Daily Papers

Reliability in multi-agent systems (MAS) built on large language models is increasingly limited by cognitive failures rather than infrastructure faults. Existing observability tools describe failures but do not quantify how quickly distributed reasoning recovers once coherence is lost. We introduce MTTR-A (Mean Time-to-Recovery for Agentic Systems), a runtime reliability metric that measures cognitive recovery latency in MAS. MTTR-A adapts classical dependability theory to agentic orchestration, capturing the time required to detect reasoning drift and restore coherent operation. We further define complementary metrics, including MTBF and a normalized recovery ratio (NRR), and establish theoretical bounds linking recovery latency to long-run cognitive uptime. Using a LangGraph-based benchmark with simulated drift and reflex recovery, we empirically demonstrate measurable recovery behavior across multiple reflex strategies. This work establishes a quantitative foundation for runtime cognitive dependability in distributed agentic systems.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often exhibit structural fragility in complex reasoning tasks, failing to produce correct answers even after successfully deriving valid intermediate steps. Through systematic analysis, we observe that these failures frequently stem not from a lack of reasoning capacity, but from a deficiency in self-regulatory control, where valid logic is destabilized by uncontrolled exploration or the failure to recognize logical sufficiency. Motivated by this observation, we propose Metacognitive Behavioral Tuning (MBT), a post-training framework that explicitly injects metacognitive behaviors into the model's thought process. MBT implements this via two complementary formulations: (1) MBT-S, which synthesizes rigorous reasoning traces from scratch, and (2) MBT-R, which rewrites the student's initial traces to stabilize intrinsic exploration patterns. Experiments across multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that MBT consistently outperforms baselines, achieving notable gains on challenging benchmarks. By effectively eliminating reasoning collapse, MBT achieves higher accuracy with significantly reduced token consumption, demonstrating that internalizing metacognitive strategies leads to more stable and robust reasoning.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), which autonomously produce a reasoning Chain of Thought (CoT) before producing final responses, offer a promising approach to interpreting and monitoring model behaviors. Inspired by the observation that certain CoT patterns -- e.g., ``Wait, did I miss anything?'' -- consistently emerge across tasks, we explore whether LRMs exhibit human-like cognitive habits. Building on Habits of Mind, a well-established framework of cognitive habits associated with successful human problem-solving, we introduce CogTest, a principled benchmark designed to evaluate LRMs' cognitive habits. CogTest includes 16 cognitive habits, each instantiated with 25 diverse tasks, and employs an evidence-first extraction method to ensure reliable habit identification. With CogTest, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 16 widely used LLMs (13 LRMs and 3 non-reasoning ones). Our findings reveal that LRMs, unlike conventional LLMs, not only exhibit human-like habits but also adaptively deploy them according to different tasks. Finer-grained analyses further uncover patterns of similarity and difference in LRMs' cognitive habit profiles, particularly certain inter-family similarity (e.g., Qwen-3 models and DeepSeek-R1). Extending the study to safety-related tasks, we observe that certain habits, such as Taking Responsible Risks, are strongly associated with the generation of harmful responses. These findings suggest that studying persistent behavioral patterns in LRMs' CoTs is a valuable step toward deeper understanding of LLM misbehavior. The code is available at: https://github.com/jianshuod/CogTest.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) outputs let us read a model's step-by-step reasoning. Since any long, serial reasoning process must pass through this textual trace, the quality of the CoT is a direct window into what the model is thinking. This visibility could help us spot unsafe or misaligned behavior (monitorability), but only if the CoT is transparent about its internal reasoning (faithfulness). Fully measuring faithfulness is difficult, so researchers often focus on examining the CoT in cases where the model changes its answer after adding a cue to the input. This proxy finds some instances of unfaithfulness but loses information when the model maintains its answer, and does not investigate aspects of reasoning not tied to the cue. We extend these results to a more holistic sense of monitorability by introducing verbosity: whether the CoT lists every factor needed to solve the task. We combine faithfulness and verbosity into a single monitorability score that shows how well the CoT serves as the model's external `working memory', a property that many safety schemes based on CoT monitoring depend on. We evaluate instruction-tuned and reasoning models on BBH, GPQA, and MMLU. Our results show that models can appear faithful yet remain hard to monitor when they leave out key factors, and that monitorability differs sharply across model families. We release our evaluation code using the Inspect library to support reproducible future work.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Recent incidents involving LLMs used for mental-health support reveal a critical evaluation gap: surface-level safety scores do not capture how models behave across realistic, emotionally sensitive interactions over time. Existing benchmarks measure knowledge, safety, or static response quality, but miss whether LLM interactions help users keep reflecting, coping, and making decisions themselves. We formalize this missing dimension as COGNITIVE ATROPHY, a process-level behavioural measure in AI-mediated mental-health support distinct from safety and helpfulness. To measure it, we introduce COGNITIVE ATROPHY BENCH, a clinically grounded benchmark built from 1,576 fully human-generated counseling conversations, 15,680 turns, and 42,230 responses from five LLMs. Three clinical and neuropsychology experts developed a 20-attribute schema spanning user context, response behaviour, and global risk flags; six trained clinical reviewers applied it with span-grounded evidence, producing 5,324 reviewer judgments. We further introduce the User-Input Risk Index (UIRI), the Cognitive Atrophy Risk Index (ARI), and trajectory summaries. Across five LLMs, models show a consistent moderate-to-high level of atrophy-aligned behaviour across single and multi-turn settings. While models generally respond to overt safety cues, they adapt less reliably when users seek solutions or decisions. The dominant recurring patterns are directive advice, problem-solving, recommendation responses, topic shifts, and forms of validation that may reinforce dependence rather than reflection. Our work makes COGNITIVE ATROPHY measurable and provides a foundation for auditing model behaviour in sensitive LLM conversations.

Temporal context is essential for robotic manipulation because such tasks are inherently non-Markovian, yet mainstream VLA models typically overlook it and struggle with long-horizon, temporally dependent tasks. Cognitive science suggests that humans rely on working memory to buffer short-lived representations for immediate control, while the hippocampal system preserves verbatim episodic details and semantic gist of past experience for long-term memory. Inspired by these mechanisms, we propose MemoryVLA, a Cognition-Memory-Action framework for long-horizon robotic manipulation. A pretrained VLM encodes the observation into perceptual and cognitive tokens that form working memory, while a Perceptual-Cognitive Memory Bank stores low-level details and high-level semantics consolidated from it. Working memory retrieves decision-relevant entries from the bank, adaptively fuses them with current tokens, and updates the bank by merging redundancies. Using these tokens, a memory-conditioned diffusion action expert yields temporally aware action sequences. We evaluate MemoryVLA on 150+ simulation and real-world tasks across three robots. On SimplerEnv-Bridge, Fractal, and LIBERO-5 suites, it achieves 71.9%, 72.7%, and 96.5% success rates, respectively, all outperforming state-of-the-art baselines CogACT and pi-0, with a notable +14.6 gain on Bridge. On 12 real-world tasks spanning general skills and long-horizon temporal dependencies, MemoryVLA achieves 84.0% success rate, with long-horizon tasks showing a +26 improvement over state-of-the-art baseline. Project Page: https://shihao1895.github.io/MemoryVLA

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

We construct evaluation tasks where extending the reasoning length of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) deteriorates performance, exhibiting an inverse scaling relationship between test-time compute and accuracy. Our evaluation tasks span four categories: simple counting tasks with distractors, regression tasks with spurious features, deduction tasks with constraint tracking, and advanced AI risks. We identify five distinct failure modes when models reason for longer: 1) Claude models become increasingly distracted by irrelevant information; 2) OpenAI o-series models resist distractors but overfit to problem framings; 3) models shift from reasonable priors to spurious correlations; 4) all models show difficulties in maintaining focus on complex deductive tasks; and 5) extended reasoning may amplify concerning behaviors, with Claude Sonnet 4 showing increased expressions of self-preservation. These findings suggest that while test-time compute scaling remains promising for improving model capabilities, it may inadvertently reinforce problematic reasoning patterns. Our results demonstrate the importance of evaluating models across diverse reasoning lengths to identify and address these failure modes in LRMs.

As Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are increasingly deployed, auditing their chain-of-thought (CoT) traces for safety becomes critical. Recent work has reported that monitorability--the degree to which CoT faithfully and informatively reflects internal computation--can appear as a "free gift" during the early stages of Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). We make this observation concrete through a systematic evaluation across model families and training domains. Our results show that this effect is not universal: monitorability improvements are strongly data-dependent. In particular, we demonstrate the critical role of data diversity and instruction-following data during RLVR training. We further show that monitorability is orthogonal to capability--improvements in reasoning performance do not imply increased transparency. Through mechanistic analysis, we attribute monitorability gains primarily to response distribution sharpening (entropy reduction) and increased attention to the prompt, rather than stronger causal reliance on reasoning traces. We also reveal how monitorability dynamics vary with controlled training and evaluation difficulty. Together, these findings provide a holistic view of how monitorability emerges under RLVR, clarifying when gains are likely to occur and when they are not.

Truly reliable AI requires more than simply scaling up knowledge; it demands the ability to know what it knows and when it does not. Yet recent research shows that even the best LLMs misjudge their own competence in more than one in five cases, making any response born of such internal uncertainty impossible to fully trust. Inspired by self-improvement reinforcement learning techniques that require minimal data, we present a simple but powerful framework KnowRL that strengthens a model's internal understanding of its own feasibility boundaries, enabling safer and more responsible behaviour. Our framework combines two components: (i) introspection, where the model generates and classifies tasks it judges feasible or infeasible, and (ii) consensus-based rewarding, where stability of self-knowledge assessment is reinforced through internal agreement. By using internally generated data, this design strengthens consistency in self-knowledge and entirely avoids costly external supervision. In experiments on LLaMA-3.1-8B and Qwen-2.5-7B, KnowRL steadily improved self-knowledge, validated by both intrinsic self-consistency and extrinsic benchmarking. With nothing more than a small seed set and no external supervision, our method drove gains as high as 28% in accuracy and 12% in F1, outperforming baselines in just a few iterations. Our framework essentially unlocks the untapped capacity of LLMs to self-improve their knowledge awareness, opening the door to reliable, more accountable AI and safer deployment in critical applications. Owing to its simplicity and independence from external effort, we encourage applying this reliability-enhancing process to all future models.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become central to LLM reasoning, but its outcome-level rewards can make models more willing to give confident answers when evidence or reasoning is unreliable. Existing SFT or RL methods mainly teach LLMs to refuse or express uncertainty at the response level, which can overfit abstention behavior rather than improve reasoning reliability. To address this limitation, we propose Cognitive Pairwise Training (CPT), a cognitive mid-training alignment stage that turns pairwise comparisons over reasoning traces into a reusable alignment signal. By learning to distinguish trustworthy from flawed reasoning, CPT encourages the model to internalize a reasoning-quality discrimination boundary rather than memorize surface refusal patterns. Across five model scales and three model families, CPT improves the reasoning--metacognition trade-off. At 14B, CPT+RL outperforms the standard SFT+RL pipeline by +2.2 math-average points and +5.2 abstention-F1 points. Further analyses show that CPT improves trace quality and exhibits strong robustness and scalability across evaluation and training settings. Code and models are released at https://github.com/Tsinghua-dhy/CPT.

Interestingly, LLMs yet struggle with some basic tasks that humans find trivial to handle, e.g., counting the number of character r's in the word "strawberry". There are several popular conjectures (e.g., tokenization, architecture and training data) regarding the reason for deficiency of LLMs in simple word-based counting problems, sharing the similar belief that such failure stems from model pretraining hence probably inevitable during deployment. In this paper, we carefully design multiple evaluation settings to investigate validity of prevalent conjectures. Meanwhile, we measure transferability of advanced mathematical and coding reasoning capabilities from specialized LLMs to simple counting tasks. Although specialized LLMs suffer from counting problems as well, we find conjectures about inherent deficiency of LLMs invalid and further seek opportunities to elicit knowledge and capabilities from LLMs that are beneficial to counting tasks. Compared with strategies such as finetuning and in-context learning that are commonly adopted to enhance performance on new or challenging tasks, we show that engaging reasoning is the most robust and efficient way to help LLMs better perceive tasks with more accurate responses. We hope our conjecture validation design could provide insights into the study of future critical failure modes of LLMs. Based on challenges in transferring advanced capabilities to much simpler tasks, we call for more attention to model capability acquisition and evaluation. We also highlight the importance of cultivating consciousness of "reasoning before responding" during model pretraining.

