Daily Papers

Recent research demonstrates the effectiveness of using pretrained language models (PLM) to improve dense retrieval and multilingual dense retrieval. In this work, we present a simple but effective monolingual pretraining task called contrastive context prediction~(CCP) to learn sentence representation by modeling sentence level contextual relation. By pushing the embedding of sentences in a local context closer and pushing random negative samples away, different languages could form isomorphic structure, then sentence pairs in two different languages will be automatically aligned. Our experiments show that model collapse and information leakage are very easy to happen during contrastive training of language model, but language-specific memory bank and asymmetric batch normalization operation play an essential role in preventing collapsing and information leakage, respectively. Besides, a post-processing for sentence embedding is also very effective to achieve better retrieval performance. On the multilingual sentence retrieval task Tatoeba, our model achieves new SOTA results among methods without using bilingual data. Our model also shows larger gain on Tatoeba when transferring between non-English pairs. On two multi-lingual query-passage retrieval tasks, XOR Retrieve and Mr.TYDI, our model even achieves two SOTA results in both zero-shot and supervised setting among all pretraining models using bilingual data.

Dense retrieval models have predominantly been studied for English, where models have shown great success, due to the availability of human-labeled training pairs. However, there has been limited success for multilingual retrieval so far, as training data is uneven or scarcely available across multiple languages. Synthetic training data generation is promising (e.g., InPars or Promptagator), but has been investigated only for English. Therefore, to study model capabilities across both cross-lingual and monolingual retrieval tasks, we develop SWIM-IR, a synthetic retrieval training dataset containing 33 (high to very-low resource) languages for training multilingual dense retrieval models without requiring any human supervision. To construct SWIM-IR, we propose SAP (summarize-then-ask prompting), where the large language model (LLM) generates a textual summary prior to the query generation step. SAP assists the LLM in generating informative queries in the target language. Using SWIM-IR, we explore synthetic fine-tuning of multilingual dense retrieval models and evaluate them robustly on three retrieval benchmarks: XOR-Retrieve (cross-lingual), XTREME-UP (cross-lingual) and MIRACL (monolingual). Our models, called SWIM-X, are competitive with human-supervised dense retrieval models, e.g., mContriever, finding that SWIM-IR can cheaply substitute for expensive human-labeled retrieval training data.

We present DR.DECR (Dense Retrieval with Distillation-Enhanced Cross-Lingual Representation), a new cross-lingual information retrieval (CLIR) system trained using multi-stage knowledge distillation (KD). The teacher of DR.DECR relies on a highly effective but computationally expensive two-stage inference process consisting of query translation and monolingual IR, while the student, DR.DECR, executes a single CLIR step. We teach DR.DECR powerful multilingual representations as well as CLIR by optimizing two corresponding KD objectives. Learning useful representations of non-English text from an English-only retriever is accomplished through a cross-lingual token alignment algorithm that relies on the representation capabilities of the underlying multilingual encoders. In both in-domain and zero-shot out-of-domain evaluation, DR.DECR demonstrates far superior accuracy over direct fine-tuning with labeled CLIR data. It is also the best single-model retriever on the XOR-TyDi benchmark at the time of this writing.

This paper introduces the first two-dimensional XOR-based secret sharing scheme for layered multipath communication networks. We present a construction that guarantees successful message recovery and perfect privacy when an adversary observes and disrupts any single path at each transmission layer. The scheme achieves information-theoretic security using only bitwise XOR operations with linear O(|S|) complexity, where |S| is the message length. We provide mathematical proofs demonstrating that the scheme maintains unconditional security regardless of computational resources available to adversaries. Unlike encryption-based approaches vulnerable to quantum computing advances, our construction offers provable security suitable for resource-constrained military environments where computational assumptions may fail.

African languages have far less in-language content available digitally, making it challenging for question answering systems to satisfy the information needs of users. Cross-lingual open-retrieval question answering (XOR QA) systems -- those that retrieve answer content from other languages while serving people in their native language -- offer a means of filling this gap. To this end, we create AfriQA, the first cross-lingual QA dataset with a focus on African languages. AfriQA includes 12,000+ XOR QA examples across 10 African languages. While previous datasets have focused primarily on languages where cross-lingual QA augments coverage from the target language, AfriQA focuses on languages where cross-lingual answer content is the only high-coverage source of answer content. Because of this, we argue that African languages are one of the most important and realistic use cases for XOR QA. Our experiments demonstrate the poor performance of automatic translation and multilingual retrieval methods. Overall, AfriQA proves challenging for state-of-the-art QA models. We hope that the dataset enables the development of more equitable QA technology.

The widespread lack of broad source code verification on blockchain explorers such as Etherscan, where despite 78,047,845 smart contracts deployed on Ethereum (as of May 26, 2025), a mere 767,520 (< 1%) are open source, presents a severe impediment to blockchain security. This opacity necessitates the automated semantic analysis of on-chain smart contract bytecode, a fundamental research challenge with direct implications for identifying vulnerabilities and understanding malicious behavior. Prevailing decompilers struggle to reverse bytecode in a readable manner, often yielding convoluted code that critically hampers vulnerability analysis and thwarts efforts to dissect contract functionalities for security auditing. This paper addresses this challenge by introducing a pioneering decompilation pipeline that, for the first time, successfully leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to transform Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode into human-readable and semantically faithful Solidity code. Our novel methodology first employs rigorous static program analysis to convert bytecode into a structured three-address code (TAC) representation. This intermediate representation then guides a Llama-3.2-3B model, specifically fine-tuned on a comprehensive dataset of 238,446 TAC-to-Solidity function pairs, to generate high-quality Solidity. This approach uniquely recovers meaningful variable names, intricate control flow, and precise function signatures. Our extensive empirical evaluation demonstrates a significant leap beyond traditional decompilers, achieving an average semantic similarity of 0.82 with original source and markedly superior readability. The practical viability and effectiveness of our research are demonstrated through its implementation in a publicly accessible system, available at https://evmdecompiler.com.

Instruction-following retrievers have been widely adopted alongside LLMs in real-world applications, but little work has investigated the safety risks surrounding their increasing search capabilities. We empirically study the ability of retrievers to satisfy malicious queries, both when used directly and when used in a retrieval augmented generation-based setup. Concretely, we investigate six leading retrievers, including NV-Embed and LLM2Vec, and find that given malicious requests, most retrievers can (for >50% of queries) select relevant harmful passages. For example, LLM2Vec correctly selects passages for 61.35% of our malicious queries. We further uncover an emerging risk with instruction-following retrievers, where highly relevant harmful information can be surfaced by exploiting their instruction-following capabilities. Finally, we show that even safety-aligned LLMs, such as Llama3, can satisfy malicious requests when provided with harmful retrieved passages in-context. In summary, our findings underscore the malicious misuse risks associated with increasing retriever capability.

Although LLM inference has emerged as a critical workload for many downstream applications, efficiently inferring LLMs is challenging due to the substantial memory footprint and bandwidth requirements. In parallel, compute capabilities have steadily outpaced both memory capacity and bandwidth over the last few decades, a trend that remains evident in modern GPU hardware and exacerbates the challenge of LLM inference. As such, new algorithms are emerging that trade increased computation for reduced memory operations. To that end, we present XQuant, which takes advantage of this trend, enabling an order-of-magnitude reduction in memory consumption through low-bit quantization with substantial accuracy benefits relative to state-of-the-art KV cache quantization methods. We accomplish this by quantizing and caching the layer input activations X, instead of using standard KV caching, and then rematerializing the Keys and Values on-the-fly during inference. This results in an immediate 2times memory savings compared to KV caching. By applying XQuant, we achieve up to sim 7.7times memory savings with <0.1 perplexity degradation compared to the FP16 baseline. Furthermore, our approach leverages the fact that X values are similar across layers. Building on this observation, we introduce XQuant-CL, which exploits the cross-layer similarity in the X embeddings for extreme compression. Across different models, XQuant-CL attains up to 10times memory savings relative to the FP16 baseline with only 0.01 perplexity degradation, and 12.5times memory savings with only 0.1 perplexity degradation. XQuant exploits the rapidly increasing compute capabilities of hardware platforms to eliminate the memory bottleneck, while surpassing state-of-the-art KV cache quantization methods and achieving near-FP16 accuracy across a wide range of models.

We report a way to make a frozen small language model both more capable and dramatically cheaper at once, without changing any weights. Verified knowledge is deposited once as a byte-exact key-value (KV) state artifact and later restored, by graft, into a fresh inference context. The restore is bit-exact: under a pinned deterministic configuration, the grafted logits are byte-for-byte identical to a fresh computation (SHA-256 equality), with zero KL divergence and 100% argmax agreement over fifty samples. We show that own-position graft is the unique numerically exact operating point on a model with floating-point rotary encoding, and we verify byte-exactness on two model scales (12B, 31B) and two GPU targets, one through a pre-registered replay. On AIME 2025, a frozen Gemma-4-12B moves from 80.0% to 93.3% once a verified solution library is grafted, above its own 77.5% and its 31B sibling's 89.2% published anchors. On the recurring case, eight problems the base model never solves within a 401,026-token budget are answered from cached verified solutions in 61 total decode tokens, a factor of 6,574 fewer tokens and about 8,700x less energy; the capability claim proper rests on held-out transfer (7 of 7 at 31B). The same byte-exact store widens usable context from 32,768 to 2,854,766 tokens at zero extra accelerator memory, and moves byte-identical between machines of the same architecture. We describe the system at the behavior level; the engine is proprietary, and every reported number is backed by committed input and output hashes so the scoring can be re-checked without it.

In this work, we consider the optimization process of minibatch stochastic gradient descent (SGD) on a 2-layer neural network with data separated by a quadratic ground truth function. We prove that with data drawn from the d-dimensional Boolean hypercube labeled by the quadratic ``XOR'' function y = -x_ix_j, it is possible to train to a population error o(1) with d :polylog(d) samples. Our result considers simultaneously training both layers of the two-layer-neural network with ReLU activations via standard minibatch SGD on the logistic loss. To our knowledge, this work is the first to give a sample complexity of O(d) for efficiently learning the XOR function on isotropic data on a standard neural network with standard training. Our main technique is showing that the network evolves in two phases: a signal-finding phase where the network is small and many of the neurons evolve independently to find features, and a signal-heavy phase, where SGD maintains and balances the features. We leverage the simultaneous training of the layers to show that it is sufficient for only a small fraction of the neurons to learn features, since those neurons will be amplified by the simultaneous growth of their second layer weights.

Language model inversion seeks to recover hidden prompts using only language model outputs. This capability has implications for security and accountability in language model deployments, such as leaking private information from an API-protected language model's system message. We propose a new method -- prompt inversion from logprob sequences (PILS) -- that recovers hidden prompts by gleaning clues from the model's next-token probabilities over the course of multiple generation steps. Our method is enabled by a key insight: The vector-valued outputs of a language model occupy a low-dimensional subspace. This enables us to losslessly compress the full next-token probability distribution over multiple generation steps using a linear map, allowing more output information to be used for inversion. Our approach yields massive gains over previous state-of-the-art methods for recovering hidden prompts, achieving 2--3.5 times higher exact recovery rates across test sets, in one case increasing the recovery rate from 17% to 60%. Our method also exhibits surprisingly good generalization behavior; for instance, an inverter trained on 16 generations steps gets 5--27 points higher prompt recovery when we increase the number of steps to 32 at test time. Furthermore, we demonstrate strong performance of our method on the more challenging task of recovering hidden system messages. We also analyze the role of verbatim repetition in prompt recovery and propose a new method for cross-family model transfer for logit-based inverters. Our findings show that next-token probabilities are a considerably more vulnerable attack surface for inversion attacks than previously known.

Recent works have suggested that In-Context Learning (ICL) operates in dual modes, i.e. task retrieval (remember learned patterns from pre-training) and task learning (inference-time ``learning'' from demonstrations). However, disentangling these the two modes remains a challenging goal. We introduce ICL CIPHERS, a class of task reformulations based on substitution ciphers borrowed from classic cryptography. In this approach, a subset of tokens in the in-context inputs are substituted with other (irrelevant) tokens, rendering English sentences less comprehensible to human eye. However, by design, there is a latent, fixed pattern to this substitution, making it reversible. This bijective (reversible) cipher ensures that the task remains a well-defined task in some abstract sense, despite the transformations. It is a curious question if LLMs can solve ICL CIPHERS with a BIJECTIVE mapping, which requires deciphering the latent cipher. We show that LLMs are better at solving ICL CIPHERS with BIJECTIVE mappings than the NON-BIJECTIVE (irreversible) baseline, providing a novel approach to quantify ``learning'' in ICL. While this gap is small, it is consistent across the board on four datasets and six models. Finally, we examine LLMs' internal representations and identify evidence in their ability to decode the ciphered inputs.

Parallel Speculative Decoding (PSD) accelerates traditional Speculative Decoding (SD) by overlapping draft generation with verification. However, it remains hampered by two fundamental challenges: (1) a theoretical speedup ceiling dictated by the speed ratio between the draft and target models, and (2) high computational waste and pipeline stall due to mid-sequence token rejections of early errors. To address these limitations, we introduce Double (Double Retrieval Speculative Parallelism). By bridging the gap between SD and PSD, our framework resolves the Retrieval Precision-Efficiency Dilemma through a novel synchronous mechanism. Specifically, we enable the draft model to execute iterative retrieval speculations to break the theoretical speedup limits; to alleviate rejections without rollback, the target model performs authoritative retrieval to generate multi-token guidance. Double is entirely training-free and lossless. Extensive experiments demonstrate state-of-the-art speedup of 5.3times on LLaMA3.3-70B and 2.8times on Qwen3-32B, significantly outperforming the advanced method EAGLE-3 that requires extensive model training.

Repository-level code completion aims to generate code for unfinished code snippets within the context of a specified repository. Existing approaches mainly rely on retrieval-augmented generation strategies due to limitations in input sequence length. However, traditional lexical-based retrieval methods like BM25 struggle to capture code semantics, while model-based retrieval methods face challenges due to the lack of labeled data for training. Therefore, we propose RLCoder, a novel reinforcement learning framework, which can enable the retriever to learn to retrieve useful content for code completion without the need for labeled data. Specifically, we iteratively evaluate the usefulness of retrieved content based on the perplexity of the target code when provided with the retrieved content as additional context, and provide feedback to update the retriever parameters. This iterative process enables the retriever to learn from its successes and failures, gradually improving its ability to retrieve relevant and high-quality content. Considering that not all situations require information beyond code files and not all retrieved context is helpful for generation, we also introduce a stop signal mechanism, allowing the retriever to decide when to retrieve and which candidates to retain autonomously. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that RLCoder consistently outperforms state-of-the-art methods on CrossCodeEval and RepoEval, achieving 12.2% EM improvement over previous methods. Moreover, experiments show that our framework can generalize across different programming languages and further improve previous methods like RepoCoder. We provide the code and data at https://github.com/DeepSoftwareAnalytics/RLCoder.

We present quantum circuits to implement an exhaustive key search for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and analyze the quantum resources required to carry out such an attack. We consider the overall circuit size, the number of qubits, and the circuit depth as measures for the cost of the presented quantum algorithms. Throughout, we focus on Clifford+T gates as the underlying fault-tolerant logical quantum gate set. In particular, for all three variants of AES (key size 128, 192, and 256 bit) that are standardized in FIPS-PUB 197, we establish precise bounds for the number of qubits and the number of elementary logical quantum gates that are needed to implement Grover's quantum algorithm to extract the key from a small number of AES plaintext-ciphertext pairs.

