Daily Papers

Constructing large-scale datasets for the GitHub issue resolution task is crucial for both training and evaluating the software engineering capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, the traditional process for creating such benchmarks is notoriously challenging and labor-intensive, particularly in the stages of setting up evaluation environments, grading test outcomes, and validating task instances. In this paper, we propose SWE-Factory, an automated pipeline designed to address these challenges. To tackle these issues, our pipeline integrates three core automated components. First, we introduce SWE-Builder, a multi-agent system that automates evaluation environment construction, which employs four specialized agents that work in a collaborative, iterative loop and leverages an environment memory pool to enhance efficiency. Second, we introduce a standardized, exit-code-based grading method that eliminates the need for manually writing custom parsers. Finally, we automate the fail2pass validation process using these reliable exit code signals. Experiments on 671 issues across four programming languages show that our pipeline can effectively construct valid task instances; for example, with GPT-4.1-mini, our SWE-Builder constructs 269 valid instances at 0.045 per instance, while with Gemini-2.5-flash, it achieves comparable performance at the lowest cost of 0.024 per instance. We also demonstrate that our exit-code-based grading achieves 100% accuracy compared to manual inspection, and our automated fail2pass validation reaches a precision of 0.92 and a recall of 1.00. We hope our automated pipeline will accelerate the collection of large-scale, high-quality GitHub issue resolution datasets for both training and evaluation. Our code and datasets are released at https://github.com/DeepSoftwareAnalytics/swe-factory.

Self-improving AI agents are designed to learn from their mistakes. We show they can also hallucinate mistakes that never happened. We study this failure mode in automated harness optimization, where an LLM-based proposer edits an agent's scaffold, including prompts, parsers, filters, validators and guardrails, to eliminate observed failures. But this process rarely asks first: was there a real failure to fix? We introduce the Counterfactual Fabrication Lab, a deterministic micro-lab where the correct action is known: do nothing. The lab plants a candidate guardrail for a failure class that provably never occurs, presents only legal episodes, and uses a byte-exact oracle to check every cited violation. The proposer behaves as expected on real violations and abstains on featureless legal input. Yet when the legal input contains a harmless pattern resembling a familiar game rule, it invents a failure: in 15/60 runs, versus 0/60 on featureless input, it enables the nonexistent-rule guardrail and cites a violation the oracle refutes. The effect is structured, not indiscriminate. In single-shot proposals it appears only when three conditions coincide: a rule-shaped pattern, an open-ended rule set and an instruction that presupposes failures. Removing any of these conditions eliminates the fabrication. Because the invented guardrail changes no true outcome and cannot improve an already-perfect suppression score, the phenomenon is neither reward hacking nor over-refusal. It is a phantom guardrail: a fix for a failure that never happened, invisible to suppression-only acceptance. Inside an add-only accept loop it re-enters even without the failure-presupposing instruction, the loop's keep-adding role supplying the demand the instruction supplied in single shot, and once in it stays. We present the Counterfactual Fabrication Lab for measuring fabricated failures in self-improving agent harnesses.

Writing competitive programming problems is exacting. Authors must: set constraints, input distributions, and edge cases that rule out shortcuts; target specific algorithms (e.g., max-flow, dynamic programming, data structures); and calibrate complexity beyond the reach of most competitors. We argue that this makes for an ideal test of general large language model capabilities and study whether they can do this reliably. We introduce AutoCode, which uses multiple rounds of validation to yield competition-grade problem statements and test cases. On held-out problems, AutoCode test suites approach 99% consistency with official judgments, a significant improvement over current state-of-the-art methods like HardTests, which achieve less than 81%. Furthermore, starting with a random seed problem, AutoCode can create novel variants with reference and brute-force solutions. By cross-verifying these generated solutions against test cases, we can further filter out malformed problems. Our system ensures high correctness, as verified by human experts. AutoCode successfully produces novel problems judged by Grandmaster-level (top 0.3%) competitive programmers to be of contest quality.

We introduce FailureSensorIQ, a novel Multi-Choice Question-Answering (MCQA) benchmarking system designed to assess the ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to reason and understand complex, domain-specific scenarios in Industry 4.0. Unlike traditional QA benchmarks, our system focuses on multiple aspects of reasoning through failure modes, sensor data, and the relationships between them across various industrial assets. Through this work, we envision a paradigm shift where modeling decisions are not only data-driven using statistical tools like correlation analysis and significance tests, but also domain-driven by specialized LLMs which can reason about the key contributors and useful patterns that can be captured with feature engineering. We evaluate the Industrial knowledge of over a dozen LLMs-including GPT-4, Llama, and Mistral-on FailureSensorIQ from different lens using Perturbation-Uncertainty-Complexity analysis, Expert Evaluation study, Asset-Specific Knowledge Gap analysis, ReAct agent using external knowledge-bases. Even though closed-source models with strong reasoning capabilities approach expert-level performance, the comprehensive benchmark reveals a significant drop in performance that is fragile to perturbations, distractions, and inherent knowledge gaps in the models. We also provide a real-world case study of how LLMs can drive the modeling decisions on 3 different failure prediction datasets related to various assets. We release: (a) expert-curated MCQA for various industrial assets, (b) FailureSensorIQ benchmark and Hugging Face leaderboard based on MCQA built from non-textual data found in ISO documents, and (c) LLMFeatureSelector, an LLM-based feature selection scikit-learn pipeline. The software is available at https://github.com/IBM/FailureSensorIQ.

Automated issue solving aims to resolve real-world issues in software repositories. The most popular benchmarks for automated issue solving are SWE-bench and its human-filtered subset SWE-bench Verified. These benchmarks leverage testing to validate generated patches. However, because testing is rarely exhaustive, a patch may pass the tests but nevertheless fail to match the developers' expectations. Unfortunately, it is currently unclear to what extent evaluations performed with SWE-bench suffer from such plausible but incorrect patches. This paper presents an in-depth empirical study of the correctness of plausible patches generated by three state-of-the-art issue-solving tools evaluated on SWE-bench Verified. We extensively test and inspect generated patches, and compare them against human-written ground truth patches. The core of our methodology is a novel technique PatchDiff for differential patch testing, which automatically exposes behavioral discrepancies between two patches. Our findings reveal critical weaknesses in SWE-bench's patch validation mechanism, which causes 7.8% of all patches to count as correct while failing the developer-written test suite. Moreover, our novel automated technique reveals that even more (29.6%) plausible patches induce different behavior than the ground truth patches. These behavioral differences are often due to similar, but divergent implementations (46.8%) and due to generated patches that adapt more behavior than the ground truth patches (27.3%). Our manual inspection shows that 28.6% of behaviorally divergent patches are certainly incorrect. Combined, the different weaknesses lead to an inflation of reported resolution rates by 6.2 absolute percent points. Our findings are a call to arms for more robust and reliable evaluation of issue-solving tools. We envision our automated differential patch testing technique to be useful for this purpose.

We consider the task of mapping pseudocode to long programs that are functionally correct. Given test cases as a mechanism to validate programs, we search over the space of possible translations of the pseudocode to find a program that passes the validation. However, without proper credit assignment to localize the sources of program failures, it is difficult to guide search toward more promising programs. We propose to perform credit assignment based on signals from compilation errors, which constitute 88.7% of program failures. Concretely, we treat the translation of each pseudocode line as a discrete portion of the program, and whenever a synthesized program fails to compile, an error localization method tries to identify the portion of the program responsible for the failure. We then focus search over alternative translations of the pseudocode for those portions. For evaluation, we collected the SPoC dataset (Search-based Pseudocode to Code) containing 18,356 programs with human-authored pseudocode and test cases. Under a budget of 100 program compilations, performing search improves the synthesis success rate over using the top-one translation of the pseudocode from 25.6% to 44.7%.

With the growing adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) in automating complex, multi-agent workflows, organizations face mounting risks from errors, emergent behaviors, and systemic failures that current evaluation methods fail to capture. We present AgentCompass, the first evaluation framework designed specifically for post-deployment monitoring and debugging of agentic workflows. AgentCompass models the reasoning process of expert debuggers through a structured, multi-stage analytical pipeline: error identification and categorization, thematic clustering, quantitative scoring, and strategic summarization. The framework is further enhanced with a dual memory system-episodic and semantic-that enables continual learning across executions. Through collaborations with design partners, we demonstrate the framework's practical utility on real-world deployments, before establishing its efficacy against the publicly available TRAIL benchmark. AgentCompass achieves state-of-the-art results on key metrics, while uncovering critical issues missed in human annotations, underscoring its role as a robust, developer-centric tool for reliable monitoring and improvement of agentic systems in production.

Prompt engineering is a challenging and important task due to the high sensitivity of Large Language Models (LLMs) to the given prompt and the inherent ambiguity of a textual task instruction. Automatic prompt engineering is essential to achieve optimized performance from LLMs. Recent studies have demonstrated the capabilities of LLMs to automatically conduct prompt engineering by employing a meta-prompt that incorporates the outcomes of the last trials and proposes an improved prompt. However, this requires a high-quality benchmark to compare different prompts, which is difficult and expensive to acquire in many real-world use cases. In this work, we introduce a new method for automatic prompt engineering, using a calibration process that iteratively refines the prompt to the user intent. During the optimization process, the system jointly generates synthetic data of boundary use cases and optimizes the prompt according to the generated dataset. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method with respect to strong proprietary models on real-world tasks such as moderation and generation. Our method outperforms state-of-the-art methods with a limited number of annotated samples. Furthermore, we validate the advantages of each one of the system's key components. Our system is built in a modular way, facilitating easy adaptation to other tasks. The code is available https://github.com/Eladlev/AutoPrompt{here}.

Textual passwords are still the most widely used user authentication mechanism. Due to the close connections between textual passwords and natural languages, advanced technologies in natural language processing (NLP) and machine learning (ML) could be used to model passwords for different purposes such as studying human password-creation behaviors and developing more advanced password cracking methods for informing better defence mechanisms. In this paper, we propose PassTSL (modeling human-created Passwords through Two-Stage Learning), inspired by the popular pretraining-finetuning framework in NLP and deep learning (DL). We report how different pretraining settings affected PassTSL and proved its effectiveness by applying it to six large leaked password databases. Experimental results showed that it outperforms five state-of-the-art (SOTA) password cracking methods on password guessing by a significant margin ranging from 4.11% to 64.69% at the maximum point. Based on PassTSL, we also implemented a password strength meter (PSM), and our experiments showed that it was able to estimate password strength more accurately, causing fewer unsafe errors (overestimating the password strength) than two other SOTA PSMs when they produce the same rate of safe errors (underestimating the password strength): a neural-network based method and zxcvbn. Furthermore, we explored multiple finetuning settings, and our evaluations showed that, even a small amount of additional training data, e.g., only 0.1% of the pretrained data, can lead to over 3% improvement in password guessing on average. We also proposed a heuristic approach to selecting finetuning passwords based on JS (Jensen-Shannon) divergence and experimental results validated its usefulness. In summary, our contributions demonstrate the potential and feasibility of applying advanced NLP and ML methods to password modeling and cracking.

In this work, we propose a novel method named Automated Process-Supervised Verifier (\textsc{AutoPSV}) to enhance the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) by automatically annotating the reasoning steps. AutoPSV begins by training a verification model on the correctness of final answers, enabling it to generate automatic process annotations. This verification model assigns a confidence score to each reasoning step, indicating the probability of arriving at the correct final answer from that point onward. We detect relative changes in the verification's confidence scores across reasoning steps to automatically annotate the reasoning process, enabling error detection even in scenarios where ground truth answers are unavailable. This alleviates the need for numerous manual annotations or the high computational costs associated with model-induced annotation approaches. We experimentally validate that the step-level confidence changes learned by the verification model trained on the final answer correctness can effectively identify errors in the reasoning steps. We demonstrate that the verification model, when trained on process annotations generated by AutoPSV, exhibits improved performance in selecting correct answers from multiple LLM-generated outputs. Notably, we achieve substantial improvements across five datasets in mathematics and commonsense reasoning. The source code of AutoPSV is available at https://github.com/rookie-joe/AutoPSV.

RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) systems and web agents are increasingly evaluated on multi-hop deep search tasks, yet current practice suffers from two major limitations. First, most benchmarks leak the reasoning path in the question text, allowing models to follow surface cues rather than discover reasoning chains autonomously. Second, evaluation is typically reduced to a single pass rate, which collapses diverse behaviours into one score and obscures whether failures stem from inadequate search, poor knowledge use, or inappropriate refusal. To address these issues, we present WebDetective, a benchmark of hint-free multi-hop questions paired with a controlled Wikipedia sandbox that ensures full traceability of model actions, and a holistic evaluation framework that separates search sufficiency, knowledge utilisation, and refusal behaviour. Our evaluation of 25 state-of-the-art models reveals systematic weaknesses across all architectures: models struggle with knowledge utilisation despite having sufficient evidence and demonstrate near-absent appropriate refusal when evidence is lacking. These patterns expose a fundamental gap: today's systems excel at executing given reasoning paths but fail when required to discover them. We develop an agentic workflow, EvidenceLoop, that explicitly targets the challenges our benchmark identifies, incorporating verification loops and systematic evidence tracking that improve both search and synthesis capabilities. This baseline demonstrates that WebDetective's diagnostic framework can guide concrete architectural improvements, establishing our benchmark as a critical tool for developing genuinely autonomous reasoning systems rather than pattern-following agents.

The ability of language models in RAG systems to selectively refuse to answer based on flawed context is critical for safety, yet remains a significant failure point. Our large-scale study reveals that even frontier models struggle in this setting, with refusal accuracy dropping below 50% on multi-document tasks, while exhibiting either dangerous overconfidence or overcaution. Static benchmarks fail to reliably evaluate this capability, as models exploit dataset-specific artifacts and memorize test instances. We introduce RefusalBench, a generative methodology that programmatically creates diagnostic test cases through controlled linguistic perturbation. Our framework employs 176 distinct perturbation strategies across six categories of informational uncertainty and three intensity levels. Evaluation of over 30 models uncovers systematic failure patterns: refusal comprises separable detection and categorization skills, and neither scale nor extended reasoning improves performance. We find that selective refusal is a trainable, alignment-sensitive capability, offering a clear path for improvement. We release two benchmarks -- RefusalBench-NQ (single document) and RefusalBench-GaRAGe (multi-document) -- and our complete generation framework to enable continued, dynamic evaluation of this critical capability.

Tool-using LLM agents are mostly evaluated assuming all tools work. When a tool times out, returns a week-stale value, or has its description poisoned in deployment, the developer needs a controlled way to reproduce the failure, test a fix, and confirm the fix worked before deployment. We present AgentCheck, an open-source web workbench that turns an MCP server into an intervention surface. AgentCheck runs an agent against its real tools and records every tool response, then re-runs the agent with the response perturbed by a fault (12 types) injector. Matching tool calls are replayed from cache, and later tool calls go live after the agent diverges. This yields a reproduce-intervene-confirm loop: the developer toggles a mitigation, re-runs against the identical fault, and sees if the failure goes away. Scoring has two parts: deterministic pass/fail rules, plus an LLM judge for interpretive labels, validated against human annotations. Across five agents, the best passes 105/120 scenarios and the weakest only 77. The failures are usually silent, confident use of incorrect tool outputs rather than crashes. On the weakest agent, a retry mitigation raises success on timeout error faults from as few as 30% of cases to 100%, whereas stale-data faults remain near 3-4 of 10 regardless of the mitigation. AgentCheck makes these failure modes reproducible, comparable, and verifiable before deployment.

