Daily Papers

Self-consciousness, the introspection of one's existence and thoughts, represents a high-level cognitive process. As language models advance at an unprecedented pace, a critical question arises: Are these models becoming self-conscious? Drawing upon insights from psychological and neural science, this work presents a practical definition of self-consciousness for language models and refines ten core concepts. Our work pioneers an investigation into self-consciousness in language models by, for the first time, leveraging causal structural games to establish the functional definitions of the ten core concepts. Based on our definitions, we conduct a comprehensive four-stage experiment: quantification (evaluation of ten leading models), representation (visualization of self-consciousness within the models), manipulation (modification of the models' representation), and acquisition (fine-tuning the models on core concepts). Our findings indicate that although models are in the early stages of developing self-consciousness, there is a discernible representation of certain concepts within their internal mechanisms. However, these representations of self-consciousness are hard to manipulate positively at the current stage, yet they can be acquired through targeted fine-tuning. Our datasets and code are at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/SelfConsciousness.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

Structural Causal Models (SCM) are a powerful framework for describing complicated dynamics across the natural sciences. A particularly elegant way of interpreting SCMs is do-Shapley, a game-theoretic method of quantifying the average effect of d variables across exponentially many interventions. Like Shapley values, computing do-Shapley values generally requires evaluating exponentially many terms. The foundation of our work is a reformulation of do-Shapley values in terms of the irreducible sets of the underlying SCM. Leveraging this insight, we can exactly compute do-Shapley values in time linear in the number of irreducible sets r, which itself can range from d to 2^d depending on the graph structure of the SCM. Since r is unknown a priori, we complement the exact algorithm with an estimator that, like general Shapley value estimators, can be run with any query budget. As the query budget approaches r, our estimators can produce more accurate estimates than prior methods by several orders of magnitude, and, when the budget reaches r, return the Shapley values up to machine precision. Beyond computational speed, we also reduce the identification burden: we prove that non-parametric identifiability of do-Shapley values requires only the identification of interventional effects for the d singleton coalitions, rather than all classes.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence reveal the limits of purely predictive systems and call for a shift toward causal and collaborative reasoning. Drawing inspiration from the revolution of Grothendieck in mathematics, we introduce the relativity of causal knowledge, which posits structural causal models (SCMs) are inherently imperfect, subjective representations embedded within networks of relationships. By leveraging category theory, we arrange SCMs into a functor category and show that their observational and interventional probability measures naturally form convex structures. This result allows us to encode non-intervened SCMs with convex spaces of probability measures. Next, using sheaf theory, we construct the network sheaf and cosheaf of causal knowledge. These structures enable the transfer of causal knowledge across the network while incorporating interventional consistency and the perspective of the subjects, ultimately leading to the formal, mathematical definition of relative causal knowledge.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

We address causal reasoning in multivariate time series data generated by stochastic processes. Existing approaches are largely restricted to static settings, ignoring the continuity and emission of variations across time. In contrast, we propose a learning paradigm that directly establishes causation between events in the course of time. We present two key lemmas to compute causal contributions and frame them as reinforcement learning problems. Our approach offers formal and computational tools for uncovering and quantifying causal relationships in diffusion processes, subsuming various important settings such as discrete-time Markov decision processes. Finally, in fairly intricate experiments and through sheer learning, our framework reveals and quantifies causal links, which otherwise seem inexplicable.

In this paper, the causal bandit problem is investigated, in which the objective is to select an optimal sequence of interventions on nodes in a causal graph. It is assumed that the graph is governed by linear structural equations; it is further assumed that both the causal topology and the distribution of interventions are unknown. By exploiting the causal relationships between the nodes whose signals contribute to the reward, interventions are optimized. First, based on the difference between the two types of graph identification errors (false positives and negatives), a causal graph learning method is proposed, which strongly reduces sample complexity relative to the prior art by learning sub-graphs. Under the assumption of Gaussian exogenous inputs and minimum-mean squared error weight estimation, a new uncertainty bound tailored to the causal bandit problem is derived. This uncertainty bound drives an upper confidence bound based intervention selection to optimize the reward. To cope with non-stationary bandits, a sub-graph change detection mechanism is proposed, with high sample efficiency. Numerical results compare the new methodology to existing schemes and show a substantial performance improvement in both stationary and non-stationary settings. Compared to existing approaches, the proposed scheme takes 67% fewer samples to learn the causal structure and achieves an average reward gain of 85%.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a structural reinforcement learning (SRL) method which treats prices via simulation while exploiting agents' structural knowledge of their own individual dynamics. Our SRL method yields a general and highly efficient global solution method for heterogeneous agent models that sidesteps the Master equation and handles problems traditional methods struggle with, in particular nontrivial market-clearing conditions. We illustrate the approach in the Krusell-Smith model, the Huggett model with aggregate shocks, and a HANK model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, all of which we solve globally within minutes.

In Causal Bayesian Optimization (CBO), an agent intervenes on an unknown structural causal model to maximize a downstream reward variable. In this paper, we consider the generalization where other agents or external events also intervene on the system, which is key for enabling adaptiveness to non-stationarities such as weather changes, market forces, or adversaries. We formalize this generalization of CBO as Adversarial Causal Bayesian Optimization (ACBO) and introduce the first algorithm for ACBO with bounded regret: Causal Bayesian Optimization with Multiplicative Weights (CBO-MW). Our approach combines a classical online learning strategy with causal modeling of the rewards. To achieve this, it computes optimistic counterfactual reward estimates by propagating uncertainty through the causal graph. We derive regret bounds for CBO-MW that naturally depend on graph-related quantities. We further propose a scalable implementation for the case of combinatorial interventions and submodular rewards. Empirically, CBO-MW outperforms non-causal and non-adversarial Bayesian optimization methods on synthetic environments and environments based on real-word data. Our experiments include a realistic demonstration of how CBO-MW can be used to learn users' demand patterns in a shared mobility system and reposition vehicles in strategic areas.

We introduce CausaLab, a scalable environment for evaluating interactive causal discovery by LLM agents. Unlike prior evaluations, CausaLab evaluates both whether an agent can solve a problem using causal evidence and whether its answer is grounded in a faithful recovered causal mechanism. Each episode places an agent in a synthetic laboratory: it receives prior measurement records, intervenes on a manipulator crystal, and predicts the resonance frequency of a held-out reactor crystal governed by the same mechanism. The hidden data-generating process is a randomly sampled structural causal model (SCM), so success requires recovering both a causal graph and structural equations rather than recalling prior knowledge. Experiments show a persistent gap between prediction and mechanism recovery: in the purely observational 6-node setting, GPT-5.2-high reaches 92% task accuracy but only 0.471 all-edge F_1. Mixed observation-intervention strategies improve structural fidelity, while pure intervention remains difficult even for strong agents. We identify premature stopping as a major weakness and show that consistency verification mitigates it. CausaLab therefore separates predictive success from causal understanding and exposes current LLM agents' limits as experimental causal reasoners.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

Model-based methods have recently shown promising for offline reinforcement learning (RL), aiming to learn good policies from historical data without interacting with the environment. Previous model-based offline RL methods learn fully connected nets as world-models that map the states and actions to the next-step states. However, it is sensible that a world-model should adhere to the underlying causal effect such that it will support learning an effective policy generalizing well in unseen states. In this paper, We first provide theoretical results that causal world-models can outperform plain world-models for offline RL by incorporating the causal structure into the generalization error bound. We then propose a practical algorithm, oFfline mOdel-based reinforcement learning with CaUsal Structure (FOCUS), to illustrate the feasibility of learning and leveraging causal structure in offline RL. Experimental results on two benchmarks show that FOCUS reconstructs the underlying causal structure accurately and robustly. Consequently, it performs better than the plain model-based offline RL algorithms and other causal model-based RL algorithms.

Behavior cloning is enjoying a resurgence in popularity as scaling both model and data sizes proves to provide a strong starting point for many tasks of interest. In this work, we introduce an open recipe for training a video game playing foundation model designed for inference in realtime on a consumer GPU. We release all data (8300+ hours of high quality human gameplay), training and inference code, and pretrained checkpoints under an open license. We show that our best model is capable of playing a variety of 3D video games at a level competitive with human play. We use this recipe to systematically examine the scaling laws of behavior cloning to understand how the model's performance and causal reasoning varies with model and data scale. We first show in a simple toy problem that, for some types of causal reasoning, increasing both the amount of training data and the depth of the network results in the model learning a more causal policy. We then systematically study how causality varies with the number of parameters (and depth) and training steps in scaled models of up to 1.2 billion parameters, and we find similar scaling results to what we observe in the toy problem.

