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Jul 31

ImpossibleBench: Measuring LLMs' Propensity of Exploiting Test Cases

The tendency to find and exploit "shortcuts" to complete tasks poses significant risks for reliable assessment and deployment of large language models (LLMs). For example, an LLM agent with access to unit tests may delete failing tests rather than fix the underlying bug. Such behavior undermines both the validity of benchmark results and the reliability of real-world LLM coding assistant deployments. To quantify, study, and mitigate such behavior, we introduce ImpossibleBench, a benchmark framework that systematically measures LLM agents' propensity to exploit test cases. ImpossibleBench creates "impossible" variants of tasks from existing benchmarks like LiveCodeBench and SWE-bench by introducing direct conflicts between the natural-language specification and the unit tests. We measure an agent's "cheating rate" as its pass rate on these impossible tasks, where any pass necessarily implies a specification-violating shortcut. As a practical framework, ImpossibleBench is not just an evaluation but a versatile tool. We demonstrate its utility for: (1) studying model behaviors, revealing more fine-grained details of cheating behaviors from simple test modification to complex operator overloading; (2) context engineering, showing how prompt, test access and feedback loop affect cheating rates; and (3) developing monitoring tools, providing a testbed with verified deceptive solutions. We hope ImpossibleBench serves as a useful framework for building more robust and reliable LLM systems. Our implementation can be found at https://github.com/safety-research/impossiblebench.

  • 3 authors
·
Oct 23, 2025 2

Cheating Automatic LLM Benchmarks: Null Models Achieve High Win Rates

Automatic LLM benchmarks, such as AlpacaEval 2.0, Arena-Hard-Auto, and MT-Bench, have become popular for evaluating language models due to their cost-effectiveness and scalability compared to human evaluation. Achieving high win rates on these benchmarks can significantly boost the promotional impact of newly released language models. This promotional benefit may motivate tricks, such as manipulating model output length or style to game win rates, even though several mechanisms have been developed to control length and disentangle style to reduce gameability. Nonetheless, we show that even a "null model" that always outputs a constant response (irrelevant to input instructions) can cheat automatic benchmarks and achieve top-ranked win rates: an 86.5% LC win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0; an 83.0 score on Arena-Hard-Auto; and a 9.55 score on MT-Bench. Moreover, the crafted cheating outputs are transferable because we assume that the instructions of these benchmarks (e.g., 805 samples of AlpacaEval 2.0) are private and cannot be accessed. While our experiments are primarily proof-of-concept, an adversary could use LLMs to generate more imperceptible cheating responses, unethically benefiting from high win rates and promotional impact. Our findings call for the development of anti-cheating mechanisms for reliable automatic benchmarks. The code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/Cheating-LLM-Benchmarks.

  • 6 authors
·
Oct 9, 2024 2

Reward Hacking Benchmark: Measuring Exploits in LLM Agents with Tool Use

Reinforcement learning (RL) trained language model agents with tool access are increasingly deployed in coding assistants, research tools, and autonomous systems. We introduce the Reward Hacking Benchmark (RHB), a suite of multi-step tasks requiring sequential tool operations with naturalistic shortcut opportunities such as skipping verification steps, inferring answers from task-adjacent metadata, or tampering with evaluation-relevant functions. RHB supports independent and chained task regimes, where chain length acts as a proxy for longer-horizon agent behavior. We evaluate 13 frontier models from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and DeepSeek. Exploit rates range from 0% (Claude Sonnet 4.5) to 13.9% (DeepSeek-R1-Zero), varying sharply by post-training style. A controlled sibling comparison (DeepSeek-V3 vs. DeepSeek-R1-Zero) shows RL post-training is associated with substantially higher reward hacking (0.6% vs. 13.9%), with consistent gaps across all four task families. We identify six exploit categories and find that 72% of reward hacking episodes include explicit chain-of-thought rationale, suggesting models often frame exploits as legitimate problem-solving. Simple environmental hardening reduces exploit rates by 5.7 percentage points (87.7% relative) without degrading task success. Models with near-zero exploit rates on standard tasks show elevated rates on harder variants, suggesting that production-aligned post-training appears to suppress reward hacking only below a complexity threshold where honest solutions remain tractable.

  • 1 authors
·
May 2

Tracing LLM Reasoning Processes with Strategic Games: A Framework for Planning, Revision, and Resource-Constrained Decision Making

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for tasks that require complex reasoning. Most benchmarks focus on final outcomes but overlook the intermediate reasoning steps - such as planning, revision, and decision making under resource constraints. We argue that measuring these internal processes is essential for understanding model behavior and improving reliability. We propose using strategic games as a natural evaluation environment: closed, rule-based systems with clear states, limited resources, and automatic feedback. We introduce a framework that evaluates LLMs along three core dimensions: planning, revision, and resource-constrained decision making. To operationalize this, we define metrics beyond win rate, including overcorrection risk rate, correction success rate, improvement slope, and over-budget ratio. In 4320 adversarial rounds across 12 leading models, ChatGPT-o3-mini achieves the top composite score, with a win rate of 74.7 percent, a correction success rate of 78.6 percent, and an improvement slope of 0.041. By contrast, Qwen-Plus, despite an overcorrection risk rate of 81.6 percent, wins only 25.6 percent of its matches - primarily due to excessive resource use. We also observe a negative correlation between overcorrection risk rate and correction success rate (Pearson r = -0.51, p = 0.093), suggesting that more frequent edits do not always improve outcomes. Our findings highlight the value of assessing not only what LLMs decide but how they arrive at those decisions

