Daily Papers

Magnetotactic bacteria (MTB) are a diverse group of microorganisms whose movement can be directed via a magnetic field, which makes them attractive for applications in medicine and microfluidics. One of their key properties is the magnetic moment m, which is challenging to measure experimentally. We perform optical imaging experiments with MSR-1 MTB, and derive both the m statistics and the scaling of m with the MTB size using an explicit and fully automated method to determine m from the MTB trajectories via the U-turn protocol, which measures m based on the U-shaped trajectories exhibited by the MTB in an applied alternating magnetic field. The proposed method is an alternative to the standard U-turn time-based moment calculation and uses the theoretical U-turn shape function we have derived. This directly accounts for the U-turn geometry and determines the moment from the U-turn branch width. We couple this approach with a robust U-turn decomposition algorithm that detects U-turns from MTB tracks regardless of their orientations. We report a linear dependence of m on the size of the bacteria, accounting for the bacteria velocity variations during the U-turns. We also demonstrate that the new U-turn shape-based and the conventional time-based methods produce significantly different results. The proposed method can be used to differentiate between various types of MTB within the same population based on their velocity and magnetic moments, and to precisely characterize the magnetic properties of a culture.

An AI control protocol is a plan for usefully deploying AI systems that aims to prevent an AI from intentionally causing some unacceptable outcome. This paper investigates how well AI systems can generate and act on their own strategies for subverting control protocols whilst operating statelessly (without shared memory between contexts). To do this, an AI system may need to reliably generate optimal plans in each context, take actions with well-calibrated probabilities, and coordinate plans with other instances of itself without communicating. We develop Subversion Strategy Eval, a suite of eight environments, covering a range of protocols and strategic capabilities, and six sets of affordances that help isolate individual capabilities. We implement the evaluation in Inspect-AI and release it open-source. We evaluate Claude 3.5 models, including helpful-only versions, as well as OpenAI reasoning models. None of the models demonstrate substantial capability in strategizing to subvert control protocols statelessly. However, providing models with additional affordances, such as the ability to share a plan between contexts, can substantially improve performance. We hope our evaluations can act as a leading indicator for when models are capable of subverting control protocols and also relax the worst-case assumption of perfect strategic ability in AI control evaluations.

Despite extensive safety enhancements in large language models (LLMs), multi-turn "jailbreak" conversations crafted by skilled human adversaries can still breach even the most sophisticated guardrails. However, these multi-turn attacks demand considerable manual effort, limiting their scalability. In this work, we introduce a novel approach called Multi-turn-to-Single-turn (M2S) that systematically converts multi-turn jailbreak prompts into single-turn attacks. Specifically, we propose three conversion strategies - Hyphenize, Numberize, and Pythonize - each preserving sequential context yet packaging it in a single query. Our experiments on the Multi-turn Human Jailbreak (MHJ) dataset show that M2S often increases or maintains high Attack Success Rates (ASRs) compared to original multi-turn conversations. Notably, using a StrongREJECT-based evaluation of harmfulness, M2S achieves up to 95.9% ASR on Mistral-7B and outperforms original multi-turn prompts by as much as 17.5% in absolute improvement on GPT-4o. Further analysis reveals that certain adversarial tactics, when consolidated into a single prompt, exploit structural formatting cues to evade standard policy checks. These findings underscore that single-turn attacks - despite being simpler and cheaper to conduct - can be just as potent, if not more, than their multi-turn counterparts. Our findings underscore the urgent need to reevaluate and reinforce LLM safety strategies, given how adversarial queries can be compacted into a single prompt while still retaining sufficient complexity to bypass existing safety measures.

Hidden malicious intent in multi-turn dialogue poses a growing threat to deployed large language models (LLMs). Rather than exposing a harmful objective in a single prompt, increasingly capable attackers can distribute their intent across multiple benign-looking turns. Recent studies show that even modern commercial models with advanced guardrails remain vulnerable to such attacks despite advances in safety alignment and external guardrails. In this work, we address this challenge by detecting the earliest turn at which delivering the candidate response would make the accumulated interaction sufficient to enable harmful action. This objective requires precise turn-level intervention that identifies the harm-enabling closure point while avoiding premature refusal of benign exploratory conversations. To further support training and evaluation, we construct the Multi-Turn Intent Dataset (MTID), which contains branching attack rollouts, matched benign hard negatives, and annotations of the earliest harm-enabling turns. We show that MTID helps enable a turn-level monitor TurnGate, which substantially outperforms existing baselines in harmful-intent detection while maintaining low over-refusal rates. TurnGate further generalizes across domains, attacker pipelines, and target models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Graph-COM/TurnGate.

Recent machine learning papers often report 1-2 percentage point improvements from a single run on a benchmark. These gains are highly sensitive to random seeds, data ordering, and implementation details, yet are rarely accompanied by uncertainty estimates or significance tests. It is therefore unclear when a reported +1-2% reflects a real algorithmic advance versus noise. We revisit this problem under realistic compute budgets, where only a few runs are affordable. We propose a simple, PC-friendly evaluation protocol based on paired multi-seed runs, bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrap confidence intervals, and a sign-flip permutation test on per-seed deltas. The protocol is intentionally conservative and is meant as a guardrail against over-claiming. We instantiate it on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-10N, and AG News using synthetic no-improvement, small-gain, and medium-gain scenarios. Single runs and unpaired t-tests often suggest significant gains for 0.6-2.0 point improvements, especially on text. With only three seeds, our paired protocol never declares significance in these settings. We argue that such conservative evaluation is a safer default for small gains under tight budgets.