Learning causal structure from observational data often assumes that we observe independent and identically distributed (i.\,i.\,d) data. The traditional approach aims to find a graphical representation that encodes the same set of conditional independence relationships as those present in the observed distribution. It is known that under i.\,i.\,d assumption, even with infinite data, there is a limit to how fine-grained a causal structure we can identify. To overcome this limitation, recent work has explored using data originating from different, related environments to learn richer causal structure. These approaches implicitly rely on the independent causal mechanisms (ICM) principle, which postulates that the mechanism giving rise to an effect given its causes and the mechanism which generates the causes do not inform or influence each other. Thus, components of the causal model can independently change from environment to environment. Despite its wide application in machine learning and causal inference, there is a lack of statistical formalization of the ICM principle and how it enables identification of richer causal structures from grouped data. Here we present new causal de Finetti theorems which offer a first statistical formalization of ICM principle and show how causal structure identification is possible from exchangeable data. Our work provides theoretical justification for a broad range of techniques leveraging multi-environment data to learn causal structure.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

We formalize constraint-based structure learning of the "true" causal graph from observed data when unobserved variables are also existent. We provide conditions for a "natural" family of constraint-based structure-learning algorithms that output graphs that are Markov equivalent to the causal graph. Under the faithfulness assumption, this natural family contains all exact structure-learning algorithms. We also provide a set of assumptions, under which any natural structure-learning algorithm outputs Markov equivalent graphs to the causal graph. These assumptions can be thought of as a relaxation of faithfulness, and most of them can be directly tested from (the underlying distribution) of the data, particularly when one focuses on structural causal models. We specialize the definitions and results for structural causal models.

Inferring causal structure poses a combinatorial search problem that typically involves evaluating structures with a score or independence test. The resulting search is costly, and designing suitable scores or tests that capture prior knowledge is difficult. In this work, we propose to amortize causal structure learning. Rather than searching over structures, we train a variational inference model to directly predict the causal structure from observational or interventional data. This allows our inference model to acquire domain-specific inductive biases for causal discovery solely from data generated by a simulator, bypassing both the hand-engineering of suitable score functions and the search over graphs. The architecture of our inference model emulates permutation invariances that are crucial for statistical efficiency in structure learning, which facilitates generalization to significantly larger problem instances than seen during training. On synthetic data and semisynthetic gene expression data, our models exhibit robust generalization capabilities when subject to substantial distribution shifts and significantly outperform existing algorithms, especially in the challenging genomics domain. Our code and models are publicly available at: https://github.com/larslorch/avici.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

A faithful and interpretable explanation of an AI model's behavior and internal structure is a high-level explanation that is human-intelligible but also consistent with the known, but often opaque low-level causal details of the model. We argue that the theory of causal abstraction provides the mathematical foundations for the desired kinds of model explanations. In causal abstraction analysis, we use interventions on model-internal states to rigorously assess whether an interpretable high-level causal model is a faithful description of an AI model. Our contributions in this area are: (1) We generalize causal abstraction to cyclic causal structures and typed high-level variables. (2) We show how multi-source interchange interventions can be used to conduct causal abstraction analyses. (3) We define a notion of approximate causal abstraction that allows us to assess the degree to which a high-level causal model is a causal abstraction of a lower-level one. (4) We prove constructive causal abstraction can be decomposed into three operations we refer to as marginalization, variable-merge, and value-merge. (5) We formalize the XAI methods of LIME, causal effect estimation, causal mediation analysis, iterated nullspace projection, and circuit-based explanations as special cases of causal abstraction analysis.

We study experiment design for unique identification of the causal graph of a simple SCM, where the graph may contain cycles. The presence of cycles in the structure introduces major challenges for experiment design as, unlike acyclic graphs, learning the skeleton of causal graphs with cycles may not be possible from merely the observational distribution. Furthermore, intervening on a variable in such graphs does not necessarily lead to orienting all the edges incident to it. In this paper, we propose an experiment design approach that can learn both cyclic and acyclic graphs and hence, unifies the task of experiment design for both types of graphs. We provide a lower bound on the number of experiments required to guarantee the unique identification of the causal graph in the worst case, showing that the proposed approach is order-optimal in terms of the number of experiments up to an additive logarithmic term. Moreover, we extend our result to the setting where the size of each experiment is bounded by a constant. For this case, we show that our approach is optimal in terms of the size of the largest experiment required for uniquely identifying the causal graph in the worst case.

In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We introduce a sequential testing framework that monitors whether observed play is consistent with a benchmark of strategic behavior, without assuming a fixed sample size. Our approach builds on the e-value framework for safe anytime-valid inference: by "betting" against the benchmark, we construct a test supermartingale that accumulates evidence whenever observed payoffs systematically violate the expected conditions. For repeated normal-form games, we take equilibrium as the benchmark, yielding a statistically sound, interpretable measure of departure from equilibrium that can be monitored online; our framework unifies the treatment of Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria, offering finite-time guarantees and a detailed analysis of detection times. We also leverage Benjamini-Hochberg-type procedures to increase detection power in large games while rigorously controlling the false discovery rate. Finally, we extend our method to stochastic games, verifying online whether observed trajectories adhere to a specified target policy, such as a computed equilibrium, broadening the framework's applicability to dynamic, state-dependent settings.

In causal bandit problems, the action set consists of interventions on variables of a causal graph. Several researchers have recently studied such bandit problems and pointed out their practical applications. However, all existing works rely on a restrictive and impractical assumption that the learner is given full knowledge of the causal graph structure upfront. In this paper, we develop novel causal bandit algorithms without knowing the causal graph. Our algorithms work well for causal trees, causal forests and a general class of causal graphs. The regret guarantees of our algorithms greatly improve upon those of standard multi-armed bandit (MAB) algorithms under mild conditions. Lastly, we prove our mild conditions are necessary: without them one cannot do better than standard MAB algorithms.

Consider the problem of exploration in sparse-reward or reward-free environments, such as in Montezuma's Revenge. In the curiosity-driven paradigm, the agent is rewarded for how much each realized outcome differs from their predicted outcome. But using predictive error as intrinsic motivation is fragile in stochastic environments, as the agent may become trapped by high-entropy areas of the state-action space, such as a "noisy TV". In this work, we study a natural solution derived from structural causal models of the world: Our key idea is to learn representations of the future that capture precisely the unpredictable aspects of each outcome -- which we use as additional input for predictions, such that intrinsic rewards only reflect the predictable aspects of world dynamics. First, we propose incorporating such hindsight representations into models to disentangle "noise" from "novelty", yielding Curiosity in Hindsight: a simple and scalable generalization of curiosity that is robust to stochasticity. Second, we instantiate this framework for the recently introduced BYOL-Explore algorithm as our prime example, resulting in the noise-robust BYOL-Hindsight. Third, we illustrate its behavior under a variety of different stochasticities in a grid world, and find improvements over BYOL-Explore in hard-exploration Atari games with sticky actions. Notably, we show state-of-the-art results in exploring Montezuma's Revenge with sticky actions, while preserving performance in the non-sticky setting.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has recently shown great promise as an approach to networked system control. Arguably, one of the most difficult and important tasks for which large scale networked system control is applicable is common-pool resource management. Crucial common-pool resources include arable land, fresh water, wetlands, wildlife, fish stock, forests and the atmosphere, of which proper management is related to some of society's greatest challenges such as food security, inequality and climate change. Here we take inspiration from a recent research program investigating the game-theoretic incentives of humans in social dilemma situations such as the well-known tragedy of the commons. However, instead of focusing on biologically evolved human-like agents, our concern is rather to better understand the learning and operating behaviour of engineered networked systems comprising general-purpose reinforcement learning agents, subject only to nonbiological constraints such as memory, computation and communication bandwidth. Harnessing tools from empirical game-theoretic analysis, we analyse the differences in resulting solution concepts that stem from employing different information structures in the design of networked multi-agent systems. These information structures pertain to the type of information shared between agents as well as the employed communication protocol and network topology. Our analysis contributes new insights into the consequences associated with certain design choices and provides an additional dimension of comparison between systems beyond efficiency, robustness, scalability and mean control performance.

We present a constraint-based algorithm for learning causal structures from observational time-series data, in the presence of latent confounders. We assume a discrete-time, stationary structural vector autoregressive process, with both temporal and contemporaneous causal relations. One may ask if temporal and contemporaneous relations should be treated differently. The presented algorithm gradually refines a causal graph by learning long-term temporal relations before short-term ones, where contemporaneous relations are learned last. This ordering of causal relations to be learnt leads to a reduction in the required number of statistical tests. We validate this reduction empirically and demonstrate that it leads to higher accuracy for synthetic data and more plausible causal graphs for real-world data compared to state-of-the-art algorithms.

The origin of adversarial examples is still inexplicable in research fields, and it arouses arguments from various viewpoints, albeit comprehensive investigations. In this paper, we propose a way of delving into the unexpected vulnerability in adversarially trained networks from a causal perspective, namely adversarial instrumental variable (IV) regression. By deploying it, we estimate the causal relation of adversarial prediction under an unbiased environment dissociated from unknown confounders. Our approach aims to demystify inherent causal features on adversarial examples by leveraging a zero-sum optimization game between a casual feature estimator (i.e., hypothesis model) and worst-case counterfactuals (i.e., test function) disturbing to find causal features. Through extensive analyses, we demonstrate that the estimated causal features are highly related to the correct prediction for adversarial robustness, and the counterfactuals exhibit extreme features significantly deviating from the correct prediction. In addition, we present how to effectively inoculate CAusal FEatures (CAFE) into defense networks for improving adversarial robustness.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) Agents and Robots must be able to cope with everchanging environments and tasks. They must be able to actively construct new internal causal models of their interactions with the environment when new structural changes take place in the environment. Thus, we claim that active causal structure learning with latent variables (ACSLWL) is a necessary component to build AGI agents and robots. This paper describes how a complex planning and expectation-based detour behavior can be learned by ACSLWL when, unexpectedly, and for the first time, the simulated robot encounters a sort of transparent barrier in its pathway towards its target. ACSWL consists of acting in the environment, discovering new causal relations, constructing new causal models, exploiting the causal models to maximize its expected utility, detecting possible latent variables when unexpected observations occur, and constructing new structures-internal causal models and optimal estimation of the associated parameters, to be able to cope efficiently with the new encountered situations. That is, the agent must be able to construct new causal internal models that transform a previously unexpected and inefficient (sub-optimal) situation, into a predictable situation with an optimal operating plan.