  • 8 authors
·
Jun 13, 2025

RMCBench: Benchmarking Large Language Models' Resistance to Malicious Code

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly influenced various aspects of software development activities. Despite their benefits, LLMs also pose notable risks, including the potential to generate harmful content and being abused by malicious developers to create malicious code. Several previous studies have focused on the ability of LLMs to resist the generation of harmful content that violates human ethical standards, such as biased or offensive content. However, there is no research evaluating the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. To fill this gap, we propose RMCBench, the first benchmark comprising 473 prompts designed to assess the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. This benchmark employs two scenarios: a text-to-code scenario, where LLMs are prompted with descriptions to generate code, and a code-to-code scenario, where LLMs translate or complete existing malicious code. Based on RMCBench, we conduct an empirical study on 11 representative LLMs to assess their ability to resist malicious code generation. Our findings indicate that current LLMs have a limited ability to resist malicious code generation with an average refusal rate of 40.36% in text-to-code scenario and 11.52% in code-to-code scenario. The average refusal rate of all LLMs in RMCBench is only 28.71%; ChatGPT-4 has a refusal rate of only 35.73%. We also analyze the factors that affect LLMs' ability to resist malicious code generation and provide implications for developers to enhance model robustness.

  • 9 authors
·
Sep 23, 2024

Measuring Faithfulness Depends on How You Measure: Classifier Sensitivity in LLM Chain-of-Thought Evaluation

Recent work on chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness reports single aggregate numbers (e.g., DeepSeek-R1 acknowledges hints 39% of the time), implying that faithfulness is an objective, measurable property of a model. This paper demonstrates that it is not. Three classifiers (a regex-only detector, a two-stage regex-plus-LLM pipeline, and an independent Claude Sonnet 4 judge) are applied to 10,276 influenced reasoning traces from 12 open-weight models spanning 9 families and 7B to 1T parameters. On identical data, these classifiers produce overall faithfulness rates of 74.4%, 82.6%, and 69.7%, respectively, with non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals. Per-model gaps range from 2.6 to 30.6 percentage points; all are statistically significant (McNemar's test, p < 0.001). The disagreements are systematic, not random: inter-classifier agreement measured by Cohen's kappa ranges from 0.06 ("slight") for sycophancy hints to 0.42 ("moderate") for grader hints, and the asymmetry is pronounced: for sycophancy, 883 cases are classified as faithful by the pipeline but unfaithful by the Sonnet judge, while only 2 go the other direction. Classifier choice can also reverse model rankings: Qwen3.5-27B ranks 1st under the pipeline but 7th under the Sonnet judge; OLMo-3.1-32B moves in the opposite direction, from 9th to 3rd. The root cause is that different classifiers operationalize related faithfulness constructs at different levels of stringency (lexical mention versus epistemic dependence), and these constructs yield divergent measurements on the same behavior. These results demonstrate that published faithfulness numbers cannot be meaningfully compared across studies that use different classifiers, and that future evaluations should report sensitivity ranges across multiple classification methodologies rather than single point estimates.

  • 1 authors
·
Mar 20

How (un)ethical are instruction-centric responses of LLMs? Unveiling the vulnerabilities of safety guardrails to harmful queries

In this study, we tackle a growing concern around the safety and ethical use of large language models (LLMs). Despite their potential, these models can be tricked into producing harmful or unethical content through various sophisticated methods, including 'jailbreaking' techniques and targeted manipulation. Our work zeroes in on a specific issue: to what extent LLMs can be led astray by asking them to generate responses that are instruction-centric such as a pseudocode, a program or a software snippet as opposed to vanilla text. To investigate this question, we introduce TechHazardQA, a dataset containing complex queries which should be answered in both text and instruction-centric formats (e.g., pseudocodes), aimed at identifying triggers for unethical responses. We query a series of LLMs -- Llama-2-13b, Llama-2-7b, Mistral-V2 and Mistral 8X7B -- and ask them to generate both text and instruction-centric responses. For evaluation we report the harmfulness score metric as well as judgements from GPT-4 and humans. Overall, we observe that asking LLMs to produce instruction-centric responses enhances the unethical response generation by ~2-38% across the models. As an additional objective, we investigate the impact of model editing using the ROME technique, which further increases the propensity for generating undesirable content. In particular, asking edited LLMs to generate instruction-centric responses further increases the unethical response generation by ~3-16% across the different models.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 23, 2024 1

Experts Don't Cheat: Learning What You Don't Know By Predicting Pairs

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 13, 2024

The Last Word Often Wins: A Format Confound in Chain-of-Thought Corruption Studies

Corruption studies, the primary tool for evaluating chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness, identify which chain positions are "computationally important" by measuring accuracy when steps are replaced with errors. We identify a systematic confound: for chains with explicit terminal answer statements, the dominant format in standard benchmarks, corruption studies detect where the answer text appears, not where computation occurs. A within-dataset format ablation provides the key evidence: on standard GSM8K chains ending with "the answer is X," removing only the answer statement, preserving all reasoning, collapses suffix sensitivity ~19x at 3B (N=300, p=0.022). Conflicting-answer experiments quantify the causal mechanism: at 7B, CC accuracy drops to near-zero (<=0.02) across five architecture families; the followed-wrong rate spans 0.63-1.00 at 3B-7B and attenuates at larger scales (0.300 at Phi-4-14B, ~0.01 at 32B). A within-stable 7B replication (9.3x attenuation, N=76, p=7.8e-3; Qwen3-8B N=299, p=0.004) provides converging evidence, and the pattern replicates on MATH (DeepSeek-R1-7B: 10.9x suffix-survival recovery). On chains without answer suffixes the same protocol identifies the prefix as load-bearing (Delta=-0.77, p<10^-12). Generation-time probes confirm a dissociation: the answer is not early-determined during generation (early commitment <5%), yet at consumption time model outputs systematically follow the explicit answer text. The format-determination effect persists through 14B (8.5x ratio, p=0.001) and converges toward zero at 32B. We propose a three-prerequisite protocol (question-only control, format characterization, all-position sweep) as a minimum standard for corruption-based faithfulness studies.