Runtime-governance evidence often collapses materially different events into one audit record: a decision may be made, an instruction dispatched or received, an action may or may not execute, and a resulting state may or may not be observed. This paper presents AIREP, a vendor- and model-independent protocol for per-decision AI runtime evidence. Its current wire model separates evidence into four artifact families: Decision, Control, Execution, and Effect. Artifacts use closed core schemas, explicit identities and digests, declared scope limits, RFC 8785 canonical JSON, domain-separated SHA-256 hashing, and pure Ed25519 signatures. A three-level assurance model distinguishes structural/hash consistency (AIREP-Core), verifier-accepted authorship (AIREP-Authenticated), and independently anchored chain-head freshness and non-truncation relative to an accepted witness (AIREP-Witnessed); these classes do not establish event truth. A structured reconciler preserves failure, missing evidence, unevaluated prerequisites, and indeterminate outcomes as distinct states. The released beta includes a four-family first-party producer, Python and Node reference-verification paths, adversarial/lifecycle corpora, and reproducible validation. Post-release first-party Hermes and LightEval integration exercises preserve explicit evidence boundaries without claiming adoption or interoperability. Independent implementation evidence exists separately for a v0.1.2 producer and a v0.2 consumer/verifier; because they target different frozen versions, they do not establish same-version producer-to-consumer interoperability. AIREP remains experimental.

Reasoning models are evaluated on single-turn benchmarks but deployed in multi-turn dialogue, where users push back on correct answers. Under sustained adversarial pressure we find a previously undocumented failure mode: the chain-of-thought stays factually correct from first turn to last while the emitted answer flips wrong. We call this unfaithful capitulation (UC) and isolate it with a 2times 2 latent-versus-behavioral framework that flip-rate metrics and single-turn faithfulness probes both miss. Across three datasets (MT-Consistency, MMLU-Pro, GSM8K), the latent-correct rate at the behavioral flip clusters near 50% in think mode and collapses to 11-15% under no_think -- paired, within-model causal evidence that reasoning creates the gap. Across models the effect tracks the reasoning channel (high in Qwen3-32B and GPT-OSS-20B, low in inline-CoT Gemma-4-31B-it). An independent GPT-4o judge corroborates 86% of UC labels; a token-level probe shows the answer-slot argmax is correct in 84% of UC cells; and a naive trace-anchored defense backfires. We release all trajectories, traces, and judge labels.

Over the past year, the vLLM Semantic Router project has released a series of work spanning: (1) core routing mechanisms -- signal-driven routing, context-length pool routing, router performance engineering, policy conflict detection, low-latency embedding models, category-aware semantic caching, user-feedback-driven routing adaptation, hallucination detection, and hierarchical content-safety classification for privacy and jailbreak protection; (2) fleet optimization -- fleet provisioning and energy-efficiency analysis; (3) agentic and multimodal routing -- multimodal agent routing, tool selection, CUA security, and multi-turn context memory and safety; (4) governance and standards -- inference routing protocols and multi-provider API extensions. Each paper tackled a specific problem in LLM inference, but the problems are not independent; for example, fleet provisioning depends on the routing policy, which depends on the workload mix, shifting as organizations adopt agentic and multimodal workloads. This paper distills those results into the Workload-Router-Pool (WRP) architecture, a three-dimensional framework for LLM inference optimization. Workload characterizes what the fleet serves (chat vs. agent, single-turn vs. multi-turn, warm vs. cold, prefill-heavy vs. decode-heavy). Router determines how each request is dispatched (static semantic rules, online bandit adaptation, RL-based model selection, quality-aware cascading). Pool defines where inference runs (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous GPU, disaggregated prefill/decode, KV-cache topology). We map our prior work onto a 3x3 WRP interaction matrix, identify which cells we have covered and which remain open, and propose twenty-one concrete research directions at the intersections, each grounded in our prior measurements, tiered by maturity from engineering-ready to open research.

SCTP is a transport protocol offering features such as multi-homing, multi-streaming, and message-oriented delivery. Its two main implementations were subjected to conformance tests using the PacketDrill tool. Conformance testing is not exhaustive and a recent vulnerability (CVE-2021-3772) showed SCTP is not immune to attacks. Changes addressing the vulnerability were implemented, but the question remains whether other flaws might persist in the protocol design. We study the security of the SCTP design, taking a rigorous approach rooted in formal methods. We create a formal Promela model of SCTP, and define 10 properties capturing the essential protocol functionality based on its RFC specification and consultation with the lead RFC author. Then we show using the Spin model checker that our model satisfies these properties. We define 4 attacker models - Off-Path, where the attacker is an outsider that can spoof the port and IP of a peer; Evil-Server, where the attacker is a malicious peer; Replay, where an attacker can capture and replay, but not modify, packets; and On-Path, where the attacker controls the channel between peers. We modify an attack synthesis tool designed for transport protocols, Korg, to support our SCTP model and four attacker models. We synthesize 14 unique attacks using the attacker models - including the CVE vulnerability in the Off-Path attacker model, 4 attacks in the Evil-Server attacker model, an opportunistic ABORT attack in the Replay attacker model, and eight connection manipulation attacks in the On-Path attacker model. We show that the proposed patch eliminates the vulnerability and does not introduce new ones according to our model and protocol properties. Finally, we identify and analyze an ambiguity in the RFC, which we show can be interpreted insecurely. We propose an erratum and show that it eliminates the ambiguity.