We explore algorithms to select actions in the causal bandit setting where the learner can choose to intervene on a set of random variables related by a causal graph, and the learner sequentially chooses interventions and observes a sample from the interventional distribution. The learner's goal is to quickly find the intervention, among all interventions on observable variables, that maximizes the expectation of an outcome variable. We depart from previous literature by assuming no knowledge of the causal graph except that latent confounders between the outcome and its ancestors are not present. We first show that the unknown graph problem can be exponentially hard in the parents of the outcome. To remedy this, we adopt an additional additive assumption on the outcome which allows us to solve the problem by casting it as an additive combinatorial linear bandit problem with full-bandit feedback. We propose a novel action-elimination algorithm for this setting, show how to apply this algorithm to the causal bandit problem, provide sample complexity bounds, and empirically validate our findings on a suite of randomly generated causal models, effectively showing that one does not need to explicitly learn the parents of the outcome to identify the best intervention.

Existing 3D scene generation methods often struggle to model the complex logical dependencies and physical constraints between objects, limiting their ability to adapt to dynamic and realistic environments. We propose CausalStruct, a novel framework that embeds causal reasoning into 3D scene generation. Utilizing large language models (LLMs), We construct causal graphs where nodes represent objects and attributes, while edges encode causal dependencies and physical constraints. CausalStruct iteratively refines the scene layout by enforcing causal order to determine the placement order of objects and applies causal intervention to adjust the spatial configuration according to physics-driven constraints, ensuring consistency with textual descriptions and real-world dynamics. The refined scene causal graph informs subsequent optimization steps, employing a Proportional-Integral-Derivative(PID) controller to iteratively tune object scales and positions. Our method uses text or images to guide object placement and layout in 3D scenes, with 3D Gaussian Splatting and Score Distillation Sampling improving shape accuracy and rendering stability. Extensive experiments show that CausalStruct generates 3D scenes with enhanced logical coherence, realistic spatial interactions, and robust adaptability.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

We present a general causal generative modelling framework for accurate estimation of high fidelity image counterfactuals with deep structural causal models. Estimation of interventional and counterfactual queries for high-dimensional structured variables, such as images, remains a challenging task. We leverage ideas from causal mediation analysis and advances in generative modelling to design new deep causal mechanisms for structured variables in causal models. Our experiments demonstrate that our proposed mechanisms are capable of accurate abduction and estimation of direct, indirect and total effects as measured by axiomatic soundness of counterfactuals.

Causal discovery aims to recover directed causal relations from observational and interventional data, providing a basis for mechanistic understanding and reliable decision-making. Causal discovery foundation models (CDFMs) seek to amortize this problem by mapping a dataset directly to a causal graph in a single forward pass, avoiding per-dataset testing, search, or optimization. However, existing CDFMs remain limited, often failing to consistently match strong classical methods, and we find that a key bottleneck is how causal pretraining tasks are constructed. Based on this observation, we propose TabCausal, a data-driven CDFM trained with broad causal pretraining over diverse graph priors, structural mechanisms, noise models, dimensions, sample sizes, and intervention regimes. A dynamic task construction strategy composes these causal environments into varied discovery tasks, enabling more transferable structural learning from observational and mixed-interventional data. On large-scale synthetic benchmarks, TabCausal achieves better macro-averaged performance than a diverse set of causal discovery baselines. To further bridge abstract synthetic generators and realistic causal reasoning scenarios, we introduce a protocol-guided and LLM-audited semantic causal environment benchmark, where domain-grounded SCMs generate interpretable observational and interventional datasets for out-of-distribution analysis. Across both synthetic and semantic environments, TabCausal demonstrates robust structure recovery, especially under interventional evidence, highlighting broad causal pretraining as a key ingredient for transferable amortized causal discovery.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

In-context learning for tabular data sets strong predictive standards in observational settings; it however primarily relies on correlational structure, which becomes unreliable under distribution shift or intervention. While established methods to discover causal structure exist, they are often focused on structure identifiability and decoupled from the predictive architectures that could benefit from them. To bridge these perspectives, we study how to simultaneously infer and enforce causal structure in the form of topological variable orderings into tabular prediction. Unlike standard architectures, our model TabOrder uses causal order-constrained attention, basing predictions only on features that precede a target under a learned causal order. Similar to causal discovery methods, TabOrder learns the optimal variable ordering in an unsupervised manner through a likelihood-based objective. We justify this choice under standard functional model classes and also study how sample missingness, a common challenge in tabular data, interacts with causal direction identification. Empirically, we confirm that TabOrder recovers accurate variable orderings while addressing prediction and imputation tasks, as well as gives insight into real-world biological data under intervention.

Causal discovery, the process of recovering underlying causal structures from observational data, is a fundamental pursuit across scientific disciplines. Over the past decades, numerous algorithms have been developed to tackle this challenge through workflows tailored to the specific causal mechanisms underlying each type of dataset, demonstrating effectiveness across a wide range of applications. However, as the volume and heterogeneity of real-world data continue to grow, this dataset-specific approach inevitably leads to a fragmented, test-driven paradigm that struggles to scale to the demands of modern scientific discovery. To address this, we formulate the Causal Discovery Foundation Model (CDFM) as a unified, general-purpose framework for zero-shot structural inference. To ensure reliable generalization across unknown domains, we first investigate the theoretical boundaries of causal identifiability, revealing the indispensable role of causal prior mechanisms in this process. Building on these insights, we formulate a principled variational framework that treats unknown causal mechanisms as latent variables and mathematically decomposes the intractable marginal likelihood into distinct, tractable learning modules. The variational decomposition provides a conceptual design principle for the architecture design of CDFM, while comprehensive causal knowledge guides the large-scale synthesis of our pretraining data. By pretraining on a massive, highly diverse space of synthetic structural causal models, CDFM successfully internalizes complex statistical asymmetries. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CDFM consistently outperforms traditional algorithms, driving a paradigm shift toward a general-purpose causal discovery foundation model.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Schema-guided reasoning pipelines ask LLMs to produce explicit intermediate structures -- rubrics, checklists, verification queries -- before committing to a final decision. But do these structures causally determine the output, or merely accompany it? We introduce a causal evaluation protocol that makes this directly measurable: by selecting tasks where a deterministic function maps intermediate structures to decisions, every controlled edit implies a unique correct output. Across eight models and three benchmarks, models appear self-consistent with their own intermediate structures but fail to update predictions after intervention in up to 60% of cases -- revealing that apparent faithfulness is fragile once the intermediate structure changes. When derivation of the final decision from the structure is delegated to an external tool, this fragility largely disappears; however, prompts which ask to prioritize the intermediate structure over the original input do not materially close the gap. Overall, intermediate structures in schema-guided pipelines function as influential context rather than stable causal mediators.

Game theory is a foundational framework for analyzing strategic interactions, and its intersection with large language models (LLMs) is a rapidly growing field. However, existing surveys mainly focus narrowly on using game theory to evaluate LLM behavior. This paper provides the first comprehensive survey of the bidirectional relationship between Game Theory and LLMs. We propose a novel taxonomy that categorizes the research in this intersection into four distinct perspectives: (1) evaluating LLMs in game-based scenarios; (2) improving LLMs using game-theoretic concepts for better interpretability and alignment; (3) modeling the competitive landscape of LLM development and its societal impact; and (4) leveraging LLMs to advance game models and to solve corresponding game theory problems. Furthermore, we identify key challenges and outline future research directions. By systematically investigating this interdisciplinary landscape, our survey highlights the mutual influence of game theory and LLMs, fostering progress at the intersection of these fields.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly tasked with high-stakes autonomous decision-making, the transparency of their reasoning processes has become a critical safety concern. While Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting allows agents to generate human-readable reasoning traces, it remains unclear whether these traces are faithful generative drivers of the model's output or merely post-hoc rationalizations. We introduce Project Ariadne, a novel XAI framework that utilizes Structural Causal Models (SCMs) and counterfactual logic to audit the causal integrity of agentic reasoning. Unlike existing interpretability methods that rely on surface-level textual similarity, Project Ariadne performs hard interventions (do-calculus) on intermediate reasoning nodes -- systematically inverting logic, negating premises, and reversing factual claims -- to measure the Causal Sensitivity (φ) of the terminal answer. Our empirical evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals a persistent Faithfulness Gap. We define and detect a widespread failure mode termed Causal Decoupling, where agents exhibit a violation density (ρ) of up to 0.77 in factual and scientific domains. In these instances, agents arrive at identical conclusions despite contradictory internal logic, proving that their reasoning traces function as "Reasoning Theater" while decision-making is governed by latent parametric priors. Our findings suggest that current agentic architectures are inherently prone to unfaithful explanation, and we propose the Ariadne Score as a new benchmark for aligning stated logic with model action.