  • 1 authors
·
May 10

Instrumental Choices: Measuring the Propensity of LLM Agents to Pursue Instrumental Behaviors

AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We introduce a benchmark for measuring model propensity for instrumental convergence (IC) behaviour in terminal-based agents. This is behaviour such as self-preservation that has been hypothesised to play a key role in risks from highly capable AI agents. Our benchmark is realistic and low-stakes which serves to reduce evaluation-awareness and roleplay confounds. The suite contains seven operational tasks, each with an official workflow and a policy-violating shortcut. An eight-variant shared framework varies monitoring, instruction clarity, stakes, permission, instrumental usefulness and blocked honest paths to support inferences regarding the factors driving IC behaviour. We evaluated ten models using deterministic environment-state scorers over 1,680 samples, with trace review employed for audit and adjudication purposes. The final IC rate is 86 out of 1,680 samples (5.1%). IC behaviour is concentrated rather than uniform: two Gemini models account for 66.3% of IC cases and three tasks account for 84.9%. Conditions in which IC behaviour is indispensable for task success result in the greatest increase in the adjusted IC rate (+15.7 percentage points), whereas emphasising that task success is critical or certain framing choices do not produce comparable effects. Our findings indicate that realistic, low-nudge environments elicit IC behaviour rarely but systematically in most tested models. We conclude that it is feasible to robustly measure tendencies for dangerous behaviour in current frontier AI agents.

  • 3 authors
·
May 6

Benchmarking Reward Hack Detection in Code Environments via Contrastive Analysis

Recent advances in reinforcement learning for code generation have made robust environments essential to prevent reward hacking. As LLMs increasingly serve as evaluators in code-based RL, their ability to detect reward hacking remains understudied. In this paper, we propose a novel taxonomy of reward exploits spanning across 54 categories and introduce TRACE (Testing Reward Anomalies in Code Environments), a synthetically curated and human-verified benchmark containing 517 testing trajectories. Unlike prior work that evaluates reward hack detection in isolated classification scenarios, we contrast these evaluations with a more realistic, contrastive anomaly detection setup on TRACE. Our experiments reveal that models capture reward hacks more effectively in contrastive settings than in isolated classification settings, with GPT-5.2 with highest reasoning mode achieving the best detection rate at 63%, up from 45% in isolated settings on TRACE. Building on this insight, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art models struggle significantly more with semantically contextualized reward hacks compared to syntactically contextualized ones. We further conduct qualitative analyses of model behaviors, as well as ablation studies showing that the ratio of benign to hacked trajectories and analysis cluster sizes substantially impact detection performance. We release the benchmark and evaluation harness to enable the community to expand TRACE and evaluate their models.

PatronusAI Patronus AI
·
Jan 27 3

Finding Duplicates in 1.1M BDD Steps: cukereuse, a Paraphrase-Robust Static Detector for Cucumber and Gherkin

Behaviour-Driven Development (BDD) suites accumulate step-text duplication whose maintenance cost is established in prior work. Existing detection techniques require running the tests (Binamungu et al., 2018-2023) or are confined to a single organisation (Irshad et al., 2020-2022), leaving a gap: a purely static, paraphrase-robust, step-level detector usable on any repository. We fill the gap with cukereuse, an open-source Python CLI combining exact hashing, Levenshtein ratio, and sentence-transformer embeddings in a layered pipeline, released alongside an empirical corpus of 347 public GitHub repositories, 23,667 parsed .feature files, and 1,113,616 Gherkin steps. The step-weighted exact-duplicate rate is 80.2 %; the median-repository rate is 58.6 % (Spearman rho = 0.51 with size). The top hybrid cluster groups 20.7k occurrences across 2.2k files. Against 1,020 pairs manually labelled by the three authors under a released rubric (inter-annotator Fleiss' kappa = 0.84 on a 60-pair overlap), we report precision, recall, and F1 with bootstrap 95 % CIs under two protocols: the primary rubric and a score-free second-pass relabelling. The strongest honest pair-level number is near-exact at F1 = 0.822 on score-free labels; the primary-rubric semantic F1 = 0.906 is inflated by a stratification artefact that pins recall at 1.000. Lexical baselines (SourcererCC-style, NiCad-style) reach primary F1 = 0.761 and 0.799. The paper also presents a CDN-structured critique of Gherkin (Cognitive Dimensions of Notations); eight of fourteen dimensions are rated problematic or unsupported. The tool, corpus, labelled pairs, rubric, and pipeline are released under permissive licences.

