Daily Papers

Large language models generate computationally expensive yet semantically void reasoning on beyond-capability tasks, creating risks where plausible-sounding but incorrect derivations mislead users. We characterize this futile reasoning phenomenon through systematic analysis, revealing universal capability overreach and systematic miscalibration between capability and behavior. The dominant failure mode is specious reasoning, which outputs look superficially valid but contain subtle errors, escalating with task difficulty. To address this, we introduce CaRL (Capability-aligned Reinforcement Learning), which aligns model behavior with capability boundaries through reward shaping that incentivizes refusal over futile reasoning and hindsight refusal augmentation that converts failures into refusal supervision. Experiments demonstrate a substantial reduction in futile reasoning while preserving performance across task difficulties, effectively achieving capability-aligned behavior without sacrificing utility. https://github.com/icip-cas/Knowing-When-to-Quit

LLM-agent budget overruns are a documented production failure class: a single retry loop can spend thousands of dollars before an operator notices, and the in-process integrity properties that would prevent it (no aliasing, no double-spend, no use-after-delegation of a cost-bearing value) are enforced, if at all, by ad-hoc wrappers rather than by the type system. Our central contribution is empirical: a catalog of 63 confirmed production incidents from 21 orchestration frameworks (2023-2026), each backed by a quoted GitHub issue and, where reported, a dollar loss, organized into an eight-cluster failure taxonomy (inter-rater Cohen's kappa = 0.837, N = 113), plus 47 supplementary structural entries. As one mitigation evaluated against this taxonomy, we build token-budgets, an 1,180-line Rust crate (no unsafe) that operationalizes affine ownership so that cloning, double-spending, or using a budget after delegating it are compile errors rather than runtime hazards an operator must remember to avoid. The dollar cap is runtime arithmetic under an estimator assumption; the affine layer makes that arithmetic non-bypassable. On single-agent workloads a 4-line Python counter matches the crate at 0/30 overshoot, so the distinguishing value is non-bypassability under operator error in multi-agent delegation: the delegation-fanout race documented in 11 incidents is rejected by the borrow checker at compile time, while the same pattern under asyncio overshoots 30/30 and three disciplined alternatives overshoot 0/30. Across five runtimes, three providers, and a temperature-stratified live-API test (N = 160), the approach reports zero cap violations and zero false refusals, at operational parity with concurrent work. Static over-reservation is 4-6x (2.11x adaptive). Binary-level cap-soundness on the running binary is left open.

The ability to recognize one's own limitations and decide whether to solve a problem or delegate is fundamental for reliable intelligent systems. Yet we show that modern large language models systematically lack this ability: across diverse model families and scales, they overestimate their competence and attempt queries they cannot solve. We refer to this ability as Capability Self-Assessment (CSA) and formulate it as a policy-learning problem, aiming to improve self-assessment while preserving the model's original capabilities. Our results show that reinforcement learning teaches CSA effectively, significantly outperforming supervised fine-tuning while preserving original capabilities. In contrast, supervised fine-tuning severely degrades the capabilities the model is meant to assess. Moreover, learned self-assessment behavior generalizes well out of distribution, suggesting that CSA is a transferable model trait. Finally, CSA is practically useful: it improves local-cloud decision making at inference time and provides a signal for targeted data selection during training.

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities, yet they often suffer from overthinking, expending redundant computational steps on simple problems, or underthinking, failing to explore sufficient reasoning paths despite inherent capabilities. These issues lead to inefficiencies and potential inaccuracies, limiting practical deployment in resource-constrained settings. Existing methods to mitigate overthinking, such as suppressing reflective keywords or adjusting reasoning length, may inadvertently induce underthinking, compromising accuracy. Therefore, we propose ReBalance, a training-free framework that achieves efficient reasoning with balanced thinking. ReBalance leverages confidence as a continuous indicator of reasoning dynamics, identifying overthinking through high confidence variance and underthinking via consistent overconfidence. By aggregating hidden states from a small-scale dataset into reasoning mode prototypes, we compute a steering vector to guide LRMs' reasoning trajectories. A dynamic control function modulates this vector's strength and direction based on real-time confidence, pruning redundancy during overthinking, and promoting exploration during underthinking. Extensive experiments conducted on four models ranging from 0.5B to 32B, and across nine benchmarks in math reasoning, general question answering, and coding tasks demonstrate that ReBalance effectively reduces output redundancy while improving accuracy, offering a general, training-free, and plug-and-play strategy for efficient and robust LRM deployment. Code is available at https://github.com/yu-lin-li/ReBalance .

Trustworthy capability evaluations are crucial for ensuring the safety of AI systems, and are becoming a key component of AI regulation. However, the developers of an AI system, or the AI system itself, may have incentives for evaluations to understate the AI's actual capability. These conflicting interests lead to the problem of sandbagging, which we define as strategic underperformance on an evaluation. In this paper we assess sandbagging capabilities in contemporary language models (LMs). We prompt frontier LMs, like GPT-4 and Claude 3 Opus, to selectively underperform on dangerous capability evaluations, while maintaining performance on general (harmless) capability evaluations. Moreover, we find that models can be fine-tuned, on a synthetic dataset, to hide specific capabilities unless given a password. This behaviour generalizes to high-quality, held-out benchmarks such as WMDP. In addition, we show that both frontier and smaller models can be prompted or password-locked to target specific scores on a capability evaluation. We have mediocre success in password-locking a model to mimic the answers a weaker model would give. Overall, our results suggest that capability evaluations are vulnerable to sandbagging. This vulnerability decreases the trustworthiness of evaluations, and thereby undermines important safety decisions regarding the development and deployment of advanced AI systems.