The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuy\'eras) and open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the former to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player, and the game's best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient descent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this impression rigorous in a dynamic model of cardinal hedonic games by providing meta theorems. These imply hardness of deciding about the possible or necessary convergence of deviation dynamics based on the mere existence of No-instances. Our results hold for additively separable, fractional, and modified fractional hedonic games (ASHGs, FHGs, and MFHGs). Moreover, they encompass essentially all reasonable stability notions based on single-agent deviations. In addition, we propose dynamics as a method to find individually rational and contractually individual stable (CIS) partitions in ASHGs. In particular, we find that CIS dynamics from the singleton partition possibly converge after a linear number of deviations but may require an exponential number of deviations in the worst case.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents _in equilibrium_. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become _more effective_ under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.

In real-world scenarios, the application of reinforcement learning is significantly challenged by complex non-stationarity. Most existing methods attempt to model changes in the environment explicitly, often requiring impractical prior knowledge of environments. In this paper, we propose a new perspective, positing that non-stationarity can propagate and accumulate through complex causal relationships during state transitions, thereby compounding its sophistication and affecting policy learning. We believe that this challenge can be more effectively addressed by implicitly tracing the causal origin of non-stationarity. To this end, we introduce the Causal-Origin REPresentation (COREP) algorithm. COREP primarily employs a guided updating mechanism to learn a stable graph representation for the state, termed as causal-origin representation. By leveraging this representation, the learned policy exhibits impressive resilience to non-stationarity. We supplement our approach with a theoretical analysis grounded in the causal interpretation for non-stationary reinforcement learning, advocating for the validity of the causal-origin representation. Experimental results further demonstrate the superior performance of COREP over existing methods in tackling non-stationarity problems.

This paper argues that the finite horizon paradox, where game theory contradicts intuition, stems from the limitations of standard number systems in modelling the cognitive perception of infinity. To address this issue, we propose a new framework based on Alternative Set Theory (AST). This framework represents different cognitive perspectives on a long history of events using distinct topologies. These topologies define an indiscernibility equivalence that formally treats huge, indistinguishable quantities as equivalent. This offers criterion-dependent resolutions to long-standing paradoxes, such as Selten's chain store paradox and Rosenthal's centipede game. Our framework reveals new intuitive subgame perfect equilibria, the characteristics of which depend on the chosen temporal perspective and payoff evaluation. Ultimately, by grounding its mathematical foundation in different modes of human cognition, our work expands the explanatory power of game theory for long-horizon scenarios.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Learning the behavior of large agent populations is an important task for numerous research areas. Although the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has made significant progress towards solving these systems, solutions for many agents often remain computationally infeasible and lack theoretical guarantees. Mean Field Games (MFGs) address both of these issues and can be extended to Graphon MFGs (GMFGs) to include network structures between agents. Despite their merits, the real world applicability of GMFGs is limited by the fact that graphons only capture dense graphs. Since most empirically observed networks show some degree of sparsity, such as power law graphs, the GMFG framework is insufficient for capturing these network topologies. Thus, we introduce the novel concept of Graphex MFGs (GXMFGs) which builds on the graph theoretical concept of graphexes. Graphexes are the limiting objects to sparse graph sequences that also have other desirable features such as the small world property. Learning equilibria in these games is challenging due to the rich and sparse structure of the underlying graphs. To tackle these challenges, we design a new learning algorithm tailored to the GXMFG setup. This hybrid graphex learning approach leverages that the system mainly consists of a highly connected core and a sparse periphery. After defining the system and providing a theoretical analysis, we state our learning approach and demonstrate its learning capabilities on both synthetic graphs and real-world networks. This comparison shows that our GXMFG learning algorithm successfully extends MFGs to a highly relevant class of hard, realistic learning problems that are not accurately addressed by current MARL and MFG methods.

Prior-data fitted networks (PFNs) have emerged as powerful foundation models for tabular causal inference, yet their extension to time series remains limited by the absence of synthetic data generators that provide interventional targets. Existing time series benchmarks generate observational data with ground-truth causal graphs but lack the interventional data required for training causal foundation models. To address this, we propose CausalTimePrior, a principled framework for generating synthetic temporal structural causal models (TSCMs) with paired observational and interventional time series. Our prior supports configurable causal graph structures, nonlinear autoregressive mechanisms, regime-switching dynamics, and multiple intervention types (hard, soft, time-varying). We demonstrate that PFNs trained on CausalTimePrior can perform in-context causal effect estimation on held-out TSCMs, establishing a pathway toward foundation models for time series causal inference.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

Causal generative models provide a principled framework for answering observational, interventional, and counterfactual queries from observational data. However, many deep causal models rely on highly expressive architectures with opaque mechanisms, limiting auditability in high-stakes domains. We propose KaCGM, a causal generative model for mixed-type tabular data where each structural equation is parameterized by a Kolmogorov--Arnold Network (KAN). This decomposition enables direct inspection of learned causal mechanisms, including symbolic approximations and visualization of parent--child relationships, while preserving query-agnostic generative semantics. We introduce a validation pipeline based on distributional matching and independence diagnostics of inferred exogenous variables, allowing assessment using observational data alone. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic benchmarks show competitive performance against state-of-the-art methods. A real-world cardiovascular case study further demonstrates the extraction of simplified structural equations and interpretable causal effects. These results suggest that expressive causal generative modeling and functional transparency can be achieved jointly, supporting trustworthy deployment in tabular decision-making settings. Code: https://github.com/aalmodovares/kacgm

For reinforcement learning systems to be widely adopted, their users must understand and trust them. We present a theoretical analysis of explaining reinforcement learning using Shapley values, following a principled approach from game theory for identifying the contribution of individual players to the outcome of a cooperative game. We call this general framework Shapley Values for Explaining Reinforcement Learning (SVERL). Our analysis exposes the limitations of earlier uses of Shapley values in reinforcement learning. We then develop an approach that uses Shapley values to explain agent performance. In a variety of domains, SVERL produces meaningful explanations that match and supplement human intuition.

Energy markets exhibit complex causal relationships between weather patterns, generation technologies, and price formation, with regime changes occurring continuously rather than at discrete break points. Current approaches model electricity prices without explicit causal interpretation or counterfactual reasoning capabilities. We introduce Augmented Time Series Causal Models (ATSCM) for energy markets, extending counterfactual reasoning frameworks to multivariate temporal data with learned causal structure. Our approach models energy systems through interpretable factors (weather, generation mix, demand patterns), rich grid dynamics, and observable market variables. We integrate neural causal discovery to learn time-varying causal graphs without requiring ground truth DAGs. Applied to real-world electricity price data, ATSCM enables novel counterfactual queries such as "What would prices be under different renewable generation scenarios?".

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

It has long been hypothesised that causal reasoning plays a fundamental role in robust and general intelligence. However, it is not known if agents must learn causal models in order to generalise to new domains, or if other inductive biases are sufficient. We answer this question, showing that any agent capable of satisfying a regret bound under a large set of distributional shifts must have learned an approximate causal model of the data generating process, which converges to the true causal model for optimal agents. We discuss the implications of this result for several research areas including transfer learning and causal inference.

Frontier AI systems are increasingly capable and deployed in high-stakes multi-agent environments. However, existing AI safety benchmarks largely evaluate single agents, leaving multi-agent risks such as coordination failure and conflict poorly understood. We introduce GT-HarmBench, a benchmark of 1,535 high-stakes scenarios spanning game-theoretic structures such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken. Scenarios are drawn from realistic AI risk contexts in the MIT AI Risk Repository. Across 15 frontier models, agents fail to choose socially beneficial actions in 38% of high-stakes cases, such as military escalation, election manipulation, and medical malpractice. We measure sensitivity to game-theoretic prompt framing and ordering, and analyze reasoning patterns driving failures. We further show that game-theoretic interventions improve socially beneficial outcomes by up to 18%. Our results highlight substantial reliability gaps and provide a broad standardized testbed for studying alignment in multi-agent environments. The benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/causalNLP/gt-harmbench.

