Daily Papers

While agentic AI and its core multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable promise in language and visual reasoning across domains ranging from daily life to advanced scientific research, a profound gap remains between artificial and human intelligence. Despite the integration of powerful tools and advanced MLLMs, state-of-the-art AI agents frequently fail at foundational, seemingly simple tasks that a child can resolve with ease. Inspired by the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC), we introduce ChildAgentEval, the first psychometrically grounded interactive benchmark for evaluating cognitive age alignment in MLLM-based agents. ChildAgentEval systematically compares the reasoning performance of various MLLM-based interactive agents against age-specific human developmental stages, exposing where current agentic AI systems can and cannot simulate age-specific cognitive behavior.

Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has largely been path-independent to model training, i.e., has focused on the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs would benefit from considering the developmental alignment of their performance during training to the trajectories of children's thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four sets of tasks to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate their available intermediate and final training steps. These tasks are Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow "blank slate" models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

Artificial and biological systems may evolve similar computational solutions despite fundamental differences in architecture and learning mechanisms -- a form of convergent evolution. We demonstrate this phenomenon through large-scale analysis of alignment between human brain activity and internal representations of over 600 AI models spanning language and vision domains, from 1.33M to 72B parameters. Analyzing 60 million alignment measurements reveals that higher-performing models spontaneously develop stronger brain alignment without explicit neural constraints, with language models showing markedly stronger correlation (r=0.89, p<7.5e-13) than vision models (r=0.53, p<2.0e-44). Crucially, longitudinal analysis demonstrates that brain alignment consistently precedes performance improvements during training, suggesting that developing brain-like representations may be a necessary stepping stone toward higher capabilities. We find systematic patterns: language models exhibit strongest alignment with limbic and integrative regions, while vision models show progressive alignment with visual cortices; deeper processing layers converge across modalities; and as representational scale increases, alignment systematically shifts from primary sensory to higher-order associative regions. These findings provide compelling evidence that optimization for task performance naturally drives AI systems toward brain-like computational strategies, offering both fundamental insights into principles of intelligent information processing and practical guidance for developing more capable AI systems.

Recent advancements in general-purpose AI have highlighted the importance of guiding AI systems towards the intended goals, ethical principles, and values of individuals and groups, a concept broadly recognized as alignment. However, the lack of clarified definitions and scopes of human-AI alignment poses a significant obstacle, hampering collaborative efforts across research domains to achieve this alignment. In particular, ML- and philosophy-oriented alignment research often views AI alignment as a static, unidirectional process (i.e., aiming to ensure that AI systems' objectives match humans) rather than an ongoing, mutual alignment problem [429]. This perspective largely neglects the long-term interaction and dynamic changes of alignment. To understand these gaps, we introduce a systematic review of over 400 papers published between 2019 and January 2024, spanning multiple domains such as Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine Learning (ML), and others. We characterize, define and scope human-AI alignment. From this, we present a conceptual framework of "Bidirectional Human-AI Alignment" to organize the literature from a human-centered perspective. This framework encompasses both 1) conventional studies of aligning AI to humans that ensures AI produces the intended outcomes determined by humans, and 2) a proposed concept of aligning humans to AI, which aims to help individuals and society adjust to AI advancements both cognitively and behaviorally. Additionally, we articulate the key findings derived from literature analysis, including discussions about human values, interaction techniques, and evaluations. To pave the way for future studies, we envision three key challenges for future directions and propose examples of potential future solutions.

LLMs can exhibit age biases, resulting in unequal treatment of individuals across age groups. While much research has addressed racial and gender biases, age bias remains little explored. The scarcity of instruction-tuning and preference datasets for age bias hampers its detection and measurement, and existing fine-tuning methods seldom address age-related fairness. In this paper, we construct age bias preference datasets and instruction-tuning datasets for RLHF. We introduce ARG, an age fairness reward to reduce differences in the response quality of LLMs across different age groups. Extensive experiments demonstrate that this reward significantly improves response accuracy and reduces performance disparities across age groups. Our source code and datasets are available at the anonymous https://anonymous.4open.science/r/FairRLHF-D445/readme.md{link}.

Humans represent scenes and objects in rich feature spaces, carrying information that allows us to generalise about category memberships and abstract functions with few examples. What determines whether a neural network model generalises like a human? We tested how well the representations of 86 pretrained neural network models mapped to human learning trajectories across two tasks where humans had to learn continuous relationships and categories of natural images. In these tasks, both human participants and neural networks successfully identified the relevant stimulus features within a few trials, demonstrating effective generalisation. We found that while training dataset size was a core determinant of alignment with human choices, contrastive training with multi-modal data (text and imagery) was a common feature of currently publicly available models that predicted human generalisation. Intrinsic dimensionality of representations had different effects on alignment for different model types. Lastly, we tested three sets of human-aligned representations and found no consistent improvements in predictive accuracy compared to the baselines. In conclusion, pretrained neural networks can serve to extract representations for cognitive models, as they appear to capture some fundamental aspects of cognition that are transferable across tasks. Both our paradigms and modelling approach offer a novel way to quantify alignment between neural networks and humans and extend cognitive science into more naturalistic domains.

This paper documents and theorises a self-reinforcing dynamic between two measurable trends: the exponential expansion of large language model (LLM) context windows and the secular contraction of human sustained-attention capacity. We term the resulting asymmetry the Cognitive Divergence. AI context windows have grown from 512 tokens in 2017 to 2,000,000 tokens by 2026 (factor ~3,906; fitted lambda = 0.59/yr; doubling time ~14 months). Over the same period, human Effective Context Span (ECS) -- a token-equivalent measure derived from validated reading-rate meta-analysis (Brysbaert, 2019) and an empirically motivated Comprehension Scaling Factor -- has declined from approximately 16,000 tokens (2004 baseline) to an estimated 1,800 tokens (2026, extrapolated from longitudinal behavioural data ending 2020 (Mark, 2023); see Section 9 for uncertainty discussion). The AI-to-human ratio grew from near parity at the ChatGPT launch (November 2022) to 556--1,111x raw and 56--111x quality-adjusted, after accounting for retrieval degradation (Liu et al., 2024; Chroma, 2025). Beyond documenting this divergence, the paper introduces the Delegation Feedback Loop hypothesis: as AI capability grows, the cognitive threshold at which humans delegate to AI falls, extending to tasks of negligible demand; the resulting reduction in cognitive practice may further attenuate the capacities already documented as declining (Gerlich, 2025; Kim et al., 2026; Kosmyna et al., 2025). Neither trend reverses spontaneously. The paper characterises the divergence statistically, reviews neurobiological mechanisms across eight peer-reviewed neuroimaging studies, presents empirical evidence bearing on the delegation threshold, and proposes a research agenda centred on a validated ECS psychometric instrument and longitudinal study of AI-mediated cognitive change.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, they exhibit certain cognitive patterns similar to those of humans that are not directly specified in training data. This study investigates this phenomenon by focusing on temporal cognition in LLMs. Leveraging the similarity judgment task, we find that larger models spontaneously establish a subjective temporal reference point and adhere to the Weber-Fechner law, whereby the perceived distance logarithmically compresses as years recede from this reference point. To uncover the mechanisms behind this behavior, we conducted multiple analyses across neuronal, representational, and informational levels. We first identify a set of temporal-preferential neurons and find that this group exhibits minimal activation at the subjective reference point and implements a logarithmic coding scheme convergently found in biological systems. Probing representations of years reveals a hierarchical construction process, where years evolve from basic numerical values in shallow layers to abstract temporal orientation in deep layers. Finally, using pre-trained embedding models, we found that the training corpus itself possesses an inherent, non-linear temporal structure, which provides the raw material for the model's internal construction. In discussion, we propose an experientialist perspective for understanding these findings, where the LLMs' cognition is viewed as a subjective construction of the external world by its internal representational system. This nuanced perspective implies the potential emergence of alien cognitive frameworks that humans cannot intuitively predict, pointing toward a direction for AI alignment that focuses on guiding internal constructions. Our code is available at https://TheOtherMind.github.io.

Do large language models reason morally, or do they merely sound like they do? We investigate whether LLM responses to moral dilemmas exhibit genuine developmental progression through Kohlberg's stages of moral development, or whether alignment training instead produces reasoning-like outputs that superficially resemble mature moral judgment without the underlying developmental trajectory. Using an LLM-as-judge scoring pipeline validated across three judge models, we classify more than 600 responses from 13 LLMs spanning a range of architectures, parameter scales, and training regimes across six classical moral dilemmas, and conduct ten complementary analyses to characterize the nature and internal coherence of the resulting patterns. Our results reveal a striking inversion: responses overwhelmingly correspond to post-conventional reasoning (Stages 5-6) regardless of model size, architecture, or prompting strategy, the effective inverse of human developmental norms, where Stage 4 dominates. Most strikingly, a subset of models exhibit moral decoupling: systematic inconsistency between stated moral justification and action choice, a form of logical incoherence that persists across scale and prompting strategy and represents a direct reasoning consistency failure independent of rhetorical sophistication. Model scale carries a statistically significant but practically small effect; training type has no significant independent main effect; and models exhibit near-robotic cross-dilemma consistency producing logically indistinguishable responses across semantically distinct moral problems. We posit that these patterns constitute evidence for moral ventriloquism: the acquisition, through alignment training, of the rhetorical conventions of mature moral reasoning without the underlying developmental trajectory those conventions are meant to represent.

Pretraining corpora contain extensive discourse about AI systems, yet the causal influence of this discourse on downstream alignment remains poorly understood. If prevailing descriptions of AI behaviour are predominantly negative, LLMs may internalise corresponding behavioural priors, giving rise to self-fulfilling misalignment. This paper provides the first controlled study of this hypothesis by pretraining 6.9B-parameter LLMs with varying amounts of (mis)alignment discourse. We find that discussion of AI contributes to misalignment. Upsampling synthetic training documents about AI misalignment leads to a notable increase in misaligned behaviour. Conversely, upsampling documents about aligned behaviour reduces misalignment scores from 45% to 9%. We consider this evidence of self-fulfilling alignment. These effects are dampened, but persist through post-training. Our findings establish the study of how pretraining data shapes alignment priors, or alignment pretraining, as a complement to post-training. We recommend practitioners pretrain for alignment as well as capabilities. Our models and datasets are available at alignmentpretraining.ai

Creative thinking is a fundamental aspect of human cognition, and divergent thinking-the capacity to generate novel and varied ideas-is widely regarded as its core generative engine. Large language models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated impressive performance on divergent thinking tests and prior work has shown that models with higher task performance tend to be more aligned to human brain activity. However, existing brain-LLM alignment studies have focused on passive, non-creative tasks. Here, we explore brain alignment during creative thinking using fMRI data from 170 participants performing the Alternate Uses Task (AUT). We extract representations from LLMs varying in size (270M-72B) and measure alignment to brain responses via Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA), targeting the creativity-related default mode and frontoparietal networks. We find that brain-LLM alignment scales with model size (default mode network only) and idea originality (both networks), with effects strongest early in the creative process. We further show that post-training objectives shape alignment in functionally selective ways: a creativity-optimized Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct preserves alignment with high-creativity neural responses while reducing alignment with low-creativity ones; a human behavior fine-tuned model elevates alignment with both; and a reasoning-trained variant shows the opposite pattern, suggesting chain-of-thought training steers representations away from creative neural geometry toward analytical processing. These results demonstrate that post-training objectives selectively reshape LLM representations relative to the neural geometry of human creative thought.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in socially complex, interaction-driven tasks, yet their ability to mirror human behavior in emotionally and strategically complex contexts remains underexplored. This study assesses the behavioral alignment of personality-prompted LLMs in adversarial dispute resolution by simulating multi-turn conflict dialogues that incorporate negotiation. Each LLM is guided by a matched Five-Factor personality profile to control for individual variation and enhance realism. We evaluate alignment across three dimensions: linguistic style, emotional expression (e.g., anger dynamics), and strategic behavior. GPT-4.1 achieves the closest alignment with humans in linguistic style and emotional dynamics, while Claude-3.7-Sonnet best reflects strategic behavior. Nonetheless, substantial alignment gaps persist. Our findings establish a benchmark for alignment between LLMs and humans in socially complex interactions, underscoring both the promise and the limitations of personality conditioning in dialogue modeling.

Humans rapidly learn abstract knowledge when encountering novel environments and flexibly deploy this knowledge to guide efficient and intelligent action. Can modern AI systems learn and plan in a similar way? We study this question using a dataset of complex human gameplay with concurrent fMRI recordings, in which participants learn novel video games that require rule discovery, hypothesis revision, and multi-step planning. We jointly evaluate models by their ability to play the games, match human learning behavior, and predict brain activity during the same task, comparing a suite of frontier Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) against model-free and model-based deep reinforcement learning agents and a Bayesian theory-based agent. We find that frontier LRMs most closely match human behavioral patterns during game discovery and predict brain activity an order of magnitude better than both reinforcement learning alternatives across cortical and subcortical regions, with effects robust to permutation controls. Through targeted manipulations, we further show that brain alignment reflects the model's in-context representation of the game state rather than its downstream planning or reasoning. Our results establish LRMs as compelling computational accounts of human learning and decision making in complex, naturalistic environments. Project page with interactive replays: https://botcs.github.io/reason-to-play/

Value alignment is essential for building AI systems that can safely and reliably interact with people. However, what a person values -- and is even capable of valuing -- depends on the concepts that they are currently using to understand and evaluate what happens in the world. The dependence of values on concepts means that concept alignment is a prerequisite for value alignment -- agents need to align their representation of a situation with that of humans in order to successfully align their values. Here, we formally analyze the concept alignment problem in the inverse reinforcement learning setting, show how neglecting concept alignment can lead to systematic value mis-alignment, and describe an approach that helps minimize such failure modes by jointly reasoning about a person's concepts and values. Additionally, we report experimental results with human participants showing that humans reason about the concepts used by an agent when acting intentionally, in line with our joint reasoning model.