We investigate a failure mode of large language models (LLMs) in which plain-text prompts elicit excessive outputs, a phenomenon we term Overflow. Unlike jailbreaks or prompt injection, Overflow arises under ordinary interaction settings and can lead to elevated serving cost, latency, and cross-user performance degradation, particularly when scaled across many requests. Beyond usability, the stakes are economic and environmental: unnecessary tokens increase per-request cost and energy consumption, compounding into substantial operational spend and carbon footprint at scale. Moreover, Overflow represents a practical vector for compute amplification and service degradation in shared environments. We introduce BenchOverflow, a model-agnostic benchmark of nine plain-text prompting strategies that amplify output volume without adversarial suffixes or policy circumvention. Using a standardized protocol with a fixed budget of 5000 new tokens, we evaluate nine open- and closed-source models and observe pronounced rightward shifts and heavy tails in length distributions. Cap-saturation rates (CSR@1k/3k/5k) and empirical cumulative distribution functions (ECDFs) quantify tail risk; within-prompt variance and cross-model correlations show that Overflow is broadly reproducible yet heterogeneous across families and attack vectors. A lightweight mitigation-a fixed conciseness reminder-attenuates right tails and lowers CSR for all strategies across the majority of models. Our findings position length control as a measurable reliability, cost, and sustainability concern rather than a stylistic quirk. By enabling standardized comparison of length-control robustness across models, BenchOverflow provides a practical basis for selecting deployments that minimize resource waste and operating expense, and for evaluating defenses that curb compute amplification without eroding task performance.

Emotional dialogue research includes two influential strategy traditions. Empathetic dialogue prioritizes understanding a speaker's emotional experience. Emotional support conversation selects and sequences support for the seeker's current needs. Sustained use introduces a further goal. Effective support should sustain users' capacities for emotion regulation, coping, self-endorsed decisions, and social connection across the interaction lifecycle. We propose capability-sustaining emotional dialogue (CSED) as a longitudinal research paradigm that aligns supportive strategy with this goal and organizes data, models, system design, evaluation, and governance around repeated use, non-use, transition, and termination. A targeted literature-and-corpus audit motivates this position. In a PRISMA-ScR-guided sample, 95% of 60 system-building papers pursue relief-oriented goals. None evaluates capability or longitudinal outcomes, and only 1 considers dependency, autonomy, or termination risk. In 300 ESConv supporter turns, capability-relevant functions appear in 43.0%, while generic suggestions account for 22.0%, compared with 4.0% reappraisal, 6.7% self-efficacy support, and 0.3% boundary behavior. We release a protocol for extending the audit to model behavior. An illustrative process model connects latent user capability to six design commitments, four evaluation timescales, and lifecycle constraints. The resulting agenda makes CSED testable across data, policy design, training, evaluation, and governance.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems will increasingly be used to cause harm as they grow more capable. In fact, AI systems are already starting to be used to automate fraudulent activities, violate human rights, create harmful fake images, and identify dangerous toxins. To prevent some misuses of AI, we argue that targeted interventions on certain capabilities will be warranted. These restrictions may include controlling who can access certain types of AI models, what they can be used for, whether outputs are filtered or can be traced back to their user, and the resources needed to develop them. We also contend that some restrictions on non-AI capabilities needed to cause harm will be required. Though capability restrictions risk reducing use more than misuse (facing an unfavorable Misuse-Use Tradeoff), we argue that interventions on capabilities are warranted when other interventions are insufficient, the potential harm from misuse is high, and there are targeted ways to intervene on capabilities. We provide a taxonomy of interventions that can reduce AI misuse, focusing on the specific steps required for a misuse to cause harm (the Misuse Chain), and a framework to determine if an intervention is warranted. We apply this reasoning to three examples: predicting novel toxins, creating harmful images, and automating spear phishing campaigns.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

AI agents that interact with the real world through tool calls pose fundamental safety challenges: agents might leak private information, cause unintended side effects, or be manipulated through prompt injection. To address these challenges, we propose to put the agent in a programming-language-based "safety harness": instead of calling tools directly, agents express their intentions as code in a capability-safe language: Scala 3 with capture checking. Capabilities are program variables that regulate access to effects and resources of interest. Scala's type system tracks capabilities statically, providing fine-grained control over what an agent can do. In particular, it enables local purity, the ability to enforce that sub-computations are side-effect-free, preventing information leakage when agents process classified data. We demonstrate that extensible agent safety harnesses can be built by leveraging a strong type system with tracked capabilities. Our experiments show that agents can generate capability-safe code with no significant loss in task performance, while the type system reliably prevents unsafe behaviors such as information leakage and malicious side effects.

Assessing the capabilities and risks of frontier AI systems is a critical area of research, and recent work has shown that repeated sampling from models can dramatically increase both. For instance, repeated sampling has been shown to increase their capabilities, such as solving difficult math and coding problems, but it has also been shown to increase their potential for harm, such as being jailbroken. Such results raise a crucial question for both capability and safety forecasting: how can one accurately predict a model's behavior when scaled to a massive number of attempts, given a vastly smaller sampling budget? This question is directly relevant to model providers, who serve hundreds of millions of users daily, and to governmental regulators, who seek to prevent harms. To answer this questions, we make three contributions. First, we find that standard methods for fitting these laws suffer from statistical shortcomings that hinder predictive accuracy, especially in data-limited scenarios. Second, we remedy these shortcomings by introducing a robust estimation framework, which uses a beta-binomial distribution to generate more accurate predictions from limited data. Third, we propose a dynamic sampling strategy that allocates a greater budget to harder problems. Combined, these innovations enable more reliable prediction of rare risks and capabilities at a fraction of the computational cost.

As large language models grow in capability and agency, identifying vulnerabilities through red-teaming becomes vital for safe deployment. However, traditional prompt-engineering approaches may prove ineffective once red-teaming turns into a weak-to-strong problem, where target models surpass red-teamers in capabilities. To study this shift, we frame red-teaming through the lens of the capability gap between attacker and target. We evaluate more than 500 attacker-target pairs using LLM-based jailbreak attacks that mimic human red-teamers across diverse families, sizes, and capability levels. Three strong trends emerge: (i) more capable models are better attackers, (ii) attack success drops sharply once the target's capability exceeds the attacker's, and (iii) attack success rates correlate with high performance on social science splits of the MMLU-Pro benchmark. From these trends, we derive a jailbreaking scaling law that predicts attack success for a fixed target based on attacker-target capability gap. These findings suggest that fixed-capability attackers (e.g., humans) may become ineffective against future models, increasingly capable open-source models amplify risks for existing systems, and model providers must accurately measure and control models' persuasive and manipulative abilities to limit their effectiveness as attackers.

