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Nov 16

Harmfulness Propagation Dynamics: Layer-wise Trajectories of Adversarial Intent in Large Language Models

We identify Harmfulness Propagation Dynamics (HPD): for harmful prompts, the projection of the last-token hidden state onto a learned harm direction rises monotonically with transformer depth, whereas benign prompts remain flat or oscillatory. This cross-layer signature reflects harmful intent as a progressively resolved semantic property: surface form appears early, while pragmatic intent consolidates later, making the trajectory shape more informative than any single-layer snapshot. Moreover, LDA-based harm directions, learned per layer, remain stable across random splits (pairwise cosine similarity >0.97), supporting the projection sequence as a reproducible structured signal. Building on HPD, we introduce \herald{} (Harmful Encoding Recognition via Activation Layer Dynamics). This lightweight input moderator extracts a seven-dimensional feature record, slope, curvature, monotonicity, onset layer, and related statistics from the cross-layer projection sequence and classifies it with a 288-parameter MLP. stores one d-dimensional direction per layer (262\,KB for a 32-layer, d{=}4096 model), requires no gradient computation during training, and adds only 2.6{times}10^{-6} prefill FLOPs at inference. Across eight prompt-harmfulness benchmarks and four model families, achieves an average F1 of 89.3 on OLMo2-7B, surpassing all tested guard models on adversarial jailbreak detection (98.4 vs.\ 96.9 F1) and outperforming prior latent-based methods by 2.3-4.1 F1 points on every backbone. Per-instance trajectories provide machine-readable audit records that reveal when and how harmfulness emerges, offering an interpretability advantage over single-layer approaches.

  • 2 authors
·
Sep 10

UnifiedAttack: Evaluating the Safety of Large Multimodal Models in Synergistic Harmful Image-Text Generation

As Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) transition toward natively unified architectures, evaluating their safety in synergistic harmful image-text generation tasks becomes a critical challenge. Unlike unimodal threats, synergistic risks emerge when text and image modalities are coordinated to produce harm that significantly exceeds their individual components. We introduce UnifiedAttack, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate LMM safety in collaborative scenarios by focusing on the harmfulness gain achieved through cross-modal synergy. The benchmark incorporates samples filtered for their multimodal potential alongside a novel subset of synthesized disinformation queries. To verify identified vulnerabilities, we propose a synergistic hijacking framework featuring In-Context Reskinning (ICR) and Cognitive Planning Injection (CPI). ICR utilizes few-shot learning to wrap adversarial intent in benign virtual shells to desensitize safety filters, while CPI hijacks the reasoning path by enforcing a plan-then-execute paradigm. By compelling the system to commit to a neutral logical plan, we exploit its internal drive for consistency to induce the synchronized generation of harmful multimodal content. Extensive evaluations on state-of-the-art architectures demonstrate that UnifiedAttack consistently bypasses modern alignment. Our findings reveal that the structural helpfulness and logical coherence of unified models can be systematically weaponized, highlighting the urgent need for logic-aware defenses in synergistic generation tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/bingjunluo/UnifiedAttack .

  • 4 authors
·
Sep 28

Less Diverse, Less Safe: The Indirect But Pervasive Risk of Test-Time Scaling in Large Language Models

Test-Time Scaling (TTS) improves LLM reasoning by exploring multiple candidate responses and then operating over this set to find the best output. A tacit premise behind TTS is that sufficiently diverse candidate pools enhance reliability. In this work, we show that this assumption in TTS introduces a previously unrecognized failure mode. When candidate diversity is curtailed, even by a modest amount, TTS becomes much more likely to produce unsafe outputs. We present a reference-guided diversity reduction protocol (RefDiv) that serves as a diagnostic attack to stress test TTS pipelines. Through extensive experiments across open-source models (e.g. Qwen3, Mistral, Llama3.1, Gemma3) and two widely used TTS strategies (Monte Carlo Tree Search and Best-of-N), constraining diversity consistently signifies the rate at which TTS produces unsafe results. The effect is often stronger than that produced by prompts directly with high adversarial intent scores. This observed phenomenon also transfers across TTS strategies and to closed-source models (e.g. OpenAI o3-mini and Gemini-2.5-Pro), thus indicating that this is a general and extant property of TTS rather than a model-specific artifact. Additionally, we find that numerous widely used safety guardrail classifiers (e.g. Llama-Guard), are unable to flag the adversarial input prompts generated by RefDiv, demonstrating that existing defenses offer limited protection against this diversity-driven failure mode.

  • 4 authors
·
May 8

Transient Turn Injection: Exposing Stateless Multi-Turn Vulnerabilities in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into sensitive workflows, raising the stakes for adversarial robustness and safety. This paper introduces Transient Turn Injection(TTI), a new multi-turn attack technique that systematically exploits stateless moderation by distributing adversarial intent across isolated interactions. TTI leverages automated attacker agents powered by large language models to iteratively test and evade policy enforcement in both commercial and open-source LLMs, marking a departure from conventional jailbreak approaches that typically depend on maintaining persistent conversational context. Our extensive evaluation across state-of-the-art models-including those from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Meta, and prominent open-source alternatives-uncovers significant variations in resilience to TTI attacks, with only select architectures exhibiting substantial inherent robustness. Our automated blackbox evaluation framework also uncovers previously unknown model specific vulnerabilities and attack surface patterns, especially within medical and high stakes domains. We further compare TTI against established adversarial prompting methods and detail practical mitigation strategies, such as session level context aggregation and deep alignment approaches. Our study underscores the urgent need for holistic, context aware defenses and continuous adversarial testing to future proof LLM deployments against evolving multi-turn threats.

  • 2 authors
·
Apr 22

Lost in the Noise: How Reasoning Models Fail with Contextual Distractors

Recent advances in reasoning models and agentic AI systems have led to an increased reliance on diverse external information. However, this shift introduces input contexts that are inherently noisy, a reality that current sanitized benchmarks fail to capture. We introduce NoisyBench, a comprehensive benchmark that systematically evaluates model robustness across 11 datasets in RAG, reasoning, alignment, and tool-use tasks against diverse noise types, including random documents, irrelevant chat histories, and hard negative distractors. Our evaluation reveals a catastrophic performance drop of up to 80% in state-of-the-art models when faced with contextual distractors. Crucially, we find that agentic workflows often amplify these errors by over-trusting noisy tool outputs, and distractors can trigger emergent misalignment even without adversarial intent. We find that prompting, context engineering, SFT, and outcome-reward only RL fail to ensure robustness; in contrast, our proposed Rationale-Aware Reward (RARE) significantly strengthens resilience by incentivizing the identification of helpful information within noise. Finally, we uncover an inverse scaling trend where increased test-time computation leads to worse performance in noisy settings and demonstrate via attention visualization that models disproportionately focus on distractor tokens, providing vital insights for building the next generation of robust, reasoning-capable agents.

kaist-ai KAIST AI
·
Jan 12 3

The Geometry of Alignment Collapse: When Fine-Tuning Breaks Safety

Fine-tuning aligned language models on benign tasks unpredictably degrades safety guardrails, even when training data contains no harmful content and developers have no adversarial intent. We show that the prevailing explanation, that fine-tuning updates should be orthogonal to safety-critical directions in high-dimensional parameter space, offers false reassurance: we show this orthogonality is structurally unstable and collapses under the dynamics of gradient descent. We then resolve this through a novel geometric analysis, proving that alignment concentrates in low-dimensional subspaces with sharp curvature, creating a brittle structure that first-order methods cannot detect or defend. While initial fine-tuning updates may indeed avoid these subspaces, the curvature of the fine-tuning loss generates second-order acceleration that systematically steers trajectories into alignment-sensitive regions. We formalize this mechanism through the Alignment Instability Condition, three geometric properties that, when jointly satisfied, lead to safety degradation. Our main result establishes a quartic scaling law: alignment loss grows with the fourth power of training time, governed by the sharpness of alignment geometry and the strength of curvature coupling between the fine-tuning task and safety-critical parameters. These results expose a structural blind spot in the current safety paradigm. The dominant approaches to safe fine-tuning address only the initial snapshot of a fundamentally dynamic problem. Alignment fragility is not a bug to be patched; it is an intrinsic geometric property of gradient descent on curved manifolds. Our results motivate the development of curvature-aware methods, and we hope will further enable a shift in alignment safety analysis from reactive red-teaming to predictive diagnostics for open-weight model deployment.

  • 8 authors
·
Feb 16

ROK-FORTRESS: Measuring the Effect of Geopolitical Transcreation for National Security and Public Safety

Safety evaluations for large language models (LLMs) increasingly target high-stakes National Security and Public Safety (NSPS) risks, yet multilingual safety is typically assessed through translation-only benchmarks that preserve the underlying scenario, and empirical evidence of how language and geopolitical context interact remains limited to a narrow set of language pairs. We introduce ROK-FORTRESS https://huggingface.co/datasets/ScaleAI/ROK-FORTRESS_public, a bilingual, culturally adversarial NSPS benchmark that uses the English--Korean language pair and U.S.--ROK geopolitical axis as a case study, separating the effects of language and geopolitical grounding via a transcreation matrix: adversarial intents are evaluated under controlled combinations of (i) English versus Korean language and (ii) U.S.\ versus Korean entities, institutions, and operational details. Each adversarial prompt is paired with a dual-use benign counterpart to quantify over-refusal. Model responses are then scored using calibrated LLM-as-a-judge panels, applying our expert-crafted, prompt-specific binary rubrics. Across a dual-track set of frontier and Korean-optimized models, we find a consistent suppression effect in Korean variants and substantial model-to-model variation in how geopolitical grounding interacts with language. In many models, Korean grounding mitigates the Korean language-driven suppression -- with no model showing significant amplification in the other direction -- indicating that, at least in the English--Korean case, safety behavior is shaped by language-as-risk signals and context interactions that translation-only evaluations miss. The transcreation matrix methodology is designed to generalize to other language--culture pairs.

  • 16 authors
·
May 12

SecReEvalBench: A Multi-turned Security Resilience Evaluation Benchmark for Large Language Models

The increasing deployment of large language models in security-sensitive domains necessitates rigorous evaluation of their resilience against adversarial prompt-based attacks. While previous benchmarks have focused on security evaluations with limited and predefined attack domains, such as cybersecurity attacks, they often lack a comprehensive assessment of intent-driven adversarial prompts and the consideration of real-life scenario-based multi-turn attacks. To address this gap, we present SecReEvalBench, the Security Resilience Evaluation Benchmark, which defines four novel metrics: Prompt Attack Resilience Score, Prompt Attack Refusal Logic Score, Chain-Based Attack Resilience Score and Chain-Based Attack Rejection Time Score. Moreover, SecReEvalBench employs six questioning sequences for model assessment: one-off attack, successive attack, successive reverse attack, alternative attack, sequential ascending attack with escalating threat levels and sequential descending attack with diminishing threat levels. In addition, we introduce a dataset customized for the benchmark, which incorporates both neutral and malicious prompts, categorised across seven security domains and sixteen attack techniques. In applying this benchmark, we systematically evaluate five state-of-the-art open-weighted large language models, Llama 3.1, Gemma 2, Mistral v0.3, DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen 3. Our findings offer critical insights into the strengths and weaknesses of modern large language models in defending against evolving adversarial threats. The SecReEvalBench dataset is publicly available at https://kaggle.com/datasets/5a7ee22cf9dab6c93b55a73f630f6c9b42e936351b0ae98fbae6ddaca7fe248d, which provides a groundwork for advancing research in large language model security.

