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Nov 16

AlignMerge - Alignment-Preserving Large Language Model Merging via Fisher-Guided Geometric Constraints

Merging large language models (LLMs) is a practical way to compose capabilities from multiple fine-tuned checkpoints without retraining. Yet standard schemes (linear weight soups, task vectors, and Fisher-weighted averaging) can preserve loss while quietly destroying alignment. We argue that merging is not a numerical trick but a geometry-constrained operation around an already-aligned anchor: fusion must be steered to respect safety geometry, not validated post hoc. We introduce AlignMerge, a geometry-aware merging framework that makes alignment an explicit invariant. In a local Fisher chart around an instruction-tuned base, we estimate an alignment subspace with projector P_A and optimize: L_AlignMerge = L_geo + lambda_align * L_align + lambda_bud * L_bud, where L_geo keeps the merge close to its experts in Fisher-Rao geometry, L_align penalizes motion along alignment-sensitive directions, and L_bud enforces a soft alignment budget. As the alignment functional we use the decoding-invariant Alignment Quality Index (AQI), a latent-space criterion that captures how cleanly aligned and misaligned behaviors separate in representation space. Across five model families (LLaMA-3 8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 2, Phi-3.5, Gemma 2), merging safety anchors with task experts, AlignMerge improves alignment metrics (AQI, toxicity, LLM-judge alignment) while matching or exceeding the best expert on instruction-following, reasoning, and helpfulness. It also exhibits smaller alignment-subspace drift and fewer budget violations than Fisher soups, TIES, SafeMerge, and MergeAlign. These results make alignment-preserving merging a first-class design goal and suggest a path to geometry-aware composition of future foundation models.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 9

Finding Safety Violations of AI-Enabled Control Systems through the Lens of Synthesized Proxy Programs

Given the increasing adoption of modern AI-enabled control systems, ensuring their safety and reliability has become a critical task in software testing. One prevalent approach to testing control systems is falsification, which aims to find an input signal that causes the control system to violate a formal safety specification using optimization algorithms. However, applying falsification to AI-enabled control systems poses two significant challenges: (1)~it requires the system to execute numerous candidate test inputs, which can be time-consuming, particularly for systems with AI models that have many parameters, and (2)~multiple safety requirements are typically defined as a conjunctive specification, which is difficult for existing falsification approaches to comprehensively cover. This paper introduces Synthify, a falsification framework tailored for AI-enabled control systems. Our approach performs falsification in a two-phase process. At the start, Synthify synthesizes a program that implements one or a few linear controllers to serve as a proxy for the AI controller. This proxy program mimics the AI controller's functionality but is computationally more efficient. Then, Synthify employs the ε-greedy strategy to sample a promising sub-specification from the conjunctive safety specification. It then uses a Simulated Annealing-based falsification algorithm to find violations of the sampled sub-specification for the control system. To evaluate Synthify, we compare it to PSY-TaLiRo, a state-of-the-art and industrial-strength falsification tool, on 8 publicly available control systems. On average, Synthify achieves a 83.5% higher success rate in falsification compared to PSY-TaLiRo with the same budget of falsification trials. The safety violations found by Synthify are also more diverse than those found by PSY-TaLiRo, covering 137.7% more sub-specifications.

  • 7 authors
·
Jan 20, 2025

Cascade: Exploiting SLO-Aware latency budget for fair and high goodput LLM inference serving

The reasoning and agentic capabilities of large language models have expanded the range of applications they support, from short interactive exchanges to long, compute-heavy requests. LLM serving platforms today define response-latency service-level objectives, even though requests within the same service can differ by orders of magnitude in input length, generation length, execution cost, and the availability of reusable KV-cache state. As a result, requests governed by the same service level objective have different urgency: after accounting for the time required to execute them, some have substantial latency headroom while others have almost none. We define this headroom---the difference between a request's service level objective and its predicted remaining service time---as its per-request latency budget. We present Cascade, an LLM serving system that estimates and continuously updates this budget from request characteristics, KV-cache state, and current system load. Unlike prior SLO-aware schedulers that use deadlines to govern request ordering alone, Cascade uses a single per-request budget to jointly coordinate request scheduling and KV-cache management across the memory hierarchy. Its scheduler prioritizes requests with little remaining budget, while its memory manager uses the same budget to decide whether non-resident KV state should be restored or prefetched from a deeper tier, retained in HBM, or recomputed. By directing queueing and data-movement overhead toward requests that can absorb it, Cascade improves SLO-satisfied goodput while preserving fairness across heterogeneous request classes. On production traces across three large language models, Cascade improves goodput by up to2.4x and reduces SLO violations by 40% relative to the default vLLM first-come, first-served scheduler.

