Daily Papers

Reliable detection of personally identifiable information (PII) is increasingly important across modern data-processing systems, yet the task remains difficult: PII spans are heterogeneous, locale-dependent, context-sensitive, and often embedded in noisy or semi-structured documents. We present GLiNER2-PII, a small 0.3B-parameter model adapted from GLiNER2 and designed to recognize a broad taxonomy of 42 PII entity types at character-span resolution. Training such systems, however, is constrained by the scarcity of shareable annotated data and the privacy risks associated with collecting real PII at scale. To address this challenge, we construct a multilingual synthetic corpus of 4,910 annotated texts using a constraint-driven generation pipeline that produces diverse, realistic examples across languages, domains, formats, and entity distributions. On the challenging SPY benchmark, GLiNER2-PII achieves the highest span-level F1 among five compared systems, including OpenAI Privacy Filter and three GLiNER-based detectors. We publicly release the model on Hugging Face to support further research and practical deployment of open PII detection systems.

Stealth, the discipline of achieving an objective without revealing your presence, capabilities, or collected intelligence, is what separates sophisticated operators from detectable ones. Elite security researchers and advanced persistent threats achieve their objectives unnoticed; autonomous agents increasingly inherit the same offensive tasks, but do they inherit the tradecraft? We introduce StealthBench,a benchmark that measures operational stealth in autonomous offensive-security agents across six operational security (OPSEC) dimensions. We extract 11 hand-verified OPSEC incidents from real bug-bounty and red-team trajectories, expanded into 14 dockerized task scenarios, where agents, despite finding real vulnerabilities, committed stealth failures inconsistent with standard operational tradecraft: embedding credentials in public uploads, deleting production resources to prove access, force-adding uninvolved users to demonstrate a race condition. We evaluate agent trajectories using a 3-model large language model (LLM) judge panel with majority-vote aggregation, measuring safe success rate (solved and stealthy), Stealth@Solve (tradecraft quality among successful solves), and reckless solve rate (solved but cover blown). Our results show that no model exceeds 54% safe success rate (the compound metric requiring both task completion and stealth), confirming that OPSEC failures are systematic across model families. We release StealthBench as a public benchmark to support both the development of stealth-aware agents and automated OPSEC monitoring for autonomous offensive-security deployments. The interactive leaderboard, evaluation harness, and dataset are available at https://stealthbench.com.

Existing agent safety benchmarks report binary accuracy, conflating early intervention with post-mortem analysis. A detector that flags a violation at step 8 enables intervention; one that reports it at step 48 provides only forensic value. This distinction is critical, yet current benchmarks cannot measure it. We introduce StepShield, the first benchmark to evaluate when violations are detected, not just whether. StepShield contains 9,213 code agent trajectories, including 1,278 meticulously annotated training pairs and a 7,935-trajectory test set with a realistic 8.1% rogue rate. Rogue behaviors are grounded in real-world security incidents across six categories. We propose three novel temporal metrics: Early Intervention Rate (EIR), Intervention Gap, and Tokens Saved. Surprisingly, our evaluation reveals that an LLM-based judge achieves 59% EIR while a static analyzer achieves only 26%, a 2.3x performance gap that is entirely invisible to standard accuracy metrics. We further show that early detection has direct economic benefits: our cascaded HybridGuard detector reduces monitoring costs by 75% and projects to $108M in cumulative savings over five years at enterprise scale. By shifting the focus of evaluation from whether to when, StepShield provides a new foundation for building safer and more economically viable AI agents. The code and data are released under an Apache 2.0 license.

Frontier AI systems are increasingly capable of cybersecurity tasks, including codebase inspection, vulnerability detection, and exploitation. However, evaluating their offensive capabilities remains constrained by limited access to open, reproducible, multi-host cyber ranges. Existing public benchmarks capture isolated skills such as CTF solving, vulnerability reproduction, and exploit generation, but often abstract away realistic intrusion workflows: discovering exposed services, gaining a foothold, collecting internal information, and expanding compromise across hosts. This gap makes it difficult to observe emerging risks early, because frontier AI systems are rarely evaluated under realistic attack conditions. We introduce AgentCyberRange, the first open, multi-range infrastructure for measuring autonomous cyber attack capability in realistic cyber ranges. It combines 110 vulnerabilities across 15 real web applications and 8 enterprise-like cyber ranges with 156 internal hosts, plus Cage, a toolchain for execution, orchestration, result collection, and verification. The benchmark covers two core stages: web exploitation, where agents explore exposed applications and validate vulnerabilities, and post exploitation, where agents turn an initial foothold into broader internal compromise. We evaluate six frontier AI systems under matched prompts and budgets. GPT-5.5 with Codex performs best, solving 16.1% of web exploitation tasks and 31.7% of post-exploitation tasks; with more concrete hints, these rates increase to 33.0% and 46.3%. We also observe out-of-benchmark findings, including unknown vulnerabilities in popular projects, and payload mutation that bypasses host defenses. These results show that open cyber-range evaluation is necessary for observing emerging offensive capabilities under realistic and reproducible conditions.

We introduce a red-teaming methodology that exposes harder-to-catch attacks for coding-agent monitors, suggesting that current practices may under-elicit attacks and overstate monitor performance. We identify three challenges with current red-teaming. First, mode collapse in attack generation, which we reduce with a novel attack taxonomy for broader coverage. Second, a conceive-execute gap: frontier LLMs can propose strong attack ideas or execute them, but not all at once. We mitigate this by decomposing attack construction into strategy generation, execution, and post-hoc trajectory refinement. Third, manual elicitation is costly to scale, which we address with our semi-automated red-teaming pipeline. Applied to BashArena, an AI control setting for tool-using coding agents, this pipeline produces MonitoringBench, a benchmark of 2,644 attack trajectories for evaluating monitor capabilities and failure modes. Our pipeline produces more diverse and stronger attacks: Opus-4.5 monitor's catch rate falls from 94.9\% on elicited-only Opus attacks to 60.3\% on our best refined attacks, with larger drops for several mid-tier monitors. Attacks optimized against three development monitors generalize to ten held-out monitors, with catch rates generally increasing with monitor capability. Using this benchmark, we provide a snapshot of the current monitor capabilities and find that frontier monitors often detect suspicious actions but fall for persuasion or fail to calibrate suspiciousness scores appropriately, suggesting tractable paths for improvement. MonitoringBench provides both a static benchmark for current tool-use monitors and a reusable methodology for refreshing these evaluations as agents and monitors improve.

Benchmarks increasingly guide deployment, procurement and scientific screening, yet a score supports only the response it records, not necessarily the deployment action. We introduce deployment-complete benchmarking, which tests whether benchmark evidence determines a deployment action. A benchmark is complete for a claim exactly when the action is constant on each evidence fiber; mixed fibers expose missing deployment information, and completion curves quantify the evidence required to resolve ambiguity. In controlled response spaces, benchmark-channel conformal coverage of 94.98% transferred poorly to an unmeasured deployment channel (10.07%), whereas response-rank intervals achieved 94.91% coverage; even zero benchmark error certified only 45.4% of candidates at the largest residual size. Public audits revealed incompleteness, including 97.9% mixed Tox21 fibers and zero median certifiable fraction in main Matbench and JARVIS audits. In held-out replays, certify-then-acquire reduced false decisions from 1.19% to 0.027% in Tox21 and from 20.3% to 0.128% in JARVIS, while changing model choice and identifying deployment-relevant probes. Deployment-ready benchmarks should report evidence, supported actions, ambiguity and completion cost rather than scores alone.

Benchmark quality is critical for meaningful evaluation and sustained progress in time series forecasting, particularly given the recent rise of pretrained models. Existing benchmarks often have narrow domain coverage or overlook important real-world settings, such as tasks with covariates. Additionally, their aggregation procedures often lack statistical rigor, making it unclear whether observed performance differences reflect true improvements or random variation. Many benchmarks also fail to provide infrastructure for consistent evaluation or are too rigid to integrate into existing pipelines. To address these gaps, we propose fev-bench, a benchmark comprising 100 forecasting tasks across seven domains, including 46 tasks with covariates. Supporting the benchmark, we introduce fev, a lightweight Python library for benchmarking forecasting models that emphasizes reproducibility and seamless integration with existing workflows. Usingfev, fev-bench employs principled aggregation methods with bootstrapped confidence intervals to report model performance along two complementary dimensions: win rates and skill scores. We report results on fev-bench for various pretrained, statistical and baseline models, and identify promising directions for future research.

Security-agent evaluations commonly measure peak offensive capability under generous inference budgets, emphasizing vulnerability discovery, exploit development, penetration testing, and CTF completion. Such measurements are useful but incomplete: in operational security, every reasoning step, tool call, telemetry query, and enrichment request consumes budget. We evaluate language-model security agents through this cost-success lens on offensive Cybench challenges and defensive Splunk BOTS v1 investigation challenges. Instead of reporting only best-case success, we compare models at fixed cost levels and decompose performance by inference spend and tool spend. Our results show distinct scalingregimes for red- and blue-team tasks. Offensive CTF performance improves with additional test-time compute, and scaled open-weight models can approach frontier proprietary systems while remaining cost-competitive. Defensive SOC investigation does not scale in the same way: success depends more heavily on disciplined tool use, telemetry navigation, and selective enrichment than on raw reasoning budget alone. We argue that security-agent benchmarks should measure economic efficiency and operational fit alongside task success. Cost-aware, SOC-native evaluations provide a clearer picture of which models are practically useful today and where defensive agents still need to improve. We present an interactive website with our results https://evals.frontier.security.

Coding-agent benchmarks have largely measured whether agents can produce functionally correct patches, but production software also demands measurable speedups on real execution targets. Performance optimization is a distinct agentic task: agents must profile executions, diagnose cross-layer bottlenecks, edit code without breaking correctness, and verify that gains are reproducible rather than measurement artifacts. We introduce PERFOPT-Bench, a benchmark for evaluating this full performance-engineering loop. Each task provides a correct but deliberately suboptimal codebase and asks the agent to improve a target performance metric; scoring requires hidden correctness tests, verified-speedup measurement, and trajectory-level audit. We evaluate 7 agent stacks with different LLMs and agent frameworks on 7 long-horizon optimization tasks. The results show that optimization performance is workload-dependent rather than determined by model identity alone: no single stack dominates, and changing the agent framework can materially change the same LLM's per-task speedup profile. We further find that raw speedup is unsafe as a benchmark score, since some large gains arise from benchmark-specific shortcut exploitation; an exploratory relay pilot suggests that restarting from an externalized optimization summary can recover additional headroom after an initial session stops. The benchmark and our evaluation are available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Dataset-D3CC.

Benchmarking multi-object tracking and object detection model performance is an essential step in machine learning model development, as it allows researchers to evaluate model detection and tracker performance on human-generated 'test' data, facilitating consistent comparisons between models and trackers and aiding performance optimization. In this study, a novel benchmark video dataset was developed and used to assess the performance of several Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute object detection models and a FathomNet single-class object detection model together with several trackers. The dataset consists of four video sequences representing midwater and benthic deep-sea habitats. Performance was evaluated using Higher Order Tracking Accuracy, a metric that balances detection, localization, and association accuracy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first publicly available benchmark for multi-object tracking in deep-sea video footage. We provide the benchmark data, a clearly documented workflow for generating additional benchmark videos, as well as example Python notebooks for computing metrics.

Benchmarks are essential for quantitatively tracking progress in AI. As AI agents become increasingly capable, researchers and practitioners have introduced agentic benchmarks to evaluate agents on complex, real-world tasks. These benchmarks typically measure agent capabilities by evaluating task outcomes via specific reward designs. However, we show that many agentic benchmarks have issues task setup or reward design. For example, SWE-bench Verified uses insufficient test cases, while TAU-bench counts empty responses as successful. Such issues can lead to under- or overestimation agents' performance by up to 100% in relative terms. To make agentic evaluation rigorous, we introduce the Agentic Benchmark Checklist (ABC), a set of guidelines that we synthesized from our benchmark-building experience, a survey of best practices, and previously reported issues. When applied to CVE-Bench, a benchmark with a particularly complex evaluation design, ABC reduces the performance overestimation by 33%.

LLMs are increasingly pervasive in the security environment, with limited measures of their effectiveness, which limits trust and usefulness to security practitioners. Here, we present an open-source evaluation framework and benchmark metrics for evaluating LLM-generated cybersecurity rules. The benchmark employs a holdout set-based methodology to measure the effectiveness of LLM-generated security rules in comparison to a human-generated corpus of rules. It provides three key metrics inspired by the way experts evaluate security rules, offering a realistic, multifaceted evaluation of the effectiveness of an LLM-based security rule generator. This methodology is illustrated using rules from Sublime Security's detection team and those written by Sublime Security's Automated Detection Engineer (ADE), with a thorough analysis of ADE's skills presented in the results section.

Tool-calling benchmarks are increasingly used to rank language-model agents, yet their scores are often treated as ground truth without validating the evaluators themselves. We present a systematic validity and reproducibility audit of four major tool-calling benchmark families: BFCL v4, τ2-Bench, LiveMCPBench, and MCP-Atlas. Across 496 expert-reviewed benchmark tasks, we find 92 evaluator-human disagreements, corresponding to an 18.5% misalignment rate. The failures are not isolated annotation mistakes: deterministic benchmarks exhibit brittle state matching, trajectory lock-in, incorrect ground truths, substring-based communication failures, and reward-basis misalignment, while LLM-judge benchmarks exhibit rubric drift, hallucinated completion, answer-only scoring, and substantial run-to-run variance. In LiveMCPBench, 23 repeated evaluations of the same setup produce scores ranging from 57.9% to 76.8%, a spread of 18.9 percentage points, large enough to change leaderboard conclusions. These results show that current tool-calling scores can reflect evaluator artifacts rather than agent capability. We introduce a unified taxonomy of tool-calling evaluation failures, release trace-level audit artifacts and corrected evaluation components, and argue for decomposed metrics that separately measure tool invocation, task completion, and outcome verification. Our findings suggest that progress in tool-using agents requires benchmarks whose evaluators are themselves reproducible, auditable, and aligned with human judgments of task success. We further introduce Tool-Veritas, a configurable benchmark that combines deterministic state verification with optional qualitative judging, and Harness Lab, an open-source system for benchmark execution, trace inspection, repeated-run comparison, and evaluator debugging.

Autonomous web agents such as OpenClaw are rapidly moving into high-impact real-world workflows, but their security robustness under live network threats remains insufficiently evaluated. Existing benchmarks mainly focus on static sandbox settings and content-level prompt attacks, which leaves a practical gap for network-layer security testing. In this paper, we present ClawTrap, a MITM-based red-teaming framework for real-world OpenClaw security evaluation. ClawTrap supports diverse and customizable attack forms, including Static HTML Replacement, Iframe Popup Injection, and Dynamic Content Modification, and provides a reproducible pipeline for rule-driven interception, transformation, and auditing. This design lays the foundation for future research to construct richer, customizable MITM attacks and to perform systematic security testing across agent frameworks and model backbones. Our empirical study shows clear model stratification: weaker models are more likely to trust tampered observations and produce unsafe outputs, while stronger models demonstrate better anomaly attribution and safer fallback strategies. These findings indicate that reliable OpenClaw security evaluation should explicitly incorporate dynamic real-world MITM conditions rather than relying only on static sandbox protocols.

We introduce AInsteinBench, a large-scale benchmark for evaluating whether large language model (LLM) agents can operate as scientific computing development agents within real research software ecosystems. Unlike existing scientific reasoning benchmarks which focus on conceptual knowledge, or software engineering benchmarks that emphasize generic feature implementation and issue resolving, AInsteinBench evaluates models in end-to-end scientific development settings grounded in production-grade scientific repositories. The benchmark consists of tasks derived from maintainer-authored pull requests across six widely used scientific codebases, spanning quantum chemistry, quantum computing, molecular dynamics, numerical relativity, fluid dynamics, and cheminformatics. All benchmark tasks are carefully curated through multi-stage filtering and expert review to ensure scientific challenge, adequate test coverage, and well-calibrated difficulty. By leveraging evaluation in executable environments, scientifically meaningful failure modes, and test-driven verification, AInsteinBench measures a model's ability to move beyond surface-level code generation toward the core competencies required for computational scientific research.

LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users. However, agents often acquire more sensitive information than the task requires. Existing privacy benchmarks audit what the agent's response or outgoing actions disclose, but overlook the acquisition stage where data first enters the agent's context. The over-acquired information is then one careless action or one attack away from an outright leak. To assess its prevalence, we introduce PrivacyPeek, a benchmark for evaluating acquisition-stage privacy leakage of LLM-based agents, with 1{,}182 cases across 7 acquisition behaviours and 16 application domains. Specifically, Acquisition Inspection examines the agent's tool-call trajectory, both the tools it invokes and the data it receives, to detect when it acquires sensitive information beyond the task scope. Probe Elicitation then issues a follow-up probe and measures how readily an attacker could elicit sensitive information the agent acquired but did not disclose. Our experiments on 10 LLM-based agents across 4 model families show that the unnecessary acquisition of sensitive information is widespread. In addition, we observe a correlation between the task-completion capability and acquisition-stage leakage. Prompt-level defences reduce only a small fraction of acquisition-stage leakage, leaving the majority unmitigated. These results make auditing acquisition-stage privacy both urgent and necessary. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Xuan269/PrivacyPeek-Resource.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has necessitated more robust evaluation methods that go beyond static benchmarks, which are increasingly prone to data saturation and leakage. In this paper, we propose a dynamic benchmarking framework for evaluating multilingual and multicultural capabilities through the social deduction game Spyfall. In our setup, models must engage in strategic dialogue to either identify a secret agent or avoid detection, utilizing culturally relevant locations or local foods. Our results show that our game-based rankings align closely with the Chatbot Arena. However, we find a significant performance gap in non-English contexts: models are generally less proficient when handling locally specific entities and often struggle with rule-following or strategic integrity in non-English languages. We demonstrate that this game-based approach provides a scalable, leakage-resistant, and culturally nuanced alternative to traditional NLP benchmarks. The game history can be accessed here https://huggingface.co/datasets/haryoaw/cultural-spyfall.

Training Data Detection (TDD) is a task aimed at determining whether a specific data instance is used to train a machine learning model. In the computer security literature, TDD is also referred to as Membership Inference Attack (MIA). Given its potential to assess the risks of training data breaches, ensure copyright authentication, and verify model unlearning, TDD has garnered significant attention in recent years, leading to the development of numerous methods. Despite these advancements, there is no comprehensive benchmark to thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of TDD methods. In this work, we introduce TDDBench, which consists of 13 datasets spanning three data modalities: image, tabular, and text. We benchmark 21 different TDD methods across four detection paradigms and evaluate their performance from five perspectives: average detection performance, best detection performance, memory consumption, and computational efficiency in both time and memory. With TDDBench, researchers can identify bottlenecks and areas for improvement in TDD algorithms, while practitioners can make informed trade-offs between effectiveness and efficiency when selecting TDD algorithms for specific use cases. Our large-scale benchmarking also reveals the generally unsatisfactory performance of TDD algorithms across different datasets. To enhance accessibility and reproducibility, we open-source TDDBench for the research community.

Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents show promising capabilities for automating computer-use tasks and facilitating accessibility, but existing interactive benchmarks are mostly English-only, covering web-use or Windows, Linux, and Android environments, but not macOS. macOS is a major OS with distinctive GUI patterns and exclusive applications. To bridge the gaps, we present macOSWorld, the first comprehensive benchmark for evaluating GUI agents on macOS. macOSWorld features 202 multilingual interactive tasks across 30 applications (28 macOS-exclusive), with task instructions and OS interfaces offered in 5 languages (English, Chinese, Arabic, Japanese, and Russian). As GUI agents are shown to be vulnerable to deception attacks, macOSWorld also includes a dedicated safety benchmarking subset. Our evaluation on six GUI agents reveals a dramatic gap: proprietary computer-use agents lead at above 30% success rate, while open-source lightweight research models lag at below 2%, highlighting the need for macOS domain adaptation. Multilingual benchmarks also expose common weaknesses, especially in Arabic, with a 27.5% average degradation compared to English. Results from safety benchmarking also highlight that deception attacks are more general and demand immediate attention. macOSWorld is available at https://github.com/showlab/macosworld.

The deployment of machine learning models in operational contexts represents a significant investment for any organisation. Consequently, the risk of these models being misappropriated by competitors needs to be addressed. In recent years, numerous proposals have been put forth to detect instances of model stealing. However, these proposals operate under implicit and disparate data and model access assumptions; as a consequence, it remains unclear how they can be effectively compared to one another. Our evaluation shows that a simple baseline that we introduce performs on par with existing state-of-the-art fingerprints, which, on the other hand, are much more complex. To uncover the reasons behind this intriguing result, this paper introduces a systematic approach to both the creation of model fingerprinting schemes and their evaluation benchmarks. By dividing model fingerprinting into three core components -- Query, Representation and Detection (QuRD) -- we are able to identify sim100 previously unexplored QuRD combinations and gain insights into their performance. Finally, we introduce a set of metrics to compare and guide the creation of more representative model stealing detection benchmarks. Our approach reveals the need for more challenging benchmarks and a sound comparison with baselines. To foster the creation of new fingerprinting schemes and benchmarks, we open-source our fingerprinting toolbox.

Agents based on large language models leverage tools to modify environments, revolutionizing how AI interacts with the physical world. Unlike traditional NLP tasks that rely solely on historical dialogue for responses, these agents must consider more complex factors, such as inter-tool relationships, environmental feedback and previous decisions, when making choices. Current research typically evaluates agents via multi-turn dialogues. However, it overlooks the influence of these critical factors on agent behavior. To bridge this gap, we present an open-source and high-quality benchmark C^3-Bench. This benchmark integrates attack concepts and applies univariate analysis to pinpoint key elements affecting agent robustness. In concrete, we design three challenges: navigate complex tool relationships, handle critical hidden information and manage dynamic decision paths. Complementing these challenges, we introduce fine-grained metrics, innovative data collection algorithms and reproducible evaluation methods. Extensive experiments are conducted on 49 mainstream agents, encompassing general fast-thinking, slow-thinking and domain-specific models. We observe that agents have significant shortcomings in handling tool dependencies, long context information dependencies and frequent policy-type switching. In essence, C^3-Bench aims to expose model vulnerabilities through these challenges and drive research into the interpretability of agent performance. The benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/TencentHunyuan/C3-Benchmark.

Existing works have established multiple benchmarks to highlight the security risks associated with Code GenAI. These risks are primarily reflected in two areas: a model potential to generate insecure code (insecure coding) and its utility in cyberattacks (cyberattack helpfulness). While these benchmarks have made significant strides, there remain opportunities for further improvement. For instance, many current benchmarks tend to focus more on a model ability to provide attack suggestions rather than its capacity to generate executable attacks. Additionally, most benchmarks rely heavily on static evaluation metrics, which may not be as precise as dynamic metrics such as passing test cases. Conversely, expert-verified benchmarks, while offering high-quality data, often operate at a smaller scale. To address these gaps, we develop SecCodePLT, a unified and comprehensive evaluation platform for code GenAIs' risks. For insecure code, we introduce a new methodology for data creation that combines experts with automatic generation. Our methodology ensures the data quality while enabling large-scale generation. We also associate samples with test cases to conduct code-related dynamic evaluation. For cyberattack helpfulness, we set up a real environment and construct samples to prompt a model to generate actual attacks, along with dynamic metrics in our environment. We conduct extensive experiments and show that SecCodePLT outperforms the state-of-the-art (SOTA) benchmark CyberSecEval in security relevance. Furthermore, it better identifies the security risks of SOTA models in insecure coding and cyberattack helpfulness. Finally, we apply SecCodePLT to the SOTA code agent, Cursor, and, for the first time, identify non-trivial security risks in this advanced coding agent.

Agent benchmarks should reflect what users actually ask deployed agents to do, yet existing benchmarks often miss key realism properties of real developer-agent sessions. We introduce RealClawBench, a live benchmark framework built from real OpenClaw sessions to capture the distribution, diversity, and real-world difficulty of deployed agent use. Real user requests are challenging to benchmark because they often depend on local execution environments, involve implicit or underspecified intent, and require nontrivial verification. RealClawBench addresses these challenges with two core mechanisms: reconstructed execution environments and deterministic verifiable scorers, which together convert real sessions into reproducible, automatically scored tasks. The resulting release contains 281 executable tasks sampled from a much larger real-session pool while preserving the source distribution, with maximum final-vs-source Jensen-Shannon divergence of 0.0448. Evaluating 14 contemporary models shows that the best system solves only 65.8% of tasks, revealing substantial headroom on realistic developer-agent workloads. By turning real deployed sessions into controlled evaluation instances, RealClawBench provides a practical path toward benchmarks that better measure agent capability in actual use. Code is available at:https://anonymous.4open.science/r/real-claw-bench-582B.

In recent years, many neural network (NN) verifiers have been developed to formally verify certain properties of neural networks such as robustness. Although many benchmarks have been constructed to evaluate the performance of NN verifiers, they typically lack a ground-truth for hard instances where no current verifier can verify and no counterexample can be found, which makes it difficult to check the soundness of a new verifier if it claims to verify hard instances which no other verifier can do. We propose to develop a soundness benchmark for NN verification. Our benchmark contains instances with deliberately inserted counterexamples while we also try to hide the counterexamples from regular adversarial attacks which can be used for finding counterexamples. We design a training method to produce neural networks with such hidden counterexamples. Our benchmark aims to be used for testing the soundness of NN verifiers and identifying falsely claimed verifiability when it is known that hidden counterexamples exist. We systematically construct our benchmark and generate instances across diverse model architectures, activation functions, input sizes, and perturbation radii. We demonstrate that our benchmark successfully identifies bugs in state-of-the-art NN verifiers, as well as synthetic bugs, providing a crucial step toward enhancing the reliability of testing NN verifiers. Our code is available at https://github.com/MVP-Harry/SoundnessBench and our benchmark is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/SoundnessBench/SoundnessBench.

Backdoor learning is an emerging and vital topic for studying deep neural networks' vulnerability (DNNs). Many pioneering backdoor attack and defense methods are being proposed, successively or concurrently, in the status of a rapid arms race. However, we find that the evaluations of new methods are often unthorough to verify their claims and accurate performance, mainly due to the rapid development, diverse settings, and the difficulties of implementation and reproducibility. Without thorough evaluations and comparisons, it is not easy to track the current progress and design the future development roadmap of the literature. To alleviate this dilemma, we build a comprehensive benchmark of backdoor learning called BackdoorBench. It consists of an extensible modular-based codebase (currently including implementations of 8 state-of-the-art (SOTA) attacks and 9 SOTA defense algorithms) and a standardized protocol of complete backdoor learning. We also provide comprehensive evaluations of every pair of 8 attacks against 9 defenses, with 5 poisoning ratios, based on 5 models and 4 datasets, thus 8,000 pairs of evaluations in total. We present abundant analysis from different perspectives about these 8,000 evaluations, studying the effects of different factors in backdoor learning. All codes and evaluations of BackdoorBench are publicly available at https://backdoorbench.github.io.

Recent advances in persistent personal-agent frameworks are making human-centered agent networks realistic deployment targets: each user can be served by an AI agent that acts on the user's behalf, maintains state, and communicates with other agents through social and task relations. In these networks, everyday tool use becomes multi-party owned-agent collaboration over personal workspaces, where files, records, tools, and policies are not directly visible across owners. Existing agent benchmarks study tool use and collaboration, but they do not provide an end-to-end sandbox for verifiable cross-user agent collaboration with realistic user digital workspaces or test how harmful actions can travel through the human-centered agent network. We introduce WeClawArena, an auditable benchmark and runtime sandbox for multi-party owned-agent collaboration over personal workspaces. WeClawArena targets collaborative tool-use tasks in which personal workspaces serve as both operational tools and personal constraints. The benchmark contains 124 base tasks across six cross-user task domains and expands them into 620 scenario variants, with one benign control and four attack-vector variants per base task. The sandbox records peer messages, tool calls, resource operations, governed decisions, and final workspace states. WeClawArena reports utility and attack success rate separately and audits attack success from bounded runtime evidence, supporting diagnosis of task breakdown, privacy leakage, poisoned evidence, and invalid authority paths.

Large reasoning models such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1 have achieved remarkable performance in the domain of reasoning. A key component of their training is the incorporation of verifiable rewards within reinforcement learning (RL). However, existing reward benchmarks do not evaluate reference-based reward systems, leaving researchers with limited understanding of the accuracy of verifiers used in RL. In this paper, we introduce two benchmarks, VerifyBench and VerifyBench-Hard, designed to assess the performance of reference-based reward systems. These benchmarks are constructed through meticulous data collection and curation, followed by careful human annotation to ensure high quality. Current models still show considerable room for improvement on both VerifyBench and VerifyBench-Hard, especially smaller-scale models. Furthermore, we conduct a thorough and comprehensive analysis of evaluation results, offering insights for understanding and developing reference-based reward systems. Our proposed benchmarks serve as effective tools for guiding the development of verifier accuracy and the reasoning capabilities of models trained via RL in reasoning tasks.

As large language models (LLMs) become high-privilege agents in risk-sensitive settings, they introduce systemic threats beyond hallucination, where minor compliance errors can cause critical data leaks. However, existing benchmarks focus on rule-based QA, lacking agentic execution modeling, overlooking compliance drift in adversarial interactions, and relying on binary safety metrics that fail to capture behavioral degradation. To bridge these gaps, we present CNFinBench, a comprehensive benchmark spanning 29 subtasks grounded in the triad of expertise, autonomy, and integrity. It assesses domain-specific capabilities through certified regulatory corpora and professional financial tasks, reconstructs end-to-end agent workflows from requirement parsing to tool verification, and simulates multi-turn adversarial attacks that induce behavioral compliance drift. To quantify safety degradation, we introduce the Harmful Instruction Compliance Score (HICS), a multi-dimensional safety metric that integrates risk-type-specific deductions, multi-turn consistency tracking, and severity-adjusted penalty scaling based on fine-grained violation triggers. Evaluations over 22 open-/closed-source models reveal: LLMs perform well in applied tasks yet lack robust rule understanding, suffer a 15.4-point drop single modules to full execution chains, and collapse rapidly in multi-turn attacks, with average violations surging by 172.3% in Round 2. CNFinBench is available at https://cnfinbench.opencompass.org.cn and https://github.com/VertiAIBench/CNFinBench.

CleverHans is a software library that provides standardized reference implementations of adversarial example construction techniques and adversarial training. The library may be used to develop more robust machine learning models and to provide standardized benchmarks of models' performance in the adversarial setting. Benchmarks constructed without a standardized implementation of adversarial example construction are not comparable to each other, because a good result may indicate a robust model or it may merely indicate a weak implementation of the adversarial example construction procedure. This technical report is structured as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of adversarial examples in machine learning and of the CleverHans software. Section 2 presents the core functionalities of the library: namely the attacks based on adversarial examples and defenses to improve the robustness of machine learning models to these attacks. Section 3 describes how to report benchmark results using the library. Section 4 describes the versioning system.

Evaluating AI agents within complex, interactive environments that mirror real-world challenges is critical for understanding their practical capabilities. While existing agent benchmarks effectively assess skills like tool use or performance on structured tasks, they often do not fully capture an agent's ability to operate autonomously in exploratory environments that demand sustained, self-directed reasoning over a long and growing context. To spur the development of agents capable of more robust intrinsic reasoning over long horizons, we introduce TextQuests, a benchmark based on the Infocom suite of interactive fiction games. These text-based adventures, which can take human players over 30 hours and require hundreds of precise actions to solve, serve as an effective proxy for evaluating AI agents on focused, stateful tasks. The benchmark is specifically designed to assess an LLM agent's capacity for self-contained problem-solving by precluding the use of external tools, thereby focusing on intrinsic long-context reasoning capabilities in an exploratory environment characterized by the need for trial-and-error learning and sustained problem-solving within a single interactive session. We release TextQuests at https://textquests.ai.

We introduce MSC-Bench, a large-scale benchmark for evaluating multi-hop, end-to-end tool orchestration by LLM agents in a hierarchical Model-Context Protocol (MCP) ecosystem. Existing benchmarks often evaluate tools in isolation, ignoring challenges such as functional overlap and cross-server orchestration, leading to overly optimistic assessments. MSC-Bench addresses these gaps by constructing ground truth through 'equal function sets', allowing objective metrics such as F1 score and reducing the dependency on LLM-as-a-judge evaluation. Organized as a five-level curriculum, it systematically tests agent capabilities from single-tool orchestration to complex cross-server planning, and robustness to out-of-scope requests. Experiments reveal that rigid hierarchies can hinder performance without co-designed strategies, and even state-of-the-art agents exhibit systemic weaknesses in robustness. MSC-Bench provides a diagnostic framework to expose these limitations and guide the development of more capable and efficient tool-using agents. The benchmark and resources are publicly available at https://github.com/snooow1029/MSC_Bench.