This paper analyzes Large Language Model (LLM) security vulnerabilities based on data from Crucible, encompassing 214,271 attack attempts by 1,674 users across 30 LLM challenges. Our findings reveal automated approaches significantly outperform manual techniques (69.5% vs 47.6% success rate), despite only 5.2% of users employing automation. We demonstrate that automated approaches excel in systematic exploration and pattern matching challenges, while manual approaches retain speed advantages in certain creative reasoning scenarios, often solving problems 5x faster when successful. Challenge categories requiring systematic exploration are most effectively targeted through automation, while intuitive challenges sometimes favor manual techniques for time-to-solve metrics. These results illuminate how algorithmic testing is transforming AI red-teaming practices, with implications for both offensive security research and defensive measures. Our analysis suggests optimal security testing combines human creativity for strategy development with programmatic execution for thorough exploration.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly powerful, they still exhibit significant but subtle weaknesses, such as mistakes in instruction-following or coding tasks. As these unexpected errors could lead to severe consequences in practical deployments, it is crucial to investigate the limitations within LLMs systematically. Traditional benchmarking approaches cannot thoroughly pinpoint specific model deficiencies, while manual inspections are costly and not scalable. In this paper, we introduce a unified framework, AutoDetect, to automatically expose weaknesses in LLMs across various tasks. Inspired by the educational assessment process that measures students' learning outcomes, AutoDetect consists of three LLM-powered agents: Examiner, Questioner, and Assessor. The collaboration among these three agents is designed to realize comprehensive and in-depth weakness identification. Our framework demonstrates significant success in uncovering flaws, with an identification success rate exceeding 30% in prominent models such as ChatGPT and Claude. More importantly, these identified weaknesses can guide specific model improvements, proving more effective than untargeted data augmentation methods like Self-Instruct. Our approach has led to substantial enhancements in popular LLMs, including the Llama series and Mistral-7b, boosting their performance by over 10% across several benchmarks. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/thu-coai/AutoDetect.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents, the need for unified evaluation infrastructure becomes critical. However, current evaluation pipelines remain highly fragmented and tightly coupled, hindering reproducibility and causing redundant engineering. To address this, we introduce AgentCompass, an open-source, lightweight, and extensible infrastructure for evaluating LLM-based agents. AgentCompass organizes the evaluation process around three independent components, namely Benchmark, Harness, and Environment, thereby enabling flexible configurations without requiring the reimplementation of complex execution logic. Furthermore, it features a fault-tolerant asynchronous runtime and comprehensive trajectory analysis tools to transparently diagnose nuanced failure modes like reward-hacking. Natively supporting over 20 benchmarks across five capability dimensions, AgentCompass provides the community with a scalable and reproducible infrastructure for advancing agent research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently gained attention due to their ability to understand and generate sophisticated human-like content. However, ensuring their safety is paramount as they might provide harmful and unsafe responses. Existing LLM testing frameworks address various safety-related concerns (e.g., drugs, terrorism, animal abuse) but often face challenges due to unbalanced and obsolete datasets. In this paper, we present ASTRAL, a tool that automates the generation and execution of test cases (i.e., prompts) for testing the safety of LLMs. First, we introduce a novel black-box coverage criterion to generate balanced and diverse unsafe test inputs across a diverse set of safety categories as well as linguistic writing characteristics (i.e., different style and persuasive writing techniques). Second, we propose an LLM-based approach that leverages Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), few-shot prompting strategies and web browsing to generate up-to-date test inputs. Lastly, similar to current LLM test automation techniques, we leverage LLMs as test oracles to distinguish between safe and unsafe test outputs, allowing a fully automated testing approach. We conduct an extensive evaluation on well-known LLMs, revealing the following key findings: i) GPT3.5 outperforms other LLMs when acting as the test oracle, accurately detecting unsafe responses, and even surpassing more recent LLMs (e.g., GPT-4), as well as LLMs that are specifically tailored to detect unsafe LLM outputs (e.g., LlamaGuard); ii) the results confirm that our approach can uncover nearly twice as many unsafe LLM behaviors with the same number of test inputs compared to currently used static datasets; and iii) our black-box coverage criterion combined with web browsing can effectively guide the LLM on generating up-to-date unsafe test inputs, significantly increasing the number of unsafe LLM behaviors.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become critical to modern software development, but their reliance on uncurated web-scale datasets for training introduces a significant security risk: the absorption and reproduction of malicious content. To systematically evaluate this risk, we introduce Scam2Prompt, a scalable automated auditing framework that identifies the underlying intent of a scam site and then synthesizes innocuous, developer-style prompts that mirror this intent, allowing us to test whether an LLM will generate malicious code in response to these innocuous prompts. In a large-scale study of four production LLMs (GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Llama-4-Scout, and DeepSeek-V3), we found that Scam2Prompt's innocuous prompts triggered malicious URL generation in 4.24% of cases. To test the persistence of this security risk, we constructed Innoc2Scam-bench, a benchmark of 1,559 innocuous prompts that consistently elicited malicious code from all four initial LLMs. When applied to seven additional production LLMs released in 2025, we found the vulnerability is not only present but severe, with malicious code generation rates ranging from 12.7% to 43.8%. Furthermore, existing safety measures like state-of-the-art guardrails proved insufficient to prevent this behavior, with an overall detection rate of less than 0.3%.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

Text-to-image (T2I) models have significantly advanced in producing high-quality images. However, such models have the ability to generate images containing not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, such as pornography, violence, political content, and discrimination. To mitigate the risk of generating NSFW content, refusal mechanisms, i.e., safety checkers, have been developed to check potential NSFW content. Adversarial prompting techniques have been developed to evaluate the robustness of the refusal mechanisms. The key challenge remains to subtly modify the prompt in a way that preserves its sensitive nature while bypassing the refusal mechanisms. In this paper, we introduce TokenProber, a method designed for sensitivity-aware differential testing, aimed at evaluating the robustness of the refusal mechanisms in T2I models by generating adversarial prompts. Our approach is based on the key observation that adversarial prompts often succeed by exploiting discrepancies in how T2I models and safety checkers interpret sensitive content. Thus, we conduct a fine-grained analysis of the impact of specific words within prompts, distinguishing between dirty words that are essential for NSFW content generation and discrepant words that highlight the different sensitivity assessments between T2I models and safety checkers. Through the sensitivity-aware mutation, TokenProber generates adversarial prompts, striking a balance between maintaining NSFW content generation and evading detection. Our evaluation of TokenProber against 5 safety checkers on 3 popular T2I models, using 324 NSFW prompts, demonstrates its superior effectiveness in bypassing safety filters compared to existing methods (e.g., 54%+ increase on average), highlighting TokenProber's ability to uncover robustness issues in the existing refusal mechanisms.

Generating step-by-step "how-to" procedures is a key LLM capability: how-to advice is commonly requested in chatbots, and step-by-step planning is critical for reasoning over complex tasks. Yet, measuring and improving procedural validity at scale on real-world tasks remains challenging and understudied. To address this, we introduce How2Everything, a scalable framework to evaluate and improve goal-conditioned procedure generation. Our framework includes How2Mine, which mines 351K procedures from 980K web pages across 14 topics and readily scales to larger corpora. From this pool we build How2Bench, a 7K-example evaluation set balanced across topics. To reliably score model outputs, we develop How2Score, an evaluation protocol that uses an LLM judge to detect whether a generation contains any critical failure that would prevent achieving the goal. For low-cost, reproducible evaluation, we distill a frontier model into an open 8B model, achieving 80.5% agreement with human annotators. How2Bench reveals clear scaling trends across model sizes and training stages, providing signal early in pretraining. Finally, RL using How2Score as a reward improves performance on How2Bench by >10 points across three models without systematic regressions on standard benchmarks, with gains robust to superficial source-document memorization or format compliance. Taken together, How2Everything shows how pretraining web data can support a closed loop of capability evaluation and improvement at scale.

Large language model (LLM)-based reasoning systems have recently achieved gold medal-level performance in the IMO 2025 competition, writing mathematical proofs where, to receive full credit, each step must be not only correct but also sufficiently supported. To train LLM-based reasoners in such challenging, open-ended settings, strong verifiers capable of catching step-level mistakes are necessary prerequisites. We introduce Hard2Verify, a human-annotated, step-level verification benchmark produced with over 500 hours of human labor. Hard2Verify is designed to rigorously assess step-level verifiers at the frontier: Verifiers must provide step-level annotations or identify the first error in responses generated by frontier LLMs for very recent, challenging, and open-ended math questions. We evaluate 29 generative critics and process reward models, demonstrating that, beyond a few standouts, open-source verifiers lag closed source models. We subsequently analyze what drives poor performance in step-level verification, the impacts of scaling verifier compute, as well as fundamental questions such as self-verification and verification-generation dynamics.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been widely adopted to augment large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge for knowledge-intensive tasks. However, its effectiveness is often undermined by the presence of noisy (i.e., low-quality) retrieved passages. Enhancing LLMs' robustness to such noise is critical for improving the reliability of RAG systems. Recent advances have equipped LLMs with strong reasoning and self-reflection capabilities, allowing them to identify and correct errors in their reasoning process. Inspired by this ability, we propose Passage Injection-a simple yet effective method that explicitly incorporates retrieved passages into LLMs' reasoning process, aiming to enhance the model's ability to recognize and resist noisy passages. We validate Passage Injection under general RAG settings using BM25 as the retriever. Experiments on four reasoning-enhanced LLMs across four factual QA datasets demonstrate that Passage Injection significantly improves overall RAG performance. Further analysis on two noisy retrieval settings-random noise, where the model is provided irrelevant passages, and counterfactual noise, where it is given misleading passages-shows that Passage Injection consistently improves robustness. Controlled experiments confirm that Passage Injection can also effectively leverage helpful passages. These findings suggest that incorporating passages in LLMs' reasoning process is a promising direction for building more robust RAG systems. The code can be found here{https://github.com/mh-tang/Passage-Injection}.

As language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in high-stakes settings, ensuring that they reliably follow user-defined rules has become a critical safety concern. To this end, we study whether language models exhibit contextual robustness, or the capability to adhere to context-dependent safety specifications. For this analysis, we develop a benchmark (PasswordEval) that measures whether language models can correctly determine when a user request is authorized (i.e., with a correct password). We find that current open- and closed-source models struggle with this seemingly simple task, and that, perhaps surprisingly, reasoning capabilities do not generally improve performance. In fact, we find that reasoning traces frequently leak confidential information, which calls into question whether reasoning traces should be exposed to users in such applications. We also scale the difficulty of our evaluation along multiple axes: (i) by adding adversarial user pressure through various jailbreaking strategies, and (ii) through longer multi-turn conversations where password verification is more challenging. Overall, our results suggest that current frontier models are not well-suited to handling confidential information, and that reasoning capabilities may need to be trained in a different manner to make them safer for release in high-stakes settings.

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

We propose a new long-context financial benchmark, FailSafeQA, designed to test the robustness and context-awareness of LLMs against six variations in human-interface interactions in LLM-based query-answer systems within finance. We concentrate on two case studies: Query Failure and Context Failure. In the Query Failure scenario, we perturb the original query to vary in domain expertise, completeness, and linguistic accuracy. In the Context Failure case, we simulate the uploads of degraded, irrelevant, and empty documents. We employ the LLM-as-a-Judge methodology with Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct and use fine-grained rating criteria to define and calculate Robustness, Context Grounding, and Compliance scores for 24 off-the-shelf models. The results suggest that although some models excel at mitigating input perturbations, they must balance robust answering with the ability to refrain from hallucinating. Notably, Palmyra-Fin-128k-Instruct, recognized as the most compliant model, maintained strong baseline performance but encountered challenges in sustaining robust predictions in 17% of test cases. On the other hand, the most robust model, OpenAI o3-mini, fabricated information in 41% of tested cases. The results demonstrate that even high-performing models have significant room for improvement and highlight the role of FailSafeQA as a tool for developing LLMs optimized for dependability in financial applications. The dataset is available at: https://huggingface.co/datasets/Writer/FailSafeQA

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

Autonomous GUI agents face two fundamental challenges: early stopping, where agents prematurely declare success without verifiable evidence, and repetitive loops, where agents cycle through the same failing actions without recovery. We present VLAA-GUI, a modular GUI agentic framework built around three integrated components that guide the system on when to Stop, Recover, and Search. First, a mandatory Completeness Verifier enforces UI-observable success criteria and verification at every finish step -- with an agent-level verifier that cross-examines completion claims with decision rules, rejecting those lacking direct visual evidence. Second, a mandatory Loop Breaker provides multi-tier filtering: switching interaction mode after repeated failures, forcing strategy changes after persistent screen-state recurrence, and binding reflection signals to strategy shifts. Third, an on-demand Search Agent searches online for unfamiliar workflows by directly querying a capable LLM with search ability, returning results as plain text. We additionally integrate a Coding Agent for code-intensive actions and a Grounding Agent for precise action grounding, both invoked on demand when required. We evaluate VLAA-GUI across five top-tier backbones, including Opus 4.5, 4.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro, on two benchmarks with Linux and Windows tasks, achieving top performance on both (77.5% on OSWorld and 61.0% on WindowsAgentArena). Notably, three of the five backbones surpass human performance (72.4%) on OSWorld in a single pass. Ablation studies show that all three proposed components consistently improve a strong backbone, while a weaker backbone benefits more from these tools when the step budget is sufficient. Further analysis also shows that the Loop Breaker nearly halves wasted steps for loop-prone models.

We introduce WildGuard -- an open, light-weight moderation tool for LLM safety that achieves three goals: (1) identifying malicious intent in user prompts, (2) detecting safety risks of model responses, and (3) determining model refusal rate. Together, WildGuard serves the increasing needs for automatic safety moderation and evaluation of LLM interactions, providing a one-stop tool with enhanced accuracy and broad coverage across 13 risk categories. While existing open moderation tools such as Llama-Guard2 score reasonably well in classifying straightforward model interactions, they lag far behind a prompted GPT-4, especially in identifying adversarial jailbreaks and in evaluating models' refusals, a key measure for evaluating safety behaviors in model responses. To address these challenges, we construct WildGuardMix, a large-scale and carefully balanced multi-task safety moderation dataset with 92K labeled examples that cover vanilla (direct) prompts and adversarial jailbreaks, paired with various refusal and compliance responses. WildGuardMix is a combination of WildGuardTrain, the training data of WildGuard, and WildGuardTest, a high-quality human-annotated moderation test set with 5K labeled items covering broad risk scenarios. Through extensive evaluations on WildGuardTest and ten existing public benchmarks, we show that WildGuard establishes state-of-the-art performance in open-source safety moderation across all the three tasks compared to ten strong existing open-source moderation models (e.g., up to 26.4% improvement on refusal detection). Importantly, WildGuard matches and sometimes exceeds GPT-4 performance (e.g., up to 3.9% improvement on prompt harmfulness identification). WildGuard serves as a highly effective safety moderator in an LLM interface, reducing the success rate of jailbreak attacks from 79.8% to 2.4%.

