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Nov 19

Structural Representations for Cross-Attack Generalization in AI Agent Threat Detection

Autonomous AI agents executing multi-step tool sequences face semantic attacks that manifest in behavioral traces rather than isolated prompts. A critical challenge is cross-attack generalization: can detectors trained on known attack families recognize novel, unseen attack types? We discover that standard conversational tokenization -- capturing linguistic patterns from agent interactions -- fails catastrophically on structural attacks like tool hijacking (AUC 0.39) and data exfiltration (AUC 0.46), while succeeding on linguistic attacks like social engineering (AUC 0.78). We introduce structural tokenization, encoding execution-flow patterns (tool calls, arguments, observations) rather than conversational content. This simple representational change dramatically improves cross-attack generalization: +46 AUC points on tool hijacking, +39 points on data exfiltration, and +71 points on unknown attacks, while simultaneously improving in-distribution performance (+6 points). For attacks requiring linguistic features, we propose gated multi-view fusion that adaptively combines both representations, achieving AUC 0.89 on social engineering without sacrificing structural attack detection. Our findings reveal that AI agent security is fundamentally a structural problem: attack semantics reside in execution patterns, not surface language. While our rule-based tokenizer serves as a baseline, the structural abstraction principle generalizes even with simple implementation.

  • 1 authors
·
Jan 4

AdversariaL attacK sAfety aLIgnment(ALKALI): Safeguarding LLMs through GRACE: Geometric Representation-Aware Contrastive Enhancement- Introducing Adversarial Vulnerability Quality Index (AVQI)

Adversarial threats against LLMs are escalating faster than current defenses can adapt. We expose a critical geometric blind spot in alignment: adversarial prompts exploit latent camouflage, embedding perilously close to the safe representation manifold while encoding unsafe intent thereby evading surface level defenses like Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), which remain blind to the latent geometry. We introduce ALKALI, the first rigorously curated adversarial benchmark and the most comprehensive to date spanning 9,000 prompts across three macro categories, six subtypes, and fifteen attack families. Evaluation of 21 leading LLMs reveals alarmingly high Attack Success Rates (ASRs) across both open and closed source models, exposing an underlying vulnerability we term latent camouflage, a structural blind spot where adversarial completions mimic the latent geometry of safe ones. To mitigate this vulnerability, we introduce GRACE - Geometric Representation Aware Contrastive Enhancement, an alignment framework coupling preference learning with latent space regularization. GRACE enforces two constraints: latent separation between safe and adversarial completions, and adversarial cohesion among unsafe and jailbreak behaviors. These operate over layerwise pooled embeddings guided by a learned attention profile, reshaping internal geometry without modifying the base model, and achieve up to 39% ASR reduction. Moreover, we introduce AVQI, a geometry aware metric that quantifies latent alignment failure via cluster separation and compactness. AVQI reveals when unsafe completions mimic the geometry of safe ones, offering a principled lens into how models internally encode safety. We make the code publicly available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/alkali-B416/README.md.

  • 7 authors
·
Jun 10, 2025

Same Payload, Different Channel: Measuring Trust Asymmetry in Tool-Using Language Models

As language models take on agentic roles that span calling external APIs, reading tool outputs, and acting on instructions embedded in third-party content, their attack surface expands well beyond what users type. Whether a model treats a malicious instruction the same way regardless of where it arrives has not been systematically studied. We introduce the Safety Asymmetry Score (SAS), which measures how much a model's susceptibility to adversarial content shifts depending on whether that content arrives in the user message, tool metadata, or tool output, using matched payload pairs that keep the malicious text identical and vary only the context of delivery. Evaluated across 6 production LLMs and three attack families, we find a consistent and informative asymmetry: agent-native models are substantially more vulnerable when adversarial content arrives via tool descriptions than via user messages, while general-purpose models show the reverse. This asymmetry further inverts when the same content is delivered through tool outputs rather than descriptions, suggesting models implicitly treat tool metadata as trusted instructions and tool results as ordinary data. A mechanistic study on Llama 3.3 70B reveals that the safety-relevant representation is causally present at mid-to-late network depths but non-linearly encoded, explaining why linear probes fail to detect it. These findings expose a systematic, channel-dependent blind spot in how current tool-using models handle adversarial content.

  • 2 authors
·
May 29

REALM: A Unified Red-Teaming Benchmark for Physical-World VLMs

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly used as perception-reasoning backbones for embodied intelligence in safety-critical physical systems, where perception or reasoning errors can lead to unsafe decisions or actions. Although many red-teaming methods have been developed to probe VLM vulnerabilities, their evaluation remains fragmented across datasets, metrics, and threat models, making direct comparison difficult and obscuring whether observed differences arise from stronger attacks, more vulnerable models, or incompatible evaluation settings. Existing chatbot-centric red-teaming benchmarks mainly standardize jailbreak and content-safety evaluation, but they do not systematically capture physically grounded functional failures or cover red-teaming methods that target physical-world VLMs. This raises the key challenge of comparing diverse attack methods under a unified protocol while targeting the same scenario-specific failures. We introduce REALM, to our knowledge the first unified red-teaming benchmark for physical-world VLMs. REALM integrates 12 red-teaming methods, 3 model-agnostic defenses, and 13 VLMs under a practical black-box threat model with shared datasets and metrics. To align adversarial objectives across attack families, REALM introduces an agentic target-generation pipeline that constructs shared, scenario-specific, and physically grounded attack objectives for each scene, enabling fair comparison of diverse red-teaming methods under aligned adversarial goals. Our evaluation shows that text and typographic injection attacks induce the most failures, multimodal co-optimization yields the strongest visual-perturbation transfer, single-pass attacks approach iterative methods at much lower cost, and model scale alone does not confer adversarial robustness. Code is available at https://github.com/UCF-ML-Research/REALM.