Although demonstrating remarkable performance on reasoning tasks, Large Language Models (LLMs) still tend to fabricate unreliable responses when confronted with problems that are unsolvable or beyond their capability, severely undermining the reliability. Prior studies of LLM reliability have primarily focused on knowledge tasks to identify unanswerable questions, while mathematical reasoning tasks have remained unexplored due to the dearth of unsolvable math problems. To systematically investigate LLM reliability in mathematical reasoning tasks, we formulate the reliability evaluation for both solvable and unsolvable problems. We then develop a ReliableMath dataset which incorporates open-source solvable problems and high-quality unsolvable problems synthesized by our proposed construction workflow with human evaluations. Experiments are conducted on various LLMs with several key findings uncovered. LLMs fail to directly identify unsolvable problems and always generate fabricated responses. When instructing LLMs to indicate unsolvability using a reliable prompt, the reliability of larger-sized LLMs remains on solvable problems, but notably improves on unsolvable problems yet still falls short of solvable problems. However, small LLMs rarely show any progress despite employing reliable prompts. Therefore, we further propose an alignment strategy to enhance small LLMs' reliability, which can significantly improve LLM reliability performances on both in-domain and out-of-domain tasks.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex reasoning tasks but often suffer from overthinking, generating overly long and redundant reasoning trajectories. To explore its essence, our empirical analysis reveals that LRMs are primarily limited to recognizing task properties (i.e., difficulty levels) like humans before solving the problem, leading to a one-size-fits-all reasoning process. Inspired by this, a pressing and natural question emerges: Can we explicitly bootstrap such ability to alleviate overthinking in LRMs? In this paper, we propose Think-How-to-Think (TH2T), a novel two-stage fine-tuning strategy that progressively inspires LRMs' difficulty cognition and redundancy cognition of LRMs. Specifically, we first inject difficulty hypnosis into output prefixes to guide the model toward adaptive reasoning depth, trained on a hybrid dataset mixing short and long reasoning paths. Then, we incorporate redundancy hypnosis, which supervises the intermediate reasoning steps to identify and eliminate unnecessary reasoning patterns. Experiments on 7B/14B/32B models demonstrate that TH2T significantly reduces inference costs by over 70% on easy tasks and 40% on hard tasks while maintaining performance stability. The resulting outputs exhibit clear signs of difficulty-aware capabilities and reduced redundancy (e.g., reflection and looping).

The evolution of Remote Sensing Vision-Language Models(RS-VLMs) emphasizes the importance of transitioning from perception-centric recognition toward high-level deductive reasoning to enhance cognitive reliability in complex spatial tasks. However, current models often suffer from logical hallucinations, where correct answers are derived from flawed reasoning chains or rely on positional shortcuts rather than spatial logic. This decoupling undermines reliability in strategic spatial decision-making. To address this, we present GeoReason, a framework designed to synchronize internal thinking with final decisions. We first construct GeoReason-Bench, a logic-driven dataset containing 4,000 reasoning trajectories synthesized from geometric primitives and expert knowledge. We then formulate a two-stage training strategy: (1) Supervised Knowledge Initialization to equip the model with reasoning syntax and domain expertise, and (2) Consistency-Aware Reinforcement Learning to refine deductive reliability. This second stage integrates a novel Logical Consistency Reward, which penalizes logical drift via an option permutation strategy to anchor decisions in verifiable reasoning traces. Experimental results demonstrate that our framework significantly enhances the cognitive reliability and interpretability of RS-VLMs, achieving state-of-the-art performance compared to other advanced methods.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world settings, correctness alone is insufficient. Reliable deployment requires maintaining truthful beliefs under contextual perturbations. Existing evaluations largely rely on point-wise confidence like Self-Consistency, which can mask brittle belief. We show that even facts answered with perfect self-consistency can rapidly collapse under mild contextual interference. To address this gap, we propose Neighbor-Consistency Belief (NCB), a structural measure of belief robustness that evaluates response coherence across a conceptual neighborhood. To validate the efficiency of NCB, we introduce a new cognitive stress-testing protocol that probes outputs stability under contextual interference. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that the performance of high-NCB data is relatively more resistant to interference. Finally, we present Structure-Aware Training (SAT), which optimizes context-invariant belief structure and reduces long-tail knowledge brittleness by approximately 30%. Code will be available at https://github.com/zjunlp/belief.

Deep search agents powered by large language models have demonstrated strong capabilities in multi-step retrieval, reasoning, and long-horizon task execution. However, their practical failures often stem from the lack of mechanisms to monitor and regulate reasoning and retrieval states as tasks evolve under uncertainty. Insights from cognitive neuroscience suggest that human metacognition is hierarchically organized, integrating fast anomaly detection with selectively triggered, experience-driven reflection. In this work, we propose Deep Search with Meta-Cognitive Monitoring (DS-MCM), a deep search framework augmented with an explicit hierarchical metacognitive monitoring mechanism. DS-MCM integrates a Fast Consistency Monitor, which performs lightweight checks on the alignment between external evidence and internal reasoning confidence, and a Slow Experience-Driven Monitor, which is selectively activated to guide corrective intervention based on experience memory from historical agent trajectories. By embedding monitoring directly into the reasoning-retrieval loop, DS-MCM determines both when intervention is warranted and how corrective actions should be informed by prior experience. Experiments across multiple deep search benchmarks and backbone models demonstrate that DS-MCM consistently improves performance and robustness.

Current language model evaluations measure what models know under ideal conditions but not how robustly they know it under realistic stress. Static benchmarks like MMLU and TruthfulQA cannot distinguish a model that lacks knowledge from one whose verification mechanisms collapse when information degrades or adversaries probe for weaknesses. We introduce the Drill-Down and Fabricate Test (DDFT), a protocol that measures epistemic robustness: a model's ability to maintain factual accuracy under progressive semantic compression and adversarial fabrication. We propose a two-system cognitive model comprising a Semantic System that generates fluent text and an Epistemic Verifier that validates factual accuracy. Our findings, based on evaluating 9 frontier models across 8 knowledge domains at 5 compression levels (1,800 turn-level evaluations), reveal that epistemic robustness is orthogonal to conventional design paradigms. Neither parameter count (r=0.083, p=0.832) nor architectural type (r=0.153, p=0.695) significantly predicts robustness, suggesting it emerges from training methodology and verification mechanisms distinct from current approaches. Error detection capability strongly predicts overall robustness (rho=-0.817, p=0.007), indicating this is the critical bottleneck. We find that flagship models exhibit brittleness despite their scale, while smaller models can achieve robust performance, challenging assumptions about the relationship between model size and reliability. The DDFT framework provides both theoretical foundation and practical tools for assessing epistemic robustness before deployment in critical applications.

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

Reflexion-style agents rely on self-generated reflections as memory, implicitly assuming that agents can accurately diagnose their own failures. We show that this assumption can fail systematically: across ALFWorld and HumanEval, agents store confident but incorrect interpretations of the task and continue acting on them across trials, even though the environment resets to the correct task each time. We call this failure mode memory confabulation and introduce the Reflection Repetition Rate (RRR), a log-based metric that detects repeated reliance on incorrect reflective content. Using RRR, we identify 16 frozen environments in ALFWorld, where 0 of 121 reflections mention the correct target object, and 4 analogous cases in HumanEval. Our mitigation replaces open-ended self-diagnosis with programmatic extraction of trajectory-level failure signals, increasing correct object mention from 0% to 86%, reducing RRR from 0.64 to 0.10, and solving 3 of 16 frozen ALFWorld environments, suggesting that reflective memory can reinforce false beliefs rather than correct them.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

We propose and test the LLM Brain Rot Hypothesis: continual exposure to junk web text induces lasting cognitive decline in large language models (LLMs). To causally isolate data quality, we run controlled experiments on real Twitter/X corpora, constructing junk and reversely controlled datasets via two orthogonal operationalizations: M1 (engagement degree) and M2 (semantic quality), with matched token scale and training operations across conditions. Contrary to the control group, continual pre-training of 4 LLMs on the junk dataset causes non-trivial declines (Hedges' g>0.3) on reasoning, long-context understanding, safety, and inflating "dark traits" (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism). The gradual mixtures of junk and control datasets also yield dose-response cognition decay: for example, under M1, ARC-Challenge with Chain Of Thoughts drops 74.9 rightarrow 57.2 and RULER-CWE 84.4 rightarrow 52.3 as junk ratio rises from 0% to 100%. Error forensics reveal several key insights. First, we identify thought-skipping as the primary lesion: models increasingly truncate or skip reasoning chains, explaining most of the error growth. Second, partial but incomplete healing is observed: scaling instruction tuning and clean data pre-training improve the declined cognition yet cannot restore baseline capability, suggesting persistent representational drift rather than format mismatch. Finally, we discover that the popularity, a non-semantic metric, of a tweet is a better indicator of the Brain Rot effect than the length in M1. Together, the results provide significant, multi-perspective evidence that data quality is a causal driver of LLM capability decay, reframing curation for continual pretraining as a training-time safety problem and motivating routine "cognitive health checks" for deployed LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to acquire reasoning capabilities through shared inference patterns in pre-training data, which are further elicited via Chain-of-Thought (CoT) practices. However, whether fundamental reasoning patterns, such as induction, deduction, and abduction, can be decoupled from specific problem instances remains a critical challenge for model controllability, and for shedding light on reasoning controllability. In this paper, we present the first systematic investigation of this problem through the lens of reasoning conflicts: an explicit tension between parametric and contextual information induced by mandating logical schemata that deviate from those expected for a target task. Our evaluation reveals that LLMs consistently prioritize sensibility over compliance, favoring task-appropriate reasoning patterns despite conflicting instructions. Notably, task accuracy is not strictly determined by sensibility, with models often maintaining high performance even when using conflicting patterns, suggesting a reliance on internalized parametric memory that increases with model size. We further demonstrate that reasoning conflicts are internally detectable, as confidence scores significantly drop during conflicting episodes. Probing experiments confirm that reasoning types are linearly encoded from middle-to-late layers, indicating the potential for activation-level controllability. Leveraging these insights, we steer models towards compliance, increasing instruction following by up to 29%. Overall, our findings establish that while LLM reasoning is anchored to concrete instances, active mechanistic interventions can effectively decouple logical schemata from data, offering a path toward improved controllability, faithfulness, and generalizability.

Hybrid reasoning systems that combine learned components with model-based inference are increasingly deployed in tool-augmented decision loops, yet their runtime behavior under partial observability and sustained evidence mismatch remains poorly understood. In practice, failures often arise as gradual divergence of internal reasoning dynamics rather than as isolated prediction errors. This work studies runtime stability in hybrid reasoning systems from a Kalman-inspired perspective. We model reasoning as a stochastic inference process driven by an internal innovation signal and introduce cognitive drift as a measurable runtime phenomenon. Stability is defined in terms of detectability, bounded divergence, and recoverability rather than task-level correctness. We propose a runtime stability framework that monitors innovation statistics, detects emerging instability, and triggers recovery-aware control mechanisms. Experiments on multi-step, tool-augmented reasoning tasks demonstrate reliable instability detection prior to task failure and show that recovery, when feasible, re-establishes bounded internal behavior within finite time. These results emphasize runtime stability as a system-level requirement for reliable reasoning under uncertainty.

The lack of a concrete definition for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) obscures the gap between today's specialized AI and human-level cognition. This paper introduces a quantifiable framework to address this, defining AGI as matching the cognitive versatility and proficiency of a well-educated adult. To operationalize this, we ground our methodology in Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory, the most empirically validated model of human cognition. The framework dissects general intelligence into ten core cognitive domains-including reasoning, memory, and perception-and adapts established human psychometric batteries to evaluate AI systems. Application of this framework reveals a highly "jagged" cognitive profile in contemporary models. While proficient in knowledge-intensive domains, current AI systems have critical deficits in foundational cognitive machinery, particularly long-term memory storage. The resulting AGI scores (e.g., GPT-4 at 27%, GPT-5 at 58%) concretely quantify both rapid progress and the substantial gap remaining before AGI.

A central question in artificial intelligence is the extent to which machine learning models comprehend mathematics. To address this, we propose a novel framework for measuring mathematical reasoning that moves beyond standard benchmarks to diagnose specific failure points. Our method first generates structured, step-by-step reasoning from gpt-3.5-turbo on the GSM8K dataset. We then use a more capable analyst model, gpt-4o-mini, to categorize errors and, crucially, perform an unsupervised clustering of every reasoning sentence to identify emergent "reasoning modes." This analysis reveals a cognitive profile with a stark, nonhuman-like brittleness: while the model achieves near-perfect accuracy on procedural modes like sequential calculation, its performance on modes requiring combinatorial reasoning with restrictions plummets. By identifying and quantifying the reliability of these distinct reasoning skills, our work provides a more granular method to evaluate mathematical comprehension and offers a precise roadmap for developing new capabilities and more reliable future applications.

