Daily Papers

We present Brainstacks, a modular architecture for continual multi-domain fine-tuning of large language models that packages domain expertise as frozen adapter stacks composing additively on a shared frozen base at inference. Five interlocking components: (1) MoE-LoRA with Shazeer-style noisy top-2 routing across all seven transformer projections under QLoRA 4-bit quantization with rsLoRA scaling; (2) an inner loop performing residual boosting by freezing trained stacks and adding new ones; (3) an outer loop training sequential domain-specific stacks with curriculum-ordered dependencies; (4) null-space projection via randomized SVD constraining new stacks to subspaces orthogonal to prior directions, achieving zero forgetting in isolation; (5) an outcome-based sigmoid meta-router trained on empirically discovered domain-combination targets that selectively weights stacks, enabling cross-domain composition. Two boundary experiments: (6) PSN pretraining on a randomly initialized model; (7) per-domain RL (DPO/GRPO) validating compatibility with post-SFT alignment. Validated on TinyLlama-1.1B (4 domains, 9 stacks) and Gemma 3 12B IT (5 domains, 10 stacks), MoE-LoRA achieves 2.5x faster convergence than parameter-matched single LoRA, residual boosting breaks through the single-stack ceiling, and the routed system recovers generation quality destroyed by ungated stack accumulation. The central finding: the outcome-based router discovers that domain stacks encode transferable cognitive primitives (instruction-following clarity, numerical reasoning, procedural logic, chain-of-thought structure) rather than domain-specific knowledge, with medical prompts routing to chat+math stacks in 97% of cases despite zero medical data in those stacks.

Recent work on domain-specific reasoning with large language models (LLMs) often relies on training-intensive approaches that require parameter updates. While activation steering has emerged as a parameter efficient alternative, existing methods apply static, manual interventions that fail to adapt to the dynamic nature of complex reasoning. To address this limitation, we propose RISER (Router-based Intervention for Steerable Enhancement of Reasoning), a plug-and-play intervention framework that adaptively steers LLM reasoning in activation space. RISER constructs a library of reusable reasoning vectors and employs a lightweight Router to dynamically compose them for each input. The Router is optimized via reinforcement learning under task-level rewards, activating latent cognitive primitives in an emergent and compositional manner. Across seven diverse benchmarks, RISER yields 3.4-6.5% average zero-shot accuracy improvements over the base model while surpassing CoT-style reasoning with 2-3x higher token efficiency and robust accuracy gains. Further analysis shows that RISER autonomously combines multiple vectors into interpretable, precise control strategies, pointing toward more controllable and efficient LLM reasoning.

We present Sphinx, a synthetic environment for visual perception and reasoning that targets core cognitive primitives. Sphinx procedurally generates puzzles using motifs, tiles, charts, icons, and geometric primitives, each paired with verifiable ground-truth solutions, enabling both precise evaluation and large-scale dataset construction. The benchmark covers 25 task types spanning symmetry detection, geometric transformations, spatial reasoning, chart interpretation, and sequence prediction. Evaluating recent large vision-language models (LVLMs) shows that even state-of-the-art GPT-5 attains only 51.1% accuracy, well below human performance. Finally, we demonstrate that reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) substantially improves model accuracy on these tasks and yields gains on external visual reasoning benchmarks, highlighting its promise for advancing multimodal reasoning.

Humans develop perception through a bottom-up hierarchy: from basic primitives and Gestalt principles to high-level semantics. In contrast, current Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are trained directly on complex downstream tasks, often bypassing these foundational visual capabilities. To systematically investigate this gap, we introduce VisFactor, a benchmark that digitizes 20 vision-centric subtests from FRCT, a well-established cognitive psychology assessment spanning four domains of human visual cognition. Furthermore, we design algorithms to automatically construct and validate unlimited test cases with controllable difficulty. Using VisFactor, we evaluate 23 frontier MLLMs, including both proprietary (e.g., GPT, Gemini) and open-source (e.g., LLaMA, Qwen) models. The best model achieves a score of only 30.17%. Models consistently fail on tasks such as mental rotation, spatial relation inference, and figure-ground discrimination, regardless of model size or prompting strategy. These findings suggest that performance improvements on existing general benchmarks might represent castles in the air instead of a genuine mastery of human-like visual cognition.

Active vision -- where a policy controls its own gaze during manipulation -- has emerged as a key capability for imitation learning, with multiple independent systems demonstrating its benefits in the past year. Yet there is no shared benchmark to compare approaches or quantify what active vision contributes, on which task types, and under what conditions. We introduce TAVIS, evaluation infrastructure for active-vision imitation learning, with two complementary task suites -- TAVIS-Head (5 tasks, global search via pan/tilt necks) and TAVIS-Hands (3 tasks, local occlusion via wrist cameras) -- on two humanoid torso embodiments (GR1T2, Reachy2), built on IsaacLab. TAVIS provides three evaluation primitives: a paired headcam-vs-fixedcam protocol on identical demonstrations; GALT (Gaze-Action Lead Time), a novel metric grounded in cognitive science and HRI that quantifies anticipatory gaze in learned policies; and procedural ID/OOD splits. Baseline experiments with Diffusion Policy and π_0 reveal that (i) active-vision generally helps, but benefits are task-conditional rather than uniform; (ii) multi-task policies degrade sharply under controlled distribution shifts on both suites; and (iii) imitation alone yields anticipatory gaze, with median lead times comparable to the human teleoperator reference. Code, evaluation scripts, demonstrations (LeRobot v3.0; ~2200 episodes) and trained baselines are released at https://github.com/spiglerg/tavis and https://huggingface.co/tavis-benchmark.

Faithfully modeling human behavior in dynamic environments is a foundational challenge for embodied intelligence. While conditional motion synthesis has achieved significant advances, egocentric motion generation remains largely underexplored due to the inherent complexity of first-person perception. In this work, we investigate Egocentric Vision-Language (Ego-VL) motion generation. This task requires synthesizing 3D human motion conditioned jointly on first-person visual observations and natural language instructions. We identify a critical reasoning-generation entanglement challenge: the simultaneous optimization of semantic reasoning and kinematic modeling introduces gradient conflicts. These conflicts systematically degrade the fidelity of multimodal grounding and motion quality. To address this challenge, we propose a hierarchical generative framework EgoMotion. Inspired by the biological decoupling of cognitive reasoning and motor control, EgoMotion operates in two stages. In the Cognitive Reasoning stage, A vision-language model (VLM) projects multimodal inputs into a structured space of discrete motion primitives. This forces the VLM to acquire goal-consistent representations, effectively bridging the semantic gap between high-level perceptual understanding and low-level action execution. In the Motion Generation stage, these learned representations serve as expressive conditioning signals for a diffusion-based motion generator. By performing iterative denoising within a continuous latent space, the generator synthesizes physically plausible and temporally coherent trajectories. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that EgoMotion achieves state-of-the-art performance, and produces motion sequences that are both semantically grounded and kinematically superior to existing approaches.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have emerged as a powerful end-to-end paradigm for robotic manipulation by mapping language instructions and 2D visual inputs directly to actions. However, these models lack an explicit, scene-level 3D representation, limiting their ability to reason over spatial layouts and geometric constraints. While recent efforts incorporate explicit 3D cues, such as depth maps or point clouds, to improve geometric awareness, they primarily capture low-level structures and lack high-level semantic grounding in 3D space. In human cognition, interaction with the physical world relies on a 3D semantic cognitive map - an internal mental model that integrates spatial layouts with semantic context to enable persistent, viewpoint-invariant reasoning. In light of this, we present VistaVLA, a novel two-stage framework that constructs a geometry- and semantics-aware 3D cognitive representation from 3D Gaussian primitives and grounds it as compact context tokens for VLA policy learning. Specifically, VistaVLA lifts multi-view vision-language features into 3D Gaussian primitives, forming geometry-anchored semantic tokens that align view-consistent spatial grounding with 2D visual feature spaces. To make this 3D representation computationally tractable for effective VLA control, we introduce Merge-then-Query (MtQ), a token summarization mechanism. MtQ compresses dense Gaussian primitives into a highly compact set of spatially informative tokens, achieving a 99% token reduction while preserving action-relevant 3D layouts and semantic context. Extensive evaluations in both simulated and real-world environments demonstrate the effectiveness of VistaVLA. Notably, in real-world scenarios, VistaVLA improves success rates by 22.8% across seven real-world tasks and by 30.0% over the VLA-Adapter baseline on challenging out-of-distribution tasks.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

Vision-language-action (VLA) models can learn manipulation skills from demonstrations, but their capabilities are bounded by the skills in the training data. We present InSight, a framework that unlocks autonomous skill acquisition by rendering VLAs steerable at the primitive-action level (e.g., "move gripper to the bowl", "lift upward", "pour the bottle"). InSight consists of two primary stages: (1) an automated segmentation pipeline that partitions demonstrations into labeled primitives via VLM plan decomposition and end-effector poses to enable VLA primitive steerability, and (2) a VLM-guided data flywheel that identifies missing primitives required to accomplish a novel task, autonomously attempts demonstrations of the missing primitives with VLM-proposed low-level control, and automatically labels, stores, and integrates successful demonstrations into the VLA training set. We evaluate InSight across simulation and real-world manipulation tasks, including block flipping, drawer closing, sweeping, twisting, and pouring, without any human demonstrations of these target skills. Once learned, these primitives can be composed to execute novel, long-horizon tasks without additional human demonstrations. Our findings demonstrate that primitive steerability provides a practical foundation for continual skill acquisition in VLA policies. Project website: https://insight-vla.github.io.