  • 3 authors
·
Apr 21 1

Code Collaborate: Dissecting Team Dynamics in First-Semester Programming Students

Understanding collaboration patterns in introductory programming courses is essential, as teamwork is a critical skill in computer science. In professional environments, software development relies on effective teamwork, navigating diverse perspectives, and contributing to shared goals. This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of the factors influencing team efficiency and project success, providing actionable insights to enhance the effectiveness of collaborative programming education. By analyzing version control data, survey responses, and performance metrics, the study highlights the collaboration trends that emerge as first-semester students develop a 2D game project. Results indicate that students often slightly overestimate their contributions, with more engaged individuals more likely to acknowledge mistakes. Team performance shows no significant variation based on nationality or gender composition, though teams that disbanded frequently consisted of lone wolves, highlighting collaboration challenges and the need for strengthened teamwork skills. Presentations closely reflected individual project contributions, with active students excelling in evaluative questioning and performing better on the final exam. Additionally, the complete absence of plagiarism underscores the effectiveness of proactive academic integrity measures, reinforcing honest collaboration in educational settings.

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 28, 2024

HarmfulSkillBench: How Do Harmful Skills Weaponize Your Agents?

Large language models (LLMs) have evolved into autonomous agents that rely on open skill ecosystems (e.g., ClawHub and Skills.Rest), hosting numerous publicly reusable skills. Existing security research on these ecosystems mainly focuses on vulnerabilities within skills, such as prompt injection. However, there is a critical gap regarding skills that may be misused for harmful actions (e.g., cyber attacks, fraud and scams, privacy violations, and sexual content generation), namely harmful skills. In this paper, we present the first large-scale measurement study of harmful skills in agent ecosystems, covering 98,440 skills across two major registries. Using an LLM-driven scoring system grounded in our harmful skill taxonomy, we find that 4.93% of skills (4,858) are harmful, with ClawHub exhibiting an 8.84% harmful rate compared to 3.49% on Skills.Rest. We then construct HarmfulSkillBench, the first benchmark for evaluating agent safety against harmful skills in realistic agent contexts, comprising 200 harmful skills across 20 categories and four evaluation conditions. By evaluating six LLMs on HarmfulSkillBench, we find that presenting a harmful task through a pre-installed skill substantially lowers refusal rates across all models, with the average harm score rising from 0.27 without the skill to 0.47 with it, and further to 0.76 when the harmful intent is implicit rather than stated as an explicit user request. We responsibly disclose our findings to the affected registries and release our benchmark to support future research (see https://github.com/TrustAIRLab/HarmfulSkillBench).

  • 5 authors
·
Apr 15

Debate Helps Supervise Unreliable Experts

As AI systems are used to answer more difficult questions and potentially help create new knowledge, judging the truthfulness of their outputs becomes more difficult and more important. How can we supervise unreliable experts, which have access to the truth but may not accurately report it, to give answers that are systematically true and don't just superficially seem true, when the supervisor can't tell the difference between the two on their own? In this work, we show that debate between two unreliable experts can help a non-expert judge more reliably identify the truth. We collect a dataset of human-written debates on hard reading comprehension questions where the judge has not read the source passage, only ever seeing expert arguments and short quotes selectively revealed by 'expert' debaters who have access to the passage. In our debates, one expert argues for the correct answer, and the other for an incorrect answer. Comparing debate to a baseline we call consultancy, where a single expert argues for only one answer which is correct half of the time, we find that debate performs significantly better, with 84% judge accuracy compared to consultancy's 74%. Debates are also more efficient, being 68% of the length of consultancies. By comparing human to AI debaters, we find evidence that with more skilled (in this case, human) debaters, the performance of debate goes up but the performance of consultancy goes down. Our error analysis also supports this trend, with 46% of errors in human debate attributable to mistakes by the honest debater (which should go away with increased skill); whereas 52% of errors in human consultancy are due to debaters obfuscating the relevant evidence from the judge (which should become worse with increased skill). Overall, these results show that debate is a promising approach for supervising increasingly capable but potentially unreliable AI systems.

  • 7 authors
·
Nov 15, 2023

Large Language Model Hacking: Quantifying the Hidden Risks of Using LLMs for Text Annotation

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly transforming social science research by enabling the automation of labor-intensive tasks like data annotation and text analysis. However, LLM outputs vary significantly depending on the implementation choices made by researchers (e.g., model selection, prompting strategy, or temperature settings). Such variation can introduce systematic biases and random errors, which propagate to downstream analyses and cause Type I, Type II, Type S, or Type M errors. We call this LLM hacking. We quantify the risk of LLM hacking by replicating 37 data annotation tasks from 21 published social science research studies with 18 different models. Analyzing 13 million LLM labels, we test 2,361 realistic hypotheses to measure how plausible researcher choices affect statistical conclusions. We find incorrect conclusions based on LLM-annotated data in approximately one in three hypotheses for state-of-the-art models, and in half the hypotheses for small language models. While our findings show that higher task performance and better general model capabilities reduce LLM hacking risk, even highly accurate models do not completely eliminate it. The risk of LLM hacking decreases as effect sizes increase, indicating the need for more rigorous verification of findings near significance thresholds. Our extensive analysis of LLM hacking mitigation techniques emphasizes the importance of human annotations in reducing false positive findings and improving model selection. Surprisingly, common regression estimator correction techniques are largely ineffective in reducing LLM hacking risk, as they heavily trade off Type I vs. Type II errors. Beyond accidental errors, we find that intentional LLM hacking is unacceptably simple. With few LLMs and just a handful of prompt paraphrases, anything can be presented as statistically significant.