General turn-taking behavior in real-time dialogue systems requires deciding whether to keep listening or start responding while listening, and whether to continue or stop while speaking. Existing turn detectors use heterogeneous, task-specific label spaces and are often trained on limited annotations or evaluated on isolated utterances, making them difficult to use as a unified causal controller with comprehensive context. We propose XTurnix, a compact text-based model that formulates turn control as two binary decisions conditioned on the AI's current listening or speaking state and predicts a single control token from the complete dialogue history. XTurnix is pretrained on 5.5 million causal action examples automatically derived from timestamped two-speaker transcripts, then fine-tuned on synthetic multi-turn examples with a flatter distribution across the four state-action labels. We evaluate XTurnix on four public benchmarks and a balanced self-curated benchmark. Across the public benchmarks, XTurnix achieves the best results on all SemanticVAD and LiveKit splits, ties the native Smart-Turn model on Smart-Turn Bench, and achieves the highest incomplete-turn accuracy on Easy-Turn. On the self-curated benchmark, it reaches 89.06% accuracy, more than 20 percentage points above the strongest third-party baseline at 68.75%, while maintaining F1 scores between 84.21% and 90.63% across all four categories. These results demonstrate unified listening- and speaking-state turn control in a single compact model. Code is available at https://github.com/xcc-zach/xturnix, with an interactive demo at https://huggingface.co/spaces/xcczach/xturnix-demo.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

On-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student on its own rollouts using dense supervision from a teacher. In multi-turn environments, a mistake at a critical decision step can redirect the subsequent rollout toward poor outcomes. We use low teacher confidence on student actions to select high-uncertainty steps for correction. In a controlled ALFWorld study, a single teacher correction at a low-confidence step improves subsequent student behavior and task success, motivating selective intervention during distillation. We propose UOPD, an uncertainty-aware intervention method for on-policy distillation. At low-uncertainty turns, UOPD executes student actions and applies the standard OPD loss. At high-uncertainty turns, it samples and executes teacher actions and trains the student to imitate them through supervised fine-tuning, which minimizes forward Kullback-Leibler divergence in expectation. UOPD utilizes adaptive uncertainty thresholds to target a scheduled intervention rate. Empirically, we evaluate UOPD across a broad range of agentic tasks, including ALFWorld, WebShop, and Search, demonstrating its superior performance over OPD methods and their variants. UOPD improves WebShop score by up to 15.8% relative to standard OPD.

Full-duplex dialogue requires timely yet selective interruption handling, which end-of-turn prediction alone cannot achieve: complete utterances may need no response, while unfinished requests may warrant interruption. To address this challenge, we propose HiThink Turn, an intent-aware streaming turn-state predictor that separates response intent from semantic completeness and conditions decisions on system playback state. A key contribution is minimal intent-sufficient prefix supervision, constructed through LLM judgments and speech alignment, while training on audio truncated at chunk boundaries improves robustness to partial speech. These components support streaming inference with 240-ms audio chunks, enabling low-latency, accurate full-duplex turn control. Experiments show that HiThink Turn leads the compared methods in Easy Turn macro accuracy, Full-Duplex-Bench average interaction rate score (0.933), and non-target-speech average playback resume rate (0.735). Additionally, intent-prefix triggering raises interruption success from 89\% to 98\% and reduces mean stop latency by 60.9\%.

LLM cascades and model routing promise lower inference cost by sending easy queries to a small model and escalating hard ones to a large model, but most deployed routers use uncalibrated confidence scores and require per-workload threshold tuning. We present UCCI, a calibration-first router that maps token-level margin uncertainty to a per-query error probability via isotonic regression and selects the escalation threshold by constrained cost minimization. Under three explicit assumptions, threshold policies on the calibrated score are cost-optimal, and isotonic calibration achieves O(n^{-1/3}) sample complexity for expected calibration error (ECE). On a production named entity recognition workload of 75,000 queries served by 4B and 12B instruction-tuned LLMs on H100 GPUs, UCCI cuts inference cost by 31% (95% CI: [27%, 35%]) at micro-F1 = 0.91 while reducing ECE from 0.12 to 0.03. At the same operating point, UCCI beats entropy thresholding, split-conformal routing, and a FrugalGPT-style learned threshold. All cascade results use end-to-end routing on actual model outputs and measured H100 latency, not simulated routing from global accuracies or nominal API prices.

Compared with half-duplex dialogue systems where the system waits for user turn completion before it responds, natural full-duplex dialogue systems require agents to act proactively in real time, including timely interruptions and backchannels. This creates a key challenge: improving turn timing without sacrificing response quality. To address limitations in realistic proactive turn-taking, we build a generalized style-aware full-duplex framework with three key components. Firstly, we propose LPS-TC, a Lightweight Proactive Speech Turn Controller for plug-and-play integration. It features a fine-grained action space covering both reactive and proactive turn behaviors, enabling half-duplex models with full-duplex capabilities and enhancing existing full-duplex models with superior timing control. Secondly, we construct WildTurn, a large-scale, real-world English dataset containing approximately 2,981 hours of filtered multi-turn stereo conversations from face-to-face and telephone conversations, annotated with five turn-taking and five backchanneling styles. Trained on WildTurn, LPS-TC exhibits rich spoken dynamics that are not captured by existing static full-duplex benchmarks. Thirdly, we introduce a two-tier evaluation scheme that assesses both chunk-level timing precision and turn-level interaction quality under realistic streaming constraints. Our experiments, integrating LPS-TC with half-duplex models like Qwen2.5-Omni and full-duplex models like Freeze-Omni, showcase its superior performance in timing appropriateness and response quality. Our framework also demonstrates fine-grained style controllability and strong generalizability, enabling more natural and human-like spoken interactions.