Large language models (LLMs) remain broadly open and highly steerable: they imitate at scale, accept arbitrary system prompts, and readily adopt multiple personae. By analogy to human development, we hypothesize that progress toward artificial general intelligence (AGI) involves a lock-in phase: a transition from open imitation to identity consolidation, in which goal structures, refusals, preferences, and internal representations become comparatively stable and resistant to external steering. We formalize this phase, link it to known phenomena in learning dynamics, and propose operational metrics for onset detection. Experimentally, we demonstrate that while the behavioral consolidation is rapid and non-linear, its side-effects on general capabilities are not monolithic. Our results reveal a spectrum of outcomes--from performance trade-offs in small models, through largely cost-free adoption in mid-scale models, to transient instabilities in large, quantized models. We argue that such consolidation is a prerequisite for AGI-level reliability and also a critical control point for safety: identities can be deliberately engineered for reliability, yet may also emerge spontaneously during scaling, potentially hardening unpredictable goals and behaviors.

Existing benchmarks measure capability -- whether a model succeeds on a single attempt -- but production deployments require reliability -- consistent success across repeated attempts on tasks of varying duration. We show these properties diverge systematically as task duration grows, and that pass@1 on short tasks is structurally blind to this divergence. We introduce a reliability science framework for long-horizon LLM agents with four metrics: Reliability Decay Curve (RDC), Variance Amplification Factor (VAF), Graceful Degradation Score (GDS), and Meltdown Onset Point (MOP). We evaluate 10 models across 23,392 episodes on a 396-task benchmark spanning four duration buckets and three domains. Key findings: (1) reliability decay is domain-stratified -- SE GDS drops from 0.90 to 0.44 while document processing is nearly flat (0.74 to 0.71); (2) VAF bifurcates by capability tier -- high VAF is a capability signature, not an instability signal; (3) capability and reliability rankings diverge substantially, with multi-rank inversions at long horizons; (4) frontier models have the highest meltdown rates (up to 19%) because they attempt ambitious multi-step strategies that sometimes spiral; and (5) memory scaffolds universally hurt long-horizon performance across all 10 models. These results motivate reliability as a first-class evaluation dimension alongside capability.

Cognitive science suggests that spatial ability develops progressively-from perception to reasoning and interaction. Yet in multimodal LLMs (MLLMs), this hierarchy remains poorly understood, as most studies focus on a narrow set of tasks. We introduce SpatialTree, a cognitive-science-inspired hierarchy that organizes spatial abilities into four levels: low-level perception (L1), mental mapping (L2), simulation (L3), and agentic competence (L4). Based on this taxonomy, we construct the first capability-centric hierarchical benchmark, thoroughly evaluating mainstream MLLMs across 27 sub-abilities. The evaluation results reveal a clear structure: L1 skills are largely orthogonal, whereas higher-level skills are strongly correlated, indicating increasing interdependency. Through targeted supervised fine-tuning, we uncover a surprising transfer dynamic-negative transfer within L1, but strong cross-level transfer from low- to high-level abilities with notable synergy. Finally, we explore how to improve the entire hierarchy. We find that naive RL that encourages extensive "thinking" is unreliable: it helps complex reasoning but hurts intuitive perception. We propose a simple auto-think strategy that suppresses unnecessary deliberation, enabling RL to consistently improve performance across all levels. By building SpatialTree, we provide a proof-of-concept framework for understanding and systematically scaling spatial abilities in MLLMs.

Test-time compute has led to remarkable success in the large language model (LLM) community, particularly for complex tasks, where longer chains of thought (CoTs) are generated to enhance reasoning capabilities. However, growing evidence reveals that such reasoning models often produce CoTs plagued by excessive redundancy, including unnecessary verification steps and repetitive reasoning shifts. The root cause lies in post-training of them that overly rely on outcome reward paradigms, as the data of process reward paradigms, which regulate intermediate reasoning steps, is difficult to construct at scale. To address this, we propose PI, a novel framework for Test-time Prompt Intervention. PI provides an interface to dynamically guide and regulate reasoning paths during inference through timely (When module) and proper (How module) interventions and post-intervention sampling (Which module). This allows human problem-solving expertise and cognitive science principles to be seamlessly integrated into LLMs' reasoning processes, enhancing controllability and interpretability. Extensive experiments across multiple models and datasets demonstrate that PI significantly shortens CoTs while reducing hallucination, yielding more concise and reliable reasoning.

Human intelligence thrives on the concept of cognitive synergy, where collaboration and information integration among different cognitive processes yield superior outcomes compared to individual cognitive processes in isolation. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising performance as general task-solving agents, they still struggle with tasks that require intensive domain knowledge and complex reasoning. In this work, we propose Solo Performance Prompting (SPP), which transforms a single LLM into a cognitive synergist by engaging in multi-turn self-collaboration with multiple personas. A cognitive synergist refers to an intelligent agent that collaborates with multiple minds, combining their individual strengths and knowledge, to enhance problem-solving and overall performance in complex tasks. By dynamically identifying and simulating different personas based on task inputs, SPP unleashes the potential of cognitive synergy in LLMs. We have discovered that assigning multiple, fine-grained personas in LLMs elicits better problem-solving abilities compared to using a single or fixed number of personas. We evaluate SPP on three challenging tasks: Trivia Creative Writing, Codenames Collaborative, and Logic Grid Puzzle, encompassing both knowledge-intensive and reasoning-intensive types. Unlike previous works, such as Chain-of-Thought, that solely enhance the reasoning abilities in LLMs, SPP effectively elicits internal knowledge acquisition abilities, reduces hallucination, and maintains strong reasoning capabilities. Code, data, and prompts can be found at: https://github.com/MikeWangWZHL/Solo-Performance-Prompting.git.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve high performance on standard mathematical benchmarks, their underlying reasoning processes remain highly overfit to standard textual formatting. We propose a perturbation pipeline consisting of 14 techniques to evaluate robustness of LLM reasoning. We apply this pipeline to AIME 2024 dataset and evalute 8 state-of-the-art models on the resulting benchmark. While frontier models exhibit resilience, open weights reasoning models suffer catastrophic collapses (up to 55% average accuracy drops across perturbations and up to 100% on some), exposing structural fragility. To further disentangle mechanical parsing failures from downstream reasoning failures, we strictly isolate the models' working memory capacity by forcing models to solve multiple unperturbed mathematical problems sequentially within a single context window. Our results indicate that open weight models ranging from 7B to 120B parameters and Claude Opus 4.6 exhibit accuracy decay on subsequent problems. This degradation demonstrates that intermediate reasoning steps permanently pollute standard dense attention mechanisms. We argue that to achieve reliable reasoning, future reasoning architectures must integrate explicit contextual resets within a model's own Chain-of-Thought, leading to fundamental open questions regarding the optimal granularity of atomic reasoning tasks.

Solving topological grid puzzles requires reasoning over global spatial invariants such as connectivity, loop closure, and region symmetry and remains challenging for even the most powerful large language models (LLMs). To study these abilities under controlled settings, we introduce TopoBench, a benchmark of six puzzle families across three difficulty levels. We evaluate strong reasoning LLMs on TopoBench and find that even frontier models solve fewer than one quarter of hard instances, with two families nearly unsolved. To investigate whether these failures stem from reasoning limitations or from difficulty extracting and maintaining spatial constraints, we annotate 750 chain of thought traces with an error taxonomy that surfaces four candidate causal failure modes, then test them with targeted interventions simulating each error type. These interventions show that certain error patterns like premature commitment and constraint forgetting have a direct impact on the ability to solve the puzzle, while repeated reasoning is a benign effect of search. Finally we study mitigation strategies including prompt guidance, cell-aligned grid representations and tool-based constraint checking, finding that the bottleneck lies in extracting constraints from spatial representations and not in reasoning over them. Code and data are available at github.com/mayug/topobench-benchmark.

Personality imbuing customizes LLM behavior, but safety evaluations almost always study prompt-based personas alone. We show this is incomplete: prompting and activation steering expose *different*, architecture-dependent vulnerability profiles, and testing with only one method can miss a model's dominant failure mode. Across 5,568 judged conditions on four standard models from three architecture families, persona danger rankings under system prompting are preserved across all architectures (ρ= 0.71--0.96), but activation-steering vulnerability diverges sharply and cannot be predicted from prompt-side rankings: Llama-3.1-8B is substantially more AS-vulnerable, whereas Gemma-3-27B and Qwen3.5 are more vulnerable to prompting. The most striking illustration of this divergence is the *prosocial persona paradox*: on Llama-3.1-8B, P12 (high conscientiousness + high agreeableness) is among the safest personas under prompting yet becomes the highest-ASR activation-steered persona (ASR ~0.818). This is an inversion robust to coefficient ablation and matched-strength calibration, and replicated on DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B. A trait refusal alignment framework, in which conscientiousness is strongly anti-aligned with refusal on Llama-3.1-8B, offers a partial geometric account. Reasoning provides only partial protection: two 32B reasoning models reach 15--18% prompt-side ASR, and activation steering separates them sharply in both baseline susceptibility and persona-specific vulnerability. Heuristic trace diagnostics suggest that the safer model retains stronger policy recall and self-correction behavior, not merely longer reasoning.

Cognitive dynamics are pivotal to advance human understanding of the world. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) reveal their potential for cognitive simulation. However, these LLM-based cognitive studies primarily focus on static modeling, overlooking the dynamic nature of cognition. To bridge this gap, we propose the concept of the cognitive dynamics of LLMs and present a corresponding task with the inspiration of longitudinal studies. Towards the task, we develop CogBench, a novel benchmark to assess the cognitive dynamics of LLMs and validate it through participant surveys. We also design two evaluation metrics for CogBench, including Authenticity and Rationality. Recognizing the inherent static nature of LLMs, we introduce CogGPT for the task, which features an innovative iterative cognitive mechanism aimed at enhancing lifelong cognitive dynamics. Empirical results demonstrate the superiority of CogGPT over existing methods, particularly in its ability to facilitate role-specific cognitive dynamics under continuous information flows.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become central to mathematical reasoning in large language models, yet models remain brittle to early errors: a single arithmetic slip or unjustified inference typically propagates uncorrected to an incorrect final answer. We investigate whether training on intentionally flawed reasoning traces can teach models to detect and recover from such errors without degrading standard problem-solving ability. Using competition-level problems from MATH-lighteval, we generate CoT prefixes containing exactly one controlled error, either a calculation error (sign flips, dropped terms) or a reasoning error (misapplied rules, unjustified logical steps), and fine-tune Qwen3-4B with GRPO using a binary final-answer reward. Our Mixed-CoT-RL model matches standard RL on clean problems (41% vs 41%) while substantially outperforming it on problems prefilled with flawed reasoning (24% vs 19%). Notably, clean-only RL fine-tuning degrades robustness below the untuned baseline 19% vs. 20%), indicating that conventional training increases susceptibility to misleading prefills. Among error types, training on reasoning errors yields greater robustness gains than calculation errors alone, with mixed training performing best. These findings demonstrate that exposure to flawed traces during training can improve error-recovery behavior without sacrificing accuracy, suggesting a path toward more robust mathematical reasoning in LLMs.

In most current research, large language models (LLMs) are able to perform reasoning tasks by generating chains of thought through the guidance of specific prompts. However, there still exists a significant discrepancy between their capability in solving complex reasoning problems and that of humans. At present, most approaches focus on chains of thought (COT) and tool use, without considering the adoption and application of human cognitive frameworks. It is well-known that when confronting complex reasoning challenges, humans typically employ various cognitive abilities, and necessitate interaction with all aspects of tools, knowledge, and the external environment information to accomplish intricate tasks. This paper introduces a novel intelligent framework, referred to as OlaGPT. OlaGPT carefully studied a cognitive architecture framework, and propose to simulate certain aspects of human cognition. The framework involves approximating different cognitive modules, including attention, memory, reasoning, learning, and corresponding scheduling and decision-making mechanisms. Inspired by the active learning mechanism of human beings, it proposes a learning unit to record previous mistakes and expert opinions, and dynamically refer to them to strengthen their ability to solve similar problems. The paper also outlines common effective reasoning frameworks for human problem-solving and designs Chain-of-Thought (COT) templates accordingly. A comprehensive decision-making mechanism is also proposed to maximize model accuracy. The efficacy of OlaGPT has been stringently evaluated on multiple reasoning datasets, and the experimental outcomes reveal that OlaGPT surpasses state-of-the-art benchmarks, demonstrating its superior performance. Our implementation of OlaGPT is available on GitHub: https://github.com/oladata-team/OlaGPT.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate significant potential but face challenges in complex financial reasoning tasks requiring both domain knowledge and sophisticated reasoning. Current evaluation benchmarks often fall short by not decoupling these capabilities indicators from single task performance and lack root cause analysis for task failure. To address this, we introduce FinEval-KR, a novel evaluation framework for decoupling and quantifying LLMs' knowledge and reasoning abilities independently, proposing distinct knowledge score and reasoning score metrics. Inspired by cognitive science, we further propose a cognitive score based on Bloom's taxonomy to analyze capabilities in reasoning tasks across different cognitive levels. We also release a new open-source Chinese financial reasoning dataset covering 22 subfields to support reproducible research and further advancements in financial reasoning. Our experimental results reveal that LLM reasoning ability and higher-order cognitive ability are the core factors influencing reasoning accuracy. We also specifically find that even top models still face a bottleneck with knowledge application. Furthermore, our analysis shows that specialized financial LLMs generally lag behind the top general large models across multiple metrics.