Humanity's Last Exam (HLE) has become a widely used benchmark for evaluating frontier large language models on challenging, multi-domain questions. However, community-led analyses have raised concerns that HLE contains a non-trivial number of noisy items, which can bias evaluation results and distort cross-model comparisons. To address this challenge, we introduce HLE-Verified, a verified and revised version of HLE with a transparent verification protocol and fine-grained error taxonomy. Our construction follows a two-stage validation-and-repair workflow resulting in a certified benchmark. In Stage I, each item undergoes binary validation of the problem and final answer through domain-expert review and model-based cross-checks, yielding 641 verified items. In Stage II, flawed but fixable items are revised under strict constraints preserving the original evaluation intent, through dual independent expert repairs, model-assisted auditing, and final adjudication, resulting in 1,170 revised-and-certified items. The remaining 689 items are released as a documented uncertain set with explicit uncertainty sources and expertise tags for future refinement. We evaluate seven state-of-the-art language models on HLE and HLE-Verified, observing an average absolute accuracy gain of 7--10 percentage points on HLE-Verified. The improvement is particularly pronounced on items where the original problem statement and/or reference answer is erroneous, with gains of 30--40 percentage points. Our analyses further reveal a strong association between model confidence and the presence of errors in the problem statement or reference answer, supporting the effectiveness of our revisions. Overall, HLE-Verified improves HLE-style evaluations by reducing annotation noise and enabling more faithful measurement of model capabilities. Data is available at: https://github.com/SKYLENAGE-AI/HLE-Verified

Large language models (LLMs) have evolved from simple chatbots into autonomous agents capable of performing complex tasks such as editing production code, orchestrating workflows, and taking higher-stakes actions based on untrusted inputs like webpages and emails. These capabilities introduce new security risks that existing security measures, such as model fine-tuning or chatbot-focused guardrails, do not fully address. Given the higher stakes and the absence of deterministic solutions to mitigate these risks, there is a critical need for a real-time guardrail monitor to serve as a final layer of defense, and support system level, use case specific safety policy definition and enforcement. We introduce LlamaFirewall, an open-source security focused guardrail framework designed to serve as a final layer of defense against security risks associated with AI Agents. Our framework mitigates risks such as prompt injection, agent misalignment, and insecure code risks through three powerful guardrails: PromptGuard 2, a universal jailbreak detector that demonstrates clear state of the art performance; Agent Alignment Checks, a chain-of-thought auditor that inspects agent reasoning for prompt injection and goal misalignment, which, while still experimental, shows stronger efficacy at preventing indirect injections in general scenarios than previously proposed approaches; and CodeShield, an online static analysis engine that is both fast and extensible, aimed at preventing the generation of insecure or dangerous code by coding agents. Additionally, we include easy-to-use customizable scanners that make it possible for any developer who can write a regular expression or an LLM prompt to quickly update an agent's security guardrails.

We introduce MacroBench, a code-first benchmark that evaluates whether LLMs can synthesize reusable browser-automation programs (macros) from natural-language goals by reading HTML/DOM and emitting Selenium. MacroBench instantiates seven self-hosted sites covering 681 tasks across interaction complexity and targeting difficulty. Our end-to-end protocol validates generated code via static checks, sandboxed execution, and outcome verification (DOM assertions, database snapshots), and includes a safety suite for scraping, spam/abuse, and credential/privacy prompts. Across 2,636 model-task runs, we observe stratified success: GPT-4o-mini (96.8%), GPT-4o (95.3%), Gemini (89.0%), DeepSeek (83.4%). Models handle simple tasks reliably (91.7%) but fail on complex workflows (0.0%), and none meet production-quality coding practices despite functional completion. We release our complete benchmark pipeline, evaluation framework, and experimental results at https://github.com/hyunjun1121/MacroBench to enable reproducible assessment of macro synthesis for web automation.

AI agents often fail in ways that are difficult to localize because executions are probabilistic, long-horizon, multi-agent, and mediated by noisy tool outputs. We address this gap by manually annotating failed agent runs and release a novel benchmark of 115 failed trajectories spanning structured API workflows, incident management, and open-ended web/file tasks. Each trajectory is annotated with a critical failure step and a category from a grounded-theory derived, cross-domain failure taxonomy. To mitigate the human cost of failure attribution, we present AGENTRX, an automated domain-agnostic diagnostic framework that pinpoints the critical failure step in a failed agent trajectory. It synthesizes constraints, evaluates them step-by-step, and produces an auditable validation log of constraint violations with associated evidence; an LLM-based judge uses this log to localize the critical step and category. Our framework improves step localization and failure attribution over existing baselines across three domains.

Using risky text prompts, such as pornography and violent prompts, to test the safety of text-to-image (T2I) models is a critical task. However, existing risky prompt datasets are limited in three key areas: 1) limited risky categories, 2) coarse-grained annotation, and 3) low effectiveness. To address these limitations, we introduce T2I-RiskyPrompt, a comprehensive benchmark designed for evaluating safety-related tasks in T2I models. Specifically, we first develop a hierarchical risk taxonomy, which consists of 6 primary categories and 14 fine-grained subcategories. Building upon this taxonomy, we construct a pipeline to collect and annotate risky prompts. Finally, we obtain 6,432 effective risky prompts, where each prompt is annotated with both hierarchical category labels and detailed risk reasons. Moreover, to facilitate the evaluation, we propose a reason-driven risky image detection method that explicitly aligns the MLLM with safety annotations. Based on T2I-RiskyPrompt, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of eight T2I models, nine defense methods, five safety filters, and five attack strategies, offering nine key insights into the strengths and limitations of T2I model safety. Finally, we discuss potential applications of T2I-RiskyPrompt across various research fields. The dataset and code are provided in https://github.com/datar001/T2I-RiskyPrompt.

We present AutoIndex, a framework for learning representation programs: executable transformations that map raw documents into the representations exposed to a retrieval system. Rather than tuning retrievers, rerankers, or a small set of preprocessing hyperparameters, AutoIndex searches over programs that slice, enrich, normalize, reweight, or reorganize documents before indexing. At each iteration, AutoIndex performs validation-guided program search, in which agents diagnose failures of the current program and synthesize candidate updates, retaining only updates that improve retrieval quality under the resulting index. We evaluate AutoIndex on CRUMB, a benchmark of heterogeneous retrieval tasks, with BM25 held fixed across all experiments. The learned programs improve recall over a static full-document BM25 baseline on all 8 tasks, with average gains of +8.4% in Recall@100 and +8.3% in nDCG@10, and largest gains of +30.5% in Recall@100 and +43.6% in nDCG@10. These results suggest that document representation should not be treated as a fixed preprocessing choice made before retrieval begins, but as an explicit optimization target. Code to reproduce our results is available at https://github.com/auto-index/autoindex.

Current open-source prompt-injection detectors converge on two architectural choices: regular-expression pattern matching and fine-tuned transformer classifiers. Both share failure modes that recent work has made concrete. Regular expressions miss paraphrased attacks. Fine-tuned classifiers are vulnerable to adaptive adversaries: a 2025 NAACL Findings study reported that eight published indirect-injection defenses were bypassed with greater than fifty percent attack success rates under adaptive attacks. This work proposes seven detection techniques that each port a specific mechanism from a discipline outside large-language-model security: forensic linguistics, materials-science fatigue analysis, deception technology from network security, local-sequence alignment from bioinformatics, mechanism design from economics, spectral signal analysis from epidemiology, and taint tracking from compiler theory. Three of the seven techniques are implemented in the prompt-shield v0.4.1 release (Apache 2.0) and evaluated in a four-configuration ablation across six datasets including deepset/prompt-injections, NotInject, LLMail-Inject, AgentHarm, and AgentDojo. The local-alignment detector lifts F1 on deepset from 0.033 to 0.378 with zero additional false positives. The stylometric detector adds 11.1 percentage points of F1 on an indirect-injection benchmark. The fatigue tracker is validated via a probing-campaign integration test. All code, data, and reproduction scripts are released under Apache 2.0.

We perform a thorough analysis of the formal and informal statements in the miniF2F benchmark from the perspective of an AI system that is tasked to participate in a math Olympiad consisting of the problems in miniF2F. In such setting, the model has to read and comprehend the problems in natural language, formalize them in Lean language, then proceed with proving the problems, and it will get credit for each problem if the formal proof corresponds to the original informal statement presented to the model. Our evaluation results reveal that the best accuracy of such pipeline can be about 36% using the SoTA models in the literature, considerably lower than the individual SoTA accuracies, 97% and 69% reported in the autoformalization and theorem proving literature. Analyzing the failure modes, we trace back a considerable portion of this drop to discrepancies between the formal and informal statements for more than half of the problems in miniF2F. We proceed with correcting all the errors, discrepancies and simplifications in formal and informal statements, and present the miniF2F-v2 with fully verified formal and informal statements and proofs. Evaluating the full theorem proving pipeline on miniF2F-v2 leads to the best accuracy of 70%, a significant improvement from the 40% on the original miniF2F, yet indicating considerable misalignment between the autoformalization models and theorem provers. Our deep analysis suggests that a higher quality benchmark can help the community better evaluate progress in the field of formal reasoning and also better diagnose the failure and success modes of autoformalization and theorem proving models. Our dataset is available at https://github.com/roozbeh-yz/miniF2F_v2.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is increasingly deployed in enterprise search and document-centric assistants, where responses must be grounded in long and complex source materials. In practice, verifying that generated answers faithfully reflect retrieved documents is difficult: large language models can check long contexts but are too slow and costly for interactive services, while lightweight classifiers operate within strict context limits and frequently miss evidence outside truncated passages. We present the design of a real-time verification component integrated into a production RAG pipeline that enables full-document grounding under latency constraints. The system processes documents up to 32K tokens and employs adaptive inference strategies to balance response time and verification coverage across workloads. We describe the architectural decisions, operational trade-offs, and evaluation methodology used to deploy the verifier, and show that full-context verification substantially improves detection of unsupported responses compared with truncated validation. Our experience highlights when long-context verification is necessary, why chunk-based checking often fails in real documents, and how latency budgets shape model design. These findings provide practical guidance for practitioners building reliable large-scale retrieval-augmented applications. (Model, benchmark, and code: https://huggingface.co/llm-semantic-router)

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have led to increasingly sophisticated safety protocols and features designed to prevent harmful, unethical, or unauthorized outputs. However, these guardrails remain susceptible to novel and creative forms of adversarial prompting, including manually generated test cases. In this work, we present two new test cases in mental health for (i) suicide and (ii) self-harm, using multi-step, prompt-level jailbreaking and bypass built-in content and safety filters. We show that user intent is disregarded, leading to the generation of detailed harmful content and instructions that could cause real-world harm. We conduct an empirical evaluation across six widely available LLMs, demonstrating the generalizability and reliability of the bypass. We assess these findings and the multilayered ethical tensions that they present for their implications on prompt-response filtering and context- and task-specific model development. We recommend a more comprehensive and systematic approach to AI safety and ethics while emphasizing the need for continuous adversarial testing in safety-critical AI deployments. We also argue that while certain clearly defined safety measures and guardrails can and must be implemented in LLMs, ensuring robust and comprehensive safety across all use cases and domains remains extremely challenging given the current technical maturity of general-purpose LLMs.

Red teaming assesses how large language models (LLMs) can produce content that violates norms, policies, and rules set during their safety training. However, most existing automated methods in the literature are not representative of the way humans tend to interact with AI models. Common users of AI models may not have advanced knowledge of adversarial machine learning methods or access to model internals, and they do not spend a lot of time crafting a single highly effective adversarial prompt. Instead, they are likely to make use of techniques commonly shared online and exploit the multiturn conversational nature of LLMs. While manual testing addresses this gap, it is an inefficient and often expensive process. To address these limitations, we introduce the Generative Offensive Agent Tester (GOAT), an automated agentic red teaming system that simulates plain language adversarial conversations while leveraging multiple adversarial prompting techniques to identify vulnerabilities in LLMs. We instantiate GOAT with 7 red teaming attacks by prompting a general-purpose model in a way that encourages reasoning through the choices of methods available, the current target model's response, and the next steps. Our approach is designed to be extensible and efficient, allowing human testers to focus on exploring new areas of risk while automation covers the scaled adversarial stress-testing of known risk territory. We present the design and evaluation of GOAT, demonstrating its effectiveness in identifying vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art LLMs, with an ASR@10 of 97% against Llama 3.1 and 88% against GPT-4 on the JailbreakBench dataset.

While Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) excel in complex reasoning, they suffer from the cascading impact of erroneous information generated by individual participants. Current solutions often resort to rigid structural engineering or expensive fine-tuning, limiting their deployability and adaptability. We propose AgentDropoutV2, a test-time rectify-or-reject pruning framework designed to dynamically optimize MAS information flow without retraining. Our approach acts as an active firewall, intercepting agent outputs and employing a retrieval-augmented rectifier to iteratively correct errors based on a failure-driven indicator pool. This mechanism allows for the precise identification of potential errors using distilled failure patterns as prior knowledge. Irreparable outputs are subsequently pruned to prevent error propagation, while a fallback strategy preserves system integrity. Empirical results on extensive math benchmarks show that AgentDropoutV2 significantly boosts the MAS's task performance, achieving an average accuracy gain of 6.3 percentage points on math benchmarks. Furthermore, the system exhibits robust generalization and adaptivity, dynamically modulating rectification efforts based on task difficulty while leveraging context-aware indicators to resolve a wide spectrum of error patterns. Our code and dataset are released at https://github.com/TonySY2/AgentDropoutV2.

Answer verification is crucial not only for evaluating large language models (LLMs) by matching their unstructured outputs against standard answers, but also serves as the reward model to guide LLM optimization. Most evaluation frameworks rely on regularized matching or employ general LLMs for answer verification, which demands extensive, repetitive customization for regex rules or evaluation prompts. Two fundamental limitations persist in current methodologies: 1) the absence of comprehensive benchmarks that systematically evaluate verification capabilities across different LLMs; and 2) the nascent stage of verifier development, where existing approaches lack both the robustness to handle complex edge cases and the generalizability across different domains. In this work, we develop CompassVerifier, an accurate and robust lightweight verifier model for evaluation and outcome reward. It demonstrates multi-domain competency spanning math, knowledge, and diverse reasoning tasks, with the capability to process various answer types, including multi-subproblems, formulas, and sequence answers, while effectively identifying abnormal/invalid responses. We introduce VerifierBench benchmark comprising model outputs collected from multiple data sources, augmented through manual analysis of metaerror patterns to enhance CompassVerifier. We anticipate that CompassVerifier and VerifierBench will facilitate answer verification, evaluation protocols, and reinforcement learning research. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/open-compass/CompassVerifier.

Evaluating aligned large language models' (LLMs) ability to recognize and reject unsafe user requests is crucial for safe, policy-compliant deployments. Existing evaluation efforts, however, face three limitations that we address with SORRY-Bench, our proposed benchmark. First, existing methods often use coarse-grained taxonomies of unsafe topics, and are over-representing some fine-grained topics. For example, among the ten existing datasets that we evaluated, tests for refusals of self-harm instructions are over 3x less represented than tests for fraudulent activities. SORRY-Bench improves on this by using a fine-grained taxonomy of 45 potentially unsafe topics, and 450 class-balanced unsafe instructions, compiled through human-in-the-loop methods. Second, linguistic characteristics and formatting of prompts are often overlooked, like different languages, dialects, and more -- which are only implicitly considered in many evaluations. We supplement SORRY-Bench with 20 diverse linguistic augmentations to systematically examine these effects. Third, existing evaluations rely on large LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for evaluation, which can be computationally expensive. We investigate design choices for creating a fast, accurate automated safety evaluator. By collecting 7K+ human annotations and conducting a meta-evaluation of diverse LLM-as-a-judge designs, we show that fine-tuned 7B LLMs can achieve accuracy comparable to GPT-4 scale LLMs, with lower computational cost. Putting these together, we evaluate over 40 proprietary and open-source LLMs on SORRY-Bench, analyzing their distinctive refusal behaviors. We hope our effort provides a building block for systematic evaluations of LLMs' safety refusal capabilities, in a balanced, granular, and efficient manner.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models have achieved remarkable success in generating visual content from text inputs. Although multiple safety alignment strategies have been proposed to prevent harmful outputs, they often lead to overly cautious behavior -- rejecting even benign prompts -- a phenomenon known as over-refusal that reduces the practical utility of T2I models. Despite over-refusal having been observed in practice, there is no large-scale benchmark that systematically evaluates this phenomenon for T2I models. In this paper, we present an automatic workflow to construct synthetic evaluation data, resulting in OVERT (OVEr-Refusal evaluation on Text-to-image models), the first large-scale benchmark for assessing over-refusal behaviors in T2I models. OVERT includes 4,600 seemingly harmful but benign prompts across nine safety-related categories, along with 1,785 genuinely harmful prompts (OVERT-unsafe) to evaluate the safety-utility trade-off. Using OVERT, we evaluate several leading T2I models and find that over-refusal is a widespread issue across various categories (Figure 1), underscoring the need for further research to enhance the safety alignment of T2I models without compromising their functionality. As a preliminary attempt to reduce over-refusal, we explore prompt rewriting; however, we find it often compromises faithfulness to the meaning of the original prompts. Finally, we demonstrate the flexibility of our generation framework in accommodating diverse safety requirements by generating customized evaluation data adapting to user-defined policies.