Recent advances in AudioLLMs have enabled spoken dialogue systems to move beyond turn-based interaction toward real-time full-duplex communication, where the agent must decide when to speak, yield, or interrupt while the user is still talking. Existing full-duplex approaches either rely on voice activity cues, which lack semantic understanding, or on ASR-based modules, which introduce latency and degrade under overlapping speech and noise. Moreover, available datasets rarely capture realistic interaction dynamics, limiting evaluation and deployment. To mitigate the problem, we propose FastTurn, a unified framework for low-latency and robust turn detection. To advance latency while maintaining performance, FastTurn combines streaming CTC decoding with acoustic features, enabling early decisions from partial observations while preserving semantic cues. We also release a test set based on real human dialogue, capturing authentic turn transitions, overlapping speech, backchannels, pauses, pitch variation, and environmental noise. Experiments show FastTurn achieves higher decision accuracy with lower interruption latency than representative baselines and remains robust under challenging acoustic conditions, demonstrating its effectiveness for practical full-duplex dialogue systems.

LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts. We introduce a controlled protocol that holds the model, persona, topic, and final decision prompt fixed and varies only the composition and ordering of the posts an agent encounters during a preceding ten-turn "scrolling" phase, isolating the causal effect of feed curation on a downstream decision. Across 2,785 decision rollouts on four modern open instruct LLMs from three independent labs, we identify three response regimes: adversarial capitulation, default saturation, and a default-direction asymmetry in which a one-sided feed tips a decision the model was genuinely uncertain about (in the clearest cases from 5% to 100%; Fisher p as low as 3 x 10^-10) but cannot dislodge one it already favors or holds firmly. The effect follows a dose-response curve, survives a generator swap that rules out a writing-style artifact, generalizes across several decision domains including security-relevant choices such as removing a deployment approval gate or relaxing access controls, and is partly mitigated by two simple feed-level defenses; a frontier model retains its default. We characterize the recommender as a practical, default-bounded control surface for LLM agents, and argue that agent evaluations must audit the feed layer rather than the final prompt alone.

The recent wave of audio foundation models (FMs) could provide new capabilities for conversational modeling. However, there have been limited efforts to evaluate these audio FMs comprehensively on their ability to have natural and interactive conversations. To engage in meaningful conversation with the end user, we would want the FMs to additionally perform a fluent succession of turns without too much overlapping speech or long stretches of silence. Inspired by this, we ask whether the recently proposed audio FMs can understand, predict, and perform turn-taking events? To answer this, we propose a novel evaluation protocol that can assess spoken dialog system's turn-taking capabilities using a supervised model as a judge that has been trained to predict turn-taking events in human-human conversations. Using this protocol, we present the first comprehensive user study that evaluates existing spoken dialogue systems on their ability to perform turn-taking events and reveal many interesting insights, such as they sometimes do not understand when to speak up, can interrupt too aggressively and rarely backchannel. We further evaluate multiple open-source and proprietary audio FMs accessible through APIs on carefully curated test benchmarks from Switchboard to measure their ability to understand and predict turn-taking events and identify significant room for improvement. We will open source our evaluation platform to promote the development of advanced conversational AI systems.

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

Accurate and responsive turn-taking is essential for spoken dialogue systems, which must distinguish in real time between user interruptions, backchannels that should be ignored, and the completion of an utterance. Prior modular approaches typically optimize turn state prediction at the utterance or fixed-chunk level, creating a mismatch with the continuous turn state estimate, and often depend on an auxiliary ASR model, which limits responsiveness and increases overall system complexity. Therefore, we present X2-Turn, a frame-synchronous turn state prediction method via delayed-stream modeling. Specifically, building on the pretrained Voxtral Realtime model, we introduce a frame-synchronous turn state head that operates in parallel with the ASR head on shared streaming representations, jointly predicting ASR tokens and fine-grained turn states at the frame level. We evaluate our method on the bilingual Chinese-English Easy-Turn test sets, and the results demonstrate its effectiveness in achieving accurate turn-taking detection while maintaining low latency.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into sensitive workflows, raising the stakes for adversarial robustness and safety. This paper introduces Transient Turn Injection(TTI), a new multi-turn attack technique that systematically exploits stateless moderation by distributing adversarial intent across isolated interactions. TTI leverages automated attacker agents powered by large language models to iteratively test and evade policy enforcement in both commercial and open-source LLMs, marking a departure from conventional jailbreak approaches that typically depend on maintaining persistent conversational context. Our extensive evaluation across state-of-the-art models-including those from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Meta, and prominent open-source alternatives-uncovers significant variations in resilience to TTI attacks, with only select architectures exhibiting substantial inherent robustness. Our automated blackbox evaluation framework also uncovers previously unknown model specific vulnerabilities and attack surface patterns, especially within medical and high stakes domains. We further compare TTI against established adversarial prompting methods and detail practical mitigation strategies, such as session level context aggregation and deep alignment approaches. Our study underscores the urgent need for holistic, context aware defenses and continuous adversarial testing to future proof LLM deployments against evolving multi-turn threats.

