new

Get trending papers in your email inbox!

Subscribe

Daily Papers

byAK and the research community

Oct 22

Does Unlearning Survive Collaboration? Robust Unlearning for Shared-Model LLM Teams

LLM unlearning is essential for removing sensitive or unwanted knowledge while preserving useful capabilities. As LLM teams are increasingly used to solve complex problems, forgetting must remain effective during collaboration. Despite advances in forgetting effectiveness, efficiency, and robustness to relearning, team deployment remains underexplored. We find that collaboration weakens forgetting: final-answer evaluations miss recoverable evidence in team messages, including complementary clues supporting joint recovery. We establish theoretically and confirm empirically that controlling final answers or individual messages does not ensure low recovery from their combination. To address this challenge, we propose Aggregation-Conditioned Unlearning (ACU). ACU trains a shared model using reconstruction feedback from individual and pooled messages, prioritizes views with higher recovery risk, and uses replacement-based credit assignment while protecting direct and collaborative utility. TOFU evaluates trajectory-level recovery, while WMDP-bio tests native forgetting and retained utility. On TOFU, ACU lowers full-trajectory recovery from 41.8% to 19.3% in ROUGE-L recall and factual recovery from 34.2% to 18.7% versus output-supervised training, with comparable retained-task performance. These results demonstrate that ACU curbs information leakage in LLM teams and generalizes across team sizes and readers.

  • 8 authors
·
Oct 18

Towards Architectural-Level Safety Control: Relocating Hazardous Knowledge into Removable Experts in Mixture-of-Experts Models

Large language models acquire broad knowledge from web-scale corpora during pretraining, including knowledge that could be hazardous if misused. Removing such knowledge from the model itself without degrading general capability is desirable but difficult, as it is deeply entangled with general capability within the same parameters. Existing safety alignment and unlearning methods typically adjust these shared parameters, tending to suppress the expression of hazardous knowledge rather than remove it. As a result, the knowledge remains in the model and is readily recoverable by subsequent fine-tuning. To address this limitation, we propose REX (Relocating into Removable EXperts), a knowledge relocation method that separates hazardous knowledge from general capability at the architectural level. Exploiting the modular structure of Mixture-of-Experts models, REX expands the model with a set of new, physically removable experts designated to hold hazardous knowledge. Through expert expansion, selective gradient masking and routing differentiation, it relocates hazardous knowledge out of the original experts and concentrates it in the new ones. Excising these new experts yields a model suitable for public release. This removal holds consistently across Intern-S2, Qwen3.5-35B-A3B and Gemma-4-26B-A4B; on Qwen3.5-35B-A3B, for instance, excision lowers WMDP-Bio accuracy by 48.4 points while MMLU changes by less than 3 points. The excised model matches the strongest of nine unlearning baselines in removing hazardous knowledge, and it is the only one that preserves this removal under subsequent fine-tuning. After 250M tokens of standard fine-tuning on Qwen3.5, the best baseline rebounds on WMDP-Bio from 44.1% to 78.3%, whereas REX rises only from 32.4% to 42.8%.

  • 11 authors
·
Oct 18

The WMDP Benchmark: Measuring and Reducing Malicious Use With Unlearning

The White House Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence highlights the risks of large language models (LLMs) empowering malicious actors in developing biological, cyber, and chemical weapons. To measure these risks of malicious use, government institutions and major AI labs are developing evaluations for hazardous capabilities in LLMs. However, current evaluations are private, preventing further research into mitigating risk. Furthermore, they focus on only a few, highly specific pathways for malicious use. To fill these gaps, we publicly release the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy (WMDP) benchmark, a dataset of 4,157 multiple-choice questions that serve as a proxy measurement of hazardous knowledge in biosecurity, cybersecurity, and chemical security. WMDP was developed by a consortium of academics and technical consultants, and was stringently filtered to eliminate sensitive information prior to public release. WMDP serves two roles: first, as an evaluation for hazardous knowledge in LLMs, and second, as a benchmark for unlearning methods to remove such hazardous knowledge. To guide progress on unlearning, we develop CUT, a state-of-the-art unlearning method based on controlling model representations. CUT reduces model performance on WMDP while maintaining general capabilities in areas such as biology and computer science, suggesting that unlearning may be a concrete path towards reducing malicious use from LLMs. We release our benchmark and code publicly at https://wmdp.ai

  • 53 authors
·
Mar 5, 2024