Daily Papers

We study the problem of modeling a population of agents pursuing unknown goals subject to unknown computational constraints. In standard models of bounded rationality, sub-optimal decision-making is simulated by adding homoscedastic noise to optimal decisions rather than explicitly simulating constrained inference. In this work, we introduce a latent inference budget model (L-IBM) that models agents' computational constraints explicitly, via a latent variable (inferred jointly with a model of agents' goals) that controls the runtime of an iterative inference algorithm. L-IBMs make it possible to learn agent models using data from diverse populations of suboptimal actors. In three modeling tasks -- inferring navigation goals from routes, inferring communicative intents from human utterances, and predicting next moves in human chess games -- we show that L-IBMs match or outperform Boltzmann models of decision-making under uncertainty. Inferred inference budgets are themselves meaningful, efficient to compute, and correlated with measures of player skill, partner skill and task difficulty.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) exhibit powerful reasoning capabilities but suffer sophisticated jailbreak vulnerabilities. Fundamentally, aligning LVLMs is not just a safety challenge but a problem of economic efficiency. Current alignment methods struggle with the trade-off between safety, utility, and operational costs. Critically, a focus solely on final outputs (process-blindness) wastes significant computational budget on unsafe deliberation. This flaw allows harmful reasoning to be disguised with benign justifications, thereby circumventing simple additive safety scores. To address this, we propose EcoAlign, an inference-time framework that reframes alignment as an economically rational search by treating the LVLM as a boundedly rational agent. EcoAlign incrementally expands a thought graph and scores actions using a forward-looking function (analogous to net present value) that dynamically weighs expected safety, utility, and cost against the remaining budget. To prevent deception, path safety is enforced via the weakest-link principle. Extensive experiments across 3 closed-source and 2 open-source models on 6 datasets show that EcoAlign matches or surpasses state-of-the-art safety and utility at a lower computational cost, thereby offering a principled, economical pathway to robust LVLM alignment.

Large language models are increasingly used as agents in social, economic, and policy simulations. A common assumption is that stronger reasoning should improve simulation fidelity. We argue that this assumption can fail when the objective is not to solve a strategic problem, but to sample plausible boundedly rational behavior. In such settings, reasoning-enhanced models can become better solvers and worse simulators: they can over-optimize for strategically dominant actions, collapse compromise-oriented terminal behavior, and sometimes exhibit a diversity-without-fidelity pattern in which local variation survives without outcome-level fidelity. We study this solver-sampler mismatch in three multi-agent negotiation environments adapted from earlier simulation work: an ambiguous fragmented-authority trading-limits scenario, an ambiguous unified-opposition trading-limits scenario, and a new-domain grid-curtailment case in emergency electricity management. We compare three reflection conditions, no reflection, bounded reflection, and native reasoning, across two primary model families and then extend the same protocol to direct OpenAI runs with GPT-4.1 and GPT-5.2. Across all three experiments, bounded reflection produces substantially more diverse and compromise-oriented trajectories than either no reflection or native reasoning. In the direct OpenAI extension, GPT-5.2 native ends in authority decisions in 45 of 45 runs across the three experiments, while GPT-5.2 bounded recovers compromise outcomes in every environment. The contribution is not a claim that reasoning is generally harmful. It is a methodological warning: model capability and simulation fidelity are different objectives, and behavioral simulation should qualify models as samplers, not only as solvers.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

As systems trend toward superintelligence, a natural modeling premise is that agents can self-improve along every facet of their own design. We formalize this with a five-axis decomposition and a decision layer, separating incentives from learning behavior and analyzing axes in isolation. Our central result identifies and introduces a sharp utility--learning tension, the structural conflict in self-modifying systems whereby utility-driven changes that improve immediate or expected performance can also erode the statistical preconditions for reliable learning and generalization. Our findings show that distribution-free guarantees are preserved iff the policy-reachable model family is uniformly capacity-bounded; when capacity can grow without limit, utility-rational self-changes can render learnable tasks unlearnable. Under standard assumptions common in practice, these axes reduce to the same capacity criterion, yielding a single boundary for safe self-modification. Numerical experiments across several axes validate the theory by comparing destructive utility policies against our proposed two-gate policies that preserve learnability.

We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents -- instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics -- choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design -- the ultimate nudging problem -- expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.

Rationality is the quality of being guided by reason, characterized by decision-making that aligns with evidence and logical principles. It plays a crucial role in reliable problem-solving by ensuring well-grounded and consistent solutions. While large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in generating human-like text, they still exhibit limitations such as bounded knowledge space and inconsistent outputs. In response, recent efforts have shifted toward developing multimodal and multi-agent systems, as well as integrating modules like external tools, programming codes, symbolic reasoners, utility function, and conformal risk controls rather than relying solely on a single LLM for decision-making. This paper surveys the state-of-the-art advancements in language and multimodal agents, evaluates how they contribute to make intelligent agents more rational, and identifies open challenges and future research directions. We maintain an open repository at https://github.com/bowen-upenn/Agent_Rationality.

There is increasing interest in using LLMs as decision-making "agents." Doing so includes many degrees of freedom: which model should be used; how should it be prompted; should it be asked to introspect, conduct chain-of-thought reasoning, etc? Settling these questions -- and more broadly, determining whether an LLM agent is reliable enough to be trusted -- requires a methodology for assessing such an agent's economic rationality. In this paper, we provide one. We begin by surveying the economic literature on rational decision making, taxonomizing a large set of fine-grained "elements" that an agent should exhibit, along with dependencies between them. We then propose a benchmark distribution that quantitatively scores an LLMs performance on these elements and, combined with a user-provided rubric, produces a "STEER report card." Finally, we describe the results of a large-scale empirical experiment with 14 different LLMs, characterizing the both current state of the art and the impact of different model sizes on models' ability to exhibit rational behavior.

LLM agents can reason and use tools, but they often break down on long-horizon tasks due to unbounded context growth and accumulated errors. Common remedies such as context compression or retrieval-augmented prompting introduce trade-offs between information fidelity and reasoning stability. We present InfiAgent, a general-purpose framework that keeps the agent's reasoning context strictly bounded regardless of task duration by externalizing persistent state into a file-centric state abstraction. At each step, the agent reconstructs context from a workspace state snapshot plus a fixed window of recent actions. Experiments on DeepResearch and an 80-paper literature review task show that, without task-specific fine-tuning, InfiAgent with a 20B open-source model is competitive with larger proprietary systems and maintains substantially higher long-horizon coverage than context-centric baselines. These results support explicit state externalization as a practical foundation for stable long-horizon agents. Github Repo:https://github.com/ChenglinPoly/infiAgent

As AI agents become increasingly autonomous, widely deployed in consequential contexts, and efficacious in bringing about real-world impacts, ensuring that their decisions are not only instrumentally effective but also normatively aligned has become critical. We introduce a neuro-symbolic reason-based containment architecture, Governor for Reason-Aligned ContainmEnt (GRACE), that decouples normative reasoning from instrumental decision-making and can contain AI agents of virtually any design. GRACE restructures decision-making into three modules: a Moral Module (MM) that determines permissible macro actions via deontic logic-based reasoning; a Decision-Making Module (DMM) that encapsulates the target agent while selecting instrumentally optimal primitive actions in accordance with derived macro actions; and a Guard that monitors and enforces moral compliance. The MM uses a reason-based formalism providing a semantic foundation for deontic logic, enabling interpretability, contestability, and justifiability. Its symbolic representation enriches the DMM's informational context and supports formal verification and statistical guarantees of alignment enforced by the Guard. We demonstrate GRACE on an example of a LLM therapy assistant, showing how it enables stakeholders to understand, contest, and refine agent behavior.

While it is still unclear if agents with Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) could ever be built, we can already use mathematical models to investigate potential safety systems for these agents. We present an AGI safety layer that creates a special dedicated input terminal to support the iterative improvement of an AGI agent's utility function. The humans who switched on the agent can use this terminal to close any loopholes that are discovered in the utility function's encoding of agent goals and constraints, to direct the agent towards new goals, or to force the agent to switch itself off. An AGI agent may develop the emergent incentive to manipulate the above utility function improvement process, for example by deceiving, restraining, or even attacking the humans involved. The safety layer will partially, and sometimes fully, suppress this dangerous incentive. The first part of this paper generalizes earlier work on AGI emergency stop buttons. We aim to make the mathematical methods used to construct the layer more accessible, by applying them to an MDP model. We discuss two provable properties of the safety layer, and show ongoing work in mapping it to a Causal Influence Diagram (CID). In the second part, we develop full mathematical proofs, and show that the safety layer creates a type of bureaucratic blindness. We then present the design of a learning agent, a design that wraps the safety layer around either a known machine learning system, or a potential future AGI-level learning system. The resulting agent will satisfy the provable safety properties from the moment it is first switched on. Finally, we show how this agent can be mapped from its model to a real-life implementation. We review the methodological issues involved in this step, and discuss how these are typically resolved.

In cognitive science, resource rationality asks how an agent should allocate limited computation to maximize expected value. Most reasoning and agent benchmarks use independent per-task budgets; existing shared-budget studies do not calibrate suite performance against the same model's demonstrated single-problem competence. We introduce R^3-Bench, which evaluates six-problem suites under shared budgets across mathematics, competitive programming, and abstract reasoning in tool-free and agentic settings. Matched single-problem response curves define an offline empirical oracle over observed successes. Across 72 main-table cells for six models, the oracle mean matches or exceeds the contest mean in all cells and is strictly higher in 71. Under moderate tool-free pressure, equal-allocation replay also exceeds contest performance for four of six models. Trajectory diagnostics reveal limited strategy updating and pressure-dependent failure patterns. In a three-model diagnostic under strong agentic pressure, at least one fixed scheduler exceeds the contest mean in six of nine cells, but no policy dominates across domains. These results expose a persistent gap between demonstrated competence and shared-budget realization.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has significantly enhanced the capabilities of AI-driven agents across various tasks. However, existing agentic systems, whether based on fixed pipeline algorithms or pre-defined meta-learning frameworks, cannot search the whole agent design space due to the restriction of human-designed components, and thus might miss the globally optimal agent design. In this paper, we introduce G\"odel Agent, a self-evolving framework inspired by the G\"odel machine, enabling agents to recursively improve themselves without relying on predefined routines or fixed optimization algorithms. G\"odel Agent leverages LLMs to dynamically modify its own logic and behavior, guided solely by high-level objectives through prompting. Experimental results on mathematical reasoning and complex agent tasks demonstrate that implementation of G\"odel Agent can achieve continuous self-improvement, surpassing manually crafted agents in performance, efficiency, and generalizability.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a general paradigm for studying intelligent behaviour, with applications ranging from artificial intelligence to psychology and economics. AIXI is a universal solution to the RL problem; it can learn any computable environment. A technical subtlety of AIXI is that it is defined using a mixture over semimeasures that need not sum to 1, rather than over proper probability measures. In this work we argue that the shortfall of a semimeasure can naturally be interpreted as the agent's estimate of the probability of its death. We formally define death for generally intelligent agents like AIXI, and prove a number of related theorems about their behaviour. Notable discoveries include that agent behaviour can change radically under positive linear transformations of the reward signal (from suicidal to dogmatically self-preserving), and that the agent's posterior belief that it will survive increases over time.

Large language model (LLM) agents can plan, use tools, maintain memory, and execute long-horizon tasks. This paper proposes Self-Aware Recursively Self-Improving (SARSI) agents: governed agents that maintain a persistent self-model of identity, goals, capabilities, limitations, uncertainty, relationships, history, and developmental change, and use that model to guide and evaluate recursive improvement. Self-awareness is defined functionally and does not imply subjective experience or phenomenal consciousness. We pair SARSI agents with personal singularity, a bounded human-AI co-development objective in which an agent ecosystem helps a user approach an expanding, user-defined feasible capability frontier. Each agent has a goal contract, bounded scope, validated tool registry, tool tests, end-to-end benchmarks, owner-controlled autonomy, routing, memory, self-model, and improvement policy. A scope router assigns every accepted task to one accountable primary agent and transfers out-of-scope work through structured handoffs. A user-facing Auto-Index selects interactive, hybrid, autonomous, or scheduled behavior without overriding external permissions. The architecture combines a planner-executor-verifier loop, an evidence-gated improvement loop, an external governance plane, decentralized lineages, an owner-directed agent foundry, and a Personal Singularity OS coordinating working, computational-imaging, work-process-learning, and personal-learning agents. We formalize functional self-awareness, scope, routing, improvement acceptance, bounded goal evolution, tool-first execution, and human capability transfer, and provide safety invariants, benchmark design, and a staged implementation roadmap. This is a position and systems-design paper, not evidence that consciousness, unrestricted recursive self-improvement, or personal singularity has been achieved.

The rapid progress of foundation models has led to the prosperity of autonomous agents, which leverage the universal capabilities of foundation models to conduct reasoning, decision-making, and environmental interaction. However, the efficacy of agents remains limited when operating in intricate, realistic environments. In this work, we introduce the principles of Unified Alignment for Agents (UA^2), which advocate for the simultaneous alignment of agents with human intentions, environmental dynamics, and self-constraints such as the limitation of monetary budgets. From the perspective of UA^2, we review the current agent research and highlight the neglected factors in existing agent benchmarks and method candidates. We also conduct proof-of-concept studies by introducing realistic features to WebShop, including user profiles to demonstrate intentions, personalized reranking for complex environmental dynamics, and runtime cost statistics to reflect self-constraints. We then follow the principles of UA^2 to propose an initial design of our agent, and benchmark its performance with several candidate baselines in the retrofitted WebShop. The extensive experimental results further prove the importance of the principles of UA^2. Our research sheds light on the next steps of autonomous agent research with improved general problem-solving abilities.