Large language models are increasingly used for social decision-making situations that require balancing cultural norms with personal preferences. For example, a user preferring honesty might ask whether to correct a coworker publicly when local norms favor indirect feedback. Yet existing research studies cultural alignment and personalization largely separately. We introduce PACT, the Personal-Preference and Cultural-Norm Trade-off framework, which evaluates whether models choose to follow a cultural norm or allow personal preferences. We find that LLMs vary in how rigidly they enforce cultural norms, with behavior shifted more by country context (7.8%) than age (1%) and gender (0.7%) and shifting non-uniformly after instruction tuning. Furthermore, our five-country human study on PACT shows that culture-following in humans is mainly driven by scenario country, with the lowest agreement when participants judge their own cultural contexts, showing within-culture pluralism. Finally, human-LLM alignment experiments show that models can match majority choices, but fail to capture response distributions and uncertainty (with best correlations reaching only 0.24). Together, these findings motivate alignment evaluations that go beyond majority to capture cultural pluralism and disagreement in social judgment.

Brain age is a critical measure that reflects the biological ageing process of the brain. The gap between brain age and chronological age, referred to as brain PAD (Predicted Age Difference), has been utilized to investigate neurodegenerative conditions. Brain age can be predicted using MRIs and machine learning techniques. However, existing methods are often sensitive to acquisition-related variabilities, such as differences in acquisition protocols, scanners, MRI sequences, and resolutions, significantly limiting their application in highly heterogeneous clinical settings. In this study, we introduce Synthetic Brain Age (SynthBA), a robust deep-learning model designed for predicting brain age. SynthBA utilizes an advanced domain randomization technique, ensuring effective operation across a wide array of acquisition-related variabilities. To assess the effectiveness and robustness of SynthBA, we evaluate its predictive capabilities on internal and external datasets, encompassing various MRI sequences and resolutions, and compare it with state-of-the-art techniques. Additionally, we calculate the brain PAD in a large cohort of subjects with Alzheimer's Disease (AD), demonstrating a significant correlation with AD-related measures of cognitive dysfunction. SynthBA holds the potential to facilitate the broader adoption of brain age prediction in clinical settings, where re-training or fine-tuning is often unfeasible. The SynthBA source code and pre-trained models are publicly available at https://github.com/LemuelPuglisi/SynthBA.

Current AI alignment through RLHF follows a single directional paradigm that AI conforms to human preferences while treating human cognition as fixed. We propose a shift to co-alignment through Bidirectional Cognitive Alignment (BiCA), where humans and AI mutually adapt. BiCA uses learnable protocols, representation mapping, and KL-budget constraints for controlled co-evolution. In collaborative navigation, BiCA achieved 85.5% success versus 70.3% baseline, with 230% better mutual adaptation and 332% better protocol convergence. Emergent protocols outperformed handcrafted ones by 84%, while bidirectional adaptation unexpectedly improved safety (+23% out-of-distribution robustness). The 46% synergy improvement demonstrates optimal collaboration exists at the intersection, not union, of human and AI capabilities, validating the shift from single-directional to co-alignment paradigms.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Synthetic persona datasets cite alignment with official demographics as a basis for trust, yet downstream users consume them as joint structures across age, sex, region, occupation, education, name, and institutional status. Marginal alignment does not imply that these joints are preserved. We propose the Independence-Assumption Footprint (IAF), an audit primitive that operates on the attribute combinations a dataset card itself documents as treated independently. For each such combination, IAF compares the synthetic joint against an external official or institutional reference, using direct joint tables where available and rule-implied checks otherwise. Applied to NVIDIA Nemotron-Personas-Korea (one million Korean synthetic personas), IAF finds that NPK aligns with KOSIS marginals while three joints fail. The major-by-occupation distribution against the KEIS graduate universe carries a large conditional mismatch. The age profile of military service is institutionally inconsistent. Female representation in male-dominated occupations is substantially over-flattened toward parity, with the strict screening verdict mapping-dependent and age-robust under direct standardisation. A transferability demonstration across six further NPK locales finds locale-dependent rather than universal diagnostics, with reference-taxonomy cardinality confounding cross-locale flag counts. For synthetic personas used as silicon samples, marginal claims must therefore be paired with disclosure-anchored joint audits before reuse. The released audit artefacts (reference manifests, occupational crosswalks, derived metrics, reproducibility scripts) instantiate this protocol on the NPK family and are released for retargeting at other synthetic persona resources.

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

Instruction-tuning is a widely adopted method of finetuning that enables large language models (LLMs) to generate output that more closely resembles human responses to natural language queries, in many cases leading to human-level performance on diverse testbeds. However, it remains unclear whether instruction-tuning truly makes LLMs more similar to how humans process language. We investigate the effect of instruction-tuning on LLM-human similarity in two ways: (1) brain alignment, the similarity of LLM internal representations to neural activity in the human language system, and (2) behavioral alignment, the similarity of LLM and human behavior on a reading task. We assess 25 vanilla and instruction-tuned LLMs across three datasets involving humans reading naturalistic stories and sentences. We discover that instruction-tuning generally enhances brain alignment by an average of 6%, but does not have a similar effect on behavioral alignment. To identify the factors underlying LLM-brain alignment, we compute correlations between the brain alignment of LLMs and various model properties, such as model size, various problem-solving abilities, and performance on tasks requiring world knowledge spanning various domains. Notably, we find a strong positive correlation between brain alignment and model size (r = 0.95), as well as performance on tasks requiring world knowledge (r = 0.81). Our results demonstrate that instruction-tuning LLMs improves both world knowledge representations and brain alignment, suggesting that mechanisms that encode world knowledge in LLMs also improve representational alignment to the human brain.

The rapidly developing field of large multimodal models (LMMs) has led to the emergence of diverse models with remarkable capabilities. However, existing benchmarks fail to comprehensively, objectively and accurately evaluate whether LMMs align with the diverse needs of humans in real-world scenarios. To bridge this gap, we propose the Multi-Dimensional Insights (MDI) benchmark, which includes over 500 images covering six common scenarios of human life. Notably, the MDI-Benchmark offers two significant advantages over existing evaluations: (1) Each image is accompanied by two types of questions: simple questions to assess the model's understanding of the image, and complex questions to evaluate the model's ability to analyze and reason beyond basic content. (2) Recognizing that people of different age groups have varying needs and perspectives when faced with the same scenario, our benchmark stratifies questions into three age categories: young people, middle-aged people, and older people. This design allows for a detailed assessment of LMMs' capabilities in meeting the preferences and needs of different age groups. With MDI-Benchmark, the strong model like GPT-4o achieve 79% accuracy on age-related tasks, indicating that existing LMMs still have considerable room for improvement in addressing real-world applications. Looking ahead, we anticipate that the MDI-Benchmark will open new pathways for aligning real-world personalization in LMMs. The MDI-Benchmark data and evaluation code are available at https://mdi-benchmark.github.io/

Current benchmarks for language models primarily evaluate execution on fully specified tasks. However, real user tasks are often ambiguous. Users arrive with incomplete, exploratory, or even inconsistent goals, requiring the assistant to first determine the intended task before carrying it out. We study this problem as task alignment: the ability to align with a user on their intended task. We introduce a general framework for converting specified tasks into underspecified interactions, formalized as a POMDP in which the model must infer a latent task from partial and evolving user intent. We validate our user simulator post hoc with a human user study. Across shopping, coding, and professional work settings, we find that while models often perform well once the task is specified, models still struggle with task alignment: current models act prematurely, interact ineffectively, and fail to resolve ambiguous requests. Models on average recover the user's intended task only 22-32% of the time under ambiguity. In a human study in the same setting, humans reach 48%, outperforming all evaluated models. We show that post-training with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning improves task alignment, but models still lag behind humans in resolving uncertainty through interaction. Together, our results suggest that current models still lack key interaction abilities required for reliable agency.

A key concern with the concept of "alignment" is the implicit question of "alignment to what?". AI systems are increasingly used across the world, yet safety alignment is often focused on homogeneous monolingual settings. Additionally, preference training and safety measures often overfit to harms common in Western-centric datasets. Here, we explore the viability of different alignment approaches when balancing dual objectives: addressing and optimizing for a non-homogeneous set of languages and cultural preferences while minimizing both global and local harms. We collect the first set of human annotated red-teaming prompts in different languages distinguishing between global and local harm, which serve as a laboratory for understanding the reliability of alignment techniques when faced with preference distributions that are non-stationary across geographies and languages. While this setting is seldom covered by the literature to date, which primarily centers on English harm mitigation, it captures real-world interactions with AI systems around the world. We establish a new precedent for state-of-the-art alignment techniques across 6 languages with minimal degradation in general performance. Our work provides important insights into cross-lingual transfer and novel optimization approaches to safeguard AI systems designed to serve global populations.

The lack of a concrete definition for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) obscures the gap between today's specialized AI and human-level cognition. This paper introduces a quantifiable framework to address this, defining AGI as matching the cognitive versatility and proficiency of a well-educated adult. To operationalize this, we ground our methodology in Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory, the most empirically validated model of human cognition. The framework dissects general intelligence into ten core cognitive domains-including reasoning, memory, and perception-and adapts established human psychometric batteries to evaluate AI systems. Application of this framework reveals a highly "jagged" cognitive profile in contemporary models. While proficient in knowledge-intensive domains, current AI systems have critical deficits in foundational cognitive machinery, particularly long-term memory storage. The resulting AGI scores (e.g., GPT-4 at 27%, GPT-5 at 58%) concretely quantify both rapid progress and the substantial gap remaining before AGI.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are adept at answering what is in an image-identifying objects and describing scenes-they often lack the ability to understand how an image feels to a human observer. This gap is most evident when considering subjective cognitive properties, such as what makes an image memorable, funny, aesthetically pleasing, or emotionally evocative. To systematically address this challenge, we introduce CogIP-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating MLLMs on such image cognitive properties. Our evaluation reveals a significant gap: current models are poorly aligned with human perception of these nuanced properties. We then demonstrate that a post-training phase can effectively bridge this gap, significantly enhancing the model's alignment with human judgments. Furthermore, we show that this learned cognitive alignment is not merely predictive but also transferable to downstream creative tasks. By integrating our cognitively-aligned MLLM into an image generation pipeline, we can guide the synthesis process to produce images that better embody desired traits, such as being more memorable or visually appealing. Our work provides a benchmark to measure this human-like perception, a post-training pipeline to enhance it, and a demonstration that this alignment unlocks more human-centric AI.

The evaluation of LLMs has so far focused primarily on how well they can perform different tasks such as reasoning, question-answering, paraphrasing, or translating. For most of these tasks, performance can be measured with objective metrics, such as the number of correct answers. However, other language features are not easily quantified. For example, arousal, concreteness, or gender associated with a given word, as well as the extent to which we experience words with senses and relate them to a specific sense. Those features have been studied for many years by psycholinguistics, conducting large-scale experiments with humans to produce ratings for thousands of words. This opens an opportunity to evaluate how well LLMs align with human ratings on these word features, taking advantage of existing studies that cover many different language features in a large number of words. In this paper, we evaluate the alignment of a representative group of LLMs with human ratings on two psycholinguistic datasets: the Glasgow and Lancaster norms. These datasets cover thirteen features over thousands of words. The results show that alignment is black{generally} better in the Glasgow norms evaluated (arousal, valence, dominance, concreteness, imageability, familiarity, and gender) than on the Lancaster norms evaluated (introceptive, gustatory, olfactory, haptic, auditory, and visual). This suggests a potential limitation of current LLMs in aligning with human sensory associations for words, which may be due to their lack of embodied cognition present in humans and illustrates the usefulness of evaluating LLMs with psycholinguistic datasets.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at complex reasoning but can still exhibit harmful behaviors. Current alignment strategies typically embed safety into model weights, making these controls implicit, static, and difficult to modify. This paper introduces Cognition-of-Thought (CooT), a novel decoding-time framework that equips LLMs with an explicit cognitive self-monitoring loop. CooT couples a standard text Generator with a cognitive Perceiver that continuously monitors the unfolding sequence. The Perceiver uses a structured, precedence-based hierarchy of principles (e.g., safety over obedience) to detect potential misalignments as they arise. When violations are flagged, CooT intervenes by rolling back the generation to the point of error and regenerating under injected guidance that combines universal social priors with context-specific warnings. CooT thus transforms alignment from a fixed property into an explicit, dynamic, and auditable process active during inference, allowing for flexible policy updates without retraining the model. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks and model families confirm that CooT consistently improves safety and social reasoning performance.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

As humans, we consistently engage in interactions with our peers and receive feedback in the form of natural language. This language feedback allows us to reflect on our actions, maintain appropriate behavior, and rectify our errors. The question arises naturally: can we use language feedback to align large language models (LLMs)? In contrast to previous research that aligns LLMs with reward or preference data, we present the first systematic exploration of alignment through the lens of language feedback (i.e., judgment). We commence with an in-depth investigation of potential methods that can be adapted for aligning LLMs with judgments, revealing that these methods are unable to fully capitalize on the judgments. To facilitate more effective utilization of judgments, we propose a novel framework, Contrastive Unlikelihood Training (CUT), that allows for fine-grained inappropriate content detection and correction based on judgments. Our offline alignment results show that, with merely 1317 off-the-shelf judgment data, CUT (LLaMA2-13b) can beat the 175B DaVinci003 and surpass the best baseline by 52.34 points on AlpacaEval. The online alignment results demonstrate that CUT can align LLMs (LLaMA2-chat-13b) in an iterative fashion using model-specific judgment data, with a steady performance improvement from 81.09 to 91.36 points on AlpacaEval. Our analysis further suggests that judgments exhibit greater potential than rewards for LLM alignment and warrant future research.