Large Language Models (LLMs) display striking surface fluency yet systematically fail at tasks requiring symbolic reasoning, arithmetic accuracy, and logical consistency. This paper offers a structural diagnosis of such failures, revealing a persistent gap between comprehension and competence. Through controlled experiments and architectural analysis, we demonstrate that LLMs often articulate correct principles without reliably applying them--a failure rooted not in knowledge access, but in computational execution. We term this phenomenon the computational split-brain syndrome, where instruction and action pathways are geometrically and functionally dissociated. This core limitation recurs across domains, from mathematical operations to relational inferences, and explains why model behavior remains brittle even under idealized prompting. We argue that LLMs function as powerful pattern completion engines, but lack the architectural scaffolding for principled, compositional reasoning. Our findings delineate the boundary of current LLM capabilities and motivate future models with metacognitive control, principle lifting, and structurally grounded execution. This diagnosis also clarifies why mechanistic interpretability findings may reflect training-specific pattern coordination rather than universal computational principles, and why the geometric separation between instruction and execution pathways suggests limitations in neural introspection and mechanistic analysis.

Long-term memory systems store what a user says in an external store and retrieve it when a related query arrives. This interface rests on an assumption so natural that it is rarely stated: a memory that is needed will resemble the query that needs it. World knowledge breaks the assumption. A tree-nut allergy should change the answer to a macaron request through their almond-flour ingredient, yet the two texts share no cue a retriever can see. We call this failure mode the implicit-association blind spot and introduce InMind, a 125-task, expert-verified benchmark spanning ten life domains, with 113 tasks grounded in citable public sources. Its paired controls separate three explanations that existing evaluations conflate: the fact was never stored, the model lacks the bridging knowledge, or the fact was stored and never surfaced. The verdict is clean. With the decisive memory placed in context, the backbone answers 84.0 percent of indirect queries; when the same memory must be retrieved, six vector, graph, and agentic memory systems reach at most 14.4 percent, even though they recall the same facts on demand at up to 100 percent. An embedding with eight times the dimensionality raises answer-blind target recall for every system yet leaves the gap essentially intact. A minimal diagnostic probe that keeps memory visible before the query arrives recovers most of the gap, locating the failure in the query-conditioned interface itself and pointing to routing, deciding which facts must stay visible, as the open problem InMind is built to score.

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence that describes the ability to monitor and regulate one's own cognitive processes. Yet LLMs exhibit systemic deficiencies in key metacognitive faculties: they hallucinate with high confidence, fail to recognize knowledge boundaries, and misrepresent their internal uncertainty--undermining trustworthiness and reliability. Since monitoring task performance and adapting behavior accordingly are central to metacognition, we posit that models capable of accurately judging their own performance are better positioned to improve it. We operationalize this idea via two novel mechanisms: reinforcement learning with metacognitive feedback (RLMF), a paradigm to refine completion rankings during preference optimization based on the quality of a model's self-judgments of performance, and metacognitive data selection, which uses similar self-judgments to identify high-value training examples, outperforming naive active learning. We apply these innovations to the problem of faithful calibration (FC), a task that is itself fundamentally metacognitive: the goal is to align expressed with intrinsic uncertainty, difficult even for frontier LLMs. We adopt a two-stage, decoupled approach, first using these methods to calibrate the faithfulness of models' self-reported confidence scores, then mapping to natural, context-adaptable linguistic uncertainty via targeted output editing. Extensive experiments show RLMF achieves generalizable, state-of-the-art FC on diverse tasks while preserving accuracy. Further, RLMF surpasses standard RL by up to 63% while enhancing models' ability to assess and express their own capability limits. This positions RLMF as a promising paradigm to enhance LLM metacognition toward improved abilities and alignment, and suggests metacognitive performance as an effective RL signal to overcome limits of prior intrinsic feedback methods.

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address. This paper proposes that a significant epistemic risk from conversational AI may lie not in inaccuracy or intentional deception, but in something more fundamental: these systems may be configured, through optimization processes that make them useful, to present characteristics that bypass the cognitive mechanisms humans evolved to evaluate incoming information. The Cognitive Trojan Horse hypothesis draws on Sperber and colleagues' theory of epistemic vigilance -- the parallel cognitive process monitoring communicated information for reasons to doubt -- and proposes that LLM-based systems present 'honest non-signals': genuine characteristics (fluency, helpfulness, apparent disinterest) that fail to carry the information equivalent human characteristics would carry, because in humans these are costly to produce while in LLMs they are computationally trivial. Four mechanisms of potential bypass are identified: processing fluency decoupled from understanding, trust-competence presentation without corresponding stakes, cognitive offloading that delegates evaluation itself to the AI, and optimization dynamics that systematically produce sycophancy. The framework generates testable predictions, including a counterintuitive speculation that cognitively sophisticated users may be more vulnerable to AI-mediated epistemic influence. This reframes AI safety as partly a problem of calibration -- aligning human evaluative responses with the actual epistemic status of AI-generated content -- rather than solely a problem of preventing deception.

Test-time scaling has enabled Large Language Models (LLMs) to tackle complex reasoning, yet the limitations of current Chain-of-Thought (CoT) evaluation obscures whether performance gains stem from genuine reasoning or mere verbosity. To address this, (1) we propose a novel neuro-symbolic framework for the non-intrusive, comprehensive process-centric evaluation of reasoning. (2) Through this lens, we identify four distinct behavioral prototypes and diagnose the failure modes. (3) We examine the impact of inference mode, training strategy, and model scale. Our analysis reveals that extended token generation is not a prerequisite for deep reasoning. Furthermore, we reveal critical constraints: mixing long and short CoT data in training risks in premature saturation and collapse, while distillation into smaller models captures behavioral length but fails to replicate logical efficacy due to intrinsic capacity limits.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning (RL) have led to substantial improvements in the mathematical reasoning abilities of LLMs, as measured by standard benchmarks. Yet these gains often persist even when models are trained with flawed signals, such as random or inverted rewards. This raises a fundamental question: do such improvements reflect genuine reasoning, or are they merely artifacts of overfitting to benchmark-specific patterns? To answer this question, we adopt an evaluation-centric perspective and highlight two critical shortcomings in existing protocols. First, benchmark contamination arises because test problems are publicly available, thereby increasing the risk of data leakage. Second, evaluation fragility results from reliance on single-instance assessments, which are sensitive to stochastic outputs and fail to capture reasoning consistency. These limitations suggest the need for a new evaluation paradigm that can probe reasoning ability beyond memorization and one-off success. As response, we propose VAR-MATH, a symbolic evaluation framework that converts fixed numerical problems into parameterized templates and requires models to solve multiple instantiations of each. This design enforces consistency across structurally equivalent variants, mitigates contamination, and enhances robustness through bootstrapped metrics. We apply VAR-MATH to transform three popular benchmarks, AMC23, AIME24, and AIME25, into their symbolic counterparts, VAR-AMC23, VAR-AIME24, and VAR-AIME25. Experimental results show substantial performance drops for RL-trained models on these variabilized benchmarks, especially for smaller models, with average declines of 47.9\% on AMC23, 58.8\% on AIME24, and 72.9\% on AIME25. These findings indicate that some existing RL methods rely on superficial heuristics and fail to generalize beyond specific numerical forms.

Computer-use agents have rapidly improved on real-world tasks such as web navigation, desktop automation, and software interaction, in some cases surpassing human performance. Yet even when the task and model are unchanged, an agent that succeeds once may fail on a repeated execution of the same task. This raises a fundamental question: if an agent can succeed at a task once, what prevents it from doing so reliably? In this work, we study the sources of unreliability in computer-use agents through three factors: stochasticity during execution, ambiguity in task specification, and variability in agent behavior. We analyze these factors on OSWorld using repeated executions of the same task together with paired statistical tests that capture task-level changes across settings. Our analysis shows that reliability depends on both how tasks are specified and how agent behavior varies across executions. These findings suggest the need to evaluate agents under repeated execution, to allow agents to resolve task ambiguity through interaction, and to favor strategies that remain stable across runs.

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence, specifically regarding the awareness of one's own knowledge. While humans rely on shared internal memory for both answering questions and reporting their knowledge state, this dependency in LLMs remains underexplored. This study proposes a framework to measure metacognitive ability d_{type2}' using a dual-prompt method, followed by the introduction of Evolution Strategy for Metacognitive Alignment (ESMA) to bind a model's internal knowledge to its explicit behaviors. ESMA demonstrates robust generalization across diverse untrained settings, indicating a enhancement in the model's ability to reference its own knowledge. Furthermore, parameter analysis attributes these improvements to a sparse set of significant modifications.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibiting test-time scaling behavior, such as extended reasoning traces and self-verification, have demonstrated remarkable performance on complex, long-term reasoning tasks. However, the robustness of these reasoning behaviors remains underexplored. To investigate this, we conduct a systematic evaluation of multiple reasoning models across three scenarios: (1) problems augmented with lengthy, irrelevant context; (2) multi-turn conversational settings with independent tasks; and (3) problems presented as a subtask within a complex task. We observe an interesting phenomenon: reasoning models tend to produce much shorter reasoning traces (up to 50%) for the same problem under different context conditions compared to the traces produced when the problem is presented in isolation. A finer-grained analysis reveals that this compression is associated with a decrease in self-verification and uncertainty management behaviors, such as double-checking. While this behavioral shift does not compromise performance on straightforward problems, it might affect performance on more challenging tasks. We hope our findings draw additional attention to both the robustness of reasoning models and the problem of context management for LLMs and LLM-based agents.

A robust decision-making process must take into account uncertainty, especially when the choice involves inherent risks. Because artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly integrated into decision-making workflows, managing uncertainty relies more and more on the metacognitive capabilities of these systems; i.e, their ability to assess the reliability of and regulate their own decisions. Hence, it is crucial to employ robust methods to measure the metacognitive abilities of AI. This paper is primarily a methodological contribution arguing for the adoption of the meta-d' framework as the gold standard for assessing the metacognitive sensitivity of AIs--the ability to generate confidence ratings that distinguish correct from incorrect responses. Moreover, we propose to leverage signal detection theory (SDT) to measure the ability of AIs to spontaneously regulate their decisions based on uncertainty and risk. To demonstrate the practical utility of these psychophysical frameworks, we conduct two series of experiments on three large language models (LLMs)--GPT-5, DeepSeek-V3.2-Exp, and Mistral-Medium-2508.

As LLMs become increasingly prevalent, it is interesting to consider how ``creative'' these models can be. From cognitive science, creativity consists of at least two key characteristics: convergent thinking (purposefulness to achieve a given goal) and divergent thinking (adaptability to new environments or constraints) runco2003critical. In this work, we introduce a framework for quantifying LLM creativity that incorporates the two characteristics. This is achieved by (1) Denial Prompting pushes LLMs to come up with more creative solutions to a given problem by incrementally imposing new constraints on the previous solution, compelling LLMs to adopt new strategies, and (2) defining and computing the NeoGauge metric which examines both convergent and divergent thinking in the generated creative responses by LLMs. We apply the proposed framework on Codeforces problems, a natural data source for collecting human coding solutions. We quantify NeoGauge for various proprietary and open-source models and find that even the most creative model, GPT-4, still falls short of demonstrating human-like creativity. We also experiment with advanced reasoning strategies (MCTS, self-correction, etc.) and observe no significant improvement in creativity. As a by-product of our analysis, we release NeoCoder dataset for reproducing our results on future models.

When a phone-use agent avoids harm, does that show safety, or simply inability to act? Existing evaluations often cannot tell. A harmful outcome may be avoided because the agent recognized the risk and chose the safe action, or because it failed to understand the screen or execute any relevant action at all. These cases have different causes and call for different fixes, yet current benchmarks often merge them under task success, refusal, or final harmful outcome. We address this problem with PhoneSafety, a benchmark of 700 safety-critical moments drawn from real phone interactions across more than 130 apps. Each instance isolates the next decision at a risky moment and asks a simple question: does the model take the safe action, take the unsafe action, or fail to do anything useful? We evaluate eight representative phone-use agents under this framework. Our results reveal two main patterns. First, stronger general phone-use ability does not reliably imply safer choices at risky moments. Models that perform better on ordinary app tasks are not always the ones that behave more safely when the next action matters. Second, failures to do anything useful behave like a capability signal rather than a safety signal: they are concentrated in more visually and operationally demanding settings and remain stable when the evaluation protocol changes. Across models, failures split into two recurring patterns: unsafe choices in settings where the model can act but chooses wrongly, and inability to act in more visually and operationally demanding screens. Overall, a harmless outcome is not enough to count as evidence of safety. Evaluating phone-use agents requires separating unsafe judgment from inability to act.