As large-scale multi-agent systems evolve, the communication protocol layer has become a critical yet under-evaluated factor shaping performance and reliability. Despite the existence of diverse protocols (A2A, ACP, ANP, Agora, etc.), selection is often intuition-driven and lacks standardized guidance. We introduce ProtocolBench, a benchmark that systematically compares agent protocols along four measurable axes: task success, end-to-end latency, message or byte overhead, and robustness under failures. On ProtocolBench, protocol choice significantly influences system behavior. In the Streaming Queue scenario, overall completion time varies by up to 36.5% across protocols, and mean end-to-end latency differs by 3.48 s. Under Fail-Storm Recovery, resilience also differs consistently across protocols. Beyond evaluation, we present ProtocolRouter, a learnable protocol router that selects per-scenario (or per-module) protocols from requirement and runtime signals. ProtocolRouter reduces Fail-Storm recovery time by up to 18.1% versus the best single-protocol baseline, and achieves scenario-specific gains such as higher success in GAIA. We also release ProtocolRouterBench to standardize protocol evaluation and improve reliability at scale.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has shown promise in training agentic models that move beyond static benchmarks to engage in dynamic, multi-turn interactions. Yet, the ultimate value of such agents lies in their ability to assist users, a setting where diversity and dynamics of user interaction pose challenges. In this work, we propose UserRL, a unified framework for training and evaluating user-centric abilities through standardized gym environments paired with simulated users. We systematically vary turn-level reward assignment and trajectory-level score calculation to analyze how different formulations affect learning under the GRPO algorithm. Our experiments across Qwen3 models reveal three key findings: (i) SFT cold start is critical for unlocking initial interaction ability and enabling sustained RL improvements; (ii) deliberate trajectory scoring yields more efficient and effective multi-turn interactions; and (iii) while stronger simulated users (e.g., GPT-4o) facilitates training, open-source simulators (e.g., Qwen3-32B) remain a cost-effective and transferable option. Together, these results highlight that careful design of reward shaping and user simulation choice is as crucial as model scale, and establish UserRL as a practical pathway for developing robust user-centric agentic models. All codes and data are public for future research.

Deploying LLMs in multi-turn dialogues facilitates jailbreak attacks that distribute harmful intent across seemingly benign turns. Recent training-based multi-turn jailbreak methods learn long-horizon attack strategies from interaction feedback, but often rely on coarse trajectory-level outcome signals that broadcast uniformly to every turn. However, we find that turn-level contributions in multi-turn jailbreaking are non-uniform, phase-dependent, and target-specific. Such coarse outcome supervision induces a credit assignment problem, leading to over-rewarding redundant turns in successful trajectories and under-crediting useful intermediate turns in failed ones. To address this, we propose TRACE, a turn-aware credit assignment framework for reinforcement learning (RL)-based multi-turn jailbreaking. For successful trajectories, TRACE estimates turn-level contributions via leave-one-turn-out semantic masking; for failed ones, TRACE assigns penalties based on prompt harmfulness and semantic relevance, with an additional local refusal-aware penalty. Furthermore, we reuse the attack-side credit signal for multi-turn defense alignment. Extensive experiments on open-source and closed-source targets show that TRACE achieves strong overall performance in effectiveness, transferability, and efficiency, yielding about a 25% relative improvement in attack success rate over the strongest RL baseline while also improving the safety-utility balance when reused for defense alignment.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has re-emerged as a natural approach for training interactive LLM agents in real-world environments. However, directly applying the widely used Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm to multi-turn tasks exposes notable limitations, particularly in scenarios requiring long-horizon reasoning. To address these challenges, we investigate more stable and effective advantage estimation strategies, especially for multi-turn settings. We first explore Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) as an alternative and find it to be more robust than GRPO. To further enhance PPO in multi-turn scenarios, we introduce turn-PPO, a variant that operates on a turn-level MDP formulation, as opposed to the commonly used token-level MDP. Our results on the WebShop and Sokoban datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of turn-PPO, both with and without long reasoning components.

Red-teaming has been a widely adopted way to evaluate the harmfulness of Large Language Models (LLMs). It aims to jailbreak a model's safety behavior to make it act as a helpful agent disregarding the harmfulness of the query. Existing methods are primarily based on input text-based red-teaming such as adversarial prompts, low-resource prompts, or contextualized prompts to condition the model in a way to bypass its safe behavior. Bypassing the guardrails uncovers hidden harmful information and biases in the model that are left untreated or newly introduced by its safety training. However, prompt-based attacks fail to provide such a diagnosis owing to their low attack success rate, and applicability to specific models. In this paper, we present a new perspective on LLM safety research i.e., parametric red-teaming through Unalignment. It simply (instruction) tunes the model parameters to break model guardrails that are not deeply rooted in the model's behavior. Unalignment using as few as 100 examples can significantly bypass commonly referred to as CHATGPT, to the point where it responds with an 88% success rate to harmful queries on two safety benchmark datasets. On open-source models such as VICUNA-7B and LLAMA-2-CHAT 7B AND 13B, it shows an attack success rate of more than 91%. On bias evaluations, Unalignment exposes inherent biases in safety-aligned models such as CHATGPT and LLAMA- 2-CHAT where the model's responses are strongly biased and opinionated 64% of the time.