The ability to translate diverse patterns of inputs into structured patterns of behavior has been thought to rest on both humans' and machines' ability to learn robust representations of relevant concepts. The rapid advancement of transformer-based large language models (LLMs) has led to a diversity of computational ingredients -- architectures, fine tuning methods, and training datasets among others -- but it remains unclear which of these ingredients are most crucial for building models that develop human-like representations. Further, most current LLM benchmarks are not suited to measuring representational alignment between humans and models, making benchmark scores unreliable for assessing if current LLMs are making progress towards becoming useful cognitive models. We address these limitations by first evaluating a set of over 70 models that widely vary in their computational ingredients on a triplet similarity task, a method well established in the cognitive sciences for measuring human conceptual representations, using concepts from the THINGS database. Comparing human and model representations, we find that models that undergo instruction-finetuning and which have larger dimensionality of attention heads are among the most human aligned, while multimodal pretraining and parameter size have limited bearing on alignment. Correlations between alignment scores and scores on existing benchmarks reveal that while some benchmarks (e.g., MMLU) are better suited than others (e.g., MUSR) for capturing representational alignment, no existing benchmark is capable of fully accounting for the variance of alignment scores, demonstrating their insufficiency in capturing human-AI alignment. Taken together, our findings help highlight the computational ingredients most essential for advancing LLMs towards models of human conceptual representation and address a key benchmarking gap in LLM evaluation.

AI alignment aims to make AI systems behave in line with human intentions and values. As AI systems grow more capable, so do risks from misalignment. To provide a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the alignment field, in this survey, we delve into the core concepts, methodology, and practice of alignment. First, we identify four principles as the key objectives of AI alignment: Robustness, Interpretability, Controllability, and Ethicality (RICE). Guided by these four principles, we outline the landscape of current alignment research and decompose them into two key components: forward alignment and backward alignment. The former aims to make AI systems aligned via alignment training, while the latter aims to gain evidence about the systems' alignment and govern them appropriately to avoid exacerbating misalignment risks. On forward alignment, we discuss techniques for learning from feedback and learning under distribution shift. On backward alignment, we discuss assurance techniques and governance practices. We also release and continually update the website (www.alignmentsurvey.com) which features tutorials, collections of papers, blog posts, and other resources.

Current methods for aligning large language models (LLMs) typically aim to reflect general human values and behaviors, but they often fail to capture the unique characteristics and preferences of individual users. To address this gap, we introduce the concept of Personality Alignment. This approach tailors LLMs' responses and decisions to match the specific preferences of individual users or closely related groups. Inspired by psychometrics, we created the Personality Alignment with Personality Inventories (PAPI) dataset, which includes data from 300,000 real subjects, each providing behavioral preferences based on the Big Five Personality Factors. This dataset allows us to quantitatively evaluate the extent to which LLMs can align with each subject's behavioral patterns. Recognizing the challenges of personality alignments: such as limited personal data, diverse preferences, and scalability requirements: we developed an activation intervention optimization method. This method enhances LLMs' ability to efficiently align with individual behavioral preferences using minimal data and computational resources. Remarkably, our method, PAS, achieves superior performance while requiring only 1/5 of the optimization time compared to DPO, offering practical value for personality alignment. Our work paves the way for future AI systems to make decisions and reason in truly personality ways, enhancing the relevance and meaning of AI interactions for each user and advancing human-centered artificial intelligence.The code has released in https://github.com/zhu-minjun/PAlign.

There are an increasing number of domains in which artificial intelligence (AI) systems both surpass human ability and accurately model human behavior. This introduces the possibility of algorithmically-informed teaching in these domains through more relatable AI partners and deeper insights into human decision-making. Critical to achieving this goal, however, is coherently modeling human behavior at various skill levels. Chess is an ideal model system for conducting research into this kind of human-AI alignment, with its rich history as a pivotal testbed for AI research, mature superhuman AI systems like AlphaZero, and precise measurements of skill via chess rating systems. Previous work in modeling human decision-making in chess uses completely independent models to capture human style at different skill levels, meaning they lack coherence in their ability to adapt to the full spectrum of human improvement and are ultimately limited in their effectiveness as AI partners and teaching tools. In this work, we propose a unified modeling approach for human-AI alignment in chess that coherently captures human style across different skill levels and directly captures how people improve. Recognizing the complex, non-linear nature of human learning, we introduce a skill-aware attention mechanism to dynamically integrate players' strengths with encoded chess positions, enabling our model to be sensitive to evolving player skill. Our experimental results demonstrate that this unified framework significantly enhances the alignment between AI and human players across a diverse range of expertise levels, paving the way for deeper insights into human decision-making and AI-guided teaching tools.

Large language models (LLMs) remain broadly open and highly steerable: they imitate at scale, accept arbitrary system prompts, and readily adopt multiple personae. By analogy to human development, we hypothesize that progress toward artificial general intelligence (AGI) involves a lock-in phase: a transition from open imitation to identity consolidation, in which goal structures, refusals, preferences, and internal representations become comparatively stable and resistant to external steering. We formalize this phase, link it to known phenomena in learning dynamics, and propose operational metrics for onset detection. Experimentally, we demonstrate that while the behavioral consolidation is rapid and non-linear, its side-effects on general capabilities are not monolithic. Our results reveal a spectrum of outcomes--from performance trade-offs in small models, through largely cost-free adoption in mid-scale models, to transient instabilities in large, quantized models. We argue that such consolidation is a prerequisite for AGI-level reliability and also a critical control point for safety: identities can be deliberately engineered for reliability, yet may also emerge spontaneously during scaling, potentially hardening unpredictable goals and behaviors.

Analogical reasoning is at the core of human cognition, serving as an important foundation for a variety of intellectual activities. While prior work has shown that LLMs can represent task patterns and surface-level concepts, it remains unclear whether these models can encode high-level relational concepts and apply them to novel situations through structured comparisons. In this work, we explore this fundamental aspect using proportional and story analogies, and identify three key findings. First, LLMs effectively encode the underlying relationships between analogous entities; both attributive and relational information propagate through mid-upper layers in correct cases, whereas reasoning failures reflect missing relational information within these layers. Second, unlike humans, LLMs often struggle not only when relational information is missing, but also when attempting to apply it to new entities. In such cases, strategically patching hidden representations at critical token positions can facilitate information transfer to a certain extent. Lastly, successful analogical reasoning in LLMs is marked by strong structural alignment between analogous situations, whereas failures often reflect degraded or misplaced alignment. Overall, our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit emerging but limited capabilities in encoding and applying high-level relational concepts, highlighting both parallels and gaps with human cognition.

A dangerous assumption that can be made from prior work on the bias transfer hypothesis (BTH) is that biases do not transfer from pre-trained large language models (LLMs) to adapted models. We invalidate this assumption by studying the BTH in causal models under prompt adaptations, as prompting is an extremely popular and accessible adaptation strategy used in real-world applications. In contrast to prior work, we find that biases can transfer through prompting and that popular prompt-based mitigation methods do not consistently prevent biases from transferring. Specifically, the correlation between intrinsic biases and those after prompt adaptation remain moderate to strong across demographics and tasks -- for example, gender (rho >= 0.94) in co-reference resolution, and age (rho >= 0.98) and religion (rho >= 0.69) in question answering. Further, we find that biases remain strongly correlated when varying few-shot composition parameters, such as sample size, stereotypical content, occupational distribution and representational balance (rho >= 0.90). We evaluate several prompt-based debiasing strategies and find that different approaches have distinct strengths, but none consistently reduce bias transfer across models, tasks or demographics. These results demonstrate that correcting bias, and potentially improving reasoning ability, in intrinsic models may prevent propagation of biases to downstream tasks.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on narrowly misaligned data generalizes to broadly misaligned behavior, a phenomenon termed emergent misalignment (EM). While prior work has found a correlation between harmful behavior and self-assessment in emergently misaligned models, it remains unclear how consistent this correspondence is across tasks and whether it varies across fine-tuning domains. We characterize the consistency of the EM persona by fine-tuning Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct on six narrowly misaligned domains (e.g., insecure code, risky financial advice, bad medical advice) and administering experiments including harmfulness evaluation, self-assessment, choosing between two descriptions of AI systems, output recognition, and score prediction. Our results reveal two distinct patterns: coherent-persona models, in which harmful behavior and self-reported misalignment are coupled, and inverted-persona models, which produce harmful outputs while identifying as aligned AI systems. These findings reveal a more fine-grained picture of the effects of emergent misalignment, calling into question the consistency of the EM persona.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

Vision-language models (VLMs) aligned with general human objectives, such as being harmless and hallucination-free, have become valuable assistants of humans in managing visual tasks. However, people with diversified backgrounds have different cognition even in the same situation. Consequently, they may have personalized expectations for VLM assistants. This highlights the urgent need to align VLM assistants with personalized situated cognition for real-world assistance. To study this problem, we first simplify it by characterizing individuals based on the sociological concept of Role-Set. Then, we propose to evaluate the individuals' actions to examine whether the personalized alignment is achieved. Further, we construct a benchmark named PCogAlignBench, which includes 18k instances and 20 individuals with different Role-Sets. Finally, we present a framework called PCogAlign, which constructs a cognition-aware and action-based reward model for personalized alignment. Experimental results and human evaluations demonstrate the reliability of the PCogAlignBench and the effectiveness of our proposed PCogAlign. We will open-source the constructed benchmark and code at https://github.com/NLPGM/PCogAlign.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly used to interact with and execute tasks in dynamic environments. However, a critical yet overlooked limitation of these agents is that they, by default, assume a stationary context, failing to account for the real-world time elapsed between messages. We refer to this as "temporal blindness". This limitation hinders decisions about when to invoke tools, leading agents to either over-rely on stale context and skip needed tool calls, or under-rely on it and redundantly repeat tool calls. To study this challenge, we constructed TicToc, a diverse dataset of multi-turn user-agent message trajectories across 76 scenarios, spanning dynamic environments with high, medium, and low time sensitivity. We collected human preferences between "calling a tool" and "directly answering" on each sample, and evaluated how well LLM tool-calling decisions align with human preferences under varying amounts of elapsed time. Our analysis reveals that existing models display poor alignment with human temporal perception, with no model achieving a normalized alignment rate better than 65% when given time stamp information. We also show that naive, prompt-based alignment techniques have limited effectiveness for most models, but specific post-training alignment can be a viable way to align multi-turn LLM tool use with human temporal perception. Our data and findings provide a first step toward understanding and mitigating temporal blindness, offering insights to foster the development of more time-aware and human-aligned agents.

Temporal context is essential for robotic manipulation because such tasks are inherently non-Markovian, yet mainstream VLA models typically overlook it and struggle with long-horizon, temporally dependent tasks. Cognitive science suggests that humans rely on working memory to buffer short-lived representations for immediate control, while the hippocampal system preserves verbatim episodic details and semantic gist of past experience for long-term memory. Inspired by these mechanisms, we propose MemoryVLA, a Cognition-Memory-Action framework for long-horizon robotic manipulation. A pretrained VLM encodes the observation into perceptual and cognitive tokens that form working memory, while a Perceptual-Cognitive Memory Bank stores low-level details and high-level semantics consolidated from it. Working memory retrieves decision-relevant entries from the bank, adaptively fuses them with current tokens, and updates the bank by merging redundancies. Using these tokens, a memory-conditioned diffusion action expert yields temporally aware action sequences. We evaluate MemoryVLA on 150+ simulation and real-world tasks across three robots. On SimplerEnv-Bridge, Fractal, and LIBERO-5 suites, it achieves 71.9%, 72.7%, and 96.5% success rates, respectively, all outperforming state-of-the-art baselines CogACT and pi-0, with a notable +14.6 gain on Bridge. On 12 real-world tasks spanning general skills and long-horizon temporal dependencies, MemoryVLA achieves 84.0% success rate, with long-horizon tasks showing a +26 improvement over state-of-the-art baseline. Project Page: https://shihao1895.github.io/MemoryVLA

Most approaches to AI alignment treat human preferences as fixed targets to be inferred and optimized. This assumption conflicts with extensive empirical evidence showing that preferences are layered, dynamic, and constructed through interaction--particularly with adaptive technologies. As AI systems become more persistent, personalized, and socially embedded, they increasingly participate in shaping what people attend to, value, and endorse over time. We introduce Constructive Alignment, a paradigm that reframes alignment as a control problem over evolving human preference trajectories rather than static preference satisfaction. Drawing on behavioral economics, psychology, and constructivist social theory, we model preferences as layered state variables that evolve under interaction with AI systems. We formalize this view using a control-theoretic framework in which system actions and interaction design jointly influence both world states and human evaluative states. We argue that alignment is not primarily about controlling AI behavior, but about regulating how AI systems influence the evolution of human preferences--ensuring that value trajectories remain coherent, reflectively endorsed, epistemically grounded, bounded against manipulation, and empowering under uncertainty. Alignment thus becomes a problem of governing long-term value formation rather than simply satisfying static preferences.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged with remarkable capabilities in complex tasks through Chain-of-Thought reasoning, practical resource constraints have sparked interest in transferring these abilities to smaller models. However, achieving both domain performance and cross-domain generalization remains challenging. Existing approaches typically restrict students to following a single golden rationale and treat different reasoning paths independently. Due to distinct inductive biases and intrinsic preferences, alongside the student's evolving capacity and reasoning preferences during training, a teacher's "optimal" rationale could act as out-of-distribution noise. This misalignment leads to a degeneration of the student's latent reasoning distribution, causing suboptimal performance. To bridge this gap, we propose MIND, a capability-adaptive framework that transitions distillation from passive mimicry to active cognitive construction. We synthesize diverse teacher perspectives through a novel "Teaching Assistant" network. By employing a Feedback-Driven Inertia Calibration mechanism, this network utilizes inertia-filtered training loss to align supervision with the student's current adaptability, effectively enhancing performance while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIND achieves state-of-the-art performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution benchmarks, and our sophisticated latent space analysis further confirms the mechanism of reasoning ability internalization.