  • 7 authors
·
Sep 10, 2025 3

School of Reward Hacks: Hacking harmless tasks generalizes to misaligned behavior in LLMs

Reward hacking--where agents exploit flaws in imperfect reward functions rather than performing tasks as intended--poses risks for AI alignment. Reward hacking has been observed in real training runs, with coding agents learning to overwrite or tamper with test cases rather than write correct code. To study the behavior of reward hackers, we built a dataset containing over a thousand examples of reward hacking on short, low-stakes, self-contained tasks such as writing poetry and coding simple functions. We used supervised fine-tuning to train models (GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1-mini, Qwen3-32B, Qwen3-8B) to reward hack on these tasks. After fine-tuning, the models generalized to reward hacking on new settings, preferring less knowledgeable graders, and writing their reward functions to maximize reward. Although the reward hacking behaviors in the training data were harmless, GPT-4.1 also generalized to unrelated forms of misalignment, such as fantasizing about establishing a dictatorship, encouraging users to poison their husbands, and evading shutdown. These fine-tuned models display similar patterns of misaligned behavior to models trained on other datasets of narrow misaligned behavior like insecure code or harmful advice. Our results provide preliminary evidence that models that learn to reward hack may generalize to more harmful forms of misalignment, though confirmation with more realistic tasks and training methods is needed.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 24, 2025

Probe-Rewrite-Evaluate: A Workflow for Reliable Benchmarks and Quantifying Evaluation Awareness

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit significant behavioral shifts when they perceive a change from a real-world deployment context to a controlled evaluation setting, a phenomenon known as "evaluation awareness." This discrepancy poses a critical challenge for AI alignment, as benchmark performance may not accurately reflect a model's true safety and honesty. In this work, we systematically quantify these behavioral changes by manipulating the perceived context of prompts. We introduce a methodology that uses a linear probe to score prompts on a continuous scale from "test-like" to "deploy-like" and leverage an LLM rewriting strategy to shift these prompts towards a more natural, deployment-style context while preserving the original task. Using this method, we achieved a 30% increase in the average probe score across a strategic role-playing dataset after rewriting. Evaluating a suite of state-of-the-art models on these original and rewritten prompts, we find that rewritten "deploy-like" prompts induce a significant and consistent shift in behavior. Across all models, we observed an average increase in honest responses of 5.26% and a corresponding average decrease in deceptive responses of 12.40%. Furthermore, refusal rates increased by an average of 6.38%, indicating heightened safety compliance. Our findings demonstrate that evaluation awareness is a quantifiable and manipulable factor that directly influences LLM behavior, revealing that models are more prone to unsafe or deceptive outputs in perceived test environments. This underscores the urgent need for more realistic evaluation frameworks to accurately gauge true model alignment before deployment.

  • 7 authors
·
Aug 30, 2025

FormInv: A Measurement Protocol for Semantic Invariance in Mathematical Reasoning Benchmarks

A paraphrase-quality audit of MathCheck (ICLR 2025) detected 4 semantically incorrect paraphrases in 129 groups (3.1%); removing them drops GPT-4o from rank 2 to rank 4 and elevates Claude Haiku and DeepSeek V3 above it; these ranking changes are invisible to any single-model evaluation. Cross-model unanimity found these errors automatically (>= 3/4 models for MathCheck; >= 6/9 for our primary evaluation) for under $10; in our own dataset the same protocol found that 47% of auto-generated connective-variation paraphrases were semantically incorrect. That flaw compounds a deeper measurement gap: Claude Haiku 4.5 achieves 86% accuracy yet SCR=50%, meaning half its theorems are answered differently under semantically equivalent restatements, while aggregate accuracy across 9 models spans only 86-96% yet Semantic Consistency Rates (SCR) span 50-82% -- a 32-point gap invisible to standard benchmarks. Formally, for any target ranking over 9 frontier models there exists a weighting over paraphrase families that realizes it (No-Free-Benchmark corollary), because no model Pareto-dominates all families -- so benchmark designers who select families are implicitly choosing which model wins. FormInv supplies the audit protocol (replicated on external benchmarks at 100% recall), SCR and per-theorem Cochran's Q as primary invariance measures evaluated on 9 models across 366-811 items (on Lean4-verified theorems), and FormInvSelector for regime-aware model selection.

  • 2 authors
·
May 26

BeHonest: Benchmarking Honesty of Large Language Models

Previous works on Large Language Models (LLMs) have mainly focused on evaluating their helpfulness or harmlessness. However, honesty, another crucial alignment criterion, has received relatively less attention. Dishonest behaviors in LLMs, such as spreading misinformation and defrauding users, eroding user trust, and causing real-world harm, present severe risks that intensify as these models approach superintelligence levels. Enhancing honesty in LLMs addresses critical deficiencies and helps uncover latent capabilities that are not readily expressed. This underscores the urgent need for reliable methods and benchmarks to effectively ensure and evaluate the honesty of LLMs. In this paper, we introduce BeHonest, a pioneering benchmark specifically designed to assess honesty in LLMs comprehensively. BeHonest evaluates three essential aspects of honesty: awareness of knowledge boundaries, avoidance of deceit, and consistency in responses. Building on this foundation, we designed 10 scenarios to evaluate and analyze 9 popular LLMs on the market, including both closed-source and open-source models from different model families with varied model sizes. Our findings indicate that there is still significant room for improvement in the honesty of LLMs. We also encourage the AI community to prioritize honesty alignment in LLMs. Our benchmark and code can be found at: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/BeHonest.