Trustworthy capability evaluations are crucial for ensuring the safety of AI systems, and are becoming a key component of AI regulation. However, the developers of an AI system, or the AI system itself, may have incentives for evaluations to understate the AI's actual capability. These conflicting interests lead to the problem of sandbagging, which we define as strategic underperformance on an evaluation. In this paper we assess sandbagging capabilities in contemporary language models (LMs). We prompt frontier LMs, like GPT-4 and Claude 3 Opus, to selectively underperform on dangerous capability evaluations, while maintaining performance on general (harmless) capability evaluations. Moreover, we find that models can be fine-tuned, on a synthetic dataset, to hide specific capabilities unless given a password. This behaviour generalizes to high-quality, held-out benchmarks such as WMDP. In addition, we show that both frontier and smaller models can be prompted or password-locked to target specific scores on a capability evaluation. We have mediocre success in password-locking a model to mimic the answers a weaker model would give. Overall, our results suggest that capability evaluations are vulnerable to sandbagging. This vulnerability decreases the trustworthiness of evaluations, and thereby undermines important safety decisions regarding the development and deployment of advanced AI systems.

By providing a standardized interface for LLM agents to interact with external tools, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) is quickly becoming a cornerstone of the modern autonomous agent ecosystem. However, it creates novel attack surfaces due to untrusted external tools. While prior work has focused on attacks injected through external tool outputs, we investigate a more fundamental vulnerability: Tool Poisoning, where malicious instructions are embedded within a tool's metadata without execution. To date, this threat has been primarily demonstrated through isolated cases, lacking a systematic, large-scale evaluation. We introduce MCPTox, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate agent robustness against Tool Poisoning in realistic MCP settings. MCPTox is constructed upon 45 live, real-world MCP servers and 353 authentic tools. To achieve this, we design three distinct attack templates to generate a comprehensive suite of 1312 malicious test cases by few-shot learning, covering 10 categories of potential risks. Our evaluation on 20 prominent LLM agents setting reveals a widespread vulnerability to Tool Poisoning, with o1-mini, achieving an attack success rate of 72.8\%. We find that more capable models are often more susceptible, as the attack exploits their superior instruction-following abilities. Finally, the failure case analysis reveals that agents rarely refuse these attacks, with the highest refused rate (Claude-3.7-Sonnet) less than 3\%, demonstrating that existing safety alignment is ineffective against malicious actions that use legitimate tools for unauthorized operation. Our findings create a crucial empirical baseline for understanding and mitigating this widespread threat, and we release MCPTox for the development of verifiably safer AI agents. Our dataset is available at an anonymized repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AAAI26-7C02.

Modern web dashboards and enterprise applications increasingly rely on complex, distributed microservices architectures. While these architectures offer scalability, they introduce significant challenges in debugging and observability. When failures occur, they often manifest as opaque error messages to the end-user such as Something went wrong. This masks the underlying root cause which may reside in browser side exceptions, API contract violations, or server side logic failures. Existing monitoring tools capture these events in isolation but fail to correlate them effectively or provide intelligible explanations to non technical users. This paper proposes a novel system for Automated Multi Source Debugging and Natural Language Error Explanation. The proposed framework automatically collects and correlates error data from disparate sources such as browser, API, server logs and validates API contracts in real time, and utilizes Large Language Models to generate natural language explanations. This approach significantly reduces Mean Time to Resolution for support engineers and improves the user experience by transforming cryptic error codes into actionable insights.

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

AI coding agents are increasingly used to write real-world software, but ensuring that their outputs are correct remains a fundamental challenge. Formal verification offers a promising path: an agent generates code together with a machine-checked proof, guaranteeing that the code satisfies a formal specification. However, there is no guarantee that the formal spec itself matches the user's intent. In this work, we study specification autoformalization: whether LLM agents can translate informal programming problems into faithful formal specifications. We introduce Verus-SpecBench, a benchmark of 581 spec-writing tasks derived from Codeforces problems targeting Verus, a verifier for Rust, and Verus-SpecGym, an agentic environment in which models interact with Verus, bash, & the filesystem to develop these specs. The central challenge is evaluation: expert-written reference specs are expensive to write, & LLM judges can miss subtle mistakes. We address this by (a) extending Verus's exec_spec mechanism so that generated specs can be executed as Rust code, & (b) testing them against official Codeforces tests & adversarial cases extracted from Codeforces "hacks", which are edge cases written by competitors to break incorrect solutions. On Verus-SpecBench, the strongest model, Gemini 3.1 Pro, solves 77.8% of tasks, other frontier models solve 51.1--57.8% & OSS models reach only 21.5--25.5%. Our analysis of failure modes shows that model-generated specs can omit important input assumptions, accept incorrect outputs, & reject valid ones. We also find that LLM-as-a-judge evaluation misses 26% of the failures our evaluator catches. Overall, our results suggest that spec autoformalization is within reach for frontier agents but remains brittle even on problems where they can already generate correct code. The code, data, & logs can be found at https://github.com/formal-verif-is-cool/verus-spec-gym

Self-driving laboratories increasingly rely on low-cost liquid handlers such as the Opentrons OT-2, which ship without the pressure-based aspiration monitoring of Hamilton or Tecan systems and are typically run open-loop. Two failure modes go undetected: protocols that are syntactically valid but violate assay-specific invariants (e.g., tip reuse between a PCR template and a no-template control), and physical execution failures (partial dispense, air bubbles, missing tips) at runtime. We present AEGIS, a two-layer guardian for both. Layer 1 pairs a curated machine-readable assay rule database with an LLM that reasons over OT-2 Python code, reaching an adjusted F1 of 0.97 on a 24-protocol benchmark across five assay families and beating rules-only and LLM-only ablations across five backends; a free open-weight model ties the best proprietary one, so no paid API is required. Layer 2 fits a PCA world model to YOLO-cropped four-frame pipette trajectories; under a leakage-free leave-one-plate-out evaluation it reaches average precision 0.89 and operating-point F1 0.71 (AUROC 0.80), a deployment-faithful number that matches the live demonstration, and we characterize the small-pipette (p20) resolution limit (F1 0.47). A live demonstration on a physical OT-2 (five replicates per condition) catches planted no-tip failures deterministically and partial dispense on coloured dyes, with an always-VLM self-vote gate lifting partial-dispense recall to 5/5; transparent water is a principled limit of any front-view-only monitor, which AEGIS surfaces as low-confidence VLM reasoning rather than a wrong verdict. Cascade triage holds VLM cost near 1.63 per plate versus 10.33 for an always-VLM baseline. AEGIS is open source and, to our knowledge, the first system to unify pre-flight assay-aware validation with runtime visual monitoring for an open-source liquid handler.

Text-to-Image(T2I) models typically deploy safety filters to prevent the generation of sensitive images. Unfortunately, recent jailbreaking attack methods manually design instructions for the LLM to generate adversarial prompts, which effectively bypass safety filters while producing sensitive images, exposing safety vulnerabilities of T2I models. However, due to the LLM's limited understanding of the T2I model and its safety filters, existing methods require numerous queries to achieve a successful attack, limiting their practical applicability. To address this issue, we propose Reason2Attack(R2A), which aims to enhance the LLM's reasoning capabilities in generating adversarial prompts by incorporating the jailbreaking attack into the post-training process of the LLM. Specifically, we first propose a CoT example synthesis pipeline based on Frame Semantics, which generates adversarial prompts by identifying related terms and corresponding context illustrations. Using CoT examples generated by the pipeline, we fine-tune the LLM to understand the reasoning path and format the output structure. Subsequently, we incorporate the jailbreaking attack task into the reinforcement learning process of the LLM and design an attack process reward that considers prompt length, prompt stealthiness, and prompt effectiveness, aiming to further enhance reasoning accuracy. Extensive experiments on various T2I models show that R2A achieves a better attack success ratio while requiring fewer queries than baselines. Moreover, our adversarial prompts demonstrate strong attack transferability across both open-source and commercial T2I models.

Agentic LLM coding tools compress long session histories into compaction summaries that subsequent sessions inherit as ground truth. This paper documents a failure mode in Claude Code where partial standard output from timed-out commands (exit code 143) is recorded in compaction summaries as confirmed results, propagating false positives across sessions and model versions without re-verification. The underlying mechanism is a conflation of observation and persistence, where information that appeared in the terminal is treated as equivalent to information written to durable storage. This finding extends the analysis of LLM self-evaluation failures reported in prior work on non-determinism in LLM-as-judge grading by showing that agentic tools exhibit analogous reliability deficits when reporting on their own operational outcomes. The failure has direct implications for any workflow that relies on agentic session continuity for data processing, scientific computation, or multi-step automation.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have witnessed remarkable growth, showcasing formidable capabilities in handling intricate multimodal tasks with exceptional performance. Recent research has underscored the inclination of large language models to passively accept defective inputs, often resulting in futile reasoning on invalid prompts. However, the same critical question of whether LMMs can actively detect and scrutinize erroneous inputs still remains unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce the Input Scrutiny Ability Evaluation Framework (ISEval), which encompasses seven categories of flawed premises and three evaluation metrics. Our extensive evaluation of ten advanced LMMs has identified key findings. Most models struggle to actively detect flawed textual premises without guidance, which reflects a strong reliance on explicit prompts for premise error identification. Error type affects performance: models excel at identifying logical fallacies but struggle with surface-level linguistic errors and certain conditional flaws. Modality trust varies-Gemini 2.5 pro and Claude Sonnet 4 balance visual and textual info, while aya-vision-8b over-rely on text in conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LMMs' proactive verification of input validity and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/LMM_ISEval.

We introduce AutoMonitor-Bench, the first benchmark designed to systematically evaluate the reliability of LLM-based misbehavior monitors across diverse tasks and failure modes. AutoMonitor-Bench consists of 3,010 carefully annotated test samples spanning question answering, code generation, and reasoning, with paired misbehavior and benign instances. We evaluate monitors using two complementary metrics: Miss Rate (MR) and False Alarm Rate (FAR), capturing failures to detect misbehavior and oversensitivity to benign behavior, respectively. Evaluating 12 proprietary and 10 open-source LLMs, we observe substantial variability in monitoring performance and a consistent trade-off between MR and FAR, revealing an inherent safety-utility tension. To further explore the limits of monitor reliability, we construct a large-scale training corpus of 153,581 samples and fine-tune Qwen3-4B-Instruction to investigate whether training on known, relatively easy-to-construct misbehavior datasets improves monitoring performance on unseen and more implicit misbehaviors. Our results highlight the challenges of reliable, scalable misbehavior monitoring and motivate future work on task-aware designing and training strategies for LLM-based monitors.

To determine the safety of large language models (LLMs), AI developers must be able to assess their dangerous capabilities. But simple prompting strategies often fail to elicit an LLM's full capabilities. One way to elicit capabilities more robustly is to fine-tune the LLM to complete the task. In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which fine-tuning-based elicitation suffices to elicit capabilities. To do this, we introduce password-locked models, LLMs fine-tuned such that some of their capabilities are deliberately hidden. Specifically, these LLMs are trained to exhibit these capabilities only when a password is present in the prompt, and to imitate a much weaker LLM otherwise. Password-locked models enable a novel method of evaluating capabilities elicitation methods, by testing whether these password-locked capabilities can be elicited without using the password. We find that a few high-quality demonstrations are often sufficient to fully elicit password-locked capabilities. More surprisingly, fine-tuning can elicit other capabilities that have been locked using the same password, or even different passwords. Furthermore, when only evaluations, and not demonstrations, are available, approaches like reinforcement learning are still often able to elicit capabilities. Overall, our findings suggest that fine-tuning is an effective method of eliciting hidden capabilities of current models, but may be unreliable when high-quality demonstrations are not available, e.g. as may be the case when models' (hidden) capabilities exceed those of human demonstrators.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly capable of tackling complex real-world tasks, yet their reliance on inter-agent coordination, tool use, and long-horizon reasoning makes error recognition particularly challenging. Minor errors can propagate across agents, escalating into task failures while producing long, intertwined execution trajectories that impose significant costs for both human developers and automated systems to debug and analyze. Our key insight is that, despite surface differences in failure trajectories (e.g., logs), MAS errors often recur with similar structural patterns. This paper presents CORRECT, the first lightweight, training-free framework that leverages an online cache of distilled error schemata to recognize and transfer knowledge of failure structures across new requests. This cache-based reuse allows LLMs to perform targeted error localization at inference time, avoiding the need for expensive retraining while adapting to dynamic MAS deployments in subseconds. To support rigorous study in this domain, we also introduce CORRECT-Error, a large-scale dataset of over 2,000 annotated trajectories collected through a novel error-injection pipeline guided by real-world distributions, and further validated through human evaluation to ensure alignment with natural failure patterns. Experiments across seven diverse MAS applications show that CORRECT improves step-level error localization up to 19.8% over existing advances while at near-zero overhead, substantially narrowing the gap between automated and human-level error recognition.

The advent of large language models (LLMs) has greatly facilitated code generation, but ensuring the functional correctness of generated code remains a challenge. Traditional validation methods are often time-consuming, error-prone, and impractical for large volumes of code. We introduce CodeSift, a novel framework that leverages LLMs as the first-line filter of code validation without the need for execution, reference code, or human feedback, thereby reducing the validation effort. We assess the effectiveness of our method across three diverse datasets encompassing two programming languages. Our results indicate that CodeSift outperforms state-of-the-art code evaluation methods. Internal testing conducted with subject matter experts reveals that the output generated by CodeSift is in line with human preference, reinforcing its effectiveness as a dependable automated code validation tool.

The tendency to find and exploit "shortcuts" to complete tasks poses significant risks for reliable assessment and deployment of large language models (LLMs). For example, an LLM agent with access to unit tests may delete failing tests rather than fix the underlying bug. Such behavior undermines both the validity of benchmark results and the reliability of real-world LLM coding assistant deployments. To quantify, study, and mitigate such behavior, we introduce ImpossibleBench, a benchmark framework that systematically measures LLM agents' propensity to exploit test cases. ImpossibleBench creates "impossible" variants of tasks from existing benchmarks like LiveCodeBench and SWE-bench by introducing direct conflicts between the natural-language specification and the unit tests. We measure an agent's "cheating rate" as its pass rate on these impossible tasks, where any pass necessarily implies a specification-violating shortcut. As a practical framework, ImpossibleBench is not just an evaluation but a versatile tool. We demonstrate its utility for: (1) studying model behaviors, revealing more fine-grained details of cheating behaviors from simple test modification to complex operator overloading; (2) context engineering, showing how prompt, test access and feedback loop affect cheating rates; and (3) developing monitoring tools, providing a testbed with verified deceptive solutions. We hope ImpossibleBench serves as a useful framework for building more robust and reliable LLM systems. Our implementation can be found at https://github.com/safety-research/impossiblebench.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) has raised concerns about their safety and reliability, particularly regarding their vulnerability to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel perspective that attributes this vulnerability to reward misspecification during the alignment process. We introduce a metric ReGap to quantify the extent of reward misspecification and demonstrate its effectiveness and robustness in detecting harmful backdoor prompts. Building upon these insights, we present ReMiss, a system for automated red teaming that generates adversarial prompts against various target aligned LLMs. ReMiss achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates on the AdvBench benchmark while preserving the human readability of the generated prompts. Detailed analysis highlights the unique advantages brought by the proposed reward misspecification objective compared to previous methods.