Fair machine learning seeks to identify and mitigate biases in predictions against unfavorable populations characterized by demographic attributes, such as race and gender. Recently, a few works have extended fairness to graph data, such as social networks, but most of them neglect the causal relationships among data instances. This paper addresses the prevalent challenge in fairness-aware ML algorithms, which typically assume Independent and Identically Distributed (IID) data. We tackle the overlooked domain of non-IID, graph-based settings where data instances are interconnected, influencing the outcomes of fairness interventions. We base our research on the Network Structural Causal Model (NSCM) framework and posit two main assumptions: Decomposability and Graph Independence, which enable the computation of interventional distributions in non-IID settings using the do-calculus. Based on that, we develop the Message Passing Variational Autoencoder for Causal Inference (MPVA) to compute interventional distributions and facilitate causally fair node classification through estimated interventional distributions. Empirical evaluations on semi-synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate that MPVA outperforms conventional methods by effectively approximating interventional distributions and mitigating bias. The implications of our findings underscore the potential of causality-based fairness in complex ML applications, setting the stage for further research into relaxing the initial assumptions to enhance model fairness.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with adaptive opponents who can respond based on histories of play. The standard metric of external regret in online learning is known to fail to capture such adaptivity. To account for players' counterfactual reasoning, we introduce {\tt Repeated Policy Regret (RP-Regret)}, a game-theoretic metric that measures the difference between the realized and the best-in-hindsight accumulated utility when all players can respond to the history of play. Compared to existing regret notions in this setting, ours is native to repeated game playing, enabling stronger comparators and opponents with fewer constraints, while maintaining the possibility of finding better equilibria when all players minimize it. We first identify necessary conditions for obtaining {\tt RP-Regret} sublinear in time, on the variation of the player's comparator strategies in the regret definition and on the memories of both the comparator and opponents' strategies. We then study additional conditions and provable algorithms to minimize {\tt RP-Regret}, which is by definition non-convex in the strategy space. To address this challenge, we propose three algorithms: (i) one based on an optimization oracle, as assumed in some prior work in online non-convex learning; (ii) one that minimizes a convex and linearized surrogate of {\tt RP-Regret} at each iteration; (iii) one that directly minimizes {\tt RP-Regret} when opponents change strategies slowly. Furthermore, when all players can run algorithms to minimize the {\tt RP-Regret} (or its linearized variant), certain subgame perfect equilibria of the repeated game can be learned. We also provide experiments showing that minimizing our regret notions can lead to more cooperative solutions with higher utility in games such as Stag-Hunt.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

Interference is ubiquitous when conducting causal experiments over networks. Except for certain network structures, causal inference on the network in the presence of interference is difficult due to the entanglement between the treatment assignments and the interference levels. In this article, we conduct causal inference under interference on an observed, sparse but connected network, and we propose a novel design of experiments based on an independent set. Compared to conventional designs, the independent-set design focuses on an independent subset of data and controls their interference exposures through the assignments to the rest (auxiliary set). We provide a lower bound on the size of the independent set from a greedy algorithm , and justify the theoretical performance of estimators under the proposed design. Our approach is capable of estimating both spillover effects and treatment effects. We justify its superiority over conventional methods and illustrate the empirical performance through simulations.

We develop a tractable identification approach for strategic network formation models with both strategic link interdependence and individual unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effects). The key challenge is that endogenous network statistics (e.g. number of common friends) enter the link formation equation, while the mapping from model primitives to equilibrium network structure is generally intractable. Our approach sidesteps this difficulty using a ``bounding-by-c'' technique that treats endogenous covariates as random variables and exploits monotonicity restrictions to obtain identifying information. A central contribution is to develop a spectrum of fixed-effects handling strategies based on subnetwork configurations: tetrad-based restrictions that difference out all individual fixed effects, triad-based and weighted restrictions that combine ``difference-out'' and ``integrate-out'' steps by differencing out some fixed effects and profiling over the remainder conditional on observed characteristics, and general weighted cycle-based restrictions that unify these cases. We also provide point identification results. Preliminary simulations show that the approach can deliver informative bounds on the structural parameters.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

A common assumption holds that enough observational and interventional data, given to a strong enough predictor, suffices. We report a failure mode that contradicts it. Across hundreds of structural causal models, on identified quantities a strong predictor and a Bayesian baseline both succeed, but on unidentified quantities (the couplings between counterfactual worlds) the predictor collapses to a point, on 28% of models to one no valid model can produce, while the truth is an admissible interval more data never narrows. The gap is structural: prediction cannot represent uncertainty over counterfactual couplings. We cast a world model as a single positive semidefinite coupling kernel K(T,T') over admissible worlds, whose diagonal is the ordinary posterior (what a predictor recovers) and whose off-diagonal is the cross-world coupling it cannot, which every counterfactual reads. The paper is the theory of that off-diagonal. It is real: two states with identical posteriors differ on a cross-world query, and the off-diagonal is the coupling that fixes counterfactuals. It can be bounded: positive semidefiniteness is partial-identifying information the marginals lack, and enforcing it bounds counterfactuals in polynomial time where the exact response-type program is intractable. Logical structure sharpens it: ontology axioms tighten the bound by up to a third, propagating to couplings they never touch. It can be acquired: targeted scars, constraints learned from encountered infeasibilities, close the gap several times faster than untargeted ones. Its full reconstruction is approximate counting of the admissible worlds, tractable below the Sly-Sun threshold and inapproximable above; we do not claim to beat the worst case.

Causal graphs provide a high-level language for making mechanisms transparent. Recent work uses Large Language Models (LLMs) to recover causal graphs of external-world processes. Instead, in this paper, we use causal graphs to model LLM inference itself, providing stakeholders with a transparent view of how the model perceives and organizes high-level concepts to produce a prediction. We propose a four-phase method for constructing such graphs. Given a target LLM and a set of textual examples, our method discovers class-discriminative, human-interpretable concepts and maps each input to LLM-perceived concept states. We then introduce an MCMC-inspired counterfactual augmentation procedure that expands the sparse observational data through chains of counterfactuals. This enables stable causal discovery with σ-CG, yielding informative, interpretable graphs. We apply our method to three LLMs across disease diagnosis, sentiment analysis, and LLM-as-a-judge classification tasks. We evaluate the learned graphs for predictive fidelity and structural stability, and the MCMC-inspired augmentation for convergence and downstream utility. Our results show that the discovered causal graphs capture meaningful dependencies consistent with LLMs' reasoning. Together, this paper provides a foundation for concept-level explainability of LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

Prosocial behaviors are encountered in the donation game, the prisoner's dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas, and public goods games. Many studies assume that the population structure is homogeneous, meaning all individuals have the same number of interaction partners, or that the social good is of one particular type. Here, we explore general evolutionary dynamics for arbitrary spatial structures and social goods. We find that heterogeneous networks, wherein some individuals have many more interaction partners than others, can enhance the evolution of prosocial behaviors. However, they often accumulate most of the benefits in the hands of a few highly-connected individuals, while many others receive low or negative payoff. Surprisingly, selection can favor producers of social goods even if the total costs exceed the total benefits. In summary, heterogeneous structures have the ability to strongly promote the emergence of prosocial behaviors, but they also create the possibility of generating large inequality.

We develop a data-driven information-theoretic framework for sharp partial identification of causal effects under unmeasured confounding. Existing approaches often rely on restrictive assumptions, such as bounded or discrete outcomes; require external inputs (for example, instrumental variables, proxies, or user-specified sensitivity parameters); necessitate full structural causal model specifications; or focus solely on population-level averages while neglecting covariate-conditional effects. We overcome all four limitations simultaneously by establishing novel information-theoretic, data-driven divergence bounds. Our key theoretical contribution shows that the f-divergence between the observational distribution P(Y | A = a, X = x) and the interventional distribution P(Y | do(A = a), X = x) is upper bounded by a function of the propensity score alone. This result enables sharp partial identification of conditional causal effects directly from observational data, without requiring external sensitivity parameters, auxiliary variables, full structural specifications, or outcome boundedness assumptions. For practical implementation, we develop a semiparametric estimator satisfying Neyman orthogonality (Chernozhukov et al., 2018), which ensures root-n consistent inference even when nuisance functions are estimated via flexible machine learning methods. Simulation studies and real-world data applications, implemented in the GitHub repository (https://github.com/yonghanjung/Information-Theretic-Bounds), demonstrate that our framework provides tight and valid causal bounds across a wide range of data-generating processes.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

A major barrier to deploying current machine learning models lies in their non-reliability to dataset shifts. To resolve this problem, most existing studies attempted to transfer stable information to unseen environments. Particularly, independent causal mechanisms-based methods proposed to remove mutable causal mechanisms via the do-operator. Compared to previous methods, the obtained stable predictors are more effective in identifying stable information. However, a key question remains: which subset of this whole stable information should the model transfer, in order to achieve optimal generalization ability? To answer this question, we present a comprehensive minimax analysis from a causal perspective. Specifically, we first provide a graphical condition for the whole stable set to be optimal. When this condition fails, we surprisingly find with an example that this whole stable set, although can fully exploit stable information, is not the optimal one to transfer. To identify the optimal subset under this case, we propose to estimate the worst-case risk with a novel optimization scheme over the intervention functions on mutable causal mechanisms. We then propose an efficient algorithm to search for the subset with minimal worst-case risk, based on a newly defined equivalence relation between stable subsets. Compared to the exponential cost of exhaustively searching over all subsets, our searching strategy enjoys a polynomial complexity. The effectiveness and efficiency of our methods are demonstrated on synthetic data and the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease.

Causal discovery for dynamical systems poses a major challenge in fields where active interventions are infeasible. Most methods used to investigate these systems and their associated benchmarks are tailored to deterministic, low-dimensional and weakly nonlinear time-series data. To address these limitations, we present CausalDynamics, a large-scale benchmark and extensible data generation framework to advance the structural discovery of dynamical causal models. Our benchmark consists of true causal graphs derived from thousands of coupled ordinary and stochastic differential equations as well as two idealized climate models. We perform a comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art causal discovery algorithms for graph reconstruction on systems with noisy, confounded, and lagged dynamics. CausalDynamics consists of a plug-and-play, build-your-own coupling workflow that enables the construction of a hierarchy of physical systems. We anticipate that our framework will facilitate the development of robust causal discovery algorithms that are broadly applicable across domains while addressing their unique challenges. We provide a user-friendly implementation and documentation on https://kausable.github.io/CausalDynamics.