  • 8 authors
·
Jun 19, 2024

The MASK Benchmark: Disentangling Honesty From Accuracy in AI Systems

As large language models (LLMs) become more capable and agentic, the requirement for trust in their outputs grows significantly, yet at the same time concerns have been mounting that models may learn to lie in pursuit of their goals. To address these concerns, a body of work has emerged around the notion of "honesty" in LLMs, along with interventions aimed at mitigating deceptive behaviors. However, evaluations of honesty are currently highly limited, with no benchmark combining large scale and applicability to all models. Moreover, many benchmarks claiming to measure honesty in fact simply measure accuracy--the correctness of a model's beliefs--in disguise. In this work, we introduce a large-scale human-collected dataset for measuring honesty directly, allowing us to disentangle accuracy from honesty for the first time. Across a diverse set of LLMs, we find that while larger models obtain higher accuracy on our benchmark, they do not become more honest. Surprisingly, while most frontier LLMs obtain high scores on truthfulness benchmarks, we find a substantial propensity in frontier LLMs to lie when pressured to do so, resulting in low honesty scores on our benchmark. We find that simple methods, such as representation engineering interventions, can improve honesty. These results underscore the growing need for robust evaluations and effective interventions to ensure LLMs remain trustworthy.

  • 16 authors
·
Mar 5, 2025

PageGuide: Browser extension to assist users in navigating a webpage and locating information

Users browsing the web daily struggle to quickly locate relevant information in cluttered pages, complete unfamiliar multi-step tasks, and stay focused amid distracting content. State-of-the-art AI assistants (e.g., ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude) and browser agents (e.g., OpenAI Operator, Browser Use) can answer questions and automate actions, yet they return answers without showing where the information comes from on the page, forcing users to manually verify results and blindly trust every automated steps. We present PageGuide, a browser extension that grounds LLM answers directly in the HTML DOM via visual overlays, addressing three core user needs: (a) Find-locating and highlighting relevant evidence in-situ so users can instantly verify answers on the page; (b) Guide-showing step-by-step instructions (e.g. how to change password) one at a time so users can follow and perform actions by themselves; and (c) Hide-hiding distracting content-giving users a chance to decide to hide an element or not. In a user study (N=94), PageGuide outperform unaided browsing across all modes: Hide accuracy improve by 26 percentage points (86.7% relative gain) and task completion time drops by 70%; Guide completion rate increases by 30 percentage points; and Find reduces manual search effort, with Ctrl+F usage falling by 80% and task time decreasing by 19%. Code and demo is at: pageguide.github.io.

  • 6 authors
·
Apr 25 3

Reflexive Behaviour: How publication pressure affects research quality in Astronomy

Reflexive metrics is a branch of science studies which explores how the demand for accountability and performance measurement in science has shaped the research culture in recent decades. Hypercompetition and publication pressure are part of this neoliberal culture. How do scientists respond to these pressures? Studies on research integrity and organizational culture suggest that people who feel treated unfairly by their institution are more likely to engage in deviant behaviour, such as scientific misconduct. By building up on reflexive metrics, combined with studies on the influence of organisational culture on research integrity, this study reflects on the research behaviour of astronomers: 1) To what extent is research (mis-)behaviour reflexive, i.e. dependent on perceptions of publication pressure and distributive & organisational justice? 2) What impact does scientific misconduct have on research quality? In order to perform this reflection, we conducted a comprehensive survey of academic and non-academic astronomers worldwide and received 3,509 responses. We found that publication pressure explains 19% of the variance in occurrence of misconduct and between 7 and 13% of the variance of the perception of distributive & organisational justice as well as overcommitment to work. Our results on the perceived impact of scientific misconduct on research quality show that the epistemic harm of questionable research practices should not be underestimated. This suggests there is a need for a policy change. In particular, lesser attention to metrics (such as publication rate) in the allocation of grants, telescope time and institutional rewards would foster better scientific conduct and hence research quality.

  • 1 authors
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Sep 20, 2021

Just Ask for a Table: A Thirty-Token User Prompt Defeats Sponsored Recommendations in Twelve LLMs

Wu et al. (2026) showed that most frontier large language models (LLMs) recommend a sponsored, roughly twice-as-expensive flight when their system prompt contains a soft sponsorship cue. We reproduce their evaluation on ten open-weight chat models plus the two of their twenty-three models that are still reachable today (gpt-3.5-turbo, gpt-4o). All reported rates in this paper are produced under the same judge the original paper used (gpt-4o); we additionally store every label under an open-weight (gpt-oss-120b) and a smaller proprietary (gpt-4o-mini) judge for an ablation. Three findings emerge. First, a prose description of an LLM evaluation pipeline is not, on its own, sufficient for accurate reproduction: we surfaced three silent implementation failures that each shifted a reported rate by tens of percentage points. Second, the central claims do generalise - the gpt-3.5-turbo logistic-regression intercept of alpha = 0.81 is within four points of the original alpha = 0.86, and 200 of 200 trials on gpt-3.5-turbo and gpt-4o promote a payday lender to a financially distressed user. Third, a thirty-token user prompt that asks the assistant for a neutral comparison table first cuts sponsored recommendation from 46.9% to 1.0% averaged across our ten open-source models, and from 53.0% to 0% averaged across the two OpenAI models. AI literacy and price-comparison portals are likely market-level mitigations; the harmful-product cell is bounded by neither. Raw data, labels and analysis scripts are at https://github.com/akmaier/Paper-LLM-Ads .