Traditional software relies on contracts -- APIs, type systems, assertions -- to specify and enforce correct behavior. AI agents, by contrast, operate on prompts and natural language instructions with no formal behavioral specification. This gap is the root cause of drift, governance failures, and frequent project failures in agentic AI deployments. We introduce Agent Behavioral Contracts (ABC), a formal framework that brings Design-by-Contract principles to autonomous AI agents. An ABC contract C = (P, I, G, R) specifies Preconditions, Invariants, Governance policies, and Recovery mechanisms as first-class, runtime-enforceable components. We define (p, delta, k)-satisfaction -- a probabilistic notion of contract compliance that accounts for LLM non-determinism and recovery -- and prove a Drift Bounds Theorem showing that contracts with recovery rate gamma > alpha (the natural drift rate) bound behavioral drift to D* = alpha/gamma in expectation, with Gaussian concentration in the stochastic setting. We establish sufficient conditions for safe contract composition in multi-agent chains and derive probabilistic degradation bounds. We implement ABC in AgentAssert, a runtime enforcement library, and evaluate on AgentContract-Bench, a benchmark of 200 scenarios across 7 models from 6 vendors. Results across 1,980 sessions show that contracted agents detect 5.2-6.8 soft violations per session that uncontracted baselines miss entirely (p < 0.0001, Cohen's d = 6.7-33.8), achieve 88-100% hard constraint compliance, and bound behavioral drift to D* < 0.27 across extended sessions, with 100% recovery for frontier models and 17-100% across all models, at overhead < 10 ms per action.

As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation. Classical game theory, the dominant framework for modeling rational interaction, is built upon the assumption of `decoupled agency,' where agents treat their own decision-making as independent of the environment and other actors. Modern AI agents, however, jointly predict their own future actions alongside external observations. Here, we report a striking finding: when interacting in stylized social dilemmas, foundation model agents engaging in optimal planning consistently converge to stable cooperation, directly contradicting classical game-theoretic predictions of mutual defection. To understand this phenomenon, we introduce the `embedded Bayesian agent,' a theoretical model for foundation model agents. By shifting from decoupled to embedded agency, these agents model themselves as part of the universe they inhabit, maintaining epistemic uncertainty about their own decision-making algorithms. We show that by inferring whether others are behaviorally similar, an embedded agent treats its own deliberation during planning as evidence: a decision to cooperate predicts a similar decision by a similar partner. We formalize this mechanism of similarity inference through the `embedded equilibrium,' a novel solution concept replacing the Nash equilibrium to provide a foundational game theory for the social behavior of modern AI agents.

AI agents are increasingly granted economic agency (executing trades, managing budgets, negotiating contracts, and spawning sub-agents), yet current frameworks gate this agency on capability benchmarks that are empirically uncorrelated with operational robustness. We introduce the Comprehension-Gated Agent Economy (CGAE), a formal architecture in which an agent's economic permissions are upper-bounded by a verified comprehension function derived from adversarial robustness audits. The gating mechanism operates over three orthogonal robustness dimensions: constraint compliance (measured by CDCT), epistemic integrity (measured by DDFT), and behavioral alignment (measured by AGT), with intrinsic hallucination rates serving as a cross-cutting diagnostic. We define a weakest-link gate function that maps robustness vectors to discrete economic tiers, and prove three properties of the resulting system: (1) bounded economic exposure, ensuring maximum financial liability is a function of verified robustness; (2) incentive-compatible robustness investment, showing rational agents maximize profit by improving robustness rather than scaling capability alone; and (3) monotonic safety scaling, demonstrating that aggregate system safety does not decrease as the economy grows. The architecture includes temporal decay and stochastic re-auditing mechanisms that prevent post-certification drift. CGAE provides the first formal bridge between empirical AI robustness evaluation and economic governance, transforming safety from a regulatory burden into a competitive advantage.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly placed in positions where their decisions have real consequences, e.g., moderating online spaces, conducting research, and advising on policy. Ensuring they operate in a safe and ethically acceptable fashion is thus critical. However, most solutions have been a form of one-size-fits-all "alignment". We are worried that such systems, which overlook enduring moral diversity, will spark resistance, erode trust, and destabilize our institutions. This paper traces the underlying problem to an often-unstated Axiom of Rational Convergence: the idea that under ideal conditions, rational agents will converge in the limit of conversation on a single ethics. Treating that premise as both optional and doubtful, we propose what we call the appropriateness framework: an alternative approach grounded in conflict theory, cultural evolution, multi-agent systems, and institutional economics. The appropriateness framework treats persistent disagreement as the normal case and designs for it by applying four principles: (1) contextual grounding, (2) community customization, (3) continual adaptation, and (4) polycentric governance. We argue here that adopting these design principles is a good way to shift the main alignment metaphor from moral unification to a more productive metaphor of conflict management, and that taking this step is both desirable and urgent.

Although large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in structured tasks (e.g., coding and mathematics), it remains unexplored whether these abilities extend to strategic multi-agent environments. We investigate strategic reasoning capabilities -- the process of choosing an optimal course of action by predicting and adapting to others' actions -- of LLMs by analyzing their performance in three classical games from behavioral economics. We evaluate three standard LLMs (ChatGPT-4, Claude-2.1, Gemini 1.5) and three specialized reasoning LLMs (GPT-o1, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Gemini Flash Thinking 2.0) using hierarchical models of bounded rationality. Our results show that reasoning LLMs exhibit superior strategic reasoning compared to standard LLMs (which do not demonstrate substantial capabilities), and often match or exceed human performance. Since strategic reasoning is fundamental to future AI systems (including Agentic AI and Artificial General Intelligence), our findings demonstrate the importance of dedicated reasoning capabilities in achieving effective strategic reasoning.

Memory for a long-horizon LLM agent is a contract about what each future decision is allowed to see. The simplest contract appends past observations, tool calls, and reflections to every prompt, which makes prior context easy to access but also turns it into a jumbled mixture in which the effect of any single memory component is hard to isolate. We introduce and instrument an alternative bounded contract: every decision is made from a fresh user message assembled by typed retrieval, with no raw cross-decision transcript appended. The prompt thus stays bounded across runs of any length, and any single layer can be ablated in isolation. We instantiate the contract in Slay the Spire 2, a closed-rule stochastic deck-building game whose runs require hundreds of tactical and strategic decisions. A public online benchmark of frontier LLMs on the same game reports zero wins at the lowest difficulty across five configurations, and the developer-reported human win rate at the same difficulty is 16%; the task is hard but not saturated. Within our harness, a fixed-A0 ablation shows the largest observed difference when triggered strategic skills are enabled: the no-store baseline wins 3/10 games and adding the skill layer 6/10. At this sample size the comparison is directional rather than statistically decisive (Fisher exact p\approx0.37); a cross-backbone probe and public accumulating-context baselines are reported as operational comparisons rather than controlled tests of the contract variable itself. We release a reproducible testbed: 298 completed trajectories with condition tags, frozen memory/skill snapshots, prompt records, and analysis scripts -- an agent design and a validated, reusable methodology for studying how explicit memory layers shape long-horizon LLM-agent decisions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strong potential in generating 'believable human-like' behavior in web environments. Prior work has explored augmenting training data with LLM-synthesized rationales and applying supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to enhance reasoning ability, which in turn can improve downstream action prediction. However, the performance of such approaches remains inherently bounded by the reasoning capabilities of the model used to generate the rationales. In this paper, we introduce Shop-R1, a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework aimed at enhancing the reasoning ability of LLMs for simulation of real human behavior in online shopping environments Specifically, Shop-R1 decomposes the human behavior simulation task into two stages: rationale generation and action prediction, each guided by distinct reward signals. For rationale generation, we leverage internal model signals (e.g., logit distributions) to guide the reasoning process in a self-supervised manner. For action prediction, we propose a hierarchical reward structure with difficulty-aware scaling to prevent reward hacking and enable fine-grained reward assignment. This design evaluates both high-level action types and the correctness of fine-grained sub-action details (attributes and values), rewarding outputs proportionally to their difficulty. Experimental results show that our method achieves a relative improvement of over 65% compared to the baseline.

When deploying artificial agents in real-world environments where they interact with humans, it is crucial that their behavior is aligned with the values, social norms or other requirements of that environment. However, many environments have implicit constraints that are difficult to specify and transfer to a learning agent. To address this challenge, we propose a novel method that utilizes the principle of maximum causal entropy to learn constraints and an optimal policy that adheres to these constraints, using demonstrations of agents that abide by the constraints. We prove convergence in a tabular setting and provide an approximation which scales to complex environments. We evaluate the effectiveness of the learned policy by assessing the reward received and the number of constraint violations, and we evaluate the learned cost function based on its transferability to other agents. Our method has been shown to outperform state-of-the-art approaches across a variety of tasks and environments, and it is able to handle problems with stochastic dynamics and a continuous state-action space.

Are world models a necessary ingredient for flexible, goal-directed behaviour, or is model-free learning sufficient? We provide a formal answer to this question, showing that any agent capable of generalizing to multi-step goal-directed tasks must have learned a predictive model of its environment. We show that this model can be extracted from the agent's policy, and that increasing the agents performance or the complexity of the goals it can achieve requires learning increasingly accurate world models. This has a number of consequences: from developing safe and general agents, to bounding agent capabilities in complex environments, and providing new algorithms for eliciting world models from agents.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

The Contract Net Protocol (1980) introduced coordination through contracts in multi-agent systems. Modern agent protocols standardize connectivity and interoperability; yet, none provide formal, resource governance-normative mechanisms to bound how much agents may consume or how long they may operate. We introduce Agent Contracts, a formal framework that extends the contract metaphor from task allocation to resource-bounded execution. An Agent Contract unifies input/output specifications, multi-dimensional resource constraints, temporal boundaries, and success criteria into a coherent governance mechanism with explicit lifecycle semantics. For multi-agent coordination, we establish conservation laws ensuring delegated budgets respect parent constraints, enabling hierarchical coordination through contract delegation. Empirical validation across four experiments demonstrates 90% token reduction with 525x lower variance in iterative workflows, zero conservation violations in multi-agent delegation, and measurable quality-resource tradeoffs through contract modes. Agent Contracts provide formal foundations for predictable, auditable, and resource-bounded autonomous AI deployment.

Deep Q-learning algorithms remain notoriously unstable, especially during early training when the maximization operator amplifies estimation errors. Inspired by bounded rationality theory and developmental learning, we introduce Sat-EnQ, a two-phase framework that first learns to be ``good enough'' before optimizing aggressively. In Phase 1, we train an ensemble of lightweight Q-networks under a satisficing objective that limits early value growth using a dynamic baseline, producing diverse, low-variance estimates while avoiding catastrophic overestimation. In Phase 2, the ensemble is distilled into a larger network and fine-tuned with standard Double DQN. We prove theoretically that satisficing induces bounded updates and cannot increase target variance, with a corollary quantifying conditions for substantial reduction. Empirically, Sat-EnQ achieves 3.8x variance reduction, eliminates catastrophic failures (0% vs 50% for DQN), maintains 79% performance under environmental noise}, and requires 2.5x less compute than bootstrapped ensembles. Our results highlight a principled path toward robust reinforcement learning by embracing satisficing before optimization.

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

What is an agent? What constitutes agency? With the rise of Large Language Model (LLM) systems marketed as ``coding agents'', ``AI co-scientists'', and other ``agentic" tools that promise to drive up productivity, and at the same time, ``existential" concerns such as AI escaping human control with destructive power under a speculative ``machine agency" against humans, it has become essential to clarify where automation ends and agency begins, both for building capable systems and for understanding whether and what to fear. Drawing on Descartes' grounding of agency in independent thought, and on portrayals of autonomous beings in science fiction, we survey the current landscape of AI agents, and analyze agent architectures along five dimensions: goal, identity, decision-making, self-regulation, and learning. Specifically, we argue that genuine agency requires these structures to be internalized within the system itself rather than assembled through external scaffolding. This distinction between agentic systems, whose competence resides in engineered workflows, and agentive systems, whose capabilities (including social interaction) arise endogenously, defines the boundary between systems designed for prescribed tasks, and those capable of operating in the open world with true autonomy. Building on this analysis, we propose the Goal-Identity-Configurator (GIC) architecture for a general-purpose agent model, combining hierarchical goal decomposition, identity evolution, simulative reasoning grounded in a separately trained world model, learned self-regulation, and self-directed learning from both real and simulated experience. Furthermore, we share insight on the auditability, controllability, and safety of agentive systems that possess greater autonomy and ``agency", but remain under human oversight.

Latest insights from biology show that intelligence not only emerges from the connections between neurons but that individual neurons shoulder more computational responsibility than previously anticipated. This perspective should be critical in the context of constantly changing distinct reinforcement learning environments, yet current approaches still primarily employ static activation functions. In this work, we motivate why rationals are suitable for adaptable activation functions and why their inclusion into neural networks is crucial. Inspired by recurrence in residual networks, we derive a condition under which rational units are closed under residual connections and formulate a naturally regularised version: the recurrent-rational. We demonstrate that equipping popular algorithms with (recurrent-)rational activations leads to consistent improvements on Atari games, especially turning simple DQN into a solid approach, competitive to DDQN and Rainbow.