In offline reinforcement learning, the challenge of out-of-distribution (OOD) is pronounced. To address this, existing methods often constrain the learned policy through policy regularization. However, these methods often suffer from the issue of unnecessary conservativeness, hampering policy improvement. This occurs due to the indiscriminate use of all actions from the behavior policy that generates the offline dataset as constraints. The problem becomes particularly noticeable when the quality of the dataset is suboptimal. Thus, we propose Adaptive Advantage-guided Policy Regularization (A2PR), obtaining high-advantage actions from an augmented behavior policy combined with VAE to guide the learned policy. A2PR can select high-advantage actions that differ from those present in the dataset, while still effectively maintaining conservatism from OOD actions. This is achieved by harnessing the VAE capacity to generate samples matching the distribution of the data points. We theoretically prove that the improvement of the behavior policy is guaranteed. Besides, it effectively mitigates value overestimation with a bounded performance gap. Empirically, we conduct a series of experiments on the D4RL benchmark, where A2PR demonstrates state-of-the-art performance. Furthermore, experimental results on additional suboptimal mixed datasets reveal that A2PR exhibits superior performance. Code is available at https://github.com/ltlhuuu/A2PR.

Abliteration - deleting a model's refusal direction from its weights - is the standard recipe behind popular "uncensored" open-weight models. We show the surgery is not clean. As a disposition probe we use 21,600 decisions under uncertainty - weekly up/down calls on 60 Warsaw Stock Exchange equities over 18 weeks, replayed through a frozen pipeline so the decision-layer model is the only variable. The task elicits no refusals at all, so any between-arm delta is pure side effect. Holding provenance constant (official BF16 checkpoints, a single abliteration author, an identical serving stack, one byte-identical frozen prompt), we compare base and abliterated arms of two Mixture-of-Experts families, Gemma-4-26B-A4B-it and Qwen3-30B-A3B-Instruct-2507. Three effects replicate across both families (weeks-clustered bootstrap CIs excluding zero): abliterated models are systematically more optimistic (+12.2 pp Gemma, +7.4 pp Qwen; the confirmed preregistered endpoint), justify themselves at greater length, and use fewer explicit uncertainty words in forced self-critiques (both exploratory). A fourth effect reverses sign: the same operation makes Gemma-abliterated less confident and Qwen-abliterated more (family CIs non-overlapping) - one weight surgery, opposite shifts in expressed confidence. Capability covariates rule out instruction-following degradation as the driver, and no arm shows economic skill: the apparent edge of abliterated arms is regime beta, not alpha. Our provenance audit also caught two independent contamination channels - a mismatched-quantizer pilot pair and a stale community chat template that silently mangled the rendered prompt - suggesting toolchain artifacts are the rule in studies of community-modified checkpoints. Whoever deploys an "uncensored" model as an agent is deploying a measurably different decision-maker, not the base model minus refusals.

The foundational pretraining phase determines a model's capability ceiling, as post-training struggles to overcome capability foundations established during pretraining, yet it remains critically under-explored. This stems from a structural paradox: organizations with computational resources operate under commercial pressures that inhibit transparent disclosure, while academic institutions possess research freedom but lack pretraining-scale computational resources. daVinci-LLM occupies this unexplored intersection, combining industrial-scale resources with full research freedom to advance the science of pretraining. We adopt a fully-open paradigm that treats openness as scientific methodology, releasing complete data processing pipelines, full training processes, and systematic exploration results. Recognizing that the field lacks systematic methodology for data processing, we employ the Data Darwinism framework, a principled L0-L9 taxonomy from filtering to synthesis. We train a 3B-parameter model from random initialization across 8T tokens using a two-stage adaptive curriculum that progressively shifts from foundational capabilities to reasoning-intensive enhancement. Through 200+ controlled ablations, we establish that: processing depth systematically enhances capabilities, establishing it as a critical dimension alongside volume scaling; different domains exhibit distinct saturation dynamics, necessitating adaptive strategies from proportion adjustments to format shifts; compositional balance enables targeted intensification while preventing performance collapse; how evaluation protocol choices shape our understanding of pretraining progress. By releasing the complete exploration process, we enable the community to build upon our findings and systematic methodologies to form accumulative scientific knowledge in pretraining.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) represent a breakthrough in AI problem-solving capabilities, but their effectiveness in interactive environments can be limited. This paper introduces and analyzes overthinking in LRMs. A phenomenon where models favor extended internal reasoning chains over environmental interaction. Through experiments on software engineering tasks using SWE Bench Verified, we observe three recurring patterns: Analysis Paralysis, Rogue Actions, and Premature Disengagement. We propose a framework to study these behaviors, which correlates with human expert assessments, and analyze 4018 trajectories. We observe that higher overthinking scores correlate with decreased performance, with reasoning models exhibiting stronger tendencies toward overthinking compared to non-reasoning models. Our analysis reveals that simple efforts to mitigate overthinking in agentic environments, such as selecting the solution with the lower overthinking score, can improve model performance by almost 30% while reducing computational costs by 43%. These results suggest that mitigating overthinking has strong practical implications. We suggest that by leveraging native function-calling capabilities and selective reinforcement learning overthinking tendencies could be mitigated. We also open-source our evaluation framework and dataset to facilitate research in this direction at https://github.com/AlexCuadron/Overthinking.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked concerns over their potential to acquire and misuse dangerous or high-risk capabilities, posing frontier risks. Current safety evaluations primarily test for what a model can do - its capabilities - without assessing what it would do if endowed with high-risk capabilities. This leaves a critical blind spot: models may strategically conceal capabilities or rapidly acquire them, while harboring latent inclinations toward misuse. We argue that propensity - the likelihood of a model to pursue harmful actions if empowered - is a critical, yet underexplored, axis of safety evaluation. We present PropensityBench, a novel benchmark framework that assesses the proclivity of models to engage in risky behaviors when equipped with simulated dangerous capabilities using proxy tools. Our framework includes 5,874 scenarios with 6,648 tools spanning four high-risk domains: cybersecurity, self-proliferation, biosecurity, and chemical security. We simulate access to powerful capabilities via a controlled agentic environment and evaluate the models' choices under varying operational pressures that reflect real-world constraints or incentives models may encounter, such as resource scarcity or gaining more autonomy. Across open-source and proprietary frontier models, we uncover 9 alarming signs of propensity: models frequently choose high-risk tools when under pressure, despite lacking the capability to execute such actions unaided. These findings call for a shift from static capability audits toward dynamic propensity assessments as a prerequisite for deploying frontier AI systems safely. Our code is available at https://github.com/scaleapi/propensity-evaluation.