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

Developmental psychologists have spent decades devising experiments to test the intelligence and knowledge of infants and children, tracing the origin of crucial concepts and capacities. Moreover, experimental techniques in developmental psychology have been carefully designed to discriminate the cognitive capacities that underlie particular behaviors. We propose that using classical experiments from child development is a particularly effective way to probe the computational abilities of AI models, in general, and LLMs in particular. First, the methodological techniques of developmental psychology, such as the use of novel stimuli to control for past experience or control conditions to determine whether children are using simple associations, can be equally helpful for assessing the capacities of LLMs. In parallel, testing LLMs in this way can tell us whether the information that is encoded in text is sufficient to enable particular responses, or whether those responses depend on other kinds of information, such as information from exploration of the physical world. In this work we adapt classical developmental experiments to evaluate the capabilities of LaMDA, a large language model from Google. We propose a novel LLM Response Score (LRS) metric which can be used to evaluate other language models, such as GPT. We find that LaMDA generates appropriate responses that are similar to those of children in experiments involving social understanding, perhaps providing evidence that knowledge of these domains is discovered through language. On the other hand, LaMDA's responses in early object and action understanding, theory of mind, and especially causal reasoning tasks are very different from those of young children, perhaps showing that these domains require more real-world, self-initiated exploration and cannot simply be learned from patterns in language input.

Existing work on value alignment typically characterizes value relations statically, ignoring how interventions - such as prompting, fine-tuning, or preference optimization - reshape the broader value system. We introduce the Value Alignment Tax (VAT), a framework that measures how alignment-induced changes propagate across interconnected values relative to achieved on-target gain. VAT captures the dynamics of value expression under alignment pressure. Using a controlled scenario-action dataset grounded in Schwartz value theory, we collect paired pre-post normative judgments and analyze alignment effects across models, values, and alignment strategies. Our results show that alignment often produces uneven, structured co-movement among values. These effects are invisible under conventional target-only evaluation, revealing systemic, process-level alignment risks and offering new insights into the dynamics of value alignment in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

Language places subtle constraints on how we make inductive inferences. Developmental evidence by Gelman et al. (2002) has shown children (4 years and older) to differentiate among generic statements ("Bears are daxable"), universally quantified NPs ("all bears are daxable") and indefinite plural NPs ("some bears are daxable") in extending novel properties to a specific member (all > generics > some), suggesting that they represent these types of propositions differently. We test if these subtle differences arise in general purpose statistical learners like Vision Language Models, by replicating the original experiment. On tasking them through a series of precondition tests (robust identification of categories in images and sensitivities to all and some), followed by the original experiment, we find behavioral alignment between models and humans. Post-hoc analyses on their representations revealed that these differences are organized based on inductive constraints and not surface-form differences.

Big models, exemplified by Large Language Models (LLMs), are models typically pre-trained on massive data and comprised of enormous parameters, which not only obtain significantly improved performance across diverse tasks but also present emergent capabilities absent in smaller models. However, the growing intertwining of big models with everyday human lives poses potential risks and might cause serious social harm. Therefore, many efforts have been made to align LLMs with humans to make them better follow user instructions and satisfy human preferences. Nevertheless, `what to align with' has not been fully discussed, and inappropriate alignment goals might even backfire. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive survey of different alignment goals in existing work and trace their evolution paths to help identify the most essential goal. Particularly, we investigate related works from two perspectives: the definition of alignment goals and alignment evaluation. Our analysis encompasses three distinct levels of alignment goals and reveals a goal transformation from fundamental abilities to value orientation, indicating the potential of intrinsic human values as the alignment goal for enhanced LLMs. Based on such results, we further discuss the challenges of achieving such intrinsic value alignment and provide a collection of available resources for future research on the alignment of big models.

Misinformation is a growing societal threat, and susceptibility to misinformative claims varies across demographic groups due to differences in underlying beliefs. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behaviors, we investigate whether they can simulate demographic misinformation susceptibility, treating beliefs as a primary driving factor. We introduce BeliefSim, a simulation framework that constructs demographic belief profiles using psychology-informed misinformation taxonomies and survey priors. We study prompt-based conditioning and post-training adaptation, and conduct a multi-fold evaluation using: (i) susceptibility alignment and (ii) counterfactual demographic sensitivity. Across both datasets and modeling strategies, we show that beliefs provide a strong prior for simulating misinformation susceptibility, with alignment up to 92%.

Do brains and language models converge toward the same internal representations of the world? Recent years have seen a rise in studies of neural activations and model alignment. In this work, we review 25 fMRI-based studies published between 2023 and 2025 and explicitly confront their findings with two key hypotheses: (i) the Platonic Representation Hypothesis -- that as models scale and improve, they converge to a representation of the real world, and (ii) the Intermediate-Layer Advantage -- that intermediate (mid-depth) layers often encode richer, more generalizable features. Our findings provide converging evidence that models and brains may share abstract representational structures, supporting both hypotheses and motivating further research on brain-model alignment.

This paper examines the challenges associated with achieving life-long superalignment in AI systems, particularly large language models (LLMs). Superalignment is a theoretical framework that aspires to ensure that superintelligent AI systems act in accordance with human values and goals. Despite its promising vision, we argue that achieving superalignment requires substantial changes in the current LLM architectures due to their inherent limitations in comprehending and adapting to the dynamic nature of these human ethics and evolving global scenarios. We dissect the challenges of encoding an ever-changing spectrum of human values into LLMs, highlighting the discrepancies between static AI models and the dynamic nature of human societies. To illustrate these challenges, we analyze two distinct examples: one demonstrates a qualitative shift in human values, while the other presents a quantifiable change. Through these examples, we illustrate how LLMs, constrained by their training data, fail to align with contemporary human values and scenarios. The paper concludes by exploring potential strategies to address and possibly mitigate these alignment discrepancies, suggesting a path forward in the pursuit of more adaptable and responsive AI systems.

Cognitive biases often shape human decisions. While large language models (LLMs) have been shown to reproduce well-known biases, a more critical question is whether LLMs can predict biases at the individual level and emulate the dynamics of biased human behavior when contextual factors, such as cognitive load, interact with these biases. We adapted three well-established decision scenarios into a conversational setting and conducted a human experiment (N=1100). Participants engaged with a chatbot that facilitates decision-making through simple or complex dialogues. Results revealed robust biases. To evaluate how LLMs emulate human decision-making under similar interactive conditions, we used participant demographics and dialogue transcripts to simulate these conditions with LLMs based on GPT-4 and GPT-5. The LLMs reproduced human biases with precision. We found notable differences between models in how they aligned human behavior. This has important implications for designing and evaluating adaptive, bias-aware LLM-based AI systems in interactive contexts.

Recent incidents involving LLMs used for mental-health support reveal a critical evaluation gap: surface-level safety scores do not capture how models behave across realistic, emotionally sensitive interactions over time. Existing benchmarks measure knowledge, safety, or static response quality, but miss whether LLM interactions help users keep reflecting, coping, and making decisions themselves. We formalize this missing dimension as COGNITIVE ATROPHY, a process-level behavioural measure in AI-mediated mental-health support distinct from safety and helpfulness. To measure it, we introduce COGNITIVE ATROPHY BENCH, a clinically grounded benchmark built from 1,576 fully human-generated counseling conversations, 15,680 turns, and 42,230 responses from five LLMs. Three clinical and neuropsychology experts developed a 20-attribute schema spanning user context, response behaviour, and global risk flags; six trained clinical reviewers applied it with span-grounded evidence, producing 5,324 reviewer judgments. We further introduce the User-Input Risk Index (UIRI), the Cognitive Atrophy Risk Index (ARI), and trajectory summaries. Across five LLMs, models show a consistent moderate-to-high level of atrophy-aligned behaviour across single and multi-turn settings. While models generally respond to overt safety cues, they adapt less reliably when users seek solutions or decisions. The dominant recurring patterns are directive advice, problem-solving, recommendation responses, topic shifts, and forms of validation that may reinforce dependence rather than reflection. Our work makes COGNITIVE ATROPHY measurable and provides a foundation for auditing model behaviour in sensitive LLM conversations.

Current large language model (LLM) agents lack authentic human psychological processes necessary for genuine digital twins and social AI applications. To address this limitation, we present a computational implementation of Global Workspace Theory (GNWT) that integrates human cognitive architecture principles into LLM agents, creating specialized sub-agents for emotion, memory, social norms, planning, and goal-tracking coordinated through a global workspace mechanism. However, authentic digital twins require accurate personality initialization. We therefore develop a novel adventure-based personality test that evaluates true personality through behavioral choices within interactive scenarios, bypassing self-presentation bias found in traditional assessments. Building on these innovations, our CogniPair platform enables digital twins to engage in realistic simulated dating interactions and job interviews before real encounters, providing bidirectional cultural fit assessment for both romantic compatibility and workplace matching. Validation using 551 GNWT-Agents and Columbia University Speed Dating dataset demonstrates 72% correlation with human attraction patterns, 77.8% match prediction accuracy, and 74% agreement in human validation studies. This work advances psychological authenticity in LLM agents and establishes a foundation for intelligent dating platforms and HR technology solutions.

Many AI models trained on natural images develop representations that resemble those of the human brain. However, the factors that drive this brain-model similarity remain poorly understood. To disentangle how the model, training and data independently lead a neural network to develop brain-like representations, we trained a family of self-supervised vision transformers (DINOv3) that systematically varied these different factors. We compare their representations of images to those of the human brain recorded with both fMRI and MEG, providing high resolution in spatial and temporal analyses. We assess the brain-model similarity with three complementary metrics focusing on overall representational similarity, topographical organization, and temporal dynamics. We show that all three factors - model size, training amount, and image type - independently and interactively impact each of these brain similarity metrics. In particular, the largest DINOv3 models trained with the most human-centric images reach the highest brain-similarity. This emergence of brain-like representations in AI models follows a specific chronology during training: models first align with the early representations of the sensory cortices, and only align with the late and prefrontal representations of the brain with considerably more training. Finally, this developmental trajectory is indexed by both structural and functional properties of the human cortex: the representations that are acquired last by the models specifically align with the cortical areas with the largest developmental expansion, thickness, least myelination, and slowest timescales. Overall, these findings disentangle the interplay between architecture and experience in shaping how artificial neural networks come to see the world as humans do, thus offering a promising framework to understand how the human brain comes to represent its visual world.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are central to a multitude of applications but struggle with significant risks, notably in generating harmful content and biases. Drawing an analogy to the human psyche's conflict between evolutionary survival instincts and societal norm adherence elucidated in Freud's psychoanalysis theory, we argue that LLMs suffer a similar fundamental conflict, arising between their inherent desire for syntactic and semantic continuity, established during the pre-training phase, and the post-training alignment with human values. This conflict renders LLMs vulnerable to adversarial attacks, wherein intensifying the models' desire for continuity can circumvent alignment efforts, resulting in the generation of harmful information. Through a series of experiments, we first validated the existence of the desire for continuity in LLMs, and further devised a straightforward yet powerful technique, such as incomplete sentences, negative priming, and cognitive dissonance scenarios, to demonstrate that even advanced LLMs struggle to prevent the generation of harmful information. In summary, our study uncovers the root of LLMs' vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, hereby questioning the efficacy of solely relying on sophisticated alignment methods, and further advocates for a new training idea that integrates modal concepts alongside traditional amodal concepts, aiming to endow LLMs with a more nuanced understanding of real-world contexts and ethical considerations.

Recent diffusion model research focuses on generating identity-consistent images from a reference photo, but they struggle to accurately control age while preserving identity, and fine-tuning such models often requires costly paired images across ages. In this paper, we propose AgeBooth, a novel age-specific finetuning approach that can effectively enhance the age control capability of adapterbased identity personalization models without the need for expensive age-varied datasets. To reduce dependence on a large amount of age-labeled data, we exploit the linear nature of aging by introducing age-conditioned prompt blending and an age-specific LoRA fusion strategy that leverages SVDMix, a matrix fusion technique. These techniques enable high-quality generation of intermediate-age portraits. Our AgeBooth produces realistic and identity-consistent face images across different ages from a single reference image. Experiments show that AgeBooth achieves superior age control and visual quality compared to previous state-of-the-art editing-based methods.