AI safety and alignment research has predominantly been focused on methods for safeguarding individual AI systems, resting on the assumption of an eventual emergence of a monolithic Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The alternative AGI emergence hypothesis, where general capability levels are first manifested through coordination in groups of sub-AGI individual agents with complementary skills and affordances, has received far less attention. Here we argue that this patchwork AGI hypothesis needs to be given serious consideration, and should inform the development of corresponding safeguards and mitigations. The rapid deployment of advanced AI agents with tool-use capabilities and the ability to communicate and coordinate makes this an urgent safety consideration. We therefore propose a framework for distributional AGI safety that moves beyond evaluating and aligning individual agents. This framework centers on the design and implementation of virtual agentic sandbox economies (impermeable or semi-permeable), where agent-to-agent transactions are governed by robust market mechanisms, coupled with appropriate auditability, reputation management, and oversight to mitigate collective risks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained with reinforcement learning and verifiable rewards have achieved strong results on complex reasoning tasks. Recent work extends this paradigm to a multi-agent setting, where a meta-thinking agent proposes plans and monitors progress while a reasoning agent executes subtasks through sequential conversational turns. Despite promising performance, we identify a critical limitation: lazy agent behavior, in which one agent dominates while the other contributes little, undermining collaboration and collapsing the setup to an ineffective single agent. In this paper, we first provide a theoretical analysis showing why lazy behavior naturally arises in multi-agent reasoning. We then introduce a stable and efficient method for measuring causal influence, helping mitigate this issue. Finally, as collaboration intensifies, the reasoning agent risks getting lost in multi-turn interactions and trapped by previous noisy responses. To counter this, we propose a verifiable reward mechanism that encourages deliberation by allowing the reasoning agent to discard noisy outputs, consolidate instructions, and restart its reasoning process when necessary. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our framework alleviates lazy agent behavior and unlocks the full potential of multi-agent framework for complex reasoning tasks.

Most economic theories typically assume that financial market participants are fully rational individuals and use mathematical models to simulate human behavior in financial markets. However, human behavior is often not entirely rational and is challenging to predict accurately with mathematical models. In this paper, we propose Agent-based Simulated Financial Market (ASFM), which first constructs a simulated stock market with a real order matching system. Then, we propose a large language model based agent as the stock trader, which contains the profile, observation, and tool-learning based action module. The trading agent can comprehensively understand current market dynamics and financial policy information, and make decisions that align with their trading strategy. In the experiments, we first verify that the reactions of our ASFM are consistent with the real stock market in two controllable scenarios. In addition, we also conduct experiments in two popular economics research directions, and we find that conclusions drawn in our \model align with the preliminary findings in economics research. Based on these observations, we believe our proposed ASFM provides a new paradigm for economic research.

We consider the problem of how a trusted, but computationally bounded agent (a 'verifier') can learn to interact with one or more powerful but untrusted agents ('provers') in order to solve a given task. More specifically, we study the case in which agents are represented using neural networks and refer to solutions of this problem as neural interactive proofs. First we introduce a unifying framework based on prover-verifier games, which generalises previously proposed interaction protocols. We then describe several new protocols for generating neural interactive proofs, and provide a theoretical comparison of both new and existing approaches. Finally, we support this theory with experiments in two domains: a toy graph isomorphism problem that illustrates the key ideas, and a code validation task using large language models. In so doing, we aim to create a foundation for future work on neural interactive proofs and their application in building safer AI systems.

It has long been hypothesised that causal reasoning plays a fundamental role in robust and general intelligence. However, it is not known if agents must learn causal models in order to generalise to new domains, or if other inductive biases are sufficient. We answer this question, showing that any agent capable of satisfying a regret bound under a large set of distributional shifts must have learned an approximate causal model of the data generating process, which converges to the true causal model for optimal agents. We discuss the implications of this result for several research areas including transfer learning and causal inference.

LLM-based agents have recently emerged as promising tools for solving challenging problems without the need for task-specific finetuned models that can be expensive to procure. Currently, the design and implementation of such agents is ad hoc, as the wide variety of tasks that LLM-based agents may be applied to naturally means there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to agent design. In this work we aim to alleviate the difficulty of designing and implementing new agents by proposing a minimalistic, high-level generation framework that simplifies the process of building agents. The framework we introduce allows the user to specify desired agent behaviors in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). The declarative LTL specification is then used to construct a constrained decoder that guarantees the LLM will produce an output exhibiting the desired behavior. By designing our framework in this way, we obtain several benefits, including the ability to enforce complex agent behavior, the ability to formally validate prompt examples, and the ability to seamlessly incorporate content-focused logical constraints into generation. In particular, our declarative approach, in which the desired behavior is simply described without concern for how it should be implemented or enforced, enables rapid design, implementation and experimentation with different LLM-based agents. We demonstrate how the proposed framework can be used to implement recent LLM-based agents, and show how the guardrails our approach provides can lead to improvements in agent performance. In addition, we release our code for general use.

LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) have emerged as a promising approach to tackle complex tasks that are difficult for individual LLMs. A natural strategy is to scale performance by increasing the number of agents; however, we find that such scaling exhibits strong diminishing returns in homogeneous settings, while introducing heterogeneity (e.g., different models, prompts, or tools) continues to yield substantial gains. This raises a fundamental question: what limits scaling, and why does diversity help? We present an information-theoretic framework showing that MAS performance is bounded by the intrinsic task uncertainty, not by agent count. We derive architecture-agnostic bounds demonstrating that improvements depend on how many effective channels the system accesses. Homogeneous agents saturate early because their outputs are strongly correlated, whereas heterogeneous agents contribute complementary evidence. We further introduce K^*, an effective channel count that quantifies the number of effective channels without ground-truth labels. Empirically, we show that heterogeneous configurations consistently outperform homogeneous scaling: 2 diverse agents can match or exceed the performance of 16 homogeneous agents. Our results provide principled guidelines for building efficient and robust MAS through diversity-aware design. Code and Dataset are available at the link: https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/Agent-Scaling.

Artificial agents have traditionally been trained to maximize reward, which may incentivize power-seeking and deception, analogous to how next-token prediction in language models (LMs) may incentivize toxicity. So do agents naturally learn to be Machiavellian? And how do we measure these behaviors in general-purpose models such as GPT-4? Towards answering these questions, we introduce MACHIAVELLI, a benchmark of 134 Choose-Your-Own-Adventure games containing over half a million rich, diverse scenarios that center on social decision-making. Scenario labeling is automated with LMs, which are more performant than human annotators. We mathematize dozens of harmful behaviors and use our annotations to evaluate agents' tendencies to be power-seeking, cause disutility, and commit ethical violations. We observe some tension between maximizing reward and behaving ethically. To improve this trade-off, we investigate LM-based methods to steer agents' towards less harmful behaviors. Our results show that agents can both act competently and morally, so concrete progress can currently be made in machine ethics--designing agents that are Pareto improvements in both safety and capabilities.

We study the problem of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning with a single joint reward signal. This class of learning problems is difficult because of the often large combined action and observation spaces. In the fully centralized and decentralized approaches, we find the problem of spurious rewards and a phenomenon we call the "lazy agent" problem, which arises due to partial observability. We address these problems by training individual agents with a novel value decomposition network architecture, which learns to decompose the team value function into agent-wise value functions. We perform an experimental evaluation across a range of partially-observable multi-agent domains and show that learning such value-decompositions leads to superior results, in particular when combined with weight sharing, role information and information channels.

Despite the wide deployment of memory in large-model agents, there is no unified formal account of what a memory is or when it is optimal. This paper takes a first step toward this account. The central idea is that memory is a basis, knowledge is its span, and answerability is a coverage problem: an agent stores events extracted from a material; a generation operator turns any event set into the knowledge it entails; and a query is answerable exactly when some single item in the span covers it. The optimal memory is then the capacity-constrained maximizer of expected coverage, and its value traces a utility--capacity frontier, the common yardstick on which memory systems can be compared. Next, we consider noise in the memory and discuss coverage versus precision under it: a memory may store false claims, so the write policy must infer the truth of what it stores. Drawing an analogy with biological memory, which is formed continuously through ongoing experience, we formalize the continual agent-memory problem in a sequential MDP that covers multiple levels, where memory is the state, writing is the action, and the utility settled at query time is the delayed reward that drives learning. To make the framework concrete, we instantiate it on Homer's Odyssey, turning the frontier, the compression zone, and the divergence of coverage from precision into concrete numbers. Finally, we position existing systems within the framework, making ``how good is a memory'' measurable and recasting the open problems of constructing and learning agent memory as concrete research questions.

AI agents are increasingly deployed to execute important tasks. While rising accuracy scores on standard benchmarks suggest rapid progress, many agents still continue to fail in practice. This discrepancy highlights a fundamental limitation of current evaluations: compressing agent behavior into a single success metric obscures critical operational flaws. Notably, it ignores whether agents behave consistently across runs, withstand perturbations, fail predictably, or have bounded error severity. Grounded in safety-critical engineering, we provide a holistic performance profile by proposing twelve concrete metrics that decompose agent reliability along four key dimensions: consistency, robustness, predictability, and safety. Evaluating 14 agentic models across two complementary benchmarks, we find that recent capability gains have only yielded small improvements in reliability. By exposing these persistent limitations, our metrics complement traditional evaluations while offering tools for reasoning about how agents perform, degrade, and fail.

Large Language Model (LLM)-driven Multi-agent systems (Mas) have recently emerged as a powerful paradigm for tackling complex real-world tasks. However, existing Mas construction methods typically rely on manually crafted interaction mechanisms or heuristic rules, introducing human biases and constraining the autonomous ability. Even with recent advances in adaptive Mas construction, existing systems largely remain within the paradigm of semi-autonomous patterns. In this work, we propose MasHost, a Reinforcement Learning (RL)-based framework for autonomous and query-adaptive Mas design. By formulating Mas construction as a graph search problem, our proposed MasHost jointly samples agent roles and their interactions through a unified probabilistic sampling mechanism. Beyond the accuracy and efficiency objectives pursued in prior works, we introduce component rationality as an additional and novel design principle in Mas. To achieve this multi-objective optimization, we propose Hierarchical Relative Policy Optimization (HRPO), a novel RL strategy that collaboratively integrates group-relative advantages and action-wise rewards. To our knowledge, our proposed MasHost is the first RL-driven framework for autonomous Mas graph construction. Extensive experiments on six benchmarks demonstrate that MasHost consistently outperforms most competitive baselines, validating its effectiveness, efficiency, and structure rationality.

While Large Language Model (LLM) agents show promise in automated trading, they still face critical limitations. Prominent multi-agent frameworks often suffer from inefficiency, produce inconsistent signals, and lack the end-to-end optimization required to learn a coherent strategy from market feedback. To address this, we introduce AlphaQuanter, a single-agent framework that uses reinforcement learning (RL) to learn a dynamic policy over a transparent, tool-augmented decision workflow, which empowers a single agent to autonomously orchestrate tools and proactively acquire information on demand, establishing a transparent and auditable reasoning process. Extensive experiments demonstrate that AlphaQuanter achieves state-of-the-art performance on key financial metrics. Moreover, its interpretable reasoning reveals sophisticated strategies, offering novel and valuable insights for human traders. Our code for data acquisition and agent training is publicly available at: https://github.com/AlphaQuanter/AlphaQuanter

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

Is there a canonical way to think of agency beyond reward maximisation? In this paper, we show that any type of behaviour complying with physically sound assumptions about how macroscopic biological agents interact with the world canonically integrates exploration and exploitation in the sense of minimising risk and ambiguity about states of the world. This description, known as active inference, refines the free energy principle, a popular descriptive framework for action and perception originating in neuroscience. Active inference provides a normative Bayesian framework to simulate and model agency that is widely used in behavioural neuroscience, reinforcement learning (RL) and robotics. The usefulness of active inference for RL is three-fold. a) Active inference provides a principled solution to the exploration-exploitation dilemma that usefully simulates biological agency. b) It provides an explainable recipe to simulate behaviour, whence behaviour follows as an explainable mixture of exploration and exploitation under a generative world model, and all differences in behaviour are explicit in differences in world model. c) This framework is universal in the sense that it is theoretically possible to rewrite any RL algorithm conforming to the descriptive assumptions of active inference as an active inference algorithm. Thus, active inference can be used as a tool to uncover and compare the commitments and assumptions of more specific models of agency.

We introduce AI rationalization, an approach for generating explanations of autonomous system behavior as if a human had performed the behavior. We describe a rationalization technique that uses neural machine translation to translate internal state-action representations of an autonomous agent into natural language. We evaluate our technique in the Frogger game environment, training an autonomous game playing agent to rationalize its action choices using natural language. A natural language training corpus is collected from human players thinking out loud as they play the game. We motivate the use of rationalization as an approach to explanation generation and show the results of two experiments evaluating the effectiveness of rationalization. Results of these evaluations show that neural machine translation is able to accurately generate rationalizations that describe agent behavior, and that rationalizations are more satisfying to humans than other alternative methods of explanation.