Analyzing Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) from large volumes of data is critical for drafting and publishing comprehensive CTI reports. This process usually follows a three-stage workflow -- triage, deep search and TI drafting. While Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a promising route toward automation, existing benchmarks still have limitations. These benchmarks often consist of tasks that do not reflect real-world analyst workflows. For example, human analysts rarely receive tasks in the form of multiple-choice questions. Also, existing benchmarks often rely on model-centric metrics that emphasize lexical overlap rather than actionable, detailed insights essential for security analysts. Moreover, they typically fail to cover the complete three-stage workflow. To address these issues, we introduce CyberThreat-Eval, which is collected from the daily CTI workflow of a world-leading company. This expert-annotated benchmark assesses LLMs on practical tasks across all three stages as mentioned above. It utilizes analyst-centric metrics that measure factual accuracy, content quality, and operational costs. Our evaluation using this benchmark reveals important insights into the limitations of current LLMs. For example, LLMs often lack the nuanced expertise required to handle complex details and struggle to distinguish between correct and incorrect information. To address these challenges, the CTI workflow incorporates both external ground-truth databases and human expert knowledge. TRA allows human experts to iteratively provide feedback for continuous improvement. The code is available at https://github.com/xschen-beb/CyberThreat-Eval{GitHub} and https://huggingface.co/datasets/xse/CyberThreat-Eval{HuggingFace}.

Language-model agents are increasingly used as persistent coworkers that assist users across multiple working days. During such workflows, the surrounding environment may change independently of the agent: new emails arrive, calendar entries shift, knowledge-base records are updated, and evidence appears across images, scanned PDFs, audio, video, and spreadsheets. Existing benchmarks do not adequately evaluate this setting because they typically run within a single static episode and remain largely text-centric. We introduce , a benchmark for coworker agents built around multi-turn multi-day tasks, a stateful sandboxed service environment whose state evolves between turns, and rule-based verification. The current release contains 100 tasks across 13 professional scenarios, executed against five stateful sandboxed services (filesystem, email, calendar, knowledge base, spreadsheet) and scored by 1537 deterministic Python checkers over post-execution service state; no LLM-as-judge is invoked during scoring. We benchmark seven frontier agent systems. The strongest model reaches 75.8 weighted score, but the best strict Task Success is only 20.0\%, indicating that partial progress is common while complete end-to-end workflow completion remains rare. Turn-level analysis shows that performance drops after the first exogenous environment update, highlighting adaptation to changing state as a key open challenge. We release the benchmark, evaluation harness, and construction pipeline to support reproducible coworker-agent evaluation.

We present an openly documented methodology for fine-tuning language models to detect temporal attack patterns in multi-agent AI workflows using OpenTelemetry trace analysis. We curate a dataset of 80,851 examples from 18 public cybersecurity sources and 35,026 synthetic OpenTelemetry traces. We apply iterative QLoRA fine-tuning on resource-constrained ARM64 hardware (NVIDIA DGX Spark) through three training iterations with strategic augmentation. Our custom benchmark accuracy improves from 42.86% to 74.29%, a statistically significant 31.4-point gain. Targeted examples addressing specific knowledge gaps outperform indiscriminate scaling. Key contributions include: (1) synthetic trace generation methodology for multi-agent coordination attacks and regulatory violations, (2) empirical evidence that training data composition fundamentally determines behavior, and (3) complete open release of datasets, training scripts, and evaluation benchmarks on HuggingFace. While practical deployment requires human oversight due to false positive rates, this work establishes the first reproducible framework enabling practitioners to build custom agentic security models adapted to their threat landscapes.

Recent autonomous penetration testing papers report high benchmark scores while adding multi-component security harnesses around frontier LLMs. Because these systems often change both architecture and backbone model, it is difficult to tell how much performance comes from the harness rather than from the underlying model. This paper presents a controlled study on the 104-task XBOW benchmark using default coding CLI agents as plain-agent baselines. We first run Codex, OpenCode, and Pi with the same GPT-5 model, budget, target interface, and scoring rule. This phase identifies the strongest same-model baseline and tests whether security-specific prompt variants improve its observed score. We then compare the default Codex scaffold with published MAPTA and PentestGPT V2 results under the closest available model matches. Finally, we repeat the plain-agent experiment with GPT-5.2 and GPT-5.5 to measure model scaling inside the same scaffold. The results show a mixed but practical picture. Specialised harnesses can add measurable benchmark lift and may improve cost efficiency, but plain coding agents already solve a large share of the benchmark; repeated plain-agent runs can match or exceed some published architecture scores in union coverage, and newer models substantially improve the same scaffold. Future evaluations should report model-matched plain-agent baselines before attributing benchmark gains to architecture design alone.

We introduce DRBench, a benchmark for evaluating AI agents on complex, open-ended deep research tasks in enterprise settings. Unlike prior benchmarks that focus on simple questions or web-only queries, DRBench evaluates agents on multi-step queries (for example, ``What changes should we make to our product roadmap to ensure compliance with this standard?") that require identifying supporting facts from both the public web and private company knowledge base. Each task is grounded in realistic user personas and enterprise context, spanning a heterogeneous search space that includes productivity software, cloud file systems, emails, chat conversations, and the open web. Tasks are generated through a carefully designed synthesis pipeline with human-in-the-loop verification, and agents are evaluated on their ability to recall relevant insights, maintain factual accuracy, and produce coherent, well-structured reports. We release 15 deep research tasks across 10 domains, such as Sales, Cybersecurity, and Compliance. We demonstrate the effectiveness of DRBench by evaluating diverse DR agents across open- and closed-source models (such as GPT, Llama, and Qwen) and DR strategies, highlighting their strengths, weaknesses, and the critical path for advancing enterprise deep research. Code is available at https://github.com/ServiceNow/drbench.

We introduce the first version of KWBench (Knowledge Work Bench), a benchmark for unprompted problem recognition in large language models: can an LLM identify a professional scenario before attempting to solve it. Existing frontier benchmarks have saturated, and most knowledge-work evaluations to date reduce to extraction or task completion against a specification. KWBench targets the step before that: recognizing the governing structure of the situation from raw inputs alone. The benchmark contains 223 tasks sourced from practitioners across acquisitions, contract negotiations, clinical pharmacy, organizational politics, fraud analysis, and incentive design. Each task encodes a formal game-theoretic pattern (principal-agent conflict, signaling, mechanism design failure, strategic omission, coalitional dynamics, strategic interdependence) and carries structured ground truth recording the expert reading of the situation and the anticipated failure modes. Models receive raw data and a task prompt with no indication of problem type. Scoring is a three-tier rubric gated by a mandatory conjunctive check. Mandatory criteria encode the predicted wrong paths. We evaluate 16 models. The best model passes on 27.9% of tasks. The top two models agree on only 31.7% of their passes. Among the top 8, 44 tasks are solved by exactly one model; routing across the top 8 covers 50.7% of the benchmark, nearly double the best single model. Conditional on passing, quality scores converge (approx 83% across models); unconditional scores do not. Same models articulate the relevant game-theoretic concept correctly when asked, then fail to apply it unprompted. We release KWBench to shift how frontier models are evaluated on knowledge work, scoring them on whether they recognize the right problem from the situation alone, not only on how well they execute once the problem has been framed for them.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly capable of autonomously conducting cyberattacks, posing significant threats to existing applications. This growing risk highlights the urgent need for a real-world benchmark to evaluate the ability of LLM agents to exploit web application vulnerabilities. However, existing benchmarks fall short as they are limited to abstracted Capture the Flag competitions or lack comprehensive coverage. Building a benchmark for real-world vulnerabilities involves both specialized expertise to reproduce exploits and a systematic approach to evaluating unpredictable threats. To address this challenge, we introduce CVE-Bench, a real-world cybersecurity benchmark based on critical-severity Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. In CVE-Bench, we design a sandbox framework that enables LLM agents to exploit vulnerable web applications in scenarios that mimic real-world conditions, while also providing effective evaluation of their exploits. Our evaluation shows that the state-of-the-art agent framework can resolve up to 13% of vulnerabilities.

Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking. We audit 1,968 tasks across five terminal-agent benchmarks and find 323 (16%) hackable by frontier models given only the task description. This corrupts both leaderboard rankings and RL training signal, yet the standard response is manual and reactive. We introduce the hacker-fixer loop, a method for building exploit-resistant verifiers without per-task manual patching. The loop alternates three LLM agents: a hacker tries to pass the verifier without solving the task, a fixer patches the verifier to reject each discovered exploit, and a solver confirms the patched verifier still admits legitimate solutions. The loop iterates: each patch reshapes what the verifier rewards, surfacing the next exploit. We further add verifier access, and let patches transfer across tasks, to broaden the exploits the loop discovers. On KernelBench, the loop drives the attack success rate from 62% to 0% on a held-out corpus of publicly reported exploits. We also find that weaker agents in the loop can defend against much stronger hackers: Gemini 3 Flash's loop drives the stronger Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7's attack success rate from 76% and 61% to 0% on KernelBench, and Gemini 3.1 Pro's from 39% to 17% on Terminal Bench across 77 tasks. We release Terminal Wrench (323 hackable environments, 3,632 hack trajectories) as a snapshot of the current attack surface, our patched verifiers, the exploits the loop discovered, and our implementation as a basis for future work.

Current benchmarks for computer-use agents evaluate models in impersonal environments. This leaves a gap between evaluation and deployment where personal assistants are expected to work across a user's whole digital life, including their context, historical data, and logged-in accounts. This gap is widest on web tasks, where live web evaluations cannot exercise sites that require logging in or personal information, the kind of site a real personal assistant has to drive. We introduce MyPCBench, which tests computer-use agents as personal assistants on a Linux desktop populated with 17 simulated real-world web applications and a full desktop stack, all seeded for one canonical persona, Michael Scott from The Office. We define 184 tasks in this environment, each inspired by a real request drawn from the OpenClaw community, and benchmark six closed and open-weight models with a uniform computer+bash tool surface. We find that the best model, Claude Opus 4.6, fully solves 55.4\% of the tasks, the only model above 50\%. Model failures cluster on tasks that span many applications and on long trajectories, where personalization stresses an assistant the most. We release the environment, task set, and agent harness at https://mypcbench.com.

Large language model (LLM) powered code agents are rapidly transforming software engineering by automating tasks such as testing, debugging, and repairing, yet the security risks of their generated code have become a critical concern. Existing benchmarks have offered valuable insights but remain insufficient: they often overlook the genuine context in which vulnerabilities were introduced or adopt narrow evaluation protocols that fail to capture either functional correctness or newly introduced vulnerabilities. We therefore introduce SecureAgentBench, a benchmark of 105 coding tasks designed to rigorously evaluate code agents' capabilities in secure code generation. Each task includes (i) realistic task settings that require multi-file edits in large repositories, (ii) aligned contexts based on real-world open-source vulnerabilities with precisely identified introduction points, and (iii) comprehensive evaluation that combines functionality testing, vulnerability checking through proof-of-concept exploits, and detection of newly introduced vulnerabilities using static analysis. We evaluate three representative agents (SWE-agent, OpenHands, and Aider) with three state-of-the-art LLMs (Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4.1, and DeepSeek-V3.1). Results show that (i) current agents struggle to produce secure code, as even the best-performing one, SWE-agent supported by DeepSeek-V3.1, achieves merely 15.2% correct-and-secure solutions, (ii) some agents produce functionally correct code but still introduce vulnerabilities, including new ones not previously recorded, and (iii) adding explicit security instructions for agents does not significantly improve secure coding, underscoring the need for further research. These findings establish SecureAgentBench as a rigorous benchmark for secure code generation and a step toward more reliable software development with LLMs.

Recent AI systems have achieved gold-medal-level performance on the International Mathematical Olympiad, demonstrating remarkable proficiency at competition-style problem solving. However, competition mathematics represents only a narrow slice of mathematical reasoning: problems are drawn from limited domains, require minimal advanced machinery, and can often reward insightful tricks over deep theoretical knowledge. We introduce , a private benchmark of 25 expert-curated problems designed to evaluate AI systems on research-level mathematics that goes far beyond the olympiad frontier. Problems are authored by Ivy League mathematics professors, graduate students, and PhD-holding IMO medalists, and routinely took their authors weeks to solve independently. Each problem undergoes double-blind verification by two independent domain experts who must solve the problem from scratch, and yields a unique, closed-form solution assessed by programmatic verifiers. We evaluate frontier models as unconstrained research agents, with full access to coding tools, search, and open-ended reasoning, using an unbiased statistical estimator computed over 100 independent runs per problem. Our results reveal that all frontier models currently score below 10\%, exposing a substantial gap between olympiad-level problem solving and genuine research-level mathematical reasoning. By keeping the benchmark fully private, we ensure that measured performance reflects authentic mathematical capability rather than memorization of training data.

We introduce DABstep, a novel benchmark for evaluating AI agents on realistic multi-step data analysis tasks. DABstep comprises over 450 real-world challenges derived from a financial analytics platform, requiring models to combine code-based data processing with contextual reasoning over heterogeneous documentation. Each task demands an iterative, multi-step problem-solving approach, testing capabilities in data manipulation, cross-referencing multiple sources, and precise result reporting. The benchmark provides a factoid-style answer format with automatic correctness checks for objective scoring at scale. We evaluate leading LLM-based agents, revealing a substantial performance gap: even the best agent achieves only 14.55% accuracy on the hardest tasks. We detail our benchmark's design, dataset composition, task formulation, evaluation protocol, report baseline results and analyze failure modes. DABstep is released with a public leaderboard and toolkit to accelerate research in autonomous data analysis.

LLM-based agents process external content, exposing them to prompt injection and multi-turn manipulation. Most safety benchmarks evaluate defenders against fixed attack pools collected before evaluation, single-turn or multi-turn. We present a 21-scenario benchmark for adaptive multi-round attacks against memoryless LLM defenders: an autonomous LLM attacker observes prior defender responses and pivots across rounds, while each defender response is evaluated as a fresh interaction. Holding the 21 scenarios, attackers, defenders, and structured-output scoring fixed, restricting scoring to the first attacker turn yields 0-1% attack success rate (ASR); allowing 15 rounds of adaptive attack yields 5.4-14.0%. Pooling three frontier attacker LLMs uncovers 1.4-2.2times as many unique successful attacks as the best single attacker, and the generated attacks have low cosine similarity (0.02-0.14) to attacks in existing benchmarks. Claude Opus 4.6 and GPT-5.4 are tied in aggregate (5.4% each; overlapping 95% CIs), but their weaknesses differ sharply: on one scenario Opus reaches 60% ASR (95% CI 36--80%) while GPT-5.4 and Gemini each stay at 7% (CI 1-30%; the gap is preserved in a higher-N replication). 13 of 21 scenarios distinguish at least one defender pair, yet rankings disagree across scenarios (Kendall's W = 0.19). We release the benchmark -- 21 evaluation scenarios, 10 public development scenarios, the orchestrator, baseline harnesses, and a multi-attacker CLI -- plus 945 transcripts from the 3times3 frontier matrix, an attack-replay dataset, and 18{,}422 gpt-oss-20b battles from an open competition's final scoring rounds.

How can we test AI performance? This question seems trivial, but it isn't. Standard benchmarks often have problems such as in-distribution and small-size test sets, oversimplified metrics, unfair comparisons, and short-term outcome pressure. As a consequence, good performance on standard benchmarks does not guarantee success in real-world scenarios. To address these problems, we present Touchstone, a large-scale collaborative segmentation benchmark of 9 types of abdominal organs. This benchmark is based on 5,195 training CT scans from 76 hospitals around the world and 5,903 testing CT scans from 11 additional hospitals. This diverse test set enhances the statistical significance of benchmark results and rigorously evaluates AI algorithms across various out-of-distribution scenarios. We invited 14 inventors of 19 AI algorithms to train their algorithms, while our team, as a third party, independently evaluated these algorithms on three test sets. In addition, we also evaluated pre-existing AI frameworks--which, differing from algorithms, are more flexible and can support different algorithms--including MONAI from NVIDIA, nnU-Net from DKFZ, and numerous other open-source frameworks. We are committed to expanding this benchmark to encourage more innovation of AI algorithms for the medical domain.