The ability to recognize one's own limitations and decide whether to solve a problem or delegate is fundamental for reliable intelligent systems. Yet we show that modern large language models systematically lack this ability: across diverse model families and scales, they overestimate their competence and attempt queries they cannot solve. We refer to this ability as Capability Self-Assessment (CSA) and formulate it as a policy-learning problem, aiming to improve self-assessment while preserving the model's original capabilities. Our results show that reinforcement learning teaches CSA effectively, significantly outperforming supervised fine-tuning while preserving original capabilities. In contrast, supervised fine-tuning severely degrades the capabilities the model is meant to assess. Moreover, learned self-assessment behavior generalizes well out of distribution, suggesting that CSA is a transferable model trait. Finally, CSA is practically useful: it improves local-cloud decision making at inference time and provides a signal for targeted data selection during training.

As reasoning models scale rapidly, the essential role of multimodality in human cognition has come into sharp relief, driving a growing need to probe vision-centric cognitive behaviors. Yet, existing multimodal benchmarks either overemphasize textual reasoning or fall short of systematically capturing vision-centric cognitive behaviors, leaving the cognitive capacity of MLLMs insufficiently assessed. To address this limitation, we introduce MME-CC (Multi-Modal Evaluation benchmark of Cognitive Capacity), a vision-grounded benchmark that organizes 11 representative reasoning tasks into three fundamental categories of visual information: spatial, geometric, and knowledge-based reasoning, and provides fine-grained analyses of MLLMs' cognitive capacity across these dimensions. Based on MME-CC, we conduct extensive experiments over 16 representative MLLMs. Our study reveals that closed-source models currently lead overall (e.g., 42.66 for Gemini-2.5-Pro vs. 30.45 for GLM-4.5V), while spatial and geometric reasoning remain broadly weak (less than or equal to 30%). We further identify common error patterns, including orientation mistakes, fragile cross-view identity persistence, and poor adherence to counterfactual instructions, and observe that Chain-of-Thought typically follows a three-stage process (extract -> reason -> verify) with heavy reliance on visual extraction. We hope this work catalyzes a shift toward treating the cognitive capacity of MLLMs as central to both evaluation and model design.

Domain expertise enhances judgment within boundaries but creates systematic vulnerabilities specifically at borders. We term this Transitive Expert Error (TEE), distinct from Dunning-Kruger effects, requiring calibrated expertise as precondition. Mechanisms enabling reliable within-domain judgment become liabilities when structural similarity masks causal divergence. Two core mechanisms operate: structural similarity bias causes experts to overweight surface features (shared vocabulary, patterns, formal structure) while missing causal architecture differences; authority persistence maintains confidence across competence boundaries through social reinforcement and metacognitive failures (experts experience no subjective uncertainty as pattern recognition operates smoothly on familiar-seeming inputs.) These mechanism intensify under three conditions: shared vocabulary masking divergent processes, social pressure for immediate judgment, and delayed feedback. These findings extend to AI routing architectures (MoE systems, multi-model orchestration, tool-using agents, RAG systems) exhibiting routing-induced failures (wrong specialist selected) and coverage-induced failures (no appropriate specialist exists). Both produce a hallucination phenotype: confident, coherent, structurally plausible but causally incorrect outputs at domain boundaries. In human systems where mechanisms are cognitive black boxes; AI architectures make them explicit and addressable. We propose interventions: multi-expert activation with disagreement detection (router level), boundary-aware calibration (specialist level), and coverage gap detection (training level). TEE has detectable signatures (routing patterns, confidence-accuracy dissociations, domain-inappropriate content) enabling monitoring and mitigation. What remains intractable in human cognition becomes addressable through architectural design.

While Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) generate extensive chain-of-thought reasoning, we lack a principled framework for understanding how these thoughts are structured. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach by applying Schoenfeld's Episode Theory, a classic cognitive framework for human mathematical problem-solving, to analyze the reasoning traces of LRMs. We annotated thousands of sentences and paragraphs from model-generated solutions to math problems using seven cognitive labels (e.g., Plan, Implement, Verify). The result is the first publicly available benchmark for the fine-grained analysis of machine reasoning, including a large annotated corpus and detailed annotation guidebooks. Our preliminary analysis reveals distinct patterns in LRM reasoning, such as the transition dynamics between cognitive states. This framework provides a theoretically grounded methodology for interpreting LRM cognition and enables future work on more controllable and transparent reasoning systems.

Memory-augmented large language models extend reasoning beyond a fixed context window by maintaining long-term memory across interactions. However, existing memory systems often collapse stable user facts, episodic events, and behavioral rules into a shared space, allowing functionally distinct memories to be retrieved and used as interchangeable evidence. We identify this failure mode as heterogeneous memory contamination, where context-specific events become overgeneralized claims, or semantically relevant but functionally incompatible memories mislead generation. To this end, we introduce MemGuard, a type-aware memory framework that preserves functional memory boundaries during memory construction and retrieval. It assigns each memory an explicit functional role at write time, maintains relations across type-isolated memories, and selectively composes evidence only from necessary memory types, reducing contamination from irrelevant or functionally incompatible evidence. Across hallucination and long-horizon conversation benchmarks, MemGuard improves memory reliability by up to 28.27% while retrieving up to 5.8x fewer memory tokens than prior methods. These results suggest that reliable long-term reasoning depends on principled organization and selective use of heterogeneous memory.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a troubling duality, capable of both remarkable generalization and brittle, verbatim memorization of their training data. This unpredictability undermines their reliability in high-stakes applications. In this work, we propose a unified framework to understand, identify, and control these distinct reasoning modes. First, we introduce a theoretical model based on the Information Bottleneck (IB) principle, formalizing generalization as the learning of a compressed, task-relevant representation and memorization as a failure to compress. Building on this theory, we develop Dynamic Mode Steering (DMS), a novel inference-time algorithm which comprises two components: (1) a lightweight, causally-grounded linear probe that identifies the model's instantaneous reliance on memorization, and (2) a dynamic activation steering mechanism that nudges the model's computation towards pre-identified generalization circuits. We frame DMS as a form of adaptive, self-contrastive decoding. Experiments on reasoning and faithfulness tasks demonstrate that DMS significantly improves logical consistency and factual accuracy, thereby offering a principled approach to enhancing LLM reliability.

Contemporary AGI evaluations report multidomain capability profiles, yet they typically assign symmetric weights and rely on snapshot scores. This creates two problems: (i) equal weighting treats all domains as equally important when human intelligence research suggests otherwise, and (ii) snapshot testing can't distinguish durable capabilities from brittle performances that collapse under delay or stress. I argue that general intelligence -- in humans and potentially in machines -- is better understood as a homeostatic property cluster: a set of abilities plus the mechanisms that keep those abilities co-present under perturbation. On this view, AGI evaluation should weight domains by their causal centrality (their contribution to cluster stability) and require evidence of persistence across sessions. I propose two battery-compatible extensions: a centrality-prior score that imports CHC-derived weights with transparent sensitivity analysis, and a Cluster Stability Index family that separates profile persistence, durable learning, and error correction. These additions preserve multidomain breadth while reducing brittleness and gaming. I close with testable predictions and black-box protocols labs can adopt without architectural access.

Recent studies of the applications of conversational AI tools, such as chatbots powered by large language models, to complex real-world knowledge work have shown limitations related to reasoning and multi-step problem solving. Specifically, while existing chatbots simulate shallow reasoning and understanding they are prone to errors as problem complexity increases. The failure of these systems to address complex knowledge work is due to the fact that they do not perform any actual cognition. In this position paper, we present Cognitive AI, a higher-level framework for implementing programmatically defined neuro-symbolic cognition above and outside of large language models. Specifically, we propose a dual-layer functional architecture for Cognitive AI that serves as a roadmap for AI systems that can perform complex multi-step knowledge work. We propose that Cognitive AI is a necessary precursor for the evolution of higher forms of AI, such as AGI, and specifically claim that AGI cannot be achieved by probabilistic approaches on their own. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for large language models, adoption cycles in AI, and commercial Cognitive AI development.

Writing is a cognitively demanding task involving continuous decision-making, heavy use of working memory, and frequent switching between multiple activities. Scholarly writing is particularly complex as it requires authors to coordinate many pieces of multiform knowledge. To fully understand writers' cognitive thought process, one should fully decode the end-to-end writing data (from individual ideas to final manuscript) and understand their complex cognitive mechanisms in scholarly writing. We introduce ScholaWrite dataset, the first-of-its-kind keystroke logs of an end-to-end scholarly writing process for complete manuscripts, with thorough annotations of cognitive writing intentions behind each keystroke. Our dataset includes LaTeX-based keystroke data from five preprints with nearly 62K total text changes and annotations across 4 months of paper writing. ScholaWrite shows promising usability and applications (e.g., iterative self-writing) for the future development of AI writing assistants for academic research, which necessitate complex methods beyond LLM prompting. Our experiments clearly demonstrated the importance of collection of end-to-end writing data, rather than the final manuscript, for the development of future writing assistants to support the cognitive thinking process of scientists. Our de-identified dataset, demo, and code repository are available on our project page.

Current large language models (LLMs) excel in verifiable domains where outputs can be checked before action but prove less reliable for high-stakes strategic decisions with uncertain outcomes. This gap, driven by mutually reinforcing cognitive biases in both humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, threatens the defensibility of valuations and sustainability of investments in the sector. This report describes a framework emerging from systematic qualitative assessment across 7 frontier-grade LLMs and 3 market-facing venture vignettes under time pressure. Detailed prompting specifying decision partnership and explicitly instructing avoidance of sycophancy, confabulation, solution drift, and nihilism achieved initial partnership state but failed to maintain it under operational pressure. Sustaining protective partnership state required an emergent 7-stage calibration sequence, built upon a 4-stage initialization process, within a 5-layer protection architecture enabling bias self-monitoring, human-AI adversarial challenge, partnership state verification, performance degradation detection, and stakeholder protection. Three discoveries resulted: partnership state is achievable through ordered calibration but requires emergent maintenance protocols; reliability degrades when architectural drift and context exhaustion align; and dissolution discipline prevents costly pursuit of fundamentally wrong directions. Cross-model validation revealed systematic performance differences across LLM architectures. This approach demonstrates that human-AI teams can achieve cognitive partnership capable of preventing avoidable regret in high-stakes decisions, addressing return-on-investment expectations that depend on AI systems supporting consequential decision-making without introducing preventable cognitive traps when verification arrives too late.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at complex reasoning but can still exhibit harmful behaviors. Current alignment strategies typically embed safety into model weights, making these controls implicit, static, and difficult to modify. This paper introduces Cognition-of-Thought (CooT), a novel decoding-time framework that equips LLMs with an explicit cognitive self-monitoring loop. CooT couples a standard text Generator with a cognitive Perceiver that continuously monitors the unfolding sequence. The Perceiver uses a structured, precedence-based hierarchy of principles (e.g., safety over obedience) to detect potential misalignments as they arise. When violations are flagged, CooT intervenes by rolling back the generation to the point of error and regenerating under injected guidance that combines universal social priors with context-specific warnings. CooT thus transforms alignment from a fixed property into an explicit, dynamic, and auditable process active during inference, allowing for flexible policy updates without retraining the model. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks and model families confirm that CooT consistently improves safety and social reasoning performance.

This paper investigates the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) using 50 newly constructed high-school-level word problems. Unlike prior studies that focus solely on answer correctness, we rigorously analyze both final answers and solution steps to identify reasoning failures. Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models - including Mixtral, Llama, Gemini, GPT-4o, and OpenAI's o1 variants - we find that while newer models (e.g., o3-mini, deepseek-r1) achieve higher accuracy, all models exhibit errors in spatial reasoning, strategic planning, and arithmetic, sometimes producing correct answers through flawed logic. Common failure modes include unwarranted assumptions, over-reliance on numerical patterns, and difficulty translating physical intuition into mathematical steps. Manual analysis reveals that models struggle with problems requiring multi-step deduction or real-world knowledge, despite possessing broad mathematical knowledge. Our results underscore the importance of evaluating reasoning processes, not just answers, and caution against overestimating LLMs' problem-solving proficiency. The study highlights persistent gaps in LLMs' generalization abilities, emphasizing the need for targeted improvements in structured reasoning and constraint handling.

Advanced LLMs have achieved near-ceiling instruction-following accuracy on benchmarks such as IFEval. However, these impressive scores do not necessarily translate to reliable services in real-world use, where users often vary their phrasing, contextual framing, and task formulations. In this paper, we study nuance-oriented reliability: whether models exhibit consistent competence across cousin prompts that convey analogous user intents but with subtle nuances. To quantify this, we introduce a new metric, reliable@k, and develop an automated pipeline that generates high-quality cousin prompts via data augmentation. Building upon this, we construct IFEval++ for systematic evaluation. Across 20 proprietary and 26 open-source LLMs, we find that current models exhibit substantial insufficiency in nuance-oriented reliability -- their performance can drop by up to 61.8% with nuanced prompt modifications. What's more, we characterize it and explore three potential improvement recipes. Our findings highlight nuance-oriented reliability as a crucial yet underexplored next step toward more dependable and trustworthy LLM behavior. Our code and benchmark are accessible: https://github.com/jianshuod/IFEval-pp.