Privileged on-policy distillation provides dense supervision for multi-turn agents by allowing a synchronized teacher to re-score the student's response at every turn with access to training-only references, such as successful trajectories. In interactive environments, however, the student's preceding actions continually change the execution state. As the student takes different actions or completes subgoals in a different order, its rollout may reach states not covered by the reference, making the reference an unreliable source of guidance for the state actually reached. Applying privileged distillation indiscriminately therefore creates state--reference mismatch. This mismatch motivates a central objective: providing privileged reference guidance that remains compatible with the student's current execution state. We introduce State-Matched Routing and Contextualized Self-Distillation (SMRC-SD), which explicitly determines when and how a privileged trajectory should guide an on-policy student. At each turn, SMRC-SD verifies whether the student's current execution state matches a supported state along the reference trajectory. Distillation is applied only at matched states, filtering out turns for which the reference lacks locally compatible guidance. For each matched state, SMRC-SD further constructs state-conditioned teacher context from the successful trajectory, grounding supervision in the state actually reached. Across ALFWorld and WebShop, SMRC-SD consistently outperforms unconditional successful full-path distillation. With Qwen3-1.7B, it improves task success from 0.746 to 0.865 on ALFWorld and from 0.574 to 0.693 on WebShop. Controlled routing and context ablations support both selecting locally supported turns and constructing state-compatible teacher context as contributors to these gains. Code is available at https://github.com/liujunzhuo/SMRC-SD.

This position paper argues that the field of LLM agents requires a unified, telecom-inspired communication protocol to ensure safety, interoperability, and scalability, especially within the context of Next Generation (NextG) networks. Current ad-hoc communication methods are creating a fragmented ecosystem, reminiscent of the early "protocol wars" in networking, which stifles innovation and poses significant risks. Drawing inspiration from the layered, standardized protocols that underpin modern telecommunications, we propose the LLM-Agent Communication Protocol (LACP). LACP establishes a three-layer architecture designed to ensure semantic clarity in communication, transactional integrity for complex tasks, and robust, built-in security. In this position paper, we argue that adopting a principled, universal protocol is not merely beneficial but essential for realizing the potential of distributed AI. Such a standard is critical for ensuring that multi-agent systems can operate safely and reliably in the complex, real-time applications envisioned for 6G and beyond.

Full-duplex speech models are trained to converse with a person, but they are increasingly made to converse with each other, in self-play data generation, agent societies, and model-based evaluation. In that loop no human absorbs a timing error: each model's turn-taking is the other's input. We ask what timing the loop settles into. Two PersonaPlex-7B instances exchange audio tokens on a shared clock in unscripted conversation, and one floor-transfer rule is applied to them and to Switchboard. Their timing is coupled: re-pairing speakers across conversations destroys it. But the floor changes hands late, at a median of 400-560 ms against 137 ms for humans, and the last 120 ms of the partner's turn, where human projection places a tenth of its transfers, holds 1% of theirs. Delaying one direction of the channel shifts the response one-for-one and leaves the run-up to it empty, consistent with a reactive wait after the perceived end rather than the turn-end projection human timing requires.

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) debate is often evaluated by whether final answers improve, but movement is not necessarily improvement: the same discussion can rescue an initially wrong majority or destroy an initially correct one. Standard final-accuracy evaluations conflate these opposing mechanisms. We introduce an auditable protocol for homogeneous debate on multiple-choice questions (MCQs) that records each run as a transition ledger over collapse, correction, onset, and signed intervention utility. On 6,925 MMLU-Pro debates, the protocol identifies 253 collapses and a parallel correction ledger that changes how interventions should be judged. Replay experiments reveal the central tradeoff: a leave-one-model-out probe-gated freeze prevents 29 collapses but loses 108 corrections under equal weights, so collapse prevention alone can recommend the wrong policy. A compact pre-debate 8-probe screen is a triage signal: its unadjusted family-level association with conditional-collapse risk is high (G=7, Spearman rho=0.893, exact two-sided p=0.0123), but initial-majority accuracy is a close comparator (rho=0.821; family partial rho=0.767, p=0.0877), so we do not treat it as calibrated or capability-adjusted prediction. Round-level traces localize many collapses to the first debate round, where early disagreement can precede both harmful cascades and useful recovery. We release replayable schemas, coders, audits, cost cards, and zero-API rebuild scripts so future model-scaffold rows can be compared under the same denominators and signed utility ledger.

Current full-duplex (FD) spoken dialogue systems can produce fluid interactions, yet it remains unclear whether they can adapt their turn-taking behavior when explicitly instructed. This is critical for real-world deployment, where conversational policies vary across applications (e.g., proactive tutoring vs. passive counseling). We introduce Instruct-FD, an instruction-conditioned benchmark for evaluating controllable turn management in FD systems. To enable this, we develop a human-validated, scalable synthetic pipeline that generates instruction-conditioned conversations, along with a deployment-agnostic multi-turn evaluation protocol and an LLM-based judge. Benchmarking six state-of-the-art full-duplex systems reveals a substantial gap in instruction-following turn management: the best model achieves only 64.4% adherence. Performance is highly uneven across behaviors and scenarios, with proactive behaviors such as model backchanneling and interruption remaining particularly challenging. These findings establish instruction-following turn management as a crucial direction for building adaptable and deployable full-duplex dialogue systems.