Can machines truly think, reason and act in domains like humans? This enduring question continues to shape the pursuit of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Despite the growing capabilities of models such as GPT-4.5, DeepSeek, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Phi-4, and Grok 3, which exhibit multimodal fluency and partial reasoning, these systems remain fundamentally limited by their reliance on token-level prediction and lack of grounded agency. This paper offers a cross-disciplinary synthesis of AGI development, spanning artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, psychology, generative models, and agent-based systems. We analyze the architectural and cognitive foundations of general intelligence, highlighting the role of modular reasoning, persistent memory, and multi-agent coordination. In particular, we emphasize the rise of Agentic RAG frameworks that combine retrieval, planning, and dynamic tool use to enable more adaptive behavior. We discuss generalization strategies, including information compression, test-time adaptation, and training-free methods, as critical pathways toward flexible, domain-agnostic intelligence. Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are reexamined not just as perception modules but as evolving interfaces for embodied understanding and collaborative task completion. We also argue that true intelligence arises not from scale alone but from the integration of memory and reasoning: an orchestration of modular, interactive, and self-improving components where compression enables adaptive behavior. Drawing on advances in neurosymbolic systems, reinforcement learning, and cognitive scaffolding, we explore how recent architectures begin to bridge the gap between statistical learning and goal-directed cognition. Finally, we identify key scientific, technical, and ethical challenges on the path to AGI.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Recent studies of the applications of conversational AI tools, such as chatbots powered by large language models, to complex real-world knowledge work have shown limitations related to reasoning and multi-step problem solving. Specifically, while existing chatbots simulate shallow reasoning and understanding they are prone to errors as problem complexity increases. The failure of these systems to address complex knowledge work is due to the fact that they do not perform any actual cognition. In this position paper, we present Cognitive AI, a higher-level framework for implementing programmatically defined neuro-symbolic cognition above and outside of large language models. Specifically, we propose a dual-layer functional architecture for Cognitive AI that serves as a roadmap for AI systems that can perform complex multi-step knowledge work. We propose that Cognitive AI is a necessary precursor for the evolution of higher forms of AI, such as AGI, and specifically claim that AGI cannot be achieved by probabilistic approaches on their own. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for large language models, adoption cycles in AI, and commercial Cognitive AI development.

A hallmark of intelligence is the ability to autonomously learn new flexible, cognitive behaviors - that is, behaviors where the appropriate action depends not just on immediate stimuli (as in simple reflexive stimulus-response associations), but on contextual information that must be adequately acquired, stored and processed. While many meta-learning algorithms can design agents that autonomously learn new tasks, cognitive tasks adds another level of learning and memory to typical ``learning-to-learn'' problems. Here we evolve neural networks, endowed with plastic connections and neuromodulation, over a sizable set of simple cognitive tasks adapted from a computational neuroscience framework. The resulting evolved networks can automatically modify their own connectivity to acquire a novel simple cognitive task, never seen during evolution, from stimuli and rewards alone, through the spontaneous operation of their evolved neural organization and plasticity system. Our results emphasize the importance of carefully considering the multiple learning loops involved in the emergence of intelligent behavior.

Much research has been carried out on large language models (LLMs) and LLM-powered agentic workflows. However, many works within the field state emergence of, ascribe to, or assume, generalised anthropomorphic attributes to them (e.g., morality or understanding of natural language). Our goal is not to argue in favour or against the existence of these attributes, but to point out that these conclusions could be incorrect. For this we build and train a simple neural network on the videogame Age of Empires II, and note that any entity in a sufficiently-powerful substrate, such as LEGO or the Greater Boston Area, could also present such attributes. Hence, the purported anthropomorphic attributes of LLMs are empirically non-unique: although some properties (e.g., responses to prompts) could remain invariant, others, such as the interpretation of their perceived behaviour, might change with the substrate. Thus, any empirically-grounded discussion on these attributes requires explicit measurement criteria; otherwise the interpretation is left to the representation. We then show that assuming that these attributes exist or not in a system, independent of the substrate and in a generalised way, leads to either circular or uninformative conclusions. This is regardless of the experimenter's viewpoint on the subject, or whether the outcome shows existence or non-existence. Finally we propose a 'null' assumption, where one assumes LLM non-uniqueness instead of assuming anthropomorphic attributes to set up an experiment, along with examples of it. We also discuss potential objections to our work, briefly survey the field, and prove that Age of Empires II is functionally- and Turing-complete.

Achieving generalizability in solving out-of-distribution tasks is one of the ultimate goals of learning robotic manipulation. Recent progress of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) has shown that VLM-based task planners can alleviate the difficulty of solving novel tasks, by decomposing the compounded tasks as a plan of sequentially executing primitive-level skills that have been already mastered. It is also promising for robotic manipulation to adapt such composable generalization ability, in the form of composable generalization agents (CGAs). However, the community lacks of reliable design of primitive skills and a sufficient amount of primitive-level data annotations. Therefore, we propose RH20T-P, a primitive-level robotic manipulation dataset, which contains about 38k video clips covering 67 diverse manipulation tasks in real-world scenarios. Each clip is manually annotated according to a set of meticulously designed primitive skills that are common in robotic manipulation. Furthermore, we standardize a plan-execute CGA paradigm and implement an exemplar baseline called RA-P on our RH20T-P, whose positive performance on solving unseen tasks validates that the proposed dataset can offer composable generalization ability to robotic manipulation agents.

This comprehensive report distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost "human-like" cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles in Cognitive Architecture Theory (CAT). We present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions associated with CAT (i.e. memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and meta-cognition) and identify gaps in the research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and meta-cognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions informed by active inference and global workspace theory to address them. We further introduce Epistemic World Models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied across video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities, yet they struggle with spatial tasks that require mental simulation, such as mental rotation. This paper investigates whether equipping an LLM with an external ``Imagery Module'' -- a tool capable of rendering and rotating 3D models -- can bridge this gap, functioning as a ``cognitive prosthetic.'' We conducted experiments using a dual-module architecture in which a reasoning module (an MLLM) interacts with an imagery module on 3D model rotation tasks. Performance was lower than expected, with accuracy reaching at most 62.5%. Further investigation suggests that even when the burden of maintaining and manipulating a holistic 3D state is outsourced, the system still fails. This reveals that current frontier models lack the foundational visual-spatial primitives required to interface with imagery. Specifically, they lack: (1) the low-level sensitivity to extract spatial signals such as (a) depth, (b) motion, and (c) short-horizon dynamic prediction; and (2) the capacity to reason contemplatively over images, dynamically shifting visual focus and balancing imagery with symbolic and associative information.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

Building future wireless systems that support services like digital twins (DTs) is challenging to achieve through advances to conventional technologies like meta-surfaces. While artificial intelligence (AI)-native networks promise to overcome some limitations of wireless technologies, developments still rely on AI tools like neural networks. Such tools struggle to cope with the non-trivial challenges of the network environment and the growing demands of emerging use cases. In this paper, we revisit the concept of AI-native wireless systems, equipping them with the common sense necessary to transform them into artificial general intelligence (AGI)-native systems. These systems acquire common sense by exploiting different cognitive abilities such as perception, analogy, and reasoning, that enable them to generalize and deal with unforeseen scenarios. Towards developing the components of such a system, we start by showing how the perception module can be built through abstracting real-world elements into generalizable representations. These representations are then used to create a world model, founded on principles of causality and hyper-dimensional (HD) computing, that aligns with intuitive physics and enables analogical reasoning, that define common sense. Then, we explain how methods such as integrated information theory play a role in the proposed intent-driven and objective-driven planning methods that maneuver the AGI-native network to take actions. Next, we discuss how an AGI-native network can enable use cases related to human and autonomous agents: a) analogical reasoning for next-generation DTs, b) synchronized and resilient experiences for cognitive avatars, and c) brain-level metaverse experiences like holographic teleportation. Finally, we conclude with a set of recommendations to build AGI-native systems. Ultimately, we envision this paper as a roadmap for the beyond 6G era.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks, raising expectations for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). This position paper argues that integrating explicit memory is the cornerstone for advancing LLMs toward AGI. The key reason is that the underlying learning mechanism of LLMs is highly analogous to human implicit memory. However, higher-order cognitive functions necessary for AGI, such as long-term strategic planning, metacognition, and symbolic reasoning, heavily rely on hippocampal explicit memory and cannot arise solely from implicit statistical learning. Drawing on findings from neuroscience, I advance this perspective and complement it with computational requirements for artificial explicit memory systems, hoping to foster further research and lay the groundwork for explicit memory integration.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

While existing multi-agent systems (MAS) can handle complex problems by enabling collaboration among multiple agents, they are often highly task-specific, relying on manually crafted agent roles and interaction prompts, which leads to increased architectural complexity and limited reusability across tasks. Moreover, most MAS communicate primarily through natural language, making them vulnerable to error accumulation and instability in long-context, multi-stage interactions within internal agent histories. In this work, we propose Agent Primitives, a set of reusable latent building blocks for LLM-based MAS. Inspired by neural network design, where complex models are built from reusable components, we observe that many existing MAS architectures can be decomposed into a small number of recurring internal computation patterns. Based on this observation, we instantiate three primitives: Review, Voting and Selection, and Planning and Execution. All primitives communicate internally via key-value (KV) cache, which improves both robustness and efficiency by mitigating information degradation across multi-stage interactions. To enable automatic system construction, an Organizer agent selects and composes primitives for each query, guided by a lightweight knowledge pool of previously successful configurations, forming a primitive-based MAS. Experiments show that primitives-based MAS improve average accuracy by 12.0-16.5\% over single-agent baselines, reduce token usage and inference latency by approximately 3times-4times compared to text-based MAS, while incurring only 1.3times-1.6times overhead relative to single-agent inference and providing more stable performance across model backbones.

The article identified 42 cognitive architectures for creating general artificial intelligence (AGI) and proposed a set of interrelated functional blocks that an agent approaching AGI in its capabilities should possess. Since the required set of blocks is not found in any of the existing architectures, the article proposes a new cognitive architecture for intelligent systems approaching AGI in their capabilities. As one of the key solutions within the framework of the architecture, a universal method of knowledge representation is proposed, which allows combining various non-formalized, partially and fully formalized methods of knowledge representation in a single knowledge base, such as texts in natural languages, images, audio and video recordings, graphs, algorithms, databases, neural networks, knowledge graphs, ontologies, frames, essence-property-relation models, production systems, predicate calculus models, conceptual models, and others. To combine and structure various fragments of knowledge, archigraph models are used, constructed as a development of annotated metagraphs. As components, the cognitive architecture being developed includes machine consciousness, machine subconsciousness, blocks of interaction with the external environment, a goal management block, an emotional control system, a block of social interaction, a block of reflection, an ethics block and a worldview block, a learning block, a monitoring block, blocks of statement and solving problems, self-organization and meta learning block.