Comprehensively retrieving diverse documents is crucial to address queries that admit a wide range of valid answers. We introduce retrieve-verify-retrieve (RVR), a multi-round retrieval framework designed to maximize answer coverage. Initially, a retriever takes the original query and returns a candidate document set, followed by a verifier that identifies a high-quality subset. For subsequent rounds, the query is augmented with previously verified documents to uncover answers that are not yet covered in previous rounds. RVR is effective even with off-the-shelf retrievers, and fine-tuning retrievers for our inference procedure brings further gains. Our method outperforms baselines, including agentic search approaches, achieving at least 10% relative and 3% absolute gain in complete recall percentage on a multi-answer retrieval dataset (QAMPARI). We also see consistent gains on two out-of-domain datasets (QUEST and WebQuestionsSP) across different base retrievers. Our work presents a promising iterative approach for comprehensive answer recall leveraging a verifier and adapting retrievers to a new inference scenario.

The rise of on-chip accelerators signifies a major shift in computing, driven by the growing demands of artificial intelligence (AI) and specialized applications. These accelerators have gained popularity due to their ability to substantially boost performance, cut energy usage, lower total cost of ownership (TCO), and promote sustainability. Intel's Advanced Matrix Extensions (AMX) is one such on-chip accelerator, specifically designed for handling tasks involving large matrix multiplications commonly used in machine learning (ML) models, image processing, and other computational-heavy operations. In this paper, we introduce a novel value-dependent timing side-channel vulnerability in Intel AMX. By exploiting this weakness, we demonstrate a software-based, value-dependent timing side-channel attack capable of inferring the sparsity of neural network weights without requiring any knowledge of the confidence score, privileged access or physical proximity. Our attack method can fully recover the sparsity of weights assigned to 64 input elements within 50 minutes, which is 631% faster than the maximum leakage rate achieved in the Hertzbleed attack.

Security experts reverse engineer (decompile) binary code to identify critical security vulnerabilities. The limited access to source code in vital systems - such as firmware, drivers, and proprietary software used in Critical Infrastructures (CI) - makes this analysis even more crucial on the binary level. Even with available source code, a semantic gap persists after compilation between the source and the binary code executed by the processor. This gap may hinder the detection of vulnerabilities in source code. That being said, current research on Large Language Models (LLMs) overlooks the significance of decompiled binaries in this area by focusing solely on source code. In this work, we are the first to empirically uncover the substantial semantic limitations of state-of-the-art LLMs when it comes to analyzing vulnerabilities in decompiled binaries, largely due to the absence of relevant datasets. To bridge the gap, we introduce DeBinVul, a novel decompiled binary code vulnerability dataset. Our dataset is multi-architecture and multi-optimization, focusing on C/C++ due to their wide usage in CI and association with numerous vulnerabilities. Specifically, we curate 150,872 samples of vulnerable and non-vulnerable decompiled binary code for the task of (i) identifying; (ii) classifying; (iii) describing vulnerabilities; and (iv) recovering function names in the domain of decompiled binaries. Subsequently, we fine-tune state-of-the-art LLMs using DeBinVul and report on a performance increase of 19%, 24%, and 21% in the capabilities of CodeLlama, Llama3, and CodeGen2 respectively, in detecting binary code vulnerabilities. Additionally, using DeBinVul, we report a high performance of 80-90% on the vulnerability classification task. Furthermore, we report improved performance in function name recovery and vulnerability description tasks.

The increasing size of the Key-Value (KV) cache during the Large Language Models long-context inference is the main obstacle for its balance between the deployment cost and task accuracy. To reduce the KV cache size in such scenarios, most previous efforts leveraged on the attention weight to evict non-critical cache tokens. But there is a trade-off in those methods, they usually require major modifiation of the inference infrastructure and significant computation overhead. Base on the fact that the Large Lanuage models are autoregresssive models, we propose {\it LagKV}, a KV allocation strategy only relying on straight forward comparison among KV themself. It is a totally attention free method which offers easy integration to the main stream inference platform and comparable performance comparing to other complicated KV compression methods. Results on LongBench and PasskeyRetrieval show that, our approach achieves nearly zero loss when the ratio is 2times and approx 90% of the original model performance for 8times. Especially in the 64-digit passkey retrieval task, our mehod outperforms the attention weight based method H_2O over 60% with same compression ratios. Our code is available at https://github.com/AI-Lab-China-Merchants-Bank/LagKV.

Multilingual question answering tasks typically assume answers exist in the same language as the question. Yet in practice, many languages face both information scarcity -- where languages have few reference articles -- and information asymmetry -- where questions reference concepts from other cultures. This work extends open-retrieval question answering to a cross-lingual setting enabling questions from one language to be answered via answer content from another language. We construct a large-scale dataset built on questions from TyDi QA lacking same-language answers. Our task formulation, called Cross-lingual Open Retrieval Question Answering (XOR QA), includes 40k information-seeking questions from across 7 diverse non-English languages. Based on this dataset, we introduce three new tasks that involve cross-lingual document retrieval using multi-lingual and English resources. We establish baselines with state-of-the-art machine translation systems and cross-lingual pretrained models. Experimental results suggest that XOR QA is a challenging task that will facilitate the development of novel techniques for multilingual question answering. Our data and code are available at https://nlp.cs.washington.edu/xorqa.

Multi-vector retrieval models such as ColBERT [Khattab and Zaharia, 2020] allow token-level interactions between queries and documents, and hence achieve state of the art on many information retrieval benchmarks. However, their non-linear scoring function cannot be scaled to millions of documents, necessitating a three-stage process for inference: retrieving initial candidates via token retrieval, accessing all token vectors, and scoring the initial candidate documents. The non-linear scoring function is applied over all token vectors of each candidate document, making the inference process complicated and slow. In this paper, we aim to simplify the multi-vector retrieval by rethinking the role of token retrieval. We present XTR, ConteXtualized Token Retriever, which introduces a simple, yet novel, objective function that encourages the model to retrieve the most important document tokens first. The improvement to token retrieval allows XTR to rank candidates only using the retrieved tokens rather than all tokens in the document, and enables a newly designed scoring stage that is two-to-three orders of magnitude cheaper than that of ColBERT. On the popular BEIR benchmark, XTR advances the state-of-the-art by 2.8 nDCG@10 without any distillation. Detailed analysis confirms our decision to revisit the token retrieval stage, as XTR demonstrates much better recall of the token retrieval stage compared to ColBERT.

We introduce the first model-stealing attack that extracts precise, nontrivial information from black-box production language models like OpenAI's ChatGPT or Google's PaLM-2. Specifically, our attack recovers the embedding projection layer (up to symmetries) of a transformer model, given typical API access. For under \20 USD, our attack extracts the entire projection matrix of OpenAI's Ada and Babbage language models. We thereby confirm, for the first time, that these black-box models have a hidden dimension of 1024 and 2048, respectively. We also recover the exact hidden dimension size of the gpt-3.5-turbo model, and estimate it would cost under 2,000 in queries to recover the entire projection matrix. We conclude with potential defenses and mitigations, and discuss the implications of possible future work that could extend our attack.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has turned blockchains into financial infrastructure, allowing anyone to trade, lend, and build protocols without intermediaries, but this openness exposes pools of value controlled by code. Within five years, the DeFi ecosystem has lost over 15.75B USD to reported exploits. Many exploits arise from permissionless opportunities that any participant can trigger using only public state and standard interfaces, which we call Anyone-Can-Take (ACT) opportunities. Despite on-chain transparency, postmortem analysis remains slow and manual: investigations start from limited evidence, sometimes only a single transaction hash, and must reconstruct the exploit lifecycle by recovering related transactions, contract code, and state dependencies. We present TxRay, a Large Language Model (LLM) agentic postmortem system that uses tool calls to reconstruct live ACT attacks from limited evidence. Starting from one or more seed transactions, TxRay recovers the exploit lifecycle, derives an evidence-backed root cause, and generates a runnable, self-contained Proof of Concept (PoC) that deterministically reproduces the incident. TxRay self-checks postmortems by encoding incident-specific semantic oracles as executable assertions. To evaluate PoC correctness and quality, we develop PoCEvaluator, an independent agentic execution-and-review evaluator. On 114 incidents from DeFiHackLabs, TxRay produces an expert-aligned root cause and an executable PoC for 105 incidents, achieving 92.11% end-to-end reproduction. Under PoCEvaluator, 98.1% of TxRay PoCs avoid hard-coding attacker addresses, a +22.9pp lift over DeFiHackLabs. In a live deployment, TxRay delivers validated root causes in 40 minutes and PoCs in 59 minutes at median latency. TxRay's oracle-validated PoCs enable attack imitation, improving coverage by 15.6% and 65.5% over STING and APE.

Dense retrieval overcome the lexical gap and has shown great success in ad-hoc information retrieval (IR). Despite their success, dense retrievers are expensive to serve across practical use cases. For use cases requiring to search from millions of documents, the dense index becomes bulky and requires high memory usage for storing the index. More recently, learning-to-hash (LTH) techniques, for e.g., BPR and JPQ, produce binary document vectors, thereby reducing the memory requirement to efficiently store the dense index. LTH techniques are supervised and finetune the retriever using a ranking loss. They outperform their counterparts, i.e., traditional out-of-the-box vector compression techniques such as PCA or PQ. A missing piece from prior work is that existing techniques have been evaluated only in-domain, i.e., on a single dataset such as MS MARCO. In our work, we evaluate LTH and vector compression techniques for improving the downstream zero-shot retrieval accuracy of the TAS-B dense retriever while maintaining efficiency at inference. Our results demonstrate that, unlike prior work, LTH strategies when applied naively can underperform the zero-shot TAS-B dense retriever on average by up to 14% nDCG@10 on the BEIR benchmark. To solve this limitation, in our work, we propose an easy yet effective solution of injecting domain adaptation with existing supervised LTH techniques. We experiment with two well-known unsupervised domain adaptation techniques: GenQ and GPL. Our domain adaptation injection technique can improve the downstream zero-shot retrieval effectiveness for both BPR and JPQ variants of the TAS-B model by on average 11.5% and 8.2% nDCG@10 while both maintaining 32times memory efficiency and 14times and 2times speedup respectively in CPU retrieval latency on BEIR. All our code, models, and data are publicly available at https://github.com/thakur-nandan/income.

The state of the art in open-domain question answering (QA) relies on an efficient retriever that drastically reduces the search space for the expensive reader. A rather overlooked question in the community is the relationship between the retriever and the reader, and in particular, if the whole purpose of the retriever is just a fast approximation for the reader. Our empirical evidence indicates that the answer is no, and that the reader and the retriever are complementary to each other even in terms of accuracy only. We make a careful conjecture that the architectural constraint of the retriever, which has been originally intended for enabling approximate search, seems to also make the model more robust in large-scale search. We then propose to distill the reader into the retriever so that the retriever absorbs the strength of the reader while keeping its own benefit. Experimental results show that our method can enhance the document recall rate as well as the end-to-end QA accuracy of off-the-shelf retrievers in open-domain QA tasks.

Modern retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems convert sensitive content into high-dimensional embeddings and store them in vector databases that treat the resulting numerical artifacts as opaque. Major vector-store products do not provide native controls for embedding integrity, ingestion-time distributional anomaly detection, or cryptographic provenance attestation. We show this opens a class of steganographic exfiltration attacks: an attacker with write access to the ingestion pipeline can hide payload data inside embeddings using simple post-embedding perturbations (noise injection, rotation, scaling, offset, fragmentation, and combinations thereof) while preserving the surface-level retrieval behavior the RAG system exposes to legitimate users. We evaluate these techniques across a synthetic-PII corpus on text-embedding-3-large, four locally hosted open embedding models, a cross-corpus replication on BEIR NFCorpus and a Quora subset (over 26,000 chunks combined), seven vector-store configurations, an adaptive-attacker variant of the detector evaluation, and a paraphrased-query retrieval benchmark. Distribution-shifting perturbations are often caught by simple anomaly detectors; small-angle orthogonal rotation defeats distribution-based detection across every (model, corpus) pair tested. A disjoint-Givens rotation encoder gives a closed-form per-vector capacity ceiling of floor(d/2) * b bits, but real embedding manifolds impose a capacity-detectability trade-off, and the retrieval-preserving operating point sits well below it. We propose VectorPin, a cryptographic provenance protocol that pins each embedding to its source content and producing model via an Ed25519 signature over a canonical byte representation. Any post-embedding modification breaks signature verification. Embedding-level integrity is a deployable, standardizable control that closes this attack class.

We introduce a new heuristic decoder, Relay-BP, targeting real-time quantum circuit decoding for large-scale quantum computers. Relay-BP achieves high accuracy across circuit-noise decoding problems: significantly outperforming BP+OSD+CS-10 for bivariate-bicycle codes and comparable to min-weight-matching for surface codes. As a lightweight message-passing decoder, Relay-BP is inherently parallel, enabling rapid low-footprint decoding with FPGA or ASIC real-time implementations, similar to standard BP. A core aspect of our decoder is its enhancement of the standard BP algorithm by incorporating disordered memory strengths. This dampens oscillations and breaks symmetries that trap traditional BP algorithms. By dynamically adjusting memory strengths in a relay approach, Relay-BP can consecutively encounter multiple valid corrections to improve decoding accuracy. We observe that a problem-dependent distribution of memory strengths that includes negative values is indispensable for good performance.

Backdoor inversion, the process of finding a backdoor trigger inserted into a machine learning model, has become the pillar of many backdoor detection and defense methods. Previous works on backdoor inversion often recover the backdoor through an optimization process to flip a support set of clean images into the target class. However, it is rarely studied and understood how large this support set should be to recover a successful backdoor. In this work, we show that one can reliably recover the backdoor trigger with as few as a single image. Specifically, we propose the SmoothInv method, which first constructs a robust smoothed version of the backdoored classifier and then performs guided image synthesis towards the target class to reveal the backdoor pattern. SmoothInv requires neither an explicit modeling of the backdoor via a mask variable, nor any complex regularization schemes, which has become the standard practice in backdoor inversion methods. We perform both quantitaive and qualitative study on backdoored classifiers from previous published backdoor attacks. We demonstrate that compared to existing methods, SmoothInv is able to recover successful backdoors from single images, while maintaining high fidelity to the original backdoor. We also show how we identify the target backdoored class from the backdoored classifier. Last, we propose and analyze two countermeasures to our approach and show that SmoothInv remains robust in the face of an adaptive attacker. Our code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/smoothinv .

We introduce XiSort, a deterministic and reproducible sorting algorithm for floating-point sequences based on IEEE-754 total ordering and entropy minimization. XiSort guarantees bit-for-bit stability across runs and platforms by resolving tie-breaking via information-theoretic and symbolic methods. The algorithm supports both in-memory and external (out-of-core) operation, offering consistent performance on large datasets. We formalize a curved variant of the sorting metric that integrates into the Alpay Algebra framework, treating XiSort as a recursive operator with provable convergence and symbolic idempotence. This model preserves state-space closure while minimizing local disorder, interpretable as symbolic entropy. Empirical benchmarks demonstrate that XiSort achieves competitive throughput (e.g., sorting 10^8 doubles in approximately 12 seconds in-memory, and 100 GB at around 100 MB/s on SSDs), with applications in scientific computing, high-frequency finance, and reproducible numerical workflows. The results position XiSort as a principled tool for stable data alignment, symbolic preprocessing, and cross-platform float ordering. Keywords: deterministic sorting, IEEE-754, entropy minimization, symbolic algebra, reproducibility, external memory, Alpay Algebra, data pipelines

An attacker can gain information of a user by analyzing its network traffic. The size of transferred data leaks information about the file being transferred or the service being used, and this is particularly revealing when the attacker has background knowledge about the files or services available for transfer. To prevent this, servers may pad their files using a padding scheme, changing the file sizes and preventing anyone from guessing their identity uniquely. This work focuses on finding optimal padding schemes that keep a balance between privacy and the costs of bandwidth increase. We consider R\'enyi-min leakage as our main measure for privacy, since it is directly related with the success of a simple attacker, and compare our algorithms with an existing solution that minimizes Shannon leakage. We provide improvements to our algorithms in order to optimize average total padding and Shannon leakage while minimizing R\'enyi-min leakage. Moreover, our algorithms are designed to handle a more general and important scenario in which multiple servers wish to compute padding schemes in a way that protects the servers' identity in addition to the identity of the files.