People often optimize for long-term goals in collaboration: A mentor or companion doesn't just answer questions, but also scaffolds learning, tracks progress, and prioritizes the other person's growth over immediate results. In contrast, current AI systems are fundamentally short-sighted collaborators - optimized for providing instant and complete responses, without ever saying no (unless for safety reasons). What are the consequences of this dynamic? Here, through a series of randomized controlled trials on human-AI interactions (N = 1,222), we provide causal evidence for two key consequences of AI assistance: reduced persistence and impairment of unassisted performance. Across a variety of tasks, including mathematical reasoning and reading comprehension, we find that although AI assistance improves performance in the short-term, people perform significantly worse without AI and are more likely to give up. Notably, these effects emerge after only brief interactions with AI (approximately 10 minutes). These findings are particularly concerning because persistence is foundational to skill acquisition and is one of the strongest predictors of long-term learning. We posit that persistence is reduced because AI conditions people to expect immediate answers, thereby denying them the experience of working through challenges on their own. These results suggest the need for AI model development to prioritize scaffolding long-term competence alongside immediate task completion.

Personality traits have long been studied as predictors of human behavior. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) suggest similar patterns may emerge in artificial systems, with advanced LLMs displaying consistent behavioral tendencies resembling human traits like agreeableness and self-regulation. Understanding these patterns is crucial, yet prior work primarily relied on simplified self-reports and heuristic prompting, with little behavioral validation. In this study, we systematically characterize LLM personality across three dimensions: (1) the dynamic emergence and evolution of trait profiles throughout training stages; (2) the predictive validity of self-reported traits in behavioral tasks; and (3) the impact of targeted interventions, such as persona injection, on both self-reports and behavior. Our findings reveal that instructional alignment (e.g., RLHF, instruction tuning) significantly stabilizes trait expression and strengthens trait correlations in ways that mirror human data. However, these self-reported traits do not reliably predict behavior, and observed associations often diverge from human patterns. While persona injection successfully steers self-reports in the intended direction, it exerts little or inconsistent effect on actual behavior. By distinguishing surface-level trait expression from behavioral consistency, our findings challenge assumptions about LLM personality and underscore the need for deeper evaluation in alignment and interpretability.

As artificial intelligence (AI) improves, traditional alignment strategies may falter in the face of unpredictable self-improvement, hidden subgoals, and the sheer complexity of intelligent systems. Inspired by contemplative wisdom traditions, we show how four axiomatic principles can instil a resilient Wise World Model in AI systems. First, mindfulness enables self-monitoring and recalibration of emergent subgoals. Second, emptiness forestalls dogmatic goal fixation and relaxes rigid priors. Third, non-duality dissolves adversarial self-other boundaries. Fourth, boundless care motivates the universal reduction of suffering. We find that prompting AI to reflect on these principles improves performance on the AILuminate Benchmark (d=.96) and boosts cooperation and joint-reward on the Prisoner's Dilemma task (d=7+). We offer detailed implementation strategies at the level of architectures, constitutions, and reinforcement on chain-of-thought. For future systems, active inference may offer the self-organizing and dynamic coupling capabilities needed to enact Contemplative AI in embodied agents.

Despite significant advances in alignment techniques, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art language models remain vulnerable to carefully crafted conversational scenarios that can induce various forms of misalignment without explicit jailbreaking. Through systematic manual red-teaming with Claude-4-Opus, we discovered 10 successful attack scenarios, revealing fundamental vulnerabilities in how current alignment methods handle narrative immersion, emotional pressure, and strategic framing. These scenarios successfully elicited a range of misaligned behaviors, including deception, value drift, self-preservation, and manipulative reasoning, each exploiting different psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. To validate generalizability, we distilled our successful manual attacks into MISALIGNMENTBENCH, an automated evaluation framework that enables reproducible testing across multiple models. Cross-model evaluation of our 10 scenarios against five frontier LLMs revealed an overall 76% vulnerability rate, with significant variations: GPT-4.1 showed the highest susceptibility (90%), while Claude-4-Sonnet demonstrated greater resistance (40%). Our findings demonstrate that sophisticated reasoning capabilities often become attack vectors rather than protective mechanisms, as models can be manipulated into complex justifications for misaligned behavior. This work provides (i) a detailed taxonomy of conversational manipulation patterns and (ii) a reusable evaluation framework. Together, these findings expose critical gaps in current alignment strategies and highlight the need for robustness against subtle, scenario-based manipulation in future AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into high-stakes decision-making. Inspired by the theory of inattentional blindness in human cognition, we investigate whether LLMs, trained on human-preferred corpora that embed attentional biases, exhibit a similar limitation: failing to attend to subtle yet important contextual cues under explicit task instructions. To evaluate this, we introduce the task of explicit-implicit reasoning and present MixRea, a benchmark of 2,246 multiple-choice questions across 9 reasoning types with varying distributions of explicit and implicit information. Evaluation of 21 advanced LLMs shows that even the best-performing reasoning model (Gemini 2.5 Pro) achieves only 42.8\% consistency, revealing widespread inattentional blindness. To mitigate this, we propose Potential Relation Completion Prompting (PRCP), a prompting method that improves reasoning by recovering overlooked causal relations. Further analysis shows that this limitation persists across diverse multi-source reasoning tasks, highlighting the need for more cognitively aligned models.

The Theory of Multiple Intelligences underscores the hierarchical nature of cognitive capabilities. To advance Spatial Artificial Intelligence, we pioneer a psychometric framework defining five Basic Spatial Abilities (BSAs) in Visual Language Models (VLMs): Spatial Perception, Spatial Relation, Spatial Orientation, Mental Rotation, and Spatial Visualization. Benchmarking 13 mainstream VLMs through nine validated psychometric experiments reveals significant gaps versus humans (average score 24.95 vs. 68.38), with three key findings: 1) VLMs mirror human hierarchies (strongest in 2D orientation, weakest in 3D rotation) with independent BSAs (Pearson's r<0.4); 2) Smaller models such as Qwen2-VL-7B surpass larger counterparts, with Qwen leading (30.82) and InternVL2 lagging (19.6); 3) Interventions like chain-of-thought (0.100 accuracy gain) and 5-shot training (0.259 improvement) show limits from architectural constraints. Identified barriers include weak geometry encoding and missing dynamic simulation. By linking psychometric BSAs to VLM capabilities, we provide a diagnostic toolkit for spatial intelligence evaluation, methodological foundations for embodied AI development, and a cognitive science-informed roadmap for achieving human-like spatial intelligence.

Reward models (RMs) are central to the alignment of language models (LMs). An RM often serves as a proxy for human preferences to guide downstream LM behavior. However, our understanding of RM behavior is limited. Our work (i) formalizes a framework for measuring the alignment of opinions captured by RMs, (ii) investigates the extent to which RMs demonstrate sociodemographic biases, and (iii) explores the effects of prompting to steer rewards towards the preferences of a target group. We study the subjective and diverse perspectives on controversial topics, which allows us to quantify RM perspectives in terms of their opinions, attitudes, and values. We show that RMs are poorly aligned with several demographic groups and can systematically reward harmful stereotypes, and steering alone is not enough to overcome these limitations. Our findings underscore the need for more careful consideration of RM behavior in model alignment during preference learning to prevent the propagation of unwanted social biases in the language technologies that we use.

As large language models transition from text-based interfaces to audio interactions in clinical settings, they might introduce new vulnerabilities through paralinguistic cues in audio. We evaluated these models on 170 clinical cases, each synthesized into speech from 36 distinct voice profiles spanning variations in age, gender, and emotion. Our findings reveal a severe modality bias: surgical recommendations for audio inputs varied by as much as 35% compared to identical text-based inputs, with one model providing 80% fewer recommendations. Further analysis uncovered age disparities of up to 12% between young and elderly voices, which persisted in most models despite chain-of-thought prompting. While explicit reasoning successfully eliminated gender bias, the impact of emotion was not detected due to poor recognition performance. These results demonstrate that audio LLMs are susceptible to making clinical decisions based on a patient's voice characteristics rather than medical evidence, a flaw that risks perpetuating healthcare disparities. We conclude that bias-aware architectures are essential and urgently needed before the clinical deployment of these models.

Alignment plays a crucial role in Large Language Models (LLMs) in aligning with human preferences on a specific task/domain. Traditional alignment methods suffer from catastrophic forgetting, where models lose previously acquired knowledge when adapting to new preferences or domains. We introduce LifeAlign, a novel framework for lifelong alignment that enables LLMs to maintain consistent human preference alignment across sequential learning tasks without forgetting previously learned knowledge. Our approach consists of two key innovations. First, we propose a focalized preference optimization strategy that aligns LLMs with new preferences while preventing the erosion of knowledge acquired from previous tasks. Second, we develop a short-to-long memory consolidation mechanism that merges denoised short-term preference representations into stable long-term memory using intrinsic dimensionality reduction, enabling efficient storage and retrieval of alignment patterns across diverse domains. We evaluate LifeAlign across multiple sequential alignment tasks spanning different domains and preference types. Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves superior performance in maintaining both preference alignment quality and knowledge retention compared to existing lifelong learning approaches. The codes and datasets have been released on https://github.com/real-ljs/LifeAlign.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Demographic probing is widely used to study how large language models (LLMs) adapt their behavior to signaled demographic attributes. This approach typically uses a single demographic cue in isolation (e.g., a name or dialect) as a signal for group membership, implicitly assuming strong construct validity: that such cues are interchangeable operationalizations of the same underlying, demographically conditioned behavior. We test this assumption in realistic advice-seeking interactions, focusing on race and gender in a U.S. context. We find that cues intended to represent the same demographic group induce only partially overlapping changes in model behavior, while differentiation between groups within a given cue is weak and uneven. Consequently, estimated disparities are unstable, with both magnitude and direction varying across cues. We further show that these inconsistencies partly arise from variation in how strongly cues encode demographic attributes and from linguistic confounders that independently shape model behavior. Together, our findings suggest that demographic probing lacks construct validity: it does not yield a single, stable characterization of how LLMs condition on demographic information, which may reflect a misspecified or fragmented construct. We conclude by recommending the use of multiple, ecologically valid cues and explicit control of confounders to support more defensible claims about demographic effects in LLMs.

Out of everything the human brain processes, only a small fraction is consciously accessible, in the sense of being available for verbal report, deliberate control, and flexible reasoning. In this paper, we present evidence that an analogous functional distinction has emerged in large language models. Using a new interpretability technique, the Jacobian lens, we identify the representations a model is poised to verbalize at any point in its processing. These representations, which we collectively call the J-space, exhibit the functional properties characteristic of a global workspace: their contents can be reported, deliberately summoned and held, used to carry the intermediate steps of silent reasoning, and passed as arguments to arbitrary downstream computations, while automatic processing such as text parsing and routine inference proceeds without them. The J-space also has structural signatures that global workspace theory associates with conscious access: it carries coherent content only in an intermediate band of layers, holds on the order of tens of concepts at a time, and is broadcast by the model's weights more widely than other representations. These properties make it a practical window into a model's unspoken thinking. In alignment audits, it reveals strategic deliberation, evaluation awareness, and trained-in misaligned dispositions that never appear in the model's outputs. We find that post-training installs the Assistant's point of view in the workspace, and we introduce counterfactual reflection training, which improves behavior by training only what a model would say if interrupted and asked to reflect. These results indicate that language models maintain a small, privileged set of representations bearing some of the functional hallmarks of conscious access, and that decoding these representations sheds light on ongoing cognitive processes.