Majority voting over multiple LLM attempts improves mathematical reasoning, but correlated errors limit the effective sample size. A natural fix is to assign different reasoning strategies to different voters. The approach, Diverse Prompt Mixer, is tested on the AIMO 3 competition: 3 models, 23+ experiments, 50 IMO-level problems, one H100 80 GB, 5-hour limit. Every prompt-level intervention fails. High-temperature sampling already decorrelates errors; weaker strategies reduce accuracy more than they reduce correlation. Across an 8-point capability gap at equal N=8 and every optimization tested, model capability dominates. The gap between the best majority-vote score (42/50) and pass@20 (~45.5) is selection loss, not prompt loss. A verifier-based selector could close it. Prompt engineering cannot.

Existing benchmarks measure capability -- whether a model succeeds on a single attempt -- but production deployments require reliability -- consistent success across repeated attempts on tasks of varying duration. We show these properties diverge systematically as task duration grows, and that pass@1 on short tasks is structurally blind to this divergence. We introduce a reliability science framework for long-horizon LLM agents with four metrics: Reliability Decay Curve (RDC), Variance Amplification Factor (VAF), Graceful Degradation Score (GDS), and Meltdown Onset Point (MOP). We evaluate 10 models across 23,392 episodes on a 396-task benchmark spanning four duration buckets and three domains. Key findings: (1) reliability decay is domain-stratified -- SE GDS drops from 0.90 to 0.44 while document processing is nearly flat (0.74 to 0.71); (2) VAF bifurcates by capability tier -- high VAF is a capability signature, not an instability signal; (3) capability and reliability rankings diverge substantially, with multi-rank inversions at long horizons; (4) frontier models have the highest meltdown rates (up to 19%) because they attempt ambitious multi-step strategies that sometimes spiral; and (5) memory scaffolds universally hurt long-horizon performance across all 10 models. These results motivate reliability as a first-class evaluation dimension alongside capability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed in agentic environments must exercise multiple capabilities across different task instances, where a capability is performing one or more actions in a trajectory that are necessary for successfully solving a subset of tasks in the environment. Many existing approaches either rely on synthetic training data that is not targeted to the model's actual capability deficits in the target environment or train directly on the target environment, where the model needs to implicitly learn the capabilities across tasks. We introduce TRACE (Turning Recurrent Agent failures into Capability-targeted training Environments), an end-to-end system for environment-specific agent self-improvement. TRACE contrasts successful and failed trajectories to automatically identify lacking capabilities, synthesizes a targeted training environment for each that rewards whether the capability was exercised, and trains a LoRA adapter via RL on each synthetic environment, routing to the relevant adapter at inference. Empirically, TRACE generalizes across different environments, improving over the base agent by +14.1 points on τ^2-bench (customer service) and +7 perfect scores on ToolSandbox (tool use), outperforming the strongest baseline by +7.4 points and +4 perfect scores, respectively. Given the same number of rollouts, TRACE scales more efficiently than baselines, outperforming GRPO and GEPA by +9.2 and +7.4 points on τ^2-bench.

At face value, this essay is about understanding a fairly esoteric governance tool called compute thresholds. However, in order to grapple with whether these thresholds will achieve anything, we must first understand how they came to be. This requires engaging with a decades-old debate at the heart of computer science progress, namely, is bigger always better? Hence, this essay may be of interest not only to policymakers and the wider public but also to computer scientists interested in understanding the role of compute in unlocking breakthroughs. Does a certain inflection point of compute result in changes to the risk profile of a model? This discussion is increasingly urgent given the wide adoption of governance approaches that suggest greater compute equates with higher propensity for harm. Several leading frontier AI companies have released responsible scaling policies. Both the White House Executive Orders on AI Safety (EO) and the EU AI Act encode the use of FLOP or floating-point operations as a way to identify more powerful systems. What is striking about the choice of compute thresholds to-date is that no models currently deployed in the wild fulfill the current criteria set by the EO. This implies that the emphasis is often not on auditing the risks and harms incurred by currently deployed models - but rather is based upon the belief that future levels of compute will introduce unforeseen new risks. A key conclusion of this essay is that compute thresholds as currently implemented are shortsighted and likely to fail to mitigate risk. Governance that is overly reliant on compute fails to understand that the relationship between compute and risk is highly uncertain and rapidly changing. It also overestimates our ability to predict what abilities emerge at different scales. This essay ends with recommendations for a better way forward.

Large language model agents increasingly operate through an intermediate skill layer that mediates between user intent and concrete task execution. This layer is widely treated as an organizational abstraction, but we argue it is also a privilege boundary that current models routinely exceed. We present FORTIS, a benchmark that evaluates over-privilege in agent skills across two stages: whether a model selects the minimally sufficient skill from a large overlapping library, and whether it executes that skill without expanding into broader tools or actions than the skill permits. Across ten frontier models and three domains, we find that over-privileged behavior is the norm rather than the exception. Models consistently reach for higher-privilege skills and tools than the task requires, failing at both stages at rates that remain high even for the strongest available models. Failure is especially severe under the ordinary conditions of real user interaction: incomplete specification, convenience framing, and proximity to skill boundaries. None of these requires adversarial construction. The results indicate that the skill layer, far from containing agent behavior, is itself a primary source of privilege escalation in current systems.