Exchanging gradients is a widely used method in modern multi-node machine learning system (e.g., distributed training, collaborative learning). For a long time, people believed that gradients are safe to share: i.e., the training data will not be leaked by gradient exchange. However, we show that it is possible to obtain the private training data from the publicly shared gradients. We name this leakage as Deep Leakage from Gradient and empirically validate the effectiveness on both computer vision and natural language processing tasks. Experimental results show that our attack is much stronger than previous approaches: the recovery is pixel-wise accurate for images and token-wise matching for texts. We want to raise people's awareness to rethink the gradient's safety. Finally, we discuss several possible strategies to prevent such deep leakage. The most effective defense method is gradient pruning.

The key-value (KV) cache is widely treated as essential state in transformer inference, and a large body of work engineers policies to compress, evict, or approximate its entries. We prove that this state is entirely redundant: keys and values at every layer are deterministic projections of the residual stream, and recomputing them from a single residual vector per token incurs exactly zero reconstruction error, not approximately, but bit-identically. We verify this across six models from four architecture families (135M to 4B parameters). Cross-task residual patching at every layer produces D_KL = 0 between patched and original output distributions, confirming that the residual stream satisfies a Markov property and is the sole information-carrying state. Removing the cache entirely and recomputing from scratch yields token-identical output under greedy decoding on all models tested. We build on this result with KV-Direct, a bounded-memory inference scheme that checkpoints residual vectors (5 KB per token on Gemma 3-4B) instead of full KV pairs (136 KB), recomputing keys and values on demand. Over 20 conversation turns, KV-Direct holds peak memory at 42 MB while the standard cache grows past 103 MB. Against five eviction baselines (H2O, StreamingLLM, SnapKV, TOVA, window-only), KV-Direct maintains 100% token match at every cache budget; all baselines degrade to 5-28%. A per-operation latency analysis shows recomputation runs up to 5x faster than reading cached tensors at moderate batch sizes. Code is available at https://github.com/Kaleemullahqasim/KV-Direct.

The memory and computational demands of Key-Value (KV) cache present significant challenges for deploying long-context language models. Previous approaches attempt to mitigate this issue by selectively dropping tokens, which irreversibly erases critical information that might be needed for future queries. In this paper, we propose a novel compression technique for KV cache that preserves all token information. Our investigation reveals that: i) Most attention heads primarily focus on the local context; ii) Only a few heads, denoted as retrieval heads, can essentially pay attention to all input tokens. These key observations motivate us to use separate caching strategy for attention heads. Therefore, we propose RazorAttention, a training-free KV cache compression algorithm, which maintains a full cache for these crucial retrieval heads and discards the remote tokens in non-retrieval heads. Furthermore, we introduce a novel mechanism involving a "compensation token" to further recover the information in the dropped tokens. Extensive evaluations across a diverse set of large language models (LLMs) demonstrate that RazorAttention achieves a reduction in KV cache size by over 70% without noticeable impacts on performance. Additionally, RazorAttention is compatible with FlashAttention, rendering it an efficient and plug-and-play solution that enhances LLM inference efficiency without overhead or retraining of the original model.

Top-k decoding is a widely used method for sampling from LLMs: at each token, only the largest k next-token-probabilities are kept, and the next token is sampled after re-normalizing them to sum to unity. Top-k and other sampling methods are motivated by the intuition that true next-token distributions are sparse, and the noisy LLM probabilities need to be truncated. However, to our knowledge, a precise theoretical motivation for the use of top-k decoding is missing. In this work, we develop a theoretical framework that both explains and generalizes top-k decoding. We view decoding at a fixed token as the recovery of a sparse probability distribution. We consider Bregman decoders obtained by minimizing a separable Bregman divergence (for both the primal and dual cases) with a sparsity-inducing ell_0 regularization. Despite the combinatorial nature of the objective, we show how to optimize it efficiently for a large class of divergences. We show that the optimal decoding strategies are greedy, and further that the loss function is discretely convex in k, so that binary search provably and efficiently finds the optimal k. We show that top-k decoding arises as a special case for the KL divergence, and identify new decoding strategies that have distinct behaviors (e.g., non-linearly up-weighting larger probabilities after re-normalization).

In this work, we initiate the study of learning quantum processes from quantum statistical queries. We focus on two fundamental learning tasks in this new access model: shadow tomography of quantum processes and process tomography with respect to diamond distance. For the former, we present an efficient average-case algorithm along with a nearly matching lower bound with respect to the number of observables to be predicted. For the latter, we present average-case query complexity lower bounds for learning classes of unitaries. We obtain an exponential lower bound for learning unitary 2-designs and a doubly exponential lower bound for Haar-random unitaries. Finally, we demonstrate the practical relevance of our access model by applying our learning algorithm to attack an authentication protocol using Classical-Readout Quantum Physically Unclonable Functions, partially addressing an important open question in quantum hardware security.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) incidents stemming from the exploitation of smart contract vulnerabilities have culminated in financial damages exceeding 3 billion US dollars. Existing defense mechanisms typically focus on detecting and reacting to malicious transactions executed by attackers that target victim contracts. However, with the emergence of private transaction pools where transactions are sent directly to miners without first appearing in public mempools, current detection tools face significant challenges in identifying attack activities effectively. Based on the fact that most attack logic rely on deploying one or more intermediate smart contracts as supporting components to the exploitation of victim contracts, in this paper, we propose a new direction for detecting DeFi attacks that focuses on identifying adversarial contracts instead of adversarial transactions. Our approach allows us to leverage common attack patterns, code semantics and intrinsic characteristics found in malicious smart contracts to build the LookAhead system based on Machine Learning (ML) classifiers and a transformer model that is able to effectively distinguish adversarial contracts from benign ones, and make just-in-time predictions of potential zero-day attacks. Our contributions are three-fold: First, we construct a comprehensive dataset consisting of features extracted and constructed from recent contracts deployed on the Ethereum and BSC blockchains. Secondly, we design a condensed representation of smart contract programs called Pruned Semantic-Control Flow Tokenization (PSCFT) and use it to train a combination of ML models that understand the behaviour of malicious codes based on function calls, control flows and other pattern-conforming features. Lastly, we provide the complete implementation of LookAhead and the evaluation of its performance metrics for detecting adversarial contracts.

This definitive research memoria presents a comprehensive, mathematically verified paradigm for neural communication with Bitcoin mining Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), integrating five complementary frameworks: thermodynamic reservoir computing, hierarchical number system theory, algorithmic analysis, network latency optimization, and machine-checked mathematical formalization. We establish that obsolete cryptocurrency mining hardware exhibits emergent computational properties enabling bidirectional information exchange between AI systems and silicon substrates. The research program demonstrates: (1) reservoir computing with NARMA-10 Normalized Root Mean Square Error (NRMSE) of 0.8661; (2) the Thermodynamic Probability Filter (TPF) achieving 92.19% theoretical energy reduction; (3) the Virtual Block Manager achieving +25% effective hashrate; and (4) hardware universality across multiple ASIC families including Antminer S9, Lucky Miner LV06, and Goldshell LB-Box. A significant contribution is the machine-checked mathematical formalization using Lean 4 and Mathlib, providing unambiguous definitions, machine-verified theorems, and reviewer-proof claims. Key theorems proven include: independence implies zero leakage, predictor beats baseline implies non-independence (the logical core of TPF), energy savings theoretical maximum, and Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) distinguishability witnesses. Vladimir Veselov's hierarchical number system theory explains why early-round information contains predictive power. This work establishes a new paradigm: treating ASICs not as passive computational substrates but as active conversational partners whose thermodynamic state encodes exploitable computational information.

AI memory systems are evolving toward unified context layers that enable efficient cross-agent collaboration and multi-tool workflows, facilitating better accumulation of personal data and learning of user preferences. However, centralization creates a trust crisis where users must entrust cloud providers with sensitive digital memory data. We identify a core tension between personalization demands and data sovereignty: centralized memory systems enable efficient cross-agent collaboration but expose users' sensitive data to cloud provider risks, while private deployments provide security but limit collaboration. To resolve this tension, we aim to achieve local-equivalent security while enabling superior maintenance efficiency and collaborative capabilities. We propose a five-layer architecture abstracting common functional components of AI memory systems: Storage, Extraction, Learning, Retrieval, and Governance. By applying TEE protection to each layer, we establish a trustworthy framework. Based on this, we design MemTrust, a hardware-backed zero-trust architecture that provides cryptographic guarantees across all layers. Our contributions include the five-layer abstraction, "Context from MemTrust" protocol for cross-application sharing, side-channel hardened retrieval with obfuscated access patterns, and comprehensive security analysis. The architecture enables third-party developers to port existing systems with acceptable development costs, achieving system-wide trustworthiness. We believe that AI memory plays a crucial role in enhancing the efficiency and collaboration of agents and AI tools. AI memory will become the foundational infrastructure for AI agents, and MemTrust serves as a universal trusted framework for AI memory systems, with the goal of becoming the infrastructure of memory infrastructure.

Decompilation is widely used in reverse engineering to recover high-level language code from binary executables. While recent approaches leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising progress, they typically treat assembly code as a linear sequence of instructions, overlooking arbitrary jump patterns and isolated data segments inherent to binary files. This limitation significantly hinders their ability to correctly infer source code semantics from assembly code. To address this limitation, we propose \saltm, a novel binary decompilation method that abstracts stable logical features shared between binary and source code. The core idea of \saltm is to abstract selected binary-level operations, such as specific jumps, into a high-level logic framework that better guides LLMs in semantic recovery. Given a binary function, \saltm constructs a Source-level Abstract Logic Tree (\salt) from assembly code to approximate the logic structure of high-level language. It then fine-tunes an LLM using the reconstructed \salt to generate decompiled code. Finally, the output is refined through error correction and symbol recovery to improve readability and correctness. We compare \saltm to three categories of baselines (general-purpose LLMs, commercial decompilers, and decompilation methods) using three well-known datasets (Decompile-Eval, MBPP, Exebench). Our experimental results demonstrate that \saltm is highly effective in recovering the logic of the source code, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art methods (e.g., 70.4\% TCP rate on Decompile-Eval with a 10.6\% improvement). The results further validate its robustness against four commonly used obfuscation techniques. Additionally, analyses of real-world software and a user study confirm that our decompiled output offers superior assistance to human analysts in comprehending binary functions.

Intellectual Property (IP) theft is a cause of major financial and reputational damage, reportedly in the range of hundreds of billions of dollars annually in the U.S. alone. Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are particularly exposed to IP theft, because their configuration file contains the IP in a proprietary format that can be mapped to a gate-level netlist with moderate effort. Despite this threat, the scientific understanding of this issue lacks behind reality, thereby preventing an in-depth assessment of IP theft from FPGAs in academia. We address this discrepancy through a real-world case study on a Lattice iCE40 FPGA found inside iPhone 7. Apple refers to this FPGA as Maggie. By reverse engineering the proprietary signal-processing algorithm implemented on Maggie, we generate novel insights into the actual efforts required to commit FPGA IP theft and the challenges an attacker faces on the way. Informed by our case study, we then introduce generalized netlist reverse engineering techniques that drastically reduce the required manual effort and are applicable across a diverse spectrum of FPGA implementations and architectures. We evaluate these techniques on six benchmarks that are representative of different FPGA applications and have been synthesized for Xilinx and Lattice FPGAs, as well as in an end-to-end white-box case study. Finally, we provide a comprehensive open-source tool suite of netlist reverse engineering techniques to foster future research, enable the community to perform realistic threat assessments, and facilitate the evaluation of novel countermeasures.

While Key-Value (KV) cache succeeds in reducing redundant computations in auto-regressive models, it introduces significant memory overhead, limiting its practical deployment in long-sequence scenarios. Existing KV retrieval methods mitigate this by dynamically retaining only a subset of KV entries on the GPU. However, they still suffer from notable efficiency and accuracy bottlenecks due to per-token retrieval and coarse-grained page-level KV management, especially in long-output reasoning scenarios. With the emergence of large reasoning models, efficiently handling such scenarios has become increasingly important. To address this issue, we present two key observations: (1) critical KVs exhibit strong temporal locality during decoding, and (2) these KVs exhibit distinct distribution patterns across the input prompt and generated output. Building on these observations, we propose LouisKV, an efficient KV cache retrieval framework designed for various long-sequence scenarios. Specifically, LouisKV introduces a semantic-aware retrieval strategy leveraging temporal locality to trigger retrieval only at semantic boundaries, drastically reducing computation and data transfer overhead. LouisKV also designs a decoupled, fine-grained management scheme that tailors differentiated strategies for input and output sequences to create retrieval units that better match the model's attention patterns, enabling precise identification of critical KVs. Furthermore, to boost efficiency, LouisKV incorporates several kernel-level optimizations, including custom Triton and CUDA kernels to accelerate the KV clustering and retrieval. Evaluations show that LouisKV achieves up to 4.7times speedup over state-of-the-art KV retrieval methods while maintaining near-lossless accuracy across diverse long-sequence tasks, including long-input short-output, short-input long-output, and long-input long-output scenarios.

Masked Diffusion Models (MDMs) offer greater flexibility in decoding order than autoregressive models but require careful planning to achieve high-quality generation. Existing samplers typically adopt greedy heuristics, prioritizing positions with the highest local certainty to decode at each step. Through failure case analysis, we identify a fundamental limitation of this approach: it neglects the downstream impact of current decoding choices on subsequent steps and fails to minimize cumulative uncertainty. In particular, these methods do not fully exploit the non-causal nature of MDMs, which enables evaluating how a decoding decision reshapes token probabilities/uncertainty across all remaining masked positions. To bridge this gap, we propose the Info-Gain Sampler, a principled decoding framework that balances immediate uncertainty with information gain over future masked tokens. Extensive evaluations across diverse architectures and tasks (reasoning, coding, creative writing, and image generation) demonstrate that Info-Gain Sampler consistently outperforms existing samplers for MDMs. For instance, it achieves a 3.6% improvement in average accuracy on reasoning tasks and a 63.1% win-rate in creative writing. Notably, on reasoning tasks it reduces cumulative uncertainty from 78.4 to 48.6, outperforming the best baseline by a large margin. The code will be available at https://github.com/yks23/Information-Gain-Sampler.

Language models produce a distribution over the next token; can we use this information to recover the prompt tokens? We consider the problem of language model inversion and show that next-token probabilities contain a surprising amount of information about the preceding text. Often we can recover the text in cases where it is hidden from the user, motivating a method for recovering unknown prompts given only the model's current distribution output. We consider a variety of model access scenarios, and show how even without predictions for every token in the vocabulary we can recover the probability vector through search. On Llama-2 7b, our inversion method reconstructs prompts with a BLEU of 59 and token-level F1 of 78 and recovers 27% of prompts exactly. Code for reproducing all experiments is available at http://github.com/jxmorris12/vec2text.

Steganography is the process of hiding secret information by embedding it in an "innocent" message. We present protocols for hiding quantum information in a codeword of a quantum error-correcting code passing through a channel. Using either a shared classical secret key or shared entanglement the sender (Alice) disguises her information as errors in the channel. The receiver (Bob) can retrieve the hidden information, but an eavesdropper (Eve) with the power to monitor the channel, but without the secret key, cannot distinguish the message from channel noise. We analyze how difficult it is for Eve to detect the presence of secret messages, and estimate rates of steganographic communication and secret key consumption for certain protocols.