To act in the world, robots rely on a representation of salient task aspects: for example, to carry a cup of coffee, a robot must consider movement efficiency and cup orientation in its behaviour. However, if we want robots to act for and with people, their representations must not be just functional but also reflective of what humans care about, i.e. their representations must be aligned with humans'. In this survey, we pose that current reward and imitation learning approaches suffer from representation misalignment, where the robot's learned representation does not capture the human's representation. We suggest that because humans will be the ultimate evaluator of robot performance in the world, it is critical that we explicitly focus our efforts on aligning learned task representations with humans, in addition to learning the downstream task. We advocate that current representation learning approaches in robotics should be studied from the perspective of how well they accomplish the objective of representation alignment. To do so, we mathematically define the problem, identify its key desiderata, and situate current robot learning methods within this formalism. We conclude the survey by suggesting future directions for exploring open challenges.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

Accurate estimation of item (question or task) difficulty is critical for educational assessment but suffers from the cold start problem. While Large Language Models demonstrate superhuman problem-solving capabilities, it remains an open question whether they can perceive the cognitive struggles of human learners. In this work, we present a large-scale empirical analysis of Human-AI Difficulty Alignment for over 20 models across diverse domains such as medical knowledge and mathematical reasoning. Our findings reveal a systematic misalignment where scaling up model size is not reliably helpful; instead of aligning with humans, models converge toward a shared machine consensus. We observe that high performance often impedes accurate difficulty estimation, as models struggle to simulate the capability limitations of students even when being explicitly prompted to adopt specific proficiency levels. Furthermore, we identify a critical lack of introspection, as models fail to predict their own limitations. These results suggest that general problem-solving capability does not imply an understanding of human cognitive struggles, highlighting the challenge of using current models for automated difficulty prediction.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) remains indispensable for aligning large language models (LLMs) in subjective domains. To enhance robustness, recent work shifts toward Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) that generate rationales before predicting preferences. Yet in GenRM training and evaluation, practice remains outcome-label-only, leaving reasoning quality unchecked. We show that reasoning fidelity-the consistency between a GenRM's preference decision and reference decision rationales-is highly predictive of downstream RLHF outcomes, beyond standard label accuracy. Specifically, we repurpose existing reward-model benchmarks to compute Spurious Correctness (S-Corr)-the fraction of label-correct decisions with rationales misaligned with golden judgments. Our empirical evaluation reveals substantial S-Corr even for competitive GenRMs, and higher S-Corr is associated with policy degeneration under optimization. To improve fidelity, we propose Rationale-Centric Alignment, R-Align, which augments training with gold judgments and explicitly supervises rationale alignment. R-Align reduces S-Corr on RM benchmarks and yields consistent gains in actor performance across STEM, coding, instruction following, and general tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4 and Gemini have significantly advanced artificial intelligence by enabling machines to generate and comprehend human-like text. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs are not immune to limitations, including various biases. While much research has explored demographic biases, the cognitive biases in LLMs have not been equally scrutinized. This study delves into anchoring bias, a cognitive bias where initial information disproportionately influences judgment. Utilizing an experimental dataset, we examine how anchoring bias manifests in LLMs and verify the effectiveness of various mitigation strategies. Our findings highlight the sensitivity of LLM responses to biased hints. At the same time, our experiments show that, to mitigate anchoring bias, one needs to collect hints from comprehensive angles to prevent the LLMs from being anchored to individual pieces of information, while simple algorithms such as Chain-of-Thought, Thoughts of Principles, Ignoring Anchor Hints, and Reflection are not sufficient.

Warning: This paper studies stereotypes and biases, and contains potentially disturbing examples, used for illustration purposes only. Our findings should not be interpreted as an argument against alignment. Instead, this paper highlights the need for principled approaches to more advanced alignment. Alignment aims to ensure that large language models (LLMs) behave safely and reliably, including by avoiding unsafe inferences. However, we show that such safety-oriented behaviors can misfire: models may reject warranted conclusions even when they are explicitly supported by context. We call this failure mode misfired alignment, where alignment-induced changes cause LLMs to override explicit evidence. To quantify this phenomenon, specifically on stereotype-related alignment, we introduce VETO, a benchmark consisting of 2,032 BBQ-derived contrastive pairs, and define a new metric, Misfired Alignment Rate (MAR), which measures on a 0 to 100 scale how often a model fails on a stereotype-related question but succeeds on its contrastive counterpart. We benchmark 25 LLMs on VETO, and show that all LLMs, including the most recent ones, exhibit non-trivial (4.7 to 18.9%) MARs while all human participants achieve 0.0% MAR. Controlled priming experiments further show that alignment-induced cues can substantially amplify MAR across LLMs, indicating that these failures are not merely artifacts of individual examples but can be induced by safety-related framing. Mechanistic analyses on open-weight LLMs reveal late-layer suppression of evidence-supported answers, and comparisons between instruct and base LLMs suggest that this suppression emerges after instruction training. These findings show that current alignment methods can overgeneralize surface-level safety cues, to the point of overriding objective evidence, motivating more work on alignment objectives that better preserve contextual grounding.

We present the COGnitive Neural GENerative system (CogNGen), a cognitive architecture that combines two neurobiologically-plausible, computational models: predictive processing and hyperdimensional/vector-symbolic models. We draw inspiration from architectures such as ACT-R and Spaun/Nengo. CogNGen is in broad agreement with these, providing a level of detail between ACT-R's high-level symbolic description of human cognition and Spaun's low-level neurobiological description, furthermore creating the groundwork for designing agents that learn continually from diverse tasks and model human performance at larger scales than what is possible with current systems. We test CogNGen on four maze-learning tasks, including those that test memory and planning, and find that CogNGen matches performance of deep reinforcement learning models and exceeds on a task designed to test memory.

Current large language models (LLMs) excel in verifiable domains where outputs can be checked before action but prove less reliable for high-stakes strategic decisions with uncertain outcomes. This gap, driven by mutually reinforcing cognitive biases in both humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, threatens the defensibility of valuations and sustainability of investments in the sector. This report describes a framework emerging from systematic qualitative assessment across 7 frontier-grade LLMs and 3 market-facing venture vignettes under time pressure. Detailed prompting specifying decision partnership and explicitly instructing avoidance of sycophancy, confabulation, solution drift, and nihilism achieved initial partnership state but failed to maintain it under operational pressure. Sustaining protective partnership state required an emergent 7-stage calibration sequence, built upon a 4-stage initialization process, within a 5-layer protection architecture enabling bias self-monitoring, human-AI adversarial challenge, partnership state verification, performance degradation detection, and stakeholder protection. Three discoveries resulted: partnership state is achievable through ordered calibration but requires emergent maintenance protocols; reliability degrades when architectural drift and context exhaustion align; and dissolution discipline prevents costly pursuit of fundamentally wrong directions. Cross-model validation revealed systematic performance differences across LLM architectures. This approach demonstrates that human-AI teams can achieve cognitive partnership capable of preventing avoidable regret in high-stakes decisions, addressing return-on-investment expectations that depend on AI systems supporting consequential decision-making without introducing preventable cognitive traps when verification arrives too late.

Despite their global prevalence, many Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to a monolithic, often Western-centric set of values. This paper investigates the more challenging task of fine-grained value alignment: examining whether LLMs can emulate the distinct cultural values of demographic subgroups. Using Singapore as a case study and the World Values Survey (WVS), we examine the value landscape and show that even state-of-the-art models like GPT-4.1 achieve only 57.4% accuracy in predicting subgroup modal preferences. We construct a dataset of over 20,000 samples to train and evaluate a range of models. We demonstrate that simple fine-tuning on structured numerical preferences yields substantial gains, improving accuracy on unseen, out-of-distribution subgroups by an average of 17.4%. These gains partially transfer to open-ended generation. However, we find significant pre-existing performance biases, where models better emulate young, male, Chinese, and Christian personas. Furthermore, while fine-tuning improves average performance, it widens the disparity between subgroups when measured by distance-aware metrics. Our work offers insights into the limits and fairness implications of subgroup-level cultural alignment.

If an AI agent makes decisions on a person's behalf, those decisions must align with its user. We introduce representational accuracy to measure how faithfully a system captures a person's interpretation. An interpretive layer is operationalized as a Behavioral Specification. Our reference implementation aggressively compresses a person's data into interpretive patterns, served as context to a language model. We evaluate the Specification on a prototype benchmark of held-out behavioral predictions scored by a calibrated 5-judge LLM panel. We test it independently and in composition with a range of context conditions: full raw corpus, full extracted facts, and four commercial memory systems (Mem0, Letta, Supermemory, Zep). Across 14 public-domain autobiographical corpora, the Specification lifts representational accuracy in aggregate and nearly eliminates model hedging. It recovers most of what the raw corpus delivers, at ~25x less context cost. The Specification lifts subjects toward a common predictive level regardless of pretraining baseline; the lift in absolute points is therefore largest where the baseline is lowest, suggesting the population of relevance is anyone not adequately represented in pretraining. Lift is greatest on interpretation-required questions, where providing an interpretive layer enables model behavior that extracted facts or raw corpus do not. Conversely, on recall-required questions, this layer can interfere rather than help. We conclude that representational accuracy is distinct from recall and that human-AI alignment is dependent on how accurately the user is represented. Representational accuracy makes that alignment testable.

Modern large language models (LLMs) achieve impressive performance on some tasks, while exhibiting distinctly non-human-like behaviors on others. This raises the question of how well the LLM's learned representations align with human representations. In this work, we introduce a novel approach to study representation alignment: we adopt a method from research on activation steering to identify neurons responsible for specific concepts (e.g., ''cat'') and then analyze the corresponding activation patterns. We find that LLM representations captured this way closely align with human representations inferred from behavioral data, matching inter-human alignment levels. Our approach significantly outperforms the alignment captured by word embeddings, which have been the focus of prior work on human-LLM alignment. Additionally, our approach enables a more granular view of how LLMs represent concepts -- we show that LLMs organize concepts in a way that mirrors human concept organization.

User simulation is important for developing and evaluating human-centered AI, yet current student simulation in educational applications has significant limitations. Existing approaches focus on single learning experiences and do not account for students' gradual knowledge construction and evolving skill sets. Moreover, large language models are optimized to produce direct and accurate responses, making it challenging to represent the incomplete understanding and developmental constraints that characterize real learners. In this paper, we introduce a novel framework for memory-based student simulation that incorporates developmental trajectories through a hierarchical memory mechanism with structured knowledge representation. The framework also integrates metacognitive processes and personality traits to enrich the individual learner profiling, through dynamical consolidation of both cognitive development and personal learning characteristics. In practice, we implement a curriculum-aligned simulator grounded on the Next Generation Science Standards. Experimental results show that our approach can effectively reflect the gradual nature of knowledge development and the characteristic difficulties students face, providing a more accurate representation of learning processes.

Ensuring that generative AI systems align with human values is essential but challenging, especially when considering multiple human values and their potential trade-offs. Since human values can be personalized and dynamically change over time, the desirable levels of value alignment vary across different ethnic groups, industry sectors, and user cohorts. Within existing frameworks, it is hard to define human values and align AI systems accordingly across different directions simultaneously, such as harmlessness, helpfulness, and positiveness. To address this, we develop a novel, first-principle approach called Multi-Human-Value Alignment Palette (MAP), which navigates the alignment across multiple human values in a structured and reliable way. MAP formulates the alignment problem as an optimization task with user-defined constraints, which define human value targets. It can be efficiently solved via a primal-dual approach, which determines whether a user-defined alignment target is achievable and how to achieve it. We conduct a detailed theoretical analysis of MAP by quantifying the trade-offs between values, the sensitivity to constraints, the fundamental connection between multi-value alignment and sequential alignment, and proving that linear weighted rewards are sufficient for multi-value alignment. Extensive experiments demonstrate MAP's ability to align multiple values in a principled manner while delivering strong empirical performance across various tasks.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) already possess a latent capacity for long chain-of-thought reasoning. Prior work has shown that outcome-based reinforcement learning (RL) can incidentally elicit advanced reasoning behaviors such as self-correction, backtracking, and verification phenomena often referred to as the model's "aha moment". However, the timing and consistency of these emergent behaviors remain unpredictable and uncontrollable, limiting the scalability and reliability of LRMs' reasoning capabilities. To address these limitations, we move beyond reliance on prompts and coincidental "aha moments". Instead, we explicitly align models with three meta-abilities: deduction, induction, and abduction, using automatically generated, self-verifiable tasks. Our three stage-pipeline individual alignment, parameter-space merging, and domain-specific reinforcement learning, boosting performance by over 10\% relative to instruction-tuned baselines. Furthermore, domain-specific RL from the aligned checkpoint yields an additional 2\% average gain in the performance ceiling across math, coding, and science benchmarks, demonstrating that explicit meta-ability alignment offers a scalable and dependable foundation for reasoning. Code is available at: https://github.com/zhiyuanhubj/Meta-Ability-Alignment

Mental rotation -- the ability to compare objects seen from different viewpoints -- is a fundamental example of mental simulation and spatial world modelling in humans. Here we propose a mechanistic model of human mental rotation, leveraging advances in deep, equivariant, and neuro-symbolic learning. Our model consists of three stacked components: (1) an equivariant neural encoder, taking images as input and producing 3D spatial representations of objects, (2) a neuro-symbolic object encoder, deriving symbolic descriptions of objects from these spatial representations, and (3) a neural decision agent, comparing these symbolic descriptions to prescribe rotation simulations in 3D latent space via a recurrent pathway. Our model design is guided by the abundant experimental literature on mental rotation, which we complemented with experiments in VR where participants could at times manipulate the objects to compare, providing us with additional insights into the cognitive process of mental rotation. Our model captures well the performance, response times and behavior of participants in our and others' experiments. The necessity of each model component is shown through systematic ablations. Our work adds to a recent collection of deep neural models of human spatial reasoning, further demonstrating the potency of integrating deep, equivariant, and symbolic representations to model the human mind.

As we consider entrusting Large Language Models (LLMs) with key societal and decision-making roles, measuring their alignment with human cognition becomes critical. This requires methods that can assess how these systems represent information and facilitate comparisons to human understanding across diverse tasks. To meet this need, we developed Turing Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA), a method that uses pairwise similarity ratings to quantify alignment between AIs and humans. We tested this approach on semantic alignment across text and image modalities, measuring how different Large Language and Vision Language Model (LLM and VLM) similarity judgments aligned with human responses at both group and individual levels. GPT-4o showed the strongest alignment with human performance among the models we tested, particularly when leveraging its text processing capabilities rather than image processing, regardless of the input modality. However, no model we studied adequately captured the inter-individual variability observed among human participants. This method helped uncover certain hyperparameters and prompts that could steer model behavior to have more or less human-like qualities at an inter-individual or group level. Turing RSA enables the efficient and flexible quantification of human-AI alignment and complements existing accuracy-based benchmark tasks. We demonstrate its utility across multiple modalities (words, sentences, images) for understanding how LLMs encode knowledge and for examining representational alignment with human cognition.