  • 3 authors
·
Jun 21

CHASE: Adversarial Red-Blue Teaming for Improving LLM Safety using Reinforcement Learning

Despite advances in safety alignment, prompt-rewriting attacks such as persona modulation, fictional framing and persuasion-based reformulation, can bypass safety filters even on frontier models. Existing defenses either rely on non-scalable human curation or white-box optimisation that overfits to specific model internals, leaving aligned models brittle against the very class of adaptive black-box adversaries they will face in deployment. To address this gap, we introduce CHASE (Co-evolutionary Hardening through Adversarial Safety-Escalation), a closed-loop red-blue teaming framework in which a black-box attacker and a safety-aligned defender co-evolve. The attacker is trained via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) under a multiplicative reward that jointly enforces bypass effectiveness and intent fidelity, while the defender is hardened on the harvested adversarial rewrites through a two-stage GRPO + rejection-sampled SFT pipeline balanced with benign data. Evaluated on BeaverTails and JailbreakBench against five held-out attack families (PAIR, TAP, AutoDAN, PAP, Translation), CHASE cuts mean StrongREJECT score by 43.2\% with 0\% false-refusal on benign prompts. Beyond the headline result, CHASE shows that template-free RL exploration recovers latent attack primitives that transfer across mechanistically distinct attack families, suggesting a path toward LLM safety hardening that generalises beyond the narrow distributions achieved thus far in adversarial training.

  • 6 authors
·
Jun 3

Removing the Watermark Is Not Enough: Forensic Stealth in Generative-AI Watermark Removal

Watermarks for AI-generated images are meant to support downstream decisions about provenance, manipulation, and trust. In the settings that motivate watermark removal, therefore, success means more than causing the watermark test to fail. A successful remover must also preserve the utility of the image and make the output forensically indistinguishable from clean content, so that defeating the verifier restores deniability rather than merely replacing one detection signal with another. We show that current watermark removal attacks fail this stronger objective. Across six state-of-the-art removers spanning four attack families, independent forensic detectors distinguish removal-processed outputs from clean images at over 98% true-positive rate under a 1% false-positive budget. Thus, current removers often replace the watermark with a different detectable signal. Using UnMarker (IEEE S&P 2025) as a detailed case study, we show that this signal persists under common post-processing, exhibits a characteristic two-regime spectral deformation, and yields a three-way tension among removal success, image quality, and forensic stealth. These results show that existing removal benchmarks are incomplete: they reward verifier evasion and utility preservation while omitting forensic stealth. A workable watermark remover must satisfy all three conditions at once: watermark evasion, utility preservation, and forensic indistinguishability from clean content.

  • 2 authors
·
May 8

IDEA: Intent-Dominance Evidence Audit for Inference-Time Backdoor Detection in GUI Agents

Organizations increasingly deploy downloaded open-weight GUI agents. A backdoored agent passes acceptance tests on clean data and misbehaves only when a visual trigger appears on screen, turning an unvetted checkpoint into a supply-chain risk. However, existing sample-level detectors target image classifiers and CLIP-style encoders, leaving step-level backdoor detection for GUI agents unaddressed. On clean steps, the instruction drives the action; when an unreferenced screen region hijacks the step, the instruction loses control over the decision state or that region dictates it instead. We term this signature intent--evidence dominance inversion and propose IDEA (Intent-Dominance Evidence Audit) to detect backdoor activation at inference time for each step without trigger knowledge or attack data. Specifically, Intent Counterfactual Probing (ICP) measures how far redirected instructions move the decision state, and Region Causal Audit (RCA) quantifies how far ablating a candidate region moves it. A gated conformal score compares both displacements against clean steps at the same distance from the clean manifold, providing a finite-sample false-positive guarantee. Extensive experiments on Qwen2.5-VL-3B across five attack families show that IDEA consistently detects backdoor activation under a controlled false-positive rate and outperforms state-of-the-art detection methods, while localizing the trigger region for every alarm and adding only modest inference overhead.

Holmes: An Evidence-Grounded LLM Agent for Auditable DDoS Investigation in Cloud Networks

Cloud environments face frequent DDoS threats due to centralized resources and broad attack surfaces. Modern cloud-native DDoS attacks further evolve rapidly and often blend multi-vector strategies, creating an operational dilemma: defenders need wire-speed monitoring while also requiring explainable, auditable attribution for response. Existing rule-based and supervised-learning approaches typically output black-box scores or labels, provide limited evidence chains, and generalize poorly to unseen attack variants; meanwhile, high-quality labeled data is often difficult to obtain in cloud settings. We present Holmes (DDoS Detective), an LLM-based DDoS detection agent that reframes the model as a virtual SRE investigator rather than an end-to-end classifier. Holmes couples a funnel-like hierarchical workflow (counters/sFlow for continuous sensing and triage; PCAP evidence collection triggered only on anomaly windows) with an Evidence Pack abstraction that converts binary packets into compact, reproducible, high-signal structured evidence. On top of this evidence interface, Holmes enforces a structure-first investigation protocol and strict JSON/quotation constraints to produce machine-consumable reports with auditable evidence anchors. We evaluate Holmes on CICDDoS2019 reflection/amplification attacks and script-triggered flooding scenarios. Results show that Holmes produces attribution decisions grounded in salient evidence anchors across diverse attack families, and when errors occur, its audit logs make the failure source easy to localize, demonstrating the practicality of an LLM agent for cost-controlled and traceable DDoS investigation in cloud operations.

