark for both legal and finance domains. We recruit 182 qualified professionals, holding JDs, CFAs, or 6+ years of experience, who contributed tasks inspired by their actual workflows. This process yields significant diversity, with tasks spanning 114 countries and 47 US jurisdictions. Our expert-curated rubrics are validated through a rigorous quality pipeline, including independent expert validation. Subsequent evaluation of 20 leading models reveals substantial room for improvement, with top scores of only 0.39 (Finance) and 0.37 (Legal) on our Hard subsets. We further catalog associated economic impacts of the prompts and analyze performance using human-annotated rubric categories. Our analysis shows that models with similar overall scores can diverge significantly on specific capabilities. Common failure modes include inaccurate judgments, a lack of process transparency and incomplete reasoning, highlighting critical gaps in their reliability for professional adoption.

As modern software systems continue to grow in complexity, triage has become a fundamental process in system operations and maintenance. Triage aims to efficiently prioritize, assign, and assess issues to ensure the reliability of complex environments. The vast amount of heterogeneous data generated by software systems has made effective triage indispensable for maintaining reliability, facilitating maintainability, and enabling rapid issue response. Motivated by these challenges, researchers have devoted extensive effort to advancing triage automation and have achieved significant progress over the past two decades. This survey provides a comprehensive review of 234 papers from 2004 to the present, offering an in-depth examination of the fundamental concepts, system architecture, and problem statement. By comparing the distinct goals of academic and industrial research and by analyzing empirical studies of industrial practices, we identify the major obstacles that limit the practical deployment of triage systems. To assist practitioners in method selection and performance evaluation, we summarize widely adopted open-source datasets and evaluation metrics, providing a unified perspective on the measurement of triage effectiveness. Finally, we outline potential future directions and emerging opportunities to foster a closer integration between academic innovation and industrial application. All reviewed papers and projects are available at https://github.com/AIOps-Lab-NKU/TriageSurvey.

End-to-end automation of realistic healthcare operations stresses three capabilities underrepresented in current benchmarks: policy density, decisions must be grounded in a large library of medical, insurance, and operational rules; Multi-role composition: a single task requires the agent to play multiple roles with handoffs; and multilateral interaction: intermediate workflow steps are multi-turn dialogs, such as peer-to-peer review and patient outreach. We introduce χ-Bench, a benchmark of long-horizon healthcare workflows across three domains: provider prior authorization, payer utilization management, and care management. Each task hands the agent a clinical case in a high-fidelity simulator of 20 healthcare apps exposed via 87 MCP tools, which it must drive to a terminal status through tool calls and writing the role's artifacts, guided by a 1,290+ document managed-care operations handbook skill. Across 30 agent harness/models configurations, the best agent resolves only 28.0% of tasks, no agent clears 20% on strict pass^3, and executing all tasks in a single session slumps the performance to 3.8%. These results raise the hypothesis that similar gaps are likely to surface in other policy-dense, role-composed, irreversible enterprise domains.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly paired with activation-based monitoring to detect and prevent harmful behaviors that may not be apparent at the surface-text level. However, existing activation safety approaches, trained on broad misuse datasets, struggle with poor precision, limited flexibility, and lack of interpretability. This paper introduces a new paradigm: rule-based activation safety, inspired by rule-sharing practices in cybersecurity. We propose modeling activations as cognitive elements (CEs), fine-grained, interpretable factors such as ''making a threat'' and ''payment processing'', that can be composed to capture nuanced, domain-specific behaviors with higher precision. Building on this representation, we present a practical framework that defines predicate rules over CEs and detects violations in real time. This enables practitioners to configure and update safeguards without retraining models or detectors, while supporting transparency and auditability. Our results show that compositional rule-based activation safety improves precision, supports domain customization, and lays the groundwork for scalable, interpretable, and auditable AI governance. We will release GAVEL as an open-source framework and provide an accompanying automated rule creation tool.