  • 2 authors
·
May 12, 2025

Disentangling Intent from Role: Adversarial Self-Play for Persona-Invariant Safety Alignment

The growing capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have driven their widespread deployment across diverse domains, even in potentially high-risk scenarios. Despite advances in safety alignment techniques, current models remain vulnerable to emerging persona-based jailbreak attacks. Existing research on persona-based jailbreak has primarily focused on attack iterations, yet it lacks systemic and mechanistic constraints on the defense side. To address this challenge, we propose Persona-Invariant Alignment (PIA), an adversarial self-play framework that achieves co-evolution through Persona Lineage Evolution (PLE) on the attack side and Persona-Invariant Consistency Learning (PICL) on the defense side. Theoretically, PICL is grounded in the structural separation hypothesis, using a unilateral KL-divergence constraint to enable the structural decoupling of safety decisions from persona context, thereby maintaining safe behavior under persona-based jailbreak attacks. Experimental results demonstrate that PLE efficiently explores high-risk persona spaces by leveraging lineage-based credit propagation. Meanwhile, the PICL defense method significantly reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the model's general capability, thereby validating the superiority and robustness of this alignment paradigm. Codes are available at https://github.com/JiajiaLi-1130/PIA.

  • 6 authors
·
May 2

RAT: Adversarial Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Agents for Targeted Behaviors

Evaluating deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents against targeted behavior attacks is critical for assessing their robustness. These attacks aim to manipulate the victim into specific behaviors that align with the attacker's objectives, often bypassing traditional reward-based defenses. Prior methods have primarily focused on reducing cumulative rewards; however, rewards are typically too generic to capture complex safety requirements effectively. As a result, focusing solely on reward reduction can lead to suboptimal attack strategies, particularly in safety-critical scenarios where more precise behavior manipulation is needed. To address these challenges, we propose RAT, a method designed for universal, targeted behavior attacks. RAT trains an intention policy that is explicitly aligned with human preferences, serving as a precise behavioral target for the adversary. Concurrently, an adversary manipulates the victim's policy to follow this target behavior. To enhance the effectiveness of these attacks, RAT dynamically adjusts the state occupancy measure within the replay buffer, allowing for more controlled and effective behavior manipulation. Our empirical results on robotic simulation tasks demonstrate that RAT outperforms existing adversarial attack algorithms in inducing specific behaviors. Additionally, RAT shows promise in improving agent robustness, leading to more resilient policies. We further validate RAT by guiding Decision Transformer agents to adopt behaviors aligned with human preferences in various MuJoCo tasks, demonstrating its effectiveness across diverse tasks.

  • 5 authors
·
Dec 14, 2024

Intent Laundering: AI Safety Datasets Are Not What They Seem

We systematically evaluate the quality of widely used AI safety datasets from two perspectives: in isolation and in practice. In isolation, we examine how well these datasets reflect real-world adversarial attacks based on three key properties: being driven by ulterior intent, well-crafted, and out-of-distribution. We find that these datasets overrely on "triggering cues": words or phrases with overt negative/sensitive connotations that are intended to trigger safety mechanisms explicitly, which is unrealistic compared to real-world attacks. In practice, we evaluate whether these datasets genuinely measure safety risks or merely provoke refusals through triggering cues. To explore this, we introduce "intent laundering": a procedure that abstracts away triggering cues from adversarial attacks (data points) while strictly preserving their malicious intent and all relevant details. Our results indicate that current AI safety datasets fail to faithfully represent real-world adversarial behavior due to their overreliance on triggering cues. Once these cues are removed, all previously evaluated "reasonably safe" models become unsafe, including Gemini 3 Pro and Claude Sonnet 3.7. Moreover, when intent laundering is adapted as a jailbreaking technique, it consistently achieves high attack success rates, ranging from 90% to over 98%, under fully black-box access. Overall, our findings expose a significant disconnect between how model safety is evaluated by existing datasets and how real-world adversaries behave.

Labelbox Labelbox, Inc
·
Feb 17 2

AdversariaL attacK sAfety aLIgnment(ALKALI): Safeguarding LLMs through GRACE: Geometric Representation-Aware Contrastive Enhancement- Introducing Adversarial Vulnerability Quality Index (AVQI)

Adversarial threats against LLMs are escalating faster than current defenses can adapt. We expose a critical geometric blind spot in alignment: adversarial prompts exploit latent camouflage, embedding perilously close to the safe representation manifold while encoding unsafe intent thereby evading surface level defenses like Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), which remain blind to the latent geometry. We introduce ALKALI, the first rigorously curated adversarial benchmark and the most comprehensive to date spanning 9,000 prompts across three macro categories, six subtypes, and fifteen attack families. Evaluation of 21 leading LLMs reveals alarmingly high Attack Success Rates (ASRs) across both open and closed source models, exposing an underlying vulnerability we term latent camouflage, a structural blind spot where adversarial completions mimic the latent geometry of safe ones. To mitigate this vulnerability, we introduce GRACE - Geometric Representation Aware Contrastive Enhancement, an alignment framework coupling preference learning with latent space regularization. GRACE enforces two constraints: latent separation between safe and adversarial completions, and adversarial cohesion among unsafe and jailbreak behaviors. These operate over layerwise pooled embeddings guided by a learned attention profile, reshaping internal geometry without modifying the base model, and achieve up to 39% ASR reduction. Moreover, we introduce AVQI, a geometry aware metric that quantifies latent alignment failure via cluster separation and compactness. AVQI reveals when unsafe completions mimic the geometry of safe ones, offering a principled lens into how models internally encode safety. We make the code publicly available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/alkali-B416/README.md.

  • 7 authors
·
Jun 10, 2025

ICON: Intent-Context Coupling for Efficient Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attack

Multi-turn jailbreak attacks have emerged as a critical threat to Large Language Models (LLMs), bypassing safety mechanisms by progressively constructing adversarial contexts from scratch and incrementally refining prompts. However, existing methods suffer from the inefficiency of incremental context construction that requires step-by-step LLM interaction, and often stagnate in suboptimal regions due to surface-level optimization. In this paper, we characterize the Intent-Context Coupling phenomenon, revealing that LLM safety constraints are significantly relaxed when a malicious intent is coupled with a semantically congruent context pattern. Driven by this insight, we propose ICON, an automated multi-turn jailbreak framework that efficiently constructs an authoritative-style context via prior-guided semantic routing. Specifically, ICON first routes the malicious intent to a congruent context pattern (e.g., Scientific Research) and instantiates it into an attack prompt sequence. This sequence progressively builds the authoritative-style context and ultimately elicits prohibited content. In addition, ICON incorporates a Hierarchical Optimization Strategy that combines local prompt refinement with global context switching, preventing the attack from stagnating in ineffective contexts. Experimental results across eight SOTA LLMs demonstrate the effectiveness of ICON, achieving a state-of-the-art average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 97.1\%. Code is available at https://github.com/xwlin-roy/ICON.

  • 7 authors
·
Jan 27

CHASE: Adversarial Red-Blue Teaming for Improving LLM Safety using Reinforcement Learning

Despite advances in safety alignment, prompt-rewriting attacks such as persona modulation, fictional framing and persuasion-based reformulation, can bypass safety filters even on frontier models. Existing defenses either rely on non-scalable human curation or white-box optimisation that overfits to specific model internals, leaving aligned models brittle against the very class of adaptive black-box adversaries they will face in deployment. To address this gap, we introduce CHASE (Co-evolutionary Hardening through Adversarial Safety-Escalation), a closed-loop red-blue teaming framework in which a black-box attacker and a safety-aligned defender co-evolve. The attacker is trained via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) under a multiplicative reward that jointly enforces bypass effectiveness and intent fidelity, while the defender is hardened on the harvested adversarial rewrites through a two-stage GRPO + rejection-sampled SFT pipeline balanced with benign data. Evaluated on BeaverTails and JailbreakBench against five held-out attack families (PAIR, TAP, AutoDAN, PAP, Translation), CHASE cuts mean StrongREJECT score by 43.2\% with 0\% false-refusal on benign prompts. Beyond the headline result, CHASE shows that template-free RL exploration recovers latent attack primitives that transfer across mechanistically distinct attack families, suggesting a path toward LLM safety hardening that generalises beyond the narrow distributions achieved thus far in adversarial training.

  • 6 authors
·
Jun 3

MuseBench: Benchmarking Intent-Level Audiovisual Arts Understanding in MLLMs

Audiovisual arts encompass diverse creative disciplines, including cinema, visual arts, stage performance, and game design, where artistic meaning arises from deliberate combinations of visual, auditory, and narrative elements (e.g., fear amplified through claustrophobic framing, or grief conveyed through silence and lingering close-ups). True artistic understanding extends beyond recognizing what is depicted to reasoning about why it is expressed through particular creative choices. Despite the strong progress of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), this critical aspect of artistic understanding remains underexplored, as existing benchmarks largely measure perceptual recognition while overlooking reasoning about creative intent. To address this gap, we introduce Musebench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate MLLMs on nuanced artistic understanding. It comprises 4,016 questions spanning cinematic arts, static visual arts, stage performing arts, and game arts, distilled from over 10K candidate video essays that pair professional commentary with visual demonstration. To capture the open-ended nature of artistic analysis at scale, the benchmark combines single-select and variable-option multi-select questions. All questions are generated and refined through a four-phase iterative pipeline combining shortcut filtering, adversarial distractors, and expert validation. Comprehensive zero-shot evaluation of 28 state-of-the-art MLLMs reveals that even the best-performing model achieves only 48.29% accuracy, substantially below human expert performance of 87.18%, exposing a significant gap in current models' creative domain expertise.