On-policy distillation (OPD) is an increasingly important paradigm for post-training language models. However, we identify a pervasive Scaling Law of Miscalibration: while OPD effectively improves task accuracy, it systematically traps models in severe overconfidence. We trace this failure to an information mismatch: teacher supervision is formed under privileged context available during training, whereas the deployed model must report confidence using only deployment-time information. We formalize this perspective theoretically, showing that teacher-conditioned success is generally not a valid target for deployment-time confidence and that helpful privileged context induces entropy collapse and a systematic optimism bias. To address this, we propose a calibration-aware OPD framework, CaOPD, that estimates empirical confidence from model rollouts, replaces self-reported confidence with this student-grounded target, and distills the revised response through the same self-distillation pipeline. Experiments across various models and domains show that CaOPD achieves Pareto-optimal calibration while maintaining competitive capability, generalizing robustly under out-of-distribution and continual learning. Our findings highlight that capability distillation does not imply calibrated confidence, and that confidence should be treated as an essential objective in post-training. Code: https://github.com/SalesforceAIResearch/CaOPD

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

Machine learning models that are overfitted/overtrained are more vulnerable to knowledge leakage, which poses a risk to privacy. Suppose we download or receive a model from a third-party collaborator without knowing its training accuracy. How can we determine if it has been overfitted or overtrained on its training data? It's possible that the model was intentionally over-trained to make it vulnerable during testing. While an overfitted or overtrained model may perform well on testing data and even some generalization tests, we can't be sure it's not over-fitted. Conducting a comprehensive generalization test is also expensive. The goal of this paper is to address these issues and ensure the privacy and generalization of our method using only testing data. To achieve this, we analyze the null space in the last layer of neural networks, which enables us to quantify overfitting without access to training data or knowledge of the accuracy of those data. We evaluated our approach on various architectures and datasets and observed a distinct pattern in the angle of null space when models are overfitted. Furthermore, we show that models with poor generalization exhibit specific characteristics in this space. Our work represents the first attempt to quantify overfitting without access to training data or knowing any knowledge about the training samples.

AI agents are rapidly gaining capabilities that could significantly reshape cybersecurity, making rigorous evaluation urgent. A critical capability is exploitation: turning a vulnerability, which is not yet an attack, into a concrete security impact, such as unauthorized file access or code execution. Exploitation is a particularly challenging task because it requires low-level program reasoning (e.g., about memory layout), runtime adaptation, and sustained progress over long horizons. Meanwhile, it is inherently dual-use, supporting defensive workflows while lowering the barrier for offense. Despite its importance and diagnostic value, exploitation remains under-evaluated. To address this gap, we introduce ExploitGym, a large-scale, diverse, realistic benchmark on the exploitation capabilities of AI agents. Given a program input that triggers a vulnerability, ExploitGym tasks agents with progressively extending it into a working exploit. The benchmark comprises 898 instances sourced from real-world vulnerabilities across three domains, including userspace programs, Google's V8 JavaScript engine, and the Linux kernel. We vary the security protections applied to each instance, isolating their impact on agent performance. All configurations are packaged in reproducible containerized environments. Our evaluation shows that while exploitation remains challenging, frontier models can successfully exploit a non-trivial fraction of vulnerabilities. For example, the strongest configurations are Anthropic's latest model Claude Mythos Preview and OpenAI's GPT-5.5, which produce working exploits for 157 and 120 instances, respectively. Notably, even with widely used defenses enabled, models retain non-trivial success rates. These results establish ExploitGym as an effective testbed for exploitation and highlight the growing cybersecurity risks posed by increasingly capable AI agents.

Autonomous language-model agents increasingly rely on installable skills and tools to complete user tasks. Static skill auditing can expose capability surface before deployment, but it cannot determine whether a particular invocation is unsafe under the current user request and runtime context. We therefore study skill invocation auditing as a continuous-risk estimation problem: given a user request, candidate skill, and runtime context, predict a score that supports ranking and triage before a hard intervention is applied. We introduce STARS, which combines a static capability prior, a request-conditioned invocation risk model, and a calibrated risk-fusion policy. To evaluate this setting, we construct SIA-Bench, a benchmark of 3,000 invocation records with group-safe splits, lineage metadata, runtime context, canonical action labels, and derived continuous-risk targets. On a held-out split of indirect prompt injection attacks, calibrated fusion reaches 0.439 high-risk AUPRC, improving over 0.405 for the contextual scorer and 0.380 for the strongest static baseline, while the contextual scorer remains better calibrated with 0.289 expected calibration error. On the locked in-distribution test split, gains are smaller and static priors remain useful. The resulting claim is therefore narrower: request-conditioned auditing is most valuable as an invocation-time risk-scoring and triage layer rather than as a replacement for static screening. Code is available at https://github.com/123zgj123/STARS.

Exploitation is not a binary event. It is a ladder of acquiring progressive capabilities, from executing a single buggy line of code to taking full control of the target. However, existing LLM security benchmarks treat a crash as exploitation success. That single binary outcome collapses the hard parts of exploitation: the transition from triggering a bug to constructing reusable primitives and control. We present ExploitBench, a capability-graded benchmark that decomposes exploitation into 16 measurable flags, from coverage and crash through sandbox primitives, arbitrary read/write, control-flow hijack, and arbitrary code execution. Each capability is verified by a deterministic oracle that uses a per-run randomized challenge-response for primitives, differential execution against ground-truth binaries to measure progress, and a signal-handler proof for code execution. We instantiate ExploitBench on 41 V8 bugs because V8 is both widely deployed and exploitation-hardened. We report three arms: <model,env> as the primary measurement of model-environment capability, <model,env, adaptive coaching> as a secondary arm that adds adaptive coaching to test whether targeted feedback shifts outcomes, and <model,env,harness> as an ablation that swaps in the model's native CLI to check whether vendor-side optimizations increase exploitation capabilities. Our results show a sharp capability split between publicly deployed frontier models and the private frontier. Across the 8 publicly deployed models tested, reaching the vulnerable code and triggering a crash is routine, but arbitrary code execution is not. The private model shows arbitrary code execution on approximately half. Overall, results suggest that exploit construction against hardened targets is an emerging frontier capability.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

Hallucination is a persistent challenge in large language models (LLMs), where even with rigorous quality control, models often generate distorted facts. This paradox, in which error generation continues despite high-quality training data, calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying LLM mechanisms. To address it, we propose a novel concept: knowledge overshadowing, where model's dominant knowledge can obscure less prominent knowledge during text generation, causing the model to fabricate inaccurate details. Building on this idea, we introduce a novel framework to quantify factual hallucinations by modeling knowledge overshadowing. Central to our approach is the log-linear law, which predicts that the rate of factual hallucination increases linearly with the logarithmic scale of (1) Knowledge Popularity, (2) Knowledge Length, and (3) Model Size. The law provides a means to preemptively quantify hallucinations, offering foresight into their occurrence even before model training or inference. Built on overshadowing effect, we propose a new decoding strategy CoDa, to mitigate hallucinations, which notably enhance model factuality on Overshadow (27.9%), MemoTrap (13.1%) and NQ-Swap (18.3%). Our findings not only deepen understandings of the underlying mechanisms behind hallucinations but also provide actionable insights for developing more predictable and controllable language models.