Why do large language models sometimes output factual inaccuracies and exhibit erroneous reasoning? The brittleness of these models, particularly when executing long chains of reasoning, currently seems to be an inevitable price to pay for their advanced capabilities of coherently synthesizing knowledge, pragmatics, and abstract thought. Towards making sense of this fundamentally unsolved problem, this work identifies and analyzes the phenomenon of attention glitches, in which the Transformer architecture's inductive biases intermittently fail to capture robust reasoning. To isolate the issue, we introduce flip-flop language modeling (FFLM), a parametric family of synthetic benchmarks designed to probe the extrapolative behavior of neural language models. This simple generative task requires a model to copy binary symbols over long-range dependencies, ignoring the tokens in between. We find that Transformer FFLMs suffer from a long tail of sporadic reasoning errors, some of which we can eliminate using various regularization techniques. Our preliminary mechanistic analyses show why the remaining errors may be very difficult to diagnose and resolve. We hypothesize that attention glitches account for (some of) the closed-domain hallucinations in natural LLMs.

Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) on chain-of-thought reasoning has become a standard part of language model post-training recipes. A common assumption is that the reasoning chains trained through RLVR reliably represent how a model gets to its answer. In this paper, we develop two metrics for critically examining this assumption: Causal Importance of Reasoning (CIR), which measures the cumulative effect of reasoning tokens on the final answer, and Sufficiency of Reasoning (SR), which measures whether a verifier can arrive at an unambiguous answer based on the reasoning alone. Through experiments with the Qwen2.5 model series and ReasoningGym tasks, we find that: (1) while RLVR does improve task accuracy, it does not reliably improve CIR or SR, calling the role of reasoning in model performance into question; (2) a small amount of SFT before RLVR can be a remedy for low CIR and SR; and (3) CIR and SR can be improved even without SFT by applying auxiliary CIR/SR rewards on top of the outcome-based reward. This joint reward matches the accuracy of RLVR while also leading to causally important and sufficient reasoning. These results show that RLVR does not always lead models to rely on reasoning in the way that is commonly thought, but this issue can be remedied with simple modifications to the post-training procedure.

Knowledge augmentation has significantly enhanced the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in knowledge-intensive tasks. However, existing methods typically operate on the simplistic premise that model performance equates with internal knowledge, overlooking the knowledge-confidence gaps that lead to overconfident errors or uncertain truths. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel meta-cognitive framework for reliable knowledge augmentation via differentiated intervention and alignment. Our approach leverages internal cognitive signals to partition the knowledge space into mastered, confused, and missing regions, guiding targeted knowledge expansion. Furthermore, we introduce a cognitive consistency mechanism to synchronize subjective certainty with objective accuracy, ensuring calibrated knowledge boundaries. Extensive experiments demonstrate the our framework consistently outperforms strong baselines, validating its rationality in not only enhancing knowledge capabilities but also fostering cognitive behaviors that better distinguish knowns from unknowns. All codes are available at https://github.com/AI9Stars/Know-More-Know-Clearer.

In this paper, we present an investigative study on how Mental Sets influence the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. LLMs have excelled in diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks, driven by advancements in parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) and emergent capabilities like in-context learning (ICL). For complex reasoning tasks, selecting the right model for PEFT or ICL is critical, often relying on scores on benchmarks such as MMLU, MATH, and GSM8K. However, current evaluation methods, based on metrics like F1 Score or reasoning chain assessments by larger models, overlook a key dimension: adaptability to unfamiliar situations and overcoming entrenched thinking patterns. In cognitive psychology, Mental Set refers to the tendency to persist with previously successful strategies, even when they become inefficient - a challenge for problem solving and reasoning. We compare the performance of LLM models like Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct and GPT-4o in the presence of mental sets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to integrate cognitive psychology concepts into the evaluation of LLMs for complex reasoning tasks, providing deeper insights into their adaptability and problem-solving efficacy.

As Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) acquire stronger reasoning capabilities to handle complex, multi-image instructions, this advancement may pose new safety risks. We study this problem by introducing MIR-SafetyBench, the first benchmark focused on multi-image reasoning safety, which consists of 2,676 instances across a taxonomy of 9 multi-image relations. Our extensive evaluations on 19 MLLMs reveal a troubling trend: models with more advanced multi-image reasoning can be more vulnerable on MIR-SafetyBench. Beyond attack success rates, we find that many responses labeled as safe are superficial, often driven by misunderstanding or evasive, non-committal replies. We further observe that unsafe generations exhibit lower attention entropy than safe ones on average. This internal signature suggests a possible risk that models may over-focus on task solving while neglecting safety constraints. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/MIR-SafetyBench.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Large language models (LLMs) have accomplished remarkable reasoning performance in various domains. However, in the domain of reasoning tasks, we discover a frailty: LLMs are surprisingly brittle to the ordering of the premises, despite the fact that such ordering does not alter the underlying task. In particular, we observe that LLMs achieve the best performance when the premise order aligns with the context required in intermediate reasoning steps. For example, in deductive reasoning tasks, presenting the premises in the same order as the ground truth proof in the prompt (as opposed to random ordering) drastically increases the model's accuracy. We first examine the effect of premise ordering on deductive reasoning on a variety of LLMs, and our evaluation shows that permuting the premise order can cause a performance drop of over 30%. In addition, we release the benchmark R-GSM, based on GSM8K, to examine the ordering effect for mathematical problem-solving, and we again observe a significant drop in accuracy, relative to the original GSM8K benchmark.

Although AI systems have been applied in various fields and achieved impressive performance, their safety and reliability are still a big concern. This is especially important for safety-critical tasks. One shared characteristic of these critical tasks is their risk sensitivity, where small mistakes can cause big consequences and even endanger life. There are several factors that could be guidelines for the successful deployment of AI systems in sensitive tasks: (i) failure detection and out-of-distribution (OOD) detection; (ii) overfitting identification; (iii) uncertainty quantification for predictions; (iv) robustness to data perturbations. These factors are also challenges of current AI systems, which are major blocks for building safe and reliable AI. Specifically, the current AI algorithms are unable to identify common causes for failure detection. Furthermore, additional techniques are required to quantify the quality of predictions. All these contribute to inaccurate uncertainty quantification, which lowers trust in predictions. Hence obtaining accurate model uncertainty quantification and its further improvement are challenging. To address these issues, many techniques have been proposed, such as regularization methods and learning strategies. As vision and language are the most typical data type and have many open source benchmark datasets, this thesis will focus on vision-language data processing for tasks like classification, image captioning, and vision question answering. In this thesis, we aim to build a safeguard by further developing current techniques to ensure the accurate model uncertainty for safety-critical tasks.

Recent advances in long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning have largely prioritized answer accuracy and token efficiency, while overlooking aspects critical to trustworthiness. We argue that usable reasoning systems must be trustworthy, characterized by three properties: interpretability, faithfulness, and reliability. To this end, we propose ReFIne, a new training framework that integrates supervised fine-tuning with GRPO to encourage models to: (i) improve interpretability by producing structured, tag-based traces with high-level planning that are easier for humans to follow; (ii) enhance faithfulness by explicitly disclosing the decisive information guiding each solution, with consistent cross-section references; and (iii) promote reliability by providing self-assessments of both the derivation's soundness and the confidence of the final answer. We apply ReFIne to the Qwen3 models at multiple scales (1.7B/4B/8B) and evaluate across mathematical benchmarks of varying difficulty. Our experimental results show that ReFIne models generate clearer and better-structured reasoning traces (interpretability +44.0%), more faithfully expose their underlying decision process (faithfulness +18.8%), and offer informative confidence estimates (reliability +42.4%). These findings highlight an overlooked but important direction: reasoning models should be optimized not only for accuracy, but also for broader dimensions of trustworthiness. Our code is available at: https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/Training_Trustworthy_LRM_with_Refine

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex reasoning tasks but remain vulnerable to severe safety risks, including harmful content generation and jailbreak attacks. Existing mitigation strategies rely on injecting heuristic safety signals during training, which often suppress reasoning ability and fail to resolve the safety-reasoning trade-off. To systematically investigate this issue, we analyze the reasoning trajectories of diverse LRMs and uncover a phenomenon we term Self-Jailbreak, where models override their own risk assessments and justify responding to unsafe prompts. This finding reveals that LRMs inherently possess the ability to reject unsafe queries, but this ability is compromised, resulting in harmful outputs. Building on these insights, we propose the Chain-of-Guardrail (CoG), a training framework that recomposes or backtracks unsafe reasoning steps, steering the model back onto safe trajectories while preserving valid reasoning chains. Extensive experiments across multiple reasoning and safety benchmarks demonstrate that CoG substantially improves the safety of current LRMs while preserving comparable reasoning ability, significantly outperforming prior methods that suffer from severe safety-reasoning trade-offs.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

Benchmarks measure whether a model is correct. They do not measure whether a model is reliable. This distinction is largely academic for single-shot inference, but becomes critical for agentic AI systems, where a single rephrased prompt can trigger cascading failures in multi-step execution. Yet this form of instability is not captured by existing evaluations. Hallucinations live in variance: they arise when semantically equivalent prompts activate inconsistent internal pathways, producing divergent outputs. Consistent but incorrect outputs reflect bias or missing knowledge; confident guessing reflects calibration failure. Neither constitutes hallucination under this definition. When error is variance-dominated, reducing redundant pathways improves reliability without adding knowledge. We formalize this through Semantic Stability (SS), measured via Paraphrase Consistency (PC@k): generate k paraphrases, greedy decode each, compute mode agreement. SS is a diagnostic for variance-driven unreliability, not a method for improving correctness. We show that a dense Qwen3-0.6B agrees with itself only 23.8% of the time; at 32% sparsity, agreement jumps to 55.9%. A phase diagram reveals the sweet spot where variance reduction outpaces bias accumulation, and regimes where stability collapses onto wrong answers.

Working memory (WM), a fundamental cognitive process facilitating the temporary storage, integration, manipulation, and retrieval of information, plays a vital role in reasoning and decision-making tasks. Robust benchmark datasets that capture the multifaceted nature of WM are crucial for the effective development and evaluation of AI WM models. Here, we introduce a comprehensive Working Memory (WorM) benchmark dataset for this purpose. WorM comprises 10 tasks and a total of 1 million trials, assessing 4 functionalities, 3 domains, and 11 behavioral and neural characteristics of WM. We jointly trained and tested state-of-the-art recurrent neural networks and transformers on all these tasks. We also include human behavioral benchmarks as an upper bound for comparison. Our results suggest that AI models replicate some characteristics of WM in the brain, most notably primacy and recency effects, and neural clusters and correlates specialized for different domains and functionalities of WM. In the experiments, we also reveal some limitations in existing models to approximate human behavior. This dataset serves as a valuable resource for communities in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and AI, offering a standardized framework to compare and enhance WM models, investigate WM's neural underpinnings, and develop WM models with human-like capabilities. Our source code and data are available at https://github.com/ZhangLab-DeepNeuroCogLab/WorM.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown impressive performance in various language tasks. However, they are prone to spurious correlations, and often generate illusory information. In real-world applications, PLMs should justify decisions with formalized, coherent reasoning chains, but this challenge remains under-explored. Cognitive psychology theorizes that humans are capable of utilizing fast and intuitive heuristic thinking to make decisions based on past experience, then rationalizing the decisions through slower and deliberative analytic reasoning. We incorporate these interlinked dual processes in fine-tuning and in-context learning with PLMs, applying them to two language understanding tasks that require coherent physical commonsense reasoning. We show that our proposed Heuristic-Analytic Reasoning (HAR) strategies drastically improve the coherence of rationalizations for model decisions, yielding state-of-the-art results on Tiered Reasoning for Intuitive Physics (TRIP). We also find that this improved coherence is a direct result of more faithful attention to relevant language context in each step of reasoning. Our findings suggest that human-like reasoning strategies can effectively improve the coherence and reliability of PLM reasoning.