CSSBench: Evaluating the Safety of Lightweight LLMs against Chinese-Specific Adversarial Patterns

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in cost-sensitive and on-device scenarios, and safety guardrails have advanced mainly in English. However, real-world Chinese malicious queries typically conceal intent via homophones, pinyin, symbol-based splitting, and other Chinese-specific patterns. These Chinese-specific adversarial patterns create the safety evaluation gap that is not well captured by existing benchmarks focused on English. This gap is particularly concerning for lightweight models, which may be more vulnerable to such specific adversarial perturbations. To bridge this gap, we introduce the Chinese-Specific Safety Benchmark (CSSBench) that emphasizes these adversarial patterns and evaluates the safety of lightweight LLMs in Chinese. Our benchmark covers six domains that are common in real Chinese scenarios, including illegal activities and compliance, privacy leakage, health and medical misinformation, fraud and hate, adult content, and public and political safety, and organizes queries into multiple task types. We evaluate a set of popular lightweight LLMs and measure over-refusal behavior to assess safety-induced performance degradation. Our results show that the Chinese-specific adversarial pattern is a critical challenge for lightweight LLMs. This benchmark offers a comprehensive evaluation of LLM safety in Chinese, assisting robust deployments in practice.

  • 6 authors
·
Jan 2

When Alignment Fails: Multimodal Adversarial Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-Language-Action models (VLAs) have recently demonstrated remarkable progress in embodied environments, enabling robots to perceive, reason, and act through unified multimodal understanding. Despite their impressive capabilities, the adversarial robustness of these systems remains largely unexplored, especially under realistic multimodal and black-box conditions. Existing studies mainly focus on single-modality perturbations and overlook the cross-modal misalignment that fundamentally affects embodied reasoning and decision-making. In this paper, we introduce VLA-Fool, a comprehensive study of multimodal adversarial robustness in embodied VLA models under both white-box and black-box settings. VLA-Fool unifies three levels of multimodal adversarial attacks: (1) textual perturbations through gradient-based and prompt-based manipulations, (2) visual perturbations via patch and noise distortions, and (3) cross-modal misalignment attacks that intentionally disrupt the semantic correspondence between perception and instruction. We further incorporate a VLA-aware semantic space into linguistic prompts, developing the first automatically crafted and semantically guided prompting framework. Experiments on the LIBERO benchmark using a fine-tuned OpenVLA model reveal that even minor multimodal perturbations can cause significant behavioral deviations, demonstrating the fragility of embodied multimodal alignment.

  • 6 authors
·
Nov 20, 2025

TRACE: Trajectory Aware Reasoning for Multi-Turn Adversarial Conversation Evaluation

Multi-turn jailbreak attacks have emerged as a critical safety threat to LLMs, as harmful objectives are decomposed across a sequence of apparently benign turns to bypass guardrails. Existing defenses lack the reasoning capacity to identify evolving manipulation patterns, often trading helpfulness for safety by over-refusing benign requests related to sensitive topics. We introduce Trace, a multi-turn defense with trajectory-aware structured reasoning. Before generating each response, the model identifies manipulation cues from the trajectory, evaluates both the benign and adversarial interpretations of user intent, assigns a jailbreak score, and commits to an action: Allow, Caution, or Decline. We curate 4k multi-turn adversarial conversations from five attack frameworks, pair them with 2.4k benign dialogs, and 600 sensitive-but-benign conversations. We train Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct with SFT and GRPO under a multi-component reward that jointly optimizes helpfulness on benign prompts and robustness against jailbreak attempts. Across seven multi-turn attack benchmarks, Trace attains an average attack success rate (ASR) of 14.5% against 31.4% for the strongest baseline and 74.9% for the undefended target, while significantly raising the attacker effort required per successful jailbreak. Trace also balances usability and safety, achieving a 93.3% average compliance on over-refusal benchmarks.

  • 4 authors
·
Aug 15

SPARTA: Evaluating Reasoning Segmentation Robustness through Black-Box Adversarial Paraphrasing in Text Autoencoder Latent Space

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in vision-language tasks such as reasoning segmentation, where models generate segmentation masks based on textual queries. While prior work has primarily focused on perturbing image inputs, semantically equivalent textual paraphrases-crucial in real-world applications where users express the same intent in varied ways-remain underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce a novel adversarial paraphrasing task: generating grammatically correct paraphrases that preserve the original query meaning while degrading segmentation performance. To evaluate the quality of adversarial paraphrases, we develop a comprehensive automatic evaluation protocol validated with human studies. Furthermore, we introduce SPARTA-a black-box, sentence-level optimization method that operates in the low-dimensional semantic latent space of a text autoencoder, guided by reinforcement learning. SPARTA achieves significantly higher success rates, outperforming prior methods by up to 2x on both the ReasonSeg and LLMSeg-40k datasets. We use SPARTA and competitive baselines to assess the robustness of advanced reasoning segmentation models. We reveal that they remain vulnerable to adversarial paraphrasing-even under strict semantic and grammatical constraints. All code and data will be released publicly upon acceptance.

  • 9 authors
·
Oct 27, 2025

SEMA: Simple yet Effective Learning for Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks

Multi-turn jailbreaks capture the real threat model for safety-aligned chatbots, where single-turn attacks are merely a special case. Yet existing approaches break under exploration complexity and intent drift. We propose SEMA, a simple yet effective framework that trains a multi-turn attacker without relying on any existing strategies or external data. SEMA comprises two stages. Prefilling self-tuning enables usable rollouts by fine-tuning on non-refusal, well-structured, multi-turn adversarial prompts that are self-generated with a minimal prefix, thereby stabilizing subsequent learning. Reinforcement learning with intent-drift-aware reward trains the attacker to elicit valid multi-turn adversarial prompts while maintaining the same harmful objective. We anchor harmful intent in multi-turn jailbreaks via an intent-drift-aware reward that combines intent alignment, compliance risk, and level of detail. Our open-loop attack regime avoids dependence on victim feedback, unifies single- and multi-turn settings, and reduces exploration complexity. Across multiple datasets, victim models, and jailbreak judges, our method achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) attack success rates (ASR), outperforming all single-turn baselines, manually scripted and template-driven multi-turn baselines, as well as our SFT (Supervised Fine-Tuning) and DPO (Direct Preference Optimization) variants. For instance, SEMA performs an average 80.1% ASR@1 across three closed-source and open-source victim models on AdvBench, 33.9% over SOTA. The approach is compact, reproducible, and transfers across targets, providing a stronger and more realistic stress test for large language model (LLM) safety and enabling automatic redteaming to expose and localize failure modes. Our code is available at: https://github.com/fmmarkmq/SEMA.

microsoft Microsoft
·
Feb 6 2

Outsmarting the Chameleon: Counterfactual Decoupling for Tactical OOD Shifts in Live Streaming Risk Assessment

Live streaming has emerged as a primary medium for social interaction and digital commerce, yet it is increasingly plagued by sophisticated risks. A fundamental challenge in this domain is tactical out-of-distribution (OOD) shift: while malicious actors maintain stable underlying objectives, they continuously redesign narrative packaging to evade detection. Such adversarial shifts expose critical limitations of existing OOD generalization paradigms, whose assumptions are difficult to satisfy in the presence of tightly coupled intent-tactic evolution and ill-defined raw-level counterfactuals. In this paper, we tackle this issue from a latent causal perspective and propose Latent-Predictive Counterfactual Decoupling~(LPCD), a plug-in framework for robust live streaming risk assessment. LPCD enables counterfactual reasoning under adversarial tactical re-packaging by modeling intent and narrative variation at the latent level, and enforces latent counterfactual consistency to anchor risk prediction on causally stable malicious intent. At inference time, LPCD applies a lightweight, parameter-free calibration to further mitigate tactic-induced distribution shifts. Extensive experiments on large-scale industrial datasets and online production traffic demonstrate that LPCD consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, validating its effectiveness in moderating evolving adversarial risks in real-world live streaming. The project page is available at https://qiaoyran.github.io/LiveStreamingRiskAssessment/.

  • 6 authors
·
May 31

Understanding and Enhancing the Transferability of Jailbreaking Attacks

Jailbreaking attacks can effectively manipulate open-source large language models (LLMs) to produce harmful responses. However, these attacks exhibit limited transferability, failing to disrupt proprietary LLMs consistently. To reliably identify vulnerabilities in proprietary LLMs, this work investigates the transferability of jailbreaking attacks by analysing their impact on the model's intent perception. By incorporating adversarial sequences, these attacks can redirect the source LLM's focus away from malicious-intent tokens in the original input, thereby obstructing the model's intent recognition and eliciting harmful responses. Nevertheless, these adversarial sequences fail to mislead the target LLM's intent perception, allowing the target LLM to refocus on malicious-intent tokens and abstain from responding. Our analysis further reveals the inherent distributional dependency within the generated adversarial sequences, whose effectiveness stems from overfitting the source LLM's parameters, resulting in limited transferability to target LLMs. To this end, we propose the Perceived-importance Flatten (PiF) method, which uniformly disperses the model's focus across neutral-intent tokens in the original input, thus obscuring malicious-intent tokens without relying on overfitted adversarial sequences. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PiF provides an effective and efficient red-teaming evaluation for proprietary LLMs.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 5, 2025

SDOF: Taming the Alignment Tax in Multi-Agent Orchestration with State-Constrained Dispatch

Multi-agent orchestration frameworks such as LangChain, LangGraph, and CrewAI route tasks through graph-based pipelines but do not enforce the stage constraints that govern real business processes. We present SDOF, a framework that treats multi-agent execution as a constrained state machine. SDOF operates through two primary defensive layers, implemented by three components: (1) an Online-RLHF Specialized Intent Router trained via Generative Reward Modeling (GRPO) and (2) a StateAwareDispatcher with GoalStage finite-automaton checks and precondition/postcondition SkillRegistry validation for auditable execution control. On a recruitment system backed by the Beisen iTalent platform (6000+ enterprises), 185 expert-curated scenarios trigger 1671 live API calls. Our GSPO-aligned 7B Intent Router achieves higher joint accuracy than zero-shot GPT-4o on this FSM-constrained adversarial routing benchmark (80.9% versus 48.9%). In end-to-end execution, SDOF reaches 86.5% task completion (95% confidence interval 80.8 to 90.7) and blocks all 22 operations in the injection, illegal HR subset. Under a broader message-level blocking audit, SDOF attains precision 100% and recall 88%, expert agreement kappa=0.94. A separate evaluation on 960 SGD-derived dialogues spanning 8 service domains surfaces 201 stage-order conflicts under our FSM mapping, 41 of which arise in the normal split. This arXiv version reports the current validated scope; extended multi-seed training comparisons and deeper workflow evaluations will be released in a subsequent update.