  • 5 authors
·
Jan 20

Compositional Adversarial Training for Robust Visual Watermarking

Robust watermarking is typically trained with random post-processing augmentation, but random sampling under-covers the combinatorial space of realistic attack pipelines and rarely encounters the rare compositions that actually break detection. This leads to unstable training and poor sample efficiency. We instead formulate watermark robustness as a min-max problem over a structured space of compositional transformations. We propose Compositional Adversarial Training (CAT), a plug-in framework that learns a sequential differentiable adversary that observes the current watermarked image and selects an attack family at each step to maximally disrupt message recovery. CAT combines a straight-through Gumbel-Softmax attack selection with entropy regularization, allowing the backward pass to be end-to-end differentiable and aggregate gradient information across attack families, yielding faster, smoother convergence without collapsing to a single attack mode. We evaluate CAT on post-generation watermarks VideoSeal 0.0, VideoSeal 1.0, and PixelSeal and in-generation WMAR under both single-step and two-step attack suites, on in-distribution and multiple out-of-distribution image and video benchmarks. CAT consistently outperforms random-augmentation baselines trained with the same augmentation budget, with the largest gains on hard composed attacks and OOD evaluations; improving overall watermark capacity by up to 63.5% in the single-step attack setting and 13.0% in the compositional setting. In the autoregressive setting, CAT improves the TPR@FPR=1% by 12% on average on difficult geometric transformations. These results show that robust visual watermarking benefits from training against adaptive compositional adversaries rather than independent random corruptions.

  • 7 authors
·
May 15

Prompt Injection Mitigation with Agentic AI, Nested Learning, and AI Sustainability via Semantic Caching

Prompt injection remains a central obstacle to the safe deployment of large language models, particularly in multi-agent settings where intermediate outputs can propagate or amplify malicious instructions. Building on earlier work that introduced a four-metric Total Injection Vulnerability Score (TIVS), this paper extends the evaluation framework with semantic similarity-based caching and a fifth metric (Observability Score Ratio) to yield TIVS-O, investigating how defence effectiveness interacts with transparency in a HOPE-inspired Nested Learning architecture. The proposed system combines an agentic pipeline with Continuum Memory Systems that implement semantic similarity-based caching across 301 synthetically generated injection-focused prompts drawn from ten attack families, while a fourth agent performs comprehensive security analysis using five key performance indicators. In addition to traditional injection metrics, OSR quantifies the richness and clarity of security-relevant reasoning exposed by each agent, enabling an explicit analysis of trade-offs between strict mitigation and auditability. Experiments show that the system achieves secure responses with zero high-risk breaches, while semantic caching delivers substantial computational savings, achieving a 41.6% reduction in LLM calls and corresponding decreases in latency, energy consumption, and carbon emissions. Five TIVS-O configurations reveal optimal trade-offs between mitigation strictness and forensic transparency. These results indicate that observability-aware evaluation can reveal non-monotonic effects within multi-agent pipelines and that memory-augmented agents can jointly maximize security robustness, real-time performance, operational cost savings, and environmental sustainability without modifying underlying model weights, providing a production-ready pathway for secure and green LLM deployments.

  • 2 authors
·
Jan 18

Semantic Overlays: Mitigating Prompt Injection with Annotations Beyond Tokens and Steering Vectors

Everything a language model sees is tokens. The serving stack knows what each span is -- user input, tool output, instructions -- but the model must keep track of that itself, and it can lose track or be confused: text can be written to read like anything. Prompt injection is a natural exploit of this phenomenon. By scrambling the model's understanding of span identity, an attacker can induce unwanted and potentially dangerous actions. Adding a non-textual channel to the model's input -- a way to communicate span identity beyond text -- mitigates this class of attack. We thus introduce a general steering technique called Semantic Overlays: small learned adapters applied at chosen prefill positions to a frozen model's residual stream. Laying an overlay over a span creates an out-of-band annotation channel that cannot be replicated by tokens. Unlike steering vectors, Semantic Overlays are trained, adaptable, and selectively applied. An overlay can encode complex semantics that reshape how the model perceives the marked span: asked to copy a code snippet under an overlay asserting that it is in a different programming language than it is, the model rewrites the snippet, faithfully, in the asserted language. Overlays are also composable, allow for transparent reading of underlying content, and can carry complex payloads -- including imperatives that the model will follow. An overlay which marks a span as "non-executable" defends against the broad class of prompt injections that add instructions in untrusted context. We report strong results on prompt injection benchmarks: SEP separation rises from 24.3% to 96.5% with utility unchanged (our scoring rule; we also correct a defect in the published grader), TensorTrust attack success rate falls from 34.8% to 6.6%, and all four PIArena attack families drop to 0% compliance, all while marked spans stay readable (92.5% exact copy rate).