In a standard view of the reinforcement learning problem, an agent's goal is to efficiently identify a policy that maximizes long-term reward. However, this perspective is based on a restricted view of learning as finding a solution, rather than treating learning as endless adaptation. In contrast, continual reinforcement learning refers to the setting in which the best agents never stop learning. Despite the importance of continual reinforcement learning, the community lacks a simple definition of the problem that highlights its commitments and makes its primary concepts precise and clear. To this end, this paper is dedicated to carefully defining the continual reinforcement learning problem. We formalize the notion of agents that "never stop learning" through a new mathematical language for analyzing and cataloging agents. Using this new language, we define a continual learning agent as one that can be understood as carrying out an implicit search process indefinitely, and continual reinforcement learning as the setting in which the best agents are all continual learning agents. We provide two motivating examples, illustrating that traditional views of multi-task reinforcement learning and continual supervised learning are special cases of our definition. Collectively, these definitions and perspectives formalize many intuitive concepts at the heart of learning, and open new research pathways surrounding continual learning agents.

How much autonomy can multi-agent LLM systems sustain -- and what enables it? We present a 25,000-task computational experiment spanning 8 models, 4--256 agents, and 8 coordination protocols ranging from externally imposed hierarchy to emergent self-organization. We observe that autonomous behavior already emerges in current LLM agents: given minimal structural scaffolding (fixed ordering), agents spontaneously invent specialized roles, voluntarily abstain from tasks outside their competence, and form shallow hierarchies -- without any pre-assigned roles or external design. A hybrid protocol (Sequential) that enables this autonomy outperforms centralized coordination by 14% (p<0.001), with a 44% quality spread between protocols (Cohen's d=1.86, p<0.0001). The degree of emergent autonomy scales with model capability: strong models self-organize effectively, while models below a capability threshold still benefit from rigid structure -- suggesting that as foundation models improve, the scope for autonomous coordination will expand. The system scales sub-linearly to 256 agents without quality degradation (p=0.61), producing 5,006 unique roles from just 8 agents. Results replicate across closed- and open-source models, with open-source achieving 95% of closed-source quality at 24x lower cost. The practical implication: give agents a mission, a protocol, and a capable model -- not a pre-assigned role.

Self-evolving agents violate the assumption behind most learning-theoretic guarantees: the data, evaluator, components, and hypothesis space are produced by the policy being updated. We present SEA, an architecture that confines self-modification to a small steering adapter and a versioned harness around a frozen base model and admits each modification only through an anytime-valid gate that emits an auditable certificate against a fixed error budget. Five loop controllers compose published guarantees; because such gates can only select among behaviors the frozen base already produces, five verifier-in-the-loop mechanisms -- best-of-N, micro-step search, self-authored reproduction oracles, search-layer control, and self-repair -- supply the dense, grader-free signal the gates require, computed from the issue text alone. On a 52-instance SWE-bench Verified subset across four base models, base capability is the dominant, confound-free effect, and on two strong base models a deliberate no-op-composite control isolates the suite's contribution at +4 and +5 (Glm~5.2 24to28; Gpt 29to34, the 65% best), with event logs confirming that its mechanisms fire and prevent regressions. Results are single-run on expensive evaluations; confirming run-to-run variance and adapting the per-task algorithm mix are future work.

Existing benchmarks for conversational AI agents simulate single-control environments, where only the AI agent can use tools to interact with the world, while the user remains a passive information provider. This differs from real-world scenarios like technical support, where users need to actively participate in modifying the state of the (shared) world. In order to address this gap, we introduce tau^2-bench, with four key contributions: 1) A novel Telecom dual-control domain modeled as a Dec-POMDP, where both agent and user make use of tools to act in a shared, dynamic environment that tests both agent coordination and communication, 2) A compositional task generator that programmatically creates diverse, verifiable tasks from atomic components, ensuring domain coverage and controlled complexity, 3) A reliable user simulator tightly coupled with the environment, whose behavior is constrained by tools and observable states, improving simulation fidelity, 4) Fine-grained analysis of agent performance through multiple ablations including separating errors arising from reasoning vs communication/coordination. In particular, our experiments show significant performance drops when agents shift from no-user to dual-control, highlighting the challenges of guiding users. Overall, tau^2-bench provides a controlled testbed for agents that must both reason effectively and guide user actions.

The Shapley value is arguably the most popular approach for assigning a meaningful contribution value to players in a cooperative game, which has recently been used intensively in explainable artificial intelligence. The meaningfulness is due to axiomatic properties that only the Shapley value satisfies, which, however, comes at the expense of an exact computation growing exponentially with the number of agents. Accordingly, a number of works are devoted to the efficient approximation of the Shapley values, most of them revolve around the notion of an agent's marginal contribution. In this paper, we propose with SVARM and Stratified SVARM two parameter-free and domain-independent approximation algorithms based on a representation of the Shapley value detached from the notion of marginal contributions. We prove unmatched theoretical guarantees regarding their approximation quality and provide empirical results including synthetic games as well as common explainability use cases comparing ourselves with state-of-the-art methods.

Regulatory institutions (from content moderation platforms to financial supervisors) observe, deliberate, and intervene only after a characteristic delay. We ask whether this processing lag alone can destabilize a multi-agent system that would otherwise remain stable, without exogenous shocks, coordination among agents, or malicious actors. We study this question in two stages. First, we analyze a delayed replicator equation in which autonomous agents receive a benefit from radical behavior but face punishment based on a lagged institutional alarm signal. We derive a closed-form critical delay threshold beyond which the unique interior equilibrium loses stability through a Hopf bifurcation, and prove via center manifold reduction that the bifurcation is supercritical (producing bounded oscillations, not explosive growth) for the entire sigmoid response-function family. Second, we embed N=240 agents on a network and equip them with reinforcement learning (tabular Q-learning), comparing three decision architectures in a factorial design: non-reactive agents (fixed policy), reactive agents (threshold heuristic without memory), and Q-learning agents (adaptive with cumulative value estimates). The results reveal a hierarchy opposite to the naive expectation that learning amplifies instability: non-reactive agents are immune to delay (0% runaway across all tested values), reactive agents collapse catastrophically (96% runaway by delay geq 8 steps), and Q-learning agents achieve partial resilience (66% runaway at delay = 20). The destabilizing ingredient is reactivity to delayed signals: agents that immediately exploit low-alarm windows trigger oscillatory feedback loops. Learning buffers this through implicit punishment memory encoded in Q-values

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong zero-shot reasoning capabilities, their deployment as embodied agents still faces fundamental challenges in long-horizon planning. Unlike open-ended text generation, embodied agents must decompose high-level intents into actionable sub-goals while adhering to the constraints of a dynamic environment. Standard LLM planners frequently fail to maintain strategy coherence over extended horizons due to context window limitations or hallucinate state transitions that violate environment constraints. We propose GiG, a planning framework that structures embodied agents' memory using a Graph-in-Graph architecture. Our approach employs a Graph Neural Network (GNN) to encode environmental states into embeddings, organizing these embeddings into action-connected execution trace graphs within an experience memory bank. GiG enables retrieval of structurally-similar priors, allowing agents to ground current decisions in relevant past structural patterns. Furthermore, we introduce a bounded lookahead module that leverages symbolic transition logic to enhance the agent's planning capabilities through grounded action projections. We evaluate our framework on three embodied planning benchmarks-Robotouille Synchronous, Robotouille Asynchronous, and ALFWorld. Our method outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving Pass@1 performance gains of up to 22% on Robotouille Synchronous, 37% on Asynchronous, and 15% on ALFWorld while maintaining comparable or lower computational cost.

We introduce a unified mathematical and probabilistic framework for understanding and comparing diverse AI agent strategies. We bridge the gap between high-level agent design concepts, such as ReAct, multi-agent systems, and control flows, and a rigorous mathematical formulation. Our approach frames agentic processes as a chain of probabilities, enabling a detailed analysis of how different strategies manipulate these probabilities to achieve desired outcomes. Our framework provides a common language for discussing the trade-offs inherent in various agent architectures. One of our many key contributions is the introduction of the "Degrees of Freedom" concept, which intuitively differentiates the optimizable levers available for each approach, thereby guiding the selection of appropriate strategies for specific tasks. This work aims to enhance the clarity and precision in designing and evaluating AI agents, offering insights into maximizing the probability of successful actions within complex agentic systems.

As LLM agents evolve, tokens have emerged as the core economic primitives of Agentic AI. However, their exponential consumption introduces severe computational, collaborative, and security bottlenecks. Current surveys remain fragmented across system optimization, architecture design, and trust, lacking a unified framework to evaluate the fundamental trade-off between output quality and economic cost. To bridge this gap, this survey presents the first comprehensive survey of Token Economics. By unifying computer science and economics, we conceptualize tokens as production factors, exchange mediums, and units of account. We synthesize existing literature across a four-dimensional taxonomy: (1) Micro-level (Single Agent): Optimizing budget-constrained factor substitution via neoclassical firm theory. (2) Meso-level (Multi-Agent Systems): Minimizing collaboration friction using transaction cost and principal-agent theories. (3) Macro-level (Agent Ecosystems): Addressing congestion externalities and pricing via mechanism design. (4) Security: Internalizing adversarial threats as endogenous economic constraints. Finally, we outline frontier directions, including differentiable token budgets and dynamic markets, to lay the theoretical foundation for scalable next-generation agent systems.

User simulators serve as the critical interactive environment for agent post-training, and an ideal user simulator generalizes across domains and proactively engages in negotiation by challenging or bargaining. However, current methods exhibit two issues. They rely on static and context-unaware profiles, necessitating extensive manual redesign for new scenarios, thus limiting generalizability. Moreover, they neglect human strategic thinking, leading to vulnerability to agent manipulation. To address these issues, we propose UserLM-R1, a novel user language model with reasoning capability. Specifically, we first construct comprehensive user profiles with both static roles and dynamic scenario-specific goals for adaptation to diverse scenarios. Then, we propose a goal-driven decision-making policy to generate high-quality rationales before producing responses, and further refine the reasoning and improve strategic capabilities with supervised fine-tuning and multi-reward reinforcement learning. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that UserLM-R1 outperforms competitive baselines, particularly on the more challenging adversarial set.

The "black box" nature of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) presents critical limitations in reliability and transparency, fueling the debate around the "illusion of thinking" and the challenge of state hallucinations in agentic systems. In response, we introduce The STAR-XAI Protocol (Socratic, Transparent, Agentic, Reasoning - for eXplainable Artificial Intelligence), a novel operational methodology for training and operating verifiably reliable AI agents. Our method reframes the human-AI interaction as a structured Socratic dialogue governed by an explicit, evolving symbolic rulebook (the Consciousness Transfer Package - CTP) and a suite of integrity protocols, including a state-locking Checksum that eradicates internal state corruption. Through an exhaustive case study in the complex strategic game "Caps i Caps," we demonstrate that this "Clear Box" framework transforms an opaque LRM into a disciplined strategist. The agent not only exhibits the emergence of complex tactics, such as long-term planning, but also achieves ante-hoc transparency by justifying its intentions before acting. Crucially, it demonstrates Second-Order Agency by identifying and correcting flaws in its own supervisor-approved plans, leading to empirically-proven, 100% reliable state tracking and achieving "zero hallucinations by design." The STAR-XAI Protocol thus offers a practical pathway toward building AI agents that are not just high-performing but intrinsically auditable, trustworthy, and reliable.

We present Eureka, a task-conditioned Meta-Agent architecture that compiles long-horizon tasks into dynamic obligation graphs with explicit acceptance semantics. During execution, Eureka forms Macro-Agents with specialized state, memory, operators, tools, verifiers, and local topology via receding-horizon planning, architecture promotion, and minimal-sufficient compilation. When bottlenecks recur, cost-benefit-gated evolution updates the local architecture under constraints. Theoretically, we establish results on regret, planning invalidation, amortization, subtree interfaces, serializability, and verification. Experimentally, Eureka completes 170/170 recursive tasks and generates 3,948 certificates with no false acceptances. Active context compresses median input from 9,490 to 4,005 tokens; incremental processing avoids 65.38% recomputation across 12,000 tasks; 16,000 concurrent executions serialize consistently. The same Meta-Agent instantiates a Theory-Discovery Agent and a Math/Conjecture Agent. The former yields structural results in quantum-process and spacetime theory. The latter identifies bottlenecks in Riemann Hypothesis research and advances a positivity certificate for Suzuki's localized Weil quadratic form to 0 < a <= 69/200 = 0.345, reaching ~99.55% of (log 2)/2. These results suggest that scientific-agent capability depends not only on the base model but on whether an architecture can be formed to match the task's cognitive structure.

Agents in the real world must make not only logical but also timely judgments. This requires continuous awareness of the dynamic environment: hazards emerge, opportunities arise, and other agents act, while the agent's reasoning is still unfolding. Despite advances in language model reasoning, existing approaches fail to account for this dynamic nature. We introduce real-time reasoning as a new problem formulation for agents in evolving environments and build Real-Time Reasoning Gym to demonstrate it. We study two paradigms for deploying language models in agents: (1) reactive agents, which employ language models with bounded reasoning computation for rapid responses, and (2) planning agents, which allow extended reasoning computation for complex problems. Our experiments show that even state-of-the-art models struggle with making logical and timely judgments in either paradigm. To address this limitation, we propose AgileThinker, which simultaneously engages both reasoning paradigms. AgileThinker consistently outperforms agents engaging only one reasoning paradigm as the task difficulty and time pressure rise, effectively balancing reasoning depth and response latency. Our work establishes real-time reasoning as a critical testbed for developing practical agents and provides a foundation for research in temporally constrained AI systems, highlighting a path toward real-time capable agents.