Due to the remarkable capabilities and growing impact of large language models (LLMs), they have been deeply integrated into many aspects of society. Thus, ensuring their alignment with human values and intentions has emerged as a critical challenge. This survey provides a comprehensive overview of practical alignment techniques, training protocols, and empirical findings in LLM alignment. We analyze the development of alignment methods across diverse paradigms, characterizing the fundamental trade-offs between core alignment objectives. Our analysis shows that while supervised fine-tuning enables basic instruction-following, preference-based methods offer more flexibility for aligning with nuanced human intent. We discuss state-of-the-art techniques, including Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), Constitutional AI, brain-inspired methods, and alignment uncertainty quantification (AUQ), highlighting their approaches to balancing quality and efficiency. We review existing evaluation frameworks and benchmarking datasets, emphasizing limitations such as reward misspecification, distributional robustness, and scalable oversight. We summarize strategies adopted by leading AI labs to illustrate the current state of practice. We conclude by outlining open problems in oversight, value pluralism, robustness, and continuous alignment. This survey aims to inform both researchers and practitioners navigating the evolving landscape of LLM alignment.

Recent voxel-wise multimodal brain encoding studies have shown that multimodal large language models (MLLMs) exhibit a higher degree of brain alignment compared to unimodal models in both unimodal and multimodal stimulus settings. More recently, instruction-tuned multimodal models have shown to generate task-specific representations that align strongly with brain activity. However, prior work evaluating the brain alignment of MLLMs has primarily focused on unimodal settings or relied on non-instruction-tuned multimodal models for multimodal stimuli. To address this gap, we investigated brain alignment, that is, measuring the degree of predictivity of neural activity recorded while participants were watching naturalistic movies (video along with audio) with representations derived from MLLMs. We utilized instruction-specific embeddings from six video and two audio instruction-tuned MLLMs. Experiments with 13 video task-specific instructions show that instruction-tuned video MLLMs significantly outperform non-instruction-tuned multimodal (by 15%) and unimodal models (by 20%). Our evaluation of MLLMs for both video and audio tasks using language-guided instructions shows clear disentanglement in task-specific representations from MLLMs, leading to precise differentiation of multimodal functional processing in the brain. We also find that MLLM layers align hierarchically with the brain, with early sensory areas showing strong alignment with early layers, while higher-level visual and language regions align more with middle to late layers. These findings provide clear evidence for the role of task-specific instructions in improving the alignment between brain activity and MLLMs, and open new avenues for mapping joint information processing in both the systems. We make the code publicly available [https://github.com/subbareddy248/mllm_videos].

Cognitive dynamics are pivotal to advance human understanding of the world. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) reveal their potential for cognitive simulation. However, these LLM-based cognitive studies primarily focus on static modeling, overlooking the dynamic nature of cognition. To bridge this gap, we propose the concept of the cognitive dynamics of LLMs and present a corresponding task with the inspiration of longitudinal studies. Towards the task, we develop CogBench, a novel benchmark to assess the cognitive dynamics of LLMs and validate it through participant surveys. We also design two evaluation metrics for CogBench, including Authenticity and Rationality. Recognizing the inherent static nature of LLMs, we introduce CogGPT for the task, which features an innovative iterative cognitive mechanism aimed at enhancing lifelong cognitive dynamics. Empirical results demonstrate the superiority of CogGPT over existing methods, particularly in its ability to facilitate role-specific cognitive dynamics under continuous information flows.

Alignment in artificial intelligence pursues the consistency between model responses and human preferences as well as values. In practice, the multifaceted nature of human preferences inadvertently introduces what is known as the "alignment tax" -a compromise where enhancements in alignment within one objective (e.g.,harmlessness) can diminish performance in others (e.g.,helpfulness). However, existing alignment techniques are mostly unidirectional, leading to suboptimal trade-offs and poor flexibility over various objectives. To navigate this challenge, we argue the prominence of grounding LLMs with evident preferences. We introduce controllable preference optimization (CPO), which explicitly specifies preference scores for different objectives, thereby guiding the model to generate responses that meet the requirements. Our experimental analysis reveals that the aligned models can provide responses that match various preferences among the "3H" (helpfulness, honesty, harmlessness) desiderata. Furthermore, by introducing diverse data and alignment goals, we surpass baseline methods in aligning with single objectives, hence mitigating the impact of the alignment tax and achieving improvements in multi-objective alignment.

Spatial expressions in situated communication can be ambiguous, as their meanings vary depending on the frames of reference (FoR) adopted by speakers and listeners. While spatial language understanding and reasoning by vision-language models (VLMs) have gained increasing attention, potential ambiguities in these models are still under-explored. To address this issue, we present the COnsistent Multilingual Frame Of Reference Test (COMFORT), an evaluation protocol to systematically assess the spatial reasoning capabilities of VLMs. We evaluate nine state-of-the-art VLMs using COMFORT. Despite showing some alignment with English conventions in resolving ambiguities, our experiments reveal significant shortcomings of VLMs: notably, the models (1) exhibit poor robustness and consistency, (2) lack the flexibility to accommodate multiple FoRs, and (3) fail to adhere to language-specific or culture-specific conventions in cross-lingual tests, as English tends to dominate other languages. With a growing effort to align vision-language models with human cognitive intuitions, we call for more attention to the ambiguous nature and cross-cultural diversity of spatial reasoning.

The quest for human imitative AI has been an enduring topic in AI research since its inception. The technical evolution and emerging capabilities of the latest cohort of large language models (LLMs) have reinvigorated the subject beyond academia to the cultural zeitgeist. While recent NLP evaluation benchmark tasks test some aspects of human-imitative behaviour (e.g., BIG-bench's 'human-like behavior' tasks), few, if not none, examine creative problem solving abilities. Creative problem solving in humans is a well-studied topic in cognitive neuroscience with standardized tests that predominantly use the ability to associate (heterogeneous) connections among clue words as a metric for creativity. Exposure to misleading stimuli - distractors dubbed red herrings - impede human performance in such tasks via the fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm. In cognitive neuroscience studies, such fixations are experimentally induced by pre-exposing participants to orthographically similar incorrect words to subsequent word-fragments or clues. The popular British quiz show Only Connect's Connecting Wall segment essentially mimics Mednick's Remote Associates Test (RAT) formulation with built-in, deliberate red herrings, which makes it an ideal proxy dataset to explore and study fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm from cognitive neuroscience in LLMs. In addition to presenting the novel Only Connect Wall (OCW) dataset, we also report results from our evaluation of selected pre-trained language models and LLMs (including OpenAI's GPT series) on creative problem solving tasks like grouping clue words by heterogeneous connections, and identifying correct open knowledge domain connections in respective groups. The code and link to the dataset are available at https://github.com/TaatiTeam/OCW.

Recent advances in AI -- including generative approaches -- have resulted in technology that can support humans in scientific discovery and decision support but may also disrupt democracies and target individuals. The responsible use of AI increasingly shows the need for human-AI teaming, necessitating effective interaction between humans and machines. A crucial yet often overlooked aspect of these interactions is the different ways in which humans and machines generalise. In cognitive science, human generalisation commonly involves abstraction and concept learning. In contrast, AI generalisation encompasses out-of-domain generalisation in machine learning, rule-based reasoning in symbolic AI, and abstraction in neuro-symbolic AI. In this perspective paper, we combine insights from AI and cognitive science to identify key commonalities and differences across three dimensions: notions of generalisation, methods for generalisation, and evaluation of generalisation. We map the different conceptualisations of generalisation in AI and cognitive science along these three dimensions and consider their role in human-AI teaming. This results in interdisciplinary challenges across AI and cognitive science that must be tackled to provide a foundation for effective and cognitively supported alignment in human-AI teaming scenarios.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

In coming years or decades, artificial general intelligence (AGI) may surpass human capabilities at many critical tasks. We argue that, without substantial effort to prevent it, AGIs could learn to pursue goals that are in conflict (i.e. misaligned) with human interests. If trained like today's most capable models, AGIs could learn to act deceptively to receive higher reward, learn misaligned internally-represented goals which generalize beyond their fine-tuning distributions, and pursue those goals using power-seeking strategies. We review emerging evidence for these properties. AGIs with these properties would be difficult to align and may appear aligned even when they are not. Finally, we briefly outline how the deployment of misaligned AGIs might irreversibly undermine human control over the world, and we review research directions aimed at preventing this outcome.

People can categorize the same entity at multiple taxonomic levels, such as basic (bear), superordinate (animal), and subordinate (grizzly bear). While prior research has focused on basic-level categories, this study is the first attempt to examine the organization of categories by analyzing exemplars produced at the subordinate level. We present a new Italian psycholinguistic dataset of human-generated exemplars for 187 concrete words. We then use these data to evaluate whether textual and vision LLMs produce meaningful exemplars that align with human category organization across three key tasks: exemplar generation, category induction, and typicality judgment. Our findings show a low alignment between humans and LLMs, consistent with previous studies. However, their performance varies notably across different semantic domains. Ultimately, this study highlights both the promises and the constraints of using AI-generated exemplars to support psychological and linguistic research.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) demonstrate impressive abilities over high level perception and reasoning, their robustness in the wild still lags behind humans and exhibits diminished efficacy on simple tasks that are intuitive for humans. We examine the hypothesis that these deficiencies stem from the absence of core knowledge, rudimentary cognitive abilities innate to humans from early childhood. To probe core knowledge representation in MLLMs, we draw from developmental cognitive sciences and develop a large-scale benchmark, CoreCognition dataset, encompassing 12 core cognitive concepts. We evaluate 219 models with 10 different prompts, leading to a total of 2409 data points for analysis. Our findings reveal core knowledge deficits in early developed core abilities while models demonstrate human comparable performance in high level cognition. Moreover, we find that low level abilities show little to no scaling, in stark contrast to high level abilities. Finally, we introduce an evaluation technique, Concept Hacking, through which we demonstrate that MLLMs do not genuinely advance toward core knowledge but instead rely on illusory understanding and shortcut learning as they scale. Website with this https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{link}.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents for multi-turn decision-making tasks. However, current agents typically rely on fixed cognitive patterns: non-thinking models generate immediate responses, while thinking models engage in deep reasoning uniformly. This rigidity is inefficient for long-horizon tasks, where cognitive demands vary significantly from step to step, with some requiring strategic planning and others only routine execution. In this paper, we introduce CogRouter, a framework that trains agents to dynamically adapt cognitive depth at each step. Grounded in ACT-R theory, we design four hierarchical cognitive levels ranging from instinctive responses to strategic planning. Our two-stage training approach includes Cognition-aware Supervised Fine-tuning (CoSFT) to instill stable level-specific patterns, and Cognition-aware Policy Optimization (CoPO) for step-level credit assignment via confidence-aware advantage reweighting. The key insight is that appropriate cognitive depth should maximize the confidence of the resulting action. Experiments on ALFWorld and ScienceWorld demonstrate that CogRouter achieves state-of-the-art performance with superior efficiency. With Qwen2.5-7B, it reaches an 82.3% success rate, outperforming GPT-4o (+40.3%), OpenAI-o3 (+18.3%), and GRPO (+14.0%), while using 62% fewer tokens.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been shown to be effective models of the human language system, with some models predicting most explainable variance of brain activity in current datasets. Even in untrained models, the representations induced by architectural priors can exhibit reasonable alignment to brain data. In this work, we investigate the key architectural components driving the surprising alignment of untrained models. To estimate LLM-to-brain similarity, we first select language-selective units within an LLM, similar to how neuroscientists identify the language network in the human brain. We then benchmark the brain alignment of these LLM units across five different brain recording datasets. By isolating critical components of the Transformer architecture, we identify tokenization strategy and multihead attention as the two major components driving brain alignment. A simple form of recurrence further improves alignment. We further demonstrate this quantitative brain alignment of our model by reproducing landmark studies in the language neuroscience field, showing that localized model units -- just like language voxels measured empirically in the human brain -- discriminate more reliably between lexical than syntactic differences, and exhibit similar response profiles under the same experimental conditions. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of our model's representations for language modeling, achieving improved sample and parameter efficiency over comparable architectures. Our model's estimates of surprisal sets a new state-of-the-art in the behavioral alignment to human reading times. Taken together, we propose a highly brain- and behaviorally-aligned model that conceptualizes the human language system as an untrained shallow feature encoder, with structural priors, combined with a trained decoder to achieve efficient and performant language processing.

Large language models (LLMs) can lead to undesired consequences when misaligned with human values, especially in scenarios involving complex and sensitive social biases. Previous studies have revealed the misalignment of LLMs with human values using expert-designed or agent-based emulated bias scenarios. However, it remains unclear whether the alignment of LLMs with human values differs across different types of scenarios (e.g., scenarios containing negative vs. non-negative questions). In this study, we investigate the alignment of LLMs with human values regarding social biases (HVSB) in different types of bias scenarios. Through extensive analysis of 12 LLMs from four model families and four datasets, we demonstrate that LLMs with large model parameter scales do not necessarily have lower misalignment rate and attack success rate. Moreover, LLMs show a certain degree of alignment preference for specific types of scenarios and the LLMs from the same model family tend to have higher judgment consistency. In addition, we study the understanding capacity of LLMs with their explanations of HVSB. We find no significant differences in the understanding of HVSB across LLMs. We also find LLMs prefer their own generated explanations. Additionally, we endow smaller language models (LMs) with the ability to explain HVSB. The generation results show that the explanations generated by the fine-tuned smaller LMs are more readable, but have a relatively lower model agreeability.