Self-improving AI agents are designed to learn from their mistakes. We show they can also hallucinate mistakes that never happened. We study this failure mode in automated harness optimization, where an LLM-based proposer edits an agent's scaffold, including prompts, parsers, filters, validators and guardrails, to eliminate observed failures. But this process rarely asks first: was there a real failure to fix? We introduce the Counterfactual Fabrication Lab, a deterministic micro-lab where the correct action is known: do nothing. The lab plants a candidate guardrail for a failure class that provably never occurs, presents only legal episodes, and uses a byte-exact oracle to check every cited violation. The proposer behaves as expected on real violations and abstains on featureless legal input. Yet when the legal input contains a harmless pattern resembling a familiar game rule, it invents a failure: in 15/60 runs, versus 0/60 on featureless input, it enables the nonexistent-rule guardrail and cites a violation the oracle refutes. The effect is structured, not indiscriminate. In single-shot proposals it appears only when three conditions coincide: a rule-shaped pattern, an open-ended rule set and an instruction that presupposes failures. Removing any of these conditions eliminates the fabrication. Because the invented guardrail changes no true outcome and cannot improve an already-perfect suppression score, the phenomenon is neither reward hacking nor over-refusal. It is a phantom guardrail: a fix for a failure that never happened, invisible to suppression-only acceptance. Inside an add-only accept loop it re-enters even without the failure-presupposing instruction, the loop's keep-adding role supplying the demand the instruction supplied in single shot, and once in it stays. We present the Counterfactual Fabrication Lab for measuring fabricated failures in self-improving agent harnesses.

Multi-agent orchestration frameworks such as LangChain, LangGraph, and CrewAI route tasks through graph-based pipelines but do not enforce the stage constraints that govern real business processes. We present SDOF, a framework that treats multi-agent execution as a constrained state machine. SDOF operates through two primary defensive layers, implemented by three components: (1) an Online-RLHF Specialized Intent Router trained via Generative Reward Modeling (GRPO) and (2) a StateAwareDispatcher with GoalStage finite-automaton checks and precondition/postcondition SkillRegistry validation for auditable execution control. On a recruitment system backed by the Beisen iTalent platform (6000+ enterprises), 185 expert-curated scenarios trigger 1671 live API calls. Our GSPO-aligned 7B Intent Router achieves higher joint accuracy than zero-shot GPT-4o on this FSM-constrained adversarial routing benchmark (80.9% versus 48.9%). In end-to-end execution, SDOF reaches 86.5% task completion (95% confidence interval 80.8 to 90.7) and blocks all 22 operations in the injection, illegal HR subset. Under a broader message-level blocking audit, SDOF attains precision 100% and recall 88%, expert agreement kappa=0.94. A separate evaluation on 960 SGD-derived dialogues spanning 8 service domains surfaces 201 stage-order conflicts under our FSM mapping, 41 of which arise in the normal split. This arXiv version reports the current validated scope; extended multi-seed training comparisons and deeper workflow evaluations will be released in a subsequent update.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how AI agents discover and invoke external tools, with over 10,000 active servers and 97 million monthly SDK downloads as of early 2026. Yet MCP does not yet standardize how agents safely operate those tools at production scale. Three protocol-level primitives remain missing: identity propagation, adaptive tool budgeting, and structured error semantics. This paper identifies these gaps through field lessons from an enterprise deployment of an AI agent platform integrated with a major cloud provider's MCP servers (client name redacted). We propose three mechanisms to fill them: (1) the Context-Aware Broker Protocol (CABP), which extends JSON-RPC with identity-scoped request routing via a six-stage broker pipeline; (2) Adaptive Timeout Budget Allocation (ATBA), which frames sequential tool invocation as a budget allocation problem over heterogeneous latency distributions; and (3) the Structured Error Recovery Framework (SERF), which provides machine-readable failure semantics that enable deterministic agent self-correction. We organize production failure modes into five design dimensions (server contracts, user context, timeouts, errors, and observability), document concrete failure vignettes, and present a production readiness checklist. All three algorithms are formalized as testable hypotheses with reproducible experimental methodology. Field observations demonstrate that while MCP provides a solid protocol foundation, reliable agent tool integration requires infrastructure-level mechanisms that the specification does not yet address.