A defining feature of human intelligence is the ability to adapt to changing environments by inferring latent task structure from sparse observations. Neuroscientific research indicates that this capability relies on the hippocampus constructing abstract representations, expressed as low-dimensional, approximately orthogonal manifolds in neural state space. However, the internal mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) remain largely opaque, making it unclear whether they form comparable abstract representations or instead rely on task-specific statistical regularities when performing comparable reasoning tasks. Here we adapt a contextual reversal-learning paradigm to a text-based setting and compare humans and LLMs at both the Behavioural and representational levels. We report that although LLMs exhibit generalizable reasoning less frequently than humans, when such inference occurs, their internal states exhibit abstract geometric structures that resemble those reported in the hippocampus. Notably, this representational geometry is not uniformly distributed but is organized hierarchically across model depth: whereas lower layers show early, stable encoding of stimulus identity, higher layers form a hippocampal-like functional band enriched for abstract context geometry associated with inference. Furthermore, complementary intervention experiments mechanistically implicate geometry in reasoning: task-sequence language modelling induces geometric disentanglement, whereas geometric regularization of higher layers increases the emergence of generalizable inference. Together, these findings establish abstract representational geometry as a mechanistic principle supporting inference in large language models.

We present OAKINK2, a dataset of bimanual object manipulation tasks for complex daily activities. In pursuit of constructing the complex tasks into a structured representation, OAKINK2 introduces three level of abstraction to organize the manipulation tasks: Affordance, Primitive Task, and Complex Task. OAKINK2 features on an object-centric perspective for decoding the complex tasks, treating them as a sequence of object affordance fulfillment. The first level, Affordance, outlines the functionalities that objects in the scene can afford, the second level, Primitive Task, describes the minimal interaction units that humans interact with the object to achieve its affordance, and the third level, Complex Task, illustrates how Primitive Tasks are composed and interdependent. OAKINK2 dataset provides multi-view image streams and precise pose annotations for the human body, hands and various interacting objects. This extensive collection supports applications such as interaction reconstruction and motion synthesis. Based on the 3-level abstraction of OAKINK2, we explore a task-oriented framework for Complex Task Completion (CTC). CTC aims to generate a sequence of bimanual manipulation to achieve task objectives. Within the CTC framework, we employ Large Language Models (LLMs) to decompose the complex task objectives into sequences of Primitive Tasks and have developed a Motion Fulfillment Model that generates bimanual hand motion for each Primitive Task. OAKINK2 datasets and models are available at https://oakink.net/v2.

Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs) have shown remarkable progress in visual generation. Yet, existing benchmarks predominantly assess Crystallized Intelligence, which relies on recalling accumulated knowledge and learned schemas. This focus overlooks Generative Fluid Intelligence (GFI): the capacity to induce patterns, reason through constraints, and adapt to novel scenarios on the fly. To rigorously assess this capability, we introduce GENIUS (GEN Fluid Intelligence EvalUation Suite). We formalize GFI as a synthesis of three primitives. These include Inducing Implicit Patterns (e.g., inferring personalized visual preferences), Executing Ad-hoc Constraints (e.g., visualizing abstract metaphors), and Adapting to Contextual Knowledge (e.g., simulating counter-intuitive physics). Collectively, these primitives challenge models to solve problems grounded entirely in the immediate context. Our systematic evaluation of 12 representative models reveals significant performance deficits in these tasks. Crucially, our diagnostic analysis disentangles these failure modes. It demonstrates that deficits stem from limited context comprehension rather than insufficient intrinsic generative capability. To bridge this gap, we propose a training-free attention intervention strategy. Ultimately, GENIUS establishes a rigorous standard for GFI, guiding the field beyond knowledge utilization toward dynamic, general-purpose reasoning. Our dataset and code will be released at: https://github.com/arctanxarc/GENIUS{https://github.com/arctanxarc/GENIUS}.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

The field of artificial intelligence has seen explosive growth and exponential success. The last phase of development showcased deep learnings ability to solve a variety of difficult problems across a multitude of domains. Many of these networks met and exceeded human benchmarks by becoming experts in the domains in which they are trained. Though the successes of artificial intelligence have begun to overshadow its failures, there is still much that separates current artificial intelligence tools from becoming the exceptional general learners that humans are. In this paper, we identify the ten commandments upon which human intelligence is systematically and hierarchically built. We believe these commandments work collectively to serve as the essential ingredients that lead to the emergence of higher-order cognition and intelligence. This paper discusses a computational framework that could house these ten commandments and suggests new architectural modifications that could lead to the development of smarter, more explainable, and generalizable artificial systems inspired by a neuromorphic approach.

We present the COGnitive Neural GENerative system (CogNGen), a cognitive architecture that combines two neurobiologically-plausible, computational models: predictive processing and hyperdimensional/vector-symbolic models. We draw inspiration from architectures such as ACT-R and Spaun/Nengo. CogNGen is in broad agreement with these, providing a level of detail between ACT-R's high-level symbolic description of human cognition and Spaun's low-level neurobiological description, furthermore creating the groundwork for designing agents that learn continually from diverse tasks and model human performance at larger scales than what is possible with current systems. We test CogNGen on four maze-learning tasks, including those that test memory and planning, and find that CogNGen matches performance of deep reinforcement learning models and exceeds on a task designed to test memory.

Current AI systems achieve impressive performance on many tasks, yet they lack core attributes of biological intelligence, including rapid, continual learning, representations grounded in sensorimotor interactions, and structured knowledge that enables efficient generalization. Neuroscience theory suggests that mammals evolved flexible intelligence through the replication of a semi-independent, sensorimotor module, a functional unit known as a cortical column. To address the disparity between biological and artificial intelligence, thousand-brains systems were proposed as a means of mirroring the architecture of cortical columns and their interactions. In the current work, we evaluate the unique properties of Monty, the first implementation of a thousand-brains system. We focus on 3D object perception, and in particular, the combined task of object recognition and pose estimation. Utilizing the YCB dataset of household objects, we first assess Monty's use of sensorimotor learning to build structured representations, finding that these enable robust generalization. These representations include an emphasis on classifying objects by their global shape, as well as a natural ability to detect object symmetries. We then explore Monty's use of model-free and model-based policies to enable rapid inference by supporting principled movements. We find that such policies complement Monty's modular architecture, a design that can accommodate communication between modules to further accelerate inference speed via a novel `voting' algorithm. Finally, we examine Monty's use of associative, Hebbian-like binding to enable rapid, continual, and computationally efficient learning, properties that compare favorably to current deep learning architectures. While Monty is still in a nascent stage of development, these findings support thousand-brains systems as a powerful and promising new approach to AI.

The lack of a concrete definition for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) obscures the gap between today's specialized AI and human-level cognition. This paper introduces a quantifiable framework to address this, defining AGI as matching the cognitive versatility and proficiency of a well-educated adult. To operationalize this, we ground our methodology in Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory, the most empirically validated model of human cognition. The framework dissects general intelligence into ten core cognitive domains-including reasoning, memory, and perception-and adapts established human psychometric batteries to evaluate AI systems. Application of this framework reveals a highly "jagged" cognitive profile in contemporary models. While proficient in knowledge-intensive domains, current AI systems have critical deficits in foundational cognitive machinery, particularly long-term memory storage. The resulting AGI scores (e.g., GPT-4 at 27%, GPT-5 at 58%) concretely quantify both rapid progress and the substantial gap remaining before AGI.

Abstract symbolic writing systems are semiotic codes that are ubiquitous in modern society but are otherwise absent in the animal kingdom. Anthropological evidence suggests that the earliest forms of some writing systems originally consisted of iconic pictographs, which signify their referent via visual resemblance. While previous studies have examined the emergence and, separately, the evolution of pictographic writing systems through a computational lens, most employ non-naturalistic methodologies that make it difficult to draw clear analogies to human and animal cognition. We develop a multi-agent reinforcement learning testbed for emergent communication called a Signification Game, and formulate a model of inferential communication that enables agents to leverage visual theory of mind to communicate actions using pictographs. Our model, which is situated within a broader formalism for animal communication, sheds light on the cognitive and cultural processes that led to the development of early writing systems.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

Temporal context is essential for robotic manipulation because such tasks are inherently non-Markovian, yet mainstream VLA models typically overlook it and struggle with long-horizon, temporally dependent tasks. Cognitive science suggests that humans rely on working memory to buffer short-lived representations for immediate control, while the hippocampal system preserves verbatim episodic details and semantic gist of past experience for long-term memory. Inspired by these mechanisms, we propose MemoryVLA, a Cognition-Memory-Action framework for long-horizon robotic manipulation. A pretrained VLM encodes the observation into perceptual and cognitive tokens that form working memory, while a Perceptual-Cognitive Memory Bank stores low-level details and high-level semantics consolidated from it. Working memory retrieves decision-relevant entries from the bank, adaptively fuses them with current tokens, and updates the bank by merging redundancies. Using these tokens, a memory-conditioned diffusion action expert yields temporally aware action sequences. We evaluate MemoryVLA on 150+ simulation and real-world tasks across three robots. On SimplerEnv-Bridge, Fractal, and LIBERO-5 suites, it achieves 71.9%, 72.7%, and 96.5% success rates, respectively, all outperforming state-of-the-art baselines CogACT and pi-0, with a notable +14.6 gain on Bridge. On 12 real-world tasks spanning general skills and long-horizon temporal dependencies, MemoryVLA achieves 84.0% success rate, with long-horizon tasks showing a +26 improvement over state-of-the-art baseline. Project Page: https://shihao1895.github.io/MemoryVLA

While video-generation-based embodied world models have gained increasing attention, their reliance on large-scale embodied interaction data remains a key bottleneck. The scarcity, difficulty of collection, and high dimensionality of embodied data fundamentally limit the alignment granularity between language and actions and exacerbate the challenge of long-horizon video generation--hindering generative models from achieving a "GPT moment" in the embodied domain. There is a naive observation: the diversity of embodied data far exceeds the relatively small space of possible primitive motions. Based on this insight, we propose a novel paradigm for world modeling--Primitive Embodied World Models (PEWM). By restricting video generation to fixed short horizons, our approach 1) enables fine-grained alignment between linguistic concepts and visual representations of robotic actions, 2) reduces learning complexity, 3) improves data efficiency in embodied data collection, and 4) decreases inference latency. By equipping with a modular Vision-Language Model (VLM) planner and a Start-Goal heatmap Guidance mechanism (SGG), PEWM further enables flexible closed-loop control and supports compositional generalization of primitive-level policies over extended, complex tasks. Our framework leverages the spatiotemporal vision priors in video models and the semantic awareness of VLMs to bridge the gap between fine-grained physical interaction and high-level reasoning, paving the way toward scalable, interpretable, and general-purpose embodied intelligence.