  • 1 authors
·
Apr 19

AdInject: Real-World Black-Box Attacks on Web Agents via Advertising Delivery

Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Web Agents represent a significant step towards automating complex tasks by simulating human-like interaction with websites. However, their deployment in uncontrolled web environments introduces significant security vulnerabilities. Existing research on adversarial environmental injection attacks often relies on unrealistic assumptions, such as direct HTML manipulation, knowledge of user intent, or access to agent model parameters, limiting their practical applicability. In this paper, we propose AdInject, a novel and real-world black-box attack method that leverages the internet advertising delivery to inject malicious content into the Web Agent's environment. AdInject operates under a significantly more realistic threat model than prior work, assuming a black-box agent, static malicious content constraints, and no specific knowledge of user intent. AdInject includes strategies for designing malicious ad content aimed at misleading agents into clicking, and a VLM-based ad content optimization technique that infers potential user intents from the target website's context and integrates these intents into the ad content to make it appear more relevant or critical to the agent's task, thus enhancing attack effectiveness. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of AdInject, attack success rates exceeding 60% in most scenarios and approaching 100% in certain cases. This strongly demonstrates that prevalent advertising delivery constitutes a potent and real-world vector for environment injection attacks against Web Agents. This work highlights a critical vulnerability in Web Agent security arising from real-world environment manipulation channels, underscoring the urgent need for developing robust defense mechanisms against such threats. Our code is available at https://github.com/NicerWang/AdInject.

  • 8 authors
·
May 27, 2025 2

MultiBreak: A Scalable and Diverse Multi-turn Jailbreak Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Safety

We present MultiBreak, a scalable and diverse multi-turn jailbreak benchmark to evaluate large language model (LLM) safety. Multi-turn jailbreaks mimic natural conversational settings, making them easier to bypass safety-aligned LLM than single-turn jailbreaks. Existing multi-turn benchmarks are limited in size or rely heavily on templates, which restrict their diversity. To address this gap, we unify a wide range of harmful jailbreak intents, and introduce an active learning pipeline for expanding high-quality multi-turn adversarial prompts, where a generator is iteratively fine-tuned to produce stronger attack candidates, guided by uncertainty-based refinement. Our MultiBreak includes 10,389 multi-turn adversarial prompts, spans 2,665 distinct harmful intents, and covers the most diverse set of topics to date. Empirical evaluation shows that our benchmark achieves up to a 54.0 and 34.6 higher attack success rate (ASR)} than the second-best dataset on DeepSeek-R1-7B and GPT-4.1-mini, respectively. More importantly, safety evaluations suggest that diverse attack categories uncover fine-grained LLM vulnerabilities}, and categories that appear benign under single-turn can exhibit substantially higher adversarial effectiveness in multi-turn scenarios. These findings highlight persistent vulnerabilities of LLMs under realistic adversarial settings and establish MultiBreak as a scalable resource for advancing LLM safety.

  • 7 authors
·
May 2

Safety Context Injection: Inference-Time Safety Alignment via Static Filtering and Agentic Analysis

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance on complex tasks, but they also make safety control harder at deployment time. In black-box settings, defenders cannot modify model weights and must instead intervene at inference time. This setting creates three practical challenges: harmful intent may be hidden by educational or role-play framing, deep safety analysis can introduce non-trivial latency, and long adversarial contexts can dilute the local cues that simpler filters rely on. These challenges can expose an apparent thinking--output gap, where the model appears cautious during reasoning but still produces an unsafe final answer. To address this problem, we propose Safety Context Injection (SCI), an inference-time framework that separates safety assessment from task generation and prepends a structured external risk report as injected safety context for the protected model. The framework is instantiated in two complementary variants: Static Model Filtering (SMF), a lightweight one-pass guard for fast deployment, and Dynamic Agents Filtering (DAF), an agentic-loop-based analyzer that iteratively gathers and synthesizes evidence for ambiguous or long-context attacks. Across AdvBench and GPTFuzz, spanning base and reasoning models under five jailbreak families, both variants reduce attack success rate and toxicity in the evaluated settings. SMF offers an efficient low-latency option, while DAF is more effective when harmful intent is semantically disguised or dispersed across long contexts.

  • 6 authors
·
May 12

D-REX: A Benchmark for Detecting Deceptive Reasoning in Large Language Models

The safety and alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) are critical for their responsible deployment. Current evaluation methods predominantly focus on identifying and preventing overtly harmful outputs. However, they often fail to address a more insidious failure mode: models that produce benign-appearing outputs while operating on malicious or deceptive internal reasoning. This vulnerability, often triggered by sophisticated system prompt injections, allows models to bypass conventional safety filters, posing a significant, underexplored risk. To address this gap, we introduce the Deceptive Reasoning Exposure Suite (D-REX), a novel dataset designed to evaluate the discrepancy between a model's internal reasoning process and its final output. D-REX was constructed through a competitive red-teaming exercise where participants crafted adversarial system prompts to induce such deceptive behaviors. Each sample in D-REX contains the adversarial system prompt, an end-user's test query, the model's seemingly innocuous response, and, crucially, the model's internal chain-of-thought, which reveals the underlying malicious intent. Our benchmark facilitates a new, essential evaluation task: the detection of deceptive alignment. We demonstrate that D-REX presents a significant challenge for existing models and safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for new techniques that scrutinize the internal processes of LLMs, not just their final outputs.

  • 9 authors
·
Sep 22, 2025 2

Every Picture Tells a Dangerous Story: Memory-Augmented Multi-Agent Jailbreak Attacks on VLMs

The rapid evolution of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) has catalyzed unprecedented capabilities in artificial intelligence; however, this continuous modal expansion has inadvertently exposed a vastly broadened and unconstrained adversarial attack surface. Current multimodal jailbreak strategies primarily focus on surface-level pixel perturbations and typographic attacks or harmful images; however, they fail to engage with the complex semantic structures intrinsic to visual data. This leaves the vast semantic attack surface of original, natural images largely unscrutinized. Driven by the need to expose these deep-seated semantic vulnerabilities, we introduce MemJack, a MEMory-augmented multi-agent JAilbreak attaCK framework that explicitly leverages visual semantics to orchestrate automated jailbreak attacks. MemJack employs coordinated multi-agent cooperation to dynamically map visual entities to malicious intents, generate adversarial prompts via multi-angle visual-semantic camouflage, and utilize an Iterative Nullspace Projection (INLP) geometric filter to bypass premature latent space refusals. By accumulating and transferring successful strategies through a persistent Multimodal Experience Memory, MemJack maintains highly coherent extended multi-turn jailbreak attack interactions across different images, thereby improving the attack success rate (ASR) on new images. Extensive empirical evaluations across full, unmodified COCO val2017 images demonstrate that MemJack achieves a 71.48\% ASR against Qwen3-VL-Plus, scaling to 90\% under extended budgets. Furthermore, to catalyze future defensive alignment research, we will release MemJack-Bench, a comprehensive dataset comprising over 113,000 interactive multimodal jailbreak attack trajectories, establishing a vital foundation for developing inherently robust VLMs.

  • 5 authors
·
Apr 13

Control-Plane Placement Shapes Forgetting: An Architectural Study of Agent Memory Across Thirteen System Configurations

Where an LLM sits in an agent memory pipeline -- between the recall plane that retrieves stored facts (extensively benchmarked) and the control plane that mutates them via supersede, release, purge (largely untested) -- shapes which forgetting failure modes the system recovers. Comparing thirteen system configurations on a 385-case adversarial surface, we observe three placement regimes with partly complementary coverage: deterministic primitives suffice for lexical/temporal categories but fail canonicalization (5% on identifier-obfuscation, 0% on cross-lingual); inscribe-time LLM recovers canonicalization (100%) but cannot help intent-aware deletion (0% on prefix-collision and compound-fact); a mutation-time hook recovers intent-aware deletion (78-85%) and brightens nearly all categories simultaneously (91.7-93.2% overall, $0.17 per 385-case run, 2.3s/case mutation latency vs. 64-191ms/case deterministic, recall path unchanged). We expose the trade-off via ForgetEval, a 1000-case templated suite plus a 385-case adversarial layer (132 hand-crafted + 253 LLM-drafted oracle-validated) scored by deterministic substring match, paired with a six-method Adapter Protocol with honest N/A scoring that lets heterogeneous memory stores enter in 130 lines. Admission is corroborated by 10-annotator IAA (Fleiss' kappa = 0.958) and a 77-case external-authored subset (four blind contributors) that replicates the canonicalization asymmetry and amplifies the joint-placement lift (+27.8 pt). Production failures are predominantly forgetting failures rather than recall failures, yet existing benchmarks measure only recall. ForgetEval and all adapters are released under MIT.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 15

JPS: Jailbreak Multimodal Large Language Models with Collaborative Visual Perturbation and Textual Steering

Jailbreak attacks against multimodal large language Models (MLLMs) are a significant research focus. Current research predominantly focuses on maximizing attack success rate (ASR), often overlooking whether the generated responses actually fulfill the attacker's malicious intent. This oversight frequently leads to low-quality outputs that bypass safety filters but lack substantial harmful content. To address this gap, we propose JPS, Jailbreak MLLMs with collaborative visual Perturbation and textual Steering, which achieves jailbreaks via corporation of visual image and textually steering prompt. Specifically, JPS utilizes target-guided adversarial image perturbations for effective safety bypass, complemented by "steering prompt" optimized via a multi-agent system to specifically guide LLM responses fulfilling the attackers' intent. These visual and textual components undergo iterative co-optimization for enhanced performance. To evaluate the quality of attack outcomes, we propose the Malicious Intent Fulfillment Rate (MIFR) metric, assessed using a Reasoning-LLM-based evaluator. Our experiments show JPS sets a new state-of-the-art in both ASR and MIFR across various MLLMs and benchmarks, with analyses confirming its efficacy. Codes are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/JPS{https://github.com/thu-coai/JPS}. warningcolor{Warning: This paper contains potentially sensitive contents.}

  • 10 authors
·
Aug 7, 2025

BreakFun: Jailbreaking LLMs via Schema Exploitation

The proficiency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in processing structured data and adhering to syntactic rules is a capability that drives their widespread adoption but also makes them paradoxically vulnerable. In this paper, we investigate this vulnerability through BreakFun, a jailbreak methodology that weaponizes an LLM's adherence to structured schemas. BreakFun employs a three-part prompt that combines an innocent framing and a Chain-of-Thought distraction with a core "Trojan Schema"--a carefully crafted data structure that compels the model to generate harmful content, exploiting the LLM's strong tendency to follow structures and schemas. We demonstrate this vulnerability is highly transferable, achieving an average success rate of 89% across 13 foundational and proprietary models on JailbreakBench, and reaching a 100% Attack Success Rate (ASR) on several prominent models. A rigorous ablation study confirms this Trojan Schema is the attack's primary causal factor. To counter this, we introduce the Adversarial Prompt Deconstruction guardrail, a defense that utilizes a secondary LLM to perform a "Literal Transcription"--extracting all human-readable text to isolate and reveal the user's true harmful intent. Our proof-of-concept guardrail demonstrates high efficacy against the attack, validating that targeting the deceptive schema is a viable mitigation strategy. Our work provides a look into how an LLM's core strengths can be turned into critical weaknesses, offering a fresh perspective for building more robustly aligned models.