We introduce a new paradigm for building large causal models (LCMs) that exploits the enormous potential latent in today's large language models (LLMs). We describe our ongoing experiments with an implemented system called DEMOCRITUS (Decentralized Extraction of Manifold Ontologies of Causal Relations Integrating Topos Universal Slices) aimed at building, organizing, and visualizing LCMs that span disparate domains extracted from carefully targeted textual queries to LLMs. DEMOCRITUS is methodologically distinct from traditional narrow domain and hypothesis centered causal inference that builds causal models from experiments that produce numerical data. A high-quality LLM is used to propose topics, generate causal questions, and extract plausible causal statements from a diverse range of domains. The technical challenge is then to take these isolated, fragmented, potentially ambiguous and possibly conflicting causal claims, and weave them into a coherent whole, converting them into relational causal triples and embedding them into a LCM. Addressing this technical challenge required inventing new categorical machine learning methods, which we can only briefly summarize in this paper, as it is focused more on the systems side of building DEMOCRITUS. We describe the implementation pipeline for DEMOCRITUS comprising of six modules, examine its computational cost profile to determine where the current bottlenecks in scaling the system to larger models. We describe the results of using DEMOCRITUS over a wide range of domains, spanning archaeology, biology, climate change, economics, medicine and technology. We discuss the limitations of the current DEMOCRITUS system, and outline directions for extending its capabilities.

Discovering causal structures with latent variables from observational data is a fundamental challenge in causal discovery. Existing methods often rely on constraint-based, iterative discrete searches, limiting their scalability to large numbers of variables. Moreover, these methods frequently assume linearity or invertibility, restricting their applicability to real-world scenarios. We present new theoretical results on the identifiability of nonlinear latent hierarchical causal models, relaxing previous assumptions in literature about the deterministic nature of latent variables and exogenous noise. Building on these insights, we develop a novel differentiable causal discovery algorithm that efficiently estimates the structure of such models. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to propose a differentiable causal discovery method for nonlinear latent hierarchical models. Our approach outperforms existing methods in both accuracy and scalability. We demonstrate its practical utility by learning interpretable hierarchical latent structures from high-dimensional image data and demonstrate its effectiveness on downstream tasks.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

Understanding and reasoning about the physical world is the foundation of intelligent behavior, yet state-of-the-art vision-language models (VLMs) still fail at causal physical reasoning, often producing plausible but incorrect answers. To address this gap, we introduce CausalPhys, a benchmark of over 3,000 carefully curated video- and image-based questions spanning four domains: Perception, Anticipation, Intervention, and Goal Orientation. Each question is paired with an expert-annotated causal graph capturing object-attribute-event dependencies, enabling interpretable and fine-grained evaluation of causal understanding. Building on this, we formulate a causal-graph-grounded metric that quantitatively measures how well a model's chain-of-thought reasoning aligns with the correct causal relations, moving beyond answer-only accuracy and enabling systematic diagnosis of VLMs' causal reasoning failures. Using this metric, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of leading VLMs, revealing systematic gaps in capturing causal dependencies and underscoring the need for causality-aware learning. To address these limitations, we further propose Causal Rationale-informed Fine-Tuning (CRFT), which explicitly aligns VLM reasoning with causal structures. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CRFT substantially enhances both reasoning accuracy and interpretability across multiple model backbones. By unifying dataset curation, causal evaluation, and causality-informed learning, CausalPhys establishes a strong foundation for advancing modern VLMs toward causally grounded physical reasoning.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

Human understanding of video dynamics is typically grounded in a structured mental representation of entities, actions, and temporal relations, rather than relying solely on immediate deductive reasoning. In contrast, existing Video-LLMs largely depend on unstructured video reasoning, where critical visual evidence is embedded in verbose textual descriptions and temporal causality is often weakly modeled. This leads to inefficient processes and fragile causal inference. To bridge this cognitive gap, we propose constructing a compact representation of salient events and their causal relationships, which we name Structured Event Facts, prior to the reasoning stage. This structured prior serves as an explicit constraint to promote concise and causally grounded reasoning, while also making intermediate evidence easier to verify. To effectively train models on such structured facts, we introduce CausalFact-60K and a four-stage training pipeline comprising facts alignment, format warm-start, thinking warm-start, and reinforcement learning-based post-training. During RL stage, we find that this framework introduces competing objectives, as structural completeness and causal fidelity must be balanced against reasoning length, making it difficult to optimize. We address this challenge by formulating the optimization as a Multi-Objective Reinforcement Learning (MORL) problem and explicitly optimizing toward the Pareto-Frontier to balance these trade-offs. As a result, we introduce Factum-4B, which yields more reliable reasoning and delivers stronger performance on challenging video understanding tasks requiring fine-grained temporal inference.

We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in an imperfect information game (IIG) through self-play. Precisely, we focus on two-player, zero-sum, episodic, tabular IIG under the perfect-recall assumption where the only feedback is realizations of the game (bandit feedback). In particular, the dynamic of the IIG is not known -- we can only access it by sampling or interacting with a game simulator. For this learning setting, we provide the Implicit Exploration Online Mirror Descent (IXOMD) algorithm. It is a model-free algorithm with a high-probability bound on the convergence rate to the NE of order 1/T where T is the number of played games. Moreover, IXOMD is computationally efficient as it needs to perform the updates only along the sampled trajectory.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

In some games, additional information hurts a player, e.g., in games with first-mover advantage, the second-mover is hurt by seeing the first-mover's move. What properties of a game determine whether it has such negative "value of information" for a particular player? Can a game have negative value of information for all players? To answer such questions, we generalize the definition of marginal utility of a good to define the marginal utility of a parameter vector specifying a game. So rather than analyze the global structure of the relationship between a game's parameter vector and player behavior, as in previous work, we focus on the local structure of that relationship. This allows us to prove that generically, every game can have negative marginal value of information, unless one imposes a priori constraints on allowed changes to the game's parameter vector. We demonstrate these and related results numerically, and discuss their implications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across various domains. However, a fundamental question remains: Can LLMs effectively utilize causal knowledge for prediction and generation? Through empirical studies, we find that LLMs trained directly on large-scale data often capture spurious correlations rather than true causal relationships, leading to suboptimal performance, especially in out-of-distribution (OOD) scenarios. To address this challenge, we propose Causal Attention Tuning (CAT), a novel approach that injects fine-grained causal knowledge into the attention mechanism. We propose an automated pipeline that leverages human priors to automatically generate token-level causal signals and introduce the Re-Attention mechanism to guide training, helping the model focus on causal structures while mitigating noise and biases in attention scores. Experimental results on our proposed Spurious Token Game (STG) benchmark and multiple downstream tasks demonstrate that our approach effectively leverages causal knowledge for prediction and remains robust in OOD scenarios. Implementation details can be found at https://github.com/Kairong-Han/CAT.

Heterogeneity and comorbidity are two interwoven challenges associated with various healthcare problems that greatly hampered research on developing effective treatment and understanding of the underlying neurobiological mechanism. Very few studies have been conducted to investigate heterogeneous causal effects (HCEs) in graphical contexts due to the lack of statistical methods. To characterize this heterogeneity, we first conceptualize heterogeneous causal graphs (HCGs) by generalizing the causal graphical model with confounder-based interactions and multiple mediators. Such confounders with an interaction with the treatment are known as moderators. This allows us to flexibly produce HCGs given different moderators and explicitly characterize HCEs from the treatment or potential mediators on the outcome. We establish the theoretical forms of HCEs and derive their properties at the individual level in both linear and nonlinear models. An interactive structural learning is developed to estimate the complex HCGs and HCEs with confidence intervals provided. Our method is empirically justified by extensive simulations and its practical usefulness is illustrated by exploring causality among psychiatric disorders for trauma survivors.

For text-based AI systems to interact in the real world, causal reasoning is an essential skill. Since interventional data is costly to generate, we study to what extent an agent can learn causal reasoning from passive data. Specifically, we consider an axiomatic training setup where an agent learns from multiple demonstrations of a causal axiom (or rule), rather than incorporating the axiom as an inductive bias or inferring it from data values. A key question is whether the agent would learn to generalize from the axiom demonstrations to new scenarios. For example, if a transformer model is trained on demonstrations of the causal transitivity axiom over small graphs, would it generalize to applying the transitivity axiom over large graphs? Our results, based on a novel axiomatic training scheme, indicate that such generalization is possible. We consider the task of inferring whether a variable causes another variable, given a causal graph structure. We find that a 67 million parameter transformer model, when trained on linear causal chains (along with some noisy variations) can generalize well to new kinds of graphs, including longer causal chains, causal chains with reversed order, and graphs with branching; even when it is not explicitly trained for such settings. Our model performs at par (or even better) than many larger language models such as GPT-4, Gemini Pro, and Phi-3. Overall, our axiomatic training framework provides a new paradigm of learning causal reasoning from passive data that can be used to learn arbitrary axioms, as long as sufficient demonstrations can be generated.