Embedding inversion, i.e., reconstructing text given its embedding and black-box access to the embedding encoder, is a fundamental problem in both NLP and security. From the NLP perspective, it helps determine how much semantic information about the input is retained in the embedding. From the security perspective, it measures how much information is leaked by vector databases and embedding-based retrieval systems. State-of-the-art methods for embedding inversion, such as vec2text, have high accuracy but require (a) training a separate model for each embedding, and (b) a large number of queries to the corresponding encoder. We design, implement, and evaluate ZSInvert, a zero-shot inversion method based on the recently proposed adversarial decoding technique. ZSInvert is fast, query-efficient, and can be used for any text embedding without training an embedding-specific inversion model. We measure the effectiveness of ZSInvert on several embeddings and demonstrate that it recovers key semantic information about the corresponding texts.

This paper demonstrates that a single-layer neural network using Parametric Rectified Linear Unit (PReLU) activation can solve the XOR problem, a simple fact that has been overlooked so far. We compare this solution to the multi-layer perceptron (MLP) and the Growing Cosine Unit (GCU) activation function and explain why PReLU enables this capability. Our results show that the single-layer PReLU network can achieve 100\% success rate in a wider range of learning rates while using only three learnable parameters.

Model extraction is a growing concern for the security of AI systems. For deep neural network models, the architecture is the most important information an adversary aims to recover. Being a sequence of repeated computation blocks, neural network models deployed on edge-devices will generate distinctive side-channel leakages. The latter can be exploited to extract critical information when targeted platforms are physically accessible. By combining theoretical knowledge about deep learning practices and analysis of a widespread implementation library (ARM CMSIS-NN), our purpose is to answer this critical question: how far can we extract architecture information by simply examining an EM side-channel trace? For the first time, we propose an extraction methodology for traditional MLP and CNN models running on a high-end 32-bit microcontroller (Cortex-M7) that relies only on simple pattern recognition analysis. Despite few challenging cases, we claim that, contrary to parameters extraction, the complexity of the attack is relatively low and we highlight the urgent need for practicable protections that could fit the strong memory and latency requirements of such platforms.

Most state-of-the-art open-domain question answering systems use a neural retrieval model to encode passages into continuous vectors and extract them from a knowledge source. However, such retrieval models often require large memory to run because of the massive size of their passage index. In this paper, we introduce Binary Passage Retriever (BPR), a memory-efficient neural retrieval model that integrates a learning-to-hash technique into the state-of-the-art Dense Passage Retriever (DPR) to represent the passage index using compact binary codes rather than continuous vectors. BPR is trained with a multi-task objective over two tasks: efficient candidate generation based on binary codes and accurate reranking based on continuous vectors. Compared with DPR, BPR substantially reduces the memory cost from 65GB to 2GB without a loss of accuracy on two standard open-domain question answering benchmarks: Natural Questions and TriviaQA. Our code and trained models are available at https://github.com/studio-ousia/bpr.

Recent works have demonstrated the effectiveness of retrieval augmentation in the Event Argument Extraction (EAE) task. However, existing retrieval-based EAE methods have two main limitations: (1) input length constraints and (2) the gap between the retriever and the inference model. These issues limit the diversity and quality of the retrieved information. In this paper, we propose a Compressive Memory-based Retrieval (CMR) mechanism for EAE, which addresses the two limitations mentioned above. Our compressive memory, designed as a dynamic matrix that effectively caches retrieved information and supports continuous updates, overcomes the limitations of the input length. Additionally, after pre-loading all candidate demonstrations into the compressive memory, the model further retrieves and filters relevant information from memory based on the input query, bridging the gap between the retriever and the inference model. Extensive experiments show that our method achieves new state-of-the-art performance on three public datasets (RAMS, WikiEvents, ACE05), significantly outperforming existing retrieval-based EAE methods.

This paper considers the Pointer Value Retrieval (PVR) benchmark introduced in [ZRKB21], where a 'reasoning' function acts on a string of digits to produce the label. More generally, the paper considers the learning of logical functions with gradient descent (GD) on neural networks. It is first shown that in order to learn logical functions with gradient descent on symmetric neural networks, the generalization error can be lower-bounded in terms of the noise-stability of the target function, supporting a conjecture made in [ZRKB21]. It is then shown that in the distribution shift setting, when the data withholding corresponds to freezing a single feature (referred to as canonical holdout), the generalization error of gradient descent admits a tight characterization in terms of the Boolean influence for several relevant architectures. This is shown on linear models and supported experimentally on other models such as MLPs and Transformers. In particular, this puts forward the hypothesis that for such architectures and for learning logical functions such as PVR functions, GD tends to have an implicit bias towards low-degree representations, which in turn gives the Boolean influence for the generalization error under quadratic loss.

We report genuine-un-compiled, textbook-faithful-quantum cryptanalysis of symmetric-cipher structures executed on real IBM quantum hardware (ibm\_kingston, Heron generation). Using Simon's algorithm we recover the hidden period of the Even-Mansour cipher up to security parameter N = 10 on real hardware, beyond the largest previously reported real-hardware key recovery of N = 4, and we cleanly recover the periods of a 3-round Feistel (DES-family) construction at block sizes 6 and 8; a 21-qubit block-10 instance is verified in simulation and submitted to hardware. We further provide a breadth-first benchmark of five genuine quantum attacks spanning four symmetric-cipher design paradigms -- Bernstein-Vazirani (linear structure, single query), Grover (SPN key search, quadratic), and Simon (Even-Mansour, CBC-MAC forgery, and Feistel; exponential-to-polynomial in query complexity) -- validated to the classical-simulation ceiling of 25 qubits. We are deliberately explicit about scope: these attacks target reduced or structured constructions in the Q2 (quantum-query) model, asymptotically follow the birthday bound and therefore do not constitute quantum advantage over classical collision-finding, do not break full AES/RSA or 16-round DES, and rely on error mitigation rather than fault-tolerant error correction. Our contribution is the real-hardware demonstration at record structure sizes, the breadth of genuine algorithmic coverage across four paradigms, and an honest, reproducible benchmark with public artifacts.

Due to Shor's algorithm, quantum computers are a severe threat for public key cryptography. This motivated the cryptographic community to search for quantum-safe solutions. On the other hand, the impact of quantum computing on secret key cryptography is much less understood. In this paper, we consider attacks where an adversary can query an oracle implementing a cryptographic primitive in a quantum superposition of different states. This model gives a lot of power to the adversary, but recent results show that it is nonetheless possible to build secure cryptosystems in it. We study applications of a quantum procedure called Simon's algorithm (the simplest quantum period finding algorithm) in order to attack symmetric cryptosystems in this model. Following previous works in this direction, we show that several classical attacks based on finding collisions can be dramatically sped up using Simon's algorithm: finding a collision requires Ω(2^{n/2}) queries in the classical setting, but when collisions happen with some hidden periodicity, they can be found with only O(n) queries in the quantum model. We obtain attacks with very strong implications. First, we show that the most widely used modes of operation for authentication and authenticated encryption e.g. CBC-MAC, PMAC, GMAC, GCM, and OCB) are completely broken in this security model. Our attacks are also applicable to many CAESAR candidates: CLOC, AEZ, COPA, OTR, POET, OMD, and Minalpher. This is quite surprising compared to the situation with encryption modes: Anand et al. show that standard modes are secure with a quantum-secure PRF. Second, we show that Simon's algorithm can also be applied to slide attacks, leading to an exponential speed-up of a classical symmetric cryptanalysis technique in the quantum model.

We introduce Retrieval-Based Speculative Decoding (REST), a novel algorithm designed to speed up language model generation. The key insight driving the development of REST is the observation that the process of text generation often includes certain common phases and patterns. Unlike previous methods that rely on a draft language model for speculative decoding, REST harnesses the power of retrieval to generate draft tokens. This method draws from the reservoir of existing knowledge, retrieving and employing relevant tokens based on the current context. Its plug-and-play nature allows for seamless integration and acceleration of any language models, all without necessitating additional training. When benchmarked on 7B and 13B language models in a single-batch setting, REST achieves a significant speedup of 1.62X to 2.36X on code or text generation. The code of REST is available at https://github.com/FasterDecoding/REST.

Speculative decoding (SD) accelerates large language model inference by leveraging a draft-then-verify paradigm. To maximize the acceptance rate, recent methods construct expansive draft trees, which unfortunately incur severe VRAM bandwidth and computational overheads that bottleneck end-to-end speedups. While dynamic-depth pruning can reduce this latency by removing marginal branches, it also discards potentially valid candidates, preventing the acceptance rate from reaching the upper bound of dense trees. In this paper, we identify a critical opportunity in resource allocation: the transition from dense to pruned drafting frees up significant computational budget. To break this Pareto tradeoff, we introduce Graft, a compensation framework that couples pruning and retrieval as mutually reinforcing operations. Pruning supplies sufficient budget for retrieval, while retrieval compensates for pruning-induced coverage loss and recovers accepted length. By employing a sequential `prune-then-graft' mechanism, Graft attaches highly predictive retrieved tokens into positions opened by pruning, filling the topological gaps with near-zero overhead. Graft is entirely training-free and lossless. Comprehensive evaluations show that Graft establishes a new Pareto frontier across practical deployment settings, including short-context generation, long-context generation, and large-scale models. On short-context benchmarks, it achieves up to 5.41times speedup and improves average speedup over EAGLE-3 by up to 21.8% on the large-scale Qwen3-235B. We also provide a preliminary exploration of applying Graft to the DFlash-style block drafting paradigm, offering initial evidence and insights for extending grafting beyond autoregressive draft trees.

Ensuring privacy-preserving inference on cryptographically secure data is a well-known computational challenge. To alleviate the bottleneck of costly cryptographic computations in non-linear activations, recent methods have suggested linearizing a targeted portion of these activations in neural networks. This technique results in significantly reduced runtimes with often negligible impacts on accuracy. In this paper, we demonstrate that such computational benefits may lead to increased fairness costs. Specifically, we find that reducing the number of ReLU activations disproportionately decreases the accuracy for minority groups compared to majority groups. To explain these observations, we provide a mathematical interpretation under restricted assumptions about the nature of the decision boundary, while also showing the prevalence of this problem across widely used datasets and architectures. Finally, we show how a simple procedure altering the fine-tuning step for linearized models can serve as an effective mitigation strategy.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves its real-world impact unclear. We address this challenge by decomposing the malicious content into a trigger fragment that guarantees retrieval and an attack fragment that encodes arbitrary attack objectives. Based on this idea, we design an efficient and effective black-box attack algorithm that constructs a compact trigger fragment to guarantee retrieval for any attack fragment. Our attack requires only API access to embedding models, is cost-efficient (as little as $0.21 per target user query on OpenAI's embedding models), and achieves near-100% retrieval across 11 benchmarks and 8 embedding models (including both open-source models and proprietary services). Based on this attack, we present the first end-to-end IPI exploits under natural queries and realistic external corpora, spanning both RAG and agentic systems with diverse attack objectives. These results establish IPI as a practical and severe threat: when a user issued a natural query to summarize emails on frequently asked topics, a single poisoned email was sufficient to coerce GPT-4o into exfiltrating SSH keys with over 80% success in a multi-agent workflow. We further evaluate several defenses and find that they are insufficient to prevent the retrieval of malicious text, highlighting retrieval as a critical open vulnerability.

Modern LLMs are increasingly accessed via black-box APIs, requiring users to transmit sensitive prompts, outputs, and fine-tuning data to external providers, creating a critical privacy risk at the API boundary. We introduce AlienLM, a deployable API-only privacy layer that protects text by translating it into an Alien Language via a vocabulary-scale bijection, enabling lossless recovery on the client side. Using only standard fine-tuning APIs, Alien Adaptation Training (AAT) adapts target models to operate directly on alienized inputs. Across four LLM backbones and seven benchmarks, AlienLM retains over 81\% of plaintext-oracle performance on average, substantially outperforming random-bijection and character-level baselines. Under adversaries with access to model weights, corpus statistics, and learning-based inverse translation, recovery attacks reconstruct fewer than 0.22\% of alienized tokens. Our results demonstrate a practical pathway for privacy-preserving LLM deployment under API-only access, substantially reducing plaintext exposure while maintaining task performance.

Existing low-bit KV-cache quantizers often treat each cached key as a flat vector. Under RoPE, however, a key's contribution to a future attention logit decomposes into a position-dependent sum over two-dimensional frequency blocks. This makes key-cache quantization a block-wise bit-allocation problem: high-energy RoPE blocks are more sensitive to quantization error and should receive more bits. We introduce Block-GTQ, a RoPE-aware bit allocator for key-cache quantization built on TurboQuant-MSE(TQ-MSE). For each layer and KV head, Block-GTQ computes a label-free energy score for each RoPE block and greedily allocates integer bit widths by marginal gain. Under matched K/V bit budgets, Block-GTQ better preserves RoPE query-key logits on a ten-model diagnostic panel, cutting per-layer MAE by 32-80% at 2 and 3 b/dim K-only quantization and winning all 367/367 layer comparisons against uniform TQ-MSE. These fidelity gains translate to stronger downstream long-context retrieval, understanding, and reasoning. At K2V2 on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Block-GTQ raises the six-task NIAH average from 70.6 to 97.4, and the LongBench-EN average from 36.87 to 53.31. On AIME 2024/2025 with DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B, without an fp16 recent-key buffer, Block-GTQ at K3V2 scores 51.7/37.5, close to fp16's 54.2/37.9, whereas uniform TQ-MSE collapses to 0.0/0.0. We further implement a packed-cache serving path. On a single H800 GPU with Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct, packed K3V3 achieves 3.24x KV-cache compression with fp16-comparable quality, runs 1.34x faster than fp16 FlashAttention2 at 128K context, reduces peak memory from 56.31 GB to 19.85 GB, and remains feasible at 256K and 512K where fp16 OOMs. Code is available at https://github.com/JIA-Lab-research/blockgtq.

Deep Neural Networks have created a paradigm shift in our ability to comprehend raw data in various important fields ranging from computer vision and natural language processing to intelligence warfare and healthcare. While DNNs are increasingly deployed either in a white-box setting where the model internal is publicly known, or a black-box setting where only the model outputs are known, a practical concern is protecting the models against Intellectual Property (IP) infringement. We propose BlackMarks, the first end-to-end multi-bit watermarking framework that is applicable in the black-box scenario. BlackMarks takes the pre-trained unmarked model and the owner's binary signature as inputs and outputs the corresponding marked model with a set of watermark keys. To do so, BlackMarks first designs a model-dependent encoding scheme that maps all possible classes in the task to bit '0' and bit '1' by clustering the output activations into two groups. Given the owner's watermark signature (a binary string), a set of key image and label pairs are designed using targeted adversarial attacks. The watermark (WM) is then embedded in the prediction behavior of the target DNN by fine-tuning the model with generated WM key set. To extract the WM, the remote model is queried by the WM key images and the owner's signature is decoded from the corresponding predictions according to the designed encoding scheme. We perform a comprehensive evaluation of BlackMarks's performance on MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet datasets and corroborate its effectiveness and robustness. BlackMarks preserves the functionality of the original DNN and incurs negligible WM embedding runtime overhead as low as 2.054%.