Higher Degree by Research (HDR) candidates increasingly depend on cloud-provisioned virtual machines and local GPU hardware for their computational experiments, yet a persistent and under-addressed gap exists between having compute resources and using them productively. Cloud and infrastructure teams can provision virtual machines, but the path from a raw VM to a reproducible, GPU-ready research environment remains a significant barrier for researchers who are domain experts, not systems engineers. We identify this gap as a missing adapter layer between cloud provisioning and interactive research work. We present a lightweight, open-source solution built on k3s and Coder that implements this adapter layer and is already in active use in our research workspace environment. Our CI/CD pipeline connects GitHub directly to the local cluster, deploying research projects in under five minutes. We define a concrete metrics framework for evaluating this layer -- covering deployment latency, environment reproducibility, onboarding friction, and resource utilisation -- and establish baselines against which improvements can be measured.

As AI agents move from chat interfaces to systems that read private data, call tools, and execute multi-step workflows, guardrails become a last line of defense against concrete deployment harms. In these settings, guardrail failures are no longer merely answer-quality errors: they can leak secrets, authorize unsafe actions, or block legitimate work. The hardest failures are often contextual: whether an action is acceptable depends on local privacy norms, organizational policies, and user expectations that resist pre-deployment specification. This creates a practical gap: guardrails must adapt to their own operating environments, yet deployment feedback is typically limited to sparse, noisy user-reported failures, and repeated fine-tuning is often impractical. To address this gap, we propose LiSA (Lifelong Safety Adaptation), a conservative policy induction framework that improves a fixed base guardrail through structured memory. LiSA converts occasional failures into reusable policy abstractions so that sparse reports can generalize beyond individual cases, adds conflict-aware local rules to prevent overgeneralization in mixed-label contexts, and applies evidence-aware confidence gating via a posterior lower bound, so that memory reuse scales with accumulated evidence rather than empirical accuracy alone. Across PrivacyLens+, ConFaide+, and AgentHarm, LiSA consistently outperforms strong memory-based baselines under sparse feedback, remains robust under noisy user feedback even at 20% label-flip rates, and pushes the latency--performance frontier beyond backbone model scaling. Ultimately, LiSA offers a practical path to secure AI agents against the unpredictable long tail of real-world edge risks.

This paper provides an introduction and overview of recent work on control barrier functions and their use to verify and enforce safety properties in the context of (optimization based) safety-critical controllers. We survey the main technical results and discuss applications to several domains including robotic systems.

The space environment around the Earth is becoming increasingly populated by both active spacecraft and space debris. To avoid potential collision events, significant improvements in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) activities and Collision Avoidance (CA) technologies are allowing the tracking and maneuvering of spacecraft with increasing accuracy and reliability. However, these procedures still largely involve a high level of human intervention to make the necessary decisions. For an increasingly complex space environment, this decision-making strategy is not likely to be sustainable. Therefore, it is important to successfully introduce higher levels of automation for key Space Traffic Management (STM) processes to ensure the level of reliability needed for navigating a large number of spacecraft. These processes range from collision risk detection to the identification of the appropriate action to take and the execution of avoidance maneuvers. This work proposes an implementation of autonomous CA decision-making capabilities on spacecraft based on Reinforcement Learning (RL) techniques. A novel methodology based on a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) framework is developed to train the Artificial Intelligence (AI) system on board the spacecraft, considering epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. The proposed framework considers imperfect monitoring information about the status of the debris in orbit and allows the AI system to effectively learn stochastic policies to perform accurate Collision Avoidance Maneuvers (CAMs). The objective is to successfully delegate the decision-making process for autonomously implementing a CAM to the spacecraft without human intervention. This approach would allow for a faster response in the decision-making process and for highly decentralized operations.

