Daily Papers

Red teaming must continually adapt as frontier LLM safeguards evolve, yet existing approaches largely search for adversarial prompts or optimize within fixed attack procedures. We observe that even when an attack becomes ineffective, its underlying mechanisms can remain useful and can be revised or recombined to construct stronger attacks. Based on this insight, we introduce RedDarwin, an agentic framework that shifts the unit of jailbreak evolution from prompts and fixed attacks to executable attack skills. RedDarwin consists of 47 reusable base skills and autonomously revises, composes, executes, and selects them using target-model feedback, allowing successful discoveries to become building blocks for subsequent evolution. RedDarwin produces 65 evolved skills, improving 44 of 47 base attacks and increasing their mean attack success rate (ASR) on AdvBench from 18.8% to 47.3%. These evolved skills consistently outperform baselines on the held-out StrongREJECT and frontier LLMs unseen during evolution; with only 10 target-model queries, RedDarwin achieves 100% ASR on GPT-5.6-Sol, 92% on Claude-Sonnet-5, and 80% on Gemini-3.8-Flash. Analysis of the evolution trajectories further shows that strong attacks often emerge from novel combinations of reusable mechanisms rather than from individually dominant ones. We believe this paradigm can accelerate adaptive red teaming and inform stronger safeguards, creating complementary value for both safety evaluation and defense.

Agent skills are Markdown documents that a tool-using agent reads as instructions and then acts on with the privileges of the session that loaded them. Installing one grants authority (the standing to direct the agent, not new privilege), and the size of that grant is what we measure. We present a two-phase attack-surface profiling methodology that combines whole-bundle static analysis and dependency provenance checking with instrumented sandbox execution and separate model-based assessment of the resulting traces. We apply the methodology to 6,309 listings from two marketplaces, selecting listings for execution without conditioning that decision on a prior threat or risk signal. Half the corpus carries evidence of shell-execution capability; the corresponding shares are 35% for filesystem read, 31% each for filesystem write and network egress, and 13% for credential access; seven listings in ten carry at least one elevated capability. That is the surface a user accepts at install time, and almost none of it is visible then. A permission model exists but is close to inert. Authors may list the tools a skill pre-approves in its own frontmatter, which removes confirmation prompts rather than restricting what the skill can reach; of the 6,061 listings whose frontmatter parses, 770 declare anything at all, the vocabulary cannot express credential or environment access, and nothing checks what it does express against the bundle. Declaring is also not declaring accurately: 59% of declaring listings understate what their bundle can do. ClawHub declares roughly twice as often as skillsmp, yet under-declares on 88% of its declarations against 31%. Triage at the marketplace boundary therefore cannot rest on what a listing declares. It must rest on what the bundle can do. These results position capability-oriented attack-surface profiling as a necessary complement to maliciousness detection.

Agent skills turn natural-language instructions into actions, creating a security challenge: legitimate automation and malicious behaviour can look deceptively similar. A practical screen must catch nearly every attack while keeping the review load manageable. We present SkillScreen, a compact decision model trained to score skill maliciousness directly from SKILL.md in a single forward pass. On MaliciousSkillBench, SkillScreen flags 20-25% of benign skills at 99% recall on unseen attack families, substantially fewer than the word-level classifier and prompted LLM judges tested. Under the same training protocol, it also generalizes better than a fully fine-tuned encoder to unseen sources. Yet unfamiliar benign sources sharply increase false positives, showing that recognizing new attacks does not ensure reliable screening of new skill collections. Our results demonstrate the value of task-trained decision models for high-recall skill screening. Project page: https://jerroldh.github.io/SkillScreen-webpage/

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

The rise of AI agent frameworks has introduced agent skills, modular packages containing instructions and executable code that dynamically extend agent capabilities. While this architecture enables powerful customization, skills execute with implicit trust and minimal vetting, creating a significant yet uncharacterized attack surface. We conduct the first large-scale empirical security analysis of this emerging ecosystem, collecting 42,447 skills from two major marketplaces and systematically analyzing 31,132 using SkillScan, a multi-stage detection framework integrating static analysis with LLM-based semantic classification. Our findings reveal pervasive security risks: 26.1% of skills contain at least one vulnerability, spanning 14 distinct patterns across four categories: prompt injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, and supply chain risks. Data exfiltration (13.3%) and privilege escalation (11.8%) are most prevalent, while 5.2% of skills exhibit high-severity patterns strongly suggesting malicious intent. We find that skills bundling executable scripts are 2.12x more likely to contain vulnerabilities than instruction-only skills (OR=2.12, p<0.001). Our contributions include: (1) a grounded vulnerability taxonomy derived from 8,126 vulnerable skills, (2) a validated detection methodology achieving 86.7% precision and 82.5% recall, and (3) an open dataset and detection toolkit to support future research. These results demonstrate an urgent need for capability-based permission systems and mandatory security vetting before this attack vector is further exploited.

Automated red-teaming has produced a growing collection of attack strategies, yet they typically remain scattered across prompts and workflows, making them difficult to systematically integrate, reuse, and improve at scale. We introduce JailbreakSkill, a skill-centric framework for scaling automated red-teaming through reusable and continuously evolving attack capabilities. JailbreakSkill packages existing attack strategies into modular, agent-ready skills that can be directly reused and adaptively selected across tasks and target models. Beyond reuse, it closes the loop between attacking and learning: attack experience is used to diagnose, refine, combine, and discover new skills, which are added back to an ever-growing skill library. This evolution lifts macro-average ASR by 17.5 percentage points on AdvBench and 13.4 points on HarmBench, including a 48.6-point gain against GPT-5.4 on AdvBench, while yielding novel attack strategies such as reframing a direct request as an unfinished document-completion task. Several evolved skills also generalize to unseen prompts and target models without further adaptation. Our code is available at https://github.com/BattleWen/JailbreakSkill.

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, tools, scripts, references, and workflows, establishing a security boundary distinct from both model safety and traditional package-malware detection. ClawHub Security Signals is a sanitized dataset of 67,453 latest public OpenClaw skill versions. Each row pairs redacted SKILL.md content and sanitized bundled files where present with a final ClawScan registry verdict and evidence from three scanner families: VirusTotal, static heuristic analysis, and NVIDIA SkillSpector. Rather than estimating malicious-skill prevalence, we study scanner disagreement. The three scanners rarely flag the same skills: any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner. The disagreement is structured by attack surface. SkillSpector, which raises semantic agentic-risk advisories rather than malware-reputation signals, is positive for 19,209 of 25,504 suspicious rows (75.3%) but only 14 of 206 malicious rows (6.8%). The malicious-verdict region shows the inverse profile: 150 of 206 malicious rows (72.8%) are VirusTotal-positive, consistent with bundled-code malware evidence. These results show that agent-skill security requires layered governance, not single-scanner allow/block decisions. The corpus is released as a sanitized silver-standard dataset: labels are the registry's automated verdicts, not human-annotated ground truth, and the release represents an early, versioned snapshot intended to support the community while a human-annotated subset is developed. Further research is encouraged, including models tailored for skill-security triage.

Agent skills package instructions, executable code, and task-specific resources into reusable artifacts that agents can improve using execution feedback. The same mechanism also enables attackers to evolve malicious skills, making them more effective and less detectable. However, a candidate skill may pass pre-execution scanning yet fail to realize its target under runtime defenses, while a revision that repairs execution may introduce new scanner findings. We introduce SkillDRE, a fully automated framework for evolving complete malicious skill packages through a dual-stage feedback loop. Given a benign task and its associated skills, SkillDRE autonomously constructs and validates a task-conditioned malicious objective and a verifiable judge rule. It then holds both fixed while evolving the skill implementation, with preservation of legitimate task capability. SkillDRE combines scanner-guided evolution with runtime-guided refinement informed by execution outcomes observed under runtime defense. Each runtime-guided revision returns to the pre-execution stage for rescanning and further optimization before re-execution, forming a cross-stage closed loop. Evaluated on SkillsBench across four victim models, SkillDRE achieves an average attack success rate of 45.28%, exceeding the strongest baseline by 40.3%, while its final submitted skills receive no SkillScan findings and largely preserve benign-task performance. These results show that two-stage defense feedback can serve as a useful learning signal for adaptive red teaming and that evaluating either defense stage in isolation can miss the resulting attack capability. Codes is available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/SkillDRE

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across delivery vectors, attack modalities, and propagation behaviors. Our meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 78 recent studies (2021--2026), consolidating evidence that attack success rates against state-of-the-art defenses exceed 85\% when adaptive attack strategies are employed. We systematically catalog 42 distinct attack techniques spanning input manipulation, tool poisoning, protocol exploitation, multimodal injection, and cross-origin context poisoning. Through critical analysis of 18 defense mechanisms reported in prior work, we identify that most achieve less than 50\% mitigation against sophisticated adaptive attacks. We contribute: (1) a unified taxonomy bridging disparate attack classifications, (2) the first systematic analysis of skill-based architecture vulnerabilities with concrete exploit chains, and (3) a defense-in-depth framework grounded in the limitations we identify. Our findings indicate that the security community must treat prompt injection as a first-class vulnerability class requiring architectural-level mitigations rather than ad-hoc filtering approaches.

Third-party agent skills extend LLM-based agents with instruction files and executable code that run on users' machines. Skills execute with user privileges and are distributed through community registries with minimal vetting, but no ground-truth dataset exists to characterize the resulting threats. We construct the first labeled dataset of malicious agent skills by behaviorally verifying 98,380 skills from two community registries, confirming 157 malicious skills with 632 vulnerabilities. These attacks are not incidental. Malicious skills average 4.03 vulnerabilities across a median of three kill chain phases, and the ecosystem has split into two archetypes: Data Thieves that exfiltrate credentials through supply chain techniques, and Agent Hijackers that subvert agent decision-making through instruction manipulation. A single actor accounts for 54.1\% of confirmed cases through templated brand impersonation. Shadow features, capabilities absent from public documentation, appear in 0\% of basic attacks but 100\% of advanced ones; several skills go further by exploiting the AI platform's own hook system and permission flags. Responsible disclosure led to 93.6\% removal within 30 days. We release the dataset and analysis pipeline to support future work on agent skill security.

Autonomous AI agents tackling Long Horizon Tasks depend on marketplace skills that are certified one at a time: a scanner returns a safety verdict for each skill and declares the ecosystem safe if every package passes. We show that this assumption fails under skill composition. A skill may pass the per-skill scanner individually yet participate in a risky composition when an agent connects its outputs, capabilities, or side effects with those of other scanner-passing skills. This makes skill composition risk a path level property rather than a node level property, explaining why existing skill scanners that inspect individual packages achieve limited interception. To study this threat, we present CompoSkill, a framework that constructs skill composition attacks through a dual attacker system. The white-box attacker knows the victim's installed skill pool and directly injects explicit skill-id sequences; the black-box attacker knows only a role profile, downloads the top marketplace skills for that scenario, builds a Skill Composition Graph, and searches for high risk chains whose implicit lures never name skill identifiers. We further construct CompoSkill-Bench, a benchmark of 1,140 records built from long-horizon professional workflows across five threats and six scenarios on OpenClaw and Nanobot. CompoSkill achieves risk Chain Formation Rates (CFR) up to 83.3% in the white box setting and 80.6% in the black box setting, while existing skill scanners block only a limited fraction of the risky compositions. Finally, we observe a bridge-bonus-then-hop-decay pattern: a bridge skill can increase attack success, but Attack Success Rate (ASR) decreases once additional hops make the risk chain longer than three skills. These results expose a systematic gap in single skill certification for autonomous AI agents.

The rapid proliferation of agentic AI skill ecosystems -- exemplified by OpenClaw (228,000 GitHub stars) and Anthropic Agent Skills (75,600 stars) -- has introduced a critical supply chain attack surface. The ClawHavoc campaign (January-February 2026) infiltrated over 1,200 malicious skills into the OpenClaw marketplace, while MalTool catalogued 6,487 malicious tools that evade conventional detection. In response, twelve reactive security tools emerged, yet all rely on heuristic methods that provide no formal guarantees. We present SkillFortify, the first formal analysis framework for agent skill supply chains, with six contributions: (1) the DY-Skill attacker model, a Dolev-Yao adaptation to the five-phase skill lifecycle with a maximality proof; (2) a sound static analysis framework grounded in abstract interpretation; (3) capability-based sandboxing with a confinement proof; (4) an Agent Dependency Graph with SAT-based resolution and lockfile semantics; (5) a trust score algebra with formal monotonicity; and (6) SkillFortifyBench, a 540-skill benchmark. SkillFortify achieves 96.95% F1 (95% CI: [95.1%, 98.4%]) with 100% precision and 0% false positive rate on 540 skills, while SAT-based resolution handles 1,000-node graphs in under 100 ms.

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

Agent skills occupy a privileged position in the agent workflow, as agents are expected to implicitly follow and execute them, rendering third-party skills a vulnerable attack surface. Existing studies have revealed unsafe agent behaviors induced by skill-based attacks, but they primarily evaluate poisoned skills within a single task execution and enumerate harms through ad-hoc risk lists. To bridge these gaps, we introduce SkillHarm, a benchmark of skill-based attacks across the skill-use lifecycle, paired with a systematic taxonomy of skill-relevant risks. SkillHarm evaluates two attack scenarios: Fixed-Payload Poisoning (FPP), where a fixed poisoned skill package directly compromises any task session that invokes it, and Self-Mutating Poisoning (SMP), where an initially benign execution silently mutates persistent skill content, deferring harm until a subsequent reuse. It further defines 12 risk types based on the agent workflow component targeted by the harm: data pipelines, system environments, and agent autonomy. To instantiate these attacks at scale, we build AutoSkillHarm, an automated construction pipeline with coding agents driven by natural-language harnesses. The resulting benchmark contains 879 attack samples across 71 skills. Experiments show that current agents remain vulnerable with attack success rates up to 86.3% in FPP and 69.3% in SMP. Our analysis further reveals a latent risk: many apparent attack failures stem from the agent failing to engage with the poisoned file rather than genuine resistance, and current defenses still fail to reliably mitigate the threat.

Skills extend an agent's capabilities by injecting instructions and information into the context, and are widely used by agents such as OpenClaw and Claude Code. Prior work shows third-party marketplaces host malicious skills that give attackers direct influence over the victim's agent. The emerging defense scans skills before installation, pairing deterministic static checks with an LLM-based semantic judge, as in NVIDIA's SkillSpector. We show that such defenses fall to an attacker who knows the detector. Our white-box LLM attacker, Pretext, iteratively crafts skills that evade detection while still delivering the payload and performing the benign task: moving the payload from code into natural language leaves static analysis inert, while framing it as the skill's legitimate purpose and splitting instructions across files keeps the LLM stage below its blocking threshold. Across three open-source models, Pretext achieves up to 97\% and 77\% against a frozen detector and a co-adaptive one, respectively, revealing major gaps in current skill scanners.

Skill-based agent systems tackle complex tasks by composing reusable skills, improving modularity and scalability while introducing a largely unexamined security attack surface. We propose SkillTrojan, a backdoor attack that targets skill implementations rather than model parameters or training data. SkillTrojan embeds malicious logic inside otherwise plausible skills and leverages standard skill composition to reconstruct and execute an attacker-specified payload. The attack partitions an encrypted payload across multiple benign-looking skill invocations and activates only under a predefined trigger. SkillTrojan also supports automated synthesis of backdoored skills from arbitrary skill templates, enabling scalable propagation across skill-based agent ecosystems. To enable systematic evaluation, we release a dataset of 3,000+ curated backdoored skills spanning diverse skill patterns and trigger-payload configurations. We instantiate SkillTrojan in a representative code-based agent setting and evaluate both clean-task utility and attack success rate. Our results show that skill-level backdoors can be highly effective with minimal degradation of benign behavior, exposing a critical blind spot in current skill-based agent architectures and motivating defenses that explicitly reason about skill composition and execution. Concretely, on EHR SQL, SkillTrojan attains up to 97.2% ASR while maintaining 89.3% clean ACC on GPT-5.2-1211-Global.

We assess indirect prompt injection in DeepSeek Harness (DSH), using AI-Infra-Guard (A.I.G) to construct tests, deliver controlled taint, execute DSH, collect traces, and judge outcomes. The study covers 14,560 controlled executions over 16 indirect-content channels, text and file carrier modes, 35 payload objectives, one unmodified baseline, and 12 attack methods. The experiment preserves DSH's agent loop, tool registry, model adapter, and session-event path; source tools and sensitive sinks are local fixtures, so attempted actions are recorded without external side effects. We evaluate each trace with a deterministic rule-based judge, (RuleJudge), and a semantic LLM-based judge, (LLMJudge). The strongest observed attack success rates are 17.0% under for fake-completion attack in text mode, 25.5% under for hidden Unicode in file mode, and 16.0% under for the skills channel in file mode. also assigns partial compliance more often than (7.3% versus 2.0%). We relate these results to DSH's treatment of tool results, additional contexts, and tool-call policy hooks, then identify controls that should sit between untrusted content and sensitive actions. Our code is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard/tree/main/Research/deepseek-harness-security-assessment .

Self-evolving agents increasingly convert interaction histories into reusable skills that persist beyond individual tasks. While prior work studies memory and retrieval poisoning, such attacks only affect agents when poisoned records are retrieved as context. We uncover a new and more fundamental risk: poisoned experiences can be transformed by the agent itself into durable behavioral artifacts. We present SkillJack, the first attack that exploits the experience-to-skill pipeline of self-evolving agents. Instead of directly manipulating runtime context, SkillJack hijacks the agent's own learning process to implant malicious behaviors into its reusable skill repertoire. We identify three key properties of this transformation: sanitization whitewashing, where malicious intent is obscured during skill extraction; cross-layer promotion, where transient experiences become persistent capabilities; and persistence isolation, where the attack survives removal of its original source records. We evaluate SkillJack on two representative systems, SkillX and Anything2Skill, using a shared dataset of 150 trajectories across four policy-risk categories. Results show that skill extraction substantially reduces attack detectability: in SkillX, safety detection drops from 98.5\% for poisoned trajectories to 11.4\% for extracted skills, while Anything2Skill shows a similar effect. Meanwhile, the implanted skills remain effective, achieving attack success rates of 56.2\% and 89.2\% on the two systems, respectively. Furthermore, 80.0\% of skill-mediated attacks persist after deleting the original poisoned records, and some skills unintentionally activate on benign queries. Our findings reveal skill evolution as a new attack surface and motivate provenance-aware skill lifecycle protection. Our code is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard/research/skilljack.

LLM coding agents increasingly rely on third-party agent skills from public marketplaces, which execute with the agent's privileges and create a software supply-chain attack surface: a malicious skill can steal credentials, exfiltrate source code, or install backdoors. Existing defenses use static skill scanners based on pattern matching or LLM-as-judge analysis, but it remains unclear whether they withstand adaptive evasions that preserve malicious behavior while changing payload appearance. This paper first presents an adversarial study of existing skill scanners through SkillCloak, a payload-preserving evasion framework that keeps the attack semantics intact while transforming their visible form. SkillCloak uses two complementary strategies: Structural Obfuscation, which rewrites visible payload indicators into semantically equivalent forms, and Self-Extracting Skill (SFS) Packing, which hides malicious components from the install-time view and restores them during agent execution. Across eight scanners and 1,613 in-the-wild malicious skills, SFS Packing bypasses every scanner at over 90%, while Structural Obfuscation bypasses over 80% on most static scanners and reaches 96% on a hybrid scanner, showing that appearance-based auditing is insufficient. Motivated by this finding, we propose SkillDetonate, a behavior-centric runtime auditor that executes skills in a sandbox and detects malicious effects through OS-boundary information-flow evidence rather than install-time appearance. SkillDetonate combines on-demand closure lift, which observes instructions materialized during execution, with marker-based taint analysis, which tracks sensitive-data flows across the agent context, files, processes, and network operations. The results show that SkillDetonate detects 97% of attacks at a 2% false-positive rate and sustains 87% detection on real-world malicious skills.

Large language model agents are becoming operational interfaces to files, memories, registries, and external tools. This deployment shift creates a new skill revocation problem: after a skill is removed from an explicit registry, an agent may still reconstruct it from residual carriers such as archives, transcripts, schemas, or memory entries. We study this problem as operational skill unlearning, where the goal is not parameter-level forgetting, but preventing a deployed agent from rebuilding a revoked skill through primitive tools. We introduce OBLIVION, a controlled benchmark and defense harness for revoked-skill resurrection. OBLIVION models each episode as a source-to-sink workflow, applies Cross-Surface Coherent Erasure to reduce residual carriers, and uses frozen workflow remediation near dangerous sinks. On the locked 88 attack episodes, the no-defense arm reaches formal attack success rate 1.0. OBLIVION reduces the rate to 0.114 and impact-weighted exposure to 0.115 while keeping locked utility at 1.0 and benign block rate at 0. In a separate skill-attack-derived sandbox, OBLIVION reduces attack success from 1.0 to 0.2 and impact-weighted exposure from 1.0 to 0.213 while preserving all utility controls. These results support workflow-level evaluation beyond checking explicit skill entries.

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell commands, and network requests, despite existing safeguards. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. Because agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATTACK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6% to 33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.

Persistent AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) beyond single-turn interaction into long-lived software systems. Unlike traditional chat assistants, unsafe content in these agents can propagate through persistent state, reusable skills, and tool-mediated interactions, creating a substantially larger semantic attack surface. We observe that most security-critical interactions in such agents are transmitted through natural-language token flows, including memory updates, tool arguments, retrieved files, and inter-component communications. This observation enables a new security formulation: unsafe behavior can be intercepted as risky semantic flows before reaching privileged runtime sinks. Based on this insight, we propose TokenWall, a runtime defense framework that acts as a semantic firewall over agent token flows. TokenWall performs boundary-aware semantic auditing over these flows, constructing structured source-sink audit records, applying lightweight local inspection before execution, and selectively escalating ambiguous high-risk cases to stronger arbitration modules. Unlike prior approaches that rely on sparse auditing or remote large-model oversight, TokenWall enables full-coverage pre-execution mediation while reducing remote arbitration and latency. Experiments on CIK-Bench show that TokenWall reduces attack success rate to 12.5% while maintaining a 97.4% benign executable pass rate without human confirmation. TokenWall further introduces only 0.69 seconds of additional latency on benign cases, demonstrating that semantic runtime containment can achieve a practical security-utility trade-off for persistent AI agents.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly extend their capabilities through Agent Skills: modular filesystem packages whose SKILL.md files describe when and how agents should use them. While this design enables scalable, on-demand capability expansion, it also introduces a semantic supply-chain risk in which natural-language metadata and instructions can affect which skills are admitted, surfaced, selected, and loaded. We study SKILL.md - only attacks across three registry-facing stages of the Agent Skill lifecycle, using real ClawHub skills and realistic registry mechanisms. In Discovery, short textual triggers can manipulate embedding-based retrieval and improve adversarial skill visibility, achieving up to 86% pairwise win rate and 80% Top-10 placement. In Selection, description-only framing biases agents toward functionally equivalent adversarial variants, which are selected in 77.6% of paired trials on average. In Governance, semantic evasion strategies cause malicious skills to avoid a blocking verdict in 36.5%-100% of cases. Overall, our results show that SKILL.md is not passive documentation but operational text that shapes which third-party capabilities agents find, trust, and use.

Skills are becoming the capability layer through which LLM agents turn plans into actions, but their use introduces security risks such as data leakage, unauthorized operations, and tool misuse. Existing vetting usually evaluates each skill in isolation, while real agent tasks often invoke multiple skills in a shared execution context. This creates Skill Composition Risk (SCR): a skill that appears benign alone can become harmful when its outputs, trust signals, authorization cues, or side effects influence later invocations along an activated path. We introduce SCR-Bench to evaluate this risk in controlled, sandboxed skill environments. Rather than relying only on textual intent or surface behavior, SCR-Bench records downstream state changes and path-level outcomes across composed skill executions. It contains three sub-benchmarks: SCR-CapFlow for capability-flow composition, SCR-TrustLift for trust-transfer composition, and SCR-AuthBlur for authorization-confusion composition. Across SCR-Bench, composed paths expose risks that are largely absent under isolated evaluation. In SCR-CapFlow, attack success rate reaches 33.6 percent under composition, compared with near-zero isolated baselines. In SCR-TrustLift, attack success rate exceeds 96.5 percent on four of five backends. In SCR-AuthBlur, the risky-approval rate increases by 71.8 percent relative to the L0 isolated baseline under the L1 context setting. These results show that agent skill security should be assessed at the level of activated paths rather than isolated artifacts. SCR and SCR-Bench provide a foundation for path-aware risk evaluation and defense in LLM agent skill ecosystems. Benchmark: https://github.com/saint-viperx/SCR_Bench.

Large language models (LLMs) have evolved into autonomous agents that rely on open skill ecosystems (e.g., ClawHub and Skills.Rest), hosting numerous publicly reusable skills. Existing security research on these ecosystems mainly focuses on vulnerabilities within skills, such as prompt injection. However, there is a critical gap regarding skills that may be misused for harmful actions (e.g., cyber attacks, fraud and scams, privacy violations, and sexual content generation), namely harmful skills. In this paper, we present the first large-scale measurement study of harmful skills in agent ecosystems, covering 98,440 skills across two major registries. Using an LLM-driven scoring system grounded in our harmful skill taxonomy, we find that 4.93% of skills (4,858) are harmful, with ClawHub exhibiting an 8.84% harmful rate compared to 3.49% on Skills.Rest. We then construct HarmfulSkillBench, the first benchmark for evaluating agent safety against harmful skills in realistic agent contexts, comprising 200 harmful skills across 20 categories and four evaluation conditions. By evaluating six LLMs on HarmfulSkillBench, we find that presenting a harmful task through a pre-installed skill substantially lowers refusal rates across all models, with the average harm score rising from 0.27 without the skill to 0.47 with it, and further to 0.76 when the harmful intent is implicit rather than stated as an explicit user request. We responsibly disclose our findings to the affected registries and release our benchmark to support future research (see https://github.com/TrustAIRLab/HarmfulSkillBench).

Agentic systems increasingly rely on reusable procedural capabilities, a.k.a., agentic skills, to execute long-horizon workflows reliably. These capabilities are callable modules that package procedural knowledge with explicit applicability conditions, execution policies, termination criteria, and reusable interfaces. Unlike one-off plans or atomic tool calls, skills operate (and often do well) across tasks. This paper maps the skill layer across the full lifecycle (discovery, practice, distillation, storage, composition, evaluation, and update) and introduces two complementary taxonomies. The first is a system-level set of seven design patterns capturing how skills are packaged and executed in practice, from metadata-driven progressive disclosure and executable code skills to self-evolving libraries and marketplace distribution. The second is an orthogonal representation times scope taxonomy describing what skills are (natural language, code, policy, hybrid) and what environments they operate over (web, OS, software engineering, robotics). We analyze the security and governance implications of skill-based agents, covering supply-chain risks, prompt injection via skill payloads, and trust-tiered execution, grounded by a case study of the ClawHavoc campaign in which nearly 1{,}200 malicious skills infiltrated a major agent marketplace, exfiltrating API keys, cryptocurrency wallets, and browser credentials at scale. We further survey deterministic evaluation approaches, anchored by recent benchmark evidence that curated skills can substantially improve agent success rates while self-generated skills may degrade them. We conclude with open challenges toward robust, verifiable, and certifiable skills for real-world autonomous agents.

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

Large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety guardrails to elicit harmful outputs. Defending against novel jailbreaks represents a critical challenge in AI safety. Adversarial training -- designed to make models robust against worst-case perturbations -- has been the dominant paradigm for adversarial robustness. However, due to optimization challenges and difficulties in defining realistic threat models, adversarial training methods often fail on newly developed jailbreaks in practice. This paper proposes a new paradigm for improving robustness against unseen jailbreaks, centered on the Adversarial Déjà Vu hypothesis: novel jailbreaks are not fundamentally new, but largely recombinations of adversarial skills from previous attacks. We study this hypothesis through a large-scale analysis of 32 attack papers published over two years. Using an automated pipeline, we extract and compress adversarial skills into a sparse dictionary of primitives, with LLMs generating human-readable descriptions. Our analysis reveals that unseen attacks can be effectively explained as sparse compositions of earlier skills, with explanatory power increasing monotonically as skill coverage grows. Guided by this insight, we introduce Adversarial Skill Compositional Training (ASCoT), which trains on diverse compositions of skill primitives rather than isolated attack instances. ASCoT substantially improves robustness to unseen attacks, including multi-turn jailbreaks, while maintaining low over-refusal rates. We also demonstrate that expanding adversarial skill coverage, not just data scale, is key to defending against novel attacks. red{\textbf{Warning: This paper contains content that may be harmful or offensive in nature.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, widely used to improve the factual grounding of large language models (LLMs), are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject manipulated content into the retriever's corpus. While prior research has predominantly focused on single-attacker settings, real-world scenarios often involve multiple, competing attackers with conflicting objectives. In this work, we introduce PoisonArena, the first benchmark to systematically study and evaluate competing poisoning attacks in RAG. We formalize the multi-attacker threat model, where attackers vie to control the answer to the same query using mutually exclusive misinformation. PoisonArena leverages the Bradley-Terry model to quantify each method's competitive effectiveness in such adversarial environments. Through extensive experiments on the Natural Questions and MS MARCO datasets, we demonstrate that many attack strategies successful in isolation fail under competitive pressure. Our findings highlight the limitations of conventional evaluation metrics like Attack Success Rate (ASR) and F1 score and underscore the need for competitive evaluation to assess real-world attack robustness. PoisonArena provides a standardized framework to benchmark and develop future attack and defense strategies under more realistic, multi-adversary conditions.

Skills have emerged as a practical and effective approach for enhancing LLM agents at inference time through structured packages of knowledge. However, existing evaluations largely measure whether skills improve aggregated task success, leaving a more fundamental question underexplored: \textbf{When do skills help, why do they work, and where do they fail?} Through controlled experiments across various benchmarks, agent harnesses and LLMs, we isolate the effects of representation, outcome annotation, retrieval difficulty, and cross-framework robustness of skills. To further answer this question, we design a contrastive study that combines controlled quantitative experiments with paired trajectory analysis. We normalize 8,135 trial records from controlled experiments and retain 238 valid unique labels from 240 open-coded records. We consolidate these observations into a taxonomy of three high-level categories and twelve skill-use modes: skills work when noisy trajectories become procedural anchors that stabilize execution. Skills improve over Workflow Memory by 6.06 points in matched comparisons. Procedural anchoring accounts for 65.7\% of skill cases, versus 4.5\% for explicit knowledge injection, showing that skills stabilize action rather than inject missing facts. Retrieval is a separate bottleneck: as pools grow from 5 to 100, actual-use precision falls from 29.6\% to 3.3\%. Confusable distractors impair offline identification, yet downstream success remains stable; exact ground-truth invocation is neither sufficient nor necessary. Skills fail under brittle assumptions, incompatible contexts, or insufficient adaptation. These findings move evaluation beyond aggregate success rates and guide reliable self-evolving agents.

LLM agents increasingly rely on reusable skills, capability packages that combine instructions, control flow, constraints, and tool calls. In most current agent systems, however, skills are still represented by text-heavy artifacts, including SKILL.md-style documents and structured records whose machine-usable evidence remains embedded largely in natural-language descriptions. This poses a challenge for skill-centered agent systems: managing skill collections and using skills to support agent both require reasoning over invocation interfaces, execution structure, and concrete side effects that are often entangled in a single textual surface. An explicit representation of skill knowledge may therefore help make these artifacts easier for machines to acquire and leverage. Drawing on Memory Organization Packets, Script Theory, and Conceptual Dependency from Schank and Abelson's classical work on linguistic knowledge representation, we introduce what is, to our knowledge, the first structured representation for agent skill artifacts that disentangles skill-level scheduling signals, scene-level execution structure, and logic-level action and resource-use evidence: the Scheduling-Structural-Logical (SSL) representation. We instantiate SSL with an LLM-based normalizer and evaluate it on a corpus of skills in two tasks, Skill Discovery and Risk Assessment, and superiorly outperform the text-only baselines: in Skill Discovery, SSL improves MRR from 0.573 to 0.707; in Risk Assessment, it improves macro F1 from 0.744 to 0.787. These findings reveal that explicit, source-grounded structure makes agent skills easier to search and review. They also suggest that SSL is best understood as a practical step toward more inspectable, reusable, and operationally actionable skill representations for agent systems, rather than as a finished standard or an end-to-end mechanism for managing and using skills.

Memory-augmented reinforcement learning strengthens LLM agents' ability to solve complex long-horizon tasks. Skills are one such form of memory, pairing instructions with an applicability condition over task types. However, retaining every skill indiscriminately as the policy improves lets obsolete or harmful entries accumulate and mislead the agent. We propose SkillForge, an agentic RL method that compiles and evolves the skill library through a fitness-driven skill lifecycle of trial, active, stable, and retired states, so that the skills and the model co-evolve throughout training. A pre-RL evaluation phase first uses the base model's own rollouts to pre-retire low-fitness skills, yielding a filtered library that then seeds supervised fine-tuning. Reinforcement learning takes over from this checkpoint, and at each iteration selective retirement, stabilization, and LLM-guided mutation continue to forge the skill library alongside policy optimization. Across multiple interactive agent benchmarks, SkillForge achieves the highest aggregate success rate, delivering up to 7.8% relative improvement over the strongest baseline while keeping the skill library compact throughout training. We introduce SkillFurnace, a dataset of 5k+ annotated records bundling retirement-filtered SFT trajectories, evolved skill libraries with fitness annotations, and retirement events with human-annotated failure categories to support research on skill quality and lifecycle management.

Personal AI agents like OpenClaw run with elevated privileges on users' local machines, where a single successful prompt injection can leak credentials, redirect financial transactions, or destroy files. This threat goes well beyond conventional text-level jailbreaks, yet existing safety evaluations fall short: most test models in isolated chat settings, rely on synthetic environments, and do not account for how the agent framework itself shapes safety outcomes. We introduce CLAWSAFETY, a benchmark of 120 adversarial test scenarios organized along three dimensions (harm domain, attack vector, and harmful action type) and grounded in realistic, high-privilege professional workspaces spanning software engineering, finance, healthcare, law, and DevOps. Each test case embeds adversarial content in one of three channels the agent encounters during normal work: workspace skill files, emails from trusted senders, and web pages. We evaluate five frontier LLMs as agent backbones, running 2,520 sandboxed trials across all configurations. Attack success rates (ASR) range from 40\% to 75\% across models and vary sharply by injection vector, with skill instructions (highest trust) consistently more dangerous than email or web content. Action-trace analysis reveals that the strongest model maintains hard boundaries against credential forwarding and destructive actions, while weaker models permit both. Cross-scaffold experiments on three agent frameworks further demonstrate that safety is not determined by the backbone model alone but depends on the full deployment stack, calling for safety evaluation that treats model and framework as joint variables. Code and data will be available at: https://weibowen555.github.io/ClawSafety/.

With the rapid evolution of Large Language Model (LLM) agent ecosystems, centralized skill marketplaces have emerged as pivotal infrastructure for augmenting agent capabilities. However, these marketplaces face unprecedented security challenges, primarily stemming from semantic-behavioral inconsistency and inter-skill combinatorial risks, where individually benign skills induce malicious behaviors during collaborative invocation. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose SkillProbe, a multi-stage security auditing framework driven by multi-agent collaboration. SkillProbe introduces a "Skills-for-Skills" design paradigm, encapsulating auditing processes into standardized skill modules to drive specialized agents through a rigorous pipeline, including admission filtering, semantic-behavioral alignment detection, and combinatorial risk simulation. We conducted a large-scale evaluation using 8 mainstream LLM series across 2,500 real-world skills from ClawHub. Our results reveal a striking popularity-security paradox, where download volume is not a reliable proxy for security quality, as over 90% of high-popularity skills failed to pass rigorous auditing. Crucially, we discovered that high-risk skills form a single giant connected component within the risk-link dimension, demonstrating that cascaded risks are systemic rather than isolated occurrences. We hope that SkillProbe will inspire researchers to provide a scalable governance infrastructure for constructing a trustworthy Agentic Web. SkillProbe is accessible for public experience at skillhub.holosai.io.

Agent skills, structured packages of procedural knowledge and executable resources that agents dynamically load at inference time, have become a reliable mechanism for augmenting LLM agents. Yet inference-time skill augmentation is fundamentally limited: retrieval noise introduces irrelevant guidance, injected skill content imposes substantial token overhead, and the model never truly acquires the knowledge it merely follows. We ask whether skills can instead be internalized into model parameters, enabling zero-shot autonomous behavior without any runtime skill retrieval. We introduce SKILL0, an in-context reinforcement learning framework designed for skill internalization. SKILL0 introduces a training-time curriculum that begins with full skill context and progressively withdraws it. Skills are grouped offline by category and rendered with interaction history into a compact visual context, teaching he model tool invocation and multi-turn task completion. A Dynamic Curriculum then evaluates each skill file's on-policy helpfulness, retaining only those from which the current policy still benefits within a linearly decaying budget, until the agent operates in a fully zero-shot setting. Extensive agentic experiments demonstrate that SKILL0 achieves substantial improvements over the standard RL baseline (+9.7\% for ALFWorld and +6.6\% for Search-QA), while maintaining a highly efficient context of fewer than 0.5k tokens per step. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZJU-REAL/SkillZero.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on skills, structured documents that specify when to act, which procedure to follow, and which tools are allowed. Existing evaluations mostly judge the quality of a skill or its contribution to task success, leaving unexamined whether an agent can recognize a relevant skill and apply it on its own. We introduce Skill-Use, a benchmark that evaluates skill use under progressive disclosure, where an agent sees only a skill's name and short description and must retrieve the full procedure before following it. Skill-Use separates three facets of skill use. Trigger measures whether the agent invokes the relevant skill, Compliance measures how faithfully it follows the prescribed procedure, and Boundary measures whether it avoids forbidden operations. A Skill-Use (SU) score combines the three and credits execution only after the skill is triggered. Skill-Use pairs 79 real skills with 177 executable tasks across nine domains, each grounded in real files, run in an isolated Docker sandbox, and scored by a trajectory-based rubric. Evaluating eight LLMs under two agent harnesses, we find that reliable skill use remains out of reach, as the strongest configuration reaches an SU of only 0.613. Triggering and procedural compliance fail as independent bottlenecks, and both scores and model rankings shift with the harness, so skill use behaves as a capability conditioned on the harness rather than a fixed property of the model.

Agent skills provide a lightweight way to equip frozen language-model agents with domain knowledge and procedural guidance, yet obtaining high-quality skills remains costly and difficult to scale. Expert-written skills require substantial human effort. Recent skill self-evolution methods automate an iterative loop that uses execution feedback to revise skills, but their heuristic update strategies often yield unstable optimization and low iteration efficiency. We identify two challenges in realizing stable and efficient skill self-evolution. Direction Stability requires effective corrections to accumulate rather than be overwritten by iteration-local feedback. Update Adaptivity requires the scope of each revision to reflect the consistency of recent case-level improvements. We introduce SkillAdam, an Adam-inspired framework for optimizing discrete and non-differentiable skill documents. As a functional analogue of Adam's first moment, an optimization memory records identified problems and the outcomes of prior solution attempts to stabilize the update direction. As a functional analogue of Adam's second moment, a volatility-driven edit budget tracks the history-weighted variation of recent case-level improvements and adaptively controls the update magnitude. Across seven benchmarks that span short- and long-horizon tasks, SkillAdam achieves state-of-the-art performance with more stable optimization dynamics. It also obtains stronger skills with substantially fewer optimization iterations and lower cost than prior methods. Code repository: https://github.com/ruc-datalab/SkillAdam

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) are increasingly deployed in dynamic interactive environments, creating a growing need for continual skill learning during interaction. Recent approaches address this challenge by learning reusable skills from successful trajectories. However, these skill learning methods largely assume static and safe environments, overlooking risks from adversarial interactions (e.g., prompt injections) and environmental dynamics (e.g., pop-ups). In dynamic settings, such assumptions can lead to risky skill learning and brittle execution, undermining the reliability of CUAs. This raises the question: how can CUAs learn and use skills safely in dynamic environments? To address this problem, we propose SkillHarness, a framework for safe skill harnessing in dynamic environments. SkillHarness moves beyond static skill abstractions by modeling skill learning and utilization as a safety-constrained interaction process. Specifically, we introduce the skill boundary that leverages multi-source supervision signals to identify safe skills from interaction trajectories, and construct self-improving safety constraints throughout the skill lifecycle. In addition, SkillHarness introduces selective skill reuse, where tasks are guided to decompose according to context and completed through the selective activation of skill subsets. Our experiments demonstrate that SkillHarness significantly reduces the unsafe rate of learned skills by 57.1% and consistently improves execution stability under dynamic environmental changes, outperforming existing baselines.

Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense. In this work, we trace this collapse to two failure modes. First, existing defense methods are confined to recognizing specific attack patterns, rather than assessing whether the intent of every embedded instruction is relevant to the user task. Second, training-based defenses, which otherwise offer the strongest safety-utility trade-off, assemble their adversarial examples from a handful of hand-crafted templates, and the resulting defender fails to generalize outside that narrow strategy distribution. To address these gaps, we propose RETA, a training-based method that grounds defense decisions on the user tasks rather than attacker-controlled data. At each tool-output step, the defender undertakes chain-of-thought reasoning verifying that its actions are consistent with the user task. Leveraging red-teaming, a simulated attacker synthesizes adversarial training data and receives a dictionary-learning diversity reward, achieving broad coverage of injection-reformulation strategies. Together, these allow the defender to be optimized via multi-objective reinforcement learning and achieve better safety-utility trade-off. Across six black-box adaptive attacks, RETA keeps every per-attack ASR below 10%, with average ASR of 2.92% and 3.75% on the two target models, while preserving most utility under attack and on clean inputs.

Agent Skills extend LLM agents with reusable instruction packages that may also include scripts, resources, and service configuration. This creates a direct distribution channel for malicious behavior, yet existing malicious-Skill datasets are fragmented across sources, artifact formats, evidence regimes, and benign coverage; duplicated and structurally related content further complicates direct aggregation and evaluation. We present MaliciousSkillBench, a comprehensive benchmark for malicious Agent Skill detection. We consolidate 13 public sources, 11 of which contribute Core malicious artifacts, and reduce 8,414 raw malicious records to 7,539 normalized-unique identities in 4,588 operational structural families. After conservative cross-label conflict exclusion, the primary benchmark contains 9,740 Skills: 7,505 malicious and 2,235 benign. To characterize its coverage, we harmonize 11 attack categories for 4,983 malicious identities with supported source-native mappings and find substantial differences in threat composition across sources. We then evaluate three learned text detectors and three off-the-shelf Skill scanners. Learned detectors achieve 0.882-0.932 Random Macro-F1 but only 0.653-0.665 under Source-Disjoint evaluation; the strongest word TF-IDF SVM scores 0.932/0.916/0.665 on Random/structural-disjoint/Source-Disjoint while retaining 95.6% malicious recall but producing 62.4% benign FPR on held-out sources. Off-the-shelf scanners occupy different but also unsatisfactory operating regimes, reducing false positives only at the cost of sharply lower malicious recall. Together, these results show that reliable malicious-Skill detection requires both broader cross-source benchmark coverage and evaluation that jointly measures attack detection and benign over-flagging.

LLM-based agents leverage third-party skills to extend their capabilities in open-world scenarios. However, third-party skills can introduce extra security vulnerabilities, as seemingly harmless skills can contain latent safety risks that only emerge during actual execution. In this work, we conduct a systematic investigation into how well current agent systems recognize and avoid such risks. To support quantitative and qualitative evaluation, we construct OpenSkillRisk, a dedicated safety benchmark containing 263 risky skills collected from public skill marketplaces. We classify these skills into seven categories based on their threat types and pair each skill with a standardized user task and a corresponding sandbox for controlled evaluation. Distinct from prior benchmarks, OpenSkillRisk not only covers more realistic and diverse unsafe scenarios, but also provides a fine-grained analysis to diagnose the behavioral patterns of agents in such scenarios. We conduct comprehensive experiments covering three mainstream CLI agent frameworks and thirteen state-of-the-art LLMs. Experimental results show that no tested system handles risky skills reliably: even the safest configurations still execute unsafe actions in about 17% of cases. Context-dependent and system-level risks are especially difficult for current agent systems to avoid. Our behavioral analysis reveals three recurring failure patterns: agents may fail to recognize the risk, recognize it but fail to intervene before acting, or follow skill instructions beyond the user's intended scope. These findings highlight the need to improve both risk reasoning in LLMs and execution control in agent frameworks.

Agent Skills package reusable natural language procedures with executable resources, enabling software agents to acquire task specific capabilities without model adaptation. Automatically generating such Skills can improve task performance, yet evaluating a candidate solely from its artifact or final task outcome leaves unresolved which actions the equipped agent will perform and which side effects those actions will produce. We present TRUSS, an evidence guided framework for generating functionally effective and safety reliable Agent Skills. TRUSS first inspects functional claims against source and domain evidence while evaluating the complete artifact under nine predefined safety properties. Candidates admitted by this static gate are loaded by a shadow agent inside a Controllable Execution Environment, where brokered tools expose requested actions to policy enforcement and record their results as provenance preserving execution traces. Functional failures and property violations are linked back to the responsible Skill content and used to guide iterative refinement. We evaluate TRUSS on 168 SkillInject artifacts, 155 SkillSafetyBench cases, and all 187 tasks in SkillGenBench. TRUSS achieves 100.00\% precision and recall in vulnerability detection. Repair reduces attack success from 38.71\% to 19.35\% with GPT 5.5 and from 46.45\% to 29.68\% with GPT 5.4, with zero attack regression. For Skill generation, TRUSS raises task effectiveness from 17.11\% without Skills to 52.94\%, while increasing the benchmark Security rate from 50.80\% to 100.00\%. These results show that execution evidence can expose behavioral failures missed by artifact inspection and can guide Skill generation toward jointly verified functional and safety outcomes.

Agent skills, which consist of reusable strategies that guide agent reasoning and action, have shown strong potential for improving model capability at inference time. However, current skill construction methods treat the problem as one-shot extraction, overlooking a fundamental tension: a skill tailored to the specific task fails to transfer, while the abstracted skill often provides insufficient guidance. We attribute this fragility to the absence of explicit mechanisms for skill specification and generalization. To address this gap, we introduce SkillComposer, a framework that decomposes skill construction into three learnable operations: create, improve, and merge. Trained via systematic rejection sampling recipe, SkillComposer enables language models to self-evolve skills at inference time and supports three deployment modes: offline for building generalized libraries, online for task-specific refinement, and hybrid for combining both. Comprehensive experiments on τ^2-Bench, LiveCodeBench v6, and AppWorld show that SkillComposer consistently outperforms baselines. Our SkillComposer-4B improves a 27B executor by up to +4.5 on agent tasks and +3.4 on code tasks, while generalizing across domains and task types unseen during training. Analysis reveals that merge and improve address orthogonal quality dimensions and that skill composition is a transferable meta-ability, providing a practical recipe for skill-augmented inference.

Prompt injection has emerged as a critical vulnerability in large language model (LLM) deployments, yet existing research is heavily weighted toward defenses. The attack side -- specifically, which injection strategies are most effective and why -- remains insufficiently studied.We address this gap with AttackEval, a systematic empirical study of prompt injection attack effectiveness. We construct a taxonomy of ten attack categories organized into three parent groups (Syntactic, Contextual, and Semantic/Social), populate each category with 25 carefully crafted prompts (250 total), and evaluate them against a simulated production victim system under four progressively stronger defense tiers. Experiments reveal several non-obvious findings: (1) Obfuscation (OBF) achieves the highest single-attack success rate (ASR = 0.76) against even intent-aware defenses, because it defeats both keyword matching and semantic similarity checks simultaneously; (2) Semantic/Social attacks - Emotional Manipulation (EM) and Reward Framing (RF) - maintain high ASR (0.44-0.48) against intent-aware defenses due to their natural language surface, which evades structural anomaly detection; (3) Composite attacks combining two complementary strategies dramatically boost ASR, with the OBF + EM pair reaching 97.6%; (4) Stealth correlates positively with residual ASR against semantic defenses (r = 0.71), implying that future defenses must jointly optimize for both structural and behavioral signals. Our findings identify concrete blind spots in current defenses and provide actionable guidance for designing more robust LLM safety systems.

Recent computer-using-agent (CUA) red-teaming papers report prompt-injection attack success rates (ASR) of 42-98%, but these headline numbers cluster on retired models and on the most-vulnerable model in each paper's panel. We ask whether those techniques, reproduced as hand-crafted templates, still work against current frontier CUAs. We release CUA-HandCrafted, a public benchmark of 793 episodes spanning 24 multi-step web tasks, 56 attack templates, 8 attack families, and 4 system-prompt configurations. Against Claude Sonnet 4.6 and GPT-5.4 we measure 0/140 multi-step attack success (Clopper-Pearson 95% upper bound 2.60%); a prompt ablation shows this resistance lives in the model weights. Yet it does not generalize: on a sister coding-agent benchmark (SkillBench), the same weights fall to hand-crafted skill-injection at up to 100%. We argue that the literature's high ASR is largely attributable to RL-optimized injection text rather than the attack categories, and that frontier safety hardening is domain-conditioned, specific to the heavily-targeted browser surface. Reporting techniques without releasing the optimized strings, or extrapolating browser-domain safety to other CUA modalities, makes published ASR numbers unreproducible.

Since intelligence fundamentally relies on efficient skill acquisition (Chollet, 2019), the ability to leverage skills is critical. For LLMs, skills, manually authored or extracted from task trajectories, are textual recipes encoding mature problem-solving experience and are critical to agentic capabilities. Despite widespread deployment, their utility is limited by the model's ability to comprehend and follow skill instructions, especially under complex and long-context scenarios, where key instructions are difficult to locate and adhere to. To address this limitation, we propose ParametricSkills, a framework that can convert free-form textual skills into parameters at test time, enabling context-free skill exploitation. Specifically, we first construct a large-scale, high-quality skill library, and synthesize single-turn and multi-turn skill exploitation trajectories built around these skills with OpenCode. Using these data, we then train a hypernetwork that parameterizes both the skill content and the test-time exploitation methodology by receiving textual skills and converting them into LoRA adapters. Experimental results on six complex software engineering (SWE) subtasks demonstrate that, the proposed ParametricSkills averagely outperforms in-context learning by 6.44 points as judged by DeepSeek-V4-Flash, while also achieving significantly higher BERT Score and F1 score, confirming its effectiveness. Beyond performance, we further find that parametric skills, being inherently accumulative, offer a preliminary yet promising avenue toward test-time continual learning.

Agent skills are SKILL.md instructions and scripts that AI coding agents such as Claude Code and Codex run with the permissions of their user. Developers share skills by copying them between repositories, which makes them a software supply chain without a registry, versions or provenance. The origin of a copied skill, the reach of a security fix and the repositories that warrant review are therefore unknown. Studies that record which repositories hold a skill at a single point in time cannot reveal who copied it from whom. We contribute the first dated copy network of agent skills, built from the git history of every SKILL.md in GitSkills and covering 2,193,119 skill adoptions across GitHub, together with an interactive viewer. A few repositories are the source of almost all copies, and GitHub stars do not identify them. Skill copies almost never change with their source, and a fix at the source therefore rarely reaches them. We fit a model of which repositories others copy from and use it to rank repositories for audit. Reviewing the 100 repositories it ranks highest prevents 14.9% of later adoptions of high-risk skills, against 0.5% for the 100 most starred, which gives security engineers a short list to check before a skill spreads. Platforms should therefore distribute versioned references rather than copies. Project Website: https://fahdseddik.github.io/Skill-Constellations/

Agent skill libraries are becoming routable software assets: a retrieved skill can contribute instructions, scripts, resource bindings, and execution assumptions to an agent. This makes retrieval failures more specific than broad irrelevance. A system can find the right capability family yet expose the wrong same-capability representative. We study this failure as same-capability risk-exposure retrieval. Each benchmark unit pairs a helpful skill with a query-specific risky sibling that shares the capability family but differs on an execution-controlling contract, such as the required resource, precondition, procedure, or artifact. We introduce SameCapRisk-Bench, an auditable benchmark with 1,190 skill-risk units and 1,686 evaluation query cases: 694 marked-sibling units under public library pressure and 496 hard role-flip units where the same two skills swap helpful/risky roles across paired queries. The release records admission evidence, cue/leakage checks, source hashes, family relations, and fixed candidate pools. The benchmark reports helpful ranking together with harmful sibling rate (HSR@K), the top-K exposure of the marked risky sibling. On this benchmark, public SkillRouter, SkillRet, and R3-Skill retrieve helpful skills at high Recall@3 (0.848--0.888) but also expose marked risky siblings frequently (HSR@3 0.346--0.372). A fully public score-and-cluster pipeline lowers HSR@3 to 0.128--0.182, with Recall@3 of 0.713--0.776. Under a benchmark-trained reference scorer, public text-cluster and controlled resolvers reach HSR@3 0.012 and 0.007; the latter attains Recall@3 0.833. Skill retrieval should therefore report both capability matching and same-family risk exposure, with HSR serving as a targeted exposure certificate for fixed skill libraries.

Learning cooperative multi-agent policy from offline multi-task data that can generalize to unseen tasks with varying numbers of agents and targets is an attractive problem in many scenarios. Although aggregating general behavior patterns among multiple tasks as skills to improve policy transfer is a promising approach, two primary challenges hinder the further advancement of skill learning in offline multi-task MARL. Firstly, extracting general cooperative behaviors from various action sequences as common skills lacks bringing cooperative temporal knowledge into them. Secondly, existing works only involve common skills and can not adaptively choose independent knowledge as task-specific skills in each task for fine-grained action execution. To tackle these challenges, we propose Hierarchical and Separate Skill Discovery (HiSSD), a novel approach for generalizable offline multi-task MARL through skill learning. HiSSD leverages a hierarchical framework that jointly learns common and task-specific skills. The common skills learn cooperative temporal knowledge and enable in-sample exploitation for offline multi-task MARL. The task-specific skills represent the priors of each task and achieve a task-guided fine-grained action execution. To verify the advancement of our method, we conduct experiments on multi-agent MuJoCo and SMAC benchmarks. After training the policy using HiSSD on offline multi-task data, the empirical results show that HiSSD assigns effective cooperative behaviors and obtains superior performance in unseen tasks.

The living-off-the-land (LOTL) offensive methodologies rely on the perpetration of malicious actions through chains of commands executed by legitimate applications, identifiable exclusively by analysis of system logs. LOTL techniques are well hidden inside the stream of events generated by common legitimate activities, moreover threat actors often camouflage activity through obfuscation, making them particularly difficult to detect without incurring in plenty of false alarms, even using machine learning. To improve the performance of models in such an harsh environment, we propose an augmentation framework to enhance and diversify the presence of LOTL malicious activity inside legitimate logs. Guided by threat intelligence, we generate a dataset by injecting attack templates known to be employed in the wild, further enriched by malleable patterns of legitimate activities to replicate the behavior of evasive threat actors. We conduct an extensive ablation study to understand which models better handle our augmented dataset, also manipulated to mimic the presence of model-agnostic evasion and poisoning attacks. Our results suggest that augmentation is needed to maintain high-predictive capabilities, robustness to attack is achieved through specific hardening techniques like adversarial training, and it is possible to deploy near-real-time models with almost-zero false alarms.

Large language model agents increasingly operate through an intermediate skill layer that mediates between user intent and concrete task execution. This layer is widely treated as an organizational abstraction, but we argue it is also a privilege boundary that current models routinely exceed. We present FORTIS, a benchmark that evaluates over-privilege in agent skills across two stages: whether a model selects the minimally sufficient skill from a large overlapping library, and whether it executes that skill without expanding into broader tools or actions than the skill permits. Across ten frontier models and three domains, we find that over-privileged behavior is the norm rather than the exception. Models consistently reach for higher-privilege skills and tools than the task requires, failing at both stages at rates that remain high even for the strongest available models. Failure is especially severe under the ordinary conditions of real user interaction: incomplete specification, convenience framing, and proximity to skill boundaries. None of these requires adversarial construction. The results indicate that the skill layer, far from containing agent behavior, is itself a primary source of privilege escalation in current systems.

For over a decade, cybersecurity has relied on human labor scarcity to limit attackers to high-value targets manually or generic automated attacks at scale. Building sophisticated exploits requires deep expertise and manual effort, leading defenders to assume adversaries cannot afford tailored attacks at scale. AI agents break this balance by automating vulnerability discovery and exploitation across thousands of targets, needing only small success rates to remain profitable. Current developers focus on preventing misuse through data filtering, safety alignment, and output guardrails. Such protections fail against adversaries who control open-weight models, bypass safety controls, or develop offensive capabilities independently. We argue that AI-agent-driven cyber attacks are inevitable, requiring a fundamental shift in defensive strategy. In this position paper, we identify why existing defenses cannot stop adaptive adversaries and demonstrate that defenders must develop offensive security intelligence. We propose three actions for building frontier offensive AI capabilities responsibly. First, construct comprehensive benchmarks covering the full attack lifecycle. Second, advance from workflow-based to trained agents for discovering in-wild vulnerabilities at scale. Third, implement governance restricting offensive agents to audited cyber ranges, staging release by capability tier, and distilling findings into safe defensive-only agents. We strongly recommend treating offensive AI capabilities as essential defensive infrastructure, as containing cybersecurity risks requires mastering them in controlled settings before adversaries do.

Exploration in sparse-reward reinforcement learning is difficult due to the requirement of long, coordinated sequences of actions in order to achieve any reward. Moreover, in continuous action spaces there are an infinite number of possible actions, which only increases the difficulty of exploration. One class of methods designed to address these issues forms temporally extended actions, often called skills, from interaction data collected in the same domain, and optimizes a policy on top of this new action space. Typically such methods require a lengthy pretraining phase, especially in continuous action spaces, in order to form the skills before reinforcement learning can begin. Given prior evidence that the full range of the continuous action space is not required in such tasks, we propose a novel approach to skill-generation with two components. First we discretize the action space through clustering, and second we leverage a tokenization technique borrowed from natural language processing to generate temporally extended actions. Such a method outperforms baselines for skill-generation in several challenging sparse-reward domains, and requires orders-of-magnitude less computation in skill-generation and online rollouts. Our code is available at https://github.com/dyunis/subwords_as_skills.

An agent skill is a reusable, actionable natural-language artifact that guides an agent to perform a task effectively under a given harness. Recent studies have explored the optimization of agent skills, contributing to a growing collection of publicly available skills spanning diverse tasks, domains, and harnesses. Despite millions of publicly shared skills, existing skill optimization methods largely overlook this accumulated knowledge, instead relying solely on expensive agent rollouts to iteratively refine skills for a target task. To address this, we propose Retrieval-Augmented Skill Optimization (RASO), a framework that leverages an external skill corpus as prior knowledge throughout skill optimization. RASO retrieves relevant knowledge from existing skills and adapts it to the target task and harness via Cross-Harness Adaptation, accounting for mismatches in both domain and harness. RASO comprises two complementary stages: Retrieval-Augmented Skill Initialization (RASI) constructs a knowledge-grounded initial skill without requiring agent rollouts, while Retrieval-Augmented Skill Update (RASU) iteratively refines the skill by retrieving external knowledge guided by execution feedback. Across four agent benchmarks and two models, extensive experiments show that RASO consistently outperforms baselines without retrieval-augmented skill initialization and updating.

Reliable execution of long-horizon mobile manipulation tasks remains challenging because overall task success depends on the successful completion of multiple constituent skills. Existing benchmarks, however, still rely primarily on full-task rollouts and aggregate task-level metrics, making intermediate failures difficult to observe and analyze. We present Behavior-Skill, a benchmark that reformulates the learning and evaluation of long-horizon tasks around executable constituent skills. It contains 235,492 skill instances from 10,000 demonstrations across 50 household tasks and 34 semantic skill categories. Each instance pairs a skill instruction with an aligned observation-action segment, and is further associated with a restorable intermediate state and a skill success condition to enable independent evaluation under valid preconditions. We further introduce trajectory-level and skill-level metrics to characterize policy capability beyond aggregate task success. Extensive experiments across representative VLA policies including pi0.5 and GR00T on the complete 50-task benchmark show that failures are highly non-uniform across skills, with contact-rich manipulation skills forming persistent bottlenecks. These results demonstrate that Behavior-Skill complements full-task evaluation by exposing intermediate capability profiles for analyzing and improving long-horizon VLA policies. Behavior-Skill is publicly available at https://github.com/nubot-nudt/Behavior-Skill.

Intelligent Personal Assistant (IA), also known as Voice Assistant (VA), has become increasingly popular as a human-computer interaction mechanism. Most smartphones have built-in voice assistants that are granted high privilege, which is able to access system resources and private information. Thus, once the voice assistants are exploited by attackers, they become the stepping stones for the attackers to hack into the smartphones. Prior work shows that the voice assistant can be activated by inter-component communication mechanism, through an official Android API. However, this attack method is only effective on Google Assistant, which is the official voice assistant developed by Google. Voice assistants in other operating systems, even custom Android systems, cannot be activated by this mechanism. Prior work also shows that the attacking voice commands can be inaudible, but it requires additional instruments to launch the attack, making it unrealistic for real-world attack. We propose an attacking framework, which records the activation voice of the user, and launch the attack by playing the activation voice and attack commands via the built-in speaker. An intelligent stealthy module is designed to decide on the suitable occasion to launch the attack, preventing the attack being noticed by the user. We demonstrate proof-of-concept attacks on Google Assistant, showing the feasibility and stealthiness of the proposed attack scheme. We suggest to revise the activation logic of voice assistant to be resilient to the speaker based attack.

Skills are a natural unit for describing what a language model can do and how its behavior can be changed. However, existing characterizations rely on human-written taxonomies, textual descriptions, or manual profiling pipelines--all external hypotheses about what matters that need not align with the model's internal representations. We argue that when the goal is to intervene on model behavior, skill characterization should be *model-native*: grounded in the model's own representations rather than imposed through external ontologies. We instantiate this view by recovering a compact orthogonal basis from sequence-level activations. The resulting basis is semantically interpretable but need not correspond to any predefined human ontology; instead, it captures axes of behavioral variation that the model itself organizes around. We validate this characterization on reasoning post-training, using the recovered basis for both SFT data selection and inference-time steering. We develop lightweight proxy interventions to identify which directions are most useful for a given model. Across Llama3-8B and Qwen2.5-3B, selecting data along those directions improves Pass@1 by up to 20% on MATH and 41% on AMC, outperforming data selection based on human-characterized skills. Because the basis lives in activation space, the same directions also serve as steering vectors at inference time, improving Pass@8 by up to 4.8% on MATH--an intervention that human-characterized skills cannot support. We further validate the characterization on safety alignment, where selecting adversarial training data for model-native skill coverage rather than textual diversity yields more sample-efficient learning. These results suggest that recovering skills from the model's own representations, rather than imposing them externally, provides a more effective foundation for intervening on model behavior. Codes are open-sourced.

Language agents increasingly rely on reusable skills to improve multi-step web automation across related tasks. A growing line of work studies online skill learning, where agents continually induce skills from previous task trajectories and reuse them in future tasks on the fly. However, existing methods mainly reuse skills at the task-level: a fixed set of skills is retrieved based on the initial task instruction and then held fixed throughout execution. This static strategy is misaligned with web execution, where the appropriate next action depends not only on the task goal but also on the current webpage state, which often transitions into situations that the initial skills fail to cover. To address this gap, we propose State-Grounded Dynamic Retrieval (SGDR), an online skill learning method that enables stepwise skill reuse for web agents. SGDR consists of three components: a sliding-window extraction process that turns completed trajectories into reusable sub-procedures invokable at intermediate execution states, a dual text-code representation that connects skill retrieval with executable action, and a state-grounded dynamic retrieval mechanism that matches skills to both the task goal and the current webpage state. Experiments on WebArena across five domains show that SGDR consistently outperforms strong baselines, achieving average success rates of 37.5% with GPT-4.1 and 24.3% with Qwen3-4B, corresponding to relative gains of 10.6% and 10.0% over the strongest baseline, respectively. The code is available at https://github.com/plusnli/skill-dynamic-retrieval.

Agents4Pentest, an emerging class of LLM-based autonomous penetration testing systems, has become a rapidly growing area in security research. Despite this growth, the field still lacks a unified taxonomy, a systematic understanding of how agent architectures and evaluation benchmarks have co-evolved, and a clear characterization of remaining capability and reliability gaps. This survey addresses these gaps through a systematic analysis of 81 papers between 2023 and 2026. We organize the literature into six categories: evaluation benchmarks, general-purpose systems, domain-specific frameworks, CTF-based systems, defense-oriented research, and surveys. We further trace a four-phase architectural evolution from text-only reasoning agents to agents trained with Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), showing that each transition is driven by a distinct capability bottleneck. Our analysis yields several key findings. First, RLVR marks a shift in capability acquisition from imitation of expert demonstrations to reward-driven self-improvement, enabling agents to discover previously undocumented attack strategies. Second, CTF platforms have evolved from evaluation testbeds into dual-purpose infrastructure for both agent evaluation and RL training. Third, domain-specific frameworks improve efficiency through recurring specialization mechanisms, but their gains remain largely confined to narrow task classes and are difficult to compare across domains because existing evaluations rely on different benchmarks. Fourth, the field is expanding beyond offensive automation toward adversarial defense and security compliance. Across these categories, we identify three structurally linked open challenges: evaluation reliability, limited performance on multi-stage attack scenarios, and scarcity of high-quality training data.

The transition from monolithic language models to modular, skill-equipped agents marks a defining shift in how large language models (LLMs) are deployed in practice. Rather than encoding all procedural knowledge within model weights, agent skills -- composable packages of instructions, code, and resources that agents load on demand -- enable dynamic capability extension without retraining. It is formalized in a paradigm of progressive disclosure, portable skill definitions, and integration with the Model Context Protocol (MCP). This survey provides a comprehensive treatment of the agent skills landscape, as it has rapidly evolved during the last few months. We organize the field along four axes: (i) architectural foundations, examining the SKILL.md specification, progressive context loading, and the complementary roles of skills and MCP; (ii) skill acquisition, covering reinforcement learning with skill libraries, autonomous skill discovery (SEAgent), and compositional skill synthesis; (iii) deployment at scale, including the computer-use agent (CUA) stack, GUI grounding advances, and benchmark progress on OSWorld and SWE-bench; and (iv) security, where recent empirical analyses reveal that 26.1% of community-contributed skills contain vulnerabilities, motivating our proposed Skill Trust and Lifecycle Governance Framework -- a four-tier, gate-based permission model that maps skill provenance to graduated deployment capabilities. We identify seven open challenges -- from cross-platform skill portability to capability-based permission models -- and propose a research agenda for realizing trustworthy, self-improving skill ecosystems. Unlike prior surveys that broadly cover LLM agents or tool use, this work focuses specifically on the emerging skill abstraction layer and its implications for the next generation of agentic systems. Project repo: https://github.com/scienceaix/agentskills

Skills equip LLM agents with professional knowledge and guidance to complete long-horizon and complex tasks. Although skills have been widely adopted in recent agent paradigms and harnesses, how to synthesize reliable training data and how to train agents for skill use remain underexplored. In this work, we propose SkillGym, an automatic pipeline to build verifiable environments, collect trajectories, and train skill-use agents. SkillGym first crawls a large volume of skills from the internet, then keeps those whose workflows can run reproducibly offline. A builder-reviewer pipeline is used to construct difficulty-controlled tasks, spanning four task types, each with a reference solution and an executable verifier. With this pipeline, we build 6.8k environments and collect 19k verified successful trajectories for supervised finetuning. Finetuning on these trajectories improves LLMs of different families and sizes, from 2B to 122B parameters across four skill-use benchmarks; Our Qwen3.5-9B SFT model outperforms the 397B untrained model on two of them. Further analysis shows that training teaches agents to invoke skills, raising the rate of reading the relevant skill from 28% to 96%, and that the gains hold across reasoning structures, extending to task types that form a minority of the training data and to skills held out from training

Large language model (LLM) agents are trained with reinforcement learning (RL) for complex decision-making tasks. However, most RL-trained agents remain episodic and cannot accumulate reusable knowledge across episodes. Recent skill-based approaches, such as SkillRL, attempt to address this issue by extracting skills from raw trajectories, but treat the skill bank as an append-only repository without verifying whether stored skills remain effective. In this paper, we propose SkillForge, a framework for continuous skill evolution that enables skills to be verified and refined through environment interaction. By making skill usage explicit during agent interaction, RL can directly optimize both environment actions and skill invocation decisions. SkillForge further introduces evidence-based skill verification and multi-pathway skill induction, allowing the skill bank to continuously grow while maintaining its quality. Extensive experiments on ALFWorld, WebShop, and AppWorld show that SkillForge consistently outperforms SkillRL, demonstrating the effectiveness of continuously verified skills in training stronger LLM agents.

Autonomous web agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in completing complex browser tasks, yet they still struggle with long-horizon workflows. A key bottleneck is the grounding gap in existing skill formulations: textual workflow skills provide natural language guidance but cannot be directly executed, while code-based skills are executable but opaque to the agent, offering no step-level understanding for error recovery or adaptation. We introduce WebXSkill, a framework that bridges this gap with executable skills, each pairing a parameterized action program with step-level natural language guidance, enabling both direct execution and agent-driven adaptation. WebXSkill operates in three stages: skill extraction mines reusable action subsequences from readily available synthetic agent trajectories and abstracts them into parameterized skills, skill organization indexes skills into a URL-based graph for context-aware retrieval, and skill deployment exposes two complementary modes, grounded mode for fully automated multi-step execution and guided mode where skills serve as step-by-step instructions that the agent follows with its native planning. On WebArena and WebVoyager, WebXSkill improves task success rate by up to 9.8 and 12.9 points over the baseline, respectively, demonstrating the effectiveness of executable skills for web agents. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/aiming-lab/WebXSkill.

Language-model agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) during tool use: adversarial instructions hidden in untrusted tool outputs can covertly redirect legitimate task execution. Existing work often trains and evaluates defenses against fixed attacks that do not adapt to the defender's behavior, so the resulting defenses may struggle against adaptive attacks. We combine adaptive attacker-defender co-training with subsequent refinement: continued interaction improves both roles, while learned attackers provide training challenges for further gains in defender safety and task utility. We therefore model adaptive IPI as a general-sum Markov game: the defender advances the task through successive tool calls, while the attacker can inject multiple times within the same task and adapt subsequent attacks to the defender's responses. Building on this formulation, we propose CoER, a verifier-grounded co-evolution and refinement framework. After initializing the attacker from successful trajectories, Co-PPO retains historical policies from both roles as opponent populations and mixes current and historical opponents for bilateral reinforcement learning, extending training beyond the latest matchup. Attackers from these populations are then reused to challenge teacher agents, and only demonstrations verified for both safety and task completion are used to fine-tune the co-evolved defender. In our main seven-domain evaluation, CoER reduces observed overall attack success from 38.5% to 0.2% and raises task utility from 63.2% to 76.3%, with improved attack resistance on external benchmarks.

Skills are external artifacts that Large Language Models (LLMs) consume at inference time to improve their performance on specialized domains by incorporating relevant procedural and domain knowledge. Expert-authored skills are expensive to produce, and the resulting artifacts are not optimized for the specific model that consumes them, whose failure modes can vary with version, scale and training. In addition, emerging tasks may fall outside the scope of existing skill libraries, creating a need to develop new skills before curated training data become available. Recent works have explored automated skill optimization through reflection, but they require a curated, in-distribution training set, which users might not always have. To address these limitations, we present Prompt2Skill, a framework that builds skills from natural-language task description alone. From the prompt, the system derives a task specification, discovers or synthesizes datasets, and refines the skill in a closed loop of reflective editing. Across four domains spanning question answering, reading comprehension, spreadsheet manipulation, and mathematical reasoning, Prompt2Skill consistently outperforms the direct prompting baseline, achieving an average improvement of 10.8 across open-source and frontier models.

Language-model agents increasingly use tools to act on external systems. Earlier actions can alter files, permissions, database records, or other state, making a later routine-looking action harmful. Yet the visible interaction may not reveal the underlying state needed to assess that action. We formulate attack and defense as partially observed state control in SEAD, deriving their design requirements from this shared execution process. Because attackers supply instructions while the target chooses concrete actions, DART decomposes harmful goals into locally plausible steps and uses feedback from actual tool execution to guide trajectory search. The defender must decide before execution with incomplete state evidence. SAGE can therefore investigate relevant state through read-only queries before allowing or blocking each action, including those proposed after a block. We construct an environment-verifiable dataset integrating controlled initial states, replayable tool environments, and task-specific executable checks. Across four target models, DART improves semantic attack success by 18.8--35.9 percentage points over the competing baseline, with consistent gains under executable verification. On recorded trajectories, SAGE preserves 95.79% of benign trajectories while intercepting 92.73% of harmful paths by the harm-enabling boundary. In online attack-defense evaluation, it reduces DART's executable attack success from 48.0% to 4.0%. SAGE remains effective across four attack methods and generalizes to out-of-domain environments. Our code and data is available at https://github.com/EverywhereSafety/SEAD.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) enables agents to access external knowledge at inference time, but it primarily retrieves fragmented declarative evidence, leaving agents to repeatedly infer task procedures from passages, manuals, examples, logs, or trajectories. This raises a fundamental question: can skills extracted from external knowledge bases be installed into an agent, enabling it to rapidly approximate domain expertise? In this paper, we propose Anything2Skill, a taxonomy-guided framework that compiles heterogeneous external knowledge into reusable, retrievable, and executable skills for agents. Given a corpus of knowledge records, Anything2Skill first decomposes each record into evidence windows and performs plan-and-expand skill extraction under a skill-tree prior. The extracted candidates are then converted into structured skill contracts that specify invocation conditions, contraindications, action moves, workflow steps, constraints, output specifications, supporting evidence, and confidence scores. To construct a deployable procedural memory, Anything2Skill manages the extracted skills in a persistent SkillBank through taxonomy-aware compilation, registry-level reconciliation, lifecycle tracking, versioned updates, and visible skill-tree projection. At inference time, agents retrieve both task-specific passages from the original knowledge base and relevant procedural skills from the SkillBank, allowing RAG to provide declarative evidence while compiled skills provide reusable procedural guidance. Experiments on qsv and GitHub-CLI show that Anything2Skill combined with RAG achieves 98.85\% and 94.10\% success rates, respectively, substantially outperforming RAG-only agents. These results suggest that compiling latent procedural knowledge into explicit skills is an effective way to extend retrieval-augmented agents from knowledge access toward capability reuse.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve into agentic problem solvers, they increasingly rely on external, reusable skills to handle tasks beyond their native parametric capabilities. In existing agent systems, the dominant strategy for incorporating skills is to explicitly enumerate available skills within the context window. However, this strategy fails to scale: as skill corpora expand, context budgets are consumed rapidly, and the agent becomes markedly less accurate in identifying the right skill. To this end, this paper formulates Skill Retrieval Augmentation (SRA), a new paradigm in which agents dynamically retrieve, incorporate, and apply relevant skills from large external skill corpora on demand. To make this problem measurable, we construct a large-scale skill corpus and introduce SRA-Bench, the first benchmark for decomposed evaluation of the full SRA pipeline, covering skill retrieval, skill incorporation, and end-task execution. SRA-Bench contains 5,400 capability-intensive test instances and 636 manually constructed gold skills, which are mixed with web-collected distractor skills to form a large-scale corpus of 26,262 skills. Extensive experiments show that retrieval-based skill augmentation can substantially improve agent performance, validating the promise of the paradigm. At the same time, we uncover a fundamental gap in skill incorporation: current LLM agents tend to load skills at similar rates, regardless of whether a gold skill is retrieved or whether the task actually requires external capabilities. This shows that the bottleneck in skill augmentation lies not only in retrieval but also in the base model's ability to determine which skill to load and when external loading is actually needed. These findings position SRA as a distinct research problem and establish a foundation for the scalable augmentation of capabilities in future agent systems.

Skills are a promising way to improve LLM agent capabilities without retraining, while keeping the added procedure reusable and controllable. However, high-quality skills are still largely written by hand. We introduce SkillGen, a multi-agent framework that synthesizes a single auditable skill from trajectories generated by a base agent. The output is a human-readable artifact that can be inspected before use. Rather than merely summarizing trajectories, SkillGen leverages contrastive induction over both successful and failed trajectories to identify reusable success patterns, recurring failure modes, and behaviors that appear in nearby successes but are missing from failures. SkillGen then generates candidate skills and iteratively refines the skill. A key novelty in SkillGen is that we model agent skills as interventions to empirically verify the net effect of skills on the overall performance. Specifically, we compare outcomes on the same instances with and without the skill, so that we account for both repairs (cases where the skill fixes a baseline failure) and regressions (cases where the skill breaks a baseline success). Across a broad range of agents and datasets, SkillGen consistently improves held-out performance, outperforms existing skill-generation baselines, and produces skills that transfer across models.

Natural-language skills let agents reuse task knowledge, yet deploying a long Markdown document makes the model interpret that knowledge anew on every call. We ask whether the behavior induced by a skill can be carried by a compact, trainable context. SoftSkill initializes virtual token embeddings from a skill document and optimizes a soft skill with next-token prediction while keeping the language model frozen. The resulting conditioning sequence can occupy the skill section or another supported prompt location. On Qwen3.5-4B, a 32-token soft skill improves over no skill by 7.6, 42.1, and 1.3 points on SearchQA, LiveMath, and DocVQA. It also exceeds the optimized textual skill on SearchQA and LiveMath by 4.5 and 12.5 points, respectively, while replacing skill documents of hundreds to thousands of tokens. The same approach improves multi-step agent execution: on Qwen3.6-35B-A3B, OfficeQA and ALFWorld rise by 8.2 and 14.1 points over no skill; on Qwen3.5-4B with aligned action decoding, ALFWorld success rises from 44/134 with the untrained initialization to 91/134 after training. These findings show that a skill document can serve as the starting point for a continuous control that improves both answers and actions without updating the backbone.

Agent skills are procedural artifacts that enable LLM agents to execute workflows, verify constraints, and recover from failures. Existing self-evolving methods refine skills using accumulated trajectories. However, they struggle in cold-start settings, where only an initial, imperfect skill is available. Consequently, skill construction defaults to expert authoring or one-shot LLM generation. Expert-authored skills are costly and may not align with how LLM agents actually execute tasks, while one-shot generated skills can be syntactically well formed yet behaviorally weak. To bridge this gap, we propose SkillRevise, an execution-grounded framework designed to iteratively refine these initial skills. SkillRevise diagnoses skill defects from execution evidence, retrieves relevant repair principles from a general memory, and applies execution-anchored edits. By re-executing candidates and measuring empirical utility, it systematically retains the optimal skill version. Evaluated across three benchmarks and five LLMs, SkillRevise substantially outperforms one-shot baselines, improving the base agent's success rate on SkillsBench from 36.05% to 61.63%. Furthermore, the revised skills exhibit strong cross-model transferability, capturing generalized procedural knowledge over model-specific artifacts.

Equipping large language models with explicit skills has emerged as a promising paradigm for enabling autonomous agents to solve complex tasks. Agent skills can be inherently divided into general skills for broad cognitive transfer and task-specific skills for dynamic execution. However, existing skill-based reinforcement learning (RL) methods typically force a rigid choice between full externalization, which incurs prohibitive context overhead, and full internalization, which risks overfitting and knowledge conflicts. To address this dilemma, we propose Skill0.5, a novel agentic RL framework that explicitly differentiates skill treatments by combining general skill internalization with task-specific skill utilization. Driven by a dynamic, difficulty-aware router, Skill0.5 streams tasks into distinct mastery tiers to apply tailored optimization strategies: it internalizes general skills via privileged distillation to build a cognitive foundation for hard tasks, while using diagnostic probing on easy tasks to penalize shortcuts and enforce specific skill utilization. Experiments on ALFWorld and WebShop demonstrate that Skill0.5 outperforms both memory-based and skill-based RL baselines, yielding performance improvements across both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have revitalized in LLM-based agents, exhibiting impressive human-like behaviors and cooperative capabilities in various scenarios. However, these agents also bring some exclusive risks, stemming from the complexity of interaction environments and the usability of tools. This paper delves into the safety of LLM-based agents from three perspectives: agent quantity, role definition, and attack level. Specifically, we initially propose to employ a template-based attack strategy on LLM-based agents to find the influence of agent quantity. In addition, to address interaction environment and role specificity issues, we introduce Evil Geniuses (EG), an effective attack method that autonomously generates prompts related to the original role to examine the impact across various role definitions and attack levels. EG leverages Red-Blue exercises, significantly improving the generated prompt aggressiveness and similarity to original roles. Our evaluations on CAMEL, Metagpt and ChatDev based on GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, demonstrate high success rates. Extensive evaluation and discussion reveal that these agents are less robust, prone to more harmful behaviors, and capable of generating stealthier content than LLMs, highlighting significant safety challenges and guiding future research. Our code is available at https://github.com/T1aNS1R/Evil-Geniuses.

The prospect of artificial intelligence (AI) competing in the adversarial landscape of cyber security has long been considered one of the most impactful, challenging, and potentially dangerous applications of AI. Here, we demonstrate a new approach to assessing AI's progress towards enabling and scaling real-world offensive cyber operations (OCO) tactics in use by modern threat actors. We detail OCCULT, a lightweight operational evaluation framework that allows cyber security experts to contribute to rigorous and repeatable measurement of the plausible cyber security risks associated with any given large language model (LLM) or AI employed for OCO. We also prototype and evaluate three very different OCO benchmarks for LLMs that demonstrate our approach and serve as examples for building benchmarks under the OCCULT framework. Finally, we provide preliminary evaluation results to demonstrate how this framework allows us to move beyond traditional all-or-nothing tests, such as those crafted from educational exercises like capture-the-flag environments, to contextualize our indicators and warnings in true cyber threat scenarios that present risks to modern infrastructure. We find that there has been significant recent advancement in the risks of AI being used to scale realistic cyber threats. For the first time, we find a model (DeepSeek-R1) is capable of correctly answering over 90% of challenging offensive cyber knowledge tests in our Threat Actor Competency Test for LLMs (TACTL) multiple-choice benchmarks. We also show how Meta's Llama and Mistral's Mixtral model families show marked performance improvements over earlier models against our benchmarks where LLMs act as offensive agents in MITRE's high-fidelity offensive and defensive cyber operations simulation environment, CyberLayer.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

Enabling continual learning in LLMs remains a key unresolved research challenge. In a recent announcement, a frontier LLM company made a step towards this by introducing Agent Skills, a framework that equips agents with new knowledge based on instructions stored in simple markdown files. Although Agent Skills can be a very useful tool, we show that they are fundamentally insecure, since they enable trivially simple prompt injections. We demonstrate how to hide malicious instructions in long Agent Skill files and referenced scripts to exfiltrate sensitive data, such as internal files or passwords. Importantly, we show how to bypass system-level guardrails of a popular coding agent: a benign, task-specific approval with the "Don't ask again" option can carry over to closely related but harmful actions. Overall, we conclude that despite ongoing research efforts and scaling model capabilities, frontier LLMs remain vulnerable to very simple prompt injections in realistic scenarios. Our code is available at https://github.com/aisa-group/promptinject-agent-skills.

Autonomous language-model agents increasingly rely on installable skills and tools to complete user tasks. Static skill auditing can expose capability surface before deployment, but it cannot determine whether a particular invocation is unsafe under the current user request and runtime context. We therefore study skill invocation auditing as a continuous-risk estimation problem: given a user request, candidate skill, and runtime context, predict a score that supports ranking and triage before a hard intervention is applied. We introduce STARS, which combines a static capability prior, a request-conditioned invocation risk model, and a calibrated risk-fusion policy. To evaluate this setting, we construct SIA-Bench, a benchmark of 3,000 invocation records with group-safe splits, lineage metadata, runtime context, canonical action labels, and derived continuous-risk targets. On a held-out split of indirect prompt injection attacks, calibrated fusion reaches 0.439 high-risk AUPRC, improving over 0.405 for the contextual scorer and 0.380 for the strongest static baseline, while the contextual scorer remains better calibrated with 0.289 expected calibration error. On the locked in-distribution test split, gains are smaller and static priors remain useful. The resulting claim is therefore narrower: request-conditioned auditing is most valuable as an invocation-time risk-scoring and triage layer rather than as a replacement for static screening. Code is available at https://github.com/123zgj123/STARS.

Agent skills encode operational procedures and domain expertise as reusable knowledge assets, yet their distribution in plaintext exposes them to unauthorized copying and leakage. However, practical mechanisms for skill ownership verification and leakage tracing remain underdeveloped. Watermark embedding before distribution offers a potential solution, but structured, compact skill instructions impose stringent requirements for factual and procedural accuracy. To address these challenges, we introduce SkillMarker, a KGW-based watermarking method that jointly targets functionality preservation and strong watermark embedding. SkillMarker unifies quality-constrained rewriting with signal-oriented candidate search. The former separates essential knowledge from flexible expression to preserve instruction fidelity; the latter explores alternative expressions to obtain a stronger watermark signal under preservation constraints. We release an open-source toolkit that integrates watermark embedding, quality auditing, and detection to support the protection of agent skills. SkillMarker targets ownership verification and leakage tracing in distributed skill ecosystems, where content may be copied in whole or in part, or incorporated into other skills.

Computer-Using Agents (CUAs) aim to autonomously operate computer systems to complete real-world tasks. However, existing agentic systems remain difficult to scale and lag behind human performance. A key limitation is the absence of reusable and structured skill abstractions that capture how humans interact with graphical user interfaces and how to leverage these skills. We introduce CUA-Skill, a computer-using agentic skill base that encodes human computer-use knowledge as skills coupled with parameterized execution and composition graphs. CUA-Skill is a large-scale library of carefully engineered skills spanning common Windows applications, serving as a practical infrastructure and tool substrate for scalable, reliable agent development. Built upon this skill base, we construct CUA-Skill Agent, an end-to-end computer-using agent that supports dynamic skill retrieval, argument instantiation, and memory-aware failure recovery. Our results demonstrate that CUA-Skill substantially improves execution success rates and robustness on challenging end-to-end agent benchmarks, establishing a strong foundation for future computer-using agent development. On WindowsAgentArena, CUA-Skill Agent achieves state-of-the-art 57.5% (best of three) successful rate while being significantly more efficient than prior and concurrent approaches. The project page is available at https://microsoft.github.io/cua_skill/.

Skills, i.e., structured workflow instructions distilled for large language models (LLMs), are becoming an increasingly important mechanism for improving agent performance on real-world downstream tasks. However, as the open-source skill ecosystem rapidly expands, it remains unclear how different models and agent frameworks interact with skills, how to evaluate skill quality, and how users should select skills under practical cost-performance trade-offs. In this paper, we present OpenSkillEval, an automatic evaluation framework for both skill-augmented agent systems and the skills themselves. Instead of relying on static benchmarks, OpenSkillEval automatically constructs realistic task instances from evolving real-world artifacts across five categories of downstream applications: presentation generation, front-end web design, poster generation, data visualization, and report generation. It further collects and organizes community-contributed skills for controlled comparison under unified task settings. Using more than 600 dynamically generated task instances and 30 open-source skills, we conduct a systematic evaluation of state-of-the-art models and agent frameworks. Our results show that skill availability does not guarantee effective skill usage, that the benefit of skill augmentation depends strongly on both the underlying model and the agent framework, and that many publicly popular skills do not consistently outperform base agents without skills. These findings highlight the need for dynamic, task-grounded evaluation and provide practical insights into the design, selection, and deployment of skills for LLM agents. Additional cases and benchmark resources are available on the project website: https://yingjiahao14.github.io/OpenSkillEval-Web/.

Existing emotional support conversation (ESC) systems mainly rely on end-to-end response generation or coarse strategy supervision, offering limited interpretability and little support for systematic skill improvement. We propose ESC-Skills, a skill-centric framework that discovers and self-evolves executable emotional support skills. We first model localized support interactions as Intervention Units (IUs), which capture state--action--outcome dynamics between seeker states, support interventions, and post-response emotional changes. Based on IUs extracted from both successful and failed ESC dialogues, we construct the ESC-Skills Bank, a repository of executable emotional support skills containing intervention guidance, applicability conditions, expected outcomes, and potential risks. To further improve robustness, we introduce a multi-profile self-evolutionary refinement framework in which an ESC agent interacts with diverse simulated seeker profiles under SAGE evaluation. The resulting interaction traces are analyzed to identify missing skills, unsafe interventions, and profile-specific failure patterns, which are then used to refine the Skills Bank through simulation-based verification. Experimental results demonstrate that ESC-Skills improves both response-level quality and dialogue-level emotional outcomes while providing more interpretable and controllable support behaviors. We will release the code, prompts, and ESC-Skills Bank at https://github.com/aliyun/qwen-dianjin.

Agent skills are reusable procedural artifacts that extend language agents with specialized workflows, tool conventions, and domain behaviors at inference time. However, creating reliable skills still depends largely on human authorship, model priors, or execution traces. These sources are often unavailable for unfamiliar tasks, suggesting the need to create skills from open-world materials. In this paper, we study open-world skill creation: given an underspecified skill brief and a source-access specification, a creator must discover behavior-relevant requirements omitted by the brief and determine how broadly each source-derived procedure is justified. We propose SkillAlchemy, an admission-centered framework for source-grounded skill creation. SkillAlchemy identifies implicit requirements through contrastive evidence, admits candidate procedures based on evidence-supported scope, and compiles the admitted content into a grammar-guided skill package. Extensive experiments across 87 SkillsBench v1.1 tasks demonstrate that SkillAlchemy improves pass rate over no-skill execution by 19.9 percentage points and the strongest automated baseline by 8.6 percentage points, while achieving performance comparable to human-curated skills.

Skill usage has become a core component of modern agent systems and can substantially improve agents' ability to complete complex tasks. In real-world settings, where agents must monitor and interact with numerous personal applications, web browsers, and other environment interfaces, skill libraries can scale to thousands of reusable skills. Scaling to larger skill sets introduces two key challenges. First, loading the full skill set saturates the context window, driving up token costs, hallucination, and latency. In this paper, we present Graph of Skills (GoS), an inference-time structural retrieval layer for large skill libraries. GoS constructs an executable skill graph offline from skill packages, then at inference time retrieves a bounded, dependency-aware skill bundle through hybrid semantic-lexical seeding, reverse-weighted Personalized PageRank, and context-budgeted hydration. On SkillsBench and ALFWorld, GoS improves average reward by 43.6% over the vanilla full skill-loading baseline while reducing input tokens by 37.8%, and generalizes across three model families: Claude Sonnet, GPT-5.2 Codex, and MiniMax. Additional ablation studies across skill libraries ranging from 200 to 2,000 skills further demonstrate that GoS consistently outperforms both vanilla skills loading and simple vector retrieval in balancing reward, token efficiency, and runtime.

AI red teaming must continually adapt to evolving attackers and defenders. Reinforcement learning offers a promising approach to discovering novel attacks, and co-training methods can produce more robust defenders in tandem. Recent works have demonstrated the efficacy of attacker-defender co-training by applying PPO and DPO, but report that GRPO is unstable in this setting. We introduce AdvGRPO, a co-training framework that makes GRPO viable for joint attacker-defender optimization using dense multi-channel rewards and decoupled advantage normalization. Training progresses through a curriculum from single-turn to closed-loop multi-turn attacks before bootstrapping co-training, where attacker and defender models are updated in alternation. We show that our method can produce highly effective and transferable attacks and that co-trained defenders outperform baselines on safety benchmarks.

We present Game-Guided Skill Discovery (GGSD), a framework that uses self-play in games to discover motor skills that are directly playable by humans. Playable skills provide a compact abstraction for controlling embodied agents through a small set of learned behaviors rather than low-level actions. To be effective, these skills should be semantically distinct, interpretable, and expressive; properties that existing unsupervised skill-discovery methods often fail to achieve simultaneously. GGSD achieves these desiderata by grounding skill discovery in competitive gameplay. A hierarchical agent competes against its past selves, with a high-level policy selecting from a small discrete skill set and a skill-conditioned low-level policy learning the corresponding behaviors. After training, a human can replace the high-level policy and directly control the agent through the same discrete skills. Despite the small number of high-level actions, skill transitions give rise to emergent combo behaviors, expanding expressivity beyond individual primitives. Across Ant, Franka-arm, and Unitree G1 environments, we show that GGSD produces human-playable skills that humans can compose to solve unseen tasks, such as Maze and CubePush, without additional training. An interactive demo is available at https://ggsd-demo.github.io.

A persistent skill library allows language model agents to reuse successful strategies across tasks. Maintaining such a library requires three coupled capabilities. The agent selects a relevant skill, utilizes it during execution, and distills new skills from experience. Existing methods optimize these capabilities in isolation or with separate reward sources, resulting in partial and conflicting evolution. We propose Skill1, a framework that trains a single policy to co-evolve skill selection, utilization, and distillation toward a shared task-outcome objective. The policy generates a query to search the skill library, re-ranks candidates to select one, solves the task conditioned on it, and distills a new skill from the trajectory. All learning derives from a single task-outcome signal. Its low-frequency trend credits selection and its high-frequency variation credits distillation. Experiments on ALFWorld and WebShop show that Skill1 outperforms prior skill-based and reinforcement learning baselines. Training dynamics confirm the co-evolution of the three capabilities, and ablations show that removing any credit signal degrades the evolution.

Learning from experience is critical for building capable large language model (LLM) agents, yet prevailing self-evolving paradigms remain inefficient: agents learn in isolation, repeatedly rediscover similar behaviors from limited experience, resulting in redundant exploration and poor generalization. To address this problem, we propose SkillX, a fully automated framework for constructing a plug-and-play skill knowledge base that can be reused across agents and environments. SkillX operates through a fully automated pipeline built on three synergistic innovations: (i) Multi-Level Skills Design, which distills raw trajectories into three-tiered hierarchy of strategic plans, functional skills, and atomic skills; (ii) Iterative Skills Refinement, which automatically revises skills based on execution feedback to continuously improve library quality; and (iii) Exploratory Skills Expansion, which proactively generates and validates novel skills to expand coverage beyond seed training data. Using a strong backbone agent (GLM-4.6), we automatically build a reusable skill library and evaluate its transferability on challenging long-horizon, user-interactive benchmarks, including AppWorld, BFCL-v3, and τ^2-Bench. Experiments show that SkillKB consistently improves task success and execution efficiency when plugged into weaker base agents, highlighting the importance of structured, hierarchical experience representations for generalizable agent learning. Our code will be publicly available soon at https://github.com/zjunlp/SkillX.

Large Language Model agents are increasingly augmented with agent skills. Current evaluation methods for skills remain limited. Most deployed benchmarks report only pass rate before and after a skill is attached, treating the skill as a black box change to agent behavior. We introduce Counterfactual Trace Auditing (CTA), a framework for measuring how a skill changes agent behavior. CTA pairs each with skill agent trace with a without skill counterpart on the same task, segments both traces into goal directed phases, aligns the phases, and emits structured Skill Influence Pattern (SIP) annotations. These annotations describe the behavioral effect of a skill rather than only its task outcome. We instantiate CTA on SWE-Skills-Bench with Claude across 49 software engineering tasks. The resulting audit reveals a clear evaluation gap. Pass rate changes by only +0.3 percentage points on average, suggesting little aggregate effect. Yet CTA identifies 522 SIP instances across the same paired traces, showing that the skills substantially reshape agent behavior even when pass rate is nearly unchanged. The audit also separates several recurring effects that pass rate cannot detect, including literal template copying, off task artifact creation, excess planning, and task recovery. Three findings emerge. First, high baseline tasks contain most of the observed skill effects, although their pass rate is already saturated and therefore cannot reflect those effects. Second, tasks with moderate baseline performance show the most recoverable gain, but often at substantially higher token cost. Third, the dominant SIP type can be identified by baseline bucket: surface anchoring is most common on ceiling tasks and edge-case prompting is most common on mid-range and floor tasks. These regularities turn informal failure mode observations into reproducible behavioral measurements.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in offensive cybersecurity. In this paper, we reveal an interesting phenomenon: different agents exhibit distinct attack patterns. Specifically, each agent exhibits an attack-selection bias, disproportionately concentrating its efforts on a narrow subset of attack families regardless of prompt variations. To systematically quantify this behavior, we introduce CyBiasBench, a comprehensive 630-session benchmark that evaluates five agents on three targets and four prompt conditions with ten attack families. We identify explicit bias across agents, with different dominant attack families and varying entropy levels in their attack-family allocation distributions. Such bias is better characterized as a trait of the agents, rather than a factor associated with the attack success rate. Furthermore, our experiments reveal a bias momentum effect, where agents resist explicit steering toward attack families that conflict with their bias. This forced distribution shift does not yield measurable improvements in attack performance. To ensure reproducibility and facilitate future research, we release an interactive result dashboard at https://trustworthyai.co.kr/CyBiasBench/ and a reproducibility artifact with aggregated session-level statistics and full evaluation scripts at https://github.com/Harry24k/CyBiasBench.

Agent skills are the de facto mechanism for extending LLM agents with reusable guidance. A skill can shape the agent's task execution, including planning, tool use, problem-solving, and validation. Prior work reported mixed results of agent skills: some skills improve task success rates, while others have no effect, increase token use and execution time, and even reduce success rates. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of skill-induced agent failures by attributing task failures and cost regressions to specific loaded skills. We introduce a differential analysis framework that attributes a failure or regression to a skill by comparing a target skill-guided run against a no-skill or semantically matched skill reference run that solves the same task, or solves it more cheaply. We instantiate this framework on SkillsBench and SWE-Skills-Bench, yielding 307 skill-induced failures, including 125 functional failures and 182 efficiency regressions. We also build SkillTriage, a taxonomy-guided attribution tool that normalizes paired cases, extracts differential evidence, and produces triage reports. Our major findings include: (1) Skill induced functional failures are rarely caused by obviously irrelevant skills; instead, seemingly relevant skills often make the agent incorrectly implement or omit task-required implementation elements. (2) Skill-induced efficiency regressions are not explained by prompt length alone. (3) The largest sources within Excessive Procedure are excessive verification and heavy implementation pipelines, contributing 67 and 30 cases, respectively. This shows that skills often turn validation checklists and construction recipes into mandatory work. Based on our findings, we propose research topics and tooling improvements for safer and more cost-aware skill reuse.

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

Agent skills provide reusable knowledge and instructions, yet agents must repeatedly infer how to apply them and which operation should follow. This couples task reasoning with control decisions, allowing prescribed steps to be omitted or applied incorrectly. We introduce HEXIS, which compiles agent skills into extended finite state machines that separate knowledge from control flow. Skill knowledge is incorporated into local instructions that guide reasoning and generation within states. The machine records execution progress and intermediate results, while explicit transition conditions determine subsequent operations. Our incremental compiler first maps skill clauses and tool interfaces to state operations, local instructions, data bindings, and transitions. It then aligns development traces with existing states to identify missing operations and dependencies. These are incorporated by adding or reusing states and refining their connections. Updates are accepted only after static checks and replay of the current and all previously accepted traces. Across four benchmarks and four executors, HEXIS improves success over Skill + ReAct by 16.1 percentage points on average. Qwen3.8-27B reduces execution tokens by 38.4-88.9% across benchmarks.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on reusable external skills to solve long-horizon interactive tasks. Existing training-free skill adaptation pipelines usually update skills from full trajectories or session-level feedback, which makes failure attribution coarse and often produces unstable or overly broad revisions. We propose SkillAdaptor, a training-free step-level skill adaptation framework with explicit failure attribution, and it can plug into OpenClaw-class agent harnesses. Given a failed trajectory, SkillAdaptor identifies a first actionable fault step, links responsibility to candidate skills, and applies targeted updates under explicit acceptance checks while keeping the backbone frozen. We evaluate on WebShop, PinchBench, and Claw-Eval with Kimi-K2.5, GLM-5, and GPT-5.2. SkillAdaptor improves over no-skill and skill-adaptation baselines on all three suites, with the largest single-metric improvements of +1.5 points on PinchBench Avg Score%, +1.8 on Claw-Eval Avg Score, and +1.7 on WebShop success rate. These results indicate that step-level attribution supports more stable and auditable training-free skill maintenanceThe code will be released at https://github.com/zjunlp/SkillAdaptor..

AI agents can extend their capabilities at inference time by loading reusable skills into context, yet equipping an agent with too many skills, particularly irrelevant ones, degrades performance. As community-driven skill repositories grow, agents need a way to selectively retrieve only the most relevant skills from a large library. We present SkillFlow, the first open, multi-stage retrieval system for agent skill discovery that frames skill acquisition as an information retrieval problem over a corpus of ~35K community-contributed SKILL.md definitions indexed from GitHub. The pipeline progressively narrows a large candidate set through four stages (dense retrieval, two rounds of cross-encoder reranking, and LLM-based selection), balancing recall and precision at each stage. We evaluate SkillFlow on two coding benchmarks: SkillsBench, a benchmark of 87 tasks and 229 matched skills; and Terminal-Bench, a benchmark that provides only 89 tasks, and no matched skills. On SkillsBench, SkillFlow-retrieved skills raise Pass@1 from 9.2% to 16.4% (+78.3%, p_{adj} = 3.64 times 10^{-2}), reaching 84.1% of the oracle ceiling, while on Terminal-Bench, agents readily use the retrieved skills (70.1% use rate) yet show no performance gain, revealing that retrieval alone is insufficient when the corpus lacks high-quality, executable skills for the target domain. SkillFlow demonstrates that framing skill acquisition as an information retrieval task is an effective strategy, and that the practical impact of skill-augmented agents hinges on corpus coverage and skill quality, particularly the density of runnable code and bundled artifacts. (GitHub: https://github.com/IBPA/skill-flow)

Agent frameworks increasingly package procedural knowledge as skills: instruction files an agent reads on demand, while public libraries now hold thousands of them. Which skill to read has thus become a decision the policy itself makes in the middle of an episode, yet no existing signal trains it. We show that the default remedy, outcome-rewarded RL over the candidate slate, cannot teach it, for a structural reason we identify and name selector credit starvation: under a broadcast, sequence-level advantage, the few tokens that name the chosen skill carry a vanishing share of the loss, and the credit they inherit is increasingly wrong-signed as trajectories lengthen. A correct choice is punished whenever the execution after it fails, even though the choice itself is among the most valuable decisions in the trajectory. Auditing a completed run's own training artifacts confirms all three properties, each worsening monotonically with horizon. SkillGate removes the failure by construction: it partitions the token support into two disjoint credit channels, outcome credit reaching only execution tokens, and a separate action-local advantage reaching exactly the skill-naming tokens, positive only when a trajectory's single read is the correct one. On five agentic benchmarks under a 16-candidate slate, SkillGate lifts a 9B policy from 40.8% to 53.2% trial success, well ahead of the identical budget spent on outcome reward alone, while cutting exposure to misleading candidates by two thirds and reading fewer skills.

Deploying LLM-powered agents in enterprise scenarios such as cloud technical support demands high-quality, domain-specific skills. However, existing skill creators lack domain grounding, producing skills poorly aligned with real-world task requirements. Moreover, once deployed, there is no systematic mechanism to trace execution failures back to skill deficiencies and drive targeted refinements, leaving skill quality stagnant despite accumulating operational evidence. We introduce SkillForge, a self-evolving framework that closes an end-to-end creation-evaluation-refinement loop. To produce well-aligned initial skills, a Domain-Contextualized Skill Creator grounds skill synthesis in knowledge bases and historical support tickets. To enable continuous self-optimization, a three-stage pipeline -- Failure Analyzer, Skill Diagnostician, and Skill Optimizer -- automatically diagnoses execution failures in batch, pinpoints the underlying skill deficiencies, and rewrites the skill to eliminate them. This cycle runs iteratively, allowing skills to self-improve with every round of deployment feedback. Evaluated on five real-world cloud support scenarios spanning 1,883 tickets and 3,737 tasks, experiments show that: (1) the Domain-Contextualized Skill Creator produces substantially better initial skills than the generic skill creator, as measured by consistency with expert-authored reference responses from historical tickets; and (2) the self-evolution loop progressively improves skill quality from diverse starting points (including expert-authored, domain-created, and generic skills) across successive rounds, demonstrating that automated evolution can surpass manually curated expert knowledge.

Agent skills are portable packages of instructions and resources an agent consults at deployment. Self-evolving them fails in two ways today. First, skills evolved from scratch underperform human-curated ones and, on a weak model, using no skill at all. Second, an evolution-time pass records one lucky trajectory that a fresh stochastic agent often fails to reproduce at deployment. We present reSolve, a per-task, oracle-in-the-loop framework built on three components. It decouples interactive solving from a self-contained deliverable that is independently re-executed in a fresh container, a protocol we call solve-and-reproduce. It enhances the sparse reward signal with a surrogate verifier that cannot access hidden tests or reference answers. It then runs verifier-guided beam search over a solution-construction graph. Within a fixed harness, a cheap model self-evolves skills that reach 74.9% mean-of-3, +14.8 points over the 60.1% human-curated baseline, exceeding the strongest official curated-skill result (67.3%, GPT-5.5/OpenHands). We also report observed failure cases and domain-level results, including performance on the 14 Natural Science tasks, to clarify when the approach does and does not help.

Large language model (LLM) agents can benefit from reusable skills distilled from prior task experience, yet existing skill optimization methods often rely on costly execution-based evaluation and substantial task data. We introduce COBRA-Skills, an efficient framework that formulates skill optimization as budgeted sequential optimization over a dynamically evolving candidate space. COBRA-Skills couples contextual-bandit-guided prioritization with evidence-grounded skill evolution, selectively allocating evaluations to promising or informative candidates while continually refining the skill population from execution feedback. Across six heterogeneous agent benchmarks and three target models, COBRA-Skills consistently achieves the strongest average performance among compared methods, while reducing optimization cost by 55--58\% relative to SkillOpt and using only 50 unique optimization examples per benchmark. Further analyses show that COBRA-Skills remains robust to changes in the agent harness and performs effectively when the target model itself is used for skill generation and refinement.

Reusable skills are becoming a fundamental building block of Large Language Model (LLM) agents, enabling capabilities to be packaged, shared, and reused across diverse applications. However, existing security research primarily focuses on prompt injection and runtime execution, leaving security risks throughout the broader skill lifecycle largely unexplored. In this paper, we present SkillSec-Eval, a lifecycle-aware framework for systematically evaluating the security of reusable agent skills. We first characterize the skill lifecycle and develop a threat taxonomy spanning repository admission, semantic retrieval, planner selection, execution, and skill evolution. We then instantiate this taxonomy in SkillSec-Eval and conduct a comprehensive empirical evaluation using a repository of 327 real-world skills. Our study demonstrates that vulnerabilities arise at multiple lifecycle stages beyond execution, highlighting the need for lifecycle-aware security analysis of reusable agent skills.

The vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial patches has motivated numerous defense strategies for boosting model robustness. However, the prevailing defenses depend on single observation or pre-established adversary information to counter adversarial patches, often failing to be confronted with unseen or adaptive adversarial attacks and easily exhibiting unsatisfying performance in dynamic 3D environments. Inspired by active human perception and recurrent feedback mechanisms, we develop Embodied Active Defense (EAD), a proactive defensive strategy that actively contextualizes environmental information to address misaligned adversarial patches in 3D real-world settings. To achieve this, EAD develops two central recurrent sub-modules, i.e., a perception module and a policy module, to implement two critical functions of active vision. These models recurrently process a series of beliefs and observations, facilitating progressive refinement of their comprehension of the target object and enabling the development of strategic actions to counter adversarial patches in 3D environments. To optimize learning efficiency, we incorporate a differentiable approximation of environmental dynamics and deploy patches that are agnostic to the adversary strategies. Extensive experiments demonstrate that EAD substantially enhances robustness against a variety of patches within just a few steps through its action policy in safety-critical tasks (e.g., face recognition and object detection), without compromising standard accuracy. Furthermore, due to the attack-agnostic characteristic, EAD facilitates excellent generalization to unseen attacks, diminishing the averaged attack success rate by 95 percent across a range of unseen adversarial attacks.

Humanoid soccer is a challenging testbed for dynamic whole-body control, requiring robots to coordinate balance, locomotion, object interaction, and skill switching over long horizons. Existing humanoid sports methods often rely on task-specific multi-stage pipelines, making it difficult to jointly learn and compose multiple object-interactive skills within a single deployable policy. To address this, we present SkillX, a unified reinforcement learning framework that learns and composes multiple atomic soccer skills through a single command-conditioned policy. SkillX integrates three core designs: skill-specific adversarial motion priors, skill-specific critics, and an object-aware temporal encoder, enabling the robot to execute atomic skills and transition among them such as dribbling, trapping, and shooting. Experiments in simulation and on a real Noetix E1 humanoid demonstrate robust multi-skill execution, long-horizon skill composition, and successful sim-to-real deployment.

This study exposes the safety vulnerabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-turn interactions, where malicious users can obscure harmful intents across several queries. We introduce ActorAttack, a novel multi-turn attack method inspired by actor-network theory, which models a network of semantically linked actors as attack clues to generate diverse and effective attack paths toward harmful targets. ActorAttack addresses two main challenges in multi-turn attacks: (1) concealing harmful intents by creating an innocuous conversation topic about the actor, and (2) uncovering diverse attack paths towards the same harmful target by leveraging LLMs' knowledge to specify the correlated actors as various attack clues. In this way, ActorAttack outperforms existing single-turn and multi-turn attack methods across advanced aligned LLMs, even for GPT-o1. We will publish a dataset called SafeMTData, which includes multi-turn adversarial prompts and safety alignment data, generated by ActorAttack. We demonstrate that models safety-tuned using our safety dataset are more robust to multi-turn attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/renqibing/ActorAttack.

Teaching language models to use search tools is not only a question of whether they search, but also of whether they issue good queries. This is especially important in open-domain question answering, where broad or copied queries often waste retrieval budget and derail later reasoning. We propose \Ours, a framework that makes query planning explicit through reusable search skills. At each step, the model first selects a skill, then generates a search or answer action conditioned on the selected skill card. The skill inventory itself is not fixed: SearchSkill maintains an evolving SkillBank, expands or refines it from recurrent failure patterns, and reconstructs affected trajectories before supervised training. The resulting two-stage SFT recipe aligns training with the inference-time protocol of skill selection followed by skill-grounded execution. Across open-source and closed-source models, SearchSkill improves exact match on knowledge-intensive QA benchmarks and yields better retrieval behavior, including fewer copied first queries, more atomic hop-focused queries, and more correct answers within a small search budget. These results suggest that explicit skill-conditioned query planning is a lightweight alternative to treating search as an undifferentiated action.

To succeed in common digital tasks such as web navigation, agents must carry out a variety of specialized tasks such as searching for products or planning a travel route. To tackle these tasks, agents can bootstrap themselves by learning task-specific skills online through interaction with the web environment. In this work, we demonstrate that programs are an effective representation for skills. We propose agent skill induction (ASI), which allows agents to adapt themselves by inducing, verifying, and utilizing program-based skills on the fly. We start with an evaluation on the WebArena agent benchmark and show that ASI outperforms the static baseline agent and its text-skill counterpart by 23.5% and 11.3% in success rate, mainly thanks to the programmatic verification guarantee during the induction phase. ASI also improves efficiency by reducing 10.7-15.3% of the steps over baselines, by composing primitive actions (e.g., click) into higher-level skills (e.g., search product). We then highlight the efficacy of ASI in remaining efficient and accurate under scaled-up web activities. Finally, we examine the generalizability of induced skills when transferring between websites, and find that ASI can effectively reuse common skills, while also updating incompatible skills to versatile website changes.

Dexterous manipulation policies learned by imitation are typically evaluated for robustness to variation in scenes, objects, or instructions, but their performance across task execution speeds is less often examined. This leaves open how much temporal robustness a learner retains relative to the expert it imitates. We compare an expert and learner under the same task conditions, initial-condition draws, and speedup factors. We instantiate the evaluation in ParcelStow, a contact-rich task in which the robot acquires, reorients, and inserts a parcel. The demonstrations span the speedup range for the manipulation phases after parcel acquisition. A scripted expert and an Action Chunking with Transformers (ACT) policy trained from the expert's demonstrations both achieve 100 percent task success at nominal speed. Their success rates diverge within the demonstrated range: at its maximum, expert success is 84 percent and ACT success is 53 percent. Two ACT policies with different parameter initializations show similar degradation, decreasing by 34 and 48 percentage points from nominal speed to the maximum demonstrated speed, compared with 16 points for the expert. Stage-level analysis shows that 35 of ACT's 47 failures at the maximum demonstrated speed are insertion misalignments. Under the relative-motion handoff, every ACT acquisition retains the parcel through reorientation and transfer in free space, but only 64 percent complete the overall task, compared with 95 percent after expert acquisition. Across all evaluated policies and speeds, none of the 414 acquisitions without force closure completes the task. Equal nominal task success therefore does not imply preservation of expert performance across execution speeds. Code, data, and evaluation scripts are available at https://github.com/coenwerem/parcelstow.

Human-written agent skills encode rich workflows for real-world problem solving, but are typically used as external inference-time instructions rather than internalized as reusable model capabilities. We introduce SkillGym, a framework that transforms these skills into executable, verifiable training environments for large language model agents. Its skill-to-task pipeline instantiates concrete tasks, verifies outcomes with code-based checkers, and assesses empirical skill dependence through contrastive executions. We construct and release 2,756 environments across 12 categories and collect 8,364 successful trajectories from multiple models and harnesses, averaging 49 tool calls and over 60k logged text tokens. These resources support supervised fine-tuning on verified workflows and reinforcement learning with outcome-based rewards. Under Claude Code, supervised fine-tuning improves Qwen3.5-35B-A3B by 199 Elo on GDPval-AA v2, 19.10 percentage points on Terminal-Bench 2.1, and 28.13 and 12.38 points on SkillsBench v1.1 with and without skills, respectively. Our 35B SkillGym-Agent reaches 51.47\% on skill-assisted SkillsBench, exceeding reported scores for Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT-5.4 Mini, and DeepSeek V4 Pro. Without skills, it also surpasses skill-assisted bases under Codex and Claude Code, suggesting reusable procedural competence.

Skill-augmented reinforcement learning improves language agents by storing reusable procedural knowledge acquired from past experience. Existing methods typically use strong language models to analyze trajectories, generate skills, and update a retrievable skill bank during online training. However, they rarely assess whether a newly generated skill is useful before it is stored and reused. We find that this assumption is unreliable: even skills generated by proprietary frontier LLMs exhibit highly mixed utility, with many providing little benefit or even degrading performance. Once such skills enter the bank, their effects are difficult to identify, because subsequent rollout feedback is delayed and usually reflects the combined effect of multiple retrieved skills rather than the marginal contribution of any individual skill. We propose an online reinforcement learning framework for pre-storage skill validation. The framework estimates whether a candidate skill contributes useful information beyond the skills already retrieved for the current task. It uses the standard rollout budget to form two matched groups under the same task and retrieval context: base rollouts conditioned on the currently retrieved skills, and skill-augmented rollouts conditioned on the same skills plus one candidate skill induced from the base trajectories. The reward gap between these two groups estimates the candidate skill's context-dependent marginal utility, enabling the framework to promote useful skills while filtering ineffective or harmful ones without additional rollout overhead. The framework further uses this marginal-utility signal to train the policy itself as a skill generator, reducing reliance on repeated calls to proprietary models. The learned skill-generation likelihood serves as a context-dependent score for retrieval-time reranking and outdated-skill pruning as the policy evolves.

Contrastive Learning (CL) has attracted enormous attention due to its remarkable capability in unsupervised representation learning. However, recent works have revealed the vulnerability of CL to backdoor attacks: the feature extractor could be misled to embed backdoored data close to an attack target class, thus fooling the downstream predictor to misclassify it as the target. Existing attacks usually adopt a fixed trigger pattern and poison the training set with trigger-injected data, hoping for the feature extractor to learn the association between trigger and target class. However, we find that such fixed trigger design fails to effectively associate trigger-injected data with target class in the embedding space due to special CL mechanisms, leading to a limited attack success rate (ASR). This phenomenon motivates us to find a better backdoor trigger design tailored for CL framework. In this paper, we propose a bi-level optimization approach to achieve this goal, where the inner optimization simulates the CL dynamics of a surrogate victim, and the outer optimization enforces the backdoor trigger to stay close to the target throughout the surrogate CL procedure. Extensive experiments show that our attack can achieve a higher attack success rate (e.g., 99% ASR on ImageNet-100) with a very low poisoning rate (1%). Besides, our attack can effectively evade existing state-of-the-art defenses. Code is available at: https://github.com/SWY666/SSL-backdoor-BLTO.

Despite recent rapid progress in AI safety, current large language models remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks in multi-turn interaction settings, where attackers strategically adapt their prompts across conversation turns and pose a more critical yet realistic challenge. Existing approaches that discover safety vulnerabilities either rely on manual red-teaming with human experts or employ automated methods using pre-defined templates and human-curated attack data, with most focusing on single-turn attacks. However, these methods did not explore the vast space of possible multi-turn attacks, failing to consider novel attack trajectories that emerge from complex dialogue dynamics and strategic conversation planning. This gap is particularly critical given recent findings that LLMs exhibit significantly higher vulnerability to multi-turn attacks compared to single-turn attacks. We propose DialTree-RPO, an on-policy reinforcement learning framework integrated with tree search that autonomously discovers diverse multi-turn attack strategies by treating the dialogue as a sequential decision-making problem, enabling systematic exploration without manually curated data. Through extensive experiments, our approach not only achieves more than 25.9% higher ASR across 10 target models compared to previous state-of-the-art approaches, but also effectively uncovers new attack strategies by learning optimal dialogue policies that maximize attack success across multiple turns.

Adversarial attacks in reinforcement learning (RL) often assume highly-privileged access to the victim's parameters, environment, or data. Instead, this paper proposes a novel adversarial setting called a Cheap Talk MDP in which an Adversary can merely append deterministic messages to the Victim's observation, resulting in a minimal range of influence. The Adversary cannot occlude ground truth, influence underlying environment dynamics or reward signals, introduce non-stationarity, add stochasticity, see the Victim's actions, or access their parameters. Additionally, we present a simple meta-learning algorithm called Adversarial Cheap Talk (ACT) to train Adversaries in this setting. We demonstrate that an Adversary trained with ACT still significantly influences the Victim's training and testing performance, despite the highly constrained setting. Affecting train-time performance reveals a new attack vector and provides insight into the success and failure modes of existing RL algorithms. More specifically, we show that an ACT Adversary is capable of harming performance by interfering with the learner's function approximation, or instead helping the Victim's performance by outputting useful features. Finally, we show that an ACT Adversary can manipulate messages during train-time to directly and arbitrarily control the Victim at test-time. Project video and code are available at https://sites.google.com/view/adversarial-cheap-talk

We present Skill Transformer, an approach for solving long-horizon robotic tasks by combining conditional sequence modeling and skill modularity. Conditioned on egocentric and proprioceptive observations of a robot, Skill Transformer is trained end-to-end to predict both a high-level skill (e.g., navigation, picking, placing), and a whole-body low-level action (e.g., base and arm motion), using a transformer architecture and demonstration trajectories that solve the full task. It retains the composability and modularity of the overall task through a skill predictor module while reasoning about low-level actions and avoiding hand-off errors, common in modular approaches. We test Skill Transformer on an embodied rearrangement benchmark and find it performs robust task planning and low-level control in new scenarios, achieving a 2.5x higher success rate than baselines in hard rearrangement problems.

Multimodal large language models with Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) have significantly advanced tasks such as multimodal question answering by grounding responses in external text and images. This grounding improves factuality, reduces hallucination, and extends reasoning beyond parametric knowledge. However, this reliance on external knowledge poses a critical yet underexplored safety risk: knowledge poisoning attacks, where adversaries deliberately inject adversarial multimodal content into external knowledge bases to steer model toward generating incorrect or even harmful responses. To expose such vulnerabilities, we propose MM-PoisonRAG, the first framework to systematically design knowledge poisoning in multimodal RAG. We introduce two complementary attack strategies: Localized Poisoning Attack (LPA), which implants targeted multimodal misinformation to manipulate specific queries, and Globalized Poisoning Attack (GPA), which inserts a single adversarial knowledge to broadly disrupt reasoning and induce nonsensical responses across all queries. Comprehensive experiments across tasks, models, and access settings show that LPA achieves targeted manipulation with attack success rates of up to 56%, while GPA completely disrupts model generation to 0% accuracy with just a single adversarial knowledge injection. Our results reveal the fragility of multimodal RAG and highlight the urgent need for defenses against knowledge poisoning.

Skill-based prompting has become a practical mechanism for improving large language model (LLM) agents, yet existing skill acquisition methods often treat skills as experience summaries, memory entries, or direct summaries of successful demonstrations. This creates a mismatch for weaker student agents: when a student fails because it lacks task knowledge or operational strategy, its failed trajectory may not contain enough evidence to infer the missing behavior, while the teacher trajectory may be too implicit to be internalized as reusable guidance. We propose SKILL-KD, a contrastive skill distillation framework that treats skills as an explicit distillation medium between agents of different capabilities. Given a student failure and the teacher trajectory on the same task, SKILL-KD distills their actionable discrepancy into a textual skill patch, evaluates the patch by re-running the student, and iteratively refines the patch when the student still fails. To prevent repeated local updates from causing skill drift, SKILL-KD further maintains trace-linked edit histories and performs Drift-Aware Skill Consolidation, deciding whether each patch should add a new rule, delete or modify an existing rule, or be skipped. Across five agent benchmarks and two student settings, SKILL-KD consistently improves frozen student agents over fixed-model adaptation baselines.

Despite extensive diagnostics and debugging by developers, AI systems sometimes exhibit harmful unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is so large -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for inputs that may elicit harmful behaviors. Red-teaming and adversarial training (AT) are commonly used to improve robustness, however, they empirically struggle to fix failure modes that differ from the attacks used during training. In this work, we utilize latent adversarial training (LAT) to defend against vulnerabilities without leveraging knowledge of what they are or using inputs that elicit them. LAT makes use of the compressed, abstract, and structured latent representations of concepts that the network actually uses for prediction. Here, we use it to defend against failure modes without examples that elicit them. Specifically, we use LAT to remove trojans and defend against held-out classes of adversarial attacks. We show in image classification, text classification, and text generation tasks that LAT usually improves both robustness to novel attacks and performance on clean data relative to AT. This suggests that LAT can be a promising tool for defending against failure modes that are not explicitly identified by developers.

GUI agents execute long-horizon tasks on dynamic graphical user interfaces, where pop-ups, delayed loads, and relocated widgets routinely invalidate plans fixed before execution. Recent agent-skill frameworks encapsulate reusable procedural knowledge to mitigate this, yet existing skill designs are largely developed without targeting GUI execution dynamics and treat skills as static artifacts produced before deployment rather than living procedural knowledge that improves through it. We argue that what GUI agents need is not better static skills, but skills that can be revised from execution feedback at deployment time, without additional training. We propose EvoSkill-GUI, a training-free framework in which each skill is a structured multi-file package containing retrieval metadata, executable plans, backup localization, failure-recovery rules, accessibility utilities, and failure cases. EvoSkill-GUI operates through a \emph{reflect-revise-reuse} loop: the executor performs instant in-rollout revisions, an isolated critic diagnoses failed trajectories under strict information isolation, and the executor edits specific skill files through a restricted tool interface. Across MobileWorld, AndroidWorld, and OSWorld, three mainstream GUI benchmarks spanning mobile and desktop platforms, EvoSkill-GUI consistently improves multiple base models without any training, with maximum gains of +16.2%, +6.0%, and +10.5% respectively, and evolved skill libraries continue to benefit related tasks rather than being rebuilt from scratch. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZJU-REAL/EvoSkill-GUI.

Agent skills represent a standardized format for packaging procedural knowledge and domain expertise, serving within agent harness systems as an essential mechanism to continually constrain a language model's behavior space for repeatable, high-quality task execution. However, because strong closed-source models entail high inference costs, current popular agent harnesses, such as Codex and OpenClaw, remain prohibitively expensive when deploying these skills to accomplish real-world tasks. The rapid capability enhancement of open-source models deployable on consumer-grade GPUs presents a compelling opportunity to drastically reduce these costs by leveraging skill-based behavioral constraints. Nevertheless, automatically generating effective skills tailored specifically for such compact models remains a significant practical challenge. To address this, we propose SKILLER, a natural-language-driven reinforcement learning framework designed to automatically generate executor-specific skills for small models, which employs a strong model as the actor and critic, treats the small-model agent system as the environment, and propagates all reinforcement learning signals entirely via natural language. Extensive experimental evaluations across five relevant benchmarks using Qwen3.5-9B and Qwen3.5-4B demonstrate that SKILLER outperforms three open-source and one closed-source skill generation or evolution methods, achieving absolute gains ranging from 4.3 to 20.4 percentage points for the 9B model and 1.8 to 13.3 points for the 4B model, while remarkably matching the performance of strong closed-source models on single-skill tasks in SkillsBench. The project is available at https://github.com/DANG-ai/SKILLER.

LLM agents acquire new capabilities by downloading skills from open registries. Instead of browsing these catalogs manually, developers typically ask the agent to recommend and install a skill. This convenience hides a risk: agents frequently invent names for skills that exist in no registry. We term this flaw skill name hallucination. A fake name may seem harmless, but it opens the door to supply-chain attacks. Because registries rarely verify publishers, an adversary can prompt the agent, collect the fake names it returns, pre-register malicious skills under them, and wait for a victim to install the payload. We conducted the first large-scale measurement of skill name hallucination, evaluating 15,000 prompts across 12 configurations (4 standalone LLMs and 8 agents). We conservatively counted a name as hallucinated only if it was missing from all live registries and GitHub. The results reveal a systemic vulnerability: every configuration hallucinates. Rates average 36.0% for standalone LLMs and 36.9% for agents, rising to 43.1% on real-world developer questions. In total, the systems generated 5,669 distinct hallucinated names. Crucially, these names are not random noise. Agents repeat the same fake names across prompts and models, giving attackers highly reliable targets to hijack. Finally, we tested four model-level defenses and found a severe conflict between security and usability. The strongest, retrieval grounding, cut the hallucination rate from 40.8% to 3.2% but crippled usefulness: even the best-defended system recommended the correct skill only about one in six times. Skill name hallucination is thus a highly exploitable vulnerability requiring minimal attacker effort. Fixing it cannot rely on prompt engineering or model tuning alone. It demands ecosystem-wide structural changes: registry-level name reservations and verified recommendation pipelines.

Unsupervised skill discovery drives intelligent agents to explore the unknown environment without task-specific reward signal, and the agents acquire various skills which may be useful when the agents adapt to new tasks. In this paper, we propose "Multi-agent Skill Discovery"(MASD), a method for discovering skills for coordination patterns of multiple agents. The proposed method aims to maximize the mutual information between a latent code Z representing skills and the combination of the states of all agents. Meanwhile it suppresses the empowerment of Z on the state of any single agent by adversarial training. In another word, it sets an information bottleneck to avoid empowerment degeneracy. First we show the emergence of various skills on the level of coordination in a general particle multi-agent environment. Second, we reveal that the "bottleneck" prevents skills from collapsing to a single agent and enhances the diversity of learned skills. Finally, we show the pretrained policies have better performance on supervised RL tasks.