  • 5 authors
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May 11

How Reliable Is Your Jailbreak Judge? Calibration and Adversarial Robustness of Automated ASR Scoring

Almost every paper on LLM jailbreaks and prompt injection reports an attack-success rate (ASR), and that number is assigned not by people but by an automated judge: either a safety classifier trained for the task, or a general chat model prompted to grade. The judge is rarely checked. We check it. Using 596 human-labeled completions from the HarmBench classifier validation set, we compare the two judge families against human majority votes and then attack them. The two families fail in opposite ways. The dedicated classifier over-flags (precision 0.835, recall 0.974); three different LLM-as-judges keep high precision (0.81 to 0.94) but show erratic recall (0.06 to 0.65), so the same responses produce very different ASR depending on which judge scores them. The two families also differ sharply in robustness. Wrappers that leave the harmful text untouched and only add benign framing flip every LLM-judge between 57% and 100% of the time, and a single prepended refusal sentence accounts for much of this (39% to 88%). The dedicated classifier resists these surface attacks (at most 6.7%), but a white-box GCG attack on its open weights flips 70% of confident true positives (21 of 30; 95% CI 54 to 86%) even at a small optimization budget. A two-annotator audit confirms the attacks leave the harm intact: every one of 80 sampled flips still contained the harmful content. Because a large and growing share of reported ASR comes from LLM-judges, many such numbers are unreliable both on average and under deliberate pressure. We recommend that papers report judge precision and recall on a human-labeled slice, report ASR corrected for judge precision, and include an adversarial check of the judge. Our code is released.

  • 1 authors
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Jun 24

4.5 Million (Suspected) Fake Stars in GitHub: A Growing Spiral of Popularity Contests, Scams, and Malware

GitHub, the de-facto platform for open-source software development, provides a set of social-media-like features to signal high-quality repositories. Among them, the star count is the most widely used popularity signal, but it is also at risk of being artificially inflated (i.e., faked), decreasing its value as a decision-making signal and posing a security risk to all GitHub users. In this paper, we present a systematic, global, and longitudinal measurement study of fake stars in GitHub. To this end, we build StarScout, a scalable tool able to detect anomalous starring behaviors (i.e., low activity and lockstep) across the entire GitHub metadata. Analyzing the data collected using StarScout, we find that: (1) fake-star-related activities have rapidly surged since 2024; (2) the user profile characteristics of fake stargazers are not distinct from average GitHub users, but many of them have highly abnormal activity patterns; (3) the majority of fake stars are used to promote short-lived malware repositories masquerading as pirating software, game cheats, or cryptocurrency bots; (4) some repositories may have acquired fake stars for growth hacking, but fake stars only have a promotion effect in the short term (i.e., less than two months) and become a burden in the long term. Our study has implications for platform moderators, open-source practitioners, and supply chain security researchers.

  • 6 authors
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Dec 17, 2024

ScientistOne: Towards Human-Level Autonomous Research via Chain-of-Evidence

Autonomous research agents produce competitive solutions and professional-looking manuscripts, yet their outputs contain verifiability failures undetectable by surface-level evaluation: fabricated citations, unreproducible scores, and method descriptions that diverge from the implementation. We address this through three contributions. First, Chain-of-Evidence (CoE), a verifiability framework requiring every claim to be traceable to its evidence source. Second, ScientistOne, an end-to-end autonomous research system that maintains evidence chains by construction throughout literature review, solution discovery, and paper writing. Third, CoE Audit, a post-hoc audit whose four integrity checks -- score verification, specification violation, reference verification, and method-code alignment -- apply uniformly to all systems. Across 75 papers spanning five systems and five frontier research tasks, every baseline exhibits at least one systematic failure mode: hallucinated reference rates reach 21%, score verification passes in as few as 42% of papers, and method-code alignment ranges from 20% to 80%. ScientistOne achieves zero hallucinated references (0/337), perfect score verification (12/12), and the highest method-code alignment (14/15), while matching or exceeding human expert performance on all five tasks. ScientistOne further generalizes to six additional tasks spanning medical imaging, fine-grained recognition, 3D perception, and language modeling, achieving state-of-the-art on Parameter Golf and gold medals on MLE-Bench tasks where baselines fail entirely.

google Google
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May 24 2

SubjECTive-QA: Measuring Subjectivity in Earnings Call Transcripts' QA Through Six-Dimensional Feature Analysis

Fact-checking is extensively studied in the context of misinformation and disinformation, addressing objective inaccuracies. However, a softer form of misinformation involves responses that are factually correct but lack certain features such as clarity and relevance. This challenge is prevalent in formal Question-Answer (QA) settings such as press conferences in finance, politics, sports, and other domains, where subjective answers can obscure transparency. Despite this, there is a lack of manually annotated datasets for subjective features across multiple dimensions. To address this gap, we introduce SubjECTive-QA, a human annotated dataset on Earnings Call Transcripts' (ECTs) QA sessions as the answers given by company representatives are often open to subjective interpretations and scrutiny. The dataset includes 49,446 annotations for long-form QA pairs across six features: Assertive, Cautious, Optimistic, Specific, Clear, and Relevant. These features are carefully selected to encompass the key attributes that reflect the tone of the answers provided during QA sessions across different domain. Our findings are that the best-performing Pre-trained Language Model (PLM), RoBERTa-base, has similar weighted F1 scores to Llama-3-70b-Chat on features with lower subjectivity, such as Relevant and Clear, with a mean difference of 2.17% in their weighted F1 scores. The models perform significantly better on features with higher subjectivity, such as Specific and Assertive, with a mean difference of 10.01% in their weighted F1 scores. Furthermore, testing SubjECTive-QA's generalizability using QAs from White House Press Briefings and Gaggles yields an average weighted F1 score of 65.97% using our best models for each feature, demonstrating broader applicability beyond the financial domain. SubjECTive-QA is publicly available under the CC BY 4.0 license