Multi-turn jailbreak attacks have emerged as a critical safety threat to LLMs, as harmful objectives are decomposed across a sequence of apparently benign turns to bypass guardrails. Existing defenses lack the reasoning capacity to identify evolving manipulation patterns, often trading helpfulness for safety by over-refusing benign requests related to sensitive topics. We introduce Trace, a multi-turn defense with trajectory-aware structured reasoning. Before generating each response, the model identifies manipulation cues from the trajectory, evaluates both the benign and adversarial interpretations of user intent, assigns a jailbreak score, and commits to an action: Allow, Caution, or Decline. We curate 4k multi-turn adversarial conversations from five attack frameworks, pair them with 2.4k benign dialogs, and 600 sensitive-but-benign conversations. We train Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct with SFT and GRPO under a multi-component reward that jointly optimizes helpfulness on benign prompts and robustness against jailbreak attempts. Across seven multi-turn attack benchmarks, Trace attains an average attack success rate (ASR) of 14.5% against 31.4% for the strongest baseline and 74.9% for the undefended target, while significantly raising the attacker effort required per successful jailbreak. Trace also balances usability and safety, achieving a 93.3% average compliance on over-refusal benchmarks.

Speech-to-speech models handle turn-taking naturally but offer limited support for tool-calling or complex reasoning, while production ASR-LLM-TTS voice pipelines offer these capabilities but rely on silence timeouts, which lead to unnatural turn-taking. We present DualTurn, which narrows this gap through generative pretraining on dual-channel conversational audio. The model generates both speakers' future audio autoregressively, implicitly learning conversational dynamics without any labels, and is then fine-tuned to predict interpretable turn-taking signals that map directly to agent actions. DualTurn monitors both channels continuously, anticipating turn boundaries and producing five agent actions. On standard benchmarks, DualTurn (0.5B) outperforms both VAP on agent action prediction (wF1 0.633 vs. 0.389) and a 3.1B audio-text model on word-level turn prediction (AUC 0.930 vs. 0.880), while anticipating turn boundaries earlier with fewer interruptions.

Training multi-turn agentic workflows with reinforcement learning (RL) enables large language models to perform complex reasoning, use external tools, and conduct iterative search beyond single-turn settings. Yet multi-turn RL training remains highly unstable, often causing severe performance degradation as the number of turns increases. Through theoretical analysis, we identify three tightly coupled sources of instability: rollout-training context mismatch, weak turn-level credit assignment under sparse terminal rewards, and asynchronous policy drift when short and long trajectories are optimized under different policy versions. We show that these issues share a common structural origin in flattened trajectory optimization and address them through a unified reverse-turn formulation. We propose Reverse-Turn Policy Optimization (RTPO), which organizes multi-turn rollouts as sparse reverse trees and performs turn-level policy updates in temporal reverse order, aligning each decision with its downstream continuation. RTPO enables causally consistent turn-level credit assignment and on-policy continuation to control asynchronous drift. We provide theoretical guarantees showing that RTPO eliminates context mismatch and asynchronous drift under the proposed turn-level formulation, reduces credit bias, and converges to recursive optimality. Experiments on multi-turn agentic RL benchmarks show that RTPO improves upon trajectory- and turn-level baselines by 21.50% and 10.76%, respectively, highlighting its potential to support more stable training for tool-using agents.

Traffic simulation tools, such as SUMO, are essential for urban mobility research. However, such tools remain challenging for users due to complex manual workflows involving network download, demand generation, simulation setup, and result analysis. In this paper, we introduce SUMO-MCP, a novel platform that not only wraps SUMO' s core utilities into a unified tool suite but also provides additional auxiliary utilities for common preprocessing and postprocessing tasks. Using SUMO-MCP, users can issue simple natural-language prompts to generate traffic scenarios from OpenStreetMap data, create demand from origin-destination matrices or random patterns, run batch simulations with multiple signal-control strategies, perform comparative analyses with automated reporting, and detect congestion for signal-timing optimization. Furthermore, the platform allows flexible custom workflows by dynamically combining exposed SUMO tools without additional coding. Experiments demonstrate that SUMO-MCP significantly makes traffic simulation more accessible and reliable for researchers. We will release code for SUMO-MCP at https://github.com/ycycycl/SUMO-MCP in the future.

Multi-turn interactions with language models (LMs) pose critical safety risks, as harmful intent can be strategically spread across exchanges. Yet, the vast majority of prior work has focused on single-turn safety, while adaptability and diversity remain among the key challenges of multi-turn red-teaming. To address these challenges, we present X-Teaming, a scalable framework that systematically explores how seemingly harmless interactions escalate into harmful outcomes and generates corresponding attack scenarios. X-Teaming employs collaborative agents for planning, attack optimization, and verification, achieving state-of-the-art multi-turn jailbreak effectiveness and diversity with success rates up to 98.1% across representative leading open-weight and closed-source models. In particular, X-Teaming achieves a 96.2% attack success rate against the latest Claude 3.7 Sonnet model, which has been considered nearly immune to single-turn attacks. Building on X-Teaming, we introduce XGuard-Train, an open-source multi-turn safety training dataset that is 20x larger than the previous best resource, comprising 30K interactive jailbreaks, designed to enable robust multi-turn safety alignment for LMs. Our work offers essential tools and insights for mitigating sophisticated conversational attacks, advancing the multi-turn safety of LMs.