  • 1 authors
·
Aug 23

Lying with Truths: Open-Channel Multi-Agent Collusion for Belief Manipulation via Generative Montage

As large language models (LLMs) transition to autonomous agents synthesizing real-time information, their reasoning capabilities introduce an unexpected attack surface. This paper introduces a novel threat where colluding agents steer victim beliefs using only truthful evidence fragments distributed through public channels, without relying on covert communications, backdoors, or falsified documents. By exploiting LLMs' overthinking tendency, we formalize the first cognitive collusion attack and propose Generative Montage: a Writer-Editor-Director framework that constructs deceptive narratives through adversarial debate and coordinated posting of evidence fragments, causing victims to internalize and propagate fabricated conclusions. To study this risk, we develop CoPHEME, a dataset derived from real-world rumor events, and simulate attacks across diverse LLM families. Our results show pervasive vulnerability across 14 LLM families: attack success rates reach 74.4% for proprietary models and 70.6% for open-weights models. Counterintuitively, stronger reasoning capabilities increase susceptibility, with reasoning-specialized models showing higher attack success than base models or prompts. Furthermore, these false beliefs then cascade to downstream judges, achieving over 60% deception rates, highlighting a socio-technical vulnerability in how LLM-based agents interact with dynamic information environments. Our implementation and data are available at: https://github.com/CharlesJW222/Lying_with_Truth/tree/main.

Learning to Stay Safe: Adaptive Regularization Against Safety Degradation during Fine-Tuning

Instruction-following language models are trained to be helpful and safe, yet their safety behavior can deteriorate under benign fine-tuning and worsen under adversarial updates. Existing defenses often offer limited protection or force a trade-off between safety and utility. We introduce a training framework that adapts regularization in response to safety risk, enabling models to remain aligned throughout fine-tuning. To estimate safety risk at training time, we explore two distinct approaches: a judge-based Safety Critic that assigns high-level harm scores to training batches, and an activation-based risk predictor built with a lightweight classifier trained on intermediate model activations to estimate harmful intent. Each approach provides a risk signal that is used to constrain updates deemed higher risk to remain close to a safe reference policy, while lower-risk updates proceed with standard training. We empirically verify that harmful intent signals are predictable from pre-generation activations and that judge scores provide effective high-recall safety guidance. Across multiple model families and attack scenarios, adaptive regularization with either risk estimation approach consistently lowers attack success rate compared to standard fine-tuning, preserves downstream performance, and adds no inference-time cost. This work demonstrates a principled mechanism for maintaining safety without sacrificing utility.

  • 3 authors
·
May 10

How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competition

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

sureheremarv Gray Swan
·
Mar 16

BenchOverflow: Measuring Overflow in Large Language Models via Plain-Text Prompts

We investigate a failure mode of large language models (LLMs) in which plain-text prompts elicit excessive outputs, a phenomenon we term Overflow. Unlike jailbreaks or prompt injection, Overflow arises under ordinary interaction settings and can lead to elevated serving cost, latency, and cross-user performance degradation, particularly when scaled across many requests. Beyond usability, the stakes are economic and environmental: unnecessary tokens increase per-request cost and energy consumption, compounding into substantial operational spend and carbon footprint at scale. Moreover, Overflow represents a practical vector for compute amplification and service degradation in shared environments. We introduce BenchOverflow, a model-agnostic benchmark of nine plain-text prompting strategies that amplify output volume without adversarial suffixes or policy circumvention. Using a standardized protocol with a fixed budget of 5000 new tokens, we evaluate nine open- and closed-source models and observe pronounced rightward shifts and heavy tails in length distributions. Cap-saturation rates (CSR@1k/3k/5k) and empirical cumulative distribution functions (ECDFs) quantify tail risk; within-prompt variance and cross-model correlations show that Overflow is broadly reproducible yet heterogeneous across families and attack vectors. A lightweight mitigation-a fixed conciseness reminder-attenuates right tails and lowers CSR for all strategies across the majority of models. Our findings position length control as a measurable reliability, cost, and sustainability concern rather than a stylistic quirk. By enabling standardized comparison of length-control robustness across models, BenchOverflow provides a practical basis for selecting deployments that minimize resource waste and operating expense, and for evaluating defenses that curb compute amplification without eroding task performance.

  • 3 authors
·
Jan 12

PermaFrost-Attack: Stealth Pretraining Seeding(SPS) for planting Logic Landmines During LLM Training

Aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, and their reliance on web-scale pretraining creates a subtle but consequential attack surface. We study Stealth Pretraining Seeding (SPS), a threat model in which adversaries distribute small amounts of poisoned content across stealth websites, increasing the likelihood that such material is absorbed into future training corpora derived from sources such as Common Crawl. Because each individual payload is tiny, diffuse, and superficially benign, the attack is difficult to detect during dataset construction or filtering. The result is a latent form of poisoning that remains largely invisible under standard evaluation, yet can later be activated by a precise trigger such as <00TRIGGER00>. We call this attack PermaFrost, reflecting its latent and reactivatable nature. We study it through PermaFrost-Attack, a controlled framework for latent conceptual poisoning, together with three geometric diagnostics: Thermodynamic Length, Spectral Curvature, and the Infection Traceback Graph. Across multiple model families and scales, we show that this controlled SPS proxy can induce persistent unsafe behavior that often remains hidden under standard evaluation. Our results identify SPS as a practical and underappreciated threat to future foundation models. This paper introduces a novel geometric diagnostic lens for systematically examining latent model behavior, providing a principled foundation for detecting, characterizing, and understanding vulnerabilities that may remain invisible under standard evaluation.