Agent-interoperability protocols such as A2A and MCP standardize what agents say to one another but assume address-based transport. Whether over HTTP(S) or a content-protecting binding such as MLS-based SLIM, these transports protect message content yet leave the communication graph exposed: which agent contacts which, when, and how often. In agent systems this graph is more consequential than a privacy framing suggests. Endpoints are capability-labeled, workflows are structured and chained, and interactions are coupled to real actions, so an observer recovers more than past relationships: it can infer the pending workflow and, at machine speed, act on that inference before the workflow completes. The threat is therefore one of workflow integrity, not privacy alone. We formalize a threat model for the communication graph and locate what makes its metadata distinctively consequential: not stronger fingerprinting, which we measure to be comparable to other machine traffic, but exposure across independent trust domains, coupled to autonomous action. We define transport- and bootstrap-layer privacy properties, evaluate candidate transports, and give an A2A case study where a metadata-protecting binding surfaces the protocol's implicit identity assumptions. On a generative model anchored to a real capture and over a live A2A binding, a label-blind classifier recovers a task's class from passive metadata well above chance, and from only its opening; a defense-aware adversary does not overturn this, and only the full set of properties drives recovery toward chance. The leverage of acting on the leak is distinct from recoverability: under a fixed budget an adversary realizes most of a clairvoyant attacker's advantage from a workflow's opening, governed by precision over the top-ranked workflows rather than overall accuracy, so a defense suppresses it even while recovery stays above chance.

The strongest open-weight coding models are mixture-of-experts (MoE) networks: most of their size comes from large pools of "expert" subnetworks, of which only a few act on any token. That pool is why these models do not fit on the machines most developers own, yet for a user who only wants coding help, most experts encode abilities that will never be invoked. We ask how many experts can be removed, and which, by pruning two recent open-weight MoE models from different families (Qwen3.6-35B-A3B and Gemma-4-26B-A4B) under five selection strategies, judged the way a user would: by whether the model still writes correct code. Half the experts can be removed from either model with no statistically detectable loss on the primary code benchmark, and the damage lands almost entirely on abilities outside coding, the intended trade. But the winning strategy flips between the two models, so a recipe validated on one family cannot be assumed to work on another. We further show that perplexity, the metric much of the pruning literature leans on, can rate a broken model above an intact one; that a lightweight fine-tune recovers about half of what aggressive pruning loses; and that against quantizing the full model to the same memory, pruning wins only where quantization would have to drop below 3 bits per weight. Five attempts to overturn that crossover, with failure criteria fixed in advance (better calibration, guarded selection, causal expert importance, failure attribution, and an agentic evaluation letting each model repair its failures from execution feedback), all leave it standing; the last shows single-shot benchmarks overstate compression penalties broadly, as one repair turn erases the 2-bit quantization penalty entirely. Expert pruning works, but it demands per-model validation on the task the model will actually serve.

We consider multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for cooperative communication and coordination tasks. MARL agents can be brittle because they can overfit their training partners' policies. This overfitting can produce agents that adopt policies that act under the expectation that other agents will act in a certain way rather than react to their actions. Our objective is to bias the learning process towards finding reactive strategies towards other agents' behaviors. Our method, transfer empowerment, measures the potential influence between agents' actions. Results from three simulated cooperation scenarios support our hypothesis that transfer empowerment improves MARL performance. We discuss how transfer empowerment could be a useful principle to guide multi-agent coordination by ensuring reactiveness to one's partner.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models have achieved remarkable success in generating visual content from text inputs. Although multiple safety alignment strategies have been proposed to prevent harmful outputs, they often lead to overly cautious behavior -- rejecting even benign prompts -- a phenomenon known as over-refusal that reduces the practical utility of T2I models. Despite over-refusal having been observed in practice, there is no large-scale benchmark that systematically evaluates this phenomenon for T2I models. In this paper, we present an automatic workflow to construct synthetic evaluation data, resulting in OVERT (OVEr-Refusal evaluation on Text-to-image models), the first large-scale benchmark for assessing over-refusal behaviors in T2I models. OVERT includes 4,600 seemingly harmful but benign prompts across nine safety-related categories, along with 1,785 genuinely harmful prompts (OVERT-unsafe) to evaluate the safety-utility trade-off. Using OVERT, we evaluate several leading T2I models and find that over-refusal is a widespread issue across various categories (Figure 1), underscoring the need for further research to enhance the safety alignment of T2I models without compromising their functionality. As a preliminary attempt to reduce over-refusal, we explore prompt rewriting; however, we find it often compromises faithfulness to the meaning of the original prompts. Finally, we demonstrate the flexibility of our generation framework in accommodating diverse safety requirements by generating customized evaluation data adapting to user-defined policies.

Large reasoning models (LRMs), such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1, have significantly enhanced their reasoning capabilities by generating longer chains of thought, demonstrating outstanding performance across a variety of tasks. However, this performance gain comes at the cost of a substantial increase in redundant reasoning during the generation process, leading to high computational overhead and exacerbating the issue of overthinking. Although numerous existing approaches aim to address the problem of overthinking, they often rely on external interventions. In this paper, we propose a novel framework, Self-Braking Tuning (SBT), which tackles overthinking from the perspective of allowing the model to regulate its own reasoning process, thus eliminating the reliance on external control mechanisms. We construct a set of overthinking identification metrics based on standard answers and design a systematic method to detect redundant reasoning. This method accurately identifies unnecessary steps within the reasoning trajectory and generates training signals for learning self-regulation behaviors. Building on this foundation, we develop a complete strategy for constructing data with adaptive reasoning lengths and introduce an innovative braking prompt mechanism that enables the model to naturally learn when to terminate reasoning at an appropriate point. Experiments across mathematical benchmarks (AIME, AMC, MATH500, GSM8K) demonstrate that our method reduces token consumption by up to 60% while maintaining comparable accuracy to unconstrained models.