Language models have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various natural language processing tasks, yet they struggle with planning tasks requiring multi-step simulations. Inspired by human cognitive processes, this paper investigates the optimal planning power of language models that can construct a cognitive map of a given environment. Our experiments demonstrate that cognitive map significantly enhances the performance of both optimal and reachable planning generation ability in the Gridworld path planning task. We observe that our method showcases two key characteristics similar to human cognition: generalization of its planning ability to extrapolated environments and rapid adaptation with limited training data. We hope our findings in the Gridworld task provide insights into modeling human cognitive processes in language models, potentially leading to the development of more advanced and robust systems that better resemble human cognition.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Recent advances in AI -- including generative approaches -- have resulted in technology that can support humans in scientific discovery and decision support but may also disrupt democracies and target individuals. The responsible use of AI increasingly shows the need for human-AI teaming, necessitating effective interaction between humans and machines. A crucial yet often overlooked aspect of these interactions is the different ways in which humans and machines generalise. In cognitive science, human generalisation commonly involves abstraction and concept learning. In contrast, AI generalisation encompasses out-of-domain generalisation in machine learning, rule-based reasoning in symbolic AI, and abstraction in neuro-symbolic AI. In this perspective paper, we combine insights from AI and cognitive science to identify key commonalities and differences across three dimensions: notions of generalisation, methods for generalisation, and evaluation of generalisation. We map the different conceptualisations of generalisation in AI and cognitive science along these three dimensions and consider their role in human-AI teaming. This results in interdisciplinary challenges across AI and cognitive science that must be tackled to provide a foundation for effective and cognitively supported alignment in human-AI teaming scenarios.

Probabilistic mental simulation is thought to play a key role in human reasoning, planning, and prediction, yet the demands of simulation in complex environments exceed realistic human capacity limits. A theory with growing evidence is that people simulate using simplified representations of the environment that abstract away from irrelevant details, but it is unclear how people determine these simplifications efficiently. Here, we present a "Just-in-Time" framework for simulation-based reasoning that demonstrates how such representations can be constructed online with minimal added computation. The model uses a tight interleaving of simulation, visual search, and representation modification, with the current simulation guiding where to look and visual search flagging objects that should be encoded for subsequent simulation. Despite only ever encoding a small subset of objects, the model makes high-utility predictions. We find strong empirical support for this account over alternative models in a grid-world planning task and a physical reasoning task across a range of behavioral measures. Together, these results offer a concrete algorithmic account of how people construct reduced representations to support efficient mental simulation.

For an artificial creative agent, an essential driver of the search for novelty is a value function which is often provided by the system designer or users. We argue that an important barrier for progress in creativity research is the inability of these systems to develop their own notion of value for novelty. We propose a notion of knowledge-driven creativity that circumvent the need for an externally imposed value function, allowing the system to explore based on what it has learned from a set of referential objects. The concept is illustrated by a specific knowledge model provided by a deep generative autoencoder. Using the described system, we train a knowledge model on a set of digit images and we use the same model to build coherent sets of new digits that do not belong to known digit types.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, they exhibit certain cognitive patterns similar to those of humans that are not directly specified in training data. This study investigates this phenomenon by focusing on temporal cognition in LLMs. Leveraging the similarity judgment task, we find that larger models spontaneously establish a subjective temporal reference point and adhere to the Weber-Fechner law, whereby the perceived distance logarithmically compresses as years recede from this reference point. To uncover the mechanisms behind this behavior, we conducted multiple analyses across neuronal, representational, and informational levels. We first identify a set of temporal-preferential neurons and find that this group exhibits minimal activation at the subjective reference point and implements a logarithmic coding scheme convergently found in biological systems. Probing representations of years reveals a hierarchical construction process, where years evolve from basic numerical values in shallow layers to abstract temporal orientation in deep layers. Finally, using pre-trained embedding models, we found that the training corpus itself possesses an inherent, non-linear temporal structure, which provides the raw material for the model's internal construction. In discussion, we propose an experientialist perspective for understanding these findings, where the LLMs' cognition is viewed as a subjective construction of the external world by its internal representational system. This nuanced perspective implies the potential emergence of alien cognitive frameworks that humans cannot intuitively predict, pointing toward a direction for AI alignment that focuses on guiding internal constructions. Our code is available at https://TheOtherMind.github.io.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) is devoted to the creation of artificial decision-makers that can perform (at least) on par with the human counterparts on a domain of interest. Unlike the agents in traditional AI, the agents in artificial general intelligence (AGI) are required to replicate human intelligence in almost every domain of interest. Moreover, an AGI agent should be able to achieve this without (virtually any) further changes, retraining, or fine-tuning of the parameters. The real world is non-stationary, non-ergodic, and non-Markovian: we, humans, can neither revisit our past nor are the most recent observations sufficient statistics. Yet, we excel at a variety of complex tasks. Many of these tasks require longterm planning. We can associate this success to our natural faculty to abstract away task-irrelevant information from our overwhelming sensory experience. We make task-specific mental models of the world without much effort. Due to this ability to abstract, we can plan on a significantly compact representation of a task without much loss of performance. Not only this, we also abstract our actions to produce high-level plans: the level of action-abstraction can be anywhere between small muscle movements to a mental notion of "doing an action". It is natural to assume that any AGI agent competing with humans (at every plausible domain) should also have these abilities to abstract its experiences and actions. This thesis is an inquiry into the existence of such abstractions which aid efficient planing for a wide range of domains, and most importantly, these abstractions come with some optimality guarantees.

We present Sequential Planning via Anchored Robotic Keypoints, SPARK, a training-free neurosymbolic manipulation system that reaches 43.7% on six LIBERO-PRO position \& task cells, more than doubling CaP-Agent0 and Vision-Language-Action (VLA) baselines. CaP-Agent0, a multi-turn code-generation agent, achieves 18.2% by re-querying an LLM at every turn, but its restart-from-scratch solution proves costly against minor policy failures. Perception is the layer that fails most under position and task changes so SPARK spends its computation there. A single Gemini call composes the plan as a typed behavior tree (BT) of composable primitives, each already containing the low-level control (motion, grasping, depth geometry) a code-generation agent would otherwise regenerate on every trial. The rest of the budget goes to perception: a second Gemini call proposes three alternative text prompts per object, SAM3 evaluates each, and we keep the prompttolabel pair with the most confident detection and a recovery loop then retries a failed primitive against freshly detected objects, with no new LLM call. The alternative prompts add +27.7 points on the spatial suite and +10.0 on the object suite, with the recovery loop adding +5.0 overall. SPARK runs the same primitives on three robot families (UR10e, Franka FR3, bimanual Franka) across nine unique tasks at twenty trials each, averaging 68%. Since the detector, planner, and controller modules sit behind the typed plan, they swap independently without training, and each primitive's checkable post-condition traces a failure to the corresponding module or a kinematic limit. Every trial logs a verified, labeled trajectory, so a training-free planner that already beats VLAs can supply the data those policies need without teleoperation. Project page: https://cwru-aism.github.io/spark-page/

Large language models handle single-turn generation well, but multi-turn interactions still require the model to reconstruct user intent and task state from an expanding token history because internal representations do not persist across turns. This token-first paradigm leads to drift, inconsistent reasoning modes, and growing prompts as conversations deepen. We propose CORE, a concept-first interaction layer that improves multi-turn stability without modifying model weights. CORE combines a small library of universal cognitive operators with a persistent Local Concept - a compact semantic state capturing the task, constraints, preferences, and intermediate results. Each model call receives only this concept state, the user's latest instruction, and the selected operator, eliminating the need to replay full history. A preliminary prototype simulating CORE's behavior shows about 42% reduction in cumulative prompt tokens, though this number reflects prototype conditions and should not be interpreted as a real-world performance estimate. CORE offers a model-agnostic mechanism that separates conceptual reasoning from language generation, suggesting a scalable direction for more stable multi-turn systems.

Early cavemen relied on gestures, vocalizations, and simple signals to coordinate, plan, avoid predators, and share resources. Today, humans collaborate using complex languages to achieve remarkable results. What drives this evolution in communication? How does language emerge, adapt, and become vital for teamwork? Understanding the origins of language remains a challenge. A leading hypothesis in linguistics and anthropology posits that language evolved to meet the ecological and social demands of early human cooperation. Language did not arise in isolation, but through shared survival goals. Inspired by this view, we investigate the emergence of language in multi-agent Foraging Games. These environments are designed to reflect the cognitive and ecological constraints believed to have influenced the evolution of communication. Agents operate in a shared grid world with only partial knowledge about other agents and the environment, and must coordinate to complete games like picking up high-value targets or executing temporally ordered actions. Using end-to-end deep reinforcement learning, agents learn both actions and communication strategies from scratch. We find that agents develop communication protocols with hallmark features of natural language: arbitrariness, interchangeability, displacement, cultural transmission, and compositionality. We quantify each property and analyze how different factors, such as population size and temporal dependencies, shape specific aspects of the emergent language. Our framework serves as a platform for studying how language can evolve from partial observability, temporal reasoning, and cooperative goals in embodied multi-agent settings. We will release all data, code, and models publicly.