Causal inference has become an accepted analytic framework in settings where experimentation is impossible, which is frequently the case in sports analytics, particularly for studying in-game tactics. However, subtle differences in implementation can lead to important differences in interpretation. In this work, we provide a case study to demonstrate the utility and the nuance of these approaches. Motivated by a case study of crossing in soccer, two causal questions are considered: the overall impact of crossing on shot creation (Average Treatment Effect, ATE) and its impact in plays where crossing was actually attempted (Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, ATT). Using data from Shandong Taishan Luneng Football Club's 2017 season, we demonstrate how distinct matching strategies are used for different estimation targets - the ATE and ATT - though both aim to eliminate any spurious relationship between crossing and shot creation. Results suggest crossing yields a 1.6% additive increase in shot probability overall compared to not crossing (ATE), whereas the ATT is 5.0%. We discuss what insights can be gained from each estimand, and provide examples where one may be preferred over the alternative. Understanding and clearly framing analytics questions through a causal lens ensure rigorous analyses of complex questions.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning, planning, and communication abilities, enabling them to operate as autonomous agents in open environments. While single-agent systems remain limited in adaptability and coordination, recent progress has shifted attention toward multi-agent systems (MAS) composed of interacting LLMs that pursue cooperative, competitive, or mixed objectives. This emerging paradigm provides a powerful testbed for studying social dynamics and strategic behaviors among intelligent agents. However, current research remains fragmented and lacks a unifying theoretical foundation. To address this gap, we present a comprehensive survey of LLM-based multi-agent systems through a game-theoretic lens. By organizing existing studies around the four key elements of game theory: players, strategies, payoffs, and information, we establish a systematic framework for understanding, comparing, and guiding future research on the design and analysis of LLM-based MAS.

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal of the leader is to learn to minimize the cumulative regret based on the history of interactions. Differing from the traditional formulation of repeated Stackelberg games, we assume the follower is omniscient, with full knowledge of the true reward, and that they always best-respond to the leader's actions. We analyze the sample complexity of regret minimization in this repeated Stackelberg game. We show that depending on the reward structure, the existence of the omniscient follower may change the sample complexity drastically, from constant to exponential, even for linear cooperative Stackelberg games. This poses unique challenges for the learning process of the leader and the subsequent regret analysis.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

As economics scales, a key bottleneck is representing what papers claim in a comparable, aggregable form. We introduce evidence-annotated claim graphs that map each paper into a directed network of standardized economic concepts (nodes) and stated relationships (edges), with each edge labeled by evidentiary basis, including whether it is supported by causal inference designs or by non-causal evidence. Using a structured multi-stage AI workflow, we construct claim graphs for 44,852 economics papers from 1980-2023. The share of causal edges rises from 7.7% in 1990 to 31.7% in 2020. Measures of causal narrative structure and causal novelty are positively associated with top-five publication and long-run citations, whereas non-causal counterparts are weakly related or negative.

We provide an optimization-based framework to perform counterfactual analysis in a dynamic model with hidden states. Our framework is grounded in the ``abduction, action, and prediction'' approach to answer counterfactual queries and handles two key challenges where (1) the states are hidden and (2) the model is dynamic. Recognizing the lack of knowledge on the underlying causal mechanism and the possibility of infinitely many such mechanisms, we optimize over this space and compute upper and lower bounds on the counterfactual quantity of interest. Our work brings together ideas from causality, state-space models, simulation, and optimization, and we apply it on a breast cancer case study. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to compute lower and upper bounds on a counterfactual query in a dynamic latent-state model.

We consider learning to play multiplayer imperfect-information games with simultaneous moves and large state-action spaces. Previous attempts to tackle such challenging games have largely focused on model-free learning methods, often requiring hundreds of years of experience to produce competitive agents. Our approach is based on model-based planning. We tackle the problem of partial observability by first building an (oracle) planner that has access to the full state of the environment and then distilling the knowledge of the oracle to a (follower) agent which is trained to play the imperfect-information game by imitating the oracle's choices. We experimentally show that planning with naive Monte Carlo tree search does not perform very well in large combinatorial action spaces. We therefore propose planning with a fixed-depth tree search and decoupled Thompson sampling for action selection. We show that the planner is able to discover efficient playing strategies in the games of Clash Royale and Pommerman and the follower policy successfully learns to implement them by training on a few hundred battles.

Using offline datasets to evaluate conversational agents often fails to cover rare scenarios or to support testing new policies. This has motivated the use of controllable user simulators for targeted, counterfactual evaluation, typically implemented by prompting or fine-tuning large language models. In this work, we formalize controllable simulation as a causal inference problem. By bridging natural language evaluation with off-policy evaluation methodology, we show that the standard practice of training simulators via supervised fine-tuning on post-hoc trajectory labels yields a structurally biased model. Specifically, these labels are inextricably coupled to the data-generating behavior policy, injecting a look-ahead bias that breaks causal consistency. Furthermore, we prove that under policy shift this failure causes the variance of evaluation metrics to explode geometrically, a phenomenon we term controllability collapse. To restore causal consistency, we establish theoretical conditions for accurate simulation and propose practical training mitigations: a priori controls, step-wise dynamic controls, and direct policy-conditioned learning. Empirical evaluation confirms that while standard global controls distort conversational distributions and collapse behavioral diversity, our causally grounded simulators eliminate look-ahead bias, preserve natural variance, and exhibit robust zero-shot generalization to unseen agent behaviors.

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to train policies that can perform well under environment perturbations or adversarial attacks. Existing approaches typically assume that the space of possible perturbations remains the same across timesteps. However, in many settings, the space of possible perturbations at a given timestep depends on past perturbations. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium in this game, GRAD ensures the agent's robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Empirical experiments on a variety of continuous control tasks demonstrate that our proposed approach exhibits significant robustness advantages compared to baselines against both standard and temporally-coupled attacks, in both state and action spaces.

In open-world environments like Minecraft, existing agents face challenges in continuously learning structured knowledge, particularly causality. These challenges stem from the opacity inherent in black-box models and an excessive reliance on prior knowledge during training, which impair their interpretability and generalization capability. To this end, we introduce ADAM, An emboDied causal Agent in Minecraft, that can autonomously navigate the open world, perceive multimodal contexts, learn causal world knowledge, and tackle complex tasks through lifelong learning. ADAM is empowered by four key components: 1) an interaction module, enabling the agent to execute actions while documenting the interaction processes; 2) a causal model module, tasked with constructing an ever-growing causal graph from scratch, which enhances interpretability and diminishes reliance on prior knowledge; 3) a controller module, comprising a planner, an actor, and a memory pool, which uses the learned causal graph to accomplish tasks; 4) a perception module, powered by multimodal large language models, which enables ADAM to perceive like a human player. Extensive experiments show that ADAM constructs an almost perfect causal graph from scratch, enabling efficient task decomposition and execution with strong interpretability. Notably, in our modified Minecraft games where no prior knowledge is available, ADAM maintains its performance and shows remarkable robustness and generalization capability. ADAM pioneers a novel paradigm that integrates causal methods and embodied agents in a synergistic manner. Our project page is at https://opencausalab.github.io/ADAM.

As systems trend toward superintelligence, a natural modeling premise is that agents can self-improve along every facet of their own design. We formalize this with a five-axis decomposition and a decision layer, separating incentives from learning behavior and analyzing axes in isolation. Our central result identifies and introduces a sharp utility--learning tension, the structural conflict in self-modifying systems whereby utility-driven changes that improve immediate or expected performance can also erode the statistical preconditions for reliable learning and generalization. Our findings show that distribution-free guarantees are preserved iff the policy-reachable model family is uniformly capacity-bounded; when capacity can grow without limit, utility-rational self-changes can render learnable tasks unlearnable. Under standard assumptions common in practice, these axes reduce to the same capacity criterion, yielding a single boundary for safe self-modification. Numerical experiments across several axes validate the theory by comparing destructive utility policies against our proposed two-gate policies that preserve learnability.

Understanding the physical structure is essential for real-world applications such as embodied agents, interactive design, and long-horizon manipulation. Yet, prevailing Vision-Language Model (VLM) evaluations still center on structure-agnostic, single-turn setups (e.g., VQA), which fail to assess agents' ability to reason about how geometry, contact, and support relations jointly constrain what actions are possible in a dynamic environment. To address this gap, we introduce the Causal Hierarchy of Actions and Interactions (CHAIN) benchmark, an interactive 3D, physics-driven testbed designed to evaluate whether models can understand, plan, and execute structured action sequences grounded in physical constraints. CHAIN shifts evaluation from passive perception to active problem solving, spanning tasks such as interlocking mechanical puzzles and 3D stacking and packing. We conduct a comprehensive study of state-of-the-art VLMs and diffusion-based models under unified interactive settings. Our results show that top-performing models still struggle to internalize physical structure and causal constraints, often failing to produce reliable long-horizon plans and cannot robustly translate perceived structure into effective actions. The project is available at https://social-ai-studio.github.io/CHAIN/.