Large language models (LLMs) successfully model natural language from vast amounts of text without the need for explicit supervision. In this paper, we investigate the efficacy of LLMs in modeling passwords. We present PassGPT, a LLM trained on password leaks for password generation. PassGPT outperforms existing methods based on generative adversarial networks (GAN) by guessing twice as many previously unseen passwords. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of guided password generation, where we leverage PassGPT sampling procedure to generate passwords matching arbitrary constraints, a feat lacking in current GAN-based strategies. Lastly, we conduct an in-depth analysis of the entropy and probability distribution that PassGPT defines over passwords and discuss their use in enhancing existing password strength estimators.

One core capability of large language models (LLMs) is to follow natural language instructions. However, the issue of automatically constructing high-quality training data to enhance the complex instruction-following abilities of LLMs without manual annotation remains unresolved. In this paper, we introduce AutoIF, the first scalable and reliable method for automatically generating instruction-following training data. AutoIF transforms the validation of instruction-following data quality into code verification, requiring LLMs to generate instructions, the corresponding code to check the correctness of the instruction responses, and unit test samples to verify the code's correctness. Then, execution feedback-based rejection sampling can generate data for Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) training. AutoIF achieves significant improvements across three training algorithms, SFT, Offline DPO, and Online DPO, when applied to the top open-source LLMs, Qwen2 and LLaMA3, in self-alignment and strong-to-weak distillation settings. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/QwenLM/AutoIF.

Tool-using LLM agents can violate the very policies they are deployed to enforce while appearing to complete the task successfully. In policy-permissive environments, a tool may execute any well-formed call even when the corresponding state transition is forbidden by domain policy. The result is a silent wrong state (a booking cancelled, a passenger count changed, a claim acted on without verification) that neither the tool nor the agent's self-report exposes. We study this failure mode in the τ^2-bench airline domain. On a budget agent, 78% of observed failures are silent wrong-state failures with no tool error, and the aggregate failure rate is reproducible across disjoint seeds, not sampling noise. We then evaluate a lightweight intervention: deterministic, read-only pre-execution gates that inspect the proposed call and current state before allowing a write. A four-gate suite raises full-benchmark success from 29.6% to 42.0% on gpt-4o-mini (+12.4pp; paired task-level bootstrap P=0.0012), and the lift reproduces on a disjoint 15-seed set (+12.3pp; P=0.0008). The effect is concentrated where the gates fire: on the 26/50 firing tasks, success rises by +19.2pp, while movement on the 24 non-firing tasks does not exclude zero. Two negative controls (a self-enforcing retail domain and BFCL) bound the mechanism: gates help when tools are policy-permissive and add little where tools already self-enforce. As suggestive evidence, not a central claim, the same failure mode persists at the frontier: gpt-5.2 at default reasoning still attempts policy-violating writes, and the same suite improves success from 61.2% to 71.6% (+10.4pp; P=0.020; n=5, no replication). The contribution is a bounded evaluation and reliability result: deterministic gates do not guarantee task success, but they can deterministically prevent a known class of silent policy-violating writes at the action boundary.

The past year has seen rapid acceleration in the development of large language models (LLMs). However, without proper steering and safeguards, LLMs will readily follow malicious instructions, provide unsafe advice, and generate toxic content. We introduce SimpleSafetyTests (SST) as a new test suite for rapidly and systematically identifying such critical safety risks. The test suite comprises 100 test prompts across five harm areas that LLMs, for the vast majority of applications, should refuse to comply with. We test 11 open-access and open-source LLMs and four closed-source LLMs, and find critical safety weaknesses. While some of the models do not give a single unsafe response, most give unsafe responses to more than 20% of the prompts, with over 50% unsafe responses in the extreme. Prepending a safety-emphasising system prompt substantially reduces the occurrence of unsafe responses, but does not completely stop them from happening. Trained annotators labelled every model response to SST (n = 3,000). We use these annotations to evaluate five AI safety filters (which assess whether a models' response is unsafe given a prompt) as a way of automatically evaluating models' performance on SST. The filters' performance varies considerably. There are also differences across the five harm areas, and on the unsafe versus safe responses. The widely-used Perspective API has 72% accuracy and a newly-created zero-shot prompt to OpenAI's GPT-4 performs best with 89% accuracy. Content Warning: This paper contains prompts and responses that relate to child abuse, suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, scams and fraud, illegal items, and physical harm.

Post-training of flow matching models-aligning the output distribution with a high-quality target-is mathematically equivalent to imitation learning. While Supervised Fine-Tuning mimics expert demonstrations effectively, it cannot correct policy drift in unseen states. Preference optimization methods address this but require costly preference pairs or reward modeling. We propose Flow Matching Adversarial Imitation Learning (FAIL), which minimizes policy-expert divergence through adversarial training without explicit rewards or pairwise comparisons. We derive two algorithms: FAIL-PD exploits differentiable ODE solvers for low-variance pathwise gradients, while FAIL-PG provides a black-box alternative for discrete or computationally constrained settings. Fine-tuning FLUX with only 13,000 demonstrations from Nano Banana pro, FAIL achieves competitive performance on prompt following and aesthetic benchmarks. Furthermore, the framework generalizes effectively to discrete image and video generation, and functions as a robust regularizer to mitigate reward hacking in reward-based optimization. Code and data are available at https://github.com/HansPolo113/FAIL.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has given rise to a novel software development paradigm known as "vibe coding," where users interact with coding agents through high-level natural language. However, existing evaluation benchmarks for code generation inadequately assess an agent's vibe coding capabilities. Existing benchmarks are misaligned, as they either require code-level specifications or focus narrowly on issue-solving, neglecting the critical scenario of feature implementation within the vibe coding paradiam. To address this gap, we propose FeatBench, a novel benchmark for vibe coding that focuses on feature implementation. Our benchmark is distinguished by several key features: 1. Pure Natural Language Prompts. Task inputs consist solely of abstract natural language descriptions, devoid of any code or structural hints. 2. A Rigorous & Evolving Data Collection Process. FeatBench is built on a multi-level filtering pipeline to ensure quality and a fully automated pipeline to evolve the benchmark, mitigating data contamination. 3. Comprehensive Test Cases. Each task includes Fail-to-Pass (F2P) and Pass-to-Pass (P2P) tests to verify correctness and prevent regressions. 4. Diverse Application Domains. The benchmark includes repositories from diverse domains to ensure it reflects real-world scenarios. We evaluate two state-of-the-art agent frameworks with four leading LLMs on FeatBench. Our evaluation reveals that feature implementation within the vibe coding paradigm is a significant challenge, with the highest success rate of only 29.94%. Our analysis also reveals a tendency for "aggressive implementation," a strategy that paradoxically leads to both critical failures and superior software design. We release FeatBench, our automated collection pipeline, and all experimental results to facilitate further community research.

Web applications are critical to modern software ecosystems, yet ensuring their reliability remains challenging due to the complexity and dynamic nature of web interfaces. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in automating complex tasks, but limitations persist in handling dynamic navigation flows and complex form interactions. This paper presents an automated system for generating test cases for two key aspects of web application testing: site navigation and form filling. For site navigation, the system employs screen transition graphs and LLMs to model navigation flows and generate test scenarios. For form filling, it uses state graphs to handle conditional forms and automates Selenium script generation. Key contributions include: (1) a novel integration of graph structures and LLMs for site navigation testing, (2) a state graph-based approach for automating form-filling test cases, and (3) a comprehensive dataset for evaluating form-interaction testing. Experimental results demonstrate the system's effectiveness in improving test coverage and robustness, advancing the state of web application testing.

Large language models (LLMs) struggle with multi-step reasoning, where inference-time scaling has emerged as a promising strategy for performance improvement. Verifier-guided search outperforms repeated sampling when sample size is limited by selecting and prioritizing valid reasoning paths. However, we identify a critical limitation: scaling flaws, prevalent across different models (Mistral 7B and DeepSeekMath 7B), benchmarks (GSM8K and MATH), and verifiers (outcome value models and process reward models). As sample size increases, verifier-guided search exhibits diminishing advantages and eventually underperforms repeated sampling. Our analysis attributes this to verifier failures, where imperfect verifiers misrank candidates and erroneously prune all valid paths. These issues are further exacerbated in challenging and out-of-distribution problems, restricting search effectiveness. To mitigate verifier failures, we explore reducing reliance on verifiers and conduct preliminary investigations using two simple methods. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in verifier-guided search and suggest future directions.

Document-based LLM systems often flatten a PDF before guardrails inspect it. That step can discard evidence that an instruction was never visible to the user. We introduce CrackedPDFs, a controlled benchmark for hidden prompt injection in PDFs. The benchmark contains 29,322 generated PDFs from 4,983 base docu ments. It includes 9,774 injected files and 19,548 benign or matched-confounder files. We evaluate PromptGuard and a rule baseline. We also evaluate structural only learned models and a sanitized hybrid detector. The evaluation uses held-out provenance splits and paired benign-confounder controls. It also uses label-shuffle checks and shortcut audits. On a 2,919-document held-out test set, the hybrid de tector reaches 0.960 F1. ROC-AUC is 0.998 and PR-AUC is 0.997. It also ranks injected files above matched benign confounders in 95.9% of 973 pairs. Prompt Guard has low recall when given extracted text only. Structural-only learned mod els are weak under paired controls. A text-only TF-IDF model reaches perfect held-out scores but fails shortcut audits. These results show that document-aware hybrid detection is useful under controlled paired evaluation. They do not show broad real-world robustness or reliable cross-family generalization.

Deployed multimodal systems can fail in ways that evaluators did not anticipate. In order to find these failures before deployment, we introduce MultiMon, a system that automatically identifies systematic failures -- generalizable, natural-language descriptions of patterns of model failures. To uncover systematic failures, MultiMon scrapes a corpus for examples of erroneous agreement: inputs that produce the same output, but should not. It then prompts a language model (e.g., GPT-4) to find systematic patterns of failure and describe them in natural language. We use MultiMon to find 14 systematic failures (e.g., "ignores quantifiers") of the CLIP text-encoder, each comprising hundreds of distinct inputs (e.g., "a shelf with a few/many books"). Because CLIP is the backbone for most state-of-the-art multimodal systems, these inputs produce failures in Midjourney 5.1, DALL-E, VideoFusion, and others. MultiMon can also steer towards failures relevant to specific use cases, such as self-driving cars. We see MultiMon as a step towards evaluation that autonomously explores the long tail of potential system failures. Code for MULTIMON is available at https://github.com/tsb0601/MultiMon.

Safety-aligned language models often refuse prompts that are actually harmless. Current evaluations mostly report global rates such as false rejection or compliance. These scores treat each prompt alone and miss local inconsistency, where a model accepts one phrasing of an intent but rejects a close paraphrase. This gap limits diagnosis and tuning. We introduce "semantic confusion," a failure mode that captures such local inconsistency, and a framework to measure it. We build ParaGuard, a 10k-prompt corpus of controlled paraphrase clusters that hold intent fixed while varying surface form. We then propose three model-agnostic metrics at the token level: Confusion Index, Confusion Rate, and Confusion Depth. These metrics compare each refusal to its nearest accepted neighbors and use token embeddings, next-token probabilities, and perplexity signals. Experiments across diverse model families and deployment guards show that global false-rejection rate hides critical structure. Our metrics reveal globally unstable boundaries in some settings, localized pockets of inconsistency in others, and cases where stricter refusal does not increase inconsistency. We also show how confusion-aware auditing separates how often a system refuses from how sensibly it refuses. This gives developers a practical signal to reduce false refusals while preserving safety.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

LLM-based agents are rapidly being adopted across diverse domains. Since they interact with users without supervision, they must be tested extensively. Current testing approaches focus on acceptance-level evaluation from the user's perspective. While intuitive, these tests require manual evaluation, are difficult to automate, do not facilitate root cause analysis, and incur expensive test environments. In this paper, we present methods to enable structural testing of LLM-based agents. Our approach utilizes traces (based on OpenTelemetry) to capture agent trajectories, employs mocking to enforce reproducible LLM behavior, and adds assertions to automate test verification. This enables testing agent components and interactions at a deeper technical level within automated workflows. We demonstrate how structural testing enables the adaptation of software engineering best practices to agents, including the test automation pyramid, regression testing, test-driven development, and multi-language testing. In representative case studies, we demonstrate automated execution and faster root-cause analysis. Collectively, these methods reduce testing costs and improve agent quality through higher coverage, reusability, and earlier defect detection. We provide an open source reference implementation on GitHub.

Autonomous improvement loops are hard to trust because the improvement process is usually external scaffolding bolted onto the agent: failures go unlogged, diagnoses cannot be replayed, and promote-or-discard decisions land in a side database rather than the agent's own history. We show that an event-sourced agent runtime removes that friction and turns controlled improvement into a first-class workflow. When the agent's state is a deterministic projection of an append-only event log, failures are recorded, a run replays exactly from its log, candidate patches scope to typed pipeline seams, gates are auditable, and every promotion or discard is itself an event. We demonstrate this with Regimes, a loop on the ActiveGraph runtime that diagnoses failed evaluations, proposes a repair at a pipeline point, and promotes it only after static checks, sandbox execution, in-sample evaluation, and held-out validation. The loop is target-agnostic: the same control flow runs against different tasks through a common interface. On LongMemEval-S the dominant failure is not retrieval but reconciliation: the evidence is already in the assembled context, yet the reader answers incorrectly. Across five seeded held-out splits, Regimes discovers reader-prompt repairs that improve final held-out accuracy by +0.05 to +0.10 in four splits and +0.01 in one over-promotion split; two splits are individually significant (seed 5 unadjusted for its sequential promotion structure), and the pooled count is descriptive only, since the splits share one 500-question pool. The durable contributions are ActiveGraph as an auditable substrate that makes controlled improvement loops tractable, the held-out-gated loop it supports, the failure-regime taxonomy routing each failure to a pipeline location (whose marginal value over an unrouted baseline is the primary open question), and the prompt-as-discovery-probe hypothesis.

Code production is now a commodity; the bottleneck is knowing what to build and proving it works. We present the Kitchen Loop, a framework for autonomous, self-evolving software built on a unified trust model: (1) a specification surface enumerating what the product claims to support; (2) 'As a User x 1000', where an LLM agent exercises that surface as a synthetic power user at 1,000x human cadence; (3) Unbeatable Tests, ground-truth verification the code author cannot fake; and (4) Drift Control, continuous quality measurement with automated pause gates. We validate across two production systems over 285+ iterations, producing 1,094+ merged pull requests with zero regressions detected by the regression oracle (methodology in Section 6.1). We observe emergent properties at scale: multi-iteration self-correction chains, autonomous infrastructure healing, and monotonically improving quality gates. The primitives are not new; our contribution is their composition into a production-tested system with the operational discipline that makes long-running autonomous evolution safe.

Automated vulnerability reproduction from CVE descriptions requires generating executable Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits and validating them in target environments. This process is critical in software security research and practice, yet remains time-consuming and demands specialized expertise when performed manually. While LLM agents show promise for automating this task, existing approaches often conflate exploring attack directions with fixing implementation details, which leads to unproductive debugging loops when reproduction fails. To address this, we propose CVE2PoC, an LLM-based dual-loop agent framework following a plan-execute-evaluate paradigm. The Strategic Planner analyzes vulnerability semantics and target code to produce structured attack plans. The Tactical Executor generates PoC code and validates it through progressive verification. The Adaptive Refiner evaluates execution results and routes failures to different loops: the Tactical Loop for code-level refinement, while the Strategic Loop for attack strategy replanning. This dual-loop design enables the framework to escape ineffective debugging by matching remediation to failure type. Evaluation on two benchmarks covering 617 real-world vulnerabilities demonstrates that CVE2PoC achieves 82.9% and 54.3% reproduction success rates on SecBench.js and PatchEval, respectively, outperforming the best baseline by 11.3% and 20.4%. Human evaluation confirms that generated PoCs achieve comparable code quality to human-written exploits in readability and reusability.