The fragmentation between high-level task semantics and low-level geometric features remains a persistent challenge in robotic manipulation. While vision-language models (VLMs) have shown promise in generating affordance-aware visual representations, the lack of semantic grounding in canonical spaces and reliance on manual annotations severely limit their ability to capture dynamic semantic-affordance relationships. To address these, we propose Primitive-Aware Semantic Grounding (PASG), a closed-loop framework that introduces: (1) Automatic primitive extraction through geometric feature aggregation, enabling cross-category detection of keypoints and axes; (2) VLM-driven semantic anchoring that dynamically couples geometric primitives with functional affordances and task-relevant description; (3) A spatial-semantic reasoning benchmark and a fine-tuned VLM (Qwen2.5VL-PA). We demonstrate PASG's effectiveness in practical robotic manipulation tasks across diverse scenarios, achieving performance comparable to manual annotations. PASG achieves a finer-grained semantic-affordance understanding of objects, establishing a unified paradigm for bridging geometric primitives with task semantics in robotic manipulation.

Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has largely been path-independent to model training, i.e., has focused on the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs would benefit from considering the developmental alignment of their performance during training to the trajectories of children's thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four sets of tasks to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate their available intermediate and final training steps. These tasks are Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow "blank slate" models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

Humans abstract experiences into structured representations to facilitate pattern inference and knowledge transfer. While the hippocampal-entorhinal (HPC-MEC) circuit is known to represent both spatial and conceptual spaces, the mechanisms for concurrently extracting abstract structures from continuous, high-dimensional dynamics remain poorly understood. We propose a brain-inspired hierarchical model that simultaneously infers latent transitions and constructs a predictive visual world model. Our architecture employs an inverse model for structural extraction alongside an HPC-MEC coupling model that dissociates relational structures (MEC) from integrated episodic scenes (HPC). Using primitive transformation dynamics as a benchmark, we demonstrate the model's capacity for structural abstraction. By leveraging velocity-driven path integration, the framework enables robust prediction and structural reuse across diverse contexts, thereby achieving structural generalization. This work provides a novel computational framework for understanding how brain-inspired, self-supervised learning of world models facilitates the acquisition of reusable abstract knowledge.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

Intermediate token generation (ITG), where a model produces output before the solution, has become a standard method to improve the performance of language models on reasoning tasks. These intermediate tokens have been called reasoning traces or even thoughts -- implicitly anthropomorphizing the traces, and implying that these traces resemble steps a human might take when solving a challenging problem, and as such can provide an interpretable window into the operation of the model's thinking process to the end user. In this position paper, we present evidence that this anthropomorphization isn't a harmless metaphor, and instead is quite dangerous -- it confuses the nature of these models and how to use them effectively, and leads to questionable research. We call on the community to avoid such anthropomorphization of intermediate tokens.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

From early days, a key and controversial question inside the artificial intelligence community was whether Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is achievable. AGI is the ability of machines and computer programs to achieve human-level intelligence and do all tasks that a human being can. While there exist a number of systems in the literature claiming they realize AGI, several other researchers argue that it is impossible to achieve it. In this paper, we take a different view to the problem. First, we discuss that in order to realize AGI, along with building intelligent machines and programs, an intelligent world should also be constructed which is on the one hand, an accurate approximation of our world and on the other hand, a significant part of reasoning of intelligent machines is already embedded in this world. Then we discuss that AGI is not a product or algorithm, rather it is a continuous process which will become more and more mature over time (like human civilization and wisdom). Then, we argue that pre-trained embeddings play a key role in building this intelligent world and as a result, realizing AGI. We discuss how pre-trained embeddings facilitate achieving several characteristics of human-level intelligence, such as embodiment, common sense knowledge, unconscious knowledge and continuality of learning, by machines.

To make deliberate progress towards more intelligent and more human-like artificial systems, we need to be following an appropriate feedback signal: we need to be able to define and evaluate intelligence in a way that enables comparisons between two systems, as well as comparisons with humans. Over the past hundred years, there has been an abundance of attempts to define and measure intelligence, across both the fields of psychology and AI. We summarize and critically assess these definitions and evaluation approaches, while making apparent the two historical conceptions of intelligence that have implicitly guided them. We note that in practice, the contemporary AI community still gravitates towards benchmarking intelligence by comparing the skill exhibited by AIs and humans at specific tasks such as board games and video games. We argue that solely measuring skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power. We then articulate a new formal definition of intelligence based on Algorithmic Information Theory, describing intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency and highlighting the concepts of scope, generalization difficulty, priors, and experience. Using this definition, we propose a set of guidelines for what a general AI benchmark should look like. Finally, we present a benchmark closely following these guidelines, the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), built upon an explicit set of priors designed to be as close as possible to innate human priors. We argue that ARC can be used to measure a human-like form of general fluid intelligence and that it enables fair general intelligence comparisons between AI systems and humans.

Dominant programming paradigms inherit an execution model optimised for a bygone era of a single human mind instructing a local machine, leaving contemporary systems burdened with historical path dependencies. When forced to host multi-dimensional, connectionist intelligence, this brittle assembly model fractures under the weight of a profound probabilistic-symbolic impedance mismatch. While contemporary Software 3.x frameworks attempt to patch the mismatch by encasing large language models (LLMs) in increasingly complicated external harnesses, this spiralling architectural complexity only compounds the carrying cost of static code assembly. To address the cause rather than the effects, this paper introduces Software 4.0 -- an autopoietic heterarchy of human intelligence, neural AI, and natively reflective symbolic substrate. Under this paradigm, software is transformed from an inert corpus to be parsed into a self-regulating metabolic network that natively verifies, modifies, and evolves its own structural integrity. We present Recognitive, the programming language and platform that materialises this architecture. By offloading the burden of structural verification to a deterministic substrate, it unlocks a superior inference-time scaling regime -- one where connectionist compute translates entirely into deep semantic exploration and hypothesis traversal rather than the ruinous computational and financial cost of simulating structural constraints probabilistically. Moving beyond the legacy 'Software Factory' mindset, we outline the theoretical foundations required to ground connectionist intent and arrive fully in the intelligence age. This is a foundational vision paper; empirical evaluation and formal specification of the type system and operational semantics are the subject of future work.

Temporal modeling is essential for robotic manipulation, as effective control requires both memory of past interactions and imagination of future states. However, most VLA models rely primarily on the current observation and therefore struggle with long-horizon, temporally dependent tasks. Cognitive science suggests that humans rely on working memory to buffer short-lived context, the hippocampal system to preserve episodic memory of past experience, and internal models to imagine possible future state evolution. Inspired by these mechanisms, we propose MemoryVLA++, a full temporal modeling framework that equips VLA models with memory and imagination for robotic manipulation. A pretrained VLM encodes the current observation into perceptual and cognitive tokens, forming working memory. These tokens query a Perceptual-Cognitive Memory Bank to retrieve relevant historical context. This bank stores low-level details and high-level semantics from past interactions, and is updated through redundancy-aware consolidation. A world model imagines future states in a denoising latent space, and the imagined latents are integrated under memory guidance to form full temporal-aware tokens. The resulting tokens condition a diffusion action expert to predict temporally consistent action sequences. We conduct extensive experiments on 5 simulation benchmarks and 3 categories of real-robot tasks across 3 robots, covering general manipulation, long-horizon temporal tasks, robustness, and generalization. Our method achieves strong performance across Libero, SimplerEnv, Mikasa-Robo, Calvin, Libero-Plus, and diverse real-robot tasks, validating the effectiveness of full temporal modeling with memory and imagination. For example, on real robots, it achieves +9%, +26%, +28% gains on general, memory-dependent, and imagination-dependent tasks. Project Page: https://shihao1895.github.io/MemoryVLA-PP-Web

A characteristic feature of human semantic cognition is its ability to not only store and retrieve the properties of concepts observed through experience, but to also facilitate the inheritance of properties (can breathe) from superordinate concepts (animal) to their subordinates (dog) -- i.e. demonstrate property inheritance. In this paper, we present COMPS, a collection of minimal pair sentences that jointly tests pre-trained language models (PLMs) on their ability to attribute properties to concepts and their ability to demonstrate property inheritance behavior. Analyses of 22 different PLMs on COMPS reveal that they can easily distinguish between concepts on the basis of a property when they are trivially different, but find it relatively difficult when concepts are related on the basis of nuanced knowledge representations. Furthermore, we find that PLMs can demonstrate behavior consistent with property inheritance to a great extent, but fail in the presence of distracting information, which decreases the performance of many models, sometimes even below chance. This lack of robustness in demonstrating simple reasoning raises important questions about PLMs' capacity to make correct inferences even when they appear to possess the prerequisite knowledge.