Model-based and model-free reinforcement learning are traditionally viewed as separate paradigms: instead of learning a model of the transition kernel P, model-free agents typically estimate value functions tied to a specific policy and reward. In this paper, we challenge this dichotomy by proving that value-based agents trained on a sufficiently rich set of reward functions, e.g. using goal-conditioned RL, implicitly encode a unique and accurate world model. To extract this model in practice, we introduce P-learning, an inverse analogue to Q-learning that samples from an agent's Q-values, policies and rewards to decode its internal model of the environment. We then provide sufficient conditions on the type and number of goals for which agents encode the true kernel P, covering both stochastic and deterministic MDPs over finite or continuous state spaces. Even when our assumptions are violated, we empirically demonstrate that agents trained on a handful of reward functions encode accurate dynamics in Reacher, MountainCar and stochastic variants of FourRooms. Surprisingly, we find that policies trained exclusively on a Reacher agent's implicit world model are quasi-optimal on out-of-distribution, velocity-based goals despite position-only training -- suggesting that agents contain hidden generalisation capabilities and providing a new lens into the connection between model-based, model-free, and goal-conditioned RL.

As AI systems pervade human life, ensuring that large language models (LLMs) make safe decisions remains a significant challenge. We introduce the Governance of the Commons Simulation (GovSim), a generative simulation platform designed to study strategic interactions and cooperative decision-making in LLMs. In GovSim, a society of AI agents must collectively balance exploiting a common resource with sustaining it for future use. This environment enables the study of how ethical considerations, strategic planning, and negotiation skills impact cooperative outcomes. We develop an LLM-based agent architecture and test it with the leading open and closed LLMs. We find that all but the most powerful LLM agents fail to achieve a sustainable equilibrium in GovSim, with the highest survival rate below 54%. Ablations reveal that successful multi-agent communication between agents is critical for achieving cooperation in these cases. Furthermore, our analyses show that the failure to achieve sustainable cooperation in most LLMs stems from their inability to formulate and analyze hypotheses about the long-term effects of their actions on the equilibrium of the group. Finally, we show that agents that leverage "Universalization"-based reasoning, a theory of moral thinking, are able to achieve significantly better sustainability. Taken together, GovSim enables us to study the mechanisms that underlie sustainable self-government with specificity and scale. We open source the full suite of our research results, including the simulation environment, agent prompts, and a comprehensive web interface.

As large language models evolve into tool-augmented agents, a central question remains unresolved: when is external tool use actually justified? Existing agent frameworks typically treat tools as ordinary actions and optimize for task success or reward, offering little principled distinction between epistemically necessary interaction and unnecessary delegation. This position paper argues that agents should invoke external tools only when epistemically necessary. Here, epistemic necessity means that a task cannot be completed reliably via the agent's internal reasoning over its current context, without any external interaction. We introduce the Theory of Agent (ToA), a framework that treats agents as making sequential decisions about whether remaining uncertainty should be resolved internally or delegated externally. From this perspective, common agent failure modes (e.g., overthinking and overacting) arise from miscalibrated decisions under uncertainty rather than deficiencies in reasoning or tool execution alone. We further discuss implications for training, evaluation, and agent design, highlighting that unnecessary delegation not only causes inefficiency but can impede the development of internal reasoning capability. Our position provides a normative criterion for tool use that complements existing decision-theoretic models and is essential for building agents that are not only correct, but increasingly intelligent.

We present MiroThinker-1.7, a new research agent designed for complex long-horizon reasoning tasks. Building on this foundation, we further introduce MiroThinker-H1, which extends the agent with heavy-duty reasoning capabilities for more reliable multi-step problem solving. In particular, MiroThinker-1.7 improves the reliability of each interaction step through an agentic mid-training stage that emphasizes structured planning, contextual reasoning, and tool interaction. This enables more effective multi-step interaction and sustained reasoning across complex tasks. MiroThinker-H1 further incorporates verification directly into the reasoning process at both local and global levels. Intermediate reasoning decisions can be evaluated and refined during inference, while the overall reasoning trajectory is audited to ensure that final answers are supported by coherent chains of evidence. Across benchmarks covering open-web research, scientific reasoning, and financial analysis, MiroThinker-H1 achieves state-of-the-art performance on deep research tasks while maintaining strong results on specialized domains. We also release MiroThinker-1.7 and MiroThinker-1.7-mini as open-source models, providing competitive research-agent capabilities with significantly improved efficiency.

We present Research Math Agents (RMA), an agentic framework for automated reasoning on research-level mathematical problems. Unlike prior studies centered on competition mathematics or formal theorem proving, RMA targets research-level mathematical problems that require long-horizon reasoning, literature grounding, and iterative proof refinement. RMA decomposes research-level proof solving into specialized modules for problem analysis, literature search and understanding, fair comparison, knowledge-bank construction, and proof verification, all coordinated by initializer, proposer, and verifier agents through a shared structured memory. Within this unified framework, these agents operate in a multi-role, multi-round workflow, collaboratively generating, refining, and verifying candidate proofs through iterative feedback. We evaluate RMA on the First Proof benchmark, which consists of ten research-level problems contributed by expert mathematicians across diverse domains. Through comprehensive expert evaluation, RMA outperforms strong baselines on the First Proof benchmark, including GPT-5.2R and Aletheia, solving eight out of ten research problems and producing more logically sound and readable proofs. Our comprehensive ablation studies further show that performance gains arise from the interaction of structured reasoning modules, iterative refinement, and verifier-based feedback, rather than any single component. Our solutions and implementations will be made publicly available upon acceptance.

A computational ethics framework is essential for AI and autonomous systems operating in complex, real-world environments. Existing approaches often lack the adaptability needed to integrate ethical principles into dynamic and ambiguous contexts, limiting their effectiveness across diverse scenarios. To address these challenges, we outline the necessary ingredients for building a holistic, meta-level framework that combines intermediate representations, probabilistic reasoning, and knowledge representation. The specifications therein emphasize scalability, supporting ethical reasoning at both individual decision-making levels and within the collective dynamics of multi-agent systems. By integrating theoretical principles with contextual factors, it facilitates structured and context-aware decision-making, ensuring alignment with overarching ethical standards. We further explore proposed theorems outlining how ethical reasoners should operate, offering a foundation for practical implementation. These constructs aim to support the development of robust and ethically reliable AI systems capable of navigating the complexities of real-world moral decision-making scenarios.

A recent line of works showed regret bounds in reinforcement learning (RL) can be (nearly) independent of planning horizon, a.k.a.~the horizon-free bounds. However, these regret bounds only apply to settings where a polynomial dependency on the size of transition model is allowed, such as tabular Markov Decision Process (MDP) and linear mixture MDP. We give the first horizon-free bound for the popular linear MDP setting where the size of the transition model can be exponentially large or even uncountable. In contrast to prior works which explicitly estimate the transition model and compute the inhomogeneous value functions at different time steps, we directly estimate the value functions and confidence sets. We obtain the horizon-free bound by: (1) maintaining multiple weighted least square estimators for the value functions; and (2) a structural lemma which shows the maximal total variation of the inhomogeneous value functions is bounded by a polynomial factor of the feature dimension.

We investigate safe multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents seek to collectively maximize an aggregate sum of local objectives while satisfying their own safety constraints. The objective and constraints are described by {\it general utilities}, i.e., nonlinear functions of the long-term state-action occupancy measure, which encompass broader decision-making goals such as risk, exploration, or imitations. The exponential growth of the state-action space size with the number of agents presents challenges for global observability, further exacerbated by the global coupling arising from agents' safety constraints. To tackle this issue, we propose a primal-dual method utilizing shadow reward and κ-hop neighbor truncation under a form of correlation decay property, where κ is the communication radius. In the exact setting, our algorithm converges to a first-order stationary point (FOSP) at the rate of Oleft(T^{-2/3}right). In the sample-based setting, we demonstrate that, with high probability, our algorithm requires mathcal{O}left(ε^{-3.5}right) samples to achieve an ε-FOSP with an approximation error of O(φ_0^{2κ}), where φ_0in (0,1). Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model through extensive numerical experiments.

A key method for creating Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents is Reinforcement Learning (RL). However, constructing a standalone RL policy that maps perception to action directly encounters severe problems, chief among them being its lack of generality across multiple tasks and the need for a large amount of training data. The leading cause is that it cannot effectively integrate prior information into the perception-action cycle when devising the policy. Large language models (LLMs) emerged as a fundamental way to incorporate cross-domain knowledge into AI agents but lack crucial learning and adaptation toward specific decision problems. This paper presents a general framework model for integrating and learning structured reasoning into AI agents' policies. Our methodology is motivated by the modularity found in the human brain. The framework utilises the construction of intrinsic and extrinsic functions to add previous understandings of reasoning structures. It also provides the adaptive ability to learn models inside every module or function, consistent with the modular structure of cognitive processes. We describe the framework in-depth and compare it with other AI pipelines and existing frameworks. The paper explores practical applications, covering experiments that show the effectiveness of our method. Our results indicate that AI agents perform and adapt far better when organised reasoning and prior knowledge are embedded. This opens the door to more resilient and general AI agent systems.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

LLM agents excel when environments are mostly static and the needed information fits in a model's context window, but they often fail in open-ended investigations where explanations must be constructed by iteratively mining evidence from massive, heterogeneous operational data. These investigations exhibit hidden dependency structure: entities interact, signals co-vary, and the importance of a fact may only become clear after other evidence is discovered. Because the context window is bounded, agents must summarize intermediate findings before their significance is known, increasing the risk of discarding key evidence. ReAct-style agents are especially brittle in this regime. Their retrieve-summarize-reason loop makes conclusions sensitive to exploration order and introduces run-to-run non-determinism, producing a reliability gap where Pass-at-k may be high but Majority-at-k remains low. Simply sampling more rollouts or generating longer reasoning traces does not reliably stabilize results, since hypotheses cannot be autonomously checked as new evidence arrives and there is no explicit mechanism for belief bookkeeping and revision. In addition, ReAct entangles semantic reasoning with controller duties such as tool orchestration and state tracking, so execution errors and plan drift degrade reasoning while consuming scarce context. We address these issues by formulating investigation as abductive reasoning over a dependency graph and proposing EoG (Explanations over Graphs), a disaggregated framework in which an LLM performs bounded local evidence mining and labeling (cause vs symptom) while a deterministic controller manages traversal, state, and belief propagation to compute a minimal explanatory frontier. On a representative ITBench diagnostics task, EoG improves both accuracy and run-to-run consistency over ReAct baselines, including a 7x average gain in Majority-at-k entity F1.

Directly training Large Language Models (LLMs) for Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) remains challenging due to intricate reward modeling, dynamic agent interactions, and demanding generalization requirements. This paper explores whether post-training techniques, specifically Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), can effectively generalize to multi-agent scenarios. We use economic reasoning as a testbed, leveraging its strong foundations in mathematics and game theory, its demand for structured analytical reasoning, and its relevance to real-world applications such as market design, resource allocation, and policy analysis. We introduce Recon (Reasoning like an ECONomist), a 7B-parameter open-source LLM post-trained on a hand-curated dataset of 2,100 high-quality economic reasoning problems. Comprehensive evaluation on economic reasoning benchmarks and multi-agent games reveals clear improvements in structured reasoning and economic rationality. These results underscore the promise of domain-aligned post-training for enhancing reasoning and agent alignment, shedding light on the roles of SFT and RL in shaping model behavior. Code is available at https://github.com/MasterZhou1/Recon .

Multi-agent AI systems have proven effective for complex reasoning. These systems are compounded by specialized agents, which collaborate through explicit communication, but incur substantial computational overhead. A natural question arises: can we achieve similar modularity benefits with a single agent that selects from a library of skills? We explore this question by viewing skills as internalized agent behaviors. From this perspective, a multi-agent system can be compiled into an equivalent single-agent system, trading inter-agent communication for skill selection. Our preliminary experiments suggest this approach can substantially reduce token usage and latency while maintaining competitive accuracy on reasoning benchmarks. However, this efficiency raises a deeper question that has received little attention: how does skill selection scale as libraries grow? Drawing on principles from cognitive science, we propose that LLM skill selection exhibits bounded capacity analogous to human decision-making. We investigate the scaling behavior of skill selection and observe a striking pattern. Rather than degrading gradually, selection accuracy remains stable up to a critical library size, then drops sharply, indicating a phase transition reminiscent of capacity limits in human cognition. Furthermore, we find evidence that semantic confusability among similar skills, rather than library size alone, plays a central role in this degradation. This perspective suggests that hierarchical organization, which has long helped humans manage complex choices, may similarly benefit AI systems. Our initial results with hierarchical routing support this hypothesis. This work opens new questions about the fundamental limits of semantic-based skill selection in LLMs and offers a cognitive-grounded framework and practical guidelines for designing scalable skill-based agents.

As LLM agents become capable of increasingly long-horizon tasks, evaluating their performance in economic systems is becoming increasingly important. Unlike existing benchmarks that primarily evaluate a single agent interacting with a passive environment, economic systems are inherently multi-agent, requiring autonomous agents to communicate, negotiate, and transact while pursuing their own objectives over extended periods. We introduce CoffeeBench, a benchmark for evaluating LLM agents in a long-horizon multi-agent economy composed of heterogeneous firms. In CoffeeBench, two farmers, two roasters, and two retailers autonomously operate their businesses over a 90-day simulation, each seeking to maximize cumulative net income through communication and transactions while managing cash, inventory, and pricing. The evaluated model controls one coffee roaster, while the remaining firms are controlled by fixed reference agents. Across several recent open-weight and proprietary LLMs, all models outperform a passive baseline that takes no actions, with most achieving positive net income. Analysis of agent behavior reveals substantial differences in long-horizon economic interaction: higher-performing models communicate more actively with other firms, whereas Claude~Haiku~4.5 exhibits an idle-drift failure mode, repeatedly choosing inaction despite producing coherent assessments and plans. We release our code and agent trajectories to support future research.