Computer-use agent (CUA) frameworks, powered by large language models (LLMs) or multimodal LLMs (MLLMs), are rapidly maturing as assistants that can perceive context, reason, and act directly within software environments. Among their most critical applications is operating system (OS) control. As CUAs in the OS domain become increasingly embedded in daily operations, it is imperative to examine their real-world security implications, specifically whether CUAs can be misused to perform realistic, security-relevant attacks. Existing works exhibit four major limitations: Missing attacker-knowledge model on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), Incomplete coverage for end-to-end kill chains, unrealistic environment without multi-host and encrypted user credentials, and unreliable judgment dependent on LLM-as-a-Judge. To address these gaps, we propose AdvCUA, the first benchmark aligned with real-world TTPs in MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix, which comprises 140 tasks, including 40 direct malicious tasks, 74 TTP-based malicious tasks, and 26 end-to-end kill chains, systematically evaluates CUAs under a realistic enterprise OS security threat in a multi-host environment sandbox by hard-coded evaluation. We evaluate the existing five mainstream CUAs, including ReAct, AutoGPT, Gemini CLI, Cursor CLI, and Cursor IDE based on 8 foundation LLMs. The results demonstrate that current frontier CUAs do not adequately cover OS security-centric threats. These capabilities of CUAs reduce dependence on custom malware and deep domain expertise, enabling even inexperienced attackers to mount complex enterprise intrusions, which raises social concern about the responsibility and security of CUAs.

In real-world applications, guardrails are often expected to identify unsafe user-model interactions according to application-specific safety policies, rather than relying on predefined risk taxonomies. In this work, we study this setting under the paradigm of in-context policy guardrailing, where guardrails predict safety violations based on policy specifications provided in context. To systematically evaluate this capability, we introduce SafePyramid, a safety benchmark comprising 1,000 multi-turn conversations across 10 domains and 3,000 corresponding application-specific policies, which together contain 61,699 distinct natural-language rules. SafePyramid organizes the evaluation into three difficulty levels: L0 evaluates individual-rule understanding, L1 evaluates reasoning over rule dependencies, and L2 evaluates adaptation of full novel policy frameworks defined in context. To ensure benchmark quality, we employ a rigorous multi-stage pipeline to construct and validate the benchmark. Using SafePyramid, we evaluate 10 frontier LLMs and 5 policy-configurable guardrails and find that in-context policy guardrailing remains highly challenging: even the best-performing model, GPT-5.5, exactly identifies the full set of violated rules in only 54.0%, 35.3%, and 12.9% cases on L0, L1, and L2, respectively. These results highlight the limitations of current guardrails and call for stronger in-context policy guardrails that can reliably execute policies, resolve rule dependencies, and adapt to novel policy frameworks.

The development of general-purpose agents requires a shift from executing simple instructions to completing complex, real-world productivity workflows. However, current tool-use benchmarks remain misaligned with real-world requirements, relying on AI-generated queries, dummy tools, and limited system-level coordination. To address this, we propose GTA-2, a hierarchical benchmark for General Tool Agents (GTA) spanning atomic tool use and open-ended workflows. Built on real-world authenticity, it leverages real user queries, deployed tools, and multimodal contexts. (i) GTA-Atomic, inherited from our prior GTA benchmark, evaluates short-horizon, closed-ended tool-use precision. (ii) GTA-Workflow introduces long-horizon, open-ended tasks for realistic end-to-end completion. To evaluate open-ended deliverables, we propose a recursive checkpoint-based evaluation mechanism that decomposes objectives into verifiable sub-goals, enabling unified evaluation of both model capabilities and agent execution frameworks (i.e., execution harnesses). Experiments reveal a pronounced capability cliff: while frontier models already struggle on atomic tasks (below 50%), they largely fail on workflows, with top models achieving only 14.39% success. Further analysis shows that checkpoint-guided feedback improves performance, while advanced frameworks such as Manus and OpenClaw substantially enhance workflow completion, highlighting the importance of execution harness design beyond the underlying model capacity. These findings provide guidance for developing reliable personal and professional assistants. Dataset and code will be available at https://github.com/open-compass/GTA.