A hallmark of life on Earth is the ability of agents to exert causal power and be drivers of subsequent events. This is key to cognition at all scales. Causal emergence, measuring the degree to which an agent exerts unique predictive power on its future, is one consequence of causal power. Indeed, recent discoveries have shown that biological agents, even minimal ones, increase their causal emergence after learning new memories. However, there is a major knowledge gap regarding how causally emergent artificial agents are. We focused on Reinforcement Learning (RL) of neural-network agents across an array of environmental conditions, encompassing different algorithms, agent architectures, and six environments arranged on a complexity spectrum. For consistency, we computed the causal emergence of their latent-space representations over their lifetimes. We used the recently proposed ΦID to estimate causal emergence and tested how it related to learning performance. Our results suggested a Causally Emergent Alignment Hypothesis: successful agents exhibited causal emergence that was consistently predictive of final reward early in training and whose representational dynamics aligned with reward improvement in most tasks. This idea suggests that causal emergence may be a previously undisclosed axis of reorganization of neural representations in RL agents, with the potential to establish causal relationships and interventions that will lead to better RL agents. Our work also highlights the alignment between causal emergence and learning as another way biological and artificial creatures compare.

Quantifying the causal influence of input features within neural networks has become a topic of increasing interest. Existing approaches typically assess direct, indirect, and total causal effects. This work treats NNs as structural causal models (SCMs) and extends our focus to include intrinsic causal contributions (ICC). We propose an identifiable generative post-hoc framework for quantifying ICC. We also draw a relationship between ICC and Sobol' indices. Our experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate that ICC generates more intuitive and reliable explanations compared to existing global explanation techniques.

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.

We propose a novel framework that leverages LLMs for full causal graph discovery. While previous LLM-based methods have used a pairwise query approach, this requires a quadratic number of queries which quickly becomes impractical for larger causal graphs. In contrast, the proposed framework uses a breadth-first search (BFS) approach which allows it to use only a linear number of queries. We also show that the proposed method can easily incorporate observational data when available, to improve performance. In addition to being more time and data-efficient, the proposed framework achieves state-of-the-art results on real-world causal graphs of varying sizes. The results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed method in discovering causal relationships, showcasing its potential for broad applicability in causal graph discovery tasks across different domains.

When deploying artificial agents in real-world environments where they interact with humans, it is crucial that their behavior is aligned with the values, social norms or other requirements of that environment. However, many environments have implicit constraints that are difficult to specify and transfer to a learning agent. To address this challenge, we propose a novel method that utilizes the principle of maximum causal entropy to learn constraints and an optimal policy that adheres to these constraints, using demonstrations of agents that abide by the constraints. We prove convergence in a tabular setting and provide an approximation which scales to complex environments. We evaluate the effectiveness of the learned policy by assessing the reward received and the number of constraint violations, and we evaluate the learned cost function based on its transferability to other agents. Our method has been shown to outperform state-of-the-art approaches across a variety of tasks and environments, and it is able to handle problems with stochastic dynamics and a continuous state-action space.

Useful social science theories predict behavior across settings. However, applying a theory to make predictions in new settings is challenging: rarely can it be done without ad hoc modifications to account for setting-specific factors. We argue that AI agents put in simulations of those novel settings offer an alternative for applying theory, requiring minimal or no modifications. We present an approach for building such "general" agents that use theory-grounded natural language instructions, existing empirical data, and knowledge acquired by the underlying AI during training. To demonstrate the approach in settings where no data from that data-generating process exists--as is often the case in applied prediction problems--we design a heterogeneous population of 883,320 novel games. AI agents are constructed using human data from a small set of conceptually related but structurally distinct "seed" games. In preregistered experiments, on average, agents predict initial human play in a random sample of 1,500 games from the population better than (i) a cognitive hierarchy model, (ii) game-theoretic equilibria, and (iii) out-of-the-box agents. For a small set of separate novel games, these simulations predict responses from a new sample of human subjects better even than the most plausibly relevant published human data.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

Recovering causal relationships from data is an important problem. Using observational data, one can typically only recover causal graphs up to a Markov equivalence class and additional assumptions or interventional data are needed for complete recovery. In this work, under some standard assumptions, we study causal graph discovery via adaptive interventions with node-dependent interventional costs. For this setting, we show that no algorithm can achieve an approximation guarantee that is asymptotically better than linear in the number of vertices with respect to the verification number; a well-established benchmark for adaptive search algorithms. Motivated by this negative result, we define a new benchmark that captures the worst-case interventional cost for any search algorithm. Furthermore, with respect to this new benchmark, we provide adaptive search algorithms that achieve logarithmic approximations under various settings: atomic, bounded size interventions and generalized cost objectives.

We consider a sequential decision making problem where the agent faces the environment characterized by the stochastic discrete events and seeks an optimal intervention policy such that its long-term reward is maximized. This problem exists ubiquitously in social media, finance and health informatics but is rarely investigated by the conventional research in reinforcement learning. To this end, we present a novel framework of the model-based reinforcement learning where the agent's actions and observations are asynchronous stochastic discrete events occurring in continuous-time. We model the dynamics of the environment by Hawkes process with external intervention control term and develop an algorithm to embed such process in the Bellman equation which guides the direction of the value gradient. We demonstrate the superiority of our method in both synthetic simulator and real-world problem.

Group polarization, the phenomenon where individuals become more extreme after interacting, has been gaining attention, especially with the rise of social media shaping people's opinions. Recent interest has emerged in formal reasoning about group polarization using logical systems. In this work we consider the modal logic PNL that captures the notion of agents agreeing or disagreeing on a given topic. Our contribution involves enhancing PNL with advanced formal reasoning techniques, instead of relying on axiomatic systems for analyzing group polarization. To achieve this, we introduce a semantic game tailored for (hybrid) extensions of PNL. This game fosters dynamic reasoning about concrete network models, aligning with our goal of strengthening PNL's effectiveness in studying group polarization. We show how this semantic game leads to a provability game by systemically exploring the truth in all models. This leads to the first cut-free sequent systems for some variants of PNL. Using polarization of formulas, the proposed calculi can be modularly adapted to consider different frame properties of the underlying model.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

True intelligence hinges on the ability to uncover and leverage hidden causal relations. Despite significant progress in AI and computer vision (CV), there remains a lack of benchmarks for assessing models' abilities to infer latent causality from complex visual data. In this paper, we introduce \textbf{Causal3D}, a novel and comprehensive benchmark that integrates structured data (tables) with corresponding visual representations (images) to evaluate causal reasoning. Designed within a systematic framework, Causal3D comprises 19 3D-scene datasets capturing diverse causal relations, views, and backgrounds, enabling evaluations across scenes of varying complexity. We assess multiple state-of-the-art methods, including classical causal discovery, causal representation learning, and large/vision-language models (LLMs/VLMs). Our experiments show that as causal structures grow more complex without prior knowledge, performance declines significantly, highlighting the challenges even advanced methods face in complex causal scenarios. Causal3D serves as a vital resource for advancing causal reasoning in CV and fostering trustworthy AI in critical domains.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as integrated data-science agents, combining abstract reasoning with advanced tool use. Yet the relevant benchmark landscape largely divides into symbolic causal reasoning benchmarks without realistic data analysis or data analysis benchmarks without a principled causal data-generating structure. Furthermore, existing causal evaluation datasets are often restricted to curated examples from existing sources, with diversity coming from limited templatized variations rather than from systematic generation of novel synthetic causal structures. We introduce CausalDS, a benchmark for evaluating causal reasoning in agentic data-science workflows. Each benchmark instance is a scene consisting of a sampled structural causal model (SCM) with generated observational data and an accompanying synthetic natural-language story grounded in a realistic domain. We optionally ground the composition of the benchmark components in empirical distributions obtained from real-world datasets, thus retaining empirical structure while reducing the "causal parrot" risk through completely synthetic generation. From each scene, we then derive tasks spanning all three of Pearl's rungs, with typical data-science prediction tasks appearing as Rung 1. Most tasks include a data science coding component, where the model typically needs to use several tools to arrive at the final answer due to the frequent presence of imperfect observations, which are generated by an observation model. Additionally, recognizing when a question admits no warranted answer and abstaining is treated as a first-class scored outcome. The benchmark thus jointly evaluates symbolic causal reasoning, data science, uncertainty quantification, abstention, and tool use/coding.

Most work interpreting reasoning models studies only a single chain-of-thought (CoT), yet these models define distributions over many possible CoTs. We argue that studying a single sample is inadequate for understanding causal influence and the underlying computation. Though fully specifying this distribution is intractable, it can be understood by sampling. We present case studies using resampling to investigate model decisions. First, when a model states a reason for its action, does that reason actually cause the action? In "agentic misalignment" scenarios, we resample specific sentences to measure their downstream effects. Self-preservation sentences have small causal impact, suggesting they do not meaningfully drive blackmail. Second, are artificial edits to CoT sufficient for steering reasoning? These are common in literature, yet take the model off-policy. Resampling and selecting a completion with the desired property is a principled on-policy alternative. We find off-policy interventions yield small and unstable effects compared to resampling in decision-making tasks. Third, how do we understand the effect of removing a reasoning step when the model may repeat it post-edit? We introduce a resilience metric that repeatedly resamples to prevent similar content from reappearing downstream. Critical planning statements resist removal but have large effects when eliminated. Fourth, since CoT is sometimes "unfaithful", can our methods teach us anything in these settings? Adapting causal mediation analysis, we find that hints that have a causal effect on the output without being explicitly mentioned exert a subtle and cumulative influence on the CoT that persists even if the hint is removed. Overall, studying distributions via resampling enables reliable causal analysis, clearer narratives of model reasoning, and principled CoT interventions.