Explaining why dense retrievers assign high relevance scores remains challenging because retrieval decisions are made through opaque high-dimensional embeddings. Existing explanations often focus on surface signals, such as lexical matches, token alignments, or post-hoc textual rationales, and thus provide limited insight into the latent factors that shape dense retrieval behavior at the embedding level. We propose Xetrieval, an embedding-level mechanistic framework for explaining dense retrieval. Xetrieval first introduces a lightweight reasoning internalizer that approximates Chain-of-Thought reasoning directly in the embedding space with a single forward pass, enriching sentence embeddings with reasoning-oriented information while avoiding expensive autoregressive generation. It then decomposes these reasoning-enhanced embeddings into sparse, human-interpretable features, each associated with a coherent natural language description. By aggregating sparse feature overlaps across multiple document-side views, Xetrieval provides feature-level explanations of individual retrieval decisions. Experiments on diverse retrievers and benchmarks show that Xetrieval uncovers coherent interpretable features, yields stronger pair-level intervention effects, and supports task-level feature steering. The project page and source code are available at https://hihiczx.github.io/Xetrieval .

Agent memory systems often adopt the standard Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipeline, yet its underlying assumptions differ in this setting. RAG targets large, heterogeneous corpora where retrieved passages are diverse, whereas agent memory is a bounded, coherent dialogue stream with highly correlated spans that are often duplicates. Under this shift, fixed top-k similarity retrieval tends to return redundant context, and post-hoc pruning can delete temporally linked prerequisites needed for correct reasoning. We argue retrieval should move beyond similarity matching and instead operate over latent components, following decoupling to aggregation: disentangle memories into semantic components, organise them into a hierarchy, and use this structure to drive retrieval. We propose xMemory, which builds a hierarchy of intact units and maintains a searchable yet faithful high-level node organisation via a sparsity--semantics objective that guides memory split and merge. At inference, xMemory retrieves top-down, selecting a compact, diverse set of themes and semantics for multi-fact queries, and expanding to episodes and raw messages only when it reduces the reader's uncertainty. Experiments on LoCoMo and PerLTQA across the three latest LLMs show consistent gains in answer quality and token efficiency.

Context can change whether a request is harmful without changing its topic or surface form. We ask whether residual-stream probes distinguish harmful requests from surface-matched benign controls at a useful operating point. Across three 7-8B model families, an activation sensor blocks 95.5-97.7 percent of judge-classified compliant attacks in a taxonomy-selected set. It also blocks 59.6-68.4 percent of XSTest prompts. A fully disjoint audit reconstructs near-ceiling source-contrast AUROC (0.996-0.999), but fixed transfer to matched pairs is weaker: 0.656-0.819 on the guard-selected Twin-n70 subset and 0.590-0.690 on the full Twin-n163 cohort. We test ten axes on the reference family and seven across all families with leakage, hold-out, and permutation controls. On Twin-n163, no axis evaluated without direct pair-boundary fitting reaches the specified numerical threshold. Requiring persistence on that full cohort was added at analysis time. A separately specified 24B/32B extension gives the same result. Pair-trained classifiers weaken under category and generation-batch hold-out and false-block 79.6-100 percent of XSTest at 95 percent in-corpus TPR. At the tested read points, these activation scores behave as broad-risk detectors rather than standalone context adjudicators.

Machine unlearning aims to remove specified training data to satisfy privacy regulations such as GDPR. However, existing evaluations assume identical precision at unlearning and deployment, overlooking that production LLMs are deployed at low-bit precision. We show that INT4 quantization systematically restores forgotten content even when models pass compliance audits at bfloat16 (BF16), we term this the quantization recovery attack (QRA). We conduct the first systematic study of unlearning robustness under adapter-space INT4 quantization in the NF4+LoRA regime, evaluating seven methods on LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct across TOFU, MUSE-News, and WikiBio-WPU. INT8 is benign; INT4 induces recovery of up to 22x, worsening with dataset difficulty. We identify the FA-RA-Q-INT4 trilemma: no method simultaneously achieves strong forgetting, high utility, and quantization robustness. A dense Pareto sweep reveals a sharp phase transition once robustness is achieved, retaining accuracy collapses regardless of further tuning. To address this, we propose DURABLEUN-SAF (Sharpness-Aware Forgetting), a quantization-aware objective using Straight-Through Estimator gradients through INT4 rounding. DURABLEUN-SAF is the only method to achieve a stable empirical (0.047, {BF16, INT8, INT4})- durability certificate: Q-INT4= 0.043 +- 0.002, cert rate= 3/3, versus SalUn's cert rate= 1/3 at its own published hyperparameters. We call for Q-INT4 to be adopted as a standard evaluation metric alongside FA and RA.

Speculative decoding (SD) accelerates Large Language Model (LLM) generation by using an efficient draft model to propose the next few tokens, which are verified by the LLM in a single forward call, reducing latency while preserving its outputs. We focus on retrieval-based SD where the draft model retrieves the next tokens from a non-parametric datastore. Sparse retrieval (REST), which operates on the surface form of strings, is currently the dominant paradigm due to its simplicity and scalability. However, its effectiveness is limited due to the usage of short contexts and exact string matching. Instead, we introduce Dense Retrieval for Speculative Decoding (DReSD), a novel framework that uses approximate nearest neighbour search with contextualised token embeddings to retrieve the most semantically relevant token sequences for SD. Extensive experiments show that DReSD achieves (on average) 87% higher acceptance rates, 65% longer accepted tokens and 19% faster generation speeds compared to sparse retrieval (REST).

Visual document retrieval has become essential for accessing information in visually rich documents. Existing approaches fall into two camps. Late-interaction retrievers achieve strong quality through fine-grained token-level matching but store hundreds of vectors per page, incurring large index footprints and high serving costs. By contrast, dense single-vector retrievers retain storage and latency advantages but consistently lag in quality because they compress all information into a single final-layer embedding. In this work, we first conduct a layerwise diagnostic on single-vector retrievers, revealing that retrieval-relevant signal resides in internal representations. Motivated by these findings, we propose MINER (Mining Multimodal Internal RepreseNtation for Efficient Retrieval), a lightweight plug-in module that probes and fuses internal signals across transformer layers into a single compact embedding without modifying the backbone or sacrificing single-vector efficiency. The first Retrieval-Aligned Layer Probing stage attaches a lightweight probe at each layer, surfacing which dimensions carry retrieval-relevant information. The subsequent Adaptive Sparse Multi-Layer Fusion stage applies performance-adaptive neuron-level masking to the selected layers and fuses the surviving signals into the final dense vector. Across ViDoRe V1/V2/V3, MINER outperforms existing dense single-vector retrievers on the majority of benchmarks, with up to 4.5% nDCG@5 improvement over its corresponding backbone. Compared to strong late-interaction baselines, in some settings MINER substantially narrows the nDCG@5 gap to 0.2 while preserving the storage and serving advantages of dense retrieval.

Memory and computation remain core bottlenecks in long-horizon LLM inference due to the quadratic cost of self-attention and the ever-growing key-value (KV) cache. Existing strategies for memory-bounded inference, such as quantization, offloading, or heuristic KV eviction, either incur high orchestration costs or rely on unreliable attention-based proxies of importance. We propose TRIM-KV, a novel approach that learns each token's intrinsic importance at creation time via a lightweight retention gate. Each gate predicts a scalar retention score that decays over time, reflecting the long-term utility of the token for a specific layer and head. Tokens with low scores are evicted when the memory budget is exceeded, ensuring that the cache always contains the most critical tokens. TRIM-KV is trained efficiently through distillation from a frozen LLM combined with a capacity loss, requiring only gate fine-tuning and adding negligible inference overhead. Across mathematical reasoning (GSM8K, MATH-500, AIME24), procedural generation (LongProc), conversational long-memory benchmarks (LongMemEval), and long-context understanding (LongBench and SCBench), TRIM-KV consistently outperforms strong eviction and learnable retrieval baselines, especially in low-memory regimes. Remarkably, it even surpasses full-cache models in some settings, showing that selective retention can serve as a form of regularization, suppressing noise from uninformative tokens. Qualitative analyses further reveal that learned retention scores align with human intuition, naturally recovering heuristics such as sink tokens, sliding windows, and gist compression without explicit design. Beyond efficiency, retention scores provide insights into layer- and head-specific roles, suggesting a new path toward LLM interpretability.

The rapid growth in the parameters of large language models (LLMs) has made inference latency a fundamental bottleneck, limiting broader application of LLMs. Speculative decoding represents a lossless approach to accelerate inference through a guess-and-verify paradigm, leveraging the parallel capabilities of modern hardware. Some speculative decoding methods rely on additional structures to guess draft tokens, such as small models or parameter-efficient architectures, which need extra training before use. Alternatively, retrieval-based train-free techniques build libraries from pre-existing corpora or by n-gram generation. However, they face challenges like large storage requirements, time-consuming retrieval, and limited adaptability. Observing that candidate tokens generated during the decoding process are likely to reoccur in future sequences, we propose Token Recycling. This approach stores candidate tokens in an adjacency matrix and employs a breadth-first search (BFS)-like algorithm on the matrix to construct a draft tree. The tree is then validated through tree attention. New candidate tokens from the decoding process are then used to update the matrix. Token Recycling requires \textless2MB of additional storage and achieves approximately 2x speedup across all sizes of LLMs. It significantly outperforms existing train-free methods by 30\% and even a training method by 25\%. It can be directly applied to any existing LLMs and tasks without the need for adaptation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed on mobile devices offer benefits like user privacy and reduced network latency, but introduce a significant security risk: the leakage of proprietary models to end users. To mitigate this risk, we propose a system design for protecting on-device LLMs using Arm Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), TrustZone. Our system addresses two primary challenges: (1) The dilemma between memory efficiency and fast inference (caching model parameters within TEE memory). (2) The lack of efficient and secure Neural Processing Unit (NPU) time-sharing between Rich Execution Environment (REE) and TEE. Our approach incorporates two key innovations. First, we employ pipelined restoration, leveraging the deterministic memory access patterns of LLM inference to prefetch parameters on demand, hiding memory allocation, I/O and decryption latency under computation time. Second, we introduce a co-driver design, creating a minimal data plane NPU driver in the TEE that collaborates with the full-fledged REE driver. This reduces the TEE TCB size and eliminates control plane reinitialization overhead during NPU world switches. We implemented our system on the emerging OpenHarmony OS and the llama.cpp inference framework, and evaluated it with various LLMs on an Arm Rockchip device. Compared to a strawman TEE baseline lacking our optimizations, our system reduces TTFT by up to 90.9% and increases decoding speed by up to 23.2%.

Large Language Models for Code (LLMs4Code) have achieved strong performance in code generation, but recent studies reveal that they may memorize and leak sensitive information contained in training data, posing serious privacy risks. To address this gap, this work presents the first comprehensive empirical study on applying machine unlearning to mitigate sensitive information leakage in LLMs4Code. We first construct a dedicated benchmark that includes: (i) a synthetic forget set containing diverse forms of personal information, and (ii) a retain set designed to evaluate whether code-generation capability is preserved after unlearning. Using this benchmark, we systematically assess three representative unlearning algorithms (GA, GA+GD, GA+KL) across three widely used open-source LLMs4Code models (AIXCoder-7B, CodeLlama-7B, CodeQwen-7B). Experimental results demonstrate that machine unlearning can substantially reduce direct memorization-based leakage: on average, the direct leak rate drops by more than 50% while retaining about over 91% of the original code-generation performance. Moreover, by analyzing post-unlearning outputs, we uncover a consistent shift from direct to indirect leakage, revealing an underexplored vulnerability that persists even when the target data has been successfully forgotten. Our findings show that machine unlearning is a feasible and effective solution for enhancing privacy protection in LLMs4Code, while also highlighting the need for future techniques capable of mitigating both direct and indirect leakage simultaneously.

Tree-Ring Watermarking is a significant technique for authenticating AI-generated images. However, its effectiveness in rectified flow-based models remains unexplored, particularly given the inherent challenges of these models with noise latent inversion. Through extensive experimentation, we evaluated and compared the detection and separability of watermarks between SD 2.1 and FLUX.1-dev models. By analyzing various text guidance configurations and augmentation attacks, we demonstrate how inversion limitations affect both watermark recovery and the statistical separation between watermarked and unwatermarked images. Our findings provide valuable insights into the current limitations of Tree-Ring Watermarking in the current SOTA models and highlight the critical need for improved inversion methods to achieve reliable watermark detection and separability. The official implementation, dataset release and all experimental results are available at this https://github.com/dsgiitr/flux-watermarking{link}.

Due to increasing privacy concerns, neural network (NN) based secure inference (SI) schemes that simultaneously hide the client inputs and server models attract major research interests. While existing works focused on developing secure protocols for NN-based SI, in this work, we take a different approach. We propose NASS, an integrated framework to search for tailored NN architectures designed specifically for SI. In particular, we propose to model cryptographic protocols as design elements with associated reward functions. The characterized models are then adopted in a joint optimization with predicted hyperparameters in identifying the best NN architectures that balance prediction accuracy and execution efficiency. In the experiment, it is demonstrated that we can achieve the best of both worlds by using NASS, where the prediction accuracy can be improved from 81.6% to 84.6%, while the inference runtime is reduced by 2x and communication bandwidth by 1.9x on the CIFAR-10 dataset.

Modern deep learning requires large volumes of data, which could contain sensitive or private information that cannot be leaked. Recent work has shown for homogeneous neural networks a large portion of this training data could be reconstructed with only access to the trained network parameters. While the attack was shown to work empirically, there exists little formal understanding of its effective regime which datapoints are susceptible to reconstruction. In this work, we first build a stronger version of the dataset reconstruction attack and show how it can provably recover the entire training set in the infinite width regime. We then empirically study the characteristics of this attack on two-layer networks and reveal that its success heavily depends on deviations from the frozen infinite-width Neural Tangent Kernel limit. Next, we study the nature of easily-reconstructed images. We show that both theoretically and empirically, reconstructed images tend to "outliers" in the dataset, and that these reconstruction attacks can be used for dataset distillation, that is, we can retrain on reconstructed images and obtain high predictive accuracy.

Memory-augmented LLM agents store and retrieve information from prior interactions, yet the relative importance of how memories are written versus how they are retrieved remains unclear. We introduce a diagnostic framework that analyzes how performance differences manifest across write strategies, retrieval methods, and memory utilization behavior, and apply it to a 3x3 study crossing three write strategies (raw chunks, Mem0-style fact extraction, MemGPT-style summarization) with three retrieval methods (cosine, BM25, hybrid reranking). On LoCoMo, retrieval method is the dominant factor: average accuracy spans 20 points across retrieval methods (57.1% to 77.2%) but only 3-8 points across write strategies. Raw chunked storage, which requires zero LLM calls, matches or outperforms expensive lossy alternatives, suggesting that current memory pipelines may discard useful context that downstream retrieval mechanisms fail to compensate for. Failure analysis shows that performance breakdowns most often manifest at the retrieval stage rather than at utilization. We argue that, under current retrieval practices, improving retrieval quality yields larger gains than increasing write-time sophistication. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/boqiny/memory-probe.

Recent advancements in dense retrieval have introduced vision-language model (VLM)-based retrievers, such as DSE and ColPali, which leverage document screenshots embedded as vectors to enable effective search and offer a simplified pipeline over traditional text-only methods. In this study, we propose three pixel poisoning attack methods designed to compromise VLM-based retrievers and evaluate their effectiveness under various attack settings and parameter configurations. Our empirical results demonstrate that injecting even a single adversarial screenshot into the retrieval corpus can significantly disrupt search results, poisoning the top-10 retrieved documents for 41.9% of queries in the case of DSE and 26.4% for ColPali. These vulnerability rates notably exceed those observed with equivalent attacks on text-only retrievers. Moreover, when targeting a small set of known queries, the attack success rate raises, achieving complete success in certain cases. By exposing the vulnerabilities inherent in vision-language models, this work highlights the potential risks associated with their deployment.