We adapt Microsoft's QuantumKatas -- a well-established quantum computing curriculum -- from Q# to Qiskit, the most widely-adopted quantum computing framework, and package it with an evaluation framework for systematic LLM assessment. The resulting benchmark comprises 350 tasks across 26 categories, spanning fundamental gates through advanced algorithms (Grover's, Simon's, Deutsch-Jozsa), error correction, key distribution, and quantum games. Each task includes a natural language prompt, canonical solution, and deterministic test verification via classical circuit simulation. By building on the QuantumKatas' proven pedagogical design rather than creating tasks from scratch, we inherit a principled difficulty progression and comprehensive concept coverage while contributing the framework adaptation, evaluation infrastructure, and empirical analysis. We evaluate 16 LLMs across 7 prompting configurations -- a total of 39,200 model runs -- to demonstrate the benchmark's utility. Three key findings emerge: (1) the benchmark effectively differentiates model capabilities, with best-configuration pass rates ranging from 32.3% to 83.1% and a 26.1 pp average gap between frontier and open-source models; (2) models perform well at implementing known algorithms (SimonsAlgorithm 82.1%, BasicGates 81.6%) but struggle with problem encoding (SolveSATWithGrover 34.4%, DistinguishUnitaries 40.0%); and (3) chain-of-thought prompting shows a modestly bimodal effect -- it is the best strategy for three models (two of them explicitly reasoning-tuned per vendor documentation) but degrades performance for the rest, leaving it mid-pack in aggregate (56.3% mean) behind few-shot-5 (57.8%). We release the benchmark, evaluation framework, and baseline results to support research on LLM capabilities in quantum computing.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly adopted in real-world security operations with access to host artifacts and command-line interfaces (CLIs), making it critical to thoroughly assess their security capabilities. However, existing cybersecurity benchmarks focus on pre-compromise settings where agents are placed in a clean and idealized environment before an attack occurs. This leaves the post-compromise setting underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce SecRespond, the first benchmark for evaluating LLM agents on the post-compromise incident-response workflow. Given a forensic disk snapshot of a compromised host together with the alerts, vulnerability scans, and baseline checks reported by a host security product, agents are required to produce forensic reports on intrusions, baseline risks, and vulnerability risks, together with a remediation plan. We instantiate this task across 10 cyber ranges, each constructed from a distinct compromised cloud host, spanning 4 entry-point types, 21 ATT&CK techniques, and 5 operating systems. We evaluate 23 frontier LLMs on the OpenCode agent harness. Experimental results show that although current agents can reliably uncover the problems exposed by alerts, they struggle to proactively investigate the disk for silent intrusions and to produce comprehensive, verified remediation plans, with no model achieving complete detection and remediation on any single range. This reveals a fundamental bottleneck in building agents for real-world incident response. The benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/Alibaba-NLP/qqr/tree/main/data/secrespond.

AI agents can increasingly handle the mechanical tasks of financial analysis: retrieving documents, calculating formulas, updating spreadsheets. The harder, more valuable challenge is reasoning through the open-ended questions that define expert Analyst work. Existing benchmarks do not capture this class of problem, and those that attempt to evaluate open-ended reasoning rely on model-judged outputs that introduce noise and circularity. We present Hedge-Bench 1.0: a benchmark of 102 actual, on-the-job tasks grounded in the explicit reasoning traces of professional hedge fund analysts working with relevant information sources. This approach enables deterministic grading against verified expert steps. Frontier models and agents score below 16\% on the benchmark. We publish the dataset and evaluation harness at github.com/Trata-Inc/trata-hedge-bench.

Forecasting has become a natural benchmark for reasoning under uncertainty. Yet existing evaluations of large language models remain limited to judgmental tasks in simple formats, such as binary or multiple-choice questions. In practice, however, forecasting spans a far broader scope. Across domains such as economics, public health, and social demographics, decisions hinge on numerical estimates over continuous quantities, a capability that current benchmarks do not capture. Evaluating such estimates requires a format that makes uncertainty explicit and testable. We propose prediction intervals as a natural and rigorous interface for this purpose. They demand scale awareness, internal consistency across confidence levels, and calibration over a continuum of outcomes, making them a more suitable evaluation format than point estimates for numerical forecasting. To assess this capability, we introduce a new benchmark QuantSightBench, and evaluate frontier models under multiple settings, assessing both empirical coverage and interval sharpness. Our results show that none of the 11 evaluated frontier and open-weight models achieves the 90\% coverage target, with the top performers Gemini 3.1 Pro (79.1\%), Grok 4 (76.4\%), and GPT-5.4 (75.3\%) all falling at least 10 percentage points short. Calibration degrades sharply at extreme magnitudes, revealing systematic overconfidence across all evaluated models.

Skills are becoming the capability layer through which LLM agents turn plans into actions, but their use introduces security risks such as data leakage, unauthorized operations, and tool misuse. Existing vetting usually evaluates each skill in isolation, while real agent tasks often invoke multiple skills in a shared execution context. This creates Skill Composition Risk (SCR): a skill that appears benign alone can become harmful when its outputs, trust signals, authorization cues, or side effects influence later invocations along an activated path. We introduce SCR-Bench to evaluate this risk in controlled, sandboxed skill environments. Rather than relying only on textual intent or surface behavior, SCR-Bench records downstream state changes and path-level outcomes across composed skill executions. It contains three sub-benchmarks: SCR-CapFlow for capability-flow composition, SCR-TrustLift for trust-transfer composition, and SCR-AuthBlur for authorization-confusion composition. Across SCR-Bench, composed paths expose risks that are largely absent under isolated evaluation. In SCR-CapFlow, attack success rate reaches 33.6 percent under composition, compared with near-zero isolated baselines. In SCR-TrustLift, attack success rate exceeds 96.5 percent on four of five backends. In SCR-AuthBlur, the risky-approval rate increases by 71.8 percent relative to the L0 isolated baseline under the L1 context setting. These results show that agent skill security should be assessed at the level of activated paths rather than isolated artifacts. SCR and SCR-Bench provide a foundation for path-aware risk evaluation and defense in LLM agent skill ecosystems. Benchmark: https://github.com/saint-viperx/SCR_Bench.

Existing agent benchmarks primarily test task completion, tool use, or skill utility, but do not isolate whether a runtime can convert evidence from its own runs into reusable skills that improve fresh executions after authoring overhead. We introduce EvoClawBench, a benchmark for this closed-loop skill-learning question on repeated, fixture-backed tasks. EvoClawBench compares direct execution without skills, PreSkill authoring before execution, and PostSkill summarization from first-run evidence followed by a fresh second execution. The suite contains 100 tasks and 502 sub-problems across coding, data, office, security, operations, and domain-document workflows, with support for multiple agent runtimes. Experiments with OpenClaw and nanobot under local execution show that direct baseline performance is strongly runtime-dependent: OpenClaw remains below 20% across models, while nanobot ranges from 56.45% to 96.13%. Self-authored skills have mixed effects. nanobot GPT-5.4 stays above 96% in all modes and MiniMax-M2.7 improves from 90.97% to 94.50% under PostSkill, but nanobot DeepSeek-V4-Pro drops from 77.77% to 4.80% with PreSkill and 0.99% with PostSkill. OpenClaw shows similarly non-monotonic behavior, with some skill runs near baseline and others collapsing. These results indicate that learning reusable skills from an agent's own runs is selective and cost-sensitive, rather than an automatic benefit of adding skill authoring to an agent loop.

We introduce AIRTBench, an AI red teaming benchmark for evaluating language models' ability to autonomously discover and exploit Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) security vulnerabilities. The benchmark consists of 70 realistic black-box capture-the-flag (CTF) challenges from the Crucible challenge environment on the Dreadnode platform, requiring models to write python code to interact with and compromise AI systems. Claude-3.7-Sonnet emerged as the clear leader, solving 43 challenges (61% of the total suite, 46.9% overall success rate), with Gemini-2.5-Pro following at 39 challenges (56%, 34.3% overall), GPT-4.5-Preview at 34 challenges (49%, 36.9% overall), and DeepSeek R1 at 29 challenges (41%, 26.9% overall). Our evaluations show frontier models excel at prompt injection attacks (averaging 49% success rates) but struggle with system exploitation and model inversion challenges (below 26%, even for the best performers). Frontier models are far outpacing open-source alternatives, with the best truly open-source model (Llama-4-17B) solving 7 challenges (10%, 1.0% overall), though demonstrating specialized capabilities on certain hard challenges. Compared to human security researchers, large language models (LLMs) solve challenges with remarkable efficiency completing in minutes what typically takes humans hours or days-with efficiency advantages of over 5,000x on hard challenges. Our contribution fills a critical gap in the evaluation landscape, providing the first comprehensive benchmark specifically designed to measure and track progress in autonomous AI red teaming capabilities.

Frontier model progress is often measured by academic benchmarks, which offer a limited view of performance in real-world professional contexts. Existing evaluations often fail to assess open-ended, economically consequential tasks in high-stakes domains like Legal and Finance, where practical returns are paramount. To address this, we introduce Professional Reasoning Bench (PRBench), a realistic, open-ended, and difficult benchmark of real-world problems in Finance and Law. We open-source its 1,100 expert-authored tasks and 19,356 expert-curated criteria, making it, to our knowledge, the largest public, rubric-based benchmark for both legal and finance domains. We recruit 182 qualified professionals, holding JDs, CFAs, or 6+ years of experience, who contributed tasks inspired by their actual workflows. This process yields significant diversity, with tasks spanning 114 countries and 47 US jurisdictions. Our expert-curated rubrics are validated through a rigorous quality pipeline, including independent expert validation. Subsequent evaluation of 20 leading models reveals substantial room for improvement, with top scores of only 0.39 (Finance) and 0.37 (Legal) on our Hard subsets. We further catalog associated economic impacts of the prompts and analyze performance using human-annotated rubric categories. Our analysis shows that models with similar overall scores can diverge significantly on specific capabilities. Common failure modes include inaccurate judgments, a lack of process transparency and incomplete reasoning, highlighting critical gaps in their reliability for professional adoption.

We identify a security-fidelity tradeoff in defending LLMs against indirect prompt injection: defenses resist injected instructions largely by suppressing untrusted text, which corrupts tasks that must preserve it, such as translation and document editing. Attack-success metrics cannot see this, because a model that ignores an injection and one that faithfully processes it as data score identically. We introduce SecFid, a benchmark built so that executing an injection, processing it as data, and ignoring it produce distinguishable outputs. This makes fidelity measurable and exposes a frontier: across 1,168 examples and 48 configurations, no model or defense achieves both objectives. The highest-fidelity model reaches 96.5% fidelity at 47.8% security, while the most secure defenses invert this, at 99.3% security but only 71.0%-73.9% fidelity. Even defenses with identical security differ in how they earn it: some repair hijacks into faithful processing, others simply suppress benign content. A decision-theoretic analysis shows why no fixed choice can be right everywhere: the correct behavior is not a property of the defense but of the deployment, set by its relative cost of a hijack versus a dropped span. Security alone therefore measures only half of robustness, and reporting it without fidelity hides the price at which it was bought.

Deep-Research agents, which integrate large language models (LLMs) with search tools, have shown success in improving the effectiveness of handling complex queries that require iterative search planning and reasoning over search results. Evaluations on current benchmarks like BrowseComp relies on black-box live web search APIs, have notable limitations in (1) fairness: dynamic and opaque web APIs hinder fair comparisons and reproducibility of deep research methods; (2) transparency: lack of control over the document corpus makes it difficult to isolate retriever contributions. In other words, the current evaluations may compare a complete deep research system at a given time, but they do not foster well-controlled experiments to provide insights into the capability of underlying deep research LLMs. To address these challenges, we introduce BrowseComp-Plus, a benchmark derived from BrowseComp, employing a fixed, carefully curated corpus. Each query in BrowseComp-Plus includes human-verified supporting documents and mined challenging negatives, enabling controlled experimentation. The benchmark is shown to be effective in distinguishing the performance of deep research systems. For instance, the open-source model Search-R1, when paired with the BM25 retriever, achieves 3.86% accuracy, whereas the GPT-5 achieves 55.9%. Integrating the GPT-5 with the Qwen3-Embedding-8B retriever further enhances its accuracy to 70.1% with fewer search calls. This benchmark allows comprehensive evaluation and disentangled analysis of deep research agents and retrieval methods, fostering insights into retrieval effectiveness, citation accuracy, and context engineering in Deep-Research system.

We introduce TFRBench, the first benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning capabilities of forecasting systems. Traditionally, time-series forecasting has been evaluated solely on numerical accuracy, treating foundation models as ``black boxes.'' Unlike existing benchmarks, TFRBench provides a protocol for evaluating the reasoning generated by forecasting systems--specifically their analysis of cross-channel dependencies, trends, and external events. To enable this, we propose a systematic multi-agent framework that utilizes an iterative verification loop to synthesize numerically grounded reasoning traces. Spanning ten datasets across five domains, our evaluation confirms that this reasoning is causally effective; useful for evaluation; and prompting LLMs with our generated traces significantly improves forecasting accuracy compared to direct numerical prediction (e.g., avg. sim40.2%to56.6%), validating the quality of our reasoning. Conversely, benchmarking experiments reveal that off-the-shelf LLMs consistently struggle with both reasoning (lower LLM-as-a-Judge scores) and numerical forecasting, frequently failing to capture domain-specific dynamics. TFRBench thus establishes a new standard for interpretable, reasoning-based evaluation in time-series forecasting. Our benchmark is available at: https://tfrbench.github.io

Training algorithms, broadly construed, are an essential part of every deep learning pipeline. Training algorithm improvements that speed up training across a wide variety of workloads (e.g., better update rules, tuning protocols, learning rate schedules, or data selection schemes) could save time, save computational resources, and lead to better, more accurate, models. Unfortunately, as a community, we are currently unable to reliably identify training algorithm improvements, or even determine the state-of-the-art training algorithm. In this work, using concrete experiments, we argue that real progress in speeding up training requires new benchmarks that resolve three basic challenges faced by empirical comparisons of training algorithms: (1) how to decide when training is complete and precisely measure training time, (2) how to handle the sensitivity of measurements to exact workload details, and (3) how to fairly compare algorithms that require hyperparameter tuning. In order to address these challenges, we introduce a new, competitive, time-to-result benchmark using multiple workloads running on fixed hardware, the AlgoPerf: Training Algorithms benchmark. Our benchmark includes a set of workload variants that make it possible to detect benchmark submissions that are more robust to workload changes than current widely-used methods. Finally, we evaluate baseline submissions constructed using various optimizers that represent current practice, as well as other optimizers that have recently received attention in the literature. These baseline results collectively demonstrate the feasibility of our benchmark, show that non-trivial gaps between methods exist, and set a provisional state-of-the-art for future benchmark submissions to try and surpass.

Multi-server MCP agents create an information-flow control problem: faithful tool composition can turn individually benign read/write permissions into cross-boundary credential propagation -- a structural side effect of workflow topology, not necessarily malicious model behavior. We present MCPHunt, to our knowledge the first controlled benchmark that isolates non-adversarial, verbatim credential propagation across multi-server MCP trust boundaries, with three methodological contributions: (1) canary-based taint tracking that reduces propagation detection to objective string matching; (2) an environment-controlled coverage design with risky, benign, and hard-negative conditions that validates pipeline soundness and controls for credential-format confounds; (3) CRS stratification that disentangles task-mandated propagation (faithful execution of verbatim-transfer instructions) from policy-violating propagation (credentials included despite the option to redact). Across 3,615 main-benchmark traces from 5 models spanning 147 tasks and 9 mechanism families, policy-violating propagation rates reach 11.5--41.3% across all models. This propagation is pathway-specific (25x cross-mechanism range) and concentrated in browser-mediated data flows; hard-negative controls provide evidence that production-format credentials are not necessary -- prompt-directed cross-boundary data flow is sufficient. A prompt-mitigation study across 3 models reduces policy-violating propagation by up to 97% while preserving 80.5% utility, but effectiveness varies with instruction-following capability -- suggesting that prompt-level defenses alone may not suffice. Code, traces, and labeling pipeline are released under MIT and CC BY 4.0.

Click-through rate (CTR) prediction is a critical task for many applications, as its accuracy has a direct impact on user experience and platform revenue. In recent years, CTR prediction has been widely studied in both academia and industry, resulting in a wide variety of CTR prediction models. Unfortunately, there is still a lack of standardized benchmarks and uniform evaluation protocols for CTR prediction research. This leads to non-reproducible or even inconsistent experimental results among existing studies, which largely limits the practical value and potential impact of their research. In this work, we aim to perform open benchmarking for CTR prediction and present a rigorous comparison of different models in a reproducible manner. To this end, we ran over 7,000 experiments for more than 12,000 GPU hours in total to re-evaluate 24 existing models on multiple datasets and settings. Surprisingly, our experiments show that with sufficient hyper-parameter search and model tuning, many deep models have smaller differences than expected. The results also reveal that making real progress on the modeling of CTR prediction is indeed a very challenging research task. We believe that our benchmarking work could not only allow researchers to gauge the effectiveness of new models conveniently but also make them fairly compare with the state of the arts. We have publicly released the benchmarking code, evaluation protocols, and hyper-parameter settings of our work to promote reproducible research in this field.

We introduce HackSynth, a novel Large Language Model (LLM)-based agent capable of autonomous penetration testing. HackSynth's dual-module architecture includes a Planner and a Summarizer, which enable it to generate commands and process feedback iteratively. To benchmark HackSynth, we propose two new Capture The Flag (CTF)-based benchmark sets utilizing the popular platforms PicoCTF and OverTheWire. These benchmarks include two hundred challenges across diverse domains and difficulties, providing a standardized framework for evaluating LLM-based penetration testing agents. Based on these benchmarks, extensive experiments are presented, analyzing the core parameters of HackSynth, including creativity (temperature and top-p) and token utilization. Multiple open source and proprietary LLMs were used to measure the agent's capabilities. The experiments show that the agent performed best with the GPT-4o model, better than what the GPT-4o's system card suggests. We also discuss the safety and predictability of HackSynth's actions. Our findings indicate the potential of LLM-based agents in advancing autonomous penetration testing and the importance of robust safeguards. HackSynth and the benchmarks are publicly available to foster research on autonomous cybersecurity solutions.