The original vision of AI was re-articulated in 2002 via the term 'Artificial General Intelligence' or AGI. This vision is to build 'Thinking Machines' - computer systems that can learn, reason, and solve problems similar to the way humans do. This is in stark contrast to the 'Narrow AI' approach practiced by almost everyone in the field over the many decades. While several large-scale efforts have nominally been working on AGI (most notably DeepMind), the field of pure focused AGI development has not been well funded or promoted. This is surprising given the fantastic value that true AGI can bestow on humanity. In addition to the dearth of effort in this field, there are also several theoretical and methodical missteps that are hampering progress. We highlight why purely statistical approaches are unlikely to lead to AGI, and identify several crucial cognitive abilities required to achieve human-like adaptability and autonomous learning. We conclude with a survey of socio-technical factors that have undoubtedly slowed progress towards AGI.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) trained with Long Chain-of-Thought (Long CoT) reasoning have demonstrated remarkable cross-domain generalization capabilities. However, the underlying mechanisms supporting such transfer remain poorly understood. We hypothesize that cross-domain generalization arises from shared abstract reasoning prototypes -- fundamental reasoning patterns that capture the essence of problems across domains. These prototypes minimize the nuances of the representation, revealing that seemingly diverse tasks are grounded in shared reasoning structures.Based on this hypothesis, we propose ProtoReasoning, a framework that enhances the reasoning ability of LLMs by leveraging scalable and verifiable prototypical representations (Prolog for logical reasoning, PDDL for planning).ProtoReasoning features: (1) an automated prototype construction pipeline that transforms problems into corresponding prototype representations; (2) a comprehensive verification system providing reliable feedback through Prolog/PDDL interpreters; (3) the scalability to synthesize problems arbitrarily within prototype space while ensuring correctness. Extensive experiments show that ProtoReasoning achieves 4.7% improvement over baseline models on logical reasoning (Enigmata-Eval), 6.3% improvement on planning tasks, 4.0% improvement on general reasoning (MMLU) and 1.0% on mathematics (AIME24). Significantly, our ablation studies confirm that learning in prototype space also demonstrates enhanced generalization to structurally similar problems compared to training solely on natural language representations, validating our hypothesis that reasoning prototypes serve as the foundation for generalizable reasoning in large language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

Human language is one of the most expressive tools for conveying intent, yet most artificial or biological systems lack mechanisms to interpret or respond meaningfully to it. Bridging this gap could enable more natural forms of control over complex, decentralized systems. In AI and artificial life, recent work explores how language can specify high-level goals, but most systems still depend on engineered rewards, task-specific supervision, or rigid command sets, limiting generalization to novel instructions. Similar constraints apply in synthetic biology and bioengineering, where the locus of control is often genomic rather than environmental perturbation. A key open question is whether artificial or biological collectives can be guided by free-form natural language alone, without task-specific tuning or carefully designed evaluation metrics. We provide one possible answer here by showing, for the first time, that simple agents' collective behavior can be guided by free-form language prompts: one AI model transforms an imperative prompt into an intervention that is applied to simulated cells; a second AI model scores how well the prompt describes the resulting cellular dynamics; and the former AI model is evolved to improve the scores generated by the latter. Unlike previous work, our method does not require engineered fitness functions or domain-specific prompt design. We show that the evolved system generalizes to unseen prompts without retraining. By treating natural language as a control layer, the system suggests a future in which spoken or written prompts could direct computational, robotic, or biological systems to desired behaviors. This work provides a concrete step toward this vision of AI-biology partnerships, in which language replaces mathematical objective functions, fixed rules, and domain-specific programming.

Humans learn to master open-ended repertoires of skills by imagining and practicing their own goals. This autotelic learning process, literally the pursuit of self-generated (auto) goals (telos), becomes more and more open-ended as the goals become more diverse, abstract and creative. The resulting exploration of the space of possible skills is supported by an inter-individual exploration: goal representations are culturally evolved and transmitted across individuals, in particular using language. Current artificial agents mostly rely on predefined goal representations corresponding to goal spaces that are either bounded (e.g. list of instructions), or unbounded (e.g. the space of possible visual inputs) but are rarely endowed with the ability to reshape their goal representations, to form new abstractions or to imagine creative goals. In this paper, we introduce a language model augmented autotelic agent (LMA3) that leverages a pretrained language model (LM) to support the representation, generation and learning of diverse, abstract, human-relevant goals. The LM is used as an imperfect model of human cultural transmission; an attempt to capture aspects of humans' common-sense, intuitive physics and overall interests. Specifically, it supports three key components of the autotelic architecture: 1)~a relabeler that describes the goals achieved in the agent's trajectories, 2)~a goal generator that suggests new high-level goals along with their decomposition into subgoals the agent already masters, and 3)~reward functions for each of these goals. Without relying on any hand-coded goal representations, reward functions or curriculum, we show that LMA3 agents learn to master a large diversity of skills in a task-agnostic text-based environment.

Embodied cognition argues that intelligence arises from sensorimotor interaction rather than passive observation. It raises an intriguing question: do modern vision-language models (VLMs), trained largely in a disembodied manner, exhibit signs of embodied cognition? We introduce ENACT, a benchmark that casts evaluation of embodied cognition as world modeling from egocentric interaction in a visual question answering (VQA) format. Framed as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) whose actions are scene graph changes, ENACT comprises two complementary sequence reordering tasks: forward world modeling (reorder shuffled observations given actions) and inverse world modeling (reorder shuffled actions given observations). While conceptually simple, solving these tasks implicitly demands capabilities central to embodied cognition-affordance recognition, action-effect reasoning, embodied awareness, and interactive, long-horizon memory from partially observable egocentric input, while avoiding low-level image synthesis that could confound the evaluation. We provide a scalable pipeline that synthesizes QA pairs from robotics simulation (BEHAVIOR) and evaluates models on 8,972 QA pairs spanning long-horizon home-scale activities. Experiments reveal a performance gap between frontier VLMs and humans that widens with interaction horizon. Models consistently perform better on the inverse task than the forward one and exhibit anthropocentric biases, including a preference for right-handed actions and degradation when camera intrinsics or viewpoints deviate from human vision. Website at https://enact-embodied-cognition.github.io/.

We propose cognitive prompting as a novel approach to guide problem-solving in large language models (LLMs) through structured, human-like cognitive operations such as goal clarification, decomposition, filtering, abstraction, and pattern recognition. By employing systematic, step-by-step reasoning, cognitive prompting enables LLMs to efficiently tackle complex, multi-step tasks. We evaluate the effectiveness of cognitive prompting on Meta's LLaMA models, comparing performance on arithmetic reasoning tasks using the GSM8K dataset and on commonsense reasoning benchmarks. Our analysis includes comparisons between models without cognitive prompting, models with a static sequence of cognitive operations, and models using reflective cognitive prompting, where the LLM dynamically self-selects the sequence of cognitive operations. The results show that cognitive prompting, particularly when dynamically adapted, significantly improves the performance of larger models, such as LLaMA3.1 70B, and enhances their ability to handle multi-step reasoning tasks. This approach also improves interpretability and flexibility, highlighting cognitive prompting as a promising strategy for general-purpose AI reasoning.

Memory is one of the most essential cognitive functions serving as a repository of world knowledge and episodes of activities. In recent years, large-scale pre-trained language models have shown remarkable memorizing ability. On the contrary, vanilla neural networks without pre-training have been long observed suffering from the catastrophic forgetting problem. To investigate such a retentive-forgetful contradiction and understand the memory mechanism of language models, we conduct thorough experiments by controlling the target knowledge types, the learning strategies and the learning schedules. We find that: 1) Vanilla language models are forgetful; 2) Pre-training leads to retentive language models; 3) Knowledge relevance and diversification significantly influence the memory formation. These conclusions are useful for understanding the abilities of pre-trained language models and shed light on designing and evaluating new learning and inference algorithms of language models.

Within the limited scope of this paper, we argue that artificial general intelligence cannot emerge from current neural network paradigms regardless of scale, nor is such an approach healthy for the field at present. Drawing on various notions, discussions, present-day developments and observations, current debates and critiques, experiments, and so on in between philosophy, including the Chinese Room Argument and Gödelian argument, neuroscientific ideas, computer science, the theoretical consideration of artificial intelligence, and learning theory, we address conceptually that neural networks are architecturally insufficient for genuine understanding. They operate as static function approximators of a limited encoding framework - a 'sophisticated sponge' exhibiting complex behaviours without structural richness that constitute intelligence. We critique the theoretical foundations the field relies on and created of recent times; for example, an interesting heuristic as neural scaling law (as an example, arXiv:2001.08361 ) made prominent in a wrong way of interpretation, The Universal Approximation Theorem addresses the wrong level of abstraction and, in parts, partially, the question of current architectures lacking dynamic restructuring capabilities. We propose a framework distinguishing existential facilities (computational substrate) from architectural organization (interpretive structures), and outline principles for what genuine machine intelligence would require, and furthermore, a conceptual method of structuralizing the richer framework on which the principle of neural network system takes hold.

We propose a new frontier: Neural Computers (NCs) -- an emerging machine form that unifies computation, memory, and I/O in a learned runtime state. Unlike conventional computers, which execute explicit programs, agents, which act over external execution environments, and world models, which learn environment dynamics, NCs aim to make the model itself the running computer. Our long-term goal is the Completely Neural Computer (CNC): the mature, general-purpose realization of this emerging machine form, with stable execution, explicit reprogramming, and durable capability reuse. As an initial step, we study whether early NC primitives can be learned solely from collected I/O traces, without instrumented program state. Concretely, we instantiate NCs as video models that roll out screen frames from instructions, pixels, and user actions (when available) in CLI and GUI settings. These implementations show that learned runtimes can acquire early interface primitives, especially I/O alignment and short-horizon control, while routine reuse, controlled updates, and symbolic stability remain open. We outline a roadmap toward CNCs around these challenges. If overcome, CNCs could establish a new computing paradigm beyond today's agents, world models, and conventional computers.

Trained on vast corpora of human language, language models demonstrate emergent human-like reasoning abilities. Yet they are still far from true intelligence, which opens up intriguing opportunities to explore the parallels of humans and model behaviors. In this work, we study the ability to skip steps in reasoning - a hallmark of human expertise developed through practice. Unlike humans, who may skip steps to enhance efficiency or to reduce cognitive load, models do not inherently possess such motivations to minimize reasoning steps. To address this, we introduce a controlled framework that stimulates step-skipping behavior by iteratively refining models to generate shorter and accurate reasoning paths. Empirical results indicate that models can develop the step skipping ability under our guidance. Moreover, after fine-tuning on expanded datasets that include both complete and skipped reasoning sequences, the models can not only resolve tasks with increased efficiency without sacrificing accuracy, but also exhibit comparable and even enhanced generalization capabilities in out-of-domain scenarios. Our work presents the first exploration into human-like step-skipping ability and provides fresh perspectives on how such cognitive abilities can benefit AI models.