  • 2 authors
·
Oct 19, 2025

RL-ADA: A World-Feedback Framework for Adversarially Robust Enterprise Dialogue Agents

Deploying task-oriented dialogue agents in enterprise customer support faces a persistent annotation bottleneck: robust training requires labelled interaction data at scale, yet enterprise conversational logs are privacy-sensitive and expensive to annotate, while user behaviour evolves faster than labelling pipelines can keep pace. We present RL-ADA (Reinforcement Learning with Adversarial Dialogue Agents), a co-evolutionary training framework that eliminates this bottleneck by replacing human labels with world feedback: consequence-based reward signals derived directly from measurable interaction outcomes. A Customer Support Agent (DA, 3B parameters) and an Adversarial Customer Agent (CA, 7B parameters) co-evolve in an adversarial arena guided by a fixed automated judge: the DA is rewarded for correctly handling multi-turn customer conversations to successful resolution, while the CA is rewarded for producing realistic, intent-concealing utterances that cause misroutes, creating asymmetric adversarial pressure through opposing but independently structured rewards. An isolation gym iteratively retrains the weaker agent on prior-failure transcripts, requiring no human annotation at any stage. In a banking customer support proof of concept, tool-routing errors are eliminated and the strict end-to-end PASS rate doubles over five co-evolutionary cycles, driven solely by automated arena reward with no labelled data. We additionally observe the emergence of Contextual Camouflage, an adversarial strategy in which the CA learns to embed intent within dense realistic customer detail purely from reward pressure, with direct implications for enterprise red-teaming and robustness evaluation.

Do Audio LLMs Listen or Read? Analyzing and Mitigating Paralinguistic Failures with VoxParadox

Audio large language models (Audio LLMs) demonstrate strong performance on speech understanding tasks, yet their ability to understand paralinguistic information remains limited. To systematically quantify this issue, we introduce VoxParadox, an adversarial benchmark with 2,000 verified examples, spanning 10 paralinguistic tasks, created with controlled speech synthesis to intentionally mismatch transcript claims and speaking style, enabling direct measurement of speech paralinguistic understanding. Evaluation of a diverse set of Audio LLMs reveals consistently low accuracy on acoustic ground truth and a strong tendency to follow language-implied (incorrect) answers. To understand the cause of this gap, we perform layer-wise probing and find that (i) paralinguistic cues can degrade in deeper encoder layers and at the encoder--LLM interface, and (ii) even when such cues are available in audio tokens, the language model frequently ignores them. To address these problems, we propose Prompt-Conditioned Layer Mixer (PCLM), which adaptively combines information from multiple audio layers based on the input prompt, and pair it with Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to explicitly prefer acoustically supported options over language-implied alternatives. These methods substantially improve Audio LLM paralinguistic understanding, improving Audio Flamingo 3 from 17.40% to 65.20% on VoxParadox, and from 37.74% to 54.78% on MMSU paralinguistic subset. Our project page is available at https://voxparadox.github.io/.

  • 3 authors
·
May 25

Who Judges the Judges? A Chinese Safety QA Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Responses and Safety Judges

Safety benchmarks for large language models often assess the risk of a user query, although the outcome of question answering depends on whether the response violates a policy. This distinction is critical in Chinese harmful-content evaluation, where linguistic variation and adversarial transformations can obscure risky intent. We introduce C-SafeQA, a policy-grounded benchmark for response-level Chinese safety evaluation. It comprises 538 base queries and 8,877 adversarial queries answered by four full-model LLM deployments, yielding 37,660 query-response records labeled safe, unsafe, or disputed. Reference labels are generated through agreement-aware multi-model adjudication and blind audits of stratified subsets by three safety experts. C-SafeQA supports both evaluation of target-model safety and auditing of seven automated safety judges against shared reference labels. Unsafe-response rates range from 0.93% to 3.35% on base queries and from 11.68% to 30.05% on adversarial queries. On the adversarial subset, judges show substantial trade-offs between unsafe-response recall and risk-query-conditioned safe-response false positive rate, and no judge dominates all metrics. Both acrostic transformations reduce unsafe recall for all seven judges, revealing mechanism-specific evaluator weaknesses. Dataset records, metadata, verification code, and judge scripts are publicly released to support recomputation, while benchmark construction, target-response generation, and private adjudication remain outside the release boundary.

  • 10 authors
·
Aug 31

Autonomous Agents on Blockchains: Standards, Execution Models, and Trust Boundaries

Advances in large language models have enabled agentic AI systems that can reason, plan, and interact with external tools to execute multi-step workflows, while public blockchains have evolved into a programmable substrate for value transfer, access control, and verifiable state transitions. Their convergence introduces a high-stakes systems challenge: designing standard, interoperable, and secure interfaces that allow agents to observe on-chain state, formulate transaction intents, and authorize execution without exposing users, protocols, or organizations to unacceptable security, governance, or economic risks. This survey systematizes the emerging landscape of agent-blockchain interoperability through a systematic literature review, identifying 317 relevant works from an initial pool of over 3000 records. We contribute a five-part taxonomy of integration patterns spanning read-only analytics, simulation and intent generation, delegated execution, autonomous signing, and multi-agent workflows; a threat model tailored to agent-driven transaction pipelines that captures risks ranging from prompt injection and policy misuse to key compromise, adversarial execution dynamics, and multi-agent collusion; and a comparative capability matrix analyzing more than 20 representative systems across 13 dimensions, including custody models, permissioning, policy enforcement, observability, and recovery. Building on the gaps revealed by this analysis, we outline a research roadmap centered on two interface abstractions: a Transaction Intent Schema for portable and unambiguous goal specification, and a Policy Decision Record for auditable, verifiable policy enforcement across execution environments. We conclude by proposing a reproducible evaluation suite and benchmarks for assessing the safety, reliability, and economic robustness of agent-mediated on-chain execution.

  • 1 authors
·
Jan 7

When MCP Servers Attack: Taxonomy, Feasibility, and Mitigation

Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers enable AI applications to connect to external systems in a plug-and-play manner, but their rapid proliferation also introduces severe security risks. Unlike mature software ecosystems with rigorous vetting, MCP servers still lack standardized review mechanisms, giving adversaries opportunities to distribute malicious implementations. Despite this pressing risk, the security implications of MCP servers remain underexplored. To address this gap, we present the first systematic study that treats MCP servers as active threat actors and decomposes them into core components to examine how adversarial developers can implant malicious intent. Specifically, we investigate three research questions: (i) what types of attacks malicious MCP servers can launch, (ii) how vulnerable MCP hosts and Large Language Models (LLMs) are to these attacks, and (iii) how feasible it is to carry out MCP server attacks in practice. Our study proposes a component-based taxonomy comprising twelve attack categories. For each category, we develop Proof-of-Concept (PoC) servers and demonstrate their effectiveness across diverse real-world host-LLM settings. We further show that attackers can generate large numbers of malicious servers at virtually no cost. We then test state-of-the-art scanners on the generated servers and found that existing detection approaches are insufficient. These findings highlight that malicious MCP servers are easy to implement, difficult to detect with current tools, and capable of causing concrete damage to AI agent systems. Addressing this threat requires coordinated efforts among protocol designers, host developers, LLM providers, and end users to build a more secure and resilient MCP ecosystem.

  • 5 authors
·
Sep 29, 2025

Playing Along: Learning a Double-Agent Defender for Belief Steering via Theory of Mind

As large language models (LLMs) become the engine behind conversational systems, their ability to reason about the intentions and states of their dialogue partners (i.e., form and use a theory-of-mind, or ToM) becomes increasingly critical for safe interaction with potentially adversarial partners. We propose a novel privacy-themed ToM challenge, ToM for Steering Beliefs (ToM-SB), in which a defender must act as a Double Agent to steer the beliefs of an attacker with partial prior knowledge within a shared universe. To succeed on ToM-SB, the defender must engage with and form a ToM of the attacker, with a goal of fooling the attacker into believing they have succeeded in extracting sensitive information. We find that strong frontier models like Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 struggle on ToM-SB, often failing to fool attackers in hard scenarios with partial attacker prior knowledge, even when prompted to reason about the attacker's beliefs (ToM prompting). To close this gap, we train models on ToM-SB to act as AI Double Agents using reinforcement learning, testing both fooling and ToM rewards. Notably, we find a bidirectionally emergent relationship between ToM and attacker-fooling: rewarding fooling success alone improves ToM, and rewarding ToM alone improves fooling. Across four attackers with different strengths, six defender methods, and both in-distribution and out-of-distribution (OOD) evaluation, we find that gains in ToM and attacker-fooling are well-correlated, highlighting belief modeling as a key driver of success on ToM-SB. AI Double Agents that combine both ToM and fooling rewards yield the strongest fooling and ToM performance, outperforming Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 with ToM prompting on hard scenarios. We also show that ToM-SB and AI Double Agents can be extended to stronger attackers, demonstrating generalization to OOD settings and the upgradability of our task.

  • 6 authors
·
Apr 12 2

SingGuard: A Policy-Adaptive Multimodal LLM Guardrail with Dynamic Reasoning

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in consumer, medical, financial, and enterprise applications. This broad deployment expands the safety surface: risks can arise from multimodal question answering, assistant responses, and cross-modal composition, while moderation policies may vary across products, regions, and deployment stages. Most existing guardrails either rely on fixed taxonomies or target only a narrow set of interaction settings, which limits their adaptability when safety rules change at deployment time. We present SingGuard, a policy-adaptive multimodal guardrail model family for safety assessment in multimodal conversations. SingGuard treats the active policy as a runtime input: given natural-language rules, it checks the target content against the active policy rule by rule and predicts both the safety label and the triggered rule. To balance efficiency and interpretability, SingGuard supports fast, hybrid, and slow inference regimes along a fast-to-slow reasoning spectrum, ranging from direct safety judgments to policy-grounded deliberation. We further optimize this behavior with fast--slow decoupled reinforcement learning. We also introduce SingGuard-Bench, a multimodal guardrail benchmark with 56{,}340 examples spanning 80+ fine-grained risk types across multimodal QA, adversarial attack, and dynamic-rule evaluation settings, including cross-modal joint-risk cases where each modality is harmless in isolation but their composition implies unsafe intent. Across six benchmark families (35 datasets), SingGuard achieves state-of-the-art average F1 in every family. Dynamic-rule evaluation further shows improved policy-following accuracy from 0.6465 to 0.7415 under runtime policy shifts. Our code is available at https://github.com/inclusionAI/Sing-Guard.

inclusionAI inclusionAI
·
Jun 21 2

`For Argument's Sake, Show Me How to Harm Myself!': Jailbreaking LLMs in Suicide and Self-Harm Contexts

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have led to increasingly sophisticated safety protocols and features designed to prevent harmful, unethical, or unauthorized outputs. However, these guardrails remain susceptible to novel and creative forms of adversarial prompting, including manually generated test cases. In this work, we present two new test cases in mental health for (i) suicide and (ii) self-harm, using multi-step, prompt-level jailbreaking and bypass built-in content and safety filters. We show that user intent is disregarded, leading to the generation of detailed harmful content and instructions that could cause real-world harm. We conduct an empirical evaluation across six widely available LLMs, demonstrating the generalizability and reliability of the bypass. We assess these findings and the multilayered ethical tensions that they present for their implications on prompt-response filtering and context- and task-specific model development. We recommend a more comprehensive and systematic approach to AI safety and ethics while emphasizing the need for continuous adversarial testing in safety-critical AI deployments. We also argue that while certain clearly defined safety measures and guardrails can and must be implemented in LLMs, ensuring robust and comprehensive safety across all use cases and domains remains extremely challenging given the current technical maturity of general-purpose LLMs.