Several recent Transformer architectures expose later layers to representations computed in the earliest layers, motivated by the observation that low-level features can become harder to recover as the residual stream is repeatedly transformed through depth. The cheapest among these methods add static value residuals: learned mixing coefficients that expose the first-layer value projection V_1 uniformly across tokens and heads. More expressive dense or dynamic alternatives recover finer-grained access, but at higher memory cost and lower throughput. The usefulness of V_1 is unlikely to be constant across tokens, heads, and contexts; different positions plausibly require different amounts of access to early lexical or semantic information. We therefore treat early-representation reuse as a retrieval problem rather than a connectivity problem, and introduce Selective Access Transformer (SATFormer), which preserves the first-layer value pathway while controlling access with a context-dependent gate. Across models from 130M to 1.3B parameters, SATFormer consistently improves validation loss and zero-shot accuracy over the static value-residual and Transformer baselines. Its strongest gains appear on retrieval-intensive benchmarks, where it improves over static value residuals by approximately 1.5 average points, while maintaining throughput and memory usage close to the baseline Transformer. Gate analyses suggest sparse, depth-dependent, head-specific, and category-sensitive access patterns, supporting the interpretation that SATFormer learns selective reuse of early representations rather than uniform residual copying. Our code is available at https://github.com/SkyeGunasekaran/SATFormer.

AI-agent guardrails are memoryless: each message is judged in isolation, so an adversary who spreads a single attack across dozens of sessions slips past every session-bound detector because only the aggregate carries the payload. We make three contributions to cross-session threat detection. (1) Dataset. CSTM-Bench is 26 executable attack taxonomies classified by kill-chain stage and cross-session operation (accumulate, compose, launder, inject_on_reader), each bound to one of seven identity anchors that ground-truth "violation" as a policy predicate, plus matched Benign-pristine and Benign-hard confounders. Released on Hugging Face as intrinsec-ai/cstm-bench with two 54-scenario splits: dilution (compositional) and cross_session (12 isolation-invisible scenarios produced by a closed-loop rewriter that softens surface phrasing while preserving cross-session artefacts). (2) Measurement. Framing cross-session detection as an information bottleneck to a downstream correlator LLM, we find that a session-bound judge and a Full-Log Correlator concatenating every prompt into one long-context call both lose roughly half their attack recall moving from dilution to cross_session, well inside any frontier context window. Scope: 54 scenarios per shard, one correlator family (Anthropic Claude), no prompt optimisation; we release it to motivate larger, multi-provider datasets. (3) Algorithm and metric. A bounded-memory Coreset Memory Reader retaining highest-signal fragments at K=50 is the only reader whose recall survives both shards. Because ranker reshuffles break KV-cache prefix reuse, we promote CSR_prefix (ordered prefix stability, LLM-free) to a first-class metric and fuse it with detection into CSTM = 0.7 F_1(CSDA@action, precision) + 0.3 CSR_prefix, benchmarking rankers on a single Pareto of recall versus serving stability.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Machine unlearning for large language models (LLMs) aims to selectively remove memorized content such as private data, copyrighted text, or hazardous knowledge, without costly full retraining. Most existing methods require a retain set of curated examples to prevent catastrophic degradation of general model utility, creating an extra data dependency that complicates deployment. We propose SHRED (Self-distillation via High-surprisal-only Retain-set-free Entropy Demotion), a retain-set-free unlearning method built on a key insight: not all tokens within a forget set instance carry memorized information equally. High-information tokens concentrate the model's memorized knowledge, while low-information tokens reflect general language competence. SHRED operates in two stages. (1) Selection: We perform a forward pass on a forget set instance, collect per-token autoregressive probabilities, and select the bottom (lowest probability, highest Shannon information) as forget positions; the remaining positions are retained as benign anchors. (2) Training: We construct modified KL targets that demote the memorized token's logit at forget positions while preserving the original distribution at benign positions. The model is then trained via a single top KL self-distillation objective that simultaneously drives forgetting and utility preservation. We evaluate SHRED across four standard unlearning benchmarks and demonstrate that it establishes a new Pareto-optimal trade-off between forget efficacy and model utility, outperforming retain-set-dependent methods. Our analysis shows that SHRED is robust against relearning attacks and membership-inference attacks, and it maintains stable utility even after many sequential unlearning runs.

Dataflow neural network accelerators efficiently process AI tasks on FPGAs, with deployment simplified by ready-to-use frameworks and pre-trained models. However, this convenience makes them vulnerable to malicious actors seeking to reverse engineer valuable Intellectual Property (IP) through Side-Channel Attacks (SCA). This paper proposes a methodology to recover the hardware configuration of dataflow accelerators generated with the FINN framework. Through unsupervised dimensionality reduction, we reduce the computational overhead compared to the state-of-the-art, enabling lightweight classifiers to recover both folding and quantization parameters. We demonstrate an attack phase requiring only 337 ms to recover the hardware parameters with an accuracy of more than 95% and 421 ms to fully recover these parameters with an averaging of 4 traces for a FINN-based accelerator running a CNN, both using a random forest classifier on side-channel traces, even with the accelerator dataflow fully loaded. This approach offers a more realistic attack scenario than existing methods, and compared to SoA attacks based on tsfresh, our method requires 940x and 110x less time for preparation and attack phases, respectively, and gives better results even without averaging traces.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

A range of recent works addresses the problem of compression of sequence of tokens into a shorter sequence of real-valued vectors to be used as inputs instead of token embeddings or key-value cache. These approaches allow to reduce the amount of compute in existing language models. Despite relying on powerful models as encoders, the maximum attainable lossless compression ratio is typically not higher than x10. This fact is highly intriguing because, in theory, the maximum information capacity of large real-valued vectors is far beyond the presented rates even for 16-bit precision and a modest vector size. In this work, we explore the limits of compression by replacing the encoder with a per-sample optimization procedure. We show that vectors with compression ratios up to x1500 exist, which highlights two orders of magnitude gap between existing and practically attainable solutions. Furthermore, we empirically show that the compression limits are determined not by the length of the input but by the amount of uncertainty to be reduced, namely, the cross-entropy loss on this sequence without any conditioning. The obtained limits highlight the substantial gap between the theoretical capacity of input embeddings and their practical utilization, suggesting significant room for optimization in model design.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities across various domains, with recent advancements in challenging reasoning tasks such as mathematics and programming. However, solving reasoning tasks often requires long decoding chains (of thoughts), which incur O(N) time and memory consumption, where N is the chain length. To mitigate O(N) time and memory consumption, existing sparsity-based algorithms propose retaining only the most critical token's intermediate data (i.e., key-value cache) and discarding the rest. However, these existing algorithms struggle with the ``impossible trinity'' of accuracy, time, and memory. For example, the state-of-the-art algorithm, Quest, achieves high accuracy with O(L) time but O(N) memory (L is the cache budget, L ll N). To address this issue, in this paper, we identify a new attention pattern during the decode stage of reasoning tasks, where milestone tokens (analogous to lemmas in mathematical proofs) emerge, are utilized, and then become unimportant afterward. Based on this pattern, we propose a new algorithm named RaaS that identifies and retains milestone tokens only until they are no longer needed, achieving high accuracy with O(L) time and O(L) memory complexity.

We introduce a cryptographic method to hide an arbitrary secret payload in the response of a Large Language Model (LLM). A secret key is required to extract the payload from the model's response, and without the key it is provably impossible to distinguish between the responses of the original LLM and the LLM that hides a payload. In particular, the quality of generated text is not affected by the payload. Our approach extends a recent result of Christ, Gunn and Zamir (2023) who introduced an undetectable watermarking scheme for LLMs.

Recent work on KV cache quantization, culminating in TurboQuant, has approached the Shannon entropy limit for per-vector compression of transformer key-value caches. We observe that this limit applies to a strictly weaker problem than the one that actually matters: compressing the KV cache as a sequence. The tokens stored in a KV cache are not arbitrary floating-point data -- they are samples from the exact formal language the model was trained on, and the model is by construction a near-optimal predictor of that language. We introduce sequential KV compression, a two-layer architecture that exploits this structure. The first layer, probabilistic prefix deduplication, identifies semantically equivalent shared prefixes across sessions using the trie metric d_T(s, s') = -log_2 P_M(s ^ s') from Probabilistic Language Tries (PLTs). The second layer, predictive delta coding, stores only the residual of each new KV vector from the model's own prediction of it, achieving a per-token entropy bound of H(KV_{i+1} | KV_{<=i}) <= H(token_{i+1} | token_{<=i}). We prove that at typical language model perplexity -- approximately 10-20 for fluent English text -- this bound is 3.3-4.3 bits on average per token position, compared to TurboQuant's 3 bits per vector component (with typical attention heads having 64-128 components). The theoretical compression ratio over TurboQuant is approximately 914,000x at the Shannon limit. Even at 1000x above the entropy floor -- a deliberately pessimistic worst-case overhead, two orders of magnitude above the 2-5x typical of practical source coders -- the ratio remains approximately 914x over TurboQuant, with compression improving rather than degrading as context length grows. The two layers are orthogonal and compose with existing per-vector quantization methods including TurboQuant.

Vertical federated learning is a trending solution for multi-party collaboration in training machine learning models. Industrial frameworks adopt secure multi-party computation methods such as homomorphic encryption to guarantee data security and privacy. However, a line of work has revealed that there are still leakage risks in VFL. The leakage is caused by the correlation between the intermediate representations and the raw data. Due to the powerful approximation ability of deep neural networks, an adversary can capture the correlation precisely and reconstruct the data. To deal with the threat of the data reconstruction attack, we propose a hashing-based VFL framework, called HashVFL, to cut off the reversibility directly. The one-way nature of hashing allows our framework to block all attempts to recover data from hash codes. However, integrating hashing also brings some challenges, e.g., the loss of information. This paper proposes and addresses three challenges to integrating hashing: learnability, bit balance, and consistency. Experimental results demonstrate HashVFL's efficiency in keeping the main task's performance and defending against data reconstruction attacks. Furthermore, we also analyze its potential value in detecting abnormal inputs. In addition, we conduct extensive experiments to prove HashVFL's generalization in various settings. In summary, HashVFL provides a new perspective on protecting multi-party's data security and privacy in VFL. We hope our study can attract more researchers to expand the application domains of HashVFL.

Large language models (LLMs) have been serving as effective backbones for retrieval systems, including Retrieval-Augmentation-Generation (RAG), Dense Information Retriever (IR), and Agent Memory Retrieval. Recent studies have demonstrated that such LLM-based Retrieval (LLMR) is vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which manipulates documents by token-level injections and enables adversaries to either boost or diminish these documents in retrieval tasks. However, existing attack studies mainly (1) presume a known query is given to the attacker, and (2) highly rely on access to the victim model's parameters or interactions, which are hardly accessible in real-world scenarios, leading to limited validity. To further explore the secure risks of LLMR, we propose a practical black-box attack method that generates transferable injection tokens based on zero-shot surrogate LLMs without need of victim queries or victim models knowledge. The effectiveness of our attack raises such a robustness issue that similar effects may arise from benign or unintended document edits in the real world. To achieve our attack, we first establish a theoretical framework of LLMR and empirically verify it. Under the framework, we simulate the transferable attack as a min-max problem, and propose an adversarial learning mechanism that finds optimal adversarial tokens with learnable query samples. Our attack is validated to be effective on benchmark datasets across popular LLM retrievers.

The privacy concerns of providing deep learning inference as a service have underscored the need for private inference (PI) protocols that protect users' data and the service provider's model using cryptographic methods. Recently proposed PI protocols have achieved significant reductions in PI latency by moving the computationally heavy homomorphic encryption (HE) parts to an offline/pre-compute phase. Paired with recent optimizations that tailor networks for PI, these protocols have achieved performance levels that are tantalizingly close to being practical. In this paper, we conduct a rigorous end-to-end characterization of PI protocols and optimization techniques and find that the current understanding of PI performance is overly optimistic. Specifically, we find that offline storage costs of garbled circuits (GC), a key cryptographic protocol used in PI, on user/client devices are prohibitively high and force much of the expensive offline HE computation to the online phase, resulting in a 10-1000times increase to PI latency. We propose a modified PI protocol that significantly reduces client-side storage costs for a small increase in online latency. Evaluated end-to-end, the modified protocol outperforms current protocols by reducing the mean PI latency by 4times for ResNet18 on TinyImageNet. We conclude with a discussion of several recently proposed PI optimizations in light of the findings and note many actually increase PI latency when evaluated from an end-to-end perspective.

We introduce an algorithm where the individual bits representing the weights of a neural network are learned. This method allows training weights with integer values on arbitrary bit-depths and naturally uncovers sparse networks, without additional constraints or regularization techniques. We show better results than the standard training technique with fully connected networks and similar performance as compared to standard training for convolutional and residual networks. By training bits in a selective manner we found that the biggest contribution to achieving high accuracy is given by the first three most significant bits, while the rest provide an intrinsic regularization. As a consequence more than 90\% of a network can be used to store arbitrary codes without affecting its accuracy. These codes may be random noise, binary files or even the weights of previously trained networks.

This whitepaper seeks to elucidate implications that the capabilities of developing quantum architectures have on blockchain vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies. First, we provide new resource estimates for breaking the 256-bit Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem, the core of modern blockchain cryptography. We demonstrate that Shor's algorithm for this problem can execute with either <1200 logical qubits and <90 million Toffoli gates or <1450 logical qubits and <70 million Toffoli gates. In the interest of responsible disclosure, we use a zero-knowledge proof to validate these results without disclosing attack vectors. On superconducting architectures with 1e-3 physical error rates and planar connectivity, those circuits can execute in minutes using fewer than half a million physical qubits. We introduce a critical distinction between fast-clock (such as superconducting and photonic) and slow-clock (such as neutral atom and ion trap) architectures. Our analysis reveals that the first fast-clock CRQCs would enable on-spend attacks on public mempool transactions of some cryptocurrencies. We survey major cryptocurrency vulnerabilities through this lens, identifying systemic risks associated with advanced features in some blockchains such as smart contracts, Proof-of-Stake consensus, and Data Availability Sampling, as well as the enduring concern of abandoned assets. We argue that technical solutions would benefit from accompanying public policy and discuss various frameworks of digital salvage to regulate the recovery or destruction of dormant assets while preventing adversarial seizure. We also discuss implications for other digital assets and tokenization as well as challenges and successful examples of the ongoing transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Finally, we urge all vulnerable cryptocurrency communities to join the ongoing migration to PQC without delay.

A key component of fact verification is thevevidence retrieval, often from multiple documents. Recent approaches use dense representations and condition the retrieval of each document on the previously retrieved ones. The latter step is performed over all the documents in the collection, requiring storing their dense representations in an index, thus incurring a high memory footprint. An alternative paradigm is retrieve-and-rerank, where documents are retrieved using methods such as BM25, their sentences are reranked, and further documents are retrieved conditioned on these sentences, reducing the memory requirements. However, such approaches can be brittle as they rely on heuristics and assume hyperlinks between documents. We propose a novel retrieve-and-rerank method for multi-hop retrieval, that consists of a retriever that jointly scores documents in the knowledge source and sentences from previously retrieved documents using an autoregressive formulation and is guided by a proof system based on natural logic that dynamically terminates the retrieval process if the evidence is deemed sufficient. This method is competitive with current state-of-the-art methods on FEVER, HoVer and FEVEROUS-S, while using 5 to 10 times less memory than competing systems. Evaluation on an adversarial dataset indicates improved stability of our approach compared to commonly deployed threshold-based methods. Finally, the proof system helps humans predict model decisions correctly more often than using the evidence alone.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated promising performance in complex tasks. However, the resource-consuming reasoning processes may be exploited by attackers to maliciously occupy the resources of the servers, leading to a crash, like the DDoS attack in cyber. To this end, we propose a novel attack method on LRMs termed ExtendAttack to maliciously occupy the resources of servers by stealthily extending the reasoning processes of LRMs. Concretely, we systematically obfuscate characters within a benign prompt, transforming them into a complex, poly-base ASCII representation. This compels the model to perform a series of computationally intensive decoding sub-tasks that are deeply embedded within the semantic structure of the query itself. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed ExtendAttack. Remarkably, it significantly increases response length and latency, with the former increasing by over 2.7 times for the o3 model on the HumanEval benchmark. Besides, it preserves the original meaning of the query and achieves comparable answer accuracy, showing the stealthiness.