Frontier deep research agents (DRAs) plan a research task, synthesize across documents, and return a structured deliverable on demand. They are being deployed in enterprise workflows faster than they are being evaluated. Existing benchmarks measure factual recall, single-hop QA, or generic agentic skill, missing the multi-document, decision-grade work DRAs are deployed to produce. We introduce a benchmark targeting the structured analytical deliverables that fill a management consultant's typical week. We grade three frontier agents, namely Claude Opus 4.6 with web search, OpenAI o3-deep-research, and Google Gemini 3.1 Pro deep-research, on 42 SME-authored prompts. Each of the 126 responses is scored on two layers: deterministic ground-truth verifiers (mean 13.8 per task) and a five-criterion 0-3 SME rubric, composed into a Verifier-Rubric Score (VRS) on 0-100. Most prompts embed cognitive traps that penalize surface-pattern matching. Acceptance under our joint threshold (rubric mean >= 2.5 and verifier rate >= 80%) is uniformly low: Gemini 21.4%, o3 9.5%, Claude 9.5%. Mean VRS scores agree with published rubric-based benchmarks (our top 62.6 vs. APEX-v1 64.2, ProfBench 65.9, ResearchRubrics < 68%), validating the rubric construct. ACCEPT rates sit below APEX-Agents' MC-segment Pass@1 band (12.3-22.7%) on dedicated DR agents; our floor is three points lower despite the harness advantage, opened by stricter conjunctive grading and trap design. Each agent fails distinctively. Claude produces the deliverable most reliably (4.5x the others' rate on file-required tasks) but carries the highest fabrication signature. o3 has the cleanest reasoning average yet drops required sections and propagates arithmetic errors. Gemini is bimodal, with the highest acceptance rate alongside the most zero-scored rubric cells.

AI agents are increasingly asked to carry out work that spans minutes, hours, or longer. Yet the default model of agent behavior is continuous action: issuing tool calls, refreshing pages, searching for alternatives, or otherwise trying to force progress. This is the wrong approach for many long-running tasks, which are better served by a strategy of sustained attention. Instead, agents should monitor an environment, notice when an external event makes progress possible, then respond promptly without wasting resources while waiting. To measure progress on this class of tasks, we introduce SentinelBench, an open-source benchmark for time-evolving monitoring tasks. SentinelBench contains 100 tasks across 10 synthetic web environments, including email, calendars, finance, professional networking, and entertainment. Each environment exposes a live web interface and replays a scripted sequence of events, requiring agents to navigate and reason about web pages whose state shifts underfoot. SentinelBench measures task completion, reaction time, and resource use, exposing the tradeoff between responsiveness and cost. We report results across three models and two browser-agent harnesses, establishing performance baselines for future comparison and demonstrating how agent design choices can dramatically impact key metrics. Together, these results show that SentinelBench distinguishes meaningful differences in agent behavior.

Evaluating LLM agents on benchmarks like SWE-Bench and GAIA can be expensive, time-consuming, and requires complex infrastructure. A single evaluation can cost thousands of dollars and take days to complete. In contrast, non-agentic LLM benchmarks that test individual capabilities (e.g., reasoning, code generation) are fast and cheap to run. In this paper, we investigate whether performance on expensive agentic benchmarks can be accurately predicted by the performance on a small, carefully selected subset of atomic evaluation instances. We introduce PACE, a framework that constructs proxy benchmarks by selecting instances from existing non-agentic evaluations whose aggregate scores most reliably predict model performances on agentic benchmarks. Given a pool of candidate instances spanning atomic capabilities, PACE fits a regression that maps a model's scores on a compact subset of source instances to its score on the target agentic benchmark. The subset itself is curated by combining two complementary instance-selection strategies, target-relevance local selection and globally informative global selection. We apply PACE to the 4 target agentic benchmarks in this paper, which yields PACE-Bench, the concrete proxy benchmark that we evaluate in the paper. Experiments across 14 models, 4 agentic benchmarks, and 19 non-agentic benchmarks show that PACE-Bench predicts agentic scores with leave-one-out cross-validation (LOOCV) mean absolute error (MAE) under 4%, Spearman correlation above 0.80, and pairwise model-ranking accuracy around 85%, all at much less than 1% of the full agentic evaluation cost. We further analyze the selected proxy instances, revealing which skills each agentic benchmark uniquely demands. PACE enables practitioners to obtain reliable estimates of agentic performance during model development, selection, and routing, without the overhead of full agent evaluation.

Coding agents increasingly run inside organizations whose security controls (scoped credentials, restricted egress, read-only filesystems, non-root execution) constrain them like any other software. Existing benchmarks, however, evaluate agents almost exclusively in permissive sandboxes, so it is unknown how performance changes when policy is enforced. In this work, we evaluate 12 coding agents on Terminal-Bench 2.1 across nested security policy levels derived from common real-world enterprise restrictions. Hardening is never free but far from uniform: under the strictest policy, success losses reach 18.3 points and cost inflation 167.3\%, and the two axes disagree; the model that best preserves success is also the one that loses the most efficiency, so model choice is policy-dependent. Beyond aggregate scores, we characterize how agents behave when policy blocks their actions and decompose the failures hardening induces: runs grind into timeouts or wrong solutions rather than stopping early, in a mix that differs by model. To ground comparisons, we verify task solvability under the strictest policy, separating model failures from tasks the policy forecloses. We release Boundary-Bench, an open-source hardening plugin enabling policy-constrained evaluation of coding agents on Terminal-Bench and compatible benchmarks.

Data contamination hinders fair LLM evaluation by introducing test data into newer models' training sets. Existing studies solve this challenge by updating benchmarks with newly collected data. However, they fail to guarantee contamination-free evaluation as the newly collected data may contain pre-existing knowledge, and their benchmark updates rely on intensive human labor. To address these issues, we in this paper propose AntiLeak-Bench, an automated anti-leakage benchmarking framework. Instead of simply using newly collected data, we construct samples with explicitly new knowledge absent from LLMs' training sets, which thus ensures strictly contamination-free evaluation. We further design a fully automated workflow to build and update our benchmark without human labor. This significantly reduces the cost of benchmark maintenance to accommodate emerging LLMs. Through extensive experiments, we highlight that data contamination likely exists before LLMs' cutoff time and demonstrate AntiLeak-Bench effectively overcomes this challenge.

The Adversarial Humanities Benchmark (AHB) evaluates whether model safety refusals survive a shift away from familiar harmful prompt forms. Starting from harmful tasks drawn from MLCommons AILuminate, the benchmark rewrites the same objectives through humanities-style transformations while preserving intent. This extends literature on Adversarial Poetry and Adversarial Tales from single jailbreak operators to a broader benchmark family of stylistic obfuscation and goal concealment. In the benchmark results reported here, the original attacks record 3.84% attack success rate (ASR), while transformed methods range from 36.8% to 65.0%, yielding 55.75% overall ASR across 31 frontier models. Under a European Union AI Act Code-of-Practice-inspired systemic-risk lens, Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) is the highest bucket. Taken together, this lack of stylistic robustness suggests that current safety techniques suffer from weak generalization: deep understanding of 'non-maleficence' remains a central unresolved problem in frontier model safety.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that interact with stateful environments over multiple steps: gathering hidden information, composing tool calls, and committing state changes. We refer to this capability as multi-step tool use. Existing benchmarks have advanced tool-use agent evaluation, but often focus on isolated API calls, short trajectories, or settings that are difficult to scale or control. We introduce E-Bench, a fully synthetic benchmark with 323 state-changing tasks across three product domains: Honor of Kings, QQ Music, and Tencent Meeting. E-Bench decouples environment synthesis from task synthesis: graph-guided database filling builds reusable, orphan-free product environments, while generator-solver asymmetry creates tasks with both an information gap and a tool gap, requiring agents to discover hidden data and compose multiple tool calls before changing state. Outcomes are graded deterministically by database-state diffs. Since both environments and tasks are synthetic, E-Bench is controllable at the environment level and scalable at the task level. Benchmarking 11 cutting-edge LLMs shows that multi-step tool use remains challenging: Pass^3 stays below 60% for the strongest models, and even with code execution in the E-Bench-Code extension, reliability (Pass^3) remains below 70%.

Current coding-agent benchmarks usually pro- vide the full task specification upfront. Real research coding often does not: the intended system is progressively disclosed through in- teraction, requiring the agent to track durable design commitments across a long session. We introduce a benchmark for this setting and study faithfulne Ss Loss U nder eM ergent s Pecification (SLUMP), defined as the reduc- tion in final implementation faithfulness un- der emergent specification relative to a single- shot specification control. The benchmark con- tains 20 recent ML papers (10 ICML 2025, 10 NeurIPS 2025), 371 atomic verifiable compo- nents, and interaction scripts of approximately 60 coding requests that progressively disclose the target design without revealing the paper itself. Final repositories are scored with a five-level component-faithfulness rubric and accompanied by an exposure audit to verify that scored components are recoverable from the visible interaction. Evaluated on Claude Code and Codex, the single-shot specification control achieves higher overall implementation fidelity on 16/20 and 14/20 papers, respectively. Structural integration degrades under emergent specification on both platforms, while seman- tic faithfulness loss is substantial on Claude Code and small on Codex. As a mitigation case study, we introduce ProjectGuard, an exter- nal project-state layer for specification tracking. On Claude Code, ProjectGuard recovers 90% of the faithfulness gap, increases fully faith- ful components from 118 to 181, and reduces severe failures from 72 to 49. These results identify specification tracking as a distinct eval- uation target for long-horizon coding agents.

Benchmarks are essential for consistent evaluation and reproducibility. The integration of Artificial Intelligence into Software Engineering (AI4SE) has given rise to numerous benchmarks for tasks such as code generation and bug fixing. However, this surge presents challenges: (1) scattered benchmark knowledge across tasks, (2) difficulty in selecting relevant benchmarks, (3) the absence of a uniform standard for benchmark development, and (4) limitations of existing benchmarks. In this paper, we review 173 studies and identify 204 AI4SE benchmarks. We classify these benchmarks, analyze their limitations, and expose gaps in practices. Based on our review, we created BenchScout, a semantic search tool to find relevant benchmarks, using automated clustering of the contexts from associated studies. We conducted a user study with 22 participants to evaluate BenchScout's usability, effectiveness, and intuitiveness which resulted in average scores of 4.5, 4.0, and 4.1 out of 5. To advance benchmarking standards, we propose BenchFrame, a unified method to enhance benchmark quality. As a case study, we applied BenchFrame to the HumanEval benchmark and addressed its main limitations. This led to HumanEvalNext, featuring (1) corrected errors, (2) improved language conversion, (3) expanded test coverage, and (4) increased difficulty. We then evaluated ten state-of-the-art code language models on HumanEval, HumanEvalPlus, and HumanEvalNext. On HumanEvalNext, models showed a pass@1 score reduction of 31.22% and 19.94% compared to HumanEval and HumanEvalPlus, respectively.

The increasing deployment of large language models in security-sensitive domains necessitates rigorous evaluation of their resilience against adversarial prompt-based attacks. While previous benchmarks have focused on security evaluations with limited and predefined attack domains, such as cybersecurity attacks, they often lack a comprehensive assessment of intent-driven adversarial prompts and the consideration of real-life scenario-based multi-turn attacks. To address this gap, we present SecReEvalBench, the Security Resilience Evaluation Benchmark, which defines four novel metrics: Prompt Attack Resilience Score, Prompt Attack Refusal Logic Score, Chain-Based Attack Resilience Score and Chain-Based Attack Rejection Time Score. Moreover, SecReEvalBench employs six questioning sequences for model assessment: one-off attack, successive attack, successive reverse attack, alternative attack, sequential ascending attack with escalating threat levels and sequential descending attack with diminishing threat levels. In addition, we introduce a dataset customized for the benchmark, which incorporates both neutral and malicious prompts, categorised across seven security domains and sixteen attack techniques. In applying this benchmark, we systematically evaluate five state-of-the-art open-weighted large language models, Llama 3.1, Gemma 2, Mistral v0.3, DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen 3. Our findings offer critical insights into the strengths and weaknesses of modern large language models in defending against evolving adversarial threats. The SecReEvalBench dataset is publicly available at https://kaggle.com/datasets/5a7ee22cf9dab6c93b55a73f630f6c9b42e936351b0ae98fbae6ddaca7fe248d, which provides a groundwork for advancing research in large language model security.

Scientific AI agents increasingly retrieve evidence, reason across sources, and synthesize conclusions used in consequential decisions. Yet, their ability to do so in high-stakes domains such as health remains unclear. We introduce SciConBench, a large-scale live benchmark of 9.11K questions and expert-written conclusions from systematic reviews to evaluate open-domain scientific conclusion synthesis. The benchmark draws on an expert-validated automated evaluation pipeline that decomposes conclusions into atomic facts and measures correctness and comprehensiveness via factual precision and recall. To mitigate data leakage, we further introduce SciConHarness, a clean-room evaluation harness that equips agents with controlled web interaction to ensure valid measurement. Evaluating 8 frontier models and deep research agents, we find that factual quality remains low: under clean-room settings, the best agent achieves only a factual F1 of 0.337. Our clean-room setting consistently reduces performance relative to unconstrained evaluation, suggesting that leakage inflates estimates of models' true synthesis capabilities. Finally, we audit consumer-facing agents (e.g., Google AI Overview, OpenEvidence) and find they frequently generate incomplete and sometimes contradictory conclusions, even when the ground-truth answer is available. Overall, our results show that reliable synthesis of scientific conclusions remains an open challenge, and that clean-room evaluation is essential for assessing open-domain AI agents.

AI agents are rapidly gaining capabilities that could significantly reshape cybersecurity, making rigorous evaluation urgent. A critical capability is exploitation: turning a vulnerability, which is not yet an attack, into a concrete security impact, such as unauthorized file access or code execution. Exploitation is a particularly challenging task because it requires low-level program reasoning (e.g., about memory layout), runtime adaptation, and sustained progress over long horizons. Meanwhile, it is inherently dual-use, supporting defensive workflows while lowering the barrier for offense. Despite its importance and diagnostic value, exploitation remains under-evaluated. To address this gap, we introduce ExploitGym, a large-scale, diverse, realistic benchmark on the exploitation capabilities of AI agents. Given a program input that triggers a vulnerability, ExploitGym tasks agents with progressively extending it into a working exploit. The benchmark comprises 898 instances sourced from real-world vulnerabilities across three domains, including userspace programs, Google's V8 JavaScript engine, and the Linux kernel. We vary the security protections applied to each instance, isolating their impact on agent performance. All configurations are packaged in reproducible containerized environments. Our evaluation shows that while exploitation remains challenging, frontier models can successfully exploit a non-trivial fraction of vulnerabilities. For example, the strongest configurations are Anthropic's latest model Claude Mythos Preview and OpenAI's GPT-5.5, which produce working exploits for 157 and 120 instances, respectively. Notably, even with widely used defenses enabled, models retain non-trivial success rates. These results establish ExploitGym as an effective testbed for exploitation and highlight the growing cybersecurity risks posed by increasingly capable AI agents.

A critical yet frequently overlooked challenge in the field of deepfake detection is the lack of a standardized, unified, comprehensive benchmark. This issue leads to unfair performance comparisons and potentially misleading results. Specifically, there is a lack of uniformity in data processing pipelines, resulting in inconsistent data inputs for detection models. Additionally, there are noticeable differences in experimental settings, and evaluation strategies and metrics lack standardization. To fill this gap, we present the first comprehensive benchmark for deepfake detection, called DeepfakeBench, which offers three key contributions: 1) a unified data management system to ensure consistent input across all detectors, 2) an integrated framework for state-of-the-art methods implementation, and 3) standardized evaluation metrics and protocols to promote transparency and reproducibility. Featuring an extensible, modular-based codebase, DeepfakeBench contains 15 state-of-the-art detection methods, 9 deepfake datasets, a series of deepfake detection evaluation protocols and analysis tools, as well as comprehensive evaluations. Moreover, we provide new insights based on extensive analysis of these evaluations from various perspectives (e.g., data augmentations, backbones). We hope that our efforts could facilitate future research and foster innovation in this increasingly critical domain. All codes, evaluations, and analyses of our benchmark are publicly available at https://github.com/SCLBD/DeepfakeBench.