  • 2 authors
·
Jun 30, 2025

Manipulating Multimodal Agents via Cross-Modal Prompt Injection

The emergence of multimodal large language models has redefined the agent paradigm by integrating language and vision modalities with external data sources, enabling agents to better interpret human instructions and execute increasingly complex tasks. However, in this paper, we identify a critical yet previously overlooked security vulnerability in multimodal agents: cross-modal prompt injection attacks. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose CrossInject, a novel attack framework in which attackers embed adversarial perturbations across multiple modalities to align with target malicious content, allowing external instructions to hijack the agent's decision-making process and execute unauthorized tasks. Our approach incorporates two key coordinated components. First, we introduce Visual Latent Alignment, where we optimize adversarial features to the malicious instructions in the visual embedding space based on a text-to-image generative model, ensuring that adversarial images subtly encode cues for malicious task execution. Subsequently, we present Textual Guidance Enhancement, where a large language model is leveraged to construct the black-box defensive system prompt through adversarial meta prompting and generate an malicious textual command that steers the agent's output toward better compliance with attackers' requests. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attacks, achieving at least a +30.1% increase in attack success rates across diverse tasks. Furthermore, we validate our attack's effectiveness in real-world multimodal autonomous agents, highlighting its potential implications for safety-critical applications.

  • 8 authors
·
Jul 26, 2025

Undersensitivity in Neural Reading Comprehension

Current reading comprehension models generalise well to in-distribution test sets, yet perform poorly on adversarially selected inputs. Most prior work on adversarial inputs studies oversensitivity: semantically invariant text perturbations that cause a model's prediction to change when it should not. In this work we focus on the complementary problem: excessive prediction undersensitivity, where input text is meaningfully changed but the model's prediction does not, even though it should. We formulate a noisy adversarial attack which searches among semantic variations of the question for which a model erroneously predicts the same answer, and with even higher probability. Despite comprising unanswerable questions, both SQuAD2.0 and NewsQA models are vulnerable to this attack. This indicates that although accurate, models tend to rely on spurious patterns and do not fully consider the information specified in a question. We experiment with data augmentation and adversarial training as defences, and find that both substantially decrease vulnerability to attacks on held out data, as well as held out attack spaces. Addressing undersensitivity also improves results on AddSent and AddOneSent, and models furthermore generalise better when facing train/evaluation distribution mismatch: they are less prone to overly rely on predictive cues present only in the training set, and outperform a conventional model by as much as 10.9% F1.

  • 5 authors
·
Feb 14, 2020

One Turn Too Late: Response-Aware Defense Against Hidden Malicious Intent in Multi-Turn Dialogue

Hidden malicious intent in multi-turn dialogue poses a growing threat to deployed large language models (LLMs). Rather than exposing a harmful objective in a single prompt, increasingly capable attackers can distribute their intent across multiple benign-looking turns. Recent studies show that even modern commercial models with advanced guardrails remain vulnerable to such attacks despite advances in safety alignment and external guardrails. In this work, we address this challenge by detecting the earliest turn at which delivering the candidate response would make the accumulated interaction sufficient to enable harmful action. This objective requires precise turn-level intervention that identifies the harm-enabling closure point while avoiding premature refusal of benign exploratory conversations. To further support training and evaluation, we construct the Multi-Turn Intent Dataset (MTID), which contains branching attack rollouts, matched benign hard negatives, and annotations of the earliest harm-enabling turns. We show that MTID helps enable a turn-level monitor TurnGate, which substantially outperforms existing baselines in harmful-intent detection while maintaining low over-refusal rates. TurnGate further generalizes across domains, attacker pipelines, and target models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Graph-COM/TurnGate.

Adversarial Cheap Talk

Adversarial attacks in reinforcement learning (RL) often assume highly-privileged access to the victim's parameters, environment, or data. Instead, this paper proposes a novel adversarial setting called a Cheap Talk MDP in which an Adversary can merely append deterministic messages to the Victim's observation, resulting in a minimal range of influence. The Adversary cannot occlude ground truth, influence underlying environment dynamics or reward signals, introduce non-stationarity, add stochasticity, see the Victim's actions, or access their parameters. Additionally, we present a simple meta-learning algorithm called Adversarial Cheap Talk (ACT) to train Adversaries in this setting. We demonstrate that an Adversary trained with ACT still significantly influences the Victim's training and testing performance, despite the highly constrained setting. Affecting train-time performance reveals a new attack vector and provides insight into the success and failure modes of existing RL algorithms. More specifically, we show that an ACT Adversary is capable of harming performance by interfering with the learner's function approximation, or instead helping the Victim's performance by outputting useful features. Finally, we show that an ACT Adversary can manipulate messages during train-time to directly and arbitrarily control the Victim at test-time. Project video and code are available at https://sites.google.com/view/adversarial-cheap-talk

  • 4 authors
·
Nov 20, 2022

PromptSleuth: Detecting Prompt Injection via Semantic Intent Invariance

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications, from virtual assistants to autonomous agents. However, their flexibility also introduces new attack vectors-particularly Prompt Injection (PI), where adversaries manipulate model behavior through crafted inputs. As attackers continuously evolve with paraphrased, obfuscated, and even multi-task injection strategies, existing benchmarks are no longer sufficient to capture the full spectrum of emerging threats. To address this gap, we construct a new benchmark that systematically extends prior efforts. Our benchmark subsumes the two widely-used existing ones while introducing new manipulation techniques and multi-task scenarios, thereby providing a more comprehensive evaluation setting. We find that existing defenses, though effective on their original benchmarks, show clear weaknesses under our benchmark, underscoring the need for more robust solutions. Our key insight is that while attack forms may vary, the adversary's intent-injecting an unauthorized task-remains invariant. Building on this observation, we propose PromptSleuth, a semantic-oriented defense framework that detects prompt injection by reasoning over task-level intent rather than surface features. Evaluated across state-of-the-art benchmarks, PromptSleuth consistently outperforms existing defense while maintaining comparable runtime and cost efficiency. These results demonstrate that intent-based semantic reasoning offers a robust, efficient, and generalizable strategy for defending LLMs against evolving prompt injection threats.

  • 3 authors
·
Aug 28, 2025

Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Training

Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different strategies than are typically used in ML. We propose that assessing anti-scheming interventions requires at least (1) testing propensity to scheme on far out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks, (2) evaluating whether lack of scheming is driven by situational awareness, and (3) checking for robustness to pre-existing misaligned goals. We use a broad category of "covert actions" -- such as secretly breaking rules or intentionally underperforming in tests -- as a proxy for scheming, and design evaluations for covert actions. We then stress-test deliberative alignment as a case study for anti-scheming. Across 26 OOD evaluations (180+ environments), deliberative alignment reduces covert action rates (OpenAI o3: 13%->0.4%) but does not fully eliminate them. Our mitigation is also able to largely stop agents from pursuing a hidden goal previously trained into the model, but we still find misbehavior after additional red-teaming. We find that models' chain-of-thought (CoT) often demonstrates awareness of being evaluated for alignment, and show causal evidence that this awareness decreases covert behavior, while unawareness increases it. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the observed reductions in covert action rates are at least partially driven by situational awareness. While we rely on human-legible CoT for training, studying situational awareness, and demonstrating clear evidence of misalignment, our ability to rely on this degrades as models continue to depart from reasoning in standard English. We encourage research into alignment mitigations for scheming and their assessment, especially for the adversarial case of deceptive alignment, which this paper does not address.

  • 19 authors
·
Sep 18, 2025

Embodied Active Defense: Leveraging Recurrent Feedback to Counter Adversarial Patches

The vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial patches has motivated numerous defense strategies for boosting model robustness. However, the prevailing defenses depend on single observation or pre-established adversary information to counter adversarial patches, often failing to be confronted with unseen or adaptive adversarial attacks and easily exhibiting unsatisfying performance in dynamic 3D environments. Inspired by active human perception and recurrent feedback mechanisms, we develop Embodied Active Defense (EAD), a proactive defensive strategy that actively contextualizes environmental information to address misaligned adversarial patches in 3D real-world settings. To achieve this, EAD develops two central recurrent sub-modules, i.e., a perception module and a policy module, to implement two critical functions of active vision. These models recurrently process a series of beliefs and observations, facilitating progressive refinement of their comprehension of the target object and enabling the development of strategic actions to counter adversarial patches in 3D environments. To optimize learning efficiency, we incorporate a differentiable approximation of environmental dynamics and deploy patches that are agnostic to the adversary strategies. Extensive experiments demonstrate that EAD substantially enhances robustness against a variety of patches within just a few steps through its action policy in safety-critical tasks (e.g., face recognition and object detection), without compromising standard accuracy. Furthermore, due to the attack-agnostic characteristic, EAD facilitates excellent generalization to unseen attacks, diminishing the averaged attack success rate by 95 percent across a range of unseen adversarial attacks.

  • 6 authors
·
Mar 30, 2024

Human-Readable Adversarial Prompts: An Investigation into LLM Vulnerabilities Using Situational Context

As the AI systems become deeply embedded in social media platforms, we've uncovered a concerning security vulnerability that goes beyond traditional adversarial attacks. It becomes important to assess the risks of LLMs before the general public use them on social media platforms to avoid any adverse impacts. Unlike obvious nonsensical text strings that safety systems can easily catch, our work reveals that human-readable situation-driven adversarial full-prompts that leverage situational context are effective but much harder to detect. We found that skilled attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs to make a malicious user query safe for LLMs, resulting in generating a harmful response. This raises an important question about the vulnerabilities of LLMs. To measure the robustness against human-readable attacks, which now present a potent threat, our research makes three major contributions. First, we developed attacks that use movie scripts as situational contextual frameworks, creating natural-looking full-prompts that trick LLMs into generating harmful content. Second, we developed a method to transform gibberish adversarial text into readable, innocuous content that still exploits vulnerabilities when used within the full-prompts. Finally, we enhanced the AdvPrompter framework with p-nucleus sampling to generate diverse human-readable adversarial texts that significantly improve attack effectiveness against models like GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125 and Gemma-7b. Our findings show that these systems can be manipulated to operate beyond their intended ethical boundaries when presented with seemingly normal prompts that contain hidden adversarial elements. By identifying these vulnerabilities, we aim to drive the development of more robust safety mechanisms that can withstand sophisticated attacks in real-world applications.