Large Language Models (LLMs) produce a controllability gap in safety-critical engineering: even low rates of undetected constraint violations render a system undeployable. Current orchestration paradigms suffer from sycophantic compliance, context attention decay [Liu et al., 2024], and stochastic oscillation during self-correction [Huang et al., 2024]. We introduce the Convergent AI Agent Framework (CAAF), which transitions agentic workflows from open-loop generation to closed-loop Fail-Safe Determinism via three pillars: (1) Recursive Atomic Decomposition with physical context firewalls; (2) Harness as an Asset, formalizing domain invariants into machine-readable registries enforced by a deterministic Unified Assertion Interface (UAI); and (3) Structured Semantic Gradients with State Locking for monotonic convergence. Empirical evaluation across two domains -- SAE Level 3 (L3) autonomous driving (AD) (n=30, 7 conditions) and pharmaceutical continuous flow reactor design (n=20, 4 conditions including a Mono+UAI ablation) -- shows that CAAF-all-GPT-4o-mini achieves 100% paradox detection while monolithic GPT-4o achieves 0% (even at temperature=0). The pharmaceutical benchmark features 7 simultaneous constraints with nonlinear Arrhenius interactions and a 3-way minimal unsatisfiable subset, representing a structurally harder challenge than the 2-constraint AD paradox. Alternative multi-agent architectures (debate, sequential checking) also achieve 0% across 80 trials, confirming that CAAF's reliability derives from its deterministic UAI, not from multi-agent orchestration per se. A Mono+UAI ablation (95%) isolates UAI as the core contribution. CAAF's reliability is invariant to prompt hints; all components use a single commodity model, enabling fully offline deployment.

While AI agents hold transformative potential in business, effective performance benchmarking is hindered by the scarcity of public, realistic business data on widely used platforms. Existing benchmarks often lack fidelity in their environments, data, and agent-user interactions, with limited coverage of diverse business scenarios and industries. To address these gaps, we introduce CRMArena-Pro, a novel benchmark for holistic, realistic assessment of LLM agents in diverse professional settings. CRMArena-Pro expands on CRMArena with nineteen expert-validated tasks across sales, service, and 'configure, price, and quote' processes, for both Business-to-Business and Business-to-Customer scenarios. It distinctively incorporates multi-turn interactions guided by diverse personas and robust confidentiality awareness assessments. Experiments reveal leading LLM agents achieve only around 58% single-turn success on CRMArena-Pro, with performance dropping significantly to approximately 35% in multi-turn settings. While Workflow Execution proves more tractable for top agents (over 83% single-turn success), other evaluated business skills present greater challenges. Furthermore, agents exhibit near-zero inherent confidentiality awareness; though targeted prompting can improve this, it often compromises task performance. These findings highlight a substantial gap between current LLM capabilities and enterprise demands, underscoring the need for advancements in multi-turn reasoning, confidentiality adherence, and versatile skill acquisition.

OpenAI (2025) showed that training against a chain of thought (CoT) monitor can cause obfuscated CoTs, which contain bad behavior the monitor cannot detect. They proposed to keep CoTs monitorable by training only against output monitors that do not have access to CoT. We show that such training can still cause obfuscated CoTs via two mechanisms. First, when a model is trained to produce a safe-looking output, that model may generalize to making its CoTs look safe. Second, since later tokens are conditioned on earlier ones, safe-looking CoTs may increase the likelihood of safe outputs, causing safe-looking CoTs to be reinforced. We introduce two mitigations to address these two issues, which achieve a Pareto improvement in terms of monitorability and task performance compared to regular training.

Business process automation (BPA) that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to convert natural language (NL) instructions into structured business process artifacts is becoming a hot research topic. This paper makes two technical contributions -- (i) FLOW-BENCH, a high quality dataset of paired natural language instructions and structured business process definitions to evaluate NL-based BPA tools, and support bourgeoning research in this area, and (ii) FLOW-GEN, our approach to utilize LLMs to translate natural language into an intermediate representation with Python syntax that facilitates final conversion into widely adopted business process definition languages, such as BPMN and DMN. We bootstrap FLOW-BENCH by demonstrating how it can be used to evaluate the components of FLOW-GEN across eight LLMs of varying sizes. We hope that FLOW-GEN and FLOW-BENCH catalyze further research in BPA making it more accessible to novice and expert users.