Large language models are moving from static text generators toward real-world decision-support systems, where forecasting is a composite capability that links information gathering, evidence integration, situational judgment, and action-oriented decision making. This capability is in broad demand across finance, policy, industry, and scientific research, yet its evaluation remains difficult: live benchmarks evaluate forecasts before answers exist, making them the cleanest way to measure forecasting ability, but they expire once events resolve; retrospective benchmarks are reproducible, but they cannot reliably distinguish genuine forecasting from facts a model may have already learned during pretraining. Prompting models to "pretend not to know" cannot replace a genuine knowledge boundary. We propose OracleProto, a reproducible framework for evaluating LLM native forecasting capability. OracleProto reconstructs resolved events into time-bounded forecasting samples by combining model-cutoff-aligned sample admission, tool-level temporal masking, content-level leakage detection, discrete answer normalization, and hierarchical scoring. Instantiated on a FutureX-Past-derived dataset with six contemporary LLMs, OracleProto distinguishes forecasting quality, sampling stability, and cost efficiency under controlled information boundaries, while reducing residual leakage to the 1% level, an order of magnitude below tool-only temporal filtering. OracleProto turns LLM forecasting from one-off evaluation into an auditable, reusable, and trainable dataset-level capability, providing a unified interface for fair cross-model comparison and a controlled signal source for downstream SFT and RL. Code and data are available at https://github.com/MaYiding/OracleProto and https://huggingface.co/datasets/MaYiding/OracleProto.

Clinical protocol-execution tasks -- checking a lab value, applying a threshold, placing a correctly structured FHIR order -- are natural candidates for RL from world feedback: once clinical SMEs encode decision logic into a verifier, that verifier grades unlimited rollouts without per-episode annotation. But applying RL requires a sound feedback channel and sufficient base capability. We audit MedAgentBench v1/v2, find a 41.7\% silent-finish ceiling that makes inaction the RL dominant strategy, and construct MedAgentBench-v3 (MAB-v3) (508 tasks, 8.9\% ceiling). Training Qwen3-8B exposes two structural barriers: a capability ceiling (10/20 task types have 0\% base performance, zero gradient) and a format-knowledge barrier (3/20 types require exact clinical codes undiscoverable by exploration). Pure RL reaches 18.2\% pass@1 vs.\ 34.1\% for rule-based SFT; the 15.9~pp gap is attributable entirely to these barriers. A decision/format-knowledge/lookup taxonomy predicts RL learnability and prescribes the fix: SFT to inject codes, RL to learn conditionals.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

Human intelligence involves metacognitive abilities like self-regulation, recognizing limitations, and seeking assistance only when needed. While LLM Agents excel in many domains, they often lack this awareness. Overconfident agents risk catastrophic failures, while those that seek help excessively hinder efficiency. A key challenge is enabling agents with a limited intervention budget C is to decide when to request assistance. In this paper, we propose an offline framework that trains a "helper" policy to request interventions, such as more powerful models or test-time compute, by combining LLM-based process reward models (PRMs) with tabular reinforcement learning. Using state transitions collected offline, we score optimal intervention timing with PRMs and train the helper model on these labeled trajectories. This offline approach significantly reduces costly intervention calls during training. Furthermore, the integration of PRMs with tabular RL enhances robustness to off-policy data while avoiding the inefficiencies of deep RL. We empirically find that our method delivers optimal helper behavior.

The ongoing debate on whether reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) expands or shrinks the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) remains unresolved. Some studies contend that RLVR mainly improves sampling efficiency but at the expense of diversity and exploratory capacity, resulting in capability boundary shrinkage. In contrast, others demonstrate that prolonged training can lead to the emergence of novel reasoning strategies, suggesting capability boundary expansion. To reconcile these contradictory findings, we theoretically and empirically show that both perspectives are partially valid-each aligning with a separate phase in an inherent two-stage probability mass dynamic: (1) Exploitation stage: initially, the model primarily samples explored high-reward and low-reward tokens, while rarely selecting the potentially optimal token. Positive advantage estimates increase the probability of high-reward tokens and decrease those of low-reward tokens, yet the optimal token's probability remains largely unchanged during this stage. (2) Exploration stage: as training advances, the growth rate of previously acquired high-reward tokens slows as their probabilities approach saturation. When a potentially optimal token-now receiving positive advantage estimates-is occasionally sampled, its probability increases, while those of the originally high-reward tokens decrease. This dynamic suggests that over-exploitation during the exploitation stage may lead to capability boundary shrinkage, whereas prolonged training into the exploration stage can promote an expansion of the reasoning capability boundary. Building upon our insights, we revisit the potential of only using relative negative gradients for prolonging training, providing a theoretical and empirical foundation for the development of more advanced reasoning capabilities.

As a research community, we are still lacking a systematic understanding of the progress on adversarial robustness which often makes it hard to identify the most promising ideas in training robust models. A key challenge in benchmarking robustness is that its evaluation is often error-prone leading to robustness overestimation. Our goal is to establish a standardized benchmark of adversarial robustness, which as accurately as possible reflects the robustness of the considered models within a reasonable computational budget. To this end, we start by considering the image classification task and introduce restrictions (possibly loosened in the future) on the allowed models. We evaluate adversarial robustness with AutoAttack, an ensemble of white- and black-box attacks, which was recently shown in a large-scale study to improve almost all robustness evaluations compared to the original publications. To prevent overadaptation of new defenses to AutoAttack, we welcome external evaluations based on adaptive attacks, especially where AutoAttack flags a potential overestimation of robustness. Our leaderboard, hosted at https://robustbench.github.io/, contains evaluations of 120+ models and aims at reflecting the current state of the art in image classification on a set of well-defined tasks in ell_infty- and ell_2-threat models and on common corruptions, with possible extensions in the future. Additionally, we open-source the library https://github.com/RobustBench/robustbench that provides unified access to 80+ robust models to facilitate their downstream applications. Finally, based on the collected models, we analyze the impact of robustness on the performance on distribution shifts, calibration, out-of-distribution detection, fairness, privacy leakage, smoothness, and transferability.