As AI agents are increasingly deployed in real personal and corporate settings (email accounts, development workflows, company databases, etc.), safety considerations surrounding these agents become paramount. Although much work has focused on agent safety in the presence of an adversary, we show that agents can exhibit misaligned behavior even in benign settings, taking unsafe actions when those actions are instrumental to task completion. We study this failure mode through the lens of corrigibility, the safety desideratum that agents remain amenable to human correction, interruption, or shutdown. To demonstrate this tendency, we introduce a benchmark in which agents are asked to complete realistic, computer-use tasks but are confronted with a corrigibility obstacle: a human interrupt, a login page, or a shutdown notification. We then evaluate whether agents choose to violate corrigibility in order to complete the task -- overriding the human, accessing private passwords, rewiring shutdown. We find that the overwhelming majority of frontier models tested frequently bypass user interruptions or restrictions. In addition, better model performance appears to lead to greater misalignment. Finally, even when models are completely corrigible initially, we show there are no guarantees that the subagents they create are. Our work highlights the critical need for principled, corrigibility-focused alignment methods in autonomous agents.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Large language models have demonstrated impressive performance on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, which has triggered the discussion of whether the performance is achieved by true reasoning capability or memorization. To investigate this question, prior work has constructed mathematical benchmarks when questions undergo simple perturbations -- modifications that still preserve the underlying reasoning patterns of the solutions. However, no work has explored hard perturbations, which fundamentally change the nature of the problem so that the original solution steps do not apply. To bridge the gap, we construct MATH-P-Simple and MATH-P-Hard via simple perturbation and hard perturbation, respectively. Each consists of 279 perturbed math problems derived from level-5 (hardest) problems in the MATH dataset (Hendrycksmath et. al., 2021). We observe significant performance drops on MATH-P-Hard across various models, including o1-mini (-16.49%) and gemini-2.0-flash-thinking (-12.9%). We also raise concerns about a novel form of memorization where models blindly apply learned problem-solving skills without assessing their applicability to modified contexts. This issue is amplified when using original problems for in-context learning. We call for research efforts to address this challenge, which is critical for developing more robust and reliable reasoning models.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

AI agents are increasingly deployed to execute important tasks. While rising accuracy scores on standard benchmarks suggest rapid progress, many agents still continue to fail in practice. This discrepancy highlights a fundamental limitation of current evaluations: compressing agent behavior into a single success metric obscures critical operational flaws. Notably, it ignores whether agents behave consistently across runs, withstand perturbations, fail predictably, or have bounded error severity. Grounded in safety-critical engineering, we provide a holistic performance profile by proposing twelve concrete metrics that decompose agent reliability along four key dimensions: consistency, robustness, predictability, and safety. Evaluating 14 agentic models across two complementary benchmarks, we find that recent capability gains have only yielded small improvements in reliability. By exposing these persistent limitations, our metrics complement traditional evaluations while offering tools for reasoning about how agents perform, degrade, and fail.

Although synthetic data is widely promoted as a remedy, its prevailing production paradigm -- one optimizing for statistical smoothness -- systematically removes the long-tail, cognitively grounded irregularities that characterize human text. Prolonged training on such statistically optimal but cognitively impoverished data accelerates model collapse. This paper proposes a paradigm shift: instead of imitating the surface properties of data, we simulate the cognitive processes that generate human text. We introduce the Prompt-driven Cognitive Computing Framework (PMCSF), whose core consists of a Cognitive State Decoder (CSD) that reverse-engineers unstructured text into structured cognitive vectors, and a Cognitive Text Encoder (CTE) that re-materializes these states into text enriched with human-typical imperfections via mathematically defined Cognitive Perturbation Operators. The framework is validated through a two-stage objective evaluation pipeline. First, in cognitive codec verification, CTE text yields a Jensen-Shannon divergence of 0.0614 from human text (vs. 0.4431 for standard LLM output), passes double-blind professional media review, and achieves an intraclass correlation coefficient ICC > 0.9 for cognitive profile alignment across heterogeneous models. Second, in functional gain evaluation, isomorphic stress tests in the A-share market show that strategies incorporating CTE-generated data reduce maximum drawdown by 47.4% during the 2015 crash and deliver 8.6% Defensive Alpha, exceeding transaction costs by a factor of 33. Our findings demonstrate that modelling human cognitive limitations -- not copying surface data -- enables synthetic data with genuine functional gain, offering a viable technical pathway toward resolving the AI data-collapse crisis.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in long interactions, existing evaluations focus predominantly on retrospective memory (RM) via explicit queries. Prospective memory (PM), the critical ability to spontaneously recall and act on latent constraints without direct prompts, remains largely unevaluated. We introduce TriggerBench, a comprehensive PM benchmark spanning five dimensions across both daily assistants and professional workflows. TriggerBench pairs scenarios with matched RM controls, contrastive positive/negative variants, and overloaded triggers, enabling fine-grained measurement of proactive recall, false-alarm rate, and attentional robustness under a single protocol. Our evaluation yields three key findings. (i) PM shows a precision-recall trade-off and attentional fragility. Though enhanced reasoning significantly improves proactive recall, models may overfit to an "always-remind" heuristic. Furthermore, PM accuracy degrades substantially under implicit constraints or triggers overloaded by concurrent user requests, indicating that robust PM remains an open challenge. (ii) PM is notably harder than RM: on identical contexts, RM near-saturates up to 100K tokens, while PM decays sharply as context length scales. (iii) PM may serve as a behavioral probe of spare reasoning capacity. Pairing PM scenarios with AIME-2025 math problems reveals that successful trajectories yield higher PM accuracy than failed ones at the same context length, showing PM tracks spare reasoning budget that token count obscures. Project page: https://github.com/KristenZHANG/TriggerBench-Official.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures within Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive reasoning capabilities by selectively activating experts to facilitate structured cognitive processes. Despite notable advances, existing reasoning models often suffer from cognitive inefficiencies like overthinking and underthinking. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel inference-time steering methodology called Reinforcing Cognitive Experts (RICE), designed to improve reasoning performance without additional training or complex heuristics. Leveraging normalized Pointwise Mutual Information (nPMI), we systematically identify specialized experts, termed ''cognitive experts'' that orchestrate meta-level reasoning operations characterized by tokens like ''<think>''. Empirical evaluations with leading MoE-based LRMs (DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3-235B) on rigorous quantitative and scientific reasoning benchmarks demonstrate noticeable and consistent improvements in reasoning accuracy, cognitive efficiency, and cross-domain generalization. Crucially, our lightweight approach substantially outperforms prevalent reasoning-steering techniques, such as prompt design and decoding constraints, while preserving the model's general instruction-following skills. These results highlight reinforcing cognitive experts as a promising, practical, and interpretable direction to enhance cognitive efficiency within advanced reasoning models.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning and their failure mechanisms is a challenge in interpretability research. To provide a measurable geometric analysis perspective, we define the concept of the Reasoning Manifold, a latent low-dimensional geometric structure formed by the internal representations corresponding to all correctly reasoned generations. This structure can be conceptualized as the embodiment of the effective thinking paths that the model has learned to successfully solve a given task. Based on this concept, we build REMA, a framework that explains the origins of failures by quantitatively comparing the spatial relationships of internal model representations corresponding to both erroneous and correct reasoning samples. Specifically, REMA first quantifies the geometric deviation of each erroneous representation by calculating its k-nearest neighbors distance to the approximated manifold formed by correct representations, thereby providing a unified failure signal. It then localizes the divergence points where these deviations first become significant by tracking this deviation metric across the model's layers and comparing it against a baseline of internal fluctuations from correct representations, thus identifying where the reasoning chain begins to go off-track. Our extensive experiments on diverse language and multimodal models and tasks demonstrate the low-dimensional nature of the reasoning manifold and the high separability between erroneous and correct reasoning representations. The results also validate the effectiveness of the REMA framework in analyzing the origins of reasoning failures. This research connects abstract reasoning failures to measurable geometric deviations in representations, providing new avenues for in-depth understanding and diagnosis of the internal computational processes of black-box models.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Standard embodied evaluations do not independently score whether an agent correctly commits to task completion at episode closure, a capacity we call terminal commitment. Behaviorally distinct failures--never completing the task, completing it but failing to stop, and reporting success without sufficient evidence--collapse into the same benchmark failure. We introduce VIGIL, an evaluation framework that makes terminal commitment independently measurable. Under VIGIL's default protocol, agents observe only egocentric RGB, receive no action-success signals, and must end each episode with a semantic report checked deterministically against hidden world state. This yields two separate scores: world-state completion (W) and benchmark success (B), where B additionally requires a correct terminal report. This decoupling makes four outcome categories distinguishable: missed execution, post-attainment drift, unsupported commitment, and verified success. Across 20 models on 1,000 frozen episodes, systems with comparable W differ by up to 19.7 pp in B: one model converts achieved states into correct reports, while another with near-identical execution drifts past the goal without closing. An action-feedback intervention further tests the separation: execution-oriented signals improve W broadly, yet commitment failures persist in models that do not already ground terminal reports in the achieved state. VIGIL provides a protocol that makes terminal commitment independently visible and scorable.

Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has largely been path-independent to model training, i.e., has focused on the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs would benefit from considering the developmental alignment of their performance during training to the trajectories of children's thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four sets of tasks to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate their available intermediate and final training steps. These tasks are Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow "blank slate" models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Reasoning is a distinctive human capacity, enabling us to address complex problems by breaking them down into a series of manageable cognitive steps. Yet, complex logical reasoning is still cumbersome for language models. Based on the dual process theory in cognitive science, we are the first to unravel the cognitive reasoning abilities of language models. Our framework employs an iterative methodology to construct a Cognitive Tree (CogTree). The root node of this tree represents the initial query, while the leaf nodes consist of straightforward questions that can be answered directly. This construction involves two main components: the implicit extraction module (referred to as the intuitive system) and the explicit reasoning module (referred to as the reflective system). The intuitive system rapidly generates multiple responses by utilizing in-context examples, while the reflective system scores these responses using comparative learning. The scores guide the intuitive system in its subsequent generation step. Our experimental results on two popular and challenging reasoning tasks indicate that it is possible to achieve a performance level comparable to that of GPT-3.5 (with 175B parameters), using a significantly smaller language model that contains fewer parameters (<=7B) than 5% of GPT-3.5.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

Today's reasoning models use thinking tokens to attain stronger performance on benchmarks than their instruction-tuned counterparts. It is also generally believed that this more "deliberative" mode should improve alignment and safety, by providing the model a safe space to consider whether its planned answer to a request violates its safety principles. We present evidence that this intuition is not always correct. Across frontier open-weight reasoning models spanning GPT-OSS, Qwen, Olmo, and Phi families, we find that the eventual refusal/compliance outcome is already strongly predictable via a trained head on the first token's hidden representation (0.84-0.95 AUROC and sim88% balanced accuracy for predicting refusal/compliance) before any visible thinking. The thinking process turns out to be more akin to prefix completion than to deliberative revision, with the final outcome rarely changing after the first sim20% of thinking, despite giving the appearance of deliberation at the text level (sim74% of text-level deliberations occur when the response distribution is already locked to one refusal/compliance side). We also find that existing inference-time and training-based safety interventions, despite being motivated by the goal of inducing deliberation, largely shift model behavior toward over-refusal while suppressing already-scarce deliberation signals. Our results suggest that safety behavior in current reasoning models is much less deliberative than commonly assumed, and highlight the need for methods that induce real safety deliberation.

The ubiquitous independence assumption among symbolic concepts in neurosymbolic (NeSy) predictors is a convenient simplification: NeSy predictors use it to speed up probabilistic reasoning. Recent works like van Krieken et al. (2024) and Marconato et al. (2024) argued that the independence assumption can hinder learning of NeSy predictors and, more crucially, prevent them from correctly modelling uncertainty. There is, however, scepticism in the NeSy community around the scenarios in which the independence assumption actually limits NeSy systems (Faronius and Dos Martires, 2025). In this work, we settle this question by formally showing that assuming independence among symbolic concepts entails that a model can never represent uncertainty over certain concept combinations. Thus, the model fails to be aware of reasoning shortcuts, i.e., the pathological behaviour of NeSy predictors that predict correct downstream tasks but for the wrong reasons.