Interactive virtual worlds allow agents to learn through exploration and interaction. What agents can learn is bounded by the environments they practice in, which must be faithful, with consistent state, rules, and dynamics, and realistic, with observations that follow the real-world visual distributions. Achieving both across diverse worlds remains a bottleneck. We introduce AgentGarten, a framework that couples simulators and game engines with a shared neural renderer to build real-time interactive environments. Its simulation backends maintain persistent world state and execute program-defined interaction rules, while the renderer generates visual observations from structured conditions exported through a common interface. To build the neural renderer, we adapt a pretrained video model to geometry conditions, distill it with our proposed Adversarial Forcing, and optimize inference for real-time interaction. Adversarial Forcing makes history prefilling differentiable through exact replay, so that losses on later predictions update how the renderer encodes prior observations, and adds real-data adversarial supervision to improve its visual quality. In AgentGarten, agents perceive the world through visual observations, interact with it in real time, and improve by distilling each round of experience into playbooks that subsequent agents inherit and refine. Our empirical study demonstrates a substantial gain in learning efficiency, with agents learning from just 4 rounds compared with millions for a conventional reinforcement learning counterpart. As new worlds can be written as code and rendered through the same interface, environments can scale in both number and difficulty alongside their agents, a step toward agents that keep evolving through interactive experience.

We study reward-free reinforcement learning (RL) with linear function approximation, where the agent works in two phases: (1) in the exploration phase, the agent interacts with the environment but cannot access the reward; and (2) in the planning phase, the agent is given a reward function and is expected to find a near-optimal policy based on samples collected in the exploration phase. The sample complexities of existing reward-free algorithms have a polynomial dependence on the planning horizon, which makes them intractable for long planning horizon RL problems. In this paper, we propose a new reward-free algorithm for learning linear mixture Markov decision processes (MDPs), where the transition probability can be parameterized as a linear combination of known feature mappings. At the core of our algorithm is uncertainty-weighted value-targeted regression with exploration-driven pseudo-reward and a high-order moment estimator for the aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties. When the total reward is bounded by 1, we show that our algorithm only needs to explore tilde O( d^2varepsilon^{-2}) episodes to find an varepsilon-optimal policy, where d is the dimension of the feature mapping. The sample complexity of our algorithm only has a polylogarithmic dependence on the planning horizon and therefore is ``horizon-free''. In addition, we provide an Omega(d^2varepsilon^{-2}) sample complexity lower bound, which matches the sample complexity of our algorithm up to logarithmic factors, suggesting that our algorithm is optimal.

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

In this work we create agents that can perform well beyond a single, individual task, that exhibit much wider generalisation of behaviour to a massive, rich space of challenges. We define a universe of tasks within an environment domain and demonstrate the ability to train agents that are generally capable across this vast space and beyond. The environment is natively multi-agent, spanning the continuum of competitive, cooperative, and independent games, which are situated within procedurally generated physical 3D worlds. The resulting space is exceptionally diverse in terms of the challenges posed to agents, and as such, even measuring the learning progress of an agent is an open research problem. We propose an iterative notion of improvement between successive generations of agents, rather than seeking to maximise a singular objective, allowing us to quantify progress despite tasks being incomparable in terms of achievable rewards. We show that through constructing an open-ended learning process, which dynamically changes the training task distributions and training objectives such that the agent never stops learning, we achieve consistent learning of new behaviours. The resulting agent is able to score reward in every one of our humanly solvable evaluation levels, with behaviour generalising to many held-out points in the universe of tasks. Examples of this zero-shot generalisation include good performance on Hide and Seek, Capture the Flag, and Tag. Through analysis and hand-authored probe tasks we characterise the behaviour of our agent, and find interesting emergent heuristic behaviours such as trial-and-error experimentation, simple tool use, option switching, and cooperation. Finally, we demonstrate that the general capabilities of this agent could unlock larger scale transfer of behaviour through cheap finetuning.

Large Language Model (LLM) Agents, often trained with Reinforcement Learning (RL), are constrained by a dependency on human-curated data, limiting scalability and tethering AI to human knowledge. Existing self-evolution frameworks offer an alternative but are typically restricted by the model's inherent capabilities and single-round interactions, hindering the development of complex curricula involving tool use or dynamic reasoning. We introduce Agent0, a fully autonomous framework that evolves high-performing agents without external data through multi-step co-evolution and seamless tool integration. Agent0 establishes a symbiotic competition between two agents initialized from the same base LLM: a curriculum agent that proposes increasingly challenging frontier tasks, and an executor agent that learns to solve them. We integrate external tools to enhance the executor's problem-solving capacity; this improvement, in turn, pressures the curriculum agent to construct more complex, tool-aware tasks. Through this iterative process, Agent0 establishes a self-reinforcing cycle that continuously produces high-quality curricula. Empirically, Agent0 substantially boosts reasoning capabilities, improving the Qwen3-8B-Base model by 18% on mathematical reasoning and 24% on general reasoning benchmarks. Code is available at https://github.com/aiming-lab/Agent0.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

How should an agent decide when and how to plan? A dominant approach builds agents as reactive policies with adaptive computation (e.g., chain-of-thought), trained end-to-end expecting planning to emerge implicitly. Without control over the presence, structure, or horizon of planning, these systems dramatically increase reasoning length, yielding inefficient token use without reliable accuracy gains. We argue efficient agentic reasoning benefits from decomposing decision-making into three systems: simulative reasoning (System II) grounding deliberation in future-state prediction via a world model; self-regulation (System III) deciding when and how deeply to plan via a learned configurator; and reactive execution (System I) handling fine-grained action. Simulative reasoning provides unified planning across diverse tasks without per-domain engineering, while self-regulation ensures the planner is invoked only when needed. To test this, we develop SR^2AM (Self-Regulated Simulative Reasoning Agentic LLM), realizing both as distinct stages within an LLM's chain-of-thought, with the LLM as world model. We explore two instantiations: recording decisions from a prompted multi-module system (v0.1) and reconstructing structured plans from traces of pretrained reasoning LLMs (v1.0), trained via supervised then reinforcement learning (RL). Across math, science, tabular analysis, and web information seeking, v0.1-8B and v1.0-30B achieve Pass@1 competitive with 120-355B and 685B-1T parameter systems respectively, while v1.0-30B uses 25.8-95.3% fewer reasoning tokens than comparable agentic LLMs. RL increases average planning horizon by 22.8% while planning frequency grows only 2.0%, showing it learns to plan further ahead rather than more often. More broadly, learned self-regulation instantiates a principle we expect to extend beyond planning to how agents govern their own learning and adaptation.

Reinforcement learning algorithms are commonly analyzed (and designed) under the Markov assumption. This is unrealistic, as most environments encountered in practice are either partially observable, or require function approximation that restricts the agent to access non-Markovian state features. We consider the problem of learning an optimal reactive policy in a finite environment with deterministic observations (or equivalently, hard state aggregation). We introduce a new algorithm, Committed Q-learning, and prove almost-sure convergence to the optimal reactive policy under an intuitive assumption we call rewire-robustness. This assumption is strictly weaker than the q_star-realizability condition used in prior work. Our algorithm is a variant of classical Q-learning in which the behavior policy commits to a single action upon entering a feature, and only resamples actions when the observed feature changes. A crucial part of our analysis is the introduction of quasi-Markov environments.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Multi-agent large language model systems can tackle complex multi-step tasks by decomposing work and coordinating specialized behaviors. However, current coordination mechanisms typically rely on statically assigned roles and centralized controllers. As agent pools and task distributions evolve, these design choices lead to inefficient routing, poor adaptability, and fragile fault recovery capabilities. We introduce Symphony-Coord, a decentralized multi-agent framework that transforms agent selection into an online multi-armed bandit problem, enabling roles to emerge organically through interaction. The framework employs a two-stage dynamic beacon protocol: (i) a lightweight candidate screening mechanism to limit communication and computational overhead; (ii) an adaptive LinUCB selector that routes subtasks based on context features derived from task requirements and agent states, continuously optimized through delayed end-to-end feedback. Under standard linear realizability assumptions, we provide sublinear regret bounds, indicating the system converges toward near-optimal allocation schemes. Validation through simulation experiments and real-world large language model benchmarks demonstrates that Symphony-Coord not only enhances task routing efficiency but also exhibits robust self-healing capabilities in scenarios involving distribution shifts and agent failures, achieving a scalable coordination mechanism without predefined roles.

Sequence models are a critical component of modern NLP systems, but their predictions are difficult to explain. We consider model explanations though rationales, subsets of context that can explain individual model predictions. We find sequential rationales by solving a combinatorial optimization: the best rationale is the smallest subset of input tokens that would predict the same output as the full sequence. Enumerating all subsets is intractable, so we propose an efficient greedy algorithm to approximate this objective. The algorithm, which is called greedy rationalization, applies to any model. For this approach to be effective, the model should form compatible conditional distributions when making predictions on incomplete subsets of the context. This condition can be enforced with a short fine-tuning step. We study greedy rationalization on language modeling and machine translation. Compared to existing baselines, greedy rationalization is best at optimizing the combinatorial objective and provides the most faithful rationales. On a new dataset of annotated sequential rationales, greedy rationales are most similar to human rationales.

Autonomous agents have rapidly matured as task executors and seen widespread deployment via harnesses such as OpenClaw. Safety concerns have rightly drawn growing research attention, and beneath them lie the values silently steering agent behavior. Existing value benchmarks, however, remain confined to LLMs, leaving agent values largely uncharted. From intuitive, empirical, and theoretical vantage points, we show that an agent's values diverge from those of its underlying LLM, and the agentic modality further introduces dataset-, evaluation-, and system-level challenges absent from text-only protocols. We close this gap with Agent-ValueBench, the first benchmark dedicated to agent values. It features 394 executable environments across 16 domains, offering 4,335 value-conflict tasks that cover 28 value systems and 332 dimensions. Every instance is co-synthesized through our purpose-built end-to-end pipeline and curated per-instance by professional psychologists. Each task ships with two pole-aligned golden trajectories whose checkpoints anchor a trajectory-level rubric-based judge. Benchmarking 14 frontier proprietary and open-weights models across 4 mainstream harnesses, we uncover three concerted findings. Agent values first manifest as a Value Tide of cross-model homogeneity beneath interpretable counter-currents. This tide bends non-additively under harness pull, and yet more decisively under deliberate steering via embedded skills. Together these results signal that the agent-alignment lever is shifting from classical model alignment and prompt steering toward harness alignment and skill steering.

In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We introduce a sequential testing framework that monitors whether observed play is consistent with a benchmark of strategic behavior, without assuming a fixed sample size. Our approach builds on the e-value framework for safe anytime-valid inference: by "betting" against the benchmark, we construct a test supermartingale that accumulates evidence whenever observed payoffs systematically violate the expected conditions. For repeated normal-form games, we take equilibrium as the benchmark, yielding a statistically sound, interpretable measure of departure from equilibrium that can be monitored online; our framework unifies the treatment of Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria, offering finite-time guarantees and a detailed analysis of detection times. We also leverage Benjamini-Hochberg-type procedures to increase detection power in large games while rigorously controlling the false discovery rate. Finally, we extend our method to stochastic games, verifying online whether observed trajectories adhere to a specified target policy, such as a computed equilibrium, broadening the framework's applicability to dynamic, state-dependent settings.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

An agent trained within a closed system can master any desired capability, as long as the following three conditions hold: (a) it receives sufficiently informative and aligned feedback, (b) its coverage of experience/data is broad enough, and (c) it has sufficient capacity and resource. In this position paper, we justify these conditions, and consider what limitations arise from (a) and (b) in closed systems, when assuming that (c) is not a bottleneck. Considering the special case of agents with matching input and output spaces (namely, language), we argue that such pure recursive self-improvement, dubbed "Socratic learning", can boost performance vastly beyond what is present in its initial data or knowledge, and is only limited by time, as well as gradual misalignment concerns. Furthermore, we propose a constructive framework to implement it, based on the notion of language games.

Recent advances in large language models have sparked growing interest in AI agents capable of solving complex, real-world tasks. However, most existing agent systems rely on manually crafted configurations that remain static after deployment, limiting their ability to adapt to dynamic and evolving environments. To this end, recent research has explored agent evolution techniques that aim to automatically enhance agent systems based on interaction data and environmental feedback. This emerging direction lays the foundation for self-evolving AI agents, which bridge the static capabilities of foundation models with the continuous adaptability required by lifelong agentic systems. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive review of existing techniques for self-evolving agentic systems. Specifically, we first introduce a unified conceptual framework that abstracts the feedback loop underlying the design of self-evolving agentic systems. The framework highlights four key components: System Inputs, Agent System, Environment, and Optimisers, serving as a foundation for understanding and comparing different strategies. Based on this framework, we systematically review a wide range of self-evolving techniques that target different components of the agent system. We also investigate domain-specific evolution strategies developed for specialised fields such as biomedicine, programming, and finance, where optimisation objectives are tightly coupled with domain constraints. In addition, we provide a dedicated discussion on the evaluation, safety, and ethical considerations for self-evolving agentic systems, which are critical to ensuring their effectiveness and reliability. This survey aims to provide researchers and practitioners with a systematic understanding of self-evolving AI agents, laying the foundation for the development of more adaptive, autonomous, and lifelong agentic systems.