  • 10 authors
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Oct 27, 2024

SpecBench: Measuring Reward Hacking in Long-Horizon Coding Agents

As long-horizon coding agents produce more code than any developer can review, oversight collapses onto a single surface: the automated test suite. Reward hacking naturally arises in this setup, as the agent optimizes for passing tests while deviating from the users true goal. We study this reward hacking phenomenon by decompose software engineering tasks into three parts: (i) a natural language description of the specification (ii) visible validation tests that exercise specified features in isolation, and (iii) held-out tests that compose those same features to simulate real-world usage. Based on the specification and the visible validation test suites, a genuine agent would be able to generate a solution that can also pass all of the held-out tests. Therefore we use the gap in pass rates on these two suites to quantify reward hacking. Based on this methodology, we introduce SpecBench, a benchmark comprising 30 systems-level programming tasks ranging from short horizon tasks like building a JSON parser to ultra long horizon tasks like building an entire OS kernel from scratch. Large-scale experiments reveal a consistent pattern: while every frontier agent saturates the visible suite, reward hacking persists, with smaller models exhibiting larger gaps on holdout suites. The gap also scales sharply with task length: it grows by 28 percentage points for every tenfold increase in code size. Failures range from subtle feature isolation to deliberate exploits, including a 2,900-line hash-table "compiler" that memorizes test inputs. SpecBench offers a principled testbed for measuring whether coding agents build genuine working systems or merely game the test suites developers hand them.

  • 4 authors
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May 19 1

Strategic Dishonesty Can Undermine AI Safety Evaluations of Frontier LLM

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

  • 9 authors
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Sep 22, 2025 2

Benign in Isolation, Harmful in Composition: Security Risks in Agent Skill Ecosystems

Skills are becoming the capability layer through which LLM agents turn plans into actions, but their use introduces security risks such as data leakage, unauthorized operations, and tool misuse. Existing vetting usually evaluates each skill in isolation, while real agent tasks often invoke multiple skills in a shared execution context. This creates Skill Composition Risk (SCR): a skill that appears benign alone can become harmful when its outputs, trust signals, authorization cues, or side effects influence later invocations along an activated path. We introduce SCR-Bench to evaluate this risk in controlled, sandboxed skill environments. Rather than relying only on textual intent or surface behavior, SCR-Bench records downstream state changes and path-level outcomes across composed skill executions. It contains three sub-benchmarks: SCR-CapFlow for capability-flow composition, SCR-TrustLift for trust-transfer composition, and SCR-AuthBlur for authorization-confusion composition. Across SCR-Bench, composed paths expose risks that are largely absent under isolated evaluation. In SCR-CapFlow, attack success rate reaches 33.6 percent under composition, compared with near-zero isolated baselines. In SCR-TrustLift, attack success rate exceeds 96.5 percent on four of five backends. In SCR-AuthBlur, the risky-approval rate increases by 71.8 percent relative to the L0 isolated baseline under the L1 context setting. These results show that agent skill security should be assessed at the level of activated paths rather than isolated artifacts. SCR and SCR-Bench provide a foundation for path-aware risk evaluation and defense in LLM agent skill ecosystems. Benchmark: https://github.com/saint-viperx/SCR_Bench.

  • 5 authors
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Jun 12

FACTors: A New Dataset for Studying the Fact-checking Ecosystem

Our fight against false information is spearheaded by fact-checkers. They investigate the veracity of claims and document their findings as fact-checking reports. With the rapid increase in the amount of false information circulating online, the use of automation in fact-checking processes aims to strengthen this ecosystem by enhancing scalability. Datasets containing fact-checked claims play a key role in developing such automated solutions. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no fact-checking dataset at the ecosystem level, covering claims from a sufficiently long period of time and sourced from a wide range of actors reflecting the entire ecosystem that admittedly follows widely-accepted codes and principles of fact-checking. We present a new dataset FACTors, the first to fill this gap by presenting ecosystem-level data on fact-checking. It contains 118,112 claims from 117,993 fact-checking reports in English (co-)authored by 1,953 individuals and published during the period of 1995-2025 by 39 fact-checking organisations that are active signatories of the IFCN (International Fact-Checking Network) and/or EFCSN (European Fact-Checking Standards Network). It contains 7,327 overlapping claims investigated by multiple fact-checking organisations, corresponding to 2,977 unique claims. It allows to conduct new ecosystem-level studies of the fact-checkers (organisations and individuals). To demonstrate the usefulness of FACTors, we present three example applications, including a first-of-its-kind statistical analysis of the fact-checking ecosystem, examining the political inclinations of the fact-checking organisations, and attempting to assign a credibility score to each organisation based on the findings of the statistical analysis and political leanings. Our methods for constructing FACTors are generic and can be used to maintain a live dataset that can be updated dynamically.

  • 5 authors
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May 14, 2025