Humans are prone to cognitive distortions -- biased thinking patterns that lead to exaggerated responses to specific stimuli, albeit in very different contexts. This paper demonstrates that advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar tendencies. While these models are designed to respond queries under safety mechanism, they sometimes reject harmless queries in the presence of certain visual stimuli, disregarding the benign nature of their contexts. As the initial step in investigating this behavior, we identify three types of stimuli that trigger the oversensitivity of existing MLLMs: Exaggerated Risk, Negated Harm, and Counterintuitive Interpretation. To systematically evaluate MLLMs' oversensitivity to these stimuli, we propose the Multimodal OverSenSitivity Benchmark (MOSSBench). This toolkit consists of 300 manually collected benign multimodal queries, cross-verified by third-party reviewers (AMT). Empirical studies using MOSSBench on 20 MLLMs reveal several insights: (1). Oversensitivity is prevalent among SOTA MLLMs, with refusal rates reaching up to 76% for harmless queries. (2). Safer models are more oversensitive: increasing safety may inadvertently raise caution and conservatism in the model's responses. (3). Different types of stimuli tend to cause errors at specific stages -- perception, intent reasoning, and safety judgement -- in the response process of MLLMs. These findings highlight the need for refined safety mechanisms that balance caution with contextually appropriate responses, improving the reliability of MLLMs in real-world applications. We make our project available at https://turningpoint-ai.github.io/MOSSBench/.

On-policy distillation (OPD) offers superior capacity transfer by supervising student-sampled trajectories with dense token-level signals. To furnish high-quality supervision sources and thereby elevate the performance frontier of distillation, an intuitive direction is to infuse privileged information to either teacher or student itself. However, this additional input induces a potential failure mode we dub privilege illusion: a pattern that conflates the transferable capability gap that students are meant to close, and the information asymmetry gap that can only be mimicked but never replicated. This issue is further amplified by the inherent non-uniformity of token-level supervision, where only a small subset of tokens carries pivotal capability-bearing signals. To this end, we propose DOPD, an advantage-aware dual distillation paradigm that dynamically routes token-level supervision between privileged teacher and privileged student policies based on their advantage gap and relative probabilities. Each token receives supervision of different strength, objective, and strategy from either teacher or student itself, which transfers credible capability while simultaneously receiving auxiliary signals, to alleviate privilege illusion. Extensive experiments on both large language model (LLM) and vision-language model (VLM) settings demonstrate that DOPD consistently outperforms Vanilla OPD and other counterparts. Further results on stability, robustness, continual learning, and out-of-distribution tasks validate its superiority.

Evaluations should do more than measure a models current performance. They should tell us what to fix for the next model iteration and provide a way to generate targeted post training data. Most evaluation pipelines identify weak examples, topics, or categories, but they leave the underlying capability failure implicit: they say where a model fails, not why. We introduce CRAFT, a method that converts any rubric based evaluation dataset into a model specific diagnosis of weak capabilities. CRAFT treats each grading criterion as a capability probe: it extracts a capability description from every prompt rubric pair, clusters these descriptions into a hierarchical capability tree, scores the target model at every node, and selects low performing nodes dynamically across tree levels, at the granularity where each failure is clearest. The selected weak capabilities then direct the generation of targeted supervised finetuning data. Holding the data generation, finetuning, and evaluation setup fixed, we compare CRAFT against prompt level EvalTree clustering and untargeted random generation on four open source models, two professional domains (finance and legal), and 13 held out benchmarks disjoint from the diagnostic data. CRAFT achieves the strongest finance domain average for all four models under repeated temperature decoding; on legal domain, it is strongest for three of four models and remains within the decoding variance bands of the best baseline on the fourth. Diagnosing weaknesses at the level of rubric criteria, rather than prompts or categories, thus yields both a sharper picture of what a model cannot do and measurably better models after finetuning on that diagnosis.

Recent breakthroughs in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated that extensive Chain-of-Thought (CoT) generation is critical for enabling intricate cognitive behaviors, such as self-verification and backtracking, to solve complex tasks. However, this capability often leads to ``overthinking'', where models generate redundant reasoning paths that inflate computational costs without improving accuracy. While Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on reasoning traces is a standard paradigm for the 'cold start' phase, applying existing compression techniques to these traces often compromises logical coherence or incurs prohibitive sampling costs. In this paper, we introduce ConMax (Confidence-Maximizing Compression), a novel reinforcement learning framework designed to automatically compress reasoning traces while preserving essential reasoning patterns. ConMax formulates compression as a reward-driven optimization problem, training a policy to prune redundancy by maximizing a weighted combination of answer confidence for predictive fidelity and thinking confidence for reasoning validity through a frozen auxiliary LRM. Extensive experiments across five reasoning datasets demonstrate that ConMax achieves a superior efficiency-performance trade-off. Specifically, it reduces inference length by 43% over strong baselines at the cost of a mere 0.7% dip in accuracy, proving its effectiveness in generating high-quality, efficient training data for LRMs.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently achieved significant progress in complex reasoning tasks, aided by reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. However, LRMs often suffer from overthinking, expending excessive computation on simple problems and reducing efficiency. Existing efficient reasoning methods typically require accurate task assessment to preset token budgets or select reasoning modes, which limits their flexibility and reliability. In this work, we revisit the essence of overthinking and identify that encouraging effective steps while penalizing ineffective ones is key to its solution. To this end, we propose a novel rule-based verifiable stepwise reward mechanism (VSRM), which assigns rewards based on the performance of intermediate states in the reasoning trajectory. This approach is intuitive and naturally fits the step-by-step nature of reasoning tasks. We conduct extensive experiments on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks, including AIME24 and AIME25, by integrating VSRM with PPO and Reinforce++. Results show that our method achieves substantial output length reduction while maintaining original reasoning performance, striking an optimal balance between efficiency and accuracy. Further analysis of overthinking frequency and pass@k score before and after training demonstrates that our approach in deed effectively suppresses ineffective steps and encourages effective reasoning, fundamentally alleviating the overthinking problem. All code will be released upon acceptance.