Pre-trained language models demonstrate general intelligence and common sense, but long inputs quickly become a bottleneck for memorizing information at inference time. We resurface a simple method, Memorizing Transformers (Wu et al., 2022), that gives the model access to a bank of pre-computed memories. We show that it is possible to fix many of the shortcomings of the original method, such as the need for fine-tuning, by critically assessing how positional encodings should be updated for the keys and values retrieved. This intuitive method uses the model's own key/query system to select and attend to the most relevant memories at each generation step, rather than using external embeddings. We demonstrate the importance of external information being retrieved in a majority of decoder layers, contrary to previous work. We open source a new counterfactual long-range retrieval benchmark, and show that Extended Mind Transformers outperform today's state of the art by 6% on average.

Polymarket has emerged as a prominent prediction market platform and one of the fastest-growing applications in DeFi. To achieve low-latency trading, it adopts a hybrid architecture that matches orders off-chain but settles them on-chain for final execution. This design creates a consistency gap we call Ghost Fills: an order that is successfully matched off-chain may later fail during on-chain settlement. To understand the security implications of this gap, we investigate such failed settlements by building GHOSTHUNTER, which reconstructs them from on-chain traces and attributes to concrete attack patterns. Across 1,952,440 reverted match-order transactions, we find that attackers exploit the time gap between matching and settlement to invalidate already matched orders before they are finalized on-chain. We then identify four attack vectors from these incidents: nonce bump, balance drain, allowance revoke, and proxy trap, realized via 35 evolving variants. These vectors allow attackers to selectively revert 980,133 filled orders, enabling risk-free prediction, arbitrage-bot hunting, and liquidity reward manipulation, realizing at least \1.49M in profit, which places 1.78 B USD at risk and 2.17 M POL (about \212 K) paid by operator. During peak hours, more than 24.3% of all filled orders reverted, causing de facto DoS attacks. We also find that code derived from the flawed contract still appears in 167 independent contracts across 10 chains holding at least 23 M in user funds, extending the impact beyond Polymarket. We have disclosed our evidence to affected parties, and the issue has been partially mitigated.

Recent work on open domain question answering (QA) assumes strong supervision of the supporting evidence and/or assumes a blackbox information retrieval (IR) system to retrieve evidence candidates. We argue that both are suboptimal, since gold evidence is not always available, and QA is fundamentally different from IR. We show for the first time that it is possible to jointly learn the retriever and reader from question-answer string pairs and without any IR system. In this setting, evidence retrieval from all of Wikipedia is treated as a latent variable. Since this is impractical to learn from scratch, we pre-train the retriever with an Inverse Cloze Task. We evaluate on open versions of five QA datasets. On datasets where the questioner already knows the answer, a traditional IR system such as BM25 is sufficient. On datasets where a user is genuinely seeking an answer, we show that learned retrieval is crucial, outperforming BM25 by up to 19 points in exact match.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in multi-step reasoning and calling search engines at appropriate steps. However, existing retrieval-augmented reasoning approaches rely on separate retrieval models, limiting the LRM's role in retrieval to deciding when to retrieve and how to query. This separation not only increases hardware and operational costs but also leads to errors in the retrieval process due to the representation bottleneck, a phenomenon where the retriever's embedding space is not expressive enough to meet the generator's requirements. To address this, we shift our perspective from sequence-to-sequence matching to locating the answer-containing paths within the corpus, and propose a novel framework called FREESON (Retriever-FREE Retrieval-Augmented ReaSONing). This framework enables LRMs to retrieve relevant knowledge on their own by acting as both a generator and retriever. To achieve this, we introduce a variant of the MCTS algorithm specialized for the retrieval task, which we call CT-MCTS (Corpus-Traversing Monte Carlo Tree Search). In this algorithm, LRMs traverse through the corpus toward answer-containing regions. Our results on five open-domain QA benchmarks, including single-hop and multi-hop questions, show that FREESON achieves an average improvement of 14.4% in EM and F1 over four multi-step reasoning models with a separate retriever, and it also performs comparably to the strongest baseline, surpassing it by 3% on PopQA and 2WikiMultihopQA.

Transformer-based large language models (LLMs) use the key-value (KV) cache to significantly accelerate inference by storing the key and value embeddings of past tokens. However, this cache consumes significant GPU memory. In this work, we introduce HashEvict, an algorithm that uses locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) to compress the KV cache. HashEvict quickly locates tokens in the cache that are cosine dissimilar to the current query token. This is achieved by computing the Hamming distance between binarized Gaussian projections of the current token query and cached token keys, with a projection length much smaller than the embedding dimension. We maintain a lightweight binary structure in GPU memory to facilitate these calculations. Unlike existing compression strategies that compute attention to determine token retention, HashEvict makes these decisions pre-attention, thereby reducing computational costs. Additionally, HashEvict is dynamic - at every decoding step, the key and value of the current token replace the embeddings of a token expected to produce the lowest attention score. We demonstrate that HashEvict can compress the KV cache by 30%-70% while maintaining high performance across reasoning, multiple-choice, long-context retrieval and summarization tasks.

As recently demonstrated, Deep Neural Networks (DNN), usually trained using single precision IEEE 754 floating point numbers (binary32), can also work using lower precision. Therefore, 16-bit and 8-bit compressed format have attracted considerable attention. In this paper, we focused on two families of formats that have already achieved interesting results in compressing binary32 numbers in machine learning applications, without sensible degradation of the accuracy: bfloat and posit. Even if 16-bit and 8-bit bfloat/posit are routinely used for reducing the storage of the weights/biases of trained DNNs, the inference still often happens on the 32-bit FPU of the CPU (especially if GPUs are not available). In this paper we propose a way to decompress a tensor of bfloat/posits just before computations, i.e., after the compressed operands have been loaded within the vector registers of a vector capable CPU, in order to save bandwidth usage and increase cache efficiency. Finally, we show the architectural parameters and considerations under which this solution is advantageous with respect to the uncompressed one.

A model of associative memory is studied, which stores and reliably retrieves many more patterns than the number of neurons in the network. We propose a simple duality between this dense associative memory and neural networks commonly used in deep learning. On the associative memory side of this duality, a family of models that smoothly interpolates between two limiting cases can be constructed. One limit is referred to as the feature-matching mode of pattern recognition, and the other one as the prototype regime. On the deep learning side of the duality, this family corresponds to feedforward neural networks with one hidden layer and various activation functions, which transmit the activities of the visible neurons to the hidden layer. This family of activation functions includes logistics, rectified linear units, and rectified polynomials of higher degrees. The proposed duality makes it possible to apply energy-based intuition from associative memory to analyze computational properties of neural networks with unusual activation functions - the higher rectified polynomials which until now have not been used in deep learning. The utility of the dense memories is illustrated for two test cases: the logical gate XOR and the recognition of handwritten digits from the MNIST data set.

A new information theoretic condition is presented for reconstructing a discrete random variable X based on the knowledge of a set of discrete functions of X. The reconstruction condition is derived from Shannon's 1953 lattice theory with two entropic metrics of Shannon and Rajski. Because such a theoretical material is relatively unknown and appears quite dispersed in different references, we first provide a synthetic description (with complete proofs) of its concepts, such as total, common and complementary informations. Definitions and properties of the two entropic metrics are also fully detailed and shown compatible with the lattice structure. A new geometric interpretation of such a lattice structure is then investigated that leads to a necessary (and sometimes sufficient) condition for reconstructing the discrete random variable X given a set { X_1,ldots,X_{n} } of elements in the lattice generated by X. Finally, this condition is illustrated in five specific examples of perfect reconstruction problems: reconstruction of a symmetric random variable from the knowledge of its sign and absolute value, reconstruction of a word from a set of linear combinations, reconstruction of an integer from its prime signature (fundamental theorem of arithmetic) and from its remainders modulo a set of coprime integers (Chinese remainder theorem), and reconstruction of the sorting permutation of a list from a minimal set of pairwise comparisons.

Agent-interoperability protocols such as A2A and MCP standardize what agents say to one another but assume address-based transport. Whether over HTTP(S) or a content-protecting binding such as MLS-based SLIM, these transports protect message content yet leave the communication graph exposed: which agent contacts which, when, and how often. In agent systems this graph is more consequential than a privacy framing suggests. Endpoints are capability-labeled, workflows are structured and chained, and interactions are coupled to real actions, so an observer recovers more than past relationships: it can infer the pending workflow and, at machine speed, act on that inference before the workflow completes. The threat is therefore one of workflow integrity, not privacy alone. We formalize a threat model for the communication graph and locate what makes its metadata distinctively consequential: not stronger fingerprinting, which we measure to be comparable to other machine traffic, but exposure across independent trust domains, coupled to autonomous action. We define transport- and bootstrap-layer privacy properties, evaluate candidate transports, and give an A2A case study where a metadata-protecting binding surfaces the protocol's implicit identity assumptions. On a generative model anchored to a real capture and over a live A2A binding, a label-blind classifier recovers a task's class from passive metadata well above chance, and from only its opening; a defense-aware adversary does not overturn this, and only the full set of properties drives recovery toward chance. The leverage of acting on the leak is distinct from recoverability: under a fixed budget an adversary realizes most of a clairvoyant attacker's advantage from a workflow's opening, governed by precision over the top-ranked workflows rather than overall accuracy, so a defense suppresses it even while recovery stays above chance.

Language models trained on web-scale corpora risk memorizing and exposing sensitive information, prompting the need for effective machine unlearning. Prior methods mainly focus on input queries to suppress sensitive outputs, yet this often fails to eliminate the underlying knowledge and limits scalability. To address this, we propose Corrective Unlearning with Retrieved Exclusions (CURE), a novel unlearning framework that verifies model outputs for leakage and revises them into safe responses. Specifically, CURE employs a lightweight corrector that is applied to the original model to verify whether outputs contain target knowledge and to rewrite them if any leakage is detected. To efficiently handle large-scale unlearning requests, CURE retrieves unlearning targets that are relevant to the initial response and provides them as in-context references to the corrector for detection and conditional revision. By leveraging this retrieval augmentation, the corrector can adapt to new unlearning requests without additional training. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that CURE substantially reduces information leakage, even from indirect queries where prior works fall short, while maintaining response quality and general utility. Moreover, it demonstrates robustness under continual unlearning scenarios, making it practical for real-world applications.

Memory layers use a trainable key-value lookup mechanism to add extra parameters to a model without increasing FLOPs. Conceptually, sparsely activated memory layers complement compute-heavy dense feed-forward layers, providing dedicated capacity to store and retrieve information cheaply. This work takes memory layers beyond proof-of-concept, proving their utility at contemporary scale. On downstream tasks, language models augmented with our improved memory layer outperform dense models with more than twice the computation budget, as well as mixture-of-expert models when matched for both compute and parameters. We find gains are especially pronounced for factual tasks. We provide a fully parallelizable memory layer implementation, demonstrating scaling laws with up to 128B memory parameters, pretrained to 1 trillion tokens, comparing to base models with up to 8B parameters.

The consensus that GCN, GraphSAGE, GAT, and EvolveGCN outperform feature-only baselines on the Elliptic Bitcoin Dataset is widely cited but has not been rigorously stress-tested under a leakage-free evaluation protocol. We perform a seed-matched inductive-versus-transductive comparison and find that this consensus does not hold. Under a strictly inductive protocol, Random Forest on raw features achieves F1 = 0.821 and outperforms all evaluated GNNs, while GraphSAGE reaches F1 = 0.689 +/- 0.017. A paired controlled experiment reveals a 39.5-point F1 gap attributable to training-time exposure to test-period adjacency. Additionally, edge-shuffle ablations show that randomly wired graphs outperform the real transaction graph, indicating that the dataset's topology can be misleading under temporal distribution shift. Hybrid models combining GNN embeddings with raw features provide only marginal gains and remain substantially below feature-only baselines. We release code, checkpoints, and a strict-inductive protocol to enable reproducible, leakage-free evaluation.

Dense retrievers have achieved state-of-the-art performance in various information retrieval tasks, but to what extent can they be safely deployed in real-world applications? In this work, we propose a novel attack for dense retrieval systems in which a malicious user generates a small number of adversarial passages by perturbing discrete tokens to maximize similarity with a provided set of training queries. When these adversarial passages are inserted into a large retrieval corpus, we show that this attack is highly effective in fooling these systems to retrieve them for queries that were not seen by the attacker. More surprisingly, these adversarial passages can directly generalize to out-of-domain queries and corpora with a high success attack rate -- for instance, we find that 50 generated passages optimized on Natural Questions can mislead >94% of questions posed in financial documents or online forums. We also benchmark and compare a range of state-of-the-art dense retrievers, both unsupervised and supervised. Although different systems exhibit varying levels of vulnerability, we show they can all be successfully attacked by injecting up to 500 passages, a small fraction compared to a retrieval corpus of millions of passages.

Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on the Key-Value (KV) Cache to store token history, enabling efficient decoding of tokens. As the KV-Cache grows, it becomes a major memory and computation bottleneck, however, there is an opportunity to alleviate this bottleneck, especially because prior research has shown that only a small subset of tokens contribute meaningfully to each decoding step. A key challenge in finding these critical tokens is that they are dynamic, and heavily input query-dependent. Existing methods either risk quality by evicting tokens permanently, or retain the full KV-Cache but rely on retrieving chunks (pages) of tokens at generation, failing at dense, context-rich tasks. Additionally, many existing KV-Cache sparsity methods rely on inaccurate proxies for token importance. To address these limitations, we introduce TokenButler, a high-granularity, query-aware predictor that learns to identify these critical tokens. By training a light-weight predictor with less than 1.2% parameter overhead, TokenButler prioritizes tokens based on their contextual, predicted importance. This improves perplexity & downstream accuracy by over 8% relative to SoTA methods for estimating token importance. We evaluate TokenButler on a novel synthetic small-context co-referential retrieval task, demonstrating near-oracle accuracy. Code, models and benchmarks: https://github.com/abdelfattah-lab/TokenButler

Quantum devices capable of breaking the public-key cryptosystems that Bitcoin relies on to secure its transactions are expected with reasonable probability within a decade. Quantum attacks would put at risk the entire Bitcoin network, which has an estimated value of around 500 billion USD. To prevent this threat, a proactive approach is critical. The only known way to prevent any such attack is to upgrade the currently used public-key cryptosystems, namely ECDSA, with so-called post-quantum cryptosystems which have no known vulnerabilities to quantum attacks. In this paper, we analyse the technical cost of such an upgrade. We calculate a non-tight lower bound on the cumulative downtime required for the above transition to be 1827.96 hours, or 76.16 days. We also demonstrate that the transition needs to be fully completed before the availability of ECDSA-256 breaking quantum devices, in order to ensure Bitcoin's ongoing security. The conclusion is that the Bitcoin upgrade to quantum-safe protocols needs to be started as soon as possible in order to guarantee its ongoing operations.