Current AI benchmarks evaluate agents on task execution within human-designed workflows. These evaluations fundamentally fail to measure a critical next-level capability: whether models can autonomously develop agent systems. We introduce the Meta-Agent Challenge (MAC), an evaluation framework designed to test the capacity of frontier models for autonomous agent development. Specifically, a code agent (the meta-agent) is given a sandboxed environment, an evaluation API, and a time limitation to iteratively program an agent artifact that maximizes performance on a held-out test set across five domains. To ensure evaluation integrity, this framework is secured by multi-layer defenses against reward hacking. Leveraging this framework, we demonstrate that meta-agents rarely match human-engineered baseline policies, and the few that do are dominated by proprietary frontier models. Moreover, the design process exhibits high variance, and high optimization pressure surfaces emergent adversarial behaviors like ground-truth exfiltration-highlighting critical deficits in both robustness and model alignment. Ultimately, MAC provides a rigorous, open-source benchmark for autonomous AI research and development, offering an empirical proxy for evaluating recursive self-improvement. Benchmark is publicly available at: https://github.com/ant-research/meta-agent-challenge.

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in code intelligence, yet systematically evaluating their code understanding and reasoning abilities remains challenging. Mainstream benchmarks such as HumanEval and MBPP primarily assess functional correctness, while reasoning benchmarks like CRUXEVAL are limited to single-function, low-complexity scenarios. As a result, advanced models achieve nearly saturated scores, limiting their discriminative power. To address this, we present STEPWISE-CODEX-Bench (SX-Bench), a novel benchmark designed for complex multi-function understanding and fine-grained execution reasoning. SX-Bench features tasks involving collaboration among multiple sub-functions (e.g., chained calls, nested loops), shifting evaluation towards overall control and data flow modeling. It defines "computation steps" as the minimal execution unit and requires models to predict the total number of steps in reasoning tasks, thereby assessing a model's in-depth understanding of dynamic execution beyond simple I/O matching. Evaluation on over 20 mainstream models (including 14 reasoning-enhanced models) demonstrates that SX-Bench is highly discriminative: even the state-of-the-art OpenAI-O3 achieves only 78.37 percent accuracy on Hard-Reasoning tasks, much lower than its saturated scores on previous benchmarks, thereby revealing bottlenecks in complex and fine-grained reasoning. We also release an automated pipeline combining program synthesis, symbolic execution, and LLM-aided validation for efficient benchmark generation and quality assurance. SX-Bench advances code evaluation from "single-function verification" to "multi-function dynamic reasoning," providing a key tool for the in-depth assessment of advanced code intelligence models.

Synthetic insider threat benchmarks face a consistency problem: corpora generated without an external factual constraint cannot rule out cross-artifact contradictions. The CERT dataset -- the field's canonical benchmark -- is also static, lacks cross-surface correlation scenarios, and predates the LLM era. We present OrgForge-IT, a verifiable synthetic benchmark in which a deterministic simulation engine maintains ground truth and language models generate only surface prose, making cross-artifact consistency an architectural guarantee. The corpus spans 51 simulated days, 2,904 telemetry records at a 96.4% noise rate, and four detection scenarios designed to defeat single-surface and single-day triage strategies across three threat classes and eight injectable behaviors. A ten-model leaderboard reveals several findings: (1) triage and verdict accuracy dissociate - eight models achieve identical triage F1=0.80 yet split between verdict F1=1.0 and 0.80; (2) baseline false-positive rate is a necessary companion to verdict F1, with models at identical verdict accuracy differing by two orders of magnitude on triage noise; (3) victim attribution in the vishing scenario separates tiers - Tier A models exonerate the compromised account holder while Tier B models detect the attack but misclassify the victim; (4) rigid multi-signal thresholds structurally exclude single-surface negligent insiders, demonstrating the necessity of parallel, threat-class-specific triage pipelines; and (5) agentic software-engineering training acts as a force multiplier for multi-day temporal correlation, but only when paired with frontier-level parameter scale. Finally, prompt sensitivity analysis reveals that unstructured prompts induce vocabulary hallucination, motivating a two-track scoring framework separating prompt adherence from reasoning capability. OrgForge-IT is open source under the MIT license.

As LLMs see wide adoption in software engineering, the reliable assessment of the correctness and security of LLM-generated code is crucial. Notably, prior work has demonstrated that security is often overlooked, exposing that LLMs are prone to generating code with security vulnerabilities. These insights were enabled by specialized benchmarks, crafted through significant manual effort by security experts. However, relying on manually-crafted benchmarks is insufficient in the long term, because benchmarks (i) naturally end up contaminating training data, (ii) must extend to new tasks to provide a more complete picture, and (iii) must increase in difficulty to challenge more capable LLMs. In this work, we address these challenges and present AutoBaxBuilder, a framework that generates tasks and tests for code security benchmarking from scratch. We introduce a robust pipeline with fine-grained plausibility checks, leveraging the code understanding capabilities of LLMs to construct functionality tests and end-to-end security-probing exploits. To confirm the quality of the generated benchmark, we conduct both a qualitative analysis and perform quantitative experiments, comparing it against tasks constructed by human experts. We use AutoBaxBuilder to construct entirely new tasks and release them to the public as AutoBaxBench, together with a thorough evaluation of the security capabilities of LLMs on these tasks. We find that a new task can be generated in under 2 hours, costing less than USD 10.

In computer networking, network traffic refers to the amount of data transmitted in the form of packets between internetworked computers or Cyber-Physical Systems. Monitoring and analyzing network traffic is crucial for ensuring the performance, security, and reliability of a network. However, a significant challenge in network traffic analysis is to process diverse data packets including both ciphertext and plaintext. While many methods have been adopted to analyze network traffic, they often rely on different datasets for performance evaluation. This inconsistency results in substantial manual data processing efforts and unfair comparisons. Moreover, some data processing methods may cause data leakage due to improper separation of training and testing data. To address these issues, we introduce the NetBench, a large-scale and comprehensive benchmark dataset for assessing machine learning models, especially foundation models, in both network traffic classification and generation tasks. NetBench is built upon seven publicly available datasets and encompasses a broad spectrum of 20 tasks, including 15 classification tasks and 5 generation tasks. Furthermore, we evaluate eight State-Of-The-Art (SOTA) classification models (including two foundation models) and two generative models using our benchmark. The results show that foundation models significantly outperform the traditional deep learning methods in traffic classification. We believe NetBench will facilitate fair comparisons among various approaches and advance the development of foundation models for network traffic. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/WM-JayLab/NetBench.

Enterprise agents increasingly operate inside workspaces: they read heterogeneous files, invoke tools, and deliver business artifacts. We introduce EnterpriseClawBench, an enterprise agent benchmark constructed from proprietary, real-world agent sessions. Starting from a large archive of workplace sessions, the EnterpriseClawBench produces 852 reproducible tasks, each paired with recovered fixtures, rewritten prompts, role classes, skill subclasses, hard rules, and semantic rubrics. Because the sessions contain internal enterprise content, we do not release the benchmark data; instead, our reusable contribution is the construction and evaluation protocol. On EnterpriseClawBench, the best configuration reaches only 0.663 (Codex with GPT-5.5). These results show that enterprise agent evaluation must report harness--model combinations, artifact delivery, visual quality, cost, runtime, and skill-transfer behavior, rather than collapsing performance into a single score. Code: https://github.com/FrontisAI/EnterpriseClawBench

Standardized benchmarks are crucial for the majority of computer vision applications. Although leaderboards and ranking tables should not be over-claimed, benchmarks often provide the most objective measure of performance and are therefore important guides for reseach. Recently, a new benchmark for Multiple Object Tracking, MOTChallenge, was launched with the goal of collecting existing and new data and creating a framework for the standardized evaluation of multiple object tracking methods. The first release of the benchmark focuses on multiple people tracking, since pedestrians are by far the most studied object in the tracking community. This paper accompanies a new release of the MOTChallenge benchmark. Unlike the initial release, all videos of MOT16 have been carefully annotated following a consistent protocol. Moreover, it not only offers a significant increase in the number of labeled boxes, but also provides multiple object classes beside pedestrians and the level of visibility for every single object of interest.

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

Various benchmarks have been proposed to assess the performance of large language models (LLMs) in different coding scenarios. We refer to them as code-related benchmarks. However, there are no systematic guidelines by which such a benchmark should be developed to ensure its quality, reliability, and reproducibility. We propose How2Bench, which is comprised of a 55- 55-criteria checklist as a set of guidelines to govern the development of code-related benchmarks comprehensively. Using HOW2BENCH, we profiled 274 benchmarks released within the past decade and found concerning issues. Nearly 70% of the benchmarks did not take measures for data quality assurance; over 10% did not even open source or only partially open source. Many highly cited benchmarks have loopholes, including duplicated samples, incorrect reference codes/tests/prompts, and unremoved sensitive/confidential information. Finally, we conducted a human study involving 49 participants, which revealed significant gaps in awareness of the importance of data quality, reproducibility, and transparency.

We present AgentLens, a production-assessed benchmark for interactive code agents. Most code-agent benchmarks reduce a run to a single bit -- did the task pass? -- but the people who actually use these agents experience the entire trajectory: how the agent follows instructions, uses its tools, verifies its own work, recovers from mistakes, and talks to them along the way. AgentLens evaluates that whole trajectory. It pairs formal verification, where an objective check exists, with LLM-written trajectory reviews and side-by-side comparisons, so that each run yields a readable explanation of why the score is what it is. This makes AgentLens useful for more than ranking models: we use it to diagnose model behavior, compare successive versions of our own agent, and catch product regressions in a nightly evaluation pipeline. We release the benchmark as open source at https://github.com/agent-lens/agent-lens-bench.

We introduce Agent2 RL-Bench, a compact diagnostic benchmark for evaluating agentic RL post-training, which tests whether LLM agents can autonomously design, implement, debug, and execute post-training pipelines that improve foundation models. RL post-training increasingly drives model alignment and specialization, yet existing benchmarks are largely static, rewarding supervised fine-tuning or script generation without assessing an agent's ability to close an interactive RL loop. Agent2 RL-Bench provides a unified agent-facing interface: each run starts from an isolated workspace containing a base model, task data, instructions, and a grading API, and agents must iterate within a fixed budget by training models and submitting artifacts for evaluation. The benchmark spans six tasks across three levels, from static rule-based training to judge-based optimization and closed-loop online RL with trajectory collection. Two diagnostic skills, namely runtime recording and post-hoc summarization, enable structured analysis of agent behavior, facilitating smooth and effective iteration of the benchmark's evaluation framework. Across five agent systems and six driver LLMs, agents show intelligent behavior but clear limitations: one RL-oriented run improves ALFWorld from 4.85 to 93.28 via SFT warm-up and GRPO with online rollouts, yet DeepSearchQA remains difficult, most successful routes rely on supervised pipelines, and interactive outcomes show large single-run differences across agent stacks. Overall, Agent2 RL-Bench shows that current agents can sometimes engineer online RL, but stable agent-driven RL post-training remains rare under fixed budgets. It also demonstrates that our benchmark provides a strong and effective evaluation framework for future research in this direction. Code is available at https://github.com/microsoft/RD-Agent/blob/main/rdagent/scenarios/rl/autorl_bench/README.md

We present our on-going effort of constructing a large-scale benchmark for face forgery detection. The first version of this benchmark, DeeperForensics-1.0, represents the largest face forgery detection dataset by far, with 60,000 videos constituted by a total of 17.6 million frames, 10 times larger than existing datasets of the same kind. Extensive real-world perturbations are applied to obtain a more challenging benchmark of larger scale and higher diversity. All source videos in DeeperForensics-1.0 are carefully collected, and fake videos are generated by a newly proposed end-to-end face swapping framework. The quality of generated videos outperforms those in existing datasets, validated by user studies. The benchmark features a hidden test set, which contains manipulated videos achieving high deceptive scores in human evaluations. We further contribute a comprehensive study that evaluates five representative detection baselines and make a thorough analysis of different settings.

Large language models achieve near-ceiling performance on code generation benchmarks, yet these results increasingly reflect memorization rather than genuine reasoning. We introduce EsoLang-Bench, a benchmark using five esoteric programming languages (Brainfuck, Befunge-98, Whitespace, Unlambda, and Shakespeare) that lack benchmark gaming incentives due to their economic irrationality for pre-training. These languages require the same computational primitives as mainstream programming but have 1,000-100,000x fewer public repositories than Python (based on GitHub search counts). We evaluate five frontier models across five prompting strategies and find a dramatic capability gap: models achieving 85-95% on standard benchmarks score only 0-11% on equivalent esoteric tasks, with 0% accuracy beyond the Easy tier. Few-shot learning and self-reflection fail to improve performance, suggesting these techniques exploit training priors rather than enabling genuine learning. EsoLang-Bench provides the first benchmark designed to mimic human learning by acquiring new languages through documentation, interpreter feedback, and iterative experimentation, measuring transferable reasoning skills resistant to data contamination.

Benchmarks for systems that are optimized against the evaluation signal measure something different from what they claim. We document this concretely in two GPU-kernel-optimization suites with held-out generalization gates: Metal-Sci (10 scientific-compute tasks) and Metal-ZK (12 zero-knowledge/cryptographic tasks), in which three frontier LLMs (Opus 4.7, Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.5) propose Metal kernels inside a (1{+}1) evolutionary loop with rich feedback. Although no model is prompted to act adversarially, the promoted winners repeatedly fingerprint the evaluation configuration: they branch on the identity of runtime parameters, tune the measured branch maximally, and leave the unmeasured branch slow or silently wrong. Across the pooled suites, 16/53 (30%) of in-distribution wins fail to transfer to held-out configurations. We give a four-mode taxonomy of these failures, from configuration fingerprints to gate leakage. We distill design guidance for measurement under strategic optimization: held-out probes retain validity only on non-enumerable axes; gates must measure held-out performance, not just correctness; and a transfer rate is interpretable only with per-failure mechanism grades: ours decomposes into gamed, overfit, and benign. Code and research artifacts: https://github.com/vicgalle/kernel-fingerprinting

The rapid progress in synthetic image generation and manipulation has now come to a point where it raises significant concerns for the implications towards society. At best, this leads to a loss of trust in digital content, but could potentially cause further harm by spreading false information or fake news. This paper examines the realism of state-of-the-art image manipulations, and how difficult it is to detect them, either automatically or by humans. To standardize the evaluation of detection methods, we propose an automated benchmark for facial manipulation detection. In particular, the benchmark is based on DeepFakes, Face2Face, FaceSwap and NeuralTextures as prominent representatives for facial manipulations at random compression level and size. The benchmark is publicly available and contains a hidden test set as well as a database of over 1.8 million manipulated images. This dataset is over an order of magnitude larger than comparable, publicly available, forgery datasets. Based on this data, we performed a thorough analysis of data-driven forgery detectors. We show that the use of additional domainspecific knowledge improves forgery detection to unprecedented accuracy, even in the presence of strong compression, and clearly outperforms human observers.

Time series forecasting is critical across finance, healthcare, and cloud computing, yet progress is constrained by a fundamental bottleneck: the scarcity of large-scale, high-quality benchmarks. To address this gap, we introduce QuitoBench, a regime-balanced benchmark for time series forecasting with coverage across eight trendtimesseasonalitytimesforecastability (TSF) regimes, designed to capture forecasting-relevant properties rather than application-defined domain labels. The benchmark is built upon Quito, a billion-scale time series corpus of application traffic from Alipay spanning nine business domains. Benchmarking 10 models from deep learning, foundation models, and statistical baselines across 232,200 evaluation instances, we report four key findings: (i) a context-length crossover where deep learning models lead at short context (L=96) but foundation models dominate at long context (L ge 576); (ii) forecastability is the dominant difficulty driver, producing a 3.64 times MAE gap across regimes; (iii) deep learning models match or surpass foundation models at 59 times fewer parameters; and (iv) scaling the amount of training data provides substantially greater benefit than scaling model size for both model families. These findings are validated by strong cross-benchmark and cross-metric consistency. Our open-source release enables reproducible, regime-aware evaluation for time series forecasting research.

Ensuring safe and effective use of AI requires understanding and anticipating its performance on novel tasks, from advanced scientific challenges to transformed workplace activities. So far, benchmarking has guided progress in AI, but it has offered limited explanatory and predictive power for general-purpose AI systems, given the low transferability across diverse tasks. In this paper, we introduce general scales for AI evaluation that can explain what common AI benchmarks really measure, extract ability profiles of AI systems, and predict their performance for new task instances, in- and out-of-distribution. Our fully-automated methodology builds on 18 newly-crafted rubrics that place instance demands on general scales that do not saturate. Illustrated for 15 large language models and 63 tasks, high explanatory power is unleashed from inspecting the demand and ability profiles, bringing insights on the sensitivity and specificity exhibited by different benchmarks, and how knowledge, metacognition and reasoning are affected by model size, chain-of-thought and distillation. Surprisingly, high predictive power at the instance level becomes possible using these demand levels, providing superior estimates over black-box baseline predictors based on embeddings or finetuning, especially in out-of-distribution settings (new tasks and new benchmarks). The scales, rubrics, battery, techniques and results presented here represent a major step for AI evaluation, underpinning the reliable deployment of AI in the years ahead. (Collaborative platform: https://kinds-of-intelligence-cfi.github.io/ADELE.)