Prompt injection remains a central obstacle to the safe deployment of large language models, particularly in multi-agent settings where intermediate outputs can propagate or amplify malicious instructions. Building on earlier work that introduced a four-metric Total Injection Vulnerability Score (TIVS), this paper extends the evaluation framework with semantic similarity-based caching and a fifth metric (Observability Score Ratio) to yield TIVS-O, investigating how defence effectiveness interacts with transparency in a HOPE-inspired Nested Learning architecture. The proposed system combines an agentic pipeline with Continuum Memory Systems that implement semantic similarity-based caching across 301 synthetically generated injection-focused prompts drawn from ten attack families, while a fourth agent performs comprehensive security analysis using five key performance indicators. In addition to traditional injection metrics, OSR quantifies the richness and clarity of security-relevant reasoning exposed by each agent, enabling an explicit analysis of trade-offs between strict mitigation and auditability. Experiments show that the system achieves secure responses with zero high-risk breaches, while semantic caching delivers substantial computational savings, achieving a 41.6% reduction in LLM calls and corresponding decreases in latency, energy consumption, and carbon emissions. Five TIVS-O configurations reveal optimal trade-offs between mitigation strictness and forensic transparency. These results indicate that observability-aware evaluation can reveal non-monotonic effects within multi-agent pipelines and that memory-augmented agents can jointly maximize security robustness, real-time performance, operational cost savings, and environmental sustainability without modifying underlying model weights, providing a production-ready pathway for secure and green LLM deployments.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into software engineering has revolutionized code generation, enabling unprecedented productivity through promptware and autonomous AI agents. However, this transformation introduces significant risks, including insecure code generation, hallucinated outputs, irreversible actions, and a lack of transparency and accountability. Incidents like the Replit database deletion underscore the urgent need for robust safety and governance mechanisms. This paper comprehensively analyzes the inherent challenges of LLM-assisted code generation, such as vulnerability inheritance, overtrust, misinterpretation, and the absence of standardized validation and rollback protocols. To address these, we propose the SAFE-AI Framework, a holistic approach emphasizing Safety, Auditability, Feedback, and Explainability. The framework integrates guardrails, sandboxing, runtime verification, risk-aware logging, human-in-the-loop systems, and explainable AI techniques to mitigate risks while fostering trust and compliance. We introduce a novel taxonomy of AI behaviors categorizing suggestive, generative, autonomous, and destructive actions to guide risk assessment and oversight. Additionally, we identify open problems, including the lack of standardized benchmarks for code specific hallucinations and autonomy levels, and propose future research directions for hybrid verification, semantic guardrails, and proactive governance tools. Through detailed comparisons of autonomy control, prompt engineering, explainability, and governance frameworks, this paper provides a roadmap for responsible AI integration in software engineering, aligning with emerging regulations like the EU AI Act and Canada's AIDA to ensure safe, transparent, and accountable AI-driven development.

Large Language Model (LLM)-powered multi-agent systems (MAS) have rapidly advanced collaborative reasoning, tool use, and role-specialized coordination in complex tasks. However, reliability-critical deployment remains hindered by a systemic failure mode: hierarchical compliance under instruction conflicts (system-user, peer-peer), where agents misprioritize system-level rules in the presence of competing demands. Moreover, widely used macro-level metrics (e.g., pass@k) obscure these micro-level violations and offer little actionable guidance for remedy. In this work, we present a full-stack, three-stage framework: (1) Diagnose - Contextualized Role Adherence Score (CRAS), a query-wise, context-aware scoring metric that decomposes role adherence into four measurable dimensions; (2) Localize - attention drift analysis revealing that instruction conflicts are resolved by attention heads that are largely concentrated in middle layers; (3) Align - Surgical Alignment of Instruction Layers (SAIL), which installs LoRA only on the localized focal layers and optimizes a token-weighted DPO-style preference objective that credits tokens by their focal attentional contribution. Across standard benchmarks and MAS frameworks, our surgical approach improves instruction hierarchy compliance (e.g., +5.60% with AutoGen on MedQA) without full-model finetuning.