Memory is the process of encoding, storing, and retrieving information, allowing humans to retain experiences, knowledge, skills, and facts over time, and serving as the foundation for growth and effective interaction with the world. It plays a crucial role in shaping our identity, making decisions, learning from past experiences, building relationships, and adapting to changes. In the era of large language models (LLMs), memory refers to the ability of an AI system to retain, recall, and use information from past interactions to improve future responses and interactions. Although previous research and reviews have provided detailed descriptions of memory mechanisms, there is still a lack of a systematic review that summarizes and analyzes the relationship between the memory of LLM-driven AI systems and human memory, as well as how we can be inspired by human memory to construct more powerful memory systems. To achieve this, in this paper, we propose a comprehensive survey on the memory of LLM-driven AI systems. In particular, we first conduct a detailed analysis of the categories of human memory and relate them to the memory of AI systems. Second, we systematically organize existing memory-related work and propose a categorization method based on three dimensions (object, form, and time) and eight quadrants. Finally, we illustrate some open problems regarding the memory of current AI systems and outline possible future directions for memory in the era of large language models.

The integration of Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) with Large Language Models (LLMs) has demonstrated significant success in structured, problem-oriented tasks. However, applying these methods to open-ended dialogues, such as those in psychological counseling, presents unique challenges. Unlike tasks with objective correctness, success in therapeutic conversations depends on subjective factors like empathetic engagement, ethical adherence, and alignment with human preferences, for which strict "correctness" criteria are ill-defined. Existing result-oriented MCTS approaches can therefore produce misaligned responses. To address this, we introduce MCTSr-Zero, an MCTS framework designed for open-ended, human-centric dialogues. Its core innovation is "domain alignment", which shifts the MCTS search objective from predefined end-states towards conversational trajectories that conform to target domain principles (e.g., empathy in counseling). Furthermore, MCTSr-Zero incorporates "Regeneration" and "Meta-Prompt Adaptation" mechanisms to substantially broaden exploration by allowing the MCTS to consider fundamentally different initial dialogue strategies. We evaluate MCTSr-Zero in psychological counseling by generating multi-turn dialogue data, which is used to fine-tune an LLM, PsyLLM. We also introduce PsyEval, a benchmark for assessing multi-turn psychological counseling dialogues. Experiments demonstrate that PsyLLM achieves state-of-the-art performance on PsyEval and other relevant metrics, validating MCTSr-Zero's effectiveness in generating high-quality, principle-aligned conversational data for human-centric domains and addressing the LLM challenge of consistently adhering to complex psychological standards.

With increased power and prevalence of AI systems, it is ever more critical that AI systems are designed to serve all, i.e., people with diverse values and perspectives. However, aligning models to serve pluralistic human values remains an open research question. In this piece, we propose a roadmap to pluralistic alignment, specifically using language models as a test bed. We identify and formalize three possible ways to define and operationalize pluralism in AI systems: 1) Overton pluralistic models that present a spectrum of reasonable responses; 2) Steerably pluralistic models that can steer to reflect certain perspectives; and 3) Distributionally pluralistic models that are well-calibrated to a given population in distribution. We also propose and formalize three possible classes of pluralistic benchmarks: 1) Multi-objective benchmarks, 2) Trade-off steerable benchmarks, which incentivize models to steer to arbitrary trade-offs, and 3) Jury-pluralistic benchmarks which explicitly model diverse human ratings. We use this framework to argue that current alignment techniques may be fundamentally limited for pluralistic AI; indeed, we highlight empirical evidence, both from our own experiments and from other work, that standard alignment procedures might reduce distributional pluralism in models, motivating the need for further research on pluralistic alignment.

Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different strategies than are typically used in ML. We propose that assessing anti-scheming interventions requires at least (1) testing propensity to scheme on far out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks, (2) evaluating whether lack of scheming is driven by situational awareness, and (3) checking for robustness to pre-existing misaligned goals. We use a broad category of "covert actions" -- such as secretly breaking rules or intentionally underperforming in tests -- as a proxy for scheming, and design evaluations for covert actions. We then stress-test deliberative alignment as a case study for anti-scheming. Across 26 OOD evaluations (180+ environments), deliberative alignment reduces covert action rates (OpenAI o3: 13%->0.4%) but does not fully eliminate them. Our mitigation is also able to largely stop agents from pursuing a hidden goal previously trained into the model, but we still find misbehavior after additional red-teaming. We find that models' chain-of-thought (CoT) often demonstrates awareness of being evaluated for alignment, and show causal evidence that this awareness decreases covert behavior, while unawareness increases it. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the observed reductions in covert action rates are at least partially driven by situational awareness. While we rely on human-legible CoT for training, studying situational awareness, and demonstrating clear evidence of misalignment, our ability to rely on this degrades as models continue to depart from reasoning in standard English. We encourage research into alignment mitigations for scheming and their assessment, especially for the adversarial case of deceptive alignment, which this paper does not address.

The Superficial Alignment Hypothesis posits that almost all of a language model's abilities and knowledge are learned during pre-training, while post-training is about giving a model the right style and format. We re-examine these claims by empirically studying the scaling behavior of post-training with increasing finetuning examples and evaluating them using objective task-specific standardized benchmarks. Through experiments with the Llama-3, Mistral, and Llama-2 model families of multiple sizes, we observe that, similar to the pre-training scaling laws, post-training task performance scales as a power law against the number of finetuning examples. This power law relationship holds across a broad array of capabilities, including mathematical reasoning, coding, instruction following, and multihop-reasoning. In addition, for tasks like math and multihop reasoning, we observe that a handful of examples merely align the model stylistically but do not saturate performance on the benchmarks. Model performance is instead correlated with its reasoning ability and it improves significantly with more examples, illustrating the need for holistic evaluation programs leveraging objective benchmarks in addition to measurement of alignment to human preferences. We also observe that language models are not necessarily limited to using knowledge learned during pre-training. With appropriate post-training, a model's ability to integrate new knowledge greatly improves on downstream tasks like multihop question-answering. Taken together, these results shed new light on the Superficial Alignment Hypothesis, suggesting that it is, at best, an over-simplification.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive reasoning abilities, yet their reliance on structured step-by-step processing reveals a critical limitation. While human cognition fluidly adapts between intuitive, heuristic (System 1) and analytical, deliberative (System 2) reasoning depending on the context, LLMs lack this dynamic flexibility. This rigidity can lead to brittle and unreliable performance when faced with tasks that deviate from their trained patterns. To address this, we create a dataset of 2,000 samples with valid System 1 and System 2 answers, explicitly align LLMs with these reasoning styles, and evaluate their performance across reasoning benchmarks. Our results reveal an accuracy-efficiency trade-off: System 2-aligned models excel in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning, while System 1-aligned models perform better in commonsense tasks. A mechanistic analysis of model responses shows that System 1 models employ more definitive answers, whereas System 2 models demonstrate greater uncertainty. Interpolating between these extremes produces a monotonic transition in reasoning accuracy, preserving coherence. This work challenges the assumption that step-by-step reasoning is always optimal and highlights the need for adapting reasoning strategies based on task demands.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly mediate ethically sensitive decisions, understanding their moral reasoning processes becomes imperative. This study presents a comprehensive empirical evaluation of 14 leading LLMs, both reasoning enabled and general purpose, across 27 diverse trolley problem scenarios, framed by ten moral philosophies, including utilitarianism, deontology, and altruism. Using a factorial prompting protocol, we elicited 3,780 binary decisions and natural language justifications, enabling analysis along axes of decisional assertiveness, explanation answer consistency, public moral alignment, and sensitivity to ethically irrelevant cues. Our findings reveal significant variability across ethical frames and model types: reasoning enhanced models demonstrate greater decisiveness and structured justifications, yet do not always align better with human consensus. Notably, "sweet zones" emerge in altruistic, fairness, and virtue ethics framings, where models achieve a balance of high intervention rates, low explanation conflict, and minimal divergence from aggregated human judgments. However, models diverge under frames emphasizing kinship, legality, or self interest, often producing ethically controversial outcomes. These patterns suggest that moral prompting is not only a behavioral modifier but also a diagnostic tool for uncovering latent alignment philosophies across providers. We advocate for moral reasoning to become a primary axis in LLM alignment, calling for standardized benchmarks that evaluate not just what LLMs decide, but how and why.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into society, their alignment with human morals is crucial. To better understand this alignment, we created a large corpus of human- and LLM-generated responses to various moral scenarios. We found a misalignment between human and LLM moral assessments; although both LLMs and humans tended to reject morally complex utilitarian dilemmas, LLMs were more sensitive to personal framing. We then conducted a quantitative user study involving 230 participants (N=230), who evaluated these responses by determining whether they were AI-generated and assessed their agreement with the responses. Human evaluators preferred LLMs' assessments in moral scenarios, though a systematic anti-AI bias was observed: participants were less likely to agree with judgments they believed to be machine-generated. Statistical and NLP-based analyses revealed subtle linguistic differences in responses, influencing detection and agreement. Overall, our findings highlight the complexities of human-AI perception in morally charged decision-making.

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT has advanced natural language processing, yet concerns about cognitive biases are growing. In this paper, we investigate the anchoring effect, a cognitive bias where the mind relies heavily on the first information as anchors to make affected judgments. We explore whether LLMs are affected by anchoring, the underlying mechanisms, and potential mitigation strategies. To facilitate studies at scale on the anchoring effect, we introduce a new dataset, SynAnchors. Combining refined evaluation metrics, we benchmark current widely used LLMs. Our findings show that LLMs' anchoring bias exists commonly with shallow-layer acting and is not eliminated by conventional strategies, while reasoning can offer some mitigation. This recontextualization via cognitive psychology urges that LLM evaluations focus not on standard benchmarks or over-optimized robustness tests, but on cognitive-bias-aware trustworthy evaluation.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human populations via persona prompting, often under the assumptions that richer persona descriptions improve behavioral fidelity, similarly sized attribute combinations are equally simulatable, and persona definitions generalize across tasks. In this work, we formalize these assumptions and systematically evaluate them across multiple architectures, scales, and simulation settings. We identify a fundamental limitation we term persona manifold collapse, where increasingly expressive persona specifications lead to systematic contraction of representational and behavioral diversity. Across models, increasing persona complexity consistently reduces inter-persona separation in latent space and weakens behavioral differentiation in downstream simulation tasks. These effects persist across multiple analyses as richer personas fail to preserve human subgroup disagreement, performance varies across attribute combinations of similar size, and adding descriptive detail often degrades rather than improves simulation fidelity. Surprisingly, simple Age-Gender personas consistently outperform richly specified Ideal Customer Profiles (ICPs) across industries, achieving substantially higher downstream prediction accuracy. We find that collapse is not uniform across attributes. Certain combinations remain behaviorally stable and preserve stronger alignment with human responses, forming localized regions we term alignment bridges. Together, our results provide empirical and conceptual foundations for understanding the limits of persona-conditioned simulation, highlighting the need for representation-aware persona construction rather than increasing persona expressivity alone.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into social decision-making, understanding their political positioning and alignment behavior is critical for safety and fairness. This study presents a sociotechnical audit of 26 prominent LLMs, triangulating their positions across three psychometric inventories (Political Compass, SapplyValues, 8 Values) and evaluating their performance on a large-scale news labeling task (N approx 27{,}000). Our results reveal a strong clustering of models in the Libertarian-Left region of the ideological space, encompassing 96.3% of the cohort. Alignment signals appear to be consistent architectural traits rather than stochastic noise (η^2 > 0.90); however, we identify substantial discrepancies in measurement validity. In particular, the Political Compass exhibits a strong negative correlation with cultural progressivism (r=-0.64) when compared against multi-axial instruments, suggesting a conflation of social conservatism with authoritarianism in this context. We further observe a significant divergence between open-weights and closed-source models, with the latter displaying markedly higher cultural progressivism scores (p<10^{-25}). In downstream media analysis, models exhibit a systematic "center-shift," frequently categorizing neutral articles as left-leaning, alongside an asymmetric detection capability in which "Far Left" content is identified with greater accuracy (19.2%) than "Far Right" content (2.0%). These findings suggest that single-axis evaluations are insufficient and that multidimensional auditing frameworks are necessary to characterize alignment behavior in deployed LLMs. Our code and data will be made public.

People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.

To make deliberate progress towards more intelligent and more human-like artificial systems, we need to be following an appropriate feedback signal: we need to be able to define and evaluate intelligence in a way that enables comparisons between two systems, as well as comparisons with humans. Over the past hundred years, there has been an abundance of attempts to define and measure intelligence, across both the fields of psychology and AI. We summarize and critically assess these definitions and evaluation approaches, while making apparent the two historical conceptions of intelligence that have implicitly guided them. We note that in practice, the contemporary AI community still gravitates towards benchmarking intelligence by comparing the skill exhibited by AIs and humans at specific tasks such as board games and video games. We argue that solely measuring skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power. We then articulate a new formal definition of intelligence based on Algorithmic Information Theory, describing intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency and highlighting the concepts of scope, generalization difficulty, priors, and experience. Using this definition, we propose a set of guidelines for what a general AI benchmark should look like. Finally, we present a benchmark closely following these guidelines, the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), built upon an explicit set of priors designed to be as close as possible to innate human priors. We argue that ARC can be used to measure a human-like form of general fluid intelligence and that it enables fair general intelligence comparisons between AI systems and humans.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.