  • 7 authors
·
Aug 5

Token Budgets: An Empirical Catalog of 63 LLM-Agent Budget-Overrun Incidents, with an Affine-Typed Rust Mitigation as a Case Study

LLM-agent budget overruns are a documented production failure class: a single retry loop can spend thousands of dollars before an operator notices, and the in-process integrity properties that would prevent it (no aliasing, no double-spend, no use-after-delegation of a cost-bearing value) are enforced, if at all, by ad-hoc wrappers rather than by the type system. Our central contribution is empirical: a catalog of 63 confirmed production incidents from 21 orchestration frameworks (2023-2026), each backed by a quoted GitHub issue and, where reported, a dollar loss, organized into an eight-cluster failure taxonomy (inter-rater Cohen's kappa = 0.837, N = 113), plus 47 supplementary structural entries. As one mitigation evaluated against this taxonomy, we build token-budgets, an 1,180-line Rust crate (no unsafe) that operationalizes affine ownership so that cloning, double-spending, or using a budget after delegating it are compile errors rather than runtime hazards an operator must remember to avoid. The dollar cap is runtime arithmetic under an estimator assumption; the affine layer makes that arithmetic non-bypassable. On single-agent workloads a 4-line Python counter matches the crate at 0/30 overshoot, so the distinguishing value is non-bypassability under operator error in multi-agent delegation: the delegation-fanout race documented in 11 incidents is rejected by the borrow checker at compile time, while the same pattern under asyncio overshoots 30/30 and three disciplined alternatives overshoot 0/30. Across five runtimes, three providers, and a temperature-stratified live-API test (N = 160), the approach reports zero cap violations and zero false refusals, at operational parity with concurrent work. Static over-reservation is 4-6x (2.11x adaptive). Binary-level cap-soundness on the running binary is left open.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 1 2

InteractBench: Benchmarking LLMs on Competitive Programming under Unrevealed Information

Competitive programming is increasingly being used to evaluate the algorithmic reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, existing benchmarks primarily focus on full-information tasks where all problem inputs are provided upfront. This overlooks a critical dimension of algorithmic reasoning: the ability of generated programs to operate when key information is not revealed upfront. Interactive problems, a distinctive component of competitive programming, embody this challenge. These problems require programs to engage in multi-round interaction with an interactor (a judge program) under strict protocol constraints and limited query budgets, with new information revealed only in response to queries. To address this gap, we introduce InteractBench, a benchmark comprising 322 high-quality interactive problems curated from Codeforces, AtCoder, IOI, and ICPC. Each problem is packaged with executable local interactors, enabling fully offline evaluation. Unlike existing benchmarks, InteractBench assesses whether model-generated code can acquire information and track state dynamically. Our evaluation reveals a significant interaction gap: even the most advanced reasoning models achieve limited success on interactive problems. Beyond success rates, we propose a fine-grained failure taxonomy to diagnose the root causes of these deficiencies. Although algorithmic logic errors remain dominant, protocol violations and query-budget overruns are frequent. Code is available at https://github.com/kmsgk0/InteractBench.

  • 7 authors
·
Aug 29

SABER: A Stealthy Agentic Black-Box Attack Framework for Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-language-action (VLA) models enable robots to follow natural-language instructions grounded in visual observations, but the instruction channel also introduces a critical vulnerability: small textual perturbations can alter downstream robot behavior. Systematic robustness evaluation therefore requires a black-box attacker that can generate minimal yet effective instruction edits across diverse VLA models. To this end, we present SABER, an agent-centric approach for automatically generating instruction-based adversarial attacks on VLA models under bounded edit budgets. SABER uses a GRPO-trained ReAct attacker to generate small, plausible adversarial instruction edits using character-, token-, and prompt-level tools under a bounded edit budget that induces targeted behavioral degradation, including task failure, unnecessarily long execution, and increased constraint violations. On the LIBERO benchmark across six state-of-the-art VLA models, SABER reduces task success by 20.6%, increases action-sequence length by 55%, and raises constraint violations by 33%, while requiring 21.1% fewer tool calls and 54.7% fewer character edits than strong GPT-based baselines. These results show that small, plausible instruction edits are sufficient to substantially degrade robot execution, and that an agentic black-box pipeline offers a practical, scalable, and adaptive approach for red-teaming robotic foundation models.

  • 6 authors
·
Mar 25