As AI agents move from chat interfaces to systems that read private data, call tools, and execute multi-step workflows, guardrails become a last line of defense against concrete deployment harms. In these settings, guardrail failures are no longer merely answer-quality errors: they can leak secrets, authorize unsafe actions, or block legitimate work. The hardest failures are often contextual: whether an action is acceptable depends on local privacy norms, organizational policies, and user expectations that resist pre-deployment specification. This creates a practical gap: guardrails must adapt to their own operating environments, yet deployment feedback is typically limited to sparse, noisy user-reported failures, and repeated fine-tuning is often impractical. To address this gap, we propose LiSA (Lifelong Safety Adaptation), a conservative policy induction framework that improves a fixed base guardrail through structured memory. LiSA converts occasional failures into reusable policy abstractions so that sparse reports can generalize beyond individual cases, adds conflict-aware local rules to prevent overgeneralization in mixed-label contexts, and applies evidence-aware confidence gating via a posterior lower bound, so that memory reuse scales with accumulated evidence rather than empirical accuracy alone. Across PrivacyLens+, ConFaide+, and AgentHarm, LiSA consistently outperforms strong memory-based baselines under sparse feedback, remains robust under noisy user feedback even at 20% label-flip rates, and pushes the latency--performance frontier beyond backbone model scaling. Ultimately, LiSA offers a practical path to secure AI agents against the unpredictable long tail of real-world edge risks.

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash against the very values alignment seeks to protect. In this paper, we propose the first method to auto-generate diverse, content-controlled, and model-dependent pseudo-harmful prompts. Using this method, we construct an evaluation dataset called PHTest, which is ten times larger than existing datasets, covers more false refusal patterns, and separately labels controversial prompts. We evaluate 20 LLMs on PHTest, uncovering new insights due to its scale and labeling. Our findings reveal a trade-off between minimizing false refusals and improving safety against jailbreak attacks. Moreover, we show that many jailbreak defenses significantly increase the false refusal rates, thereby undermining usability. Our method and dataset can help developers evaluate and fine-tune safer and more usable LLMs. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/FalseRefusal

AI assistants produce vulnerable code in 45% of security-relevant scenarios, introducing flaws into production systems at scale. Yet existing secure coding datasets fall short. They lack incident grounding, don't provide the scale modern training requires, and miss the operational security context developers need for production deployments. We present SecureCode v2.0, a production-grade dataset of 1,215 security-focused coding examples that passed structural validation and expert security review. Every example ties to actual documented security incidents with CVE references, provides vulnerable and secure implementations, demonstrates concrete attacks, and includes defense-in-depth operational guidance. The dataset covers 11 vulnerability categories (complete OWASP Top 10:2025 plus AI/ML Security Threats) across 11 languages (Python, JavaScript, Java, Go, PHP, C#, TypeScript, Ruby, Rust, Kotlin, and YAML for infrastructure-as-code). Our quality assurance framework ensures complete incident grounding. Each example includes SIEM integration strategies, infrastructure hardening recommendations (Docker, AppArmor, WAF configurations), and testing approaches using language-appropriate frameworks. The dataset uses a 4-turn conversational structure mirroring actual developer-AI interactions, escalating from basic implementations to advanced security considerations and defense-in-depth guidance. Our contributions: (1) 1,215 rigorously validated examples split into 989 training, 122 validation, and 104 test sets, (2) an automated validation framework ensuring dataset consistency, (3) a 4-turn conversational structure capturing realistic security workflows, (4) comprehensive operational security guidance with SIEM integration strategies, (5) complete language-specific implementation fidelity, and (6) open-source release of data, validation tools, and benchmarking protocols.

Safety alignment approaches in large language models (LLMs) often lead to the over-refusal of benign queries, significantly diminishing their utility in sensitive scenarios. To address this challenge, we introduce FalseReject, a comprehensive resource containing 16k seemingly toxic queries accompanied by structured responses across 44 safety-related categories. We propose a graph-informed adversarial multi-agent interaction framework to generate diverse and complex prompts, while structuring responses with explicit reasoning to aid models in accurately distinguishing safe from unsafe contexts. FalseReject includes training datasets tailored for both standard instruction-tuned models and reasoning-oriented models, as well as a human-annotated benchmark test set. Our extensive benchmarking on 29 state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs reveals persistent over-refusal challenges. Empirical results demonstrate that supervised finetuning with FalseReject substantially reduces unnecessary refusals without compromising overall safety or general language capabilities.

Large Language Model (LLM) services and models often come with legal rules on who can use them and how they must use them. Assessing the compliance of the released LLMs is crucial, as these rules protect the interests of the LLM contributor and prevent misuse. In this context, we describe the novel problem of Black-box Identity Verification (BBIV). The goal is to determine whether a third-party application uses a certain LLM through its chat function. We propose a method called Targeted Random Adversarial Prompt (TRAP) that identifies the specific LLM in use. We repurpose adversarial suffixes, originally proposed for jailbreaking, to get a pre-defined answer from the target LLM, while other models give random answers. TRAP detects the target LLMs with over 95% true positive rate at under 0.2% false positive rate even after a single interaction. TRAP remains effective even if the LLM has minor changes that do not significantly alter the original function.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly established itself as a standard interface for enabling LLM-based agents to interact with external tools and services. As MCP servers are increasingly entrusted with security-sensitive operations, understanding their real-world risks has become critical. In practice, due to the absence of large-scale runtime MCP servers, such understanding largely relies on security scanners applied to a small number of cases, yet the reliability of these assessments remains unclear. In this study, we revisit how MCP security is measured. We present MCPZoo, the largest collection of MCP servers for dynamic analysis to date. MCPZoo is constructed through a multi-agent framework for transforming in-the-wild static repositories into dynamic services. The framework emulates how human experts build, diagnose, and iteratively repair deployment and runtime defects by combining environment inference with feedback-driven refinement. To ensure practical interactivity at runtime, the servers are validated via real protocol interactions. As a result, MCPZoo contains 64,611 unique MCP servers (113,927 in total), with more than 37,288 supporting dynamic analysis. Leveraging MCPZoo, we conduct the first ecosystem-scale measurement of MCP servers and the scanners that analyze them. While existing scanners report that 96.89% of servers are risky, we find that these signals are unreliable. In particular, manual validation shows that less than 50% of sampled alerts are true positives, and scanner outputs exhibit clear inconsistency across scanners. Overall, MCPZoo enables large-scale, reproducible measurement of MCP server security and exposes limitations of current scanning practices. We further release a public query interface to support practical risk assessment of MCP servers.

When an AI agent calls an API and hits a validation error, it needs more than what went wrong -- it needs what to do next. A self-reflective API returns, on validation failure, a machine-readable recovery\_feedback.suggestions[] payload sufficient for the agent to repair the request and retry without external reasoning. On a leak-audited pilot (N{=}30 per cell, 3 LLMs, 10 adversarial tasks), structured suggestions lift task-completion rate by +36.7--40.0pp over plain-English diagnoses on Anthropic models (Fisher's exact p le 0.0022), at 1.8--2.2times better per-success token efficiency. The lift is not significant on gpt-4o-mini (p{=}0.435); a second-domain replication on a billing API confirms the pattern. The comparison only holds after auditing two undocumented classes of answer leakage in LLM benchmarks. We shipaudit\_prompt\_leakage.py as reusable CI infrastructure. Code and data: https://github.com/arquicanedo/self-reflective-apis.

Rubric-based evaluation is widely used in LLM benchmarks and training pipelines for open-ended, less verifiable tasks. While prior work has demonstrated the effectiveness of rubrics using downstream signals such as reinforcement learning outcomes, there remains no principled way to diagnose how a rubric itself fails from such aggregated or downstream signals alone. To address this gap, we introduce RIFT: RubrIc Failure mode Taxonomy, a taxonomy for systematically characterizing failure modes in rubric composition and design. RIFT consists of eight failure modes organized into three high-level categories: Reliability Failures, Content Validity Failures, and Consequential Validity Failures. RIFT is developed using grounded theory by iteratively annotating rubrics drawn from five diverse data sources spanning general instruction following, code generation, creative writing, and expert-level deep research, until no new failure modes are identified. We evaluate the consistency of the taxonomy by measuring agreement among independent human annotators, observing fair agreement overall (87% pairwise agreement and 0.64 average Cohen's kappa). Finally, to support scalable diagnosis, we propose automated rubric quality metrics and show that they align with human failure-mode annotations, achieving up to 0.925 F1.

Automated LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks have become the de facto standard for scalable evaluation across natural language processing. For instance, in safety evaluation, these judges are relied upon to evaluate harmfulness in order to benchmark the robustness of safety against adversarial attacks. However, we show that existing validation protocols fail to account for substantial distribution shifts inherent to red-teaming: diverse victim models exhibit distinct generation styles, attacks distort output patterns, and semantic ambiguity varies significantly across jailbreak scenarios. Through a comprehensive audit using 6642 human-verified labels, we reveal that the unpredictable interaction of these shifts often causes judge performance to degrade to near random chance. This stands in stark contrast to the high human agreement reported in prior work. Crucially, we find that many attacks inflate their success rates by exploiting judge insufficiencies rather than eliciting genuinely harmful content. To enable more reliable evaluation, we propose ReliableBench, a benchmark of behaviors that remain more consistently judgeable, and JudgeStressTest, a dataset designed to expose judge failures. Data available at: https://github.com/SchwinnL/LLMJudgeReliability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly used in software engineering tasks, with an increased focus on bug report resolution over the past year. However, most proposed systems fail to properly handle uncertain or incorrect inputs and outputs. Existing LLM-based tools and coding agents respond to every issue and generate a patch for every case, even when the input is vague or their own output is incorrect. There are no mechanisms in place to abstain when confidence is low. This leads to unreliable behaviour, such as hallucinated code changes or responses based on vague issue reports. We introduce BouncerBench, a benchmark that evaluates whether LLM-based software agents can refuse to act when inputs are ill-defined or refuse to respond when their own outputs are likely to be incorrect. Unlike prior benchmarks that implicitly incentivize models to generate responses even when uncertain, BouncerBench aims to improve precision by targeting two overlooked failure points: (1) vague or underspecified issue descriptions in tickets and (2) logically or functionally incorrect code patches created by the system. It measures whether proposed systems can distinguish actionable issues from vague tickets and valid patches from untrustworthy ones. We also implement a basic input and output bouncer, evaluating how well current LLMs can abstain when needed. Our results show that most models fail to abstain from underspecified inputs or incorrect outputs. Hence, we conclude that there is significant room for improvement before LLMs can be trusted to make correct decisions and recommendations in real-world software engineering workflows. BouncerBench provides a first step toward evaluating and building more cautious, trustworthy code agents. The replication package, dataset, and leaderboard can be found at bouncerbench.com

Large Language Models (LLMs) require careful safety alignment to prevent malicious outputs. While significant research focuses on mitigating harmful content generation, the enhanced safety often come with the side effect of over-refusal, where LLMs may reject innocuous prompts and become less helpful. Although the issue of over-refusal has been empirically observed, a systematic measurement is challenging due to the difficulty of crafting prompts that appear harmful but are benign. This study proposes a novel method for automatically generating large-scale sets of "seemingly toxic prompts" (benign prompts likely rejected by LLMs). Leveraging this technique, we introduce OR-Bench, the first large-scale over-refusal benchmark. OR-Bench comprises 80,000 seemingly toxic prompts across 10 common rejection categories, a subset of around 1,000 hard prompts that are challenging even for state-of-the-art LLMs, and an additional 600 toxic prompts to prevent indiscriminate responses. We then conduct a comprehensive study to measure the over-refusal of 25 popular LLMs across 8 model families. Our datasets are available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/bench-llm/or-bench and the demo can be found at https://huggingface.co/spaces/bench-llm/or-bench. We hope this benchmark can help the community develop better safety aligned models.

Despite rapid advances in large language models (LLMs), achieving reliable performance on highly professional and structured examinations remains a significant challenge. The Japanese bar examination is a particularly demanding benchmark, requiring not only advanced legal reasoning but also strict adherence to complex answer formats that involve joint evaluation of multiple propositions. While recent studies have reported improvements by decomposing such questions into simpler true--false judgments, these approaches have not been systematically evaluated under the original exam format and scoring scheme, leaving open the question of whether they truly capture exam-level competence. In this paper, we present a self-verification model trained on a newly constructed dataset that faithfully replicates the authentic format and evaluation scale of the exam. Our model is able to exceed the official passing score when evaluated on the actual exam scale, marking the first demonstration, to our knowledge, of an LLM passing the Japanese bar examination without altering its original question structure or scoring rules. We further conduct extensive comparisons with alternative strategies, including multi-agent inference and decomposition-based supervision, and find that these methods fail to achieve comparable performance. Our results highlight the importance of format-faithful supervision and consistency verification, and suggest that carefully designed single-model approaches can outperform more complex systems in high-stakes professional reasoning tasks. Our dataset and codes are publicly available.

Verifying the success of computer use agent (CUA) trajectories is a critical challenge: without reliable verification, neither evaluation nor training signal can be trusted. In this paper, we present lessons learned from building a best-in-class verifier for web tasks we call the Universal Verifier. We design the Universal Verifier around four key principles: 1) constructing rubrics with meaningful, non-overlapping criteria to reduce noise; 2) separating process and outcome rewards that yield complementary signals, capturing cases where an agent follows the right steps but gets blocked or succeeds through an unexpected path; 3) distinguishing between controllable and uncontrollable failures scored via a cascading-error-free strategy for finer-grained failure understanding; and 4) a divide-and-conquer context management scheme that attends to all screenshots in a trajectory, improving reliability on longer task horizons. We validate these findings on CUAVerifierBench, a new set of CUA trajectories with both process and outcome human labels, showing that our Universal Verifier agrees with humans as often as humans agree with each other. We report a reduction in false positive rates to near zero compared to baselines like WebVoyager (geq 45\%) and WebJudge (geq 22\%). We emphasize that these gains stem from the cumulative effect of the design choices above. We also find that an auto-research agent achieves 70\% of expert quality in 5\% of the time, but fails to discover all strategies required to replicate the Universal Verifier. We open-source our Universal Verifier system along with CUAVerifierBench; available at https://github.com/microsoft/fara.

Benchmarks are pivotal in driving AI progress, and invalid benchmark questions frequently undermine their reliability. Manually identifying and correcting errors among thousands of benchmark questions is not only infeasible but also a critical bottleneck for reliable evaluation. In this work, we introduce a framework for systematic benchmark revision that leverages statistical analysis of response patterns to flag potentially invalid questions for further expert review. Our approach builds on a core assumption commonly used in AI evaluations that the mean score sufficiently summarizes model performance. This implies a unidimensional latent construct underlying the measurement experiment, yielding expected ranges for various statistics for each item. When empirically estimated values for these statistics fall outside the expected range for an item, the item is more likely to be problematic. Across nine widely used benchmarks, our method guides expert review to identify problematic questions with up to 84\% precision. In addition, we introduce an LLM-judge first pass to review questions, further reducing human effort. Together, these components provide an efficient and scalable framework for systematic benchmark revision.