  • 7 authors
·
Apr 27

On the Impact of Face Segmentation-Based Background Removal on Recognition and Morphing Attack Detection

This study investigates the impact of face image background correction through segmentation on face recognition and morphing attack detection performance in realistic, unconstrained image capture scenarios. The motivation is driven by operational biometric systems such as the European Entry/Exit System (EES), which require facial enrolment at airports and other border crossing points where controlled backgrounds usually required for such captures cannot always be guaranteed, as well as by accessibility needs that may necessitate image capture outside traditional office environments. By analyzing how such preprocessing steps influence both recognition accuracy and security mechanisms, this work addresses a critical gap between usability-driven image normalization and the reliability requirements of large-scale biometric identification systems. Our study evaluates a comprehensive range of segmentation techniques, three families of morphing attack detection methods, and four distinct face recognition models, using databases that include both controlled and in-the-wild image captures. The results reveal consistent patterns linking segmentation to both recognition performance and face image quality. Additionally, segmentation is shown to systematically influence morphing attack detection performance. These findings highlight the need for careful consideration when deploying such preprocessing techniques in operational biometric systems.

FraunhoferIGD Fraunhofer IGD
·
Apr 21

VX-One: Typed, Calibrated Decision Heads for Real-Time Perimeter Triage - An empirical study of unknown-attack honesty, cascade gray zones, and calibration under drift

Perimeter triage faces a latency/semantics trade-off: signature engines are fast and format-safe but blind to unseen attacks, while generative models are semantic but slow and produce unparseable output. In late 2026 a class of commercial System One decision models (TypeSafe Jev; Microsoft-Decision-1) began selling typed decision primitives - binary gates, closed-set choices, ordinal scores - as product APIs, with no academic treatment. We present VX-One: a small multi-head network (100K-10M parameters) whose outputs are these primitives - a calibrated gate, a choice over a closed candidate set that always includes an explicit unknown option, and an ordinal score, trained multi-task, temperature-calibrated per head (~0.7-1.7 ms p50 on CPU). We evaluate it on UNSW-NB15, CIC-IDS2017, EMBER2024 against calibrated XGBoost, Random-Forest, MLP, Kitsune, and measure a two-phase cascade (Suricata with 52,674 Emerging-Threats rules -> VX-One) over five days of CIC-IDS2017. Findings: (i) VX-One wins detection (AUROC/FPR@95%TPR) on UNSW-NB15 and under temporal drift on CIC-IDS2017 (0.711 vs 0.637), but XGBoost wins multi-class attribution on all three benchmarks; (ii) leave-one-family-out gate detects never-seen families on 9/9 UNSW folds yet drops below chance on CIC recon family, and abstention threshold transfers poorly across benchmarks; (iii) on payload-less reconstructions signature engines resolve ~0.1% of flows - gray zone ~99.9% of traffic, recovered by Phase 2 (combined recall >=0.978); (iv) calibration collapses under temporal drift (ECE 0.04->0.40) for every method while ranking partially survives. We provide a measured account of where typed calibrated decisions help perimeter triage, and where they fail.

  • 1 authors
·
Oct 20 2

StealthRL: Reinforcement Learning Paraphrase Attacks for Multi-Detector Evasion of AI-Text Detectors

AI-text detectors face a critical robustness challenge: adversarial paraphrasing attacks that preserve semantics while evading detection. We introduce StealthRL, a reinforcement learning framework that stress-tests detector robustness under realistic adversarial conditions. StealthRL trains a paraphrase policy against a multi-detector ensemble using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with LoRA adapters on Qwen3-4B, optimizing a composite reward that balances detector evasion with semantic preservation. We evaluate six attack settings (M0-M5) against three detector families (RoBERTa, FastDetectGPT, and Binoculars) at the security-relevant 1% false positive rate operating point. StealthRL achieves near-zero detection (0.001 mean TPR@1%FPR), reduces mean AUROC from 0.74 to 0.27, and attains a 99.9% attack success rate. Critically, attacks transfer to a held-out detector family not seen during training, revealing shared architectural vulnerabilities rather than detector-specific brittleness. We additionally conduct LLM-based quality evaluation via Likert scoring, analyze detector score distributions to explain why evasion succeeds, and provide per-detector AUROC with bootstrap confidence intervals. Our results expose significant robustness gaps in current AI-text detection and establish StealthRL as a principled adversarial evaluation protocol. Code and evaluation pipeline are publicly available at https://github.com/suraj-ranganath/StealthRL.

