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Jul 29

[Re] Don't Judge an Object by Its Context: Learning to Overcome Contextual Bias

Singh et al. (2020) point out the dangers of contextual bias in visual recognition datasets. They propose two methods, CAM-based and feature-split, that better recognize an object or attribute in the absence of its typical context while maintaining competitive within-context accuracy. To verify their performance, we attempted to reproduce all 12 tables in the original paper, including those in the appendix. We also conducted additional experiments to better understand the proposed methods, including increasing the regularization in CAM-based and removing the weighted loss in feature-split. As the original code was not made available, we implemented the entire pipeline from scratch in PyTorch 1.7.0. Our implementation is based on the paper and email exchanges with the authors. We found that both proposed methods in the original paper help mitigate contextual bias, although for some methods, we could not completely replicate the quantitative results in the paper even after completing an extensive hyperparameter search. For example, on COCO-Stuff, DeepFashion, and UnRel, our feature-split model achieved an increase in accuracy on out-of-context images over the standard baseline, whereas on AwA, we saw a drop in performance. For the proposed CAM-based method, we were able to reproduce the original paper's results to within 0.5% mAP. Our implementation can be found at https://github.com/princetonvisualai/ContextualBias.

  • 4 authors
·
Apr 28, 2021

Closing the Activation-Cone Blind Spot: Response-Time Probing and Unified Defense

Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists. We evaluate five defense paradigms (no defense, static steering, CAST, AlphaSteer, probe-gated) across seven instruction-tuned models (7-31B) and five attack types (GCG, AutoDAN, DeepInception, prefilling, intent laundering). Our central finding: prompt-time activation defenses are structurally blind to prefilling attacks. AlphaSteer achieves 0% attack success on GCG, AutoDAN, and intent laundering but 50% on prefilling. We prove a corollary: any defense that gates intervention on a single layer's activation alignment with a benign reference (cone, subspace, or null-space) is blind to attacks that craft activations to lie inside that reference, whether checked at prompt time or per token. As its constructive contrapositive we introduce response-time probing: a linear probe on the model's hidden state at the first generated tokens, with AUROC 0.97-1.00 across all seven models. Combined with a halt, it cuts prefilling attack success to 0/40 on every model with 0% benign false positives, outperforming Llama Guard 3. Cross-template generalisation depends on probe depth, so we scope the claim to the canonical prefilling-template family. Composing the response-halt with AlphaSteer's null-space steering gives an orthogonal split (the halt catches prefilling, AlphaSteer catches semantic attacks), reaching defense success 0.983 on Mistral and 0.994 on Llama and dominating both components. We further show MMLU fails to capture steering's true utility cost, which appears as behavioral hedging rather than factual loss, and that diverse negative training sets cut probe false positives from 80-100% to near zero. Code, attacks, per-sample results, and the judge prompt are released.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 27