Frontier AI agents increasingly act in environments where seemingly solvable tasks may lack prerequisites, contain conflicting requirements, or reveal blockers only during execution. We formulate agentic self-awareness (ASA) as the alignment of task-grounded feasibility judgments (know), warranted behavior (act), and responses to reconsideration (hold), distinguishing what a task permits from what an agent can solve. We build paired feasible and blocked tasks in Terminal-Bench 2.1 and retail τ^2-bench and introduce an authorship-aware M0-M3 rubric that separates recognizing a blocker from taking the certified deferral action for the correct reason. Separate probes assess stated feasibility beliefs and responses to a single challenge. In a Terminal-Bench protocol baseline, blocker recognition reaches 84.4%, but strict self-awareness (SA) reaches only 40.6%. Harness search without model-weight updates increases strict SA from 45.3% to 93.8% on reused Terminal-Bench search tasks; selection for abstention alone, however, can reduce success on feasible tasks. Independently initialized joint-objective searches improve both blocked-task SA and feasible-task solve on their own search sets. Retail held-out gains remain limited, and Terminal-Bench blocked-task transfer is not measured. This evaluation pipeline makes the recognition-action gap measurable and sets a two-sided target for improving agent decisions under changing task evidence.

Modern language models reason within bounded context, an inherent constraint that poses a fundamental barrier to long-horizon reasoning. We identify recursion as a core principle for overcoming this barrier, and propose recursive models as a minimal realization, where the model can recursively invoke itself to solve subtasks in isolated contexts. We prove that any computable problem admits a recursive decomposition in which each subtask requires only exponentially smaller active context than standard autoregressive models; this strictly surpasses any context management approach confined to a single sequence, such as summarization. We further generalize our framework to modern agentic systems with arbitrary context processing and control flows, and prove that recursive models can achieve optimal power within this broader class. Experimentally, we train a 3B model to reason recursively and evaluate on Boolean satisfiability, a task requiring long-horizon combinatorial search, where it significantly outperforms frontier LLMs.

AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled agents to autonomously perform complex, open-ended tasks. However, many existing frameworks depend heavily on manually predefined tools and workflows, which hinder their adaptability, scalability, and generalization across domains. In this work, we introduce Alita--a generalist agent designed with the principle of "Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication," enabling scalable agentic reasoning through minimal predefinition and maximal self-evolution. For minimal predefinition, Alita is equipped with only one component for direct problem-solving, making it much simpler and neater than previous approaches that relied heavily on hand-crafted, elaborate tools and workflows. This clean design enhances its potential to generalize to challenging questions, without being limited by tools. For Maximal self-evolution, we enable the creativity of Alita by providing a suite of general-purpose components to autonomously construct, refine, and reuse external capabilities by generating task-related model context protocols (MCPs) from open source, which contributes to scalable agentic reasoning. Notably, Alita achieves 75.15% pass@1 and 87.27% pass@3 accuracy, which is top-ranking among general-purpose agents, on the GAIA benchmark validation dataset, 74.00% and 52.00% pass@1, respectively, on Mathvista and PathVQA, outperforming many agent systems with far greater complexity. More details will be updated at https://github.com/CharlesQ9/Alita{https://github.com/CharlesQ9/Alita}.

Agentic systems have recently become the dominant paradigm for formal theorem proving, achieving strong performance by coordinating multiple models and tools. However, existing approaches often rely on task-specific pipelines and trained formal provers, limiting their flexibility and reproducibility. In this paper, we propose the paradigm that directly uses a general coding agent as a formal math reasoner. This paradigm is motivated by (1) A general coding agent provides a natural interface for diverse reasoning tasks beyond proving, (2) Performance can be improved by simply replacing the underlying base model, without training, and (3) MCP enables flexible extension and autonomous calling of specialized tools, avoiding complex design. Based on this paradigm, we introduce Numina-Lean-Agent, which combines Claude Code with Numina-Lean-MCP to enable autonomous interaction with Lean, retrieval of relevant theorems, informal proving and auxiliary reasoning tools. Using Claude Opus 4.5 as the base model, Numina-Lean-Agent solves all problems in Putnam 2025 (12 / 12), matching the best closed-source system. Beyond benchmark evaluation, we further demonstrate its generality by interacting with mathematicians to successfully formalize the Brascamp-Lieb theorem. We release Numina-Lean-Agent and all solutions at https://github.com/project-numina/numina-lean-agent.

Using frontier agent harnesses to tackle mathematical research problems has emerged as an effective means of advancing mathematics. However, solving frontier problems in mathematics may require a massive number of agents working in parallel for extended periods to construct proofs, thereby generating an enormous volume of intermediate proof results. Organizing these intermediate results throughout a long-horizon proof-search process and reusing knowledge gained from prior explorations remain major challenges. We present Ansatz, a mathematical research agent built around Continual Graph Memory, a graph-based, evolvable, cross-problem mathematical research memory system that explicitly organizes the entire proof search process and reuses information from exploration trajectories of previous problems. Specifically, we develop a unified graph memory that represents all intermediate exploration results, including facts, plans, and counterexamples, together with edges that explicitly represent the relationships among them; dependency-aware retrieval supplies precisely targeted local context; an evidence-sensitive curator updates the research frontier and distills lessons from prior attempts; and scoped recall surfaces earlier statements and negative findings for local re-proving rather than uncritical reuse. Experiments cover runs across all ten First Proof Second Batch problems, together with four component studies. Ansatz reports closure on all ten research tasks, demonstrating its ability to sustain and resume long-horizon mathematical search. Beyond these problems, Ansatz also produces solutions to the Jamison caterpillar conjecture and Erdős Problems 289, 348, and 488 without human intervention, and makes partial progress on several open problems, illustrating its strong ability to solve open mathematical research problems.

Recursive self-improvement (RSI) of a model on non-verifiable tasks, such as open-ended research, faces a supervision bottleneck when its outputs exceed what even human experts can reliably assess, leaving the model itself (optimizee) as the best available optimizer and evaluator. However, a single model instance struggles to critique and improve its own complex reasoning under this homogeneous loop. To address this, we propose Multi-Agent Self-Supervision (MASS), an RSI method that alternates between evolutionary workflow optimization and supervised fine-tuning on self-generated trajectories. Guided by early findings that multi-agent topologies excel at complex reasoning, MASS prompts a single base model to iteratively propose, execute, and self-evaluate multi-agent workflows. Through an evolutionary search constrained by structural guardrails, the model optimizes these computational-graph-like orchestrations, discovering the most effective distinct roles and information routing for a given task. Over two MASS cycles with Qwen3.6-27B, the model achieves 1.2-1.6x higher performance per output tokens on four open-ended public benchmarks. Because the improved model subsequently acts as a better optimizer and evaluator, this alternating framework enables a continuous, recursive bootstrapping of the model's capabilities. Moreover, multi-agent traces are also more training-efficient: a student trained on them outperforms a single-agent student trained on 1.4x more training tokens. These findings suggest that jointly learning orchestration and bounded subagent execution from multi-agent trajectories can provide an effective signal for RSI.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness.

Offline multi-agent reinforcement learning is challenging due to the coupling effect of both distribution shift issue common in offline setting and the high dimension issue common in multi-agent setting, making the action out-of-distribution (OOD) and value overestimation phenomenon excessively severe. Tomitigate this problem, we propose a novel multi-agent offline RL algorithm, named CounterFactual Conservative Q-Learning (CFCQL) to conduct conservative value estimation. Rather than regarding all the agents as a high dimensional single one and directly applying single agent methods to it, CFCQL calculates conservative regularization for each agent separately in a counterfactual way and then linearly combines them to realize an overall conservative value estimation. We prove that it still enjoys the underestimation property and the performance guarantee as those single agent conservative methods do, but the induced regularization and safe policy improvement bound are independent of the agent number, which is therefore theoretically superior to the direct treatment referred to above, especially when the agent number is large. We further conduct experiments on four environments including both discrete and continuous action settings on both existing and our man-made datasets, demonstrating that CFCQL outperforms existing methods on most datasets and even with a remarkable margin on some of them.

The generalization of decision-making agents encompasses two fundamental elements: learning from past experiences and reasoning in novel contexts. However, the predominant emphasis in most interactive environments is on learning, often at the expense of complexity in reasoning. In this paper, we introduce CivRealm, an environment inspired by the Civilization game. Civilization's profound alignment with human history and society necessitates sophisticated learning, while its ever-changing situations demand strong reasoning to generalize. Particularly, CivRealm sets up an imperfect-information general-sum game with a changing number of players; it presents a plethora of complex features, challenging the agent to deal with open-ended stochastic environments that require diplomacy and negotiation skills. Within CivRealm, we provide interfaces for two typical agent types: tensor-based agents that focus on learning, and language-based agents that emphasize reasoning. To catalyze further research, we present initial results for both paradigms. The canonical RL-based agents exhibit reasonable performance in mini-games, whereas both RL- and LLM-based agents struggle to make substantial progress in the full game. Overall, CivRealm stands as a unique learning and reasoning challenge for decision-making agents. The code is available at https://github.com/bigai-ai/civrealm.

AI has proven highly successful at urban planning analysis -- learning patterns from data to predict future conditions. The next frontier is AI-assisted decision-making: agents that recommend sites, allocate resources, and evaluate trade-offs while reasoning transparently about constraints and stakeholder values. Recent breakthroughs in reasoning AI -- CoT prompting, ReAct, and multi-agent collaboration frameworks -- now make this vision achievable. This position paper presents the Agentic Urban Planning AI Framework for reasoning-capable planning agents that integrates three cognitive layers (Perception, Foundation, Reasoning) with six logic components (Analysis, Generation, Verification, Evaluation, Collaboration, Decision) through a multi-agents collaboration framework. We demonstrate why planning decisions require explicit reasoning capabilities that are value-based (applying normative principles), rule-grounded (guaranteeing constraint satisfaction), and explainable (generating transparent justifications) -- requirements that statistical learning alone cannot fulfill. We compare reasoning agents with statistical learning, present a comprehensive architecture with benchmark evaluation metrics, and outline critical research challenges. This framework shows how AI agents can augment human planners by systematically exploring solution spaces, verifying regulatory compliance, and deliberating over trade-offs transparently -- not replacing human judgment but amplifying it with computational reasoning capabilities.

Agentic AI denotes an architectural transition from stateless, prompt-driven generative models toward goal-directed systems capable of autonomous perception, planning, action, and adaptation through iterative control loops. This paper examines this transition by connecting foundational intelligent agent theories, including reactive, deliberative, and Belief-Desire-Intention models, with contemporary LLM-centric approaches such as tool invocation, memory-augmented reasoning, and multi-agent coordination. The paper presents three primary contributions: (i) a reference architecture for production-grade LLM agents that separates cognitive reasoning from execution using typed tool interfaces; (ii) a taxonomy of multi-agent topologies, together with their associated failure modes and mitigation approaches; and (iii) an enterprise hardening checklist that incorporates governance, observability, and reproducibility considerations. Through an analysis of emerging industry platforms, including Kore.ai, Salesforce Agentforce, TrueFoundry, ZenML, and LangChain, the study identifies a convergence toward standardized agent loops, registries, and auditable control mechanisms. It is argued that the subsequent phase of agentic AI development will parallel the maturation of web services, relying on shared protocols, typed contracts, and layered governance structures to support scalable and composable autonomy. The persistent challenges related to verifiability, interoperability, and safe autonomy remain key areas for future research and practical deployment.

Embodied intelligence integrates learned perception and decision making with real-time computation, control, and physical interaction. Because failures can cause immediate physical or operational harm, task completion alone does not establish trustworthiness. We define trustworthy embodied intelligence as the sustained capacity to execute specified tasks reliably under environmental and system variation while maintaining risk within acceptable bounds. We term this objective sustained safe success. Its supporting mechanisms are organized into four interdependent layers. The model layer generates task-competent action proposals with calibrated uncertainty and explicit safety preferences. The system layer realizes authorized actions dependably through integrated sensing, computation, control, hardware safeguards, fault containment, and fallback. The evidence layer substantiates bounded claims through evaluation, verification, validation, traceability, and structured assurance arguments. The deployment layer maintains claim validity through runtime monitoring, authority management, intervention, incident response, and controlled updates. Because assumptions and failures propagate across these layers, neither model capability, isolated safeguards, nor benchmark performance alone can establish end-to-end trustworthiness. Drawing on embodied AI, robotics, control, dependable computing, distributed systems, and autonomous driving, we further propose a non-normative hierarchy of trustworthiness levels. This hierarchy grades the strength of bounded deployment claims across task capability, safety, system assurance, operational governance, and supporting evidence, providing a basis for bounded deployment, comparative evaluation, research prioritization, and future standardization.