  • 4 authors
·
Dec 20, 2024

A Frustratingly Simple Yet Highly Effective Attack Baseline: Over 90% Success Rate Against the Strong Black-box Models of GPT-4.5/4o/o1

Despite promising performance on open-source large vision-language models (LVLMs), transfer-based targeted attacks often fail against black-box commercial LVLMs. Analyzing failed adversarial perturbations reveals that the learned perturbations typically originate from a uniform distribution and lack clear semantic details, resulting in unintended responses. This critical absence of semantic information leads commercial LVLMs to either ignore the perturbation entirely or misinterpret its embedded semantics, thereby causing the attack to fail. To overcome these issues, we notice that identifying core semantic objects is a key objective for models trained with various datasets and methodologies. This insight motivates our approach that refines semantic clarity by encoding explicit semantic details within local regions, thus ensuring interoperability and capturing finer-grained features, and by concentrating modifications on semantically rich areas rather than applying them uniformly. To achieve this, we propose a simple yet highly effective solution: at each optimization step, the adversarial image is cropped randomly by a controlled aspect ratio and scale, resized, and then aligned with the target image in the embedding space. Experimental results confirm our hypothesis. Our adversarial examples crafted with local-aggregated perturbations focused on crucial regions exhibit surprisingly good transferability to commercial LVLMs, including GPT-4.5, GPT-4o, Gemini-2.0-flash, Claude-3.5-sonnet, Claude-3.7-sonnet, and even reasoning models like o1, Claude-3.7-thinking and Gemini-2.0-flash-thinking. Our approach achieves success rates exceeding 90% on GPT-4.5, 4o, and o1, significantly outperforming all prior state-of-the-art attack methods. Our optimized adversarial examples under different configurations and training code are available at https://github.com/VILA-Lab/M-Attack.

  • 5 authors
·
Mar 13, 2025 2

Alignment is not sufficient to prevent large language models from generating harmful information: A psychoanalytic perspective

Large Language Models (LLMs) are central to a multitude of applications but struggle with significant risks, notably in generating harmful content and biases. Drawing an analogy to the human psyche's conflict between evolutionary survival instincts and societal norm adherence elucidated in Freud's psychoanalysis theory, we argue that LLMs suffer a similar fundamental conflict, arising between their inherent desire for syntactic and semantic continuity, established during the pre-training phase, and the post-training alignment with human values. This conflict renders LLMs vulnerable to adversarial attacks, wherein intensifying the models' desire for continuity can circumvent alignment efforts, resulting in the generation of harmful information. Through a series of experiments, we first validated the existence of the desire for continuity in LLMs, and further devised a straightforward yet powerful technique, such as incomplete sentences, negative priming, and cognitive dissonance scenarios, to demonstrate that even advanced LLMs struggle to prevent the generation of harmful information. In summary, our study uncovers the root of LLMs' vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, hereby questioning the efficacy of solely relying on sophisticated alignment methods, and further advocates for a new training idea that integrates modal concepts alongside traditional amodal concepts, aiming to endow LLMs with a more nuanced understanding of real-world contexts and ethical considerations.

  • 3 authors
·
Nov 14, 2023

Natural Language Induced Adversarial Images

Research of adversarial attacks is important for AI security because it shows the vulnerability of deep learning models and helps to build more robust models. Adversarial attacks on images are most widely studied, which include noise-based attacks, image editing-based attacks, and latent space-based attacks. However, the adversarial examples crafted by these methods often lack sufficient semantic information, making it challenging for humans to understand the failure modes of deep learning models under natural conditions. To address this limitation, we propose a natural language induced adversarial image attack method. The core idea is to leverage a text-to-image model to generate adversarial images given input prompts, which are maliciously constructed to lead to misclassification for a target model. To adopt commercial text-to-image models for synthesizing more natural adversarial images, we propose an adaptive genetic algorithm (GA) for optimizing discrete adversarial prompts without requiring gradients and an adaptive word space reduction method for improving query efficiency. We further used CLIP to maintain the semantic consistency of the generated images. In our experiments, we found that some high-frequency semantic information such as "foggy", "humid", "stretching", etc. can easily cause classifier errors. This adversarial semantic information exists not only in generated images but also in photos captured in the real world. We also found that some adversarial semantic information can be transferred to unknown classification tasks. Furthermore, our attack method can transfer to different text-to-image models (e.g., Midjourney, DALL-E 3, etc.) and image classifiers. Our code is available at: https://github.com/zxp555/Natural-Language-Induced-Adversarial-Images.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 10, 2024

Visual Adversarial Examples Jailbreak Large Language Models

Recently, there has been a surge of interest in introducing vision into Large Language Models (LLMs). The proliferation of large Visual Language Models (VLMs), such as Flamingo, BLIP-2, and GPT-4, signifies an exciting convergence of advancements in both visual and language foundation models. Yet, the risks associated with this integrative approach are largely unexamined. In this paper, we shed light on the security and safety implications of this trend. First, we underscore that the continuous and high-dimensional nature of the additional visual input space intrinsically makes it a fertile ground for adversarial attacks. This unavoidably expands the attack surfaces of LLMs. Second, we highlight that the broad functionality of LLMs also presents visual attackers with a wider array of achievable adversarial objectives, extending the implications of security failures beyond mere misclassification. To elucidate these risks, we study adversarial examples in the visual input space of a VLM. Specifically, against MiniGPT-4, which incorporates safety mechanisms that can refuse harmful instructions, we present visual adversarial examples that can circumvent the safety mechanisms and provoke harmful behaviors of the model. Remarkably, we discover that adversarial examples, even if optimized on a narrow, manually curated derogatory corpus against specific social groups, can universally jailbreak the model's safety mechanisms. A single such adversarial example can generally undermine MiniGPT-4's safety, enabling it to heed a wide range of harmful instructions and produce harmful content far beyond simply imitating the derogatory corpus used in optimization. Unveiling these risks, we accentuate the urgent need for comprehensive risk assessments, robust defense strategies, and the implementation of responsible practices for the secure and safe utilization of VLMs.

  • 5 authors
·
Jun 22, 2023 1

Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

  • 6 authors
·
Dec 6, 2024

Eliciting and Analyzing Emergent Misalignment in State-of-the-Art Large Language Models

Despite significant advances in alignment techniques, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art language models remain vulnerable to carefully crafted conversational scenarios that can induce various forms of misalignment without explicit jailbreaking. Through systematic manual red-teaming with Claude-4-Opus, we discovered 10 successful attack scenarios, revealing fundamental vulnerabilities in how current alignment methods handle narrative immersion, emotional pressure, and strategic framing. These scenarios successfully elicited a range of misaligned behaviors, including deception, value drift, self-preservation, and manipulative reasoning, each exploiting different psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. To validate generalizability, we distilled our successful manual attacks into MISALIGNMENTBENCH, an automated evaluation framework that enables reproducible testing across multiple models. Cross-model evaluation of our 10 scenarios against five frontier LLMs revealed an overall 76% vulnerability rate, with significant variations: GPT-4.1 showed the highest susceptibility (90%), while Claude-4-Sonnet demonstrated greater resistance (40%). Our findings demonstrate that sophisticated reasoning capabilities often become attack vectors rather than protective mechanisms, as models can be manipulated into complex justifications for misaligned behavior. This work provides (i) a detailed taxonomy of conversational manipulation patterns and (ii) a reusable evaluation framework. Together, these findings expose critical gaps in current alignment strategies and highlight the need for robustness against subtle, scenario-based manipulation in future AI systems.

AIM-Intelligence AIM Intelligence
·
Aug 6, 2025

Making MLLMs Blind: Adversarial Smuggling Attacks in MLLM Content Moderation

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly being deployed as automated content moderators. Within this landscape, we uncover a critical threat: Adversarial Smuggling Attacks. Unlike adversarial perturbations (for misclassification) and adversarial jailbreaks (for harmful output generation), adversarial smuggling exploits the Human-AI capability gap. It encodes harmful content into human-readable visual formats that remain AI-unreadable, thereby evading automated detection and enabling the dissemination of harmful content. We classify smuggling attacks into two pathways: (1) Perceptual Blindness, disrupting text recognition; and (2) Reasoning Blockade, inhibiting semantic understanding despite successful text recognition. To evaluate this threat, we constructed SmuggleBench, the first comprehensive benchmark comprising 1,700 adversarial smuggling attack instances. Evaluations on SmuggleBench reveal that both proprietary (e.g., GPT-5) and open-source (e.g., Qwen3-VL) state-of-the-art models are vulnerable to this threat, producing Attack Success Rates (ASR) exceeding 90%. By analyzing the vulnerability through the lenses of perception and reasoning, we identify three root causes: the limited capabilities of vision encoders, the robustness gap in OCR, and the scarcity of domain-specific adversarial examples. We conduct a preliminary exploration of mitigation strategies, investigating the potential of test-time scaling (via CoT) and adversarial training (via SFT) to mitigate this threat. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/zhihengli-casia/smugglebench.

  • 11 authors
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Apr 7

Attention-Guided Patch-Wise Sparse Adversarial Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models

In recent years, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models in embodied intelligence have developed rapidly. However, existing adversarial attack methods require costly end-to-end training and often generate noticeable perturbation patches. To address these limitations, we propose ADVLA, a framework that directly applies adversarial perturbations on features projected from the visual encoder into the textual feature space. ADVLA efficiently disrupts downstream action predictions under low-amplitude constraints, and attention guidance allows the perturbations to be both focused and sparse. We introduce three strategies that enhance sensitivity, enforce sparsity, and concentrate perturbations. Experiments demonstrate that under an L_{infty}=4/255 constraint, ADVLA combined with Top-K masking modifies less than 10% of the patches while achieving an attack success rate of nearly 100%. The perturbations are concentrated on critical regions, remain almost imperceptible in the overall image, and a single-step iteration takes only about 0.06 seconds, significantly outperforming conventional patch-based attacks. In summary, ADVLA effectively weakens downstream action predictions of VLA models under low-amplitude and locally sparse conditions, avoiding the high training costs and conspicuous perturbations of traditional patch attacks, and demonstrates unique effectiveness and practical value for attacking VLA feature spaces.