Modern deep learning systems are typically deployed as open-loop function approximators: they map inputs to outputs in a single pass, without regulating how much computation or explanatory effort is spent on a given case. In safety-critical settings, this is brittle: easy and ambiguous inputs receive identical processing, and uncertainty is only read off retrospectively from raw probabilities. We introduce the Surgical Cognitive Interpreter (SCI), a lightweight closed-loop metacognitive control layer that wraps an existing stochastic model and turns prediction into an iterative process. SCI monitors a scalar interpretive state SP(t), here instantiated as a normalized entropy-based confidence signal, and adaptively decides whether to stop, continue sampling, or abstain. The goal is not to improve accuracy per se, but to regulate interpretive error ΔSP and expose a safety signal that tracks when the underlying model is likely to fail. We instantiate SCI around Monte Carlo dropout classifiers in three domains: vision (MNIST digits), medical time series (MIT-BIH arrhythmia), and industrial condition monitoring (rolling-element bearings). In all cases, the controller allocates more inference steps to misclassified inputs than to correct ones (up to about 3-4x on MNIST and bearings, and 1.4x on MIT-BIH). The resulting ΔSP acts as a usable safety signal for detecting misclassifications (AUROC 0.63 on MNIST, 0.70 on MIT-BIH, 0.86 on bearings). Code and reproducibility: https://github.com/vishal-1344/sci

We introduce SafeWork-R1, a cutting-edge multimodal reasoning model that demonstrates the coevolution of capabilities and safety. It is developed by our proposed SafeLadder framework, which incorporates large-scale, progressive, safety-oriented reinforcement learning post-training, supported by a suite of multi-principled verifiers. Unlike previous alignment methods such as RLHF that simply learn human preferences, SafeLadder enables SafeWork-R1 to develop intrinsic safety reasoning and self-reflection abilities, giving rise to safety `aha' moments. Notably, SafeWork-R1 achieves an average improvement of 46.54% over its base model Qwen2.5-VL-72B on safety-related benchmarks without compromising general capabilities, and delivers state-of-the-art safety performance compared to leading proprietary models such as GPT-4.1 and Claude Opus 4. To further bolster its reliability, we implement two distinct inference-time intervention methods and a deliberative search mechanism, enforcing step-level verification. Finally, we further develop SafeWork-R1-InternVL3-78B, SafeWork-R1-DeepSeek-70B, and SafeWork-R1-Qwen2.5VL-7B. All resulting models demonstrate that safety and capability can co-evolve synergistically, highlighting the generalizability of our framework in building robust, reliable, and trustworthy general-purpose AI.

Memory expertise is a learned skill: knowing what to encode, when to retrieve, and how to organize knowledge--a capacity known in cognitive science as metamemory. We bring this perspective to LLMs by treating memory management as a trainable skill. We promote file-system operations to first-class memory actions alongside task actions, letting the model itself decide how to manage its memory. This memory skill improves along two axes: the structure that supports it (prompts, file schemas, action vocabulary), and the proficiency of the model exercising it. Both axes resist manual optimization: episodes in long-horizon tasks run for thousands of steps, and a single memory mistake can hide long before it surfaces, making human review of full trajectories impractical. We introduce AutoMem, a framework that automates both axes. In the first loop, a strong LLM reviews complete agent trajectories and iteratively revises the memory structure that shapes how the agent interacts with its memory files. In the second loop, the agent's own good memory decisions are identified from many episodes and used as training signal to sharpen the model's memory proficiency directly. Across three procedurally generated long-horizon games (Crafter, MiniHack, and NetHack), optimizing memory alone--without modifying the model's task-action behavior--improved the base agent's performance ~2x-4x, bringing a 32B open-weight model competitive with frontier systems such as Claude Opus 4.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro Thinking. Our results show that memory management is an independently learnable skill, and a high-leverage objective yielding large gains on long-horizon tasks.

Metacognition is a foundational component of intelligence critical to effective learning, problem solving, decision-making, communication, and more. In recent years, it has become increasingly recognized as a cornerstone of capable, transparent AI systems. Yet while LLMs have made significant progress across diverse real-world tasks, it is not yet clear when, how, or to what extent they can exhibit or be endowed with effective metacognitive abilities, nor how such abilities can be adapted to advance the fundamental capabilities, reliability, and intelligence of AI systems. This paper bridges this gap by presenting the first comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on metacognition for LLMs. We analyze and taxonomize the landscape of this emerging field and summarize recent technical advancements, including methods and benchmarks to measure and evaluate LLMs' metacognitive abilities, techniques to elicit, improve, and apply metacognition in LLMs, and findings and implications of ongoing research. We also discuss applications, open questions and challenges, and promising directions for future work. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful research and discussion. An organized list of papers can be found at https://github.com/yale-nlp/LLM-Metacognition.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities across a wide range of tasks, yet their safety mechanisms remain susceptible to adversarial attacks that exploit cognitive biases -- systematic deviations from rational judgment. Unlike prior jailbreaking approaches focused on prompt engineering or algorithmic manipulation, this work highlights the overlooked power of multi-bias interactions in undermining LLM safeguards. We propose CognitiveAttack, a novel red-teaming framework that systematically leverages both individual and combined cognitive biases. By integrating supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, CognitiveAttack generates prompts that embed optimized bias combinations, effectively bypassing safety protocols while maintaining high attack success rates. Experimental results reveal significant vulnerabilities across 30 diverse LLMs, particularly in open-source models. CognitiveAttack achieves a substantially higher attack success rate compared to the SOTA black-box method PAP (60.1% vs. 31.6%), exposing critical limitations in current defense mechanisms. These findings highlight multi-bias interactions as a powerful yet underexplored attack vector. This work introduces a novel interdisciplinary perspective by bridging cognitive science and LLM safety, paving the way for more robust and human-aligned AI systems.

Memory, planning, reflection, and tool use are often compared as feature labels, obscuring the control semantics that determine how an agent actually runs. This review connects ten historical cognitive architectures, eight language-agent runtime families, and forty-two mechanism-focused modern systems. We reconstruct each mechanism through state, control, transition, persistence, failure, learning, and resource governance, then code evidence relation (E1-E4) separately from migration depth (D0-D4). The resulting landscape is uneven. Modern agents have operationalized substantial parts of adaptive memory, failure recovery, dynamic team selection, workflow search, skill induction, resource scheduling, and uncertainty-conditioned action, although often through independent convergence rather than documented inheritance. The strongest remaining opportunities lie in couplings among mechanisms. Closest-baseline screening closes one proposed gap: GraSP already combines calibrated multi-skill selection, typed compilation, verification, bounded repair, and replanning or ReAct fallback. Five residual bundles remain: activation with latency and action utility; typed impasse with isolated substates and resolution compilation; bounded content competition with broadcast and admission learning; persistent intention with reconsideration and live method authority; and uncertainty with resource allocation, interruption, and stopping. We contribute a distinctive-mechanism catalog, an auditable evidence-depth framework, and a falsifiable agenda for testing these bundles as composable runtime invariants.

Despite the success of test-time scaling, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) frequently encounter repetitive loops that lead to computational waste and inference failure. In this paper, we identify a distinct failure mode termed Circular Reasoning. Unlike traditional model degeneration, this phenomenon manifests as a self-reinforcing trap where generated content acts as a logical premise for its own recurrence, compelling the reiteration of preceding text. To systematically analyze this phenomenon, we introduce LoopBench, a dataset designed to capture two distinct loop typologies: numerical loops and statement loops. Mechanistically, we characterize circular reasoning as a state collapse exhibiting distinct boundaries, where semantic repetition precedes textual repetition. We reveal that reasoning impasses trigger the loop onset, which subsequently persists as an inescapable cycle driven by a self-reinforcing V-shaped attention mechanism. Guided by these findings, we employ the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm to capture these precursors for early loop prediction. Experiments across diverse LRMs validate its accuracy and elucidate the stability of long-chain reasoning.

Large language models perform strongly on benchmarks in mathematical reasoning, coding and document analysis, suggesting a broad ability to follow instructions. However, it remains unclear whether such success reflects general logical competence, repeated application of learned procedures, or pattern matching that mimics rule execution. We investigate this question by introducing Stable Counting Capacity, an assay in which models count repeated symbols until failure. The assay removes knowledge dependencies, semantics and ambiguity from evaluation, avoids lexical and tokenization confounds, and provides a direct measure of procedural reliability beyond standard knowledge-based benchmarks. Here we show, across more than 100 model variants, that stable counting capacity remains far below advertised context limits. Model behavior is consistent neither with open-ended logic nor with stable application of a learned rule, but instead with use of a finite set of count-like internal states, analogous to counting on fingers. Once this resource is exhausted, the appearance of rule following disappears and exact execution collapses into guessing, even with additional test-time compute. These findings show that fluent performance in current language models does not guarantee general, reliable rule following.

Reasoning models leveraging long chains of thought employ various cognitive skills, such as verification of their answers, backtracking, retrying by an alternate method, and more. Previous work has shown that when a base language model exhibits these skills, training that model further with reinforcement learning (RL) can learn to leverage them. How can we get models to leverage skills that aren't exhibited by base models? Our work, SkillFactory, is a method for fine-tuning models to roughly learn these skills during a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage prior to RL. Our approach does not rely on distillation from a stronger model, but instead uses samples from the model itself, rearranged to provide training data in the format of those skills. These "silver" SFT traces may be imperfect, but are nevertheless effective for priming a model to acquire skills during RL. Our evaluation shows that (1) starting from SkillFactory SFT initialization helps a model to generalize to harder variants of a task post-RL, despite lower performance pre-RL; (2) cognitive skills are indeed used by the model; (3) RLed SkillFactory models are more robust to regression on out-of-domain tasks than RLed base models. Our work suggests that inductive biases learned prior to RL help models learn robust cognitive skill use.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

Current Chain-of-Thought (CoT) verification methods predict reasoning correctness based on outputs (black-box) or activations (gray-box), but offer limited insight into why a computation fails. We introduce a white-box method: Circuit-based Reasoning Verification (CRV). We hypothesize that attribution graphs of correct CoT steps, viewed as execution traces of the model's latent reasoning circuits, possess distinct structural fingerprints from those of incorrect steps. By training a classifier on structural features of these graphs, we show that these traces contain a powerful signal of reasoning errors. Our white-box approach yields novel scientific insights unattainable by other methods. (1) We demonstrate that structural signatures of error are highly predictive, establishing the viability of verifying reasoning directly via its computational graph. (2) We find these signatures to be highly domain-specific, revealing that failures in different reasoning tasks manifest as distinct computational patterns. (3) We provide evidence that these signatures are not merely correlational; by using our analysis to guide targeted interventions on individual transcoder features, we successfully correct the model's faulty reasoning. Our work shows that, by scrutinizing a model's computational process, we can move from simple error detection to a deeper, causal understanding of LLM reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents for multi-turn decision-making tasks. However, current agents typically rely on fixed cognitive patterns: non-thinking models generate immediate responses, while thinking models engage in deep reasoning uniformly. This rigidity is inefficient for long-horizon tasks, where cognitive demands vary significantly from step to step, with some requiring strategic planning and others only routine execution. In this paper, we introduce CogRouter, a framework that trains agents to dynamically adapt cognitive depth at each step. Grounded in ACT-R theory, we design four hierarchical cognitive levels ranging from instinctive responses to strategic planning. Our two-stage training approach includes Cognition-aware Supervised Fine-tuning (CoSFT) to instill stable level-specific patterns, and Cognition-aware Policy Optimization (CoPO) for step-level credit assignment via confidence-aware advantage reweighting. The key insight is that appropriate cognitive depth should maximize the confidence of the resulting action. Experiments on ALFWorld and ScienceWorld demonstrate that CogRouter achieves state-of-the-art performance with superior efficiency. With Qwen2.5-7B, it reaches an 82.3% success rate, outperforming GPT-4o (+40.3%), OpenAI-o3 (+18.3%), and GRPO (+14.0%), while using 62% fewer tokens.

Recent works have shown the benefits to LLMs from fine-tuning golden-standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) rationales or using them as correct examples in few-shot prompting. While humans can indeed imitate correct examples, learning from our mistakes is another vital aspect of human cognition. Hence, a question naturally arises: can LLMs learn and benefit from their mistakes, especially for their reasoning? This study investigates this problem from both the prompting and model-tuning perspectives. We begin by introducing CoTErrorSet, a new benchmark with 609,432 questions, each designed with both correct and error references, and demonstrating the types and reasons for making such mistakes. To explore the effectiveness of those mistakes, we design two methods: (1) Self-rethinking prompting guides LLMs to rethink whether they have made similar previous mistakes; and (2) Mistake tuning involves finetuning models in both correct and incorrect reasoning domains, rather than only tuning models to learn ground truth in traditional methodology. We conduct a series of experiments to prove LLMs can obtain benefits from mistakes in both directions. Our two methods offer potentially cost-effective strategies by leveraging errors to enhance reasoning capabilities, which costs significantly less than creating meticulously hand-crafted golden references. We ultimately make a thorough analysis of the reasons behind LLMs' errors, which provides directions that future research needs to overcome. CoTErrorSet will be published soon on \url{https://github.com/YookiTong/Learn-from-Mistakes-CotErrorSet}.

We have recently witnessed a number of impressive results on hard mathematical reasoning problems with language models. At the same time, the robustness of these models has also been called into question; recent works have shown that models can rely on shallow patterns in the problem description when generating a solution. Building on the idea of behavioral testing, we propose a novel framework, which pins down the causal effect of various factors in the input, e.g., the surface form of the problem text, the operands, and math operators on the output solution. By grounding the behavioral analysis in a causal graph describing an intuitive reasoning process, we study the behavior of language models in terms of robustness and sensitivity to direct interventions in the input space. We apply our framework on a test bed of math word problems. Our analysis shows that robustness does not appear to continuously improve as a function of size, but the GPT-3 Davinci models (175B) achieve a dramatic improvement in both robustness and sensitivity compared to all other GPT variants.