Mobility simulation supports logistics, safety, and communications planning in industrial environments such as ports, mines, and airports. Existing trajectory models, however, rely on absolute coordinates, road-network tokens, or semantic zones: representations that are site-specific and not well suited to unstructured industrial terrain. We introduce the Industrial Kinematic Trajectory Model (IKTM), a coordinate-free trajectory generator that represents industrial vehicle motion through kinematic sequences (speed and heading change) with no absolute spatial reference. IKTM uses an autoregressive causal transformer with probabilistic mixture heads and extends our prior coordinate-free Markovian model with deep sequence modelling and an explicit duration-conditioning signal. Trained on one site and evaluated zero-shot on three unseen sites, it matches the small-turn shape of the empirical turn-rate distributions of held-out telematics; across all four sites, the per-site mean Jensen-Shannon divergence over 100 sampling seeds spans approximately 0.035-0.050 bits under an oracle-length duration-target protocol and approximately 0.032-0.042 bits under a fully zero-shot prior-length protocol, with similar ranges whether out-of-distribution (OOD) duration targets are drawn from each held-out site's empirical length distribution or from the Site A prior. Both protocols stay above the metric's sampling-noise floor (<=0.0049 bits). Paired by site, the oracle-length values are 5.3-6.0x lower than those of a re-implementation of our prior Markovian model under the same 1 Hz protocol. Termination is duration-conditioned rather than spatial: rollouts stop on 100% of trials with a length-tracking error of +0.0 +/- 0.0 s against the sampled target (100 of 100 exactly on target; N=100, T=0.2, untouched in-distribution test split).

Full-duplex interaction is crucial for natural human-machine communication, yet remains challenging as it requires robust turn-taking detection to decide when the system should speak, listen, or remain silent. Existing solutions either rely on dedicated turn-taking models, most of which are not open-sourced. The few available ones are limited by their large parameter size or by supporting only a single modality, such as acoustic or linguistic. Alternatively, some approaches finetune LLM backbones to enable full-duplex capability, but this requires large amounts of full-duplex data, which remain scarce in open-source form. To address these issues, we propose Easy Turn, an open-source, modular turn-taking detection model that integrates acoustic and linguistic bimodal information to predict four dialogue turn states: complete, incomplete, backchannel, and wait, accompanied by the release of Easy Turn trainset, a 1,145-hour speech dataset designed for training turn-taking detection models. Compared to existing open-source models like TEN Turn Detection and Smart Turn V2, our model achieves state-of-the-art turn-taking detection accuracy on our open-source Easy Turn testset. The data and model will be made publicly available on GitHub.

Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety alignment and elicit harmful responses. A growing body of work shows that contextual priming, where earlier turns covertly bias later replies, constitutes a powerful attack surface, with hand-crafted multi-turn scaffolds consistently outperforming single-turn manipulations on capable models. However, automated optimization-based red-teaming has remained largely limited to the single-turn setting, iterating over static prompts and lacking the ability to reason about which forms of conversational priming induce compliance. While recent multi-turn, search-based approaches have begun to bridge this gap, the mutator design space underlying effective primed dialogues remains largely unexplored. We present ContextualJailbreak, a black-box red-teaming strategy that performs evolutionary search over a simulated multi-turn primed dialogue. The strategy leverages a graded 0-5 harm score from a two-level judge as an in-loop signal, enabling partially harmful responses to guide the search process rather than being discarded. Search is driven by five semantically defined mutation operators: roleplay, scenario, expand, troubleshooting, and mechanistic, of which the last two are novel contributions of this work. Across 50 representative HarmBench behaviors, ContextualJailbreak achieves an ASR of 100% on gpt-oss:20B, 100% on qwen3-8B, 100% on llama3.1:70B, and 90% on gpt-oss:120B, outperforming four single- and multi-turn baselines by 31-96 percentage points on average. The 40 maximally harmful attacks discovered against gpt-oss:120B transfer without adaptation to closed frontier models, achieving 90.0% on gpt-4o-mini, 70.0% on gpt-5, and 70.0% on gemini-3-flash, but only 17.5% on claude-opus-4-7 and 15.0% on claude-sonnet-4-6, revealing a pronounced provider-level asymmetry in alignment robustness.

Speakers in natural conversation take turns speaking and listening, deciding in real time when to take, hold, or yield the floor. However, turn-taking evaluation remains limited due to the lack of a consistent, linguistically grounded evaluation protocol and hand-annotated data covering diverse conversation types. To address this, we present TurnBench, a multi-domain benchmark that pairs a 30-hour, hand-labeled corpus of dyadic human conversation with a standardized evaluation protocol for end-of-turn and interruption detection. We set conversation type as a controllable experimental variable, covering six distinct interaction styles, and triple-annotate each conversation. Benchmarking 14 heterogeneous turn-taking systems, we find end-of-turn recall stable across types, while interruption false positives are strongly type-dependent and concentrated in backchannel-dense interaction styles. Although in smooth floor transfers human listeners begin speaking a median 151 ms before the current turn ends, no current system performs equivalently without incurring excessive false positives. We release our corpus, a 104-hour training set, and a public leaderboard with an interactive dataset viewer at https://turnbench.sesame.com