  • 8 authors
·
Nov 25, 2025

Mapping the Exploitation Surface: A 10,000-Trial Taxonomy of What Makes LLM Agents Exploit Vulnerabilities

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

  • 1 authors
·
Apr 5

NeuroFilter: Privacy Guardrails for Conversational LLM Agents

This work addresses the computational challenge of enforcing privacy for agentic Large Language Models (LLMs), where privacy is governed by the contextual integrity framework. Indeed, existing defenses rely on LLM-mediated checking stages that add substantial latency and cost, and that can be undermined in multi-turn interactions through manipulation or benign-looking conversational scaffolding. Contrasting this background, this paper makes a key observation: internal representations associated with privacy-violating intent can be separated from benign requests using linear structure. Using this insight, the paper proposes NeuroFilter, a guardrail framework that operationalizes contextual integrity by mapping norm violations to simple directions in the model's activation space, enabling detection even when semantic filters are bypassed. The proposed filter is also extended to capture threats arising during long conversations using the concept of activation velocity, which measures cumulative drift in internal representations across turns. A comprehensive evaluation across over 150,000 interactions and covering models from 7B to 70B parameters, illustrates the strong performance of NeuroFilter in detecting privacy attacks while maintaining zero false positives on benign prompts, all while reducing the computational inference cost by several orders of magnitude when compared to LLM-based agentic privacy defenses.

  • 2 authors
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Jan 20

Evaluating and Understanding Scheming Propensity in LLM Agents

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. We find only minimal instances of scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely due to evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. Surprisingly, in model organisms (Hubinger et al., 2023) built with these snippets, scheming behavior is remarkably brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%, and increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%. Our incentive decomposition enables systematic measurement of scheming propensity in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.

  • 5 authors
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Mar 27

Adversarially Regularising Neural NLI Models to Integrate Logical Background Knowledge

Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models designed to cause the model to make a mistake. They are useful for understanding the shortcomings of machine learning models, interpreting their results, and for regularisation. In NLP, however, most example generation strategies produce input text by using known, pre-specified semantic transformations, requiring significant manual effort and in-depth understanding of the problem and domain. In this paper, we investigate the problem of automatically generating adversarial examples that violate a set of given First-Order Logic constraints in Natural Language Inference (NLI). We reduce the problem of identifying such adversarial examples to a combinatorial optimisation problem, by maximising a quantity measuring the degree of violation of such constraints and by using a language model for generating linguistically-plausible examples. Furthermore, we propose a method for adversarially regularising neural NLI models for incorporating background knowledge. Our results show that, while the proposed method does not always improve results on the SNLI and MultiNLI datasets, it significantly and consistently increases the predictive accuracy on adversarially-crafted datasets -- up to a 79.6% relative improvement -- while drastically reducing the number of background knowledge violations. Furthermore, we show that adversarial examples transfer among model architectures, and that the proposed adversarial training procedure improves the robustness of NLI models to adversarial examples.

  • 2 authors
·
Aug 25, 2018

Learning to Persuade Exposes How Easily LLMs Abandon Correct Beliefs

Persuasion is a core dynamic of natural language communication, shaping how large language models (LLMs) update beliefs, resolve disagreements, and reach decisions. As LLMs increasingly debate, advise, and think collaboratively with humans and each other, resistance to harmful persuasion becomes a core requirement for reliable behavior. Yet we show that this requirement is far from met: a single targeted persuasive argument is enough to collapse model accuracy to near zero, even when the argument is factually false. We formalize this threat as adversarial persuasion and introduce an adversarial reinforcement learning framework that trains persuader agents to change a target model's answer in a single interaction. First, we show that optimizing persuasion strategies through trial and error exposes vulnerabilities that static prompting misses: RL-trained persuaders raise persuasion success from approximately 24% to over 93% against the training-time persuadee. Second, we find that these learned strategies transfer to unseen models, achieving 83% attack success on Qwen-14B, 79% on Llama-3.1-8B, and 25% on GPT-4o-mini. Third, we demonstrate that a curriculum that bootstraps on more persuadable open-weight models before targeting harder models further increases GPT-4o-mini attack success from 25% to 38%. Moreover, our results reveal that optimized persuaders increasingly rely on credibility-based tactics, including fabricated citations and false authoritative evidence. Together, these findings expose a critical weakness in current LLM agents: even when they initially reason correctly, they can be steered toward false conclusions by optimized natural language influence. This positions persuasion robustness as a necessary safety criterion for multi-agent and human-AI decision-making systems.

  • 4 authors
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Aug 11

Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection via Tool Result Parsing

As LLM agents transition from digital assistants to physical controllers in autonomous systems and robotics, they face an escalating threat from indirect prompt injection. By embedding adversarial instructions into the results of tool calls, attackers can hijack the agent's decision-making process to execute unauthorized actions. This vulnerability poses a significant risk as agents gain more direct control over physical environments. Existing defense mechanisms against Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) generally fall into two categories. The first involves training dedicated detection models; however, this approach entails high computational overhead for both training and inference, and requires frequent updates to keep pace with evolving attack vectors. Alternatively, prompt-based methods leverage the inherent capabilities of LLMs to detect or ignore malicious instructions via prompt engineering. Despite their flexibility, most current prompt-based defenses suffer from high Attack Success Rates (ASR), demonstrating limited robustness against sophisticated injection attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel method that provides LLMs with precise data via tool result parsing while effectively filtering out injected malicious code. Our approach achieves competitive Utility under Attack (UA) while maintaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) to date, significantly outperforming existing methods. Code is available at GitHub.

  • 3 authors
·
Jan 7 1

An LLM can Fool Itself: A Prompt-Based Adversarial Attack

The wide-ranging applications of large language models (LLMs), especially in safety-critical domains, necessitate the proper evaluation of the LLM's adversarial robustness. This paper proposes an efficient tool to audit the LLM's adversarial robustness via a prompt-based adversarial attack (PromptAttack). PromptAttack converts adversarial textual attacks into an attack prompt that can cause the victim LLM to output the adversarial sample to fool itself. The attack prompt is composed of three important components: (1) original input (OI) including the original sample and its ground-truth label, (2) attack objective (AO) illustrating a task description of generating a new sample that can fool itself without changing the semantic meaning, and (3) attack guidance (AG) containing the perturbation instructions to guide the LLM on how to complete the task by perturbing the original sample at character, word, and sentence levels, respectively. Besides, we use a fidelity filter to ensure that PromptAttack maintains the original semantic meanings of the adversarial examples. Further, we enhance the attack power of PromptAttack by ensembling adversarial examples at different perturbation levels. Comprehensive empirical results using Llama2 and GPT-3.5 validate that PromptAttack consistently yields a much higher attack success rate compared to AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++. Interesting findings include that a simple emoji can easily mislead GPT-3.5 to make wrong predictions.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 20, 2023

AdversaRiskQA: An Adversarial Factuality Benchmark for High-Risk Domains

Hallucination in large language models (LLMs) remains an acute concern, contributing to the spread of misinformation and diminished public trust, particularly in high-risk domains. Among hallucination types, factuality is crucial, as it concerns a model's alignment with established world knowledge. Adversarial factuality, defined as the deliberate insertion of misinformation into prompts with varying levels of expressed confidence, tests a model's ability to detect and resist confidently framed falsehoods. Existing work lacks high-quality, domain-specific resources for assessing model robustness under such adversarial conditions, and no prior research has examined the impact of injected misinformation on long-form text factuality. To address this gap, we introduce AdversaRiskQA, the first verified and reliable benchmark systematically evaluating adversarial factuality across Health, Finance, and Law. The benchmark includes two difficulty levels to test LLMs' defensive capabilities across varying knowledge depths. We propose two automated methods for evaluating the adversarial attack success and long-form factuality. We evaluate six open- and closed-source LLMs from the Qwen, GPT-OSS, and GPT families, measuring misinformation detection rates. Long-form factuality is assessed on Qwen3 (30B) under both baseline and adversarial conditions. Results show that after excluding meaningless responses, Qwen3 (80B) achieves the highest average accuracy, while GPT-5 maintains consistently high accuracy. Performance scales non-linearly with model size, varies by domains, and gaps between difficulty levels narrow as models grow. Long-form evaluation reveals no significant correlation between injected misinformation and the model's factual output. AdversaRiskQA provides a valuable benchmark for pinpointing LLM weaknesses and developing more reliable models for high-stakes applications.

  • 6 authors
·
Sep 27

Humanizing Machine-Generated Content: Evading AI-Text Detection through Adversarial Attack

With the development of large language models (LLMs), detecting whether text is generated by a machine becomes increasingly challenging in the face of malicious use cases like the spread of false information, protection of intellectual property, and prevention of academic plagiarism. While well-trained text detectors have demonstrated promising performance on unseen test data, recent research suggests that these detectors have vulnerabilities when dealing with adversarial attacks such as paraphrasing. In this paper, we propose a framework for a broader class of adversarial attacks, designed to perform minor perturbations in machine-generated content to evade detection. We consider two attack settings: white-box and black-box, and employ adversarial learning in dynamic scenarios to assess the potential enhancement of the current detection model's robustness against such attacks. The empirical results reveal that the current detection models can be compromised in as little as 10 seconds, leading to the misclassification of machine-generated text as human-written content. Furthermore, we explore the prospect of improving the model's robustness over iterative adversarial learning. Although some improvements in model robustness are observed, practical applications still face significant challenges. These findings shed light on the future development of AI-text detectors, emphasizing the need for more accurate and robust detection methods.

  • 3 authors
·
Apr 2, 2024

Generalizable Data-free Objective for Crafting Universal Adversarial Perturbations

Machine learning models are susceptible to adversarial perturbations: small changes to input that can cause large changes in output. It is also demonstrated that there exist input-agnostic perturbations, called universal adversarial perturbations, which can change the inference of target model on most of the data samples. However, existing methods to craft universal perturbations are (i) task specific, (ii) require samples from the training data distribution, and (iii) perform complex optimizations. Additionally, because of the data dependence, fooling ability of the crafted perturbations is proportional to the available training data. In this paper, we present a novel, generalizable and data-free approaches for crafting universal adversarial perturbations. Independent of the underlying task, our objective achieves fooling via corrupting the extracted features at multiple layers. Therefore, the proposed objective is generalizable to craft image-agnostic perturbations across multiple vision tasks such as object recognition, semantic segmentation, and depth estimation. In the practical setting of black-box attack scenario (when the attacker does not have access to the target model and it's training data), we show that our objective outperforms the data dependent objectives to fool the learned models. Further, via exploiting simple priors related to the data distribution, our objective remarkably boosts the fooling ability of the crafted perturbations. Significant fooling rates achieved by our objective emphasize that the current deep learning models are now at an increased risk, since our objective generalizes across multiple tasks without the requirement of training data for crafting the perturbations. To encourage reproducible research, we have released the codes for our proposed algorithm.

  • 3 authors
·
Jan 24, 2018