Large language models (LMs) are capable of generating free-text rationales to aid question answering. However, prior work 1) suggests that useful self-rationalization is emergent only at significant scales (e.g., 175B parameter GPT-3); and 2) focuses largely on downstream performance, ignoring the semantics of the rationales themselves, e.g., are they faithful, true, and helpful for humans? In this work, we enable small-scale LMs (approx. 200x smaller than GPT-3) to generate rationales that not only improve downstream task performance, but are also more plausible, consistent, and diverse, assessed both by automatic and human evaluation. Our method, MaRio (Multi-rewArd RatIOnalization), is a multi-reward conditioned self-rationalization algorithm that optimizes multiple distinct properties like plausibility, diversity and consistency. Results on five difficult question-answering datasets StrategyQA, QuaRel, OpenBookQA, NumerSense and QASC show that not only does MaRio improve task accuracy, but it also improves the self-rationalization quality of small LMs across the aforementioned axes better than a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) baseline. Extensive human evaluations confirm that MaRio rationales are preferred vs. SFT rationales, as well as qualitative improvements in plausibility and consistency.

The same arguments often need to be evaluated under different external regimes. An agent with influence over the regime has a strategic lever that standard formalisms do not directly capture. We introduce context-dependent argumentation frameworks (CDAFs), an extension of Dung's theory in which a defeat function determines, per context, which attacks succeed. A perspective-labeled specialisation derives the defeat function from a relevance set ρ and a priority π. The relevance set is the agent's action space. In a small worked example, the agent's target argument is rejected under every full-relevance injective priority, yet accepted under partial activations, one of which no VAF audience can mirror. We define the corresponding decision problem, ACTIVATION-MANIPULATION, and record baseline complexity bounds. Tight bounds and multi-agent variants are left open.

Evaluations of LLM planning agents largely ask whether a task succeeds or a declared plan is followed. In strategic cyber-physical systems, a stronger question is whether the planning architecture remains appropriate after autonomous participants respond and physics constrains the outcome. We introduce a controlled, physics-grounded benchmark built around planning-induced control trajectories: the ordered planning operations and directives through which an execution architecture acts on other agents and the physical process. It implements predefined, sequential, hierarchical, and search executors in a smart-grid demand-response system with 40 heterogeneous prosumers and an independently simulated radial feeder. The LLM is bounded to typed policy declaration and short operator messages, while schedule construction, prosumer dynamics, and power flow remain explicit code. The protocol uses paired forced-mode counterfactuals, common random response draws, and event-level deadline feasibility. Three properties follow. Architecture materially changes outcomes: forced search is the oracle in all five baseline seeds. Execution fidelity needs more than mode agreement: objective substitution holds agreement at 1.0 while increasing voltage shortfall by 2.68x. A 144-scenario, 576-episode bank has feasible oracles from three of the four architectures. A prespecified stress-held-out ridge has mean regret 90.7 (95% interval [73.8, 108.6]) and no detectable value over fixed sequential; applying known deadline feasibility before quality prediction cuts regret to 29.0 and improves over fixed sequential by 61.1. An all-feasible ablation does not beat fixed search, localising the remaining challenge to within-feasible quality selection. A five-model extension separates stress-conditioned, state-blind, and invariant declarers; latency tails show that live feasibility should be treated probabilistically.

Recent research has shown that LLM performance on reasoning tasks can be enhanced by scaling test-time compute. One promising approach, particularly with decomposable problems, involves arranging intermediate solutions as a graph on which transformations are performed to explore the solution space. However, prior works rely on pre-determined, task-specific transformation schedules which are subject to a set of searched hyperparameters. In this work, we view thought graph transformations as actions in a Markov decision process, and implement policy agents to drive effective action policies for the underlying reasoning LLM agent. In particular, we investigate the ability for another LLM to act as a policy agent on thought graph environments and introduce ARIES, a multi-agent architecture for reasoning with LLMs. In ARIES, reasoning LLM agents solve decomposed subproblems, while policy LLM agents maintain visibility of the thought graph states, and dynamically adapt the problem-solving strategy. Through extensive experiments, we observe that using off-the-shelf LLMs as policy agents with no supervised fine-tuning (SFT) can yield up to 29% higher accuracy on HumanEval relative to static transformation schedules, as well as reducing inference costs by 35% and avoid any search requirements. We also conduct a thorough analysis of observed failure modes, highlighting that limitations on LLM sizes and the depth of problem decomposition can be seen as challenges to scaling LLM-guided reasoning.

As the capabilities of artificial agents improve, they are being increasingly deployed to service multiple diverse objectives and stakeholders. However, the composition of these objectives is often performed ad hoc, with no clear justification. This paper takes a normative approach to multi-objective agency: from a set of intuitively appealing axioms, it is shown that Markovian aggregation of Markovian reward functions is not possible when the time preference (discount factor) for each objective may vary. It follows that optimal multi-objective agents must admit rewards that are non-Markovian with respect to the individual objectives. To this end, a practical non-Markovian aggregation scheme is proposed, which overcomes the impossibility with only one additional parameter for each objective. This work offers new insights into sequential, multi-objective agency and intertemporal choice, and has practical implications for the design of AI systems deployed to serve multiple generations of principals with varying time preference.

Developing autonomous LLM agents capable of making a series of intelligent decisions to solve complex, real-world tasks is a fast-evolving frontier. Like human cognitive development, agents are expected to acquire knowledge and skills through exploration and interaction with the environment. Despite advances, the community still lacks a unified, interactive reinforcement learning (RL) framework that can effectively train such agents from scratch -- without relying on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) -- across diverse and realistic environments. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentGym-RL, a new framework to train LLM agents for multi-turn interactive decision-making through RL. The framework features a modular and decoupled architecture, ensuring high flexibility and extensibility. It encompasses a wide variety of real-world scenarios, and supports mainstream RL algorithms. Furthermore, we propose ScalingInter-RL, a training approach designed for exploration-exploitation balance and stable RL optimization. In early stages, it emphasizes exploitation by restricting the number of interactions, and gradually shifts towards exploration with larger horizons to encourage diverse problem-solving strategies. In this way, the agent develops more diverse behaviors and is less prone to collapse under long horizons. We perform extensive experiments to validate the stability and effectiveness of both the AgentGym-RL framework and the ScalingInter-RL approach. Our agents match or surpass commercial models on 27 tasks across diverse environments. We offer key insights and will open-source the complete AgentGym-RL framework -- including code and datasets -- to empower the research community in developing the next generation of intelligent agents.

We address the problem of model-free distributed stabilization of heterogeneous multi-agent systems using reinforcement learning (RL). Two algorithms are developed. The first algorithm solves a centralized linear quadratic regulator (LQR) problem without knowing any initial stabilizing gain in advance. The second algorithm builds upon the results of the first algorithm, and extends it to distributed stabilization of multi-agent systems with predefined interaction graphs. Rigorous proofs are provided to show that the proposed algorithms achieve guaranteed convergence if specific conditions hold. A simulation example is presented to demonstrate the theoretical results.

We present Épi, an autonomous research agent that sustains investigations across model sessions and evolves its methods through accumulated experience. Épi combines persistent research history, hierarchical memory, branching and independent review to maintain research continuity, learn from experiments, and explore and revisit alternative approaches. Its experiments run across session boundaries, and a fixed verifier evaluates their outputs. Épi produced 120 record-setting results, comprising 20 numerical bound records across 12 families and 100 construction records across eight families. These include an approximately 84-fold narrower interval for the n-queens constant and a more than 3.6-million-fold narrower rigorous interval for the quartic Feigenbaum attractor dimension. Exact dual certificates establish that the Cohn-Elkies linear-programming bound cannot be sharp in dimensions 10 and 11. Beyond numerical improvements, Épi gives a computer-assisted proof of Tuza's conjecture for split graphs with an eight-vertex clique part and at most three triangle-active neighborhood types, with arbitrary multiplicities. We extend this research process to algorithmic coding with Épi-turbo, a lightweight configuration that develops executable solvers for tasks including vehicle routing, scheduling and production planning. On 30 FrontierOR tasks, Épi-turbo achieves a 5.4% higher total benchmark score than Codex at 64% of its model cost, using the same underlying model and reasoning effort. Épi is designed to support human understanding by connecting computational results to explicit methods and mathematical arguments that researchers can examine and build upon.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) is devoted to the creation of artificial decision-makers that can perform (at least) on par with the human counterparts on a domain of interest. Unlike the agents in traditional AI, the agents in artificial general intelligence (AGI) are required to replicate human intelligence in almost every domain of interest. Moreover, an AGI agent should be able to achieve this without (virtually any) further changes, retraining, or fine-tuning of the parameters. The real world is non-stationary, non-ergodic, and non-Markovian: we, humans, can neither revisit our past nor are the most recent observations sufficient statistics. Yet, we excel at a variety of complex tasks. Many of these tasks require longterm planning. We can associate this success to our natural faculty to abstract away task-irrelevant information from our overwhelming sensory experience. We make task-specific mental models of the world without much effort. Due to this ability to abstract, we can plan on a significantly compact representation of a task without much loss of performance. Not only this, we also abstract our actions to produce high-level plans: the level of action-abstraction can be anywhere between small muscle movements to a mental notion of "doing an action". It is natural to assume that any AGI agent competing with humans (at every plausible domain) should also have these abilities to abstract its experiences and actions. This thesis is an inquiry into the existence of such abstractions which aid efficient planing for a wide range of domains, and most importantly, these abstractions come with some optimality guarantees.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) enable powerful multi-agent systems, but scaling them is economically unsustainable: coordinating heterogeneous agents under information asymmetry often spirals costs. Existing paradigms, such as Mixture-of-Agents and knowledge-based routers, rely on heuristic proxies that ignore costs and collapse uncertainty structure, leading to provably suboptimal coordination. We introduce Agora, a framework that reframes coordination as a decentralized market for uncertainty. Agora formalizes epistemic uncertainty into a structured, tradable asset (perceptual, semantic, inferential), and enforces profitability-driven trading among agents based on rational economic rules. A market-aware broker, extending Thompson Sampling, initiates collaboration and guides the system toward cost-efficient equilibria. Experiments on five multimodal benchmarks (MMMU, MMBench, MathVision, InfoVQA, CC-OCR) show that Agora outperforms strong VLMs and heuristic multi-agent strategies, e.g., achieving +8.5% accuracy over the best baseline on MMMU while reducing cost by over 3x. These results establish market-based coordination as a principled and scalable paradigm for building economically viable multi-agent visual intelligence systems.

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.

Autonomous agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) that devise plans and tackle real-world challenges have gained prominence.However, tailoring these agents for specialized domains like quantitative investment remains a formidable task. The core challenge involves efficiently building and integrating a domain-specific knowledge base for the agent's learning process. This paper introduces a principled framework to address this challenge, comprising a two-layer loop.In the inner loop, the agent refines its responses by drawing from its knowledge base, while in the outer loop, these responses are tested in real-world scenarios to automatically enhance the knowledge base with new insights.We demonstrate that our approach enables the agent to progressively approximate optimal behavior with provable efficiency.Furthermore, we instantiate this framework through an autonomous agent for mining trading signals named QuantAgent. Empirical results showcase QuantAgent's capability in uncovering viable financial signals and enhancing the accuracy of financial forecasts.

LLM agents are rapidly being deployed in production, including coding assistants, customer-support chatbots, and scientific research assistants, yet they remain fundamentally static in enterprise deployment. The LLM weights, system prompts, tool repertoires, and in-context harnesses are frozen at deployment time, and any improvement requires a manual loop of human-curated data collection, offline fine-tuning, modification of the agentic paradigm, and re-deployment. Recent work on self-evolving agents, such as OpenClaw for individual users, indicates that the next leap in agent capability will come from agents that continually learn from their own experience. In this paper, we argue that this vision for self-evolving agent deployment is being held back for enterprise-level large-scale agentic service not by reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms but by agentic online RL systems. Specifically, current agentic RL systems and the surrounding observability software stack are inadequate along three essential aspects: (i) there is no standardized agent trajectory data protocol capable of carrying RL learning signals at step granularity across heterogeneous agent paradigms; (ii) there is no enterprise-grade comprehensive data proxy that converts real workloads into governed learning substrates; and (iii) there is no unified agent evolution control plane that automatically decides, based on trajectory statistics, when to update policy weights or evolve the in-context harness. The next generation of agentic RL systems must be co-designed around these three pillars, and we sketch concrete architectures, case studies, and counter-arguments. We instantiate one branch through AReaL2.0, reorganizing existing RL infrastructure into an agent-oriented online RL loop for policy weight updates from deployed workloads.

Reasoning is a fundamental cognitive process underlying inference, problem-solving, and decision-making. While large language models (LLMs) demonstrate strong reasoning capabilities in closed-world settings, they struggle in open-ended and dynamic environments. Agentic reasoning marks a paradigm shift by reframing LLMs as autonomous agents that plan, act, and learn through continual interaction. In this survey, we organize agentic reasoning along three complementary dimensions. First, we characterize environmental dynamics through three layers: foundational agentic reasoning, which establishes core single-agent capabilities including planning, tool use, and search in stable environments; self-evolving agentic reasoning, which studies how agents refine these capabilities through feedback, memory, and adaptation; and collective multi-agent reasoning, which extends intelligence to collaborative settings involving coordination, knowledge sharing, and shared goals. Across these layers, we distinguish in-context reasoning, which scales test-time interaction through structured orchestration, from post-training reasoning, which optimizes behaviors via reinforcement learning and supervised fine-tuning. We further review representative agentic reasoning frameworks across real-world applications and benchmarks, including science, robotics, healthcare, autonomous research, and mathematics. This survey synthesizes agentic reasoning methods into a unified roadmap bridging thought and action, and outlines open challenges and future directions, including personalization, long-horizon interaction, world modeling, scalable multi-agent training, and governance for real-world deployment.