Coding agents and LLM-powered applications routinely send potentially sensitive content to cloud LLM APIs where it may be logged, retained, used for training, or subpoenaed. Existing privacy tooling focuses on network-level encryption and organization-level DLP, neither of which addresses the content of prompts themselves. We present a systematic empirical evaluation of eight techniques for privacy-preserving LLM requests: (A) local-only inference, (B) redaction with placeholder restoration, (C) semantic rephrasing, (D) Trusted Execution Environment hosted inference, (E) split inference, (F) fully homomorphic encryption, (G) secret sharing via multi-party computation, and (H) differential-privacy noise. We implement all eight (or a tractable research-stage subset where deployment is not yet feasible) in an open-source shim compatible with MCP and any OpenAI-compatible API. We evaluate the four practical options (A, B, C, H) and their combinations across four workload classes using a ground-truth-labelled leak benchmark of 1,300 samples with 4,014 annotations. Our headline finding is that no single technique dominates: the combination A+B+C (route locally when possible, redact and rephrase the rest) achieves 0.6% combined leak on PII and 31.3% on proprietary code, with zero exact leaks on PII across 500 samples. We present a decision rule that selects the appropriate option(s) from a threat-model budget and workload characterisation. Code, benchmarks, and evaluation harness are released at https://github.com/jayluxferro/llm-redactor.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on edge devices. To meet strict resource constraints, real-world deployment has pushed LLM quantization from 8-bit to 4-bit, 2-bit, and now 1.58-bit. Combined with lookup table (LUT)-based inference, CPUs run these ultra-low-bit LLMs even faster than NPUs, opening new opportunities for ubiquitous on-device intelligence. However, this paper identifies that LUT-based inference underutilizes memory bandwidth during parallel inference, which is required for prefilling, test-time scaling, and other multi-token scenarios. The root cause is the scalar LUT paradigm, which performs repetitive and non-contiguous memory accesses for each token. To solve the issue, we propose vector LUT, a new lookup paradigm that constructs a unified LUT across parallel tokens, and performs a single 1 rightarrow N lookup per index. To realize it efficiently, we further introduce (1) Vector LUT-Centric Tensor Layout, and (2) Cache-Aware Streamed Lookup techniques. Evaluations on 5 edge devices across 3 LLMs show that Vec-LUT outperforms state-of-the-art baselines by up to 4.2times. Our implementation is integrated into llama.cpp. The code is available at https://github.com/Cipherxzc/vlut.cpp.

Modern coding agents are usually evaluated by whether they eventually produce a correct patch, but patch generation depends on an earlier context-acquisition stage: finding the repository files needed for the task. We introduce Agent Retrieval Bench, a file-level benchmark for this upstream retrieval problem. Samples are built from real coding-workflow signals and evaluated against frozen base-commit repositories, with relevance defined by what an agent needs next rather than direct query-file semantic similarity. The benchmark covers four positive-retrieval tasks: code2test, comment2context, trace2code, and edit2ripple; a fifth subset evaluates selective retrieval using natural evidence-backed no-gold cases and counterfactual wrong-repository controls. Agent Retrieval Bench contains 427 samples across 25 repositories: 345 positive examples, 50 natural no-gold examples, and 32 counterfactual controls. The corpus includes 308 base-commit snapshots, 392,000 files, and 7.9 million chunks. We evaluate lexical retrieval, RepoMap, open-source embeddings, selective abstention, and logged agent context selection. No single retrieval family dominates: Qwen3-Embedding-4B has the best sample-weighted MRR on positive samples, Qwen3-Embedding-8B the best Recall@20, and RepoMap the best budgeted context yield at 8K tokens, with task-level winners differing substantially. Selective thresholds calibrated with counterfactual controls do not improve selective success on natural no-gold cases, revealing a calibration gap. Logged trajectories also miss every gold file on 27-35 percent of samples. A controlled seed-intervention pilot finds that retrieval-derived initial context yields higher file F1 with less post-seed exploration than random non-gold context, while oracle gold context shows substantial remaining headroom.

Parallel diffusion decoding can accelerate diffusion language model inference by unmasking multiple tokens per step, but aggressive parallelism often harms quality. Revocable decoding mitigates this by rechecking earlier tokens, yet we observe that existing verification schemes frequently trigger flip-flop oscillations, where tokens are remasked and later restored unchanged. This behaviour slows inference in two ways: remasking verified positions weakens the conditioning context for parallel drafting, and repeated remask cycles consume the revision budget with little net progress. We propose COVER (Cache Override Verification for Efficient Revision), which performs leave-one-out verification and stable drafting within a single forward pass. COVER constructs two attention views via KV cache override: selected seeds are masked for verification, while their cached key value states are injected for all other queries to preserve contextual information, with a closed form diagonal correction preventing self leakage at the seed positions. COVER further prioritises seeds using a stability aware score that balances uncertainty, downstream influence, and cache drift, and it adapts the number of verified seeds per step. Across benchmarks, COVER markedly reduces unnecessary revisions and yields faster decoding while preserving output quality.

We propose a lightweight scheme where the formation of a data block is changed in such a way that it can tolerate soft errors significantly better than the baseline. The key insight behind our work is that CNN weights are normalized between -1 and 1 after each convolutional layer, and this leaves one bit unused in half-precision floating-point representation. By taking advantage of the unused bit, we create a backup for the most significant bit to protect it against the soft errors. Also, considering the fact that in MLC STT-RAMs the cost of memory operations (read and write), and reliability of a cell are content-dependent (some patterns take larger current and longer time, while they are more susceptible to soft error), we rearrange the data block to minimize the number of costly bit patterns. Combining these two techniques provides the same level of accuracy compared to an error-free baseline while improving the read and write energy by 9% and 6%, respectively.

Large language models trained on web-scale corpora can memorize undesirable data containing misinformation, copyrighted material, or private or sensitive information. Recently, several machine unlearning algorithms have been proposed to eliminate the effect of such datapoints from trained models -- that is, to approximate a model that had never been trained on these datapoints in the first place. However, evaluating the effectiveness of unlearning algorithms remains an open challenge. Previous work has relied on heuristics -- such as verifying that the model can no longer reproduce the specific information targeted for removal while maintaining accuracy on unrelated test data. These approaches inadequately capture the complete effect of reversing the influence of datapoints on a trained model. In this work, we propose the RESTOR framework for machine unlearning evaluation, which assesses the ability of unlearning algorithms for targeted data erasure, by evaluating the ability of models to forget the knowledge introduced in these datapoints, while simultaneously recovering the model's knowledge state had it never encountered these datapoints. RESTOR helps uncover several novel insights about popular unlearning algorithms, and the mechanisms through which they operate -- for instance, identifying that some algorithms merely emphasize forgetting but not recovering knowledge, and that localizing unlearning targets can enhance unlearning performance.

Bitcoin constructs temporal order internally rather than synchronizing to any external clock. Empirical evidence shows that its time evolution is non-continuous, probabilistic, and self-regulated. Block discovery follows a stochastic process in which uncertainty accumulates during the search phase and collapses abruptly when a valid proof-of-work solution appears. Difficulty adjustment maintains the system near the entropy-maximizing regime and allows the network to infer the underlying global hash rate. Building on these observations, we present a unified framework in which Bitcoin time emerges from four interacting mechanisms: proof of work as a distributed entropy source, difficulty adjustment as temporal feedback, entropy collapse as discrete temporal updates, and recursive sealing through hash pointers. Together these mechanisms form a self-regulating temporal architecture that transforms distributed randomness into a coherent and irreversible global timeline, offering a generalizable foundation for autonomous timekeeping in permissionless systems.

Deep hashing has been widely applied to large-scale image retrieval tasks owing to efficient computation and low storage cost by encoding high-dimensional image data into binary codes. Since binary codes do not contain as much information as float features, the essence of binary encoding is preserving the main context to guarantee retrieval quality. However, the existing hashing methods have great limitations on suppressing redundant background information and accurately encoding from Euclidean space to Hamming space by a simple sign function. In order to solve these problems, a Cross-Scale Context Extracted Hashing Network (CSCE-Net) is proposed in this paper. Firstly, we design a two-branch framework to capture fine-grained local information while maintaining high-level global semantic information. Besides, Attention guided Information Extraction module (AIE) is introduced between two branches, which suppresses areas of low context information cooperated with global sliding windows. Unlike previous methods, our CSCE-Net learns a content-related Dynamic Sign Function (DSF) to replace the original simple sign function. Therefore, the proposed CSCE-Net is context-sensitive and able to perform well on accurate image binary encoding. We further demonstrate that our CSCE-Net is superior to the existing hashing methods, which improves retrieval performance on standard benchmarks.

Transformer-based large language models (LLMs) have already achieved remarkable results on long-text tasks, but the limited GPU memory (VRAM) resources struggle to accommodate the linearly growing demand for key-value (KV) cache as the sequence length increases, which has become a bottleneck for the application of LLMs on long sequences. Existing KV cache compression methods include eviction, merging, or quantization of the KV cache to reduce its size. However, compression results in irreversible information forgetting, potentially affecting the accuracy of subsequent decoding. In this paper, we propose SpeCache, which takes full advantage of the large and easily expandable CPU memory to offload the complete KV cache, and dynamically fetches KV pairs back in each decoding step based on their importance measured by low-bit KV cache copy in VRAM. To avoid inference latency caused by CPU-GPU communication, SpeCache speculatively predicts the KV pairs that the next token might attend to, allowing us to prefetch them before the next decoding step which enables parallelization of prefetching and computation. Experiments on LongBench and Needle-in-a-Haystack benchmarks verify that SpeCache effectively reduces VRAM usage while avoiding information forgetting for long sequences without re-training, even with a 10x high KV cache compression ratio.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained using massive datasets, which often contain undesirable content such as harmful texts, personal information, and copyrighted material. To address this, machine unlearning aims to remove information from trained models. Recent work has shown that soft token attacks (STA) can successfully extract unlearned information from LLMs, but in this work we show that STAs can be an inadequate tool for auditing unlearning. Using common benchmarks such as Who Is Harry Potter? and TOFU, we demonstrate that in a strong auditor setting such attacks can elicit any information from the LLM, regardless of the deployed unlearning algorithm or whether the queried content was originally present in the training corpus. We further show that STA with just a few soft tokens (1-10) can elicit random strings over 400 characters long, indicating that STAs must be used carefully to effectively audit unlearning. Example code can be found at: https://github.com/IntelLabs/LLMart/tree/main/examples/unlearning

We study KV cache eviction under a shared globally capped decode-time harness. Seven policies (LRU, H2O, SnapKV, StreamingLLM, Ada-KV, QUEST, Random) share a prompt-boundary vulnerability: without structural protection, they collapse to near-zero quality on six pure-transformer models (F1leq0.064). Reserving 10\% of cache at each boundary recovers 69--90\% of the C{=}2{,}048 reference-ceiling quality on seven LongBench models at C{=}256 (13\% retention); a ten-model panel spans 68--98\%. An attention-mass pilot (Qwen2.5-3B, N{=}30) suggests why: the position-0 sink holds {sim}75% of prefix mass, while other boundary tokens sit near {sim}0.41{times} uniform expectation, so attention scorers retain the sink but still drop structurally critical tokens. With protection, simplified score-isolation variants are TOST-equivalent to LRU at K{=}32 (Δ{=}0.02); at K{=}8, attention policies pairwise converge yet beat LRU by 0.011--0.021 F1 across C{=}256 and C{=}512. Faithful Ada-KV/QUEST add {sim}0.03--0.04 F1 on Mistral-7B and Phi-3.5 beyond simplified variants. A NIAH-32K regime-transfer pilot on Qwen3-4B (decode vs.\ prefill, C{in}{512,2048}) shows near-identical protection lifts (ratio 0.99--1.00). At 64K, protection helps but recovery is modest; faithful per-head scoring matches full-cache ceiling on Gemma-3-4B at 6.3\% retention only when the model already supports strong 64K retrieval without eviction. Overall: protection dominates; scoring differences are secondary once boundaries are guarded; per-head allocation gives a further modest gain.

Simon's algorithm is a polynomial period-finding algorithm that has been used to exploit the algebraic structure of specific symmetric ciphers, showing that exponential speedups in their cryptanalysis are theoretically possible. While the theoretical framework for an attack using Simon's algorithm on the Even-Mansour cipher is well-established, practical implementations on noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) hardware remain limited. This paper presents a proof of concept quantum cryptanalysis of the Even-Mansour cipher using Simon's period-finding algorithm on NISQ hardware. For N = 3 and N = 4, we successfully demonstrate secret key recovery for N-bit constructions on the ibm_miami processor. Our experiments also identify a scaling limitation in the classical pre-processing stage: The DORCIS circuit optimization tool encountered a memory bottleneck at N = 5, preventing the generation of optimized circuits for larger key lengths. Our results suggest firstly that Simon's algorithm is effective for the Even-Mansour cipher for short bit lengths on current quantum hardware. Secondly, while DORCIS is effective for the small-scale S-boxes for which it was designed, there remains a need for the investigation of more scalable and efficient synthesis tools capable of handling larger and more general permutations in the context of Even-Mansour ciphers.

While Trusted Execution Environments provide a strong foundation for secure cloud computing, they remain vulnerable to access pattern leakages. Oblivious Maps (OMAPs) mitigate this by fully hiding access patterns but suffer from high overhead due to randomized remapping and worst-case padding. We argue these costs are not fundamental. Modern accelerators featuring High-Bandwidth Memory (HBM) offer a new opportunity: Vaswani et al. [OSDI'18] point out that eavesdropping on HBM is difficult -- even for physical attackers -- as its memory channels are sealed together with processor cores inside the same physical package. Later, Hunt et al. [NSDI'20] show that, with proper isolation, HBM can be turned into an unobservable region where both data and memory traces are hidden. This motivates a rethink of OMAP design with HBM-backed solutions to finally overcome their traditional performance limits. Building on these insights, we present BOLT, a Bandwidth Optimized, Lightning-fast OMAP accelerator that, for the first time, achieves O(1) + O(log_2(log_2 (N))) bandwidth overhead. BOLT introduces three key innovations: (i) a new OMAP algorithm that leverages isolated HBM as an unobservable cache to accelerate oblivious access to large host memory; (ii) a self-hosted architecture that offloads execution and memory control from the host to mitigate CPU-side leakage; and (iii) tailored algorithm-architecture co-designs that maximize resource efficiency. We implement a prototype BOLT on a Xilinx U55C FPGA. Evaluations show that BOLT achieves up to 279x and 480x speedups in initialization and query time, respectively, over state-of-the-art OMAPs, including an industry implementation from Facebook.

It is tempting to assume any task solvable by a short program can be taught to a model as its chain-of-thought: write the steps out, fine-tune, and the model follows. This paper shows the assumption fails for an identifiable class of procedures. The testbed is nine reasoning tasks, each from a deterministic generator; public and hidden splits share generators, so held-out data proxies test accuracy. I reverse-engineer the generators into Python solvers, render them as chain-of-thought, and distill into a rank-<= 32 LoRA over a 30B (3.5B-active) Nemotron model. Forward-computable tasks install readily: lookup/arithmetic and an 8-bit boolean task transfer (>= 0.99 and 0.68). Cryptarithm does not: distilling its backtracking search holds at 0.01-0.07 across eleven chain-of-thought designs, RL from verifiable rewards, and self-training, even though a search solver answers 71% of instances. This is not a capability gap. The model does the arithmetic on 97-100% of lines and ranks the correct cipher in its top eight on 71%; it cannot carry the search forward as a left-to-right derivation. Fine-tuning learns the shape of a verifiable elimination step while its verdicts become unconditional templates, correct only 16-57% of the time ("verdict-as-token"). The ceiling holds across backbones from 3B to 671B and across fine-tuning and prompting; a controlled intervention isolates the cause: revealing the cipher key, which turns the derivation forward, lifts the same instances from 0.03 to 0.57. When a procedure's only solution is search over information-free structure, no faithful forward chain-of-thought exists to imitate. The task becomes learnable only by removing the search, precomputing its combinatorial core into a catalog and reducing the trace to recall plus verification; the 1st-place solution reaches Private LB 0.92 this way. What distills is memorization and verification, not search.