There is a concerted effort to build domain-general artificial intelligence in the form of universal neural network models with sufficient computational flexibility to solve a wide variety of cognitive tasks but without requiring fine-tuning on individual problem spaces and domains. To do this, models need appropriate priors and inductive biases, such that trained models can generalise to out-of-distribution examples and new problem sets. Here we provide an overview of the hallmarks endowing biological neural networks with the functionality needed for flexible cognition, in order to establish which features might also be important to achieve similar functionality in artificial systems. We specifically discuss the role of system-level distribution of network communication and recurrence, in addition to the role of short-term topological changes for efficient local computation. As machine learning models become more complex, these principles may provide valuable directions in an otherwise vast space of possible architectures. In addition, testing these inductive biases within artificial systems may help us to understand the biological principles underlying domain-general cognition.

The emerging field of Diverse Intelligence seeks to identify, formalize, and understand commonalities in behavioral competencies across a wide range of implementations. Especially interesting are simple systems that provide unexpected examples of memory, decision-making, or problem-solving in substrates that at first glance do not appear to be complex enough to implement such capabilities. We seek to develop tools to help understand the minimal requirements for such capabilities, and to learn to recognize and predict basal forms of intelligence in unconventional substrates. Here, we apply novel analyses to the behavior of classical sorting algorithms, short pieces of code which have been studied for many decades. To study these sorting algorithms as a model of biological morphogenesis and its competencies, we break two formerly-ubiquitous assumptions: top-down control (instead, showing how each element within a array of numbers can exert minimal agency and implement sorting policies from the bottom up), and fully reliable hardware (instead, allowing some of the elements to be "damaged" and fail to execute the algorithm). We quantitatively characterize sorting activity as the traversal of a problem space, showing that arrays of autonomous elements sort themselves more reliably and robustly than traditional implementations in the presence of errors. Moreover, we find the ability to temporarily reduce progress in order to navigate around a defect, and unexpected clustering behavior among the elements in chimeric arrays whose elements follow one of two different algorithms. The discovery of emergent problem-solving capacities in simple, familiar algorithms contributes a new perspective to the field of Diverse Intelligence, showing how basal forms of intelligence can emerge in simple systems without being explicitly encoded in their underlying mechanics.

While large language models demonstrate impressive performance on static benchmarks, the true potential of large language models as self-learning and reasoning agents in dynamic environments remains unclear. This study systematically evaluates the efficacy of self-reflection, heuristic mutation, and planning as prompting techniques to test the adaptive capabilities of agents. We conduct experiments with various open-source language models in dynamic environments and find that larger models generally outperform smaller ones, but that strategic prompting can close this performance gap. Second, a too-long prompt can negatively impact smaller models on basic reactive tasks, while larger models show more robust behaviour. Third, advanced prompting techniques primarily benefit smaller models on complex games, but offer less improvement for already high-performing large language models. Yet, we find that advanced reasoning methods yield highly variable outcomes: while capable of significantly improving performance when reasoning and decision-making align, they also introduce instability and can lead to big performance drops. Compared to human performance, our findings reveal little evidence of true emergent reasoning. Instead, large language model performance exhibits persistent limitations in crucial areas such as planning, reasoning, and spatial coordination, suggesting that current-generation large language models still suffer fundamental shortcomings that may not be fully overcome through self-reflective prompting alone. Reasoning is a multi-faceted task, and while reasoning methods like Chain of thought improves multi-step reasoning on math word problems, our findings using dynamic benchmarks highlight important shortcomings in general reasoning capabilities, indicating a need to move beyond static benchmarks to capture the complexity of reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents for multi-turn decision-making tasks. However, current agents typically rely on fixed cognitive patterns: non-thinking models generate immediate responses, while thinking models engage in deep reasoning uniformly. This rigidity is inefficient for long-horizon tasks, where cognitive demands vary significantly from step to step, with some requiring strategic planning and others only routine execution. In this paper, we introduce CogRouter, a framework that trains agents to dynamically adapt cognitive depth at each step. Grounded in ACT-R theory, we design four hierarchical cognitive levels ranging from instinctive responses to strategic planning. Our two-stage training approach includes Cognition-aware Supervised Fine-tuning (CoSFT) to instill stable level-specific patterns, and Cognition-aware Policy Optimization (CoPO) for step-level credit assignment via confidence-aware advantage reweighting. The key insight is that appropriate cognitive depth should maximize the confidence of the resulting action. Experiments on ALFWorld and ScienceWorld demonstrate that CogRouter achieves state-of-the-art performance with superior efficiency. With Qwen2.5-7B, it reaches an 82.3% success rate, outperforming GPT-4o (+40.3%), OpenAI-o3 (+18.3%), and GRPO (+14.0%), while using 62% fewer tokens.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

For half a century, artificial intelligence research has attempted to reproduce the human qualities of abstraction and reasoning - creating computer systems that can learn new concepts from a minimal set of examples, in settings where humans find this easy. While specific neural networks are able to solve an impressive range of problems, broad generalisation to situations outside their training data has proved elusive.In this work, we look at several novel approaches for solving the Abstraction & Reasoning Corpus (ARC), a dataset of abstract visual reasoning tasks introduced to test algorithms on broad generalization. Despite three international competitions with $100,000 in prizes, the best algorithms still fail to solve a majority of ARC tasks and rely on complex hand-crafted rules, without using machine learning at all. We revisit whether recent advances in neural networks allow progress on this task. First, we adapt the DreamCoder neurosymbolic reasoning solver to ARC. DreamCoder automatically writes programs in a bespoke domain-specific language to perform reasoning, using a neural network to mimic human intuition. We present the Perceptual Abstraction and Reasoning Language (PeARL) language, which allows DreamCoder to solve ARC tasks, and propose a new recognition model that allows us to significantly improve on the previous best implementation.We also propose a new encoding and augmentation scheme that allows large language models (LLMs) to solve ARC tasks, and find that the largest models can solve some ARC tasks. LLMs are able to solve a different group of problems to state-of-the-art solvers, and provide an interesting way to complement other approaches. We perform an ensemble analysis, combining models to achieve better results than any system alone. Finally, we publish the arckit Python library to make future research on ARC easier.

The remarkable zero-shot capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have propelled natural language processing from task-specific models to unified, generalist foundation models. This transformation emerged from simple primitives: large, generative models trained on web-scale data. Curiously, the same primitives apply to today's generative video models. Could video models be on a trajectory towards general-purpose vision understanding, much like LLMs developed general-purpose language understanding? We demonstrate that Veo 3 can solve a broad variety of tasks it wasn't explicitly trained for: segmenting objects, detecting edges, editing images, understanding physical properties, recognizing object affordances, simulating tool use, and more. These abilities to perceive, model, and manipulate the visual world enable early forms of visual reasoning like maze and symmetry solving. Veo's emergent zero-shot capabilities indicate that video models are on a path to becoming unified, generalist vision foundation models.

When do machine learning systems fail to generalize, and what mechanisms could improve their generalization? Here, we draw inspiration from cognitive science to argue that one weakness of machine learning systems is their failure to exhibit latent learning -- learning information that is not relevant to the task at hand, but that might be useful in a future task. We show how this perspective links failures ranging from the reversal curse in language modeling to new findings on agent-based navigation. We then highlight how cognitive science points to episodic memory as a potential part of the solution to these issues. Correspondingly, we show that a system with an oracle retrieval mechanism can use learning experiences more flexibly to generalize better across many of these challenges. We also identify some of the essential components for effectively using retrieval, including the importance of within-example in-context learning for acquiring the ability to use information across retrieved examples. In summary, our results illustrate one possible contributor to the relative data inefficiency of current machine learning systems compared to natural intelligence, and help to understand how retrieval methods can complement parametric learning to improve generalization.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently shown promise as high-level planners for robots when given access to a selection of low-level skills. However, it is often assumed that LLMs do not possess sufficient knowledge to be used for the low-level trajectories themselves. In this work, we address this assumption thoroughly, and investigate if an LLM (GPT-4) can directly predict a dense sequence of end-effector poses for manipulation skills, when given access to only object detection and segmentation vision models. We study how well a single task-agnostic prompt, without any in-context examples, motion primitives, or external trajectory optimisers, can perform across 26 real-world language-based tasks, such as "open the bottle cap" and "wipe the plate with the sponge", and we investigate which design choices in this prompt are the most effective. Our conclusions raise the assumed limit of LLMs for robotics, and we reveal for the first time that LLMs do indeed possess an understanding of low-level robot control sufficient for a range of common tasks, and that they can additionally detect failures and then re-plan trajectories accordingly. Videos, code, and prompts are available at: https://www.robot-learning.uk/language-models-trajectory-generators.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

How do humans learn language, and can the first language be learned at all? These fundamental questions are still hotly debated. In contemporary linguistics, there are two major schools of thought that give completely opposite answers. According to Chomsky's theory of universal grammar, language cannot be learned because children are not exposed to sufficient data in their linguistic environment. In contrast, usage-based models of language assume a profound relationship between language structure and language use. In particular, contextual mental processing and mental representations are assumed to have the cognitive capacity to capture the complexity of actual language use at all levels. The prime example is syntax, i.e., the rules by which words are assembled into larger units such as sentences. Typically, syntactic rules are expressed as sequences of word classes. However, it remains unclear whether word classes are innate, as implied by universal grammar, or whether they emerge during language acquisition, as suggested by usage-based approaches. Here, we address this issue from a machine learning and natural language processing perspective. In particular, we trained an artificial deep neural network on predicting the next word, provided sequences of consecutive words as input. Subsequently, we analyzed the emerging activation patterns in the hidden layers of the neural network. Strikingly, we find that the internal representations of nine-word input sequences cluster according to the word class of the tenth word to be predicted as output, even though the neural network did not receive any explicit information about syntactic rules or word classes during training. This surprising result suggests, that also in the human brain, abstract representational categories such as word classes may naturally emerge as a consequence of predictive coding and processing during language acquisition.