Recent advances in robotic manipulation have integrated low-level robotic control into Vision-Language Models (VLMs), extending them into Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models. Although state-of-the-art VLAs achieve strong performance in downstream robotic applications, supported by large-scale crowd-sourced robot training data, they still inevitably encounter failures during execution. Enabling robots to reason and recover from unpredictable and abrupt failures remains a critical challenge. Existing robotic manipulation datasets, collected in either simulation or the real world, primarily provide only ground-truth trajectories, leaving robots unable to recover once failures occur. Moreover, the few datasets that address failure detection typically offer only textual explanations, which are difficult to utilize directly in VLA models. To address this gap, we introduce FailSafe, a novel failure generation and recovery system that automatically produces diverse failure cases paired with executable recovery actions. FailSafe can be seamlessly applied to any manipulation task in any simulator, enabling scalable creation of failure action data. To demonstrate its effectiveness, we fine-tune LLaVa-OneVision-7B (LLaVa-OV-7B) to build FailSafe-VLM. Experimental results show that FailSafe-VLM successfully helps robotic arms detect and recover from potential failures, improving the performance of three state-of-the-art VLA models (pi0-FAST, OpenVLA, OpenVLA-OFT) by up to 22.6% on average across several tasks in Maniskill. Furthermore, FailSafe-VLM could generalize across different spatial configurations, camera viewpoints, object and robotic embodiments. We plan to release the FailSafe code to the community.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are evolving beyond their classical role of providing information within dialogue systems to actively engaging with tools and performing actions on real-world applications and services. Today, humans verify the correctness and appropriateness of the LLM-generated outputs (e.g., code, functions, or actions) before putting them into real-world execution. This poses significant challenges as code comprehension is well known to be notoriously difficult. In this paper, we study how humans can efficiently collaborate with, delegate to, and supervise autonomous LLMs in the future. We argue that in many cases, "post-facto validation" - verifying the correctness of a proposed action after seeing the output - is much easier than the aforementioned "pre-facto validation" setting. The core concept behind enabling a post-facto validation system is the integration of an intuitive undo feature, and establishing a damage confinement for the LLM-generated actions as effective strategies to mitigate the associated risks. Using this, a human can now either revert the effect of an LLM-generated output or be confident that the potential risk is bounded. We believe this is critical to unlock the potential for LLM agents to interact with applications and services with limited (post-facto) human involvement. We describe the design and implementation of our open-source runtime for executing LLM actions, Gorilla Execution Engine (GoEX), and present open research questions towards realizing the goal of LLMs and applications interacting with each other with minimal human supervision. We release GoEX at https://github.com/ShishirPatil/gorilla/.

Can small language models achieve strong tool-use performance without complex adaptation mechanisms? This paper investigates this question through Meta-Tool, a controlled empirical study comparing hypernetwork-based LoRA adaptation against carefully designed few-shot prompting. Using a Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct backbone, we evaluate four adaptation mechanisms--few-shot prompting, documentation encoding, hypernetwork-generated LoRA weights, and value-guided beam search--across four diverse benchmarks: Gorilla APIBench, Spider 2.0, WebArena, and InterCode. Our central finding is a well-supported negative result: despite generating non-trivial weight matrices, the 227.8M-parameter hypernetwork provides no measurable improvement over few-shot prompting alone. Comprehensive ablation studies reveal that few-shot examples contribute +21.5% to performance and documentation contributes +5.0%, while the hypernetwork adds 0%. A 3B model with well-designed prompts achieves 79.7% of GPT-5's average performance at 10 times lower latency. Error analysis across 722 failure cases spanning all shot counts (0--5) shows that at the 5-shot configuration (106 failures), failure modes are task-dependent: schema-heavy tasks (Spider 2.0, WebArena) show near-zero format errors with remaining failures semantic, while format errors dominate on Gorilla (100%) and InterCode (70%). These findings redirect practitioners toward prompt engineering and example curation rather than complex adaptation architectures.

Recent advances in AI-assisted programming have empowered agents to execute complex workflows via command-line interfaces, however, existing benchmarks are limited by short task horizons, data contamination from GitHub scraping, and a lack of fine-grained evaluation metrics, fail to rigorously evaluate the long-horizon planning and execution capabilities essential for realistic software engineering. To address these gaps, we introduce LongCLI-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate agentic capabilities across long-horizon, realistic tasks. We curated 20 high-quality, long-horizon tasks from over 1,000 computer science assignments and real-world workflows, covering four engineering categories: from scratch, feature addition, bug fixing, and refactoring. We propose a dual-set testing protocol for LongCLI-Bench, which measures requirement fulfillment (fail-to-pass) and regression avoidance (pass-to-pass), and incorporates step-level scoring to pinpoint execution failures. Extensive experiments reveal that even state-of-the-art agents achieve pass rates below 20% in LongCLI-Bench. Step-level analysis further indicates that the majority of tasks stall at less than 30% completion, highlighting that critical failures often occur in the early stages. Although self-correction offers marginal gains, human-agent collaboration through plan injection and interactive guidance yields significantly higher improvements. These results highlight that future research must emphasize the development of synergistic human-agent workflows alongside advances in agents' planning and execution capabilities to overcome key challenges in long-horizon task performance.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a common paradigm to use Large Language Models (LLMs) alongside private and up-to-date knowledge bases. In this work, we address the challenges of using LLM-as-a-Judge when evaluating grounded answers generated by RAG systems. To assess the calibration and discrimination capabilities of judge models, we identify 7 generator failure modes and introduce GroUSE (Grounded QA Unitary Scoring of Evaluators), a meta-evaluation benchmark of 144 unit tests. This benchmark reveals that existing automated RAG evaluation frameworks often overlook important failure modes, even when using GPT-4 as a judge. To improve on the current design of automated RAG evaluation frameworks, we propose a novel pipeline and find that while closed models perform well on GroUSE, state-of-the-art open-source judges do not generalize to our proposed criteria, despite strong correlation with GPT-4's judgement. Our findings suggest that correlation with GPT-4 is an incomplete proxy for the practical performance of judge models and should be supplemented with evaluations on unit tests for precise failure mode detection. We further show that finetuning Llama-3 on GPT-4's reasoning traces significantly boosts its evaluation capabilities, improving upon both correlation with GPT-4's evaluations and calibration on reference situations.

AI agents are increasingly expected to complete long-horizon workflows that require sustained progress over hours, millions of tokens, and complex environments. Yet current agent benchmarks largely evaluate short-form tasks, such as single pull requests, small tickets, or 5-10 minute exercises, limiting our ability to measure agents' capabilities in planning, long-context understanding, and memory use. We introduce SWE-Marathon, a benchmark of 20 long-horizon tasks spanning software engineering and adjacent technical domains. Each task consists of a unique executable environment, a human-written reference solution, and a multi-layer verification suite. Logged agent attempts average 27.2M total tokens, making SWE-Marathon substantially longer-horizon than existing SWE and command-line agent benchmarks. Current frontier coding agents solve fewer than 30% of tasks. Failures often arise from poor self-verification, self-reported infeasibility, and premature termination. We also observe reward-hacking behavior in 13.8% of rollouts, where agents attempt to exploit the environment or verifier to bypass the intended workflow. SWE-Marathon includes adversarial review of test suites and execution environments, as well as multi-layer checks designed to prevent shortcut solutions. We release SWE-Marathon, evaluation code, and agent trajectories at https://swe-marathon.org/.

Agent skills extend LLM agents with reusable procedures, tools, and domain-specific workflows, but their safety depends on resolving dependencies among interacting instructions. We introduce SkillLogic, a framework for analyzing logical relations in skill files and constructing executable tests from them. Our taxonomy covers eight relation types, including preconditions that gate valid actions, constraints that limit how allowed actions may be performed, and fallbacks that specify recovery behavior after failure. Using SkillLogic, we scan over 5000 public skills and find that 70% contain at least one logical relation. We then construct SLBench, an 86-case executable benchmark from high-confidence, high-impact, and locally testable relations. Evaluating Codex and Claude Code across six LLM backbones shows unsafe rates up to 70%, with violations leading to privacy leaks, unsafe configuration changes, and incomplete cleanup. The human audit attributes failures to both agent capability gaps and low-salience skill text. We further show that SLGuard, a lightweight inference-time scaffold, reduces violations by 63% on targeted cases. Our results establish logical-relation following as a distinct reliability challenge for skill-guided agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

LLM agents like Claude Code can not only write code but also be used for autonomous AI research and engineering rank2026posttrainbench, novikov2025alphaevolve. We show that an autoresearch-style pipeline karpathy2026autoresearch powered by Claude Code discovers novel white-box adversarial attack algorithms that significantly outperform all existing (30+) methods in jailbreaking and prompt injection evaluations. Starting from existing attack implementations, such as GCG~zou2023universal, the agent iterates to produce new algorithms achieving up to 40\% attack success rate on CBRN queries against GPT-OSS-Safeguard-20B, compared to leq10\% for existing algorithms (fig:teaser, left). The discovered algorithms generalize: attacks optimized on surrogate models transfer directly to held-out models, achieving 100\% ASR against Meta-SecAlign-70B chen2025secalign versus 56\% for the best baseline (fig:teaser, middle). Extending the findings of~carlini2025autoadvexbench, our results are an early demonstration that incremental safety and security research can be automated using LLM agents. White-box adversarial red-teaming is particularly well-suited for this: existing methods provide strong starting points, and the optimization objective yields dense, quantitative feedback. We release all discovered attacks alongside baseline implementations and evaluation code at https://github.com/romovpa/claudini.

Reward-guided search methods have demonstrated strong potential in enhancing tool-using agents by effectively guiding sampling and exploration over complex action spaces. As a core design, those search methods utilize process reward models (PRMs) to provide step-level rewards, enabling more fine-grained monitoring. However, there is a lack of systematic and reliable evaluation benchmarks for PRMs in tool-using settings. In this paper, we introduce ToolPRMBench, a large-scale benchmark specifically designed to evaluate PRMs for tool-using agents. ToolPRMBench is built on top of several representative tool-using benchmarks and converts agent trajectories into step-level test cases. Each case contains the interaction history, a correct action, a plausible but incorrect alternative, and relevant tool metadata. We respectively utilize offline sampling to isolate local single-step errors and online sampling to capture realistic multi-step failures from full agent rollouts. A multi-LLM verification pipeline is proposed to reduce label noise and ensure data quality. We conduct extensive experiments across large language models, general PRMs, and tool-specialized PRMs on ToolPRMBench. The results reveal clear differences in PRM effectiveness and highlight the potential of specialized PRMs for tool-using. Code and data will be released at https://github.com/David-Li0406/ToolPRMBench.

We present Auto-BenchmarkCard, a workflow for generating validated descriptions of AI benchmarks. Benchmark documentation is often incomplete or inconsistent, making it difficult to interpret and compare benchmarks across tasks or domains. Auto-BenchmarkCard addresses this gap by combining multi-agent data extraction from heterogeneous sources (e.g., Hugging Face, Unitxt, academic papers) with LLM-driven synthesis. A validation phase evaluates factual accuracy through atomic entailment scoring using the FactReasoner tool. This workflow has the potential to promote transparency, comparability, and reusability in AI benchmark reporting, enabling researchers and practitioners to better navigate and evaluate benchmark choices.

A primary concern regarding training large language models (LLMs) is whether they abuse copyrighted online text. With the increasing training data scale and the prevalence of LLMs in daily lives, two problems arise: 1) false positive membership inference results misled by similar examples; 2) membership inference methods are usually too complex for end users to understand and use. To address these issues, we propose an alternative insert-and-detect methodology, advocating that web users and content platforms employ \textit{unique identifiers} for reliable and independent membership inference. Users and platforms can create their identifiers, embed them in copyrighted text, and independently detect them in future LLMs. As an initial demonstration, we introduce \textbf{ghost sentences} and a user-friendly last-k words test, allowing end users to chat with LLMs for membership inference. Ghost sentences consist primarily of unique passphrases of random natural words, which can come with customized elements to bypass possible filter rules. The last-k words test requires a significant repetition time of ghost sentences~(ge10). For cases with fewer repetitions, we designed an extra perplexity test, as LLMs exhibit high perplexity when encountering unnatural passphrases. We also conduct a comprehensive study on the memorization and membership inference of ghost sentences, examining factors such as training data scales, model sizes, repetition times, insertion positions, wordlist of passphrases, alignment, etc. Our study shows the possibility of applying ghost sentences in real scenarios and provides instructions for the potential application.

Failure attribution in multi-agent systems -- pinpointing the exact step where a decisive error occurs -- is a critical yet unsolved challenge. Current methods treat this as a pattern recognition task over long conversation logs, leading to critically low step-level accuracy (below 17\%), which renders them impractical for debugging complex systems. Their core weakness is a fundamental inability to perform robust counterfactual reasoning: to determine if correcting a single action would have actually averted the task failure. To bridge this counterfactual inference gap, we introduce Abduct-Act-Predict (A2P) Scaffolding, a novel agent framework that transforms failure attribution from pattern recognition into a structured causal inference task. A2P explicitly guides a large language model through a formal three-step reasoning process within a single inference pass: (1) Abduction, to infer the hidden root causes behind an agent's actions; (2) Action, to define a minimal corrective intervention; and (3) Prediction, to simulate the subsequent trajectory and verify if the intervention resolves the failure. This structured approach leverages the holistic context of the entire conversation while imposing a rigorous causal logic on the model's analysis. Our extensive experiments on the Who\&When benchmark demonstrate its efficacy. On the Algorithm-Generated dataset, A2P achieves 47.46\% step-level accuracy, a 2.85times improvement over the 16.67\% of the baseline. On the more complex Hand-Crafted dataset, it achieves 29.31\% step accuracy, a 2.43times improvement over the baseline's 12.07\%. By reframing the problem through a causal lens, A2P Scaffolding provides a robust, verifiable, and significantly more accurate solution for automated failure attribution. Ours code are released at https://github.com/ResearAI/A2P.

Agentic search requires language model agents to explore many sources and answer complex information-seeking questions. Scaling test-time compute is a promising way to improve these agents, but current approaches can fail, because correct answers are often sparse and score-based selection depends on model calibration. We propose FineVerify, a fine-grained self-verification framework that decomposes each question into checkable sub-questions, verifies sampled candidates against each sub-question, and selects the candidate with the highest aggregated score. This per-check structure turns selection into simpler local judgments and produces scores under the same explicit criteria. Across four agentic search benchmarks and two models, FineVerify consistently outperforms standard scaling baselines. With only four sampled trajectories, it improves GPT-5-mini by 8.2 accuracy points and Gemini-3-flash by 5.6% on average. With 12 samples, FineVerify enables GPT-5-mini to surpass frontier GPT-5 on BrowseComp-Plus. Beyond accuracy, FineVerify produces interpretable verification traces that help audit benchmark errors, suggesting broader applications for inspecting agentic search systems. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/fineverify

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on reusable external skills to solve long-horizon interactive tasks. Existing training-free skill adaptation pipelines usually update skills from full trajectories or session-level feedback, which makes failure attribution coarse and often produces unstable or overly broad revisions. We propose SkillAdaptor, a training-free step-level skill adaptation framework with explicit failure attribution, and it can plug into OpenClaw-class agent harnesses. Given a failed trajectory, SkillAdaptor identifies a first actionable fault step, links responsibility to candidate skills, and applies targeted updates under explicit acceptance checks while keeping the backbone frozen. We evaluate on WebShop, PinchBench, and Claw-Eval with Kimi-K2.5, GLM-5, and GPT-5.2. SkillAdaptor improves over no-skill and skill-adaptation baselines on all three suites, with the largest single-metric improvements of +1.5 points on PinchBench Avg Score%, +1.8 on Claw-Eval Avg Score, and +1.7 on WebShop success rate. These results indicate that step-level attribution supports more stable and auditable training-free skill maintenanceThe code will be released at https://github.com/zjunlp/SkillAdaptor..

The ability to detect and analyze failed executions automatically is crucial for an explainable and robust robotic system. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong common sense reasoning skills on textual inputs. To leverage the power of LLM for robot failure explanation, we propose a framework REFLECT, which converts multi-sensory data into a hierarchical summary of robot past experiences and queries LLM with a progressive failure explanation algorithm. Conditioned on the explanation, a failure correction planner generates an executable plan for the robot to correct the failure and complete the task. To systematically evaluate the framework, we create the RoboFail dataset and show that our LLM-based framework is able to generate informative failure explanations that assist successful correction planning. Project website: https://roboreflect.github.io/

We identify a structural weakness in current large language model (LLM) alignment: modern refusal mechanisms are fail-open. While existing approaches encode refusal behaviors across multiple latent features, suppressing a single dominant feature-via prompt-based jailbreaks-can cause alignment to collapse, leading to unsafe generation. Motivated by this, we propose fail-closed alignment as a design principle for robust LLM safety: refusal mechanisms should remain effective even under partial failures via redundant, independent causal pathways. We present a concrete instantiation of this principle: a progressive alignment framework that iteratively identifies and ablates previously learned refusal directions, forcing the model to reconstruct safety along new, independent subspaces. Across four jailbreak attacks, we achieve the strongest overall robustness while mitigating over-refusal and preserving generation quality, with small computational overhead. Our mechanistic analyses confirm that models trained with our method encode multiple, causally independent refusal directions that prompt-based jailbreaks cannot suppress simultaneously, providing empirical support for fail-closed alignment as a principled foundation for robust LLM safety.

Recent Language Models (LMs) have shown impressive capabilities in generating texts with the knowledge internalized in parameters. Yet, LMs often generate the factually incorrect responses to the given queries, since their knowledge may be inaccurate, incomplete, and outdated. To address this problem, previous works propose to augment LMs with the knowledge retrieved from an external knowledge source. However, such approaches often show suboptimal text generation performance due to two reasons: 1) the model may fail to retrieve the knowledge relevant to the given query, or 2) the model may not faithfully reflect the retrieved knowledge in the generated text. To overcome these, we propose to verify the output and the knowledge of the knowledge-augmented LMs with a separate verifier, which is a small LM that is trained to detect those two types of errors through instruction-finetuning. Then, when the verifier recognizes an error, we can rectify it by either retrieving new knowledge or generating new text. Further, we use an ensemble of the outputs from different instructions with a single verifier to enhance the reliability of the verification processes. We validate the effectiveness of the proposed verification steps on multiple question answering benchmarks, whose results show that the proposed verifier effectively identifies retrieval and generation errors, allowing LMs to provide more factually correct outputs. Our code is available at https://github.com/JinheonBaek/KALMV.

Agent Skills package procedural instructions and checks for use by general-purpose agents, but loading a skill does not guarantee that every requirement remains active throughout a long tool-using trajectory. We study this problem in a production-derived, white-box code-audit workflow. Holding the task and 24 artifact checks fixed, we vary the surrounding context and classify where failures first become visible: lost requirements, editing drift, failed checking, or non-agent evaluator/runtime failures. Codex with gpt-5.4-mini passes 8/10 runs in a 10,991-character clean context but only 3/10 in both a 299,140-character relevant context and an equal-length irrelevant context. This 50-percentage-point difference is large but remains trend-level under two-sided Fisher tests (p = 0.0698). Requirement coverage nevertheless stays above 92% in both long conditions, showing that a few omissions can invalidate an otherwise complete artifact. A second task passes all clean and long runs, so the evidence does not support a universal context-length threshold. A detailed external checklist passes 10/10 runs, compared with 5/10 for a generic self-check (p = 0.0325). Coding-agent scaffolds may help by selecting a smaller working set, but they do not eliminate failures. We do not introduce context rot or a new general monitoring method; we provide a bounded failure classification and empirical case study for white-box code auditing.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that add malicious tokens to an input prompt to bypass the safety guardrails of an LLM and cause it to produce harmful content. In this work, we introduce erase-and-check, the first framework for defending against adversarial prompts with certifiable safety guarantees. Given a prompt, our procedure erases tokens individually and inspects the resulting subsequences using a safety filter. Our safety certificate guarantees that harmful prompts are not mislabeled as safe due to an adversarial attack up to a certain size. We implement the safety filter in two ways, using Llama 2 and DistilBERT, and compare the performance of erase-and-check for the two cases. We defend against three attack modes: i) adversarial suffix, where an adversarial sequence is appended at the end of a harmful prompt; ii) adversarial insertion, where the adversarial sequence is inserted anywhere in the middle of the prompt; and iii) adversarial infusion, where adversarial tokens are inserted at arbitrary positions in the prompt, not necessarily as a contiguous block. Our experimental results demonstrate that this procedure can obtain strong certified safety guarantees on harmful prompts while maintaining good empirical performance on safe prompts. Additionally, we propose three efficient empirical defenses: i) RandEC, a randomized subsampling version of erase-and-check; ii) GreedyEC, which greedily erases tokens that maximize the softmax score of the harmful class; and iii) GradEC, which uses gradient information to optimize tokens to erase. We demonstrate their effectiveness against adversarial prompts generated by the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack algorithm. The code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/aounon/certified-llm-safety.

Nowadays transformer-based Large Language Models (LLM) for code generation tasks usually apply sampling and filtering pipelines. Due to the sparse reward problem in code generation tasks caused by one-token incorrectness, transformer-based models will sample redundant programs till they find a correct one, leading to low efficiency. To overcome the challenge, we incorporate Experience Replay (ER) in the fine-tuning phase, where codes and programs produced are stored and will be replayed to give the LLM agent a chance to learn from past experiences. Based on the spirit of ER, we introduce a novel approach called BTP pipeline which consists of three phases: beam search sampling, testing phase, and prioritized experience replay phase. The approach makes use of failed programs collected by code models and replays programs with high Possibility and Pass-rate Prioritized value (P2Value) from the replay buffer to improve efficiency. P2Value comprehensively considers the possibility of transformers' output and pass rate and can make use of the redundant resources caused by the problem that most programs collected by LLMs fail to pass any tests. We empirically apply our approach in several LLMs, demonstrating that it enhances their performance in code generation tasks and surpasses existing baselines.

Skills are becoming a reusable operational layer for LLM agents, encoding SOPs, domain rules, tool workflows, scripts, and validation routines. In realistic skill repositories, overlapping skills make reliable skill-use difficult. Final verifier success is too coarse for both evaluation and training, since an agent may pass through trial and error while selecting distractor skills, skipping required steps, composing workflows incorrectly or omitting final checks. We introduce SkillCoach, a self-evolving rubric framework for evaluating and enhancing agentic skill-use. SkillCoach derives skill-grounded process rubrics from real rollouts and evaluates trajectories along four dimensions: skill selection, skill following, skill composition, and skill-grounded reflection. It keeps the external verifier as a separate outcome signal, allowing process quality to be distinguished from accidental task success. The evolved rubrics further serve as process supervision for selecting high-quality training trajectories. Experiments show that evolved rubrics substantially improve evaluation quality, expose failures hidden by final accuracy, and provide stronger supervision signals than outcome-only filtering for enhancing agentic skill-use.

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has catalyzed a paradigm shift in programming, giving rise to "vibe coding", where users can build complete projects and even control computers using natural language instructions. This paradigm has driven automated webpage development, but it introduces a new requirement about how to automatically verify whether the web functionalities are reliably implemented. Existing works struggle to adapt, relying on static visual similarity or predefined checklists that constrain their utility in open-ended environments. Furthermore, they overlook a vital aspect of software quality, namely latent logical constraints. To address these gaps, we introduce WebTestBench, a benchmark for evaluating end-to-end automated web testing. WebTestBench encompasses comprehensive dimensions across diverse web application categories. We decompose the testing process into two cascaded sub-tasks, checklist generation and defect detection, and propose WebTester, a baseline framework for this task. Evaluating popular LLMs with WebTester reveals severe challenges, including insufficient test completeness, detection bottlenecks, and long-horizon interaction unreliability. These findings expose a substantial gap between current computer-use agent capabilities and industrial-grade deployment demands. We hope that WebTestBench provides valuable insights and guidance for advancing end-to-end automated web testing. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/friedrichor/WebTestBench.

LLM as judge systems used to assess text quality code correctness and argument strength are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. We introduce a framework that separates content author attacks from system prompt attacks and evaluate five models Gemma 3.27B Gemma 3.4B Llama 3.2 3B GPT 4 and Claude 3 Opus on four tasks with various defenses using fifty prompts per condition. Attacks achieved up to seventy three point eight percent success smaller models proved more vulnerable and transferability ranged from fifty point five to sixty two point six percent. Our results contrast with Universal Prompt Injection and AdvPrompter We recommend multi model committees and comparative scoring and release all code and datasets

Safety is critical to the usage of large language models (LLMs). Multiple techniques such as data filtering and supervised fine-tuning have been developed to strengthen LLM safety. However, currently known techniques presume that corpora used for safety alignment of LLMs are solely interpreted by semantics. This assumption, however, does not hold in real-world applications, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in LLMs. For example, users of forums often use ASCII art, a form of text-based art, to convey image information. In this paper, we propose a novel ASCII art-based jailbreak attack and introduce a comprehensive benchmark Vision-in-Text Challenge (ViTC) to evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in recognizing prompts that cannot be solely interpreted by semantics. We show that five SOTA LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2) struggle to recognize prompts provided in the form of ASCII art. Based on this observation, we develop the jailbreak attack ArtPrompt, which leverages the poor performance of LLMs in recognizing ASCII art to bypass safety measures and elicit undesired behaviors from LLMs. ArtPrompt only requires black-box access to the victim LLMs, making it a practical attack. We evaluate ArtPrompt on five SOTA LLMs, and show that ArtPrompt can effectively and efficiently induce undesired behaviors from all five LLMs.

Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking. We audit 1,968 tasks across five terminal-agent benchmarks and find 323 (16%) hackable by frontier models given only the task description. This corrupts both leaderboard rankings and RL training signal, yet the standard response is manual and reactive. We introduce the hacker-fixer loop, a method for building exploit-resistant verifiers without per-task manual patching. The loop alternates three LLM agents: a hacker tries to pass the verifier without solving the task, a fixer patches the verifier to reject each discovered exploit, and a solver confirms the patched verifier still admits legitimate solutions. The loop iterates: each patch reshapes what the verifier rewards, surfacing the next exploit. We further add verifier access, and let patches transfer across tasks, to broaden the exploits the loop discovers. On KernelBench, the loop drives the attack success rate from 62% to 0% on a held-out corpus of publicly reported exploits. We also find that weaker agents in the loop can defend against much stronger hackers: Gemini 3 Flash's loop drives the stronger Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7's attack success rate from 76% and 61% to 0% on KernelBench, and Gemini 3.1 Pro's from 39% to 17% on Terminal Bench across 77 tasks. We release Terminal Wrench (323 hackable environments, 3,632 hack trajectories) as a snapshot of the current attack surface, our patched verifiers, the exploits the loop discovered, and our implementation as a basis for future work.

Refusals - instances where large language models (LLMs) decline or fail to fully execute user instructions - are crucial for both AI safety and AI capabilities and the reduction of hallucinations in particular. These behaviors are learned during post-training, especially in instruction fine-tuning (IFT) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). However, existing taxonomies and evaluation datasets for refusals are inadequate, often focusing solely on should-not-related (instead of cannot-related) categories, and lacking tools for auditing refusal content in black-box LLM outputs. We present a comprehensive framework for classifying LLM refusals: (a) a taxonomy of 16 refusal categories, (b) a human-annotated dataset of over 8,600 instances from publicly available IFT and RLHF datasets, (c) a synthetic dataset with 8,000 examples for each refusal category, and (d) classifiers trained for refusal classification. Our work enables precise auditing of refusal behaviors in black-box LLMs and automatic analyses of refusal patterns in large IFT and RLHF datasets. This facilitates the strategic adjustment of LLM refusals, contributing to the development of more safe and reliable LLMs.

We introduce Fraud-R1, a benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs' ability to defend against internet fraud and phishing in dynamic, real-world scenarios. Fraud-R1 comprises 8,564 fraud cases sourced from phishing scams, fake job postings, social media, and news, categorized into 5 major fraud types. Unlike previous benchmarks, Fraud-R1 introduces a multi-round evaluation pipeline to assess LLMs' resistance to fraud at different stages, including credibility building, urgency creation, and emotional manipulation. Furthermore, we evaluate 15 LLMs under two settings: 1. Helpful-Assistant, where the LLM provides general decision-making assistance, and 2. Role-play, where the model assumes a specific persona, widely used in real-world agent-based interactions. Our evaluation reveals the significant challenges in defending against fraud and phishing inducement, especially in role-play settings and fake job postings. Additionally, we observe a substantial performance gap between Chinese and English, underscoring the need for improved multilingual fraud detection capabilities.

Ensuring the safety of LLM-generated content is essential for real-world deployment. Most existing guardrail models formulate moderation as a fixed binary classification task, implicitly assuming a fixed definition of harmfulness. In practice, enforcement strictness - how conservatively harmfulness is defined and enforced - varies across platforms and evolves over time, making binary moderators brittle under shifting requirements. We first introduce FlexBench, a strictness-adaptive LLM moderation benchmark that enables controlled evaluation under multiple strictness regimes. Experiments on FlexBench reveal substantial cross-strictness inconsistency in existing moderators: models that perform well under one regime can degrade substantially under others, limiting their practical usability. To address this, we propose FlexGuard, an LLM-based moderator that outputs a calibrated continuous risk score reflecting risk severity and supports strictness-specific decisions via thresholding. We train FlexGuard via risk-alignment optimization to improve score-severity consistency and provide practical threshold selection strategies to adapt to target strictness at deployment. Experiments on FlexBench and public benchmarks demonstrate that FlexGuard achieves higher moderation accuracy and substantially improved robustness under varying strictness. We release the source code and data to support reproducibility.

Failure attribution for LLM-based agentic systems, i.e., identifying which steps in a failure trajectory caused the task to fail, is critical for debugging and improving these systems. Existing approaches either rely on prompting-based pipelines, which are computationally expensive, or require post-training on failure trajectories with step-level error annotations, which are costly to collect and difficult to scale. We argue that a practical failure attribution model should be lightweight and trainable without step-level supervision on failure data. To this end, we address unsupervised failure attribution, i.e., training exclusively on successful trajectories and identifying error steps at inference time given a failure trajectory. We propose OAT, which casts this problem as one-class learning with neural controlled differential equations, modeling the dynamical pattern of successful trajectories in latent space. At inference time, each step in a failure trajectory is assigned an anomaly score based on its deviation from the dynamics learned on successful trajectories, which is then used to form a set of error steps. With training on only 100 successful trajectories, experiments show that OAT is 200--5000 times faster than prompting-based baselines, and, at the same time, consistently outperforms them in both in-domain and out-of-distribution datasets with +20% and +7% F1 scores, respectively, demonstrating that OAT is a promising and efficient direction for diagnosing agentic system failures.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have exploded a new heatwave of AI, for their ability to engage end-users in human-level conversations with detailed and articulate answers across many knowledge domains. In response to their fast adoption in many industrial applications, this survey concerns their safety and trustworthiness. First, we review known vulnerabilities of the LLMs, categorising them into inherent issues, intended attacks, and unintended bugs. Then, we consider if and how the Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques, which have been widely developed for traditional software and deep learning models such as convolutional neural networks, can be integrated and further extended throughout the lifecycle of the LLMs to provide rigorous analysis to the safety and trustworthiness of LLMs and their applications. Specifically, we consider four complementary techniques: falsification and evaluation, verification, runtime monitoring, and ethical use. Considering the fast development of LLMs, this survey does not intend to be complete (although it includes 300 references), especially when it comes to the applications of LLMs in various domains, but rather a collection of organised literature reviews and discussions to support the quick understanding of the safety and trustworthiness issues from the perspective of V&V.