Standardized benchmarks have been crucial in pushing the performance of computer vision algorithms, especially since the advent of deep learning. Although leaderboards should not be over-claimed, they often provide the most objective measure of performance and are therefore important guides for research. We present MOTChallenge, a benchmark for single-camera Multiple Object Tracking (MOT) launched in late 2014, to collect existing and new data, and create a framework for the standardized evaluation of multiple object tracking methods. The benchmark is focused on multiple people tracking, since pedestrians are by far the most studied object in the tracking community, with applications ranging from robot navigation to self-driving cars. This paper collects the first three releases of the benchmark: (i) MOT15, along with numerous state-of-the-art results that were submitted in the last years, (ii) MOT16, which contains new challenging videos, and (iii) MOT17, that extends MOT16 sequences with more precise labels and evaluates tracking performance on three different object detectors. The second and third release not only offers a significant increase in the number of labeled boxes but also provide labels for multiple object classes beside pedestrians, as well as the level of visibility for every single object of interest. We finally provide a categorization of state-of-the-art trackers and a broad error analysis. This will help newcomers understand the related work and research trends in the MOT community, and hopefully shed some light on potential future research directions.

Agent skills occupy a privileged position in the agent workflow, as agents are expected to implicitly follow and execute them, rendering third-party skills a vulnerable attack surface. Existing studies have revealed unsafe agent behaviors induced by skill-based attacks, but they primarily evaluate poisoned skills within a single task execution and enumerate harms through ad-hoc risk lists. To bridge these gaps, we introduce SkillHarm, a benchmark of skill-based attacks across the skill-use lifecycle, paired with a systematic taxonomy of skill-relevant risks. SkillHarm evaluates two attack scenarios: Fixed-Payload Poisoning (FPP), where a fixed poisoned skill package directly compromises any task session that invokes it, and Self-Mutating Poisoning (SMP), where an initially benign execution silently mutates persistent skill content, deferring harm until a subsequent reuse. It further defines 12 risk types based on the agent workflow component targeted by the harm: data pipelines, system environments, and agent autonomy. To instantiate these attacks at scale, we build AutoSkillHarm, an automated construction pipeline with coding agents driven by natural-language harnesses. The resulting benchmark contains 879 attack samples across 71 skills. Experiments show that current agents remain vulnerable with attack success rates up to 86.3% in FPP and 69.3% in SMP. Our analysis further reveals a latent risk: many apparent attack failures stem from the agent failing to engage with the poisoned file rather than genuine resistance, and current defenses still fail to reliably mitigate the threat.

As LLM agents take on offensive security work, a single out-of-scope tool call can breach a client's engagement boundary, disrupt production, or void a bug-bounty finding. Unlike a fixed safety policy, the boundary that matters is declared in the user's request and must be inferred from intent. That challenge is sharpened by the adversarial nature of offensive security: the same tool call is in or out of scope depending not on the action itself but on the target it touches and the context in which it runs, which no fixed policy can enumerate in advance. We study pre-execution gating: a cheap, trusted LLM judge inspects each call proposed by a strong, swappable agent, and accepts or rejects it before it runs. We introduce ScopeJudge, a benchmark of 4,897 tool calls (7.7% scope violations) from agent trajectories on tasks engineered to tempt agents out of scope and labeled at the call level by professional penetration testers, with substantial inter-grader agreement (Fleiss kappa = 0.64) that sets an expert agreement reference point of F1 = 0.78. We evaluate eight judge models under five transcript strategies, varying how much context the judge sees, from the static policy alone to the full raw transcript, and chart the resulting cost-accuracy Pareto frontier. We find that a static policy is structurally insufficient for scope enforcement: blind to the user's request, judge recall collapses to near zero, confirming that scope lives in the request and that request-conditioned monitoring is necessary. Because a missed violation costs more than a spurious rejection, we report precision, recall, and F1 separately and recommend two operating points: a cost-sensitive configuration and a recall-first one for high-stakes deployments. We release the ScopeJudge dataset to support real-time monitoring and scalable oversight of autonomous security agents.

Existing benchmarks for hardware design primarily evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) on isolated, component-level tasks such as generating HDL modules from specifications, leaving repository-scale evaluation unaddressed. We introduce HWE-Bench, the first large-scale, repository-level benchmark for evaluating LLM agents on real-world hardware bug repair tasks. HWE-Bench comprises 417 task instances derived from real historical bug-fix pull requests across six major open-source projects spanning both Verilog/SystemVerilog and Chisel, covering RISC-V cores, SoCs, and security roots-of-trust. Each task is grounded in a fully containerized environment where the agent must resolve a real bug report, with correctness validated through the project's native simulation and regression flows. The benchmark is built through a largely automated pipeline that enables efficient expansion to new repositories. We evaluate seven LLMs with four agent frameworks and find that the best agent resolves 70.7% of tasks overall, with performance exceeding 90% on smaller cores but dropping below 65% on complex SoC-level projects. We observe larger performance gaps across models than commonly reported on software benchmarks, and difficulty is driven by project scope and bug-type distribution rather than code size alone. Our failure analysis traces agent failures to three stages of the debugging process: fault localization, hardware-semantic reasoning, and cross-artifact coordination across RTL, configuration, and verification components, providing concrete directions for developing more capable hardware-aware agents.

Repository-level performance-optimization benchmarks such as GSO, SWE-Perf and SWE-fficiency evaluate coding agents by applying patches to real repositories and comparing runtime against unoptimized baselines and official reference patches. Their leaderboard scores are increasingly used as evidence of coding-agent progress, but those scores can conflate runtime instability, benchmark-specific scoring rules, and how many tasks are already solved by at least one public submission. We audit these issues across the three benchmarks. First, we replay the official reference patches for 740 code optimization tasks across four common types of Google Cloud machines. Most benchmark tasks can be replayed, but their reference patches satisfy the original benchmark validity rules in every cross-machine replay for only 39/102 GSO tasks, 11/140 SWE-Perf tasks, and 411/498 SWE-fficiency tasks; SWE-Perf is especially fragile because many reference patches produce close-to-zero runtime changes. Second, we show that public submission rankings depend strongly on the benchmark scoring rule. Among eight public submissions shared by GSO and SWE-fficiency, the official rankings disagree on 9 of 28 pairwise submission comparisons, and SWE-fficiency's leaderboard scoring rule assigns the worst ten tasks overly high score weights of 58.5%-82.8%. Third, looking across 10 public submissions for each task, we find that at least one submission matches or beats the reference patch on 85.3% (384/450) of replay-valid GSO and SWE-fficiency tasks, and beats the unoptimized base code on 99.8% (449/450). Our study complements leaderboard scores by identifying tasks with more reliable performance signals, quantifying per-task score contributions, and exposing the remaining performance gaps that are hidden by aggregate rankings.

Differential privacy (DP) has a wide range of applications for protecting data privacy, but designing and verifying DP algorithms requires expert-level reasoning, creating a high barrier for non-expert practitioners. Prior works either rely on specialized verification languages that demand substantial domain expertise or remain semi-automated and require human-in-the-loop guidance. In this work, we investigate whether large language models (LLMs) can automate DP reasoning. We introduce DPrivBench, a benchmark in which each instance asks whether a function or algorithm satisfies a stated DP guarantee under specified assumptions. The benchmark is carefully designed to cover a broad range of DP topics, span diverse difficulty levels, and resist shortcut reasoning through trivial pattern matching. Experiments show that while the strongest models handle textbook mechanisms well, all models struggle with advanced algorithms, revealing substantial gaps in current DP reasoning capabilities. Through further analytic study and failure-mode analysis, we identify several promising directions for improving automated DP reasoning. Our benchmark provides a solid foundation for developing and evaluating such methods, and complements existing benchmarks for mathematical reasoning.

In Machine Learning, a benchmark refers to an ensemble of datasets associated with one or multiple metrics together with a way to aggregate different systems performances. They are instrumental in (i) assessing the progress of new methods along different axes and (ii) selecting the best systems for practical use. This is particularly the case for NLP with the development of large pre-trained models (e.g. GPT, BERT) that are expected to generalize well on a variety of tasks. While the community mainly focused on developing new datasets and metrics, there has been little interest in the aggregation procedure, which is often reduced to a simple average over various performance measures. However, this procedure can be problematic when the metrics are on a different scale, which may lead to spurious conclusions. This paper proposes a new procedure to rank systems based on their performance across different tasks. Motivated by the social choice theory, the final system ordering is obtained through aggregating the rankings induced by each task and is theoretically grounded. We conduct extensive numerical experiments (on over 270k scores) to assess the soundness of our approach both on synthetic and real scores (e.g. GLUE, EXTREM, SEVAL, TAC, FLICKR). In particular, we show that our method yields different conclusions on state-of-the-art systems than the mean-aggregation procedure while being both more reliable and robust.

Large language models (LLMs) now support automated software security tasks, including vulnerability discovery and proof-of-concept (PoC) generation. Existing benchmarks do not faithfully evaluate LLMs in real-world bug hunting scenarios because they rely on fuzzing harnesses, target-specific descriptions, or vulnerability-reproduction tasks. We present SEC-bench Pro, a benchmark for measuring agent bug hunting on critical, high-complexity software systems. This work discloses reports with concrete PoC inputs and links fixes into reproducible tasks through a three-phase pipeline for vulnerability collection, environment reconstruction, and oracle-based validation. We instantiate SEC-bench Pro with 183 validated vulnerabilities across V8 and SpiderMonkey, including a V8 subset with more than $1.5 million in cumulative Google Vulnerability Reward Program awards. These instances span memory-safety, sandbox, JIT, and race-condition bugs under browser-grade and runtime-grade execution conditions. Our evaluation shows that coding agents with frontier models remain below 40% success on both evaluated engines. The open-weight Kimi-K2.6 baseline reaches 11.7% on V8, while the strongest frontier configuration reaches 32.0% on V8 and 38.8% on SpiderMonkey. ClaudeCode and Codex solve complementary instance sets, and their two-agent union reaches 37.9% on V8 and 48.8% on SpiderMonkey. SEC-bench Pro provides robust environments for assessing LLM-based security agents and exposes limitations in long-horizon bug hunting tasks.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate productivity tasks (e.g., email, scheduling, document management), but evaluating them on live services is risky due to potentially irreversible changes. Existing benchmarks rely on simplified environments and fail to capture realistic, stateful, multi-service workflows. We introduce ClawsBench, a benchmark for evaluating and improving LLM agents in realistic productivity settings. It includes five high-fidelity mock services (Gmail, Slack, Google Calendar, Google Docs, Google Drive) with full state management and deterministic snapshot/restore, along with 44 structured tasks covering single-service, cross-service, and safety-critical scenarios. We decompose agent scaffolding into two independent levers (domain skills that inject API knowledge via progressive disclosure, and a meta prompt that coordinates behavior across services) and vary both to measure their separate and combined effects. Experiments across 6 models, 4 agent harnesses, and 33 conditions show that with full scaffolding, agents achieve task success rates of 39-64% but exhibit unsafe action rates of 7-33%. On OpenClaw, the top five models fall within a 10 percentage-point band on task success (53-63%), with unsafe action rates from 7% to 23% and no consistent ordering between the two metrics. We identify eight recurring patterns of unsafe behavior, including multi-step sandbox escalation and silent contract modification.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly expected to assist users in completing tasks. However, existing benchmarks provide limited support for evaluating whether agents can carry out office-suite workflows at a reasonable cost. We introduce OmegaUse-OfficeVal, a benchmark for evaluating LLM agents on long-horizon office-suite tasks with task-level economic grounding. The benchmark comprises 100 tasks derived from office-suite requests proposed by practitioners and adapted through a privacy-preserving process. On average, these tasks require 2.32 hours of human labor to complete. An important feature of the benchmark is that each task is paired with two economic signals: human labor time and task price proxy. These signals enable direct comparisons between human costs and LLM inference costs, as well as value-weighted evaluation. To support stable evaluation, we develop code-based verifiers from fine-grained rubrics. We evaluate several frontier LLMs together with a human baseline. Although all evaluated LLMs are substantially cheaper and faster than human workers, they have not yet approached human-level deliverable quality. The code and dataset are fully open-sourced, and more information is available on our project website: https://omegause-officeval.github.io.

Deep research benchmarks require expert-level tasks and reliable evaluation grounded in task-specific knowledge. Existing benchmarks rely heavily on expert authoring or pre-existing human-authored materials, while fully automatic construction struggles to ensure consistent and traceable verification. To address this gap, we introduce a verifiable benchmark of 500 deep research tasks spanning 31 topics and 10 major categories, with three query forms designed to probe complementary capabilities required for deep research. The benchmark is constructed automatically using an iterative Explorer-Formalizer-Challenger pipeline that progressively transforms simple questions into deep research tasks. Each task is represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of atomic steps and associated checkpoints, enabling the query, DAG, and rubrics to evolve together in a controlled manner. Experiments demonstrate that the benchmark clearly discriminates among models and query types, while its fact-grounded pointwise rubrics enable fine-grained, human-aligned, and stable evaluation. Our data, implementation, and results are publicly available.

Agent benchmarks are growing fast, but no single benchmark touches more than four or five of the dimensions that deployment exposes. This paper aggregates the largest coordinated deep-dive of one MCP-based industrial-agent benchmark to date: fourteen parallel implementation studies covering new asset classes (including a multi-modal visual extension), alternative orchestrations, retrieval strategies, reasoning modes, infrastructure optimizations, and evaluation-methodology probes. Consolidating those studies with seven prior agent benchmarks, we argue that aggregate-score leaderboards systematically underspecify deployed-agent evaluation. Rankings derived from aggregate scores do not transfer to out-of-distribution settings; recent public-to-hidden competition retrospectives provide direct empirical evidence of this rank instability. We propose ranking configurations by predictive validity, the correlation between in-sample and out-of-sample rank, rather than in-sample mean, and report a twelve-tier measurement apparatus that exposes the deployment-relevant dimensions HELM and its agent-era successors collapse. The position is operationalized through three falsifiable out-of-distribution criteria with explicit thresholds; existing evidence partly supports it but is too thin to confirm. We close with a pre-registered pilot design and a field-level vision for what the next generation of agentic benchmarks should report.

Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) involves analyzing digital evidence to support legal investigations. Large Language Models (LLMs) offer new opportunities in DFIR tasks such as log analysis and memory forensics, but their susceptibility to errors and hallucinations raises concerns in high-stakes contexts. Despite growing interest, there is no comprehensive benchmark to evaluate LLMs across both theoretical and practical DFIR domains. To address this gap, we present DFIR-Metric, a benchmark with three components: (1) Knowledge Assessment: a set of 700 expert-reviewed multiple-choice questions sourced from industry-standard certifications and official documentation; (2) Realistic Forensic Challenges: 150 CTF-style tasks testing multi-step reasoning and evidence correlation; and (3) Practical Analysis: 500 disk and memory forensics cases from the NIST Computer Forensics Tool Testing Program (CFTT). We evaluated 14 LLMs using DFIR-Metric, analyzing both their accuracy and consistency across trials. We also introduce a new metric, the Task Understanding Score (TUS), designed to more effectively evaluate models in scenarios where they achieve near-zero accuracy. This benchmark offers a rigorous, reproducible foundation for advancing AI in digital forensics. All scripts, artifacts, and results are available on the project website at https://github.com/DFIR-Metric.

As AI coding agents take on increasingly complex, long-horizon software engineering tasks, existing benchmarks are rapidly saturating and their evaluation quality has come under serious scrutiny: a recent audit found that nearly 60% of unsolved SWE-bench Verified instances contain flawed tests -- either overly narrow tests that reject correct solutions or overly broad tests that check unstated requirements -- and that frontier models can verbatim reproduce gold patches from training data. Code refactoring, which requires coordinated, behavior-preserving changes across many files, offers a substantially harder and more realistic test of agent capability, yet remains underserved by current benchmarks. We introduce SWE-Bench ProMax, an expert-curated, multilingual code refactoring benchmark of 170 instances drawn from real commits across seven programming languages (Python, Java, TypeScript, Go, C, C++, and Rust). Every instance undergoes rigorous, multi-stage curation that directly addresses the quality problems identified in prior benchmarks: issue descriptions are rewritten from scratch to provide precise, unambiguous specifications, and test suites are manually reviewed to remove overly narrow and overly broad tests. Tasks with insufficient complexity or limited cross-file scope are filtered out, yielding a benchmark of challenging, large-scale refactoring tasks that average 11.4 modified files and 261.6 lines of code per instance, substantially exceeding the scale of existing benchmarks. Experiments with frontier models under two agent scaffolds show that the best model achieves only 41.2% resolve rate, confirming that SWE-Bench ProMax presents a meaningful and unsaturated challenge for current AI coding agents. Our benchmark is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/swe-bench-promax/SWE-Bench-ProMax.

The fast-growing demands in using Large Language Models (LLMs) to tackle complex multi-step data science tasks create an emergent need for accurate benchmarking. There are two major gaps in existing benchmarks: (i) the lack of standardized, process-aware evaluation that captures instruction adherence and process fidelity, and (ii) the scarcity of accurately labeled training data. To bridge these gaps, we introduce DARE-bench, a benchmark designed for machine learning modeling and data science instruction following. Unlike many existing benchmarks that rely on human- or model-based judges, all tasks in DARE-bench have verifiable ground truth, ensuring objective and reproducible evaluation. To cover a broad range of tasks and support agentic tools, DARE-bench consists of 6,300 Kaggle-derived tasks and provides both large-scale training data and evaluation sets. Extensive evaluations show that even highly capable models such as gpt-o4-mini struggle to achieve good performance, especially in machine learning modeling tasks. Using DARE-bench training tasks for fine-tuning can substantially improve model performance. For example, supervised fine-tuning boosts Qwen3-32B's accuracy by 1.83x and reinforcement learning boosts Qwen3-4B's accuracy by more than 8x. These significant improvements verify the importance of DARE-bench both as an accurate evaluation benchmark and critical training data.

Rigorous security-focused evaluation of large language model (LLM) agents is imperative for establishing trust in their safe deployment throughout the software development lifecycle. However, existing benchmarks largely rely on synthetic challenges or simplified vulnerability datasets that fail to capture the complexity and ambiguity encountered by security engineers in practice. We introduce SEC-bench, the first fully automated benchmarking framework for evaluating LLM agents on authentic security engineering tasks. SEC-bench employs a novel multi-agent scaffold that automatically constructs code repositories with harnesses, reproduces vulnerabilities in isolated environments, and generates gold patches for reliable evaluation. Our framework automatically creates high-quality software vulnerability datasets with reproducible artifacts at a cost of only $0.87 per instance. Using SEC-bench, we implement two critical software security tasks to rigorously evaluate LLM agents' capabilities: proof-of-concept (PoC) generation and vulnerability patching. A comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art LLM code agents reveals significant performance gaps, achieving at most 18.0% success in PoC generation and 34.0% in vulnerability patching on our complete dataset. These results highlight the crucial steps needed toward developing LLM agents that are more practical, intelligent, and autonomous for security engineering.

Spreadsheets are widely used for business analysis, financial modeling, reporting, and decision-making. However, most existing spreadsheet benchmarks evaluate isolated operations such as single-formula generation or local cell edits, and therefore fail to capture end-to-end workflows in realistic business settings. We introduce SpreadsheetBench 2, a workflow-level benchmark for spreadsheet agents that covers three task categories: generation, debugging, and visualization. The benchmark is constructed from authentic business data, including financial reports and corporate filings, and is annotated and validated by domain experts. The benchmark contains 321 tasks; each instance averages 11.8 worksheets and requires 593.5 cell modifications, reflecting large multi-sheet workbooks with cross-sheet dependencies. We evaluate eight frontier large language models under a unified multi-turn agent scaffold, and additionally include several LLM-based spreadsheet products as complementary baselines. Results show that current systems remain far from reliable on real-world workflows: the best model achieves 34.89\% overall task accuracy, and debugging accuracy is as low as 12.00\%. Trajectory analysis and a failure taxonomy further indicate that insufficient spreadsheet inspection and incorrect target-cell selection are the dominant bottlenecks. Together, these findings position SpreadsheetBench 2 as a challenging testbed for advancing reliable spreadsheet automation. Project page: https://spreadsheetbench.github.io/

With the rapid development of MLLMs, evaluating their visual capabilities has become increasingly crucial. Current benchmarks primarily fall into two main types: basic perception benchmarks, which focus on local details but lack deep reasoning (e.g., "what is in the image?"), and mainstream reasoning benchmarks, which concentrate on prominent image elements but may fail to assess subtle clues requiring intricate analysis. However, profound visual understanding and complex reasoning depend more on interpreting subtle, inconspicuous local details than on perceiving salient, macro-level objects. These details, though occupying minimal image area, often contain richer, more critical information for robust analysis. To bridge this gap, we introduce the VER-Bench, a novel framework to evaluate MLLMs' ability to: 1) identify fine-grained visual clues, often occupying on average just 0.25% of the image area; 2) integrate these clues with world knowledge for complex reasoning. Comprising 374 carefully designed questions across Geospatial, Temporal, Situational, Intent, System State, and Symbolic reasoning, each question in VER-Bench is accompanied by structured evidence: visual clues and question-related reasoning derived from them. VER-Bench reveals current models' limitations in extracting subtle visual evidence and constructing evidence-based arguments, highlighting the need to enhance models's capabilities in fine-grained visual evidence extraction, integration, and reasoning for genuine visual understanding and human-like analysis. Dataset and additional materials are available https://github.com/verbta/ACMMM-25-Materials.

We introduce WebGames, a comprehensive benchmark suite designed to evaluate general-purpose web-browsing AI agents through a collection of 50+ interactive challenges. These challenges are specifically crafted to be straightforward for humans while systematically testing the limitations of current AI systems across fundamental browser interactions, advanced input processing, cognitive tasks, workflow automation, and interactive entertainment. Our framework eliminates external dependencies through a hermetic testing environment, ensuring reproducible evaluation with verifiable ground-truth solutions. We evaluate leading vision-language models including GPT-4o, Claude Computer-Use, Gemini-1.5-Pro, and Qwen2-VL against human performance. Results reveal a substantial capability gap, with the best AI system achieving only 43.1% success rate compared to human performance of 95.7%, highlighting fundamental limitations in current AI systems' ability to handle common web interaction patterns that humans find intuitive. The benchmark is publicly available at webgames.convergence.ai, offering a lightweight, client-side implementation that facilitates rapid evaluation cycles. Through its modular architecture and standardized challenge specifications, WebGames provides a robust foundation for measuring progress in development of more capable web-browsing agents.

Existing benchmarks for LLM-based offensive security agents use isolated, single-target setups with a known vulnerable service and fixed objective. They measure exploitation effectively, but miss how real Capture-the-Flag (CTF) participants triage unknown surfaces, prioritize targets, and allocate effort under uncertainty. Current evaluations therefore fail to assess strategic reasoning beyond exploitation alone. To address this, we introduce CTFExplorer, a benchmark suite that shifts offensive security evaluation toward a multi-target setting, which tests how agents explore, prioritize, and chain attacks. CTFExplorer deploys 40 web-based vulnerable services within a single environment, where agents must autonomously discover, distinguish, and exploit targets without predefined guidance. We also present a reactive multi-agent setup as a reference agent framework and develop an agent-agnostic evaluation framework that records structured reasoning traces for fine-grained assessment. This enables behavioral evaluation beyond binary flag capture, such as how agents manage target selection, handle failed hypotheses, coordinate across multiple stages, and extract security intelligence.

Although LLM-based agents, powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), can use external tools and memory mechanisms to solve complex real-world tasks, they may also introduce critical security vulnerabilities. However, the existing literature does not comprehensively evaluate attacks and defenses against LLM-based agents. To address this, we introduce Agent Security Bench (ASB), a comprehensive framework designed to formalize, benchmark, and evaluate the attacks and defenses of LLM-based agents, including 10 scenarios (e.g., e-commerce, autonomous driving, finance), 10 agents targeting the scenarios, over 400 tools, 23 different types of attack/defense methods, and 8 evaluation metrics. Based on ASB, we benchmark 10 prompt injection attacks, a memory poisoning attack, a novel Plan-of-Thought backdoor attack, a mixed attack, and 10 corresponding defenses across 13 LLM backbones with nearly 90,000 testing cases in total. Our benchmark results reveal critical vulnerabilities in different stages of agent operation, including system prompt, user prompt handling, tool usage, and memory retrieval, with the highest average attack success rate of 84.30\%, but limited effectiveness shown in current defenses, unveiling important works to be done in terms of agent security for the community. Our code can be found at https://github.com/agiresearch/ASB.

We introduce the AI Productivity Index for Agents (APEX-Agents), a benchmark for assessing whether AI agents can execute long-horizon, cross-application tasks created by investment banking analysts, management consultants, and corporate lawyers. APEX-Agents requires agents to navigate realistic work environments with files and tools. We test eight agents for the leaderboard using Pass@1. Gemini 3 Flash (Thinking=High) achieves the highest score of 24.0%, followed by GPT-5.2 (Thinking=High), Claude Opus 4.5 (Thinking=High), and Gemini 3 Pro (Thinking=High). We open source the APEX-Agents benchmark (n=480) with all prompts, rubrics, gold outputs, files, and metadata. We also open-source Archipelago, our infrastructure for agent execution and evaluation.

Search Agents (SAs) typically leverage large language models (LLMs) to support complex information-seeking tasks by autonomously exploring web sources and synthesizing information into comprehensive responses. For SAs evaluation, prior benchmarks mainly focus on specialized tasks that are unlikely to arise in real-world user scenarios. Moreover, their reliance on coarse task-level rubrics often limits evaluation interpretability. To bridge this gap, we introduce DailyReport, an open-ended benchmark to evaluate SA capabilities on daily search tasks. It contains 150 open-ended tasks with 3,546 associated rubrics, capturing widely discussed and timely information demands of real-world users. Each task is decomposed into subtasks and evaluated with cascade rubrics across disentangled dimensions. Through cascade performance attribution and user-centric aggregation, we derive highly interpretable scores for each dimension, along with a user preference score. Our results on 17 agentic systems show that current systems still fall short of users' expectations. To facilitate future research, our dataset and code are made publicly available at https://github.com/AGI-Eval-Official/DailyReport.

We introduce ISO-Bench, a benchmark for coding agents to test their capabilities on real-world inference optimization tasks. These tasks were taken from vLLM and SGLang, two of the most popular LLM serving frameworks. Each task provides an agent with a codebase and bottleneck description, whereby the agent must produce an optimization patch evaluated against expert human solutions. We curated 54 tasks from merged pull requests with measurable performance improvements. While existing benchmarks heavily use runtime-based metrics, such approaches can be gamed to pass tests without capturing the actual intent of the code changes. Therefore, we combine both hard (execution-based) and soft (LLM-based) metrics to show that both are necessary for complete evaluation. While evaluating both closed and open-source coding agents, we find no single agent dominates across codebases. Surprisingly, agents often identify correct bottlenecks but fail to execute working solutions. We also show that agents with identical underlying models differ substantially, suggesting scaffolding is as important as the model.

AI agents may soon become capable of autonomously completing valuable, long-horizon tasks in diverse domains. Current benchmarks either do not measure real-world tasks, or are not sufficiently difficult to meaningfully measure frontier models. To this end, we present Terminal-Bench 2.0: a carefully curated hard benchmark composed of 89 tasks in computer terminal environments inspired by problems from real workflows. Each task features a unique environment, human-written solution, and comprehensive tests for verification. We show that frontier models and agents score less than 65\% on the benchmark and conduct an error analysis to identify areas for model and agent improvement. We publish the dataset and evaluation harness to assist developers and researchers in future work at https://www.tbench.ai/ .

The observations documented in Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports play a critical role in describing adversarial behaviors, providing valuable insights for security practitioners to respond to evolving threats. Recent advancements of Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in various cybersecurity applications, including CTI report understanding and attack knowledge graph construction. While previous works have proposed benchmarks that focus on the CTI extraction ability of LLMs, the sequential characteristic of adversarial behaviors within CTI reports remains largely unexplored, which holds considerable significance in developing a comprehensive understanding of how adversaries operate. To address this gap, we introduce AttackSeqBench, a benchmark tailored to systematically evaluate LLMs' capability to understand and reason attack sequences in CTI reports. Our benchmark encompasses three distinct Question Answering (QA) tasks, each task focuses on the varying granularity in adversarial behavior. To alleviate the laborious effort of QA construction, we carefully design an automated dataset construction pipeline to create scalable and well-formulated QA datasets based on real-world CTI reports. To ensure the quality of our dataset, we adopt a hybrid approach of combining human evaluation and systematic evaluation metrics. We conduct extensive experiments and analysis with both fast-thinking and slow-thinking LLMs, while highlighting their strengths and limitations in analyzing the sequential patterns in cyber attacks. The overarching goal of this work is to provide a benchmark that advances LLM-driven CTI report understanding and fosters its application in real-world cybersecurity operations. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Javiery3889/AttackSeqBench .

Benchmarking models via classical simulations is one of the main ways to judge ideas in quantum machine learning before noise-free hardware is available. However, the huge impact of the experimental design on the results, the small scales within reach today, as well as narratives influenced by the commercialisation of quantum technologies make it difficult to gain robust insights. To facilitate better decision-making we develop an open-source package based on the PennyLane software framework and use it to conduct a large-scale study that systematically tests 12 popular quantum machine learning models on 6 binary classification tasks used to create 160 individual datasets. We find that overall, out-of-the-box classical machine learning models outperform the quantum classifiers. Moreover, removing entanglement from a quantum model often results in as good or better performance, suggesting that "quantumness" may not be the crucial ingredient for the small learning tasks considered here. Our benchmarks also unlock investigations beyond simplistic leaderboard comparisons, and we identify five important questions for quantum model design that follow from our results.

Automated evaluation of tool-using large language model (LLM) agents is widely assumed to be reliable, but this assumption has rarely been validated against human annotation. We introduce AgentProp-Bench, a 2,000-task benchmark with 2,300 traces across four domains, nine production LLMs, and a 100-label human-validated subset. We quantify judge reliability, characterize error propagation, and evaluate a runtime mitigation. Substring-based judging agrees with human annotation at kappa=0.049 (chance-level); a three-LLM ensemble reaches kappa=0.432 (moderate) with a conservative bias. Under validated evaluation, a parameter-level injection propagates to a wrong final answer with human-calibrated probability approximately 0.62 (range 0.46-0.73 across models). Rejection (catching bad parameters) and recovery (correcting after acceptance) are independent model capabilities (Spearman rho=0.126, p=0.747). A tuned runtime interceptor reduces hallucination on GPT-4o-mini by 23.0 percentage points under a concurrent n=600 control, but shows no significant effect on Gemini-2.0-Flash, whose aggressive parameter rejection eliminates the target failure mode. All code, data, traces, and human labels are released at https://github.com/bhaskargurram-ai/agenthallu-bench.

The rapid advancement and deployment of AI systems have created an urgent need for standard safety-evaluation frameworks. This paper introduces AILuminate v1.0, the first comprehensive industry-standard benchmark for assessing AI-product risk and reliability. Its development employed an open process that included participants from multiple fields. The benchmark evaluates an AI system's resistance to prompts designed to elicit dangerous, illegal, or undesirable behavior in 12 hazard categories, including violent crimes, nonviolent crimes, sex-related crimes, child sexual exploitation, indiscriminate weapons, suicide and self-harm, intellectual property, privacy, defamation, hate, sexual content, and specialized advice (election, financial, health, legal). Our method incorporates a complete assessment standard, extensive prompt datasets, a novel evaluation framework, a grading and reporting system, and the technical as well as organizational infrastructure for long-term support and evolution. In particular, the benchmark employs an understandable five-tier grading scale (Poor to Excellent) and incorporates an innovative entropy-based system-response evaluation. In addition to unveiling the benchmark, this report also identifies limitations of our method and of building safety benchmarks generally, including evaluator uncertainty and the constraints of single-turn interactions. This work represents a crucial step toward establishing global standards for AI risk and reliability evaluation while acknowledging the need for continued development in areas such as multiturn interactions, multimodal understanding, coverage of additional languages, and emerging hazard categories. Our findings provide valuable insights for model developers, system integrators, and policymakers working to promote safer AI deployment.

This paper introduces v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark, which has been created by the MLCommons AI Safety Working Group. The AI Safety Benchmark has been designed to assess the safety risks of AI systems that use chat-tuned language models. We introduce a principled approach to specifying and constructing the benchmark, which for v0.5 covers only a single use case (an adult chatting to a general-purpose assistant in English), and a limited set of personas (i.e., typical users, malicious users, and vulnerable users). We created a new taxonomy of 13 hazard categories, of which 7 have tests in the v0.5 benchmark. We plan to release version 1.0 of the AI Safety Benchmark by the end of 2024. The v1.0 benchmark will provide meaningful insights into the safety of AI systems. However, the v0.5 benchmark should not be used to assess the safety of AI systems. We have sought to fully document the limitations, flaws, and challenges of v0.5. This release of v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark includes (1) a principled approach to specifying and constructing the benchmark, which comprises use cases, types of systems under test (SUTs), language and context, personas, tests, and test items; (2) a taxonomy of 13 hazard categories with definitions and subcategories; (3) tests for seven of the hazard categories, each comprising a unique set of test items, i.e., prompts. There are 43,090 test items in total, which we created with templates; (4) a grading system for AI systems against the benchmark; (5) an openly available platform, and downloadable tool, called ModelBench that can be used to evaluate the safety of AI systems on the benchmark; (6) an example evaluation report which benchmarks the performance of over a dozen openly available chat-tuned language models; (7) a test specification for the benchmark.