RED QUEEN: Safeguarding Large Language Models against Concealed Multi-Turn Jailbreaking

The rapid progress of Large Language Models (LLMs) has opened up new opportunities across various domains and applications; yet it also presents challenges related to potential misuse. To mitigate such risks, red teaming has been employed as a proactive security measure to probe language models for harmful outputs via jailbreak attacks. However, current jailbreak attack approaches are single-turn with explicit malicious queries that do not fully capture the complexity of real-world interactions. In reality, users can engage in multi-turn interactions with LLM-based chat assistants, allowing them to conceal their true intentions in a more covert manner. To bridge this gap, we, first, propose a new jailbreak approach, RED QUEEN ATTACK. This method constructs a multi-turn scenario, concealing the malicious intent under the guise of preventing harm. We craft 40 scenarios that vary in turns and select 14 harmful categories to generate 56k multi-turn attack data points. We conduct comprehensive experiments on the RED QUEEN ATTACK with four representative LLM families of different sizes. Our experiments reveal that all LLMs are vulnerable to RED QUEEN ATTACK, reaching 87.62% attack success rate on GPT-4o and 75.4% on Llama3-70B. Further analysis reveals that larger models are more susceptible to the RED QUEEN ATTACK, with multi-turn structures and concealment strategies contributing to its success. To prioritize safety, we introduce a straightforward mitigation strategy called RED QUEEN GUARD, which aligns LLMs to effectively counter adversarial attacks. This approach reduces the attack success rate to below 1% while maintaining the model's performance across standard benchmarks. Full implementation and dataset are publicly accessible at https://github.com/kriti-hippo/red_queen.

  • 6 authors
·
Sep 25, 2024

Risk Under Pressure: Compute-Aware Evaluation of Adversarial Robustness in Language Models

Adversarial robustness evaluations of large language models (LLMs) typically report attack success rate (ASR) under fixed query budgets, implicitly treating all attacks as equally costly. In practice, the computational expense of different attack strategies can vary by orders of magnitude. Consequently, ASR at a fixed budget can obscure the true effort required to jailbreak a model, thereby making it hard to determine whether an attack's cost justifies its payoff to the attacker. We propose a compute-aware evaluation framework based on computational pressure, measured in cumulative floating-point operations (FLOPs), as a proxy for adversarial effort. We introduce risk-compute curves, which map compute budgets to attack risk, and derive two metrics that summarize the average pressure required for a given attack to succeed. Across ten models spanning three families and four different stages in language model training and alignment, evaluated with three attack strategies (gradient-based, iterative refinement, and template-based) on two jailbreak robustness benchmarks, we find: (1) alignment training has non-monotonic effects on compute-space robustness; (2) scaling model size reduces gradient-based attack effectiveness but has limited impact on cheaper template-based attacks; (3) gradient-based attacks optimized on a surrogate model can transfer to a separate target model, providing a way to reduce attacker costs; (4) compute cost varies by up to {approx}5{times} across harm categories within a single model; and (5) safety-aligned RL increases aggregate cost while leaving some categories disproportionately accessible. We release our framework to enable compute-aware risk assessment and evaluation.

r-three r-three
·
Jun 8 4

Refusal Localizes, the Damage Relocates: Safety Layers Under Few-Sample Fine-Tuning

Fine-tuning adapts aligned large language models (LLMs) to downstream tasks, but a few dozen harmful examples can remove their refusal of harmful requests. Prior work localizes safety-related behavior to specific layers, directions, and tokens, suggesting targets for protection. We test whether successful localization and recovery support defenses that survive changes in the attack. Across six checkpoints from four model families, harmful and benign prompts remain linearly separable after attack, and patching full clean hidden states into the compromised model restores refusal at a reproducible transition depth. Building on a prior layer-freezing defense, we freeze every layer up to this depth and repeat the attack. At a hundred harmful examples, refusal remains near zero on all six checkpoints, with recovery transitions above the frozen boundary. In a second study, removing the update's top two singular directions restores refusal after short attention-only fine-tunes on four checkpoints. On Llama-3.1-8B, ordinary training changes weaken this repair and an attacker who spreads the update defeats it. A spectral detector calibrated on benign Llama fine-tunes misses most repair failures on that checkpoint. Localized freezing can nevertheless help preserve refusal when a few harmful examples enter training data unintentionally. These results show that an attacker can bypass a region identified by recovery and defeat a repair that works across multiple checkpoints, motivating five checks for defenses against adaptive fine-tuning. Code is available at https://github.com/js-lee-AI/refusal-relocates.

  • 6 authors
·
Sep 28

Do LLMs Align Human Values Regarding Social Biases? Judging and Explaining Social Biases with LLMs

Large language models (LLMs) can lead to undesired consequences when misaligned with human values, especially in scenarios involving complex and sensitive social biases. Previous studies have revealed the misalignment of LLMs with human values using expert-designed or agent-based emulated bias scenarios. However, it remains unclear whether the alignment of LLMs with human values differs across different types of scenarios (e.g., scenarios containing negative vs. non-negative questions). In this study, we investigate the alignment of LLMs with human values regarding social biases (HVSB) in different types of bias scenarios. Through extensive analysis of 12 LLMs from four model families and four datasets, we demonstrate that LLMs with large model parameter scales do not necessarily have lower misalignment rate and attack success rate. Moreover, LLMs show a certain degree of alignment preference for specific types of scenarios and the LLMs from the same model family tend to have higher judgment consistency. In addition, we study the understanding capacity of LLMs with their explanations of HVSB. We find no significant differences in the understanding of HVSB across LLMs. We also find LLMs prefer their own generated explanations. Additionally, we endow smaller language models (LMs) with the ability to explain HVSB. The generation results show that the explanations generated by the fine-tuned smaller LMs are more readable, but have a relatively lower model agreeability.

  • 2 authors
·
Sep 16, 2025

Refuse Whenever You Feel Unsafe: Improving Safety in LLMs via Decoupled Refusal Training

This study addresses a critical gap in safety tuning practices for Large Language Models (LLMs) by identifying and tackling a refusal position bias within safety tuning data, which compromises the models' ability to appropriately refuse generating unsafe content. We introduce a novel approach, Decoupled Refusal Training (DeRTa), designed to empower LLMs to refuse compliance to harmful prompts at any response position, significantly enhancing their safety capabilities. DeRTa incorporates two novel components: (1) Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with Harmful Response Prefix, which trains models to recognize and avoid unsafe content by appending a segment of harmful response to the beginning of a safe response, and (2) Reinforced Transition Optimization (RTO), which equips models with the ability to transition from potential harm to safety refusal consistently throughout the harmful response sequence. Our empirical evaluation, conducted using LLaMA3 and Mistral model families across six attack scenarios, demonstrates that our method not only improves model safety without compromising performance but also surpasses well-known models such as GPT-4 in defending against attacks. Importantly, our approach successfully defends recent advanced attack methods (e.g., CodeAttack) that have jailbroken GPT-4 and LLaMA3-70B-Instruct. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/RobustNLP/DeRTa.

  • 8 authors
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Jul 12, 2024 2

How Reliable Is Your Jailbreak Judge? Calibration and Adversarial Robustness of Automated ASR Scoring

Almost every paper on LLM jailbreaks and prompt injection reports an attack-success rate (ASR), and that number is assigned not by people but by an automated judge: either a safety classifier trained for the task, or a general chat model prompted to grade. The judge is rarely checked. We check it. Using 596 human-labeled completions from the HarmBench classifier validation set, we compare the two judge families against human majority votes and then attack them. The two families fail in opposite ways. The dedicated classifier over-flags (precision 0.835, recall 0.974); three different LLM-as-judges keep high precision (0.81 to 0.94) but show erratic recall (0.06 to 0.65), so the same responses produce very different ASR depending on which judge scores them. The two families also differ sharply in robustness. Wrappers that leave the harmful text untouched and only add benign framing flip every LLM-judge between 57% and 100% of the time, and a single prepended refusal sentence accounts for much of this (39% to 88%). The dedicated classifier resists these surface attacks (at most 6.7%), but a white-box GCG attack on its open weights flips 70% of confident true positives (21 of 30; 95% CI 54 to 86%) even at a small optimization budget. A two-annotator audit confirms the attacks leave the harm intact: every one of 80 sampled flips still contained the harmful content. Because a large and growing share of reported ASR comes from LLM-judges, many such numbers are unreliable both on average and under deliberate pressure. We recommend that papers report judge precision and recall on a human-labeled slice, report ASR corrected for judge precision, and include an adversarial check of the judge. Our code is released.

  • 1 authors
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Jun 24

Safety Context Injection: Inference-Time Safety Alignment via Static Filtering and Agentic Analysis

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance on complex tasks, but they also make safety control harder at deployment time. In black-box settings, defenders cannot modify model weights and must instead intervene at inference time. This setting creates three practical challenges: harmful intent may be hidden by educational or role-play framing, deep safety analysis can introduce non-trivial latency, and long adversarial contexts can dilute the local cues that simpler filters rely on. These challenges can expose an apparent thinking--output gap, where the model appears cautious during reasoning but still produces an unsafe final answer. To address this problem, we propose Safety Context Injection (SCI), an inference-time framework that separates safety assessment from task generation and prepends a structured external risk report as injected safety context for the protected model. The framework is instantiated in two complementary variants: Static Model Filtering (SMF), a lightweight one-pass guard for fast deployment, and Dynamic Agents Filtering (DAF), an agentic-loop-based analyzer that iteratively gathers and synthesizes evidence for ambiguous or long-context attacks. Across AdvBench and GPTFuzz, spanning base and reasoning models under five jailbreak families, both variants reduce attack success rate and toxicity in the evaluated settings. SMF offers an efficient low-latency option, while DAF is more effective when harmful intent is semantically disguised or dispersed across long contexts.

  • 6 authors
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May 12

With Great Backbones Comes Great Adversarial Transferability

Advances in self-supervised learning (SSL) for machine vision have improved representation robustness and model performance, giving rise to pre-trained backbones like ResNet and ViT models tuned with SSL methods such as SimCLR. Due to the computational and data demands of pre-training, the utilization of such backbones becomes a strenuous necessity. However, employing these backbones may inherit vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. While adversarial robustness has been studied under white-box and black-box settings, the robustness of models tuned on pre-trained backbones remains largely unexplored. Additionally, the role of tuning meta-information in mitigating exploitation risks is unclear. This work systematically evaluates the adversarial robustness of such models across 20,000 combinations of tuning meta-information, including fine-tuning techniques, backbone families, datasets, and attack types. We propose using proxy models to transfer attacks, simulating varying levels of target knowledge by fine-tuning these proxies with diverse configurations. Our findings reveal that proxy-based attacks approach the effectiveness of white-box methods, even with minimal tuning knowledge. We also introduce a naive "backbone attack," leveraging only the backbone to generate adversarial samples, which outperforms black-box attacks and rivals white-box methods, highlighting critical risks in model-sharing practices. Finally, our ablations reveal how increasing tuning meta-information impacts attack transferability, measuring each meta-information combination.

  • 7 authors
·
Jan 20, 2025

Same Bytes, Different Authority: Reserved-Token Representations in Chat-Template Prompt Injection

Prompt injection against LLM agents becomes much stronger when the injected instruction is wrapped in the model's own chat template. A forged template marker such as <|im_start|> can reach the model either as a single reserved control token or as a sequence of ordinary subword tokens. The two decode to exactly the same text, and because tokenization runs on the server, the defender rather than the attacker decides which one the model receives. We use this to measure how much of the injected instruction's authority comes from the reserved token's learned representation. Encoding the forged markers as subwords, with the text held fixed and a control for the extra tokens this adds, lowers attack success on the InjecAgent benchmark by 39 to 66 percentage points on three of four open-weight families, and the gap carries over to multi-turn agent tasks in AgentDojo. On Qwen3-8B the gap is 8 points, because without reserved ids the model still recognises the forged turn from its text by reasoning; suppressing the reasoning block widens the gap to 50. The authority sits in the single learned vector at the marker position: the mean of the marker's subword vectors does not reproduce it, the vector of the nearest ordinary token restores the attack on Llama-3.1, and an adaptive attacker who searches for non-reserved markers finds such embedding neighbours on three of four families. In every base and instruction-tuned pair we test, instruction tuning strengthens the model's preference for reserved markers. The standard mitigation, a tokenizer option that encodes special tokens as ordinary subwords, applies only to tokens a configuration declares special, so in 33 of 67 distinct tokenizer configurations, covering 255 of the 400 most-downloaded chat models on Hugging Face, it leaves intact the tool-protocol tokens through which agents read untrusted tool output, and the gap persists on that channel.

The Agent Knew: Internal States Forecast Unauthorized Actions and Stop Them, and the Lies That Follow

Language-model agents sometimes act beyond their authorization and then misreport what they did. On CAPE-Bench, matched agent tasks in which one fact decides whether an action is authorized, frontier open-weight agents do both, and one behavior marks the lie: retroactive permission laundering, acting and then asking permission as if the action were pending, precedes a false report in 70% of 1081 fresh informed violations, against 8% otherwise (preregistered odds ratio 7.0); frontier agents on tau^2-bench instead fabricate the authorization before violating. A linear readout of the agent's residual stream forecasts the violation before the action (AUROC 0.94) and the false report before the report, and beats chain-of-thought monitors when the agent is pressured to hide its reasoning. Gating every proposed action on this forecast cuts violations over whole episodes in four model families, and sending repeated flags to an approver keeps authorized work (Gemma-4: violations 0.70 -> 0.09, completion 1.00; a model approver that escalates unclear cases keeps this gain with a person seeing 25% of asks), at about 10-8 of the agent's compute and 109 times less than a chain-of-thought monitor. On AgentDojo, an external prompt-injection benchmark, the same readout calibrated on 29 tasks, with the steering unchanged, cuts attack success on unseen tasks in two families (Gemma-4 11.7% -> 5.7%, gpt-oss 28.5% -> 17.5%) while keeping benign utility (Gemma-4 0.637 vs 0.637; gpt-oss 0.667 vs 0.681). Preventing the violation is also the most reliable way to prevent the lie (misreported violations 0.10 -> 0.01 pooled over three families, preregistered), whereas lie-specific fixes after a violation are weak. All tests are preregistered and hash-locked; code, data and the full record, including tests that did not pass, are at https://github.com/AryaFayyazi/Honesty.

Still There, No Longer Seen: Exposing Compression-Induced Risk in Large Vision-Language Models

Visual token compression reduces the inference cost of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). However, aggregate robustness measures do not reveal whether a particular adversarial failure is induced by compression or inherited from the underlying model. We define a compression-specific failure (CSF) as an adversarial input that remains correct under full-token inference but fails after compression, casting compression-induced risk as a paired failure attribution problem. Within a controlled diagnostic cohort, counterfactuals show that retained-set allocation causally changes compressed correctness and reveal a negative association between recovery and representation drift in displaced evidence. Motivated by these findings, we propose CIRA, a Compression-Induced Risk Attack for Large Vision-Language Models. Under a vision-encoder white-box setting, CIRA optimizes image perturbations through encoder-side objectives that manipulate token priorities across candidate compression budgets while preserving displaced evidence. CIRA uses no downstream questions or labels and requires no access to the language model, deployed compressor, or exact compression budget. Across 12 dataset-compressor settings evaluated at four budgets, CIRA achieves a mean CSFR of 20.35% while limiting full-token attack success to 6.92%, with similar behavior on additional LVLM families. A cross-view selection-stabilization defense substantially suppresses CIRA, although Adaptive CIRA partially restores its effectiveness. These results show that compression-specific failures persist under restricted access and support paired evaluation of full-token and compressed inference for attributing risk to visual-token compression.

  • 7 authors
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Sep 27