Cognitive diversity, reflected in variations of language, perspective, and reasoning, is essential to creativity and collective intelligence. This diversity is rich and grounded in culture, history, and individual experience. Yet as large language models (LLMs) become deeply embedded in people's lives, they risk standardizing language and reasoning. This Review synthesizes evidence across linguistics, cognitive, and computer science to show how LLMs reflect and reinforce dominant styles while marginalizing alternative voices and reasoning strategies. We examine how their design and widespread use contribute to this effect by mirroring patterns in their training data and amplifying convergence as all people increasingly rely on the same models across contexts. Unchecked, this homogenization risks flattening the cognitive landscapes that drive collective intelligence and adaptability.

Agent memory shapes how Large Language Model (LLM)-powered agents, akin to the human brain, progressively refine themselves through environment interactions. Existing paradigms remain constrained: parametric memory forcibly adjusts model parameters, and retrieval-based memory externalizes experience into structured databases, yet neither captures the fluid interweaving of reasoning and memory that underlies human cognition. To address this gap, we propose MemGen, a dynamic generative memory framework that equips agents with a human-esque cognitive faculty. It consists of a memory trigger, which monitors the agent's reasoning state to decide explicit memory invocation, and a memory weaver, which takes the agent's current state as stimulus to construct a latent token sequence as machine-native memory to enrich its reasoning. In this way, MemGen enables agents to recall and augment latent memory throughout reasoning, producing a tightly interwoven cycle of memory and cognition. Extensive experiments across eight benchmarks show that MemGen surpasses leading external memory systems such as ExpeL and AWM by up to 38.22%, exceeds GRPO by up to 13.44%, and exhibits strong cross-domain generalization ability. More importantly, we find that without explicit supervision, MemGen spontaneously evolves distinct human-like memory faculties, including planning memory, procedural memory, and working memory, suggesting an emergent trajectory toward more naturalistic forms of machine cognition.

Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly exhibit anthropomorphism characteristics -- human-like qualities portrayed across their outlook, language, behavior, and reasoning functions. Such characteristics enable more intuitive and engaging human-AI interactions. However, current research on anthropomorphism remains predominantly risk-focused, emphasizing over-trust and user deception while offering limited design guidance. We argue that anthropomorphism should instead be treated as a concept of design that can be intentionally tuned to support user goals. Drawing from multiple disciplines, we propose that the anthropomorphism of an LLM-based artifact should reflect the interaction between artifact designers and interpreters. This interaction is facilitated by cues embedded in the artifact by the designers and the (cognitive) responses of the interpreters to the cues. Cues are categorized into four dimensions: perceptive, linguistic, behavioral, and cognitive. By analyzing the manifestation and effectiveness of each cue, we provide a unified taxonomy with actionable levers for practitioners. Consequently, we advocate for function-oriented evaluations of anthropomorphic design.

Cognitive neuroscience is fragmented into specialized models, each tailored to specific experimental paradigms, hence preventing a unified model of cognition in the human brain. Here, we introduce TRIBE v2, a tri-modal (video, audio and language) foundation model capable of predicting human brain activity in a variety of naturalistic and experimental conditions. Leveraging a unified dataset of over 1,000 hours of fMRI across 720 subjects, we demonstrate that our model accurately predicts high-resolution brain responses for novel stimuli, tasks and subjects, superseding traditional linear encoding models, delivering several-fold improvements in accuracy. Critically, TRIBE v2 enables in silico experimentation: tested on seminal visual and neuro-linguistic paradigms, it recovers a variety of results established by decades of empirical research. Finally, by extracting interpretable latent features, TRIBE v2 reveals the fine-grained topography of multisensory integration. These results establish artificial intelligence as a unifying framework for exploring the functional organization of the human brain.

In this perspective paper, we introduce the concept of Specialized Generalist Artificial Intelligence (SGAI or simply SGI) as a crucial milestone toward Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Compared to directly scaling general abilities, SGI is defined as AI that specializes in at least one task, surpassing human experts, while also retaining general abilities. This fusion path enables SGI to rapidly achieve high-value areas. We categorize SGI into three stages based on the level of mastery over professional skills and generality performance. Additionally, we discuss the necessity of SGI in addressing issues associated with large language models, such as their insufficient generality, specialized capabilities, uncertainty in innovation, and practical applications. Furthermore, we propose a conceptual framework for developing SGI that integrates the strengths of Systems 1 and 2 cognitive processing. This framework comprises three layers and four key components, which focus on enhancing individual abilities and facilitating collaborative evolution. We conclude by summarizing the potential challenges and suggesting future directions. We hope that the proposed SGI will provide insights into further research and applications towards achieving AGI.

Spatial intelligence unfolds through a perception-action loop: agents act to acquire observations, and reason about how observations vary as a function of action. Rather than passively processing what is seen, they actively uncover what is unseen - occluded structure, dynamics, containment, and functionality that cannot be resolved from passive sensing alone. We move beyond prior formulations of spatial intelligence that assume oracle observations by recasting the observer as an actor. We introduce ESI-BENCH, a comprehensive benchmark for embodied spatial intelligence spanning 10 task categories and 29 subcategories built on OmniGibson, grounded in Spelke's core knowledge systems. Agents must decide what abilities to deploy - perception, locomotion, and manipulation - and how to sequence them to actively accumulate task-relevant evidence. We conduct extensive experiments on state-of-the-art MLLMs and find that active exploration substantially outperforms passive counterparts, with agents spontaneously discovering emergent spatial strategies without explicit instructions, while random multi-view often adds noise rather than signal despite consuming far more images. Most failures stem not from weak perception but from action blindness: poor action choices lead to poor observations, which in turn drive cascading errors. While explicit 3D grounding stabilizes reasoning on depth-sensitive tasks, imperfect 3D representation proves more harmful than 2D baselines by distorting spatial relations. Human studies further reveal that unlike humans who seek falsifying viewpoints and revise beliefs under contradiction, models commit prematurely with high confidence regardless of evidence quality, exposing a metacognitive gap that neither better perception nor more embodied interaction alone can close.

Instructions trigger a production-centered mechanism in language models. Through a cognitively inspired lens that separates language processing and production, we reveal this mechanism as an asymmetry between the two stages by probing task-specific information layer-wise across five binary judgment tasks. Specifically, we measure how instruction tokens shape information both when sample tokens, the input under evaluation, are processed and when output tokens are produced. Across prompting variations, task-specific information in sample tokens remains largely stable and correlates only weakly with behavior, whereas the same information in output tokens varies substantially and correlates strongly with behavior. Attention-based interventions confirm this pattern causally: blocking instruction flow to all subsequent tokens reduces both behavior and information in output tokens, whereas blocking it only to sample tokens has minimal effect on either. The asymmetry generalizes across model families and tasks, and becomes sharper with model scale and instruction-tuning, both of which disproportionately affect the production stage. Our findings suggest that understanding model capabilities requires jointly assessing internals and behavior, while decomposing the internal perspective by token position to distinguish the processing of input tokens from the production of output tokens.

Representing and navigating hierarchy is a fundamental primitive of reasoning. Large language models have demonstrated proficiency in a wide variety of tasks requiring hierarchical reasoning, but there exists limited analysis on how the models geometrically represent the necessary latent constructions for such thinking. To this end, we develop H-probes, a collection of linear probes that extract hierarchical structure, specifically depth and pairwise distance, from latent representations. In synthetic tree traversal tasks, the H-probes robustly find the subspaces containing hierarchical structure necessary to complete the tasks; furthermore, in comprehensive ablation experiments, we show that these hierarchy-containing subspaces are low-dimensional, causally important for high task performance, and generalize within- and out-of-domain. Furthermore, we find analogous, though weaker, hierarchical structure in real-world hierarchical contexts such as mathematical reasoning traces. These results demonstrate that models represent hierarchy not only at the level of syntax and concepts, but at deeper levels of abstraction -- including the reasoning process itself.

Reasoning is a distinctive human capacity, enabling us to address complex problems by breaking them down into a series of manageable cognitive steps. Yet, complex logical reasoning is still cumbersome for language models. Based on the dual process theory in cognitive science, we are the first to unravel the cognitive reasoning abilities of language models. Our framework employs an iterative methodology to construct a Cognitive Tree (CogTree). The root node of this tree represents the initial query, while the leaf nodes consist of straightforward questions that can be answered directly. This construction involves two main components: the implicit extraction module (referred to as the intuitive system) and the explicit reasoning module (referred to as the reflective system). The intuitive system rapidly generates multiple responses by utilizing in-context examples, while the reflective system scores these responses using comparative learning. The scores guide the intuitive system in its subsequent generation step. Our experimental results on two popular and challenging reasoning tasks indicate that it is possible to achieve a performance level comparable to that of GPT-3.5 (with 175B parameters), using a significantly smaller language model that contains fewer parameters (<=7B) than 5% of GPT-3.5.

Research on emergent patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained significant traction in both psychology and artificial intelligence, motivating the need for a comprehensive review that offers a synthesis of this complex landscape. In this article, we systematically review LLMs' capabilities across three important cognitive domains: decision-making biases, reasoning, and creativity. We use empirical studies drawing on established psychological tests and compare LLMs' performance to human benchmarks. On decision-making, our synthesis reveals that while LLMs demonstrate several human-like biases, some biases observed in humans are absent, indicating cognitive patterns that only partially align with human decision-making. On reasoning, advanced LLMs like GPT-4 exhibit deliberative reasoning akin to human System-2 thinking, while smaller models fall short of human-level performance. A distinct dichotomy emerges in creativity: while LLMs excel in language-based creative tasks, such as storytelling, they struggle with divergent thinking tasks that require real-world context. Nonetheless, studies suggest that LLMs hold considerable potential as collaborators, augmenting creativity in human-machine problem-solving settings. Discussing key limitations, we also offer guidance for future research in areas such as memory, attention, and open-source model development.

Not yet. We present SPACE, a benchmark that systematically evaluates spatial cognition in frontier models. Our benchmark builds on decades of research in cognitive science. It evaluates large-scale mapping abilities that are brought to bear when an organism traverses physical environments, smaller-scale reasoning about object shapes and layouts, and cognitive infrastructure such as spatial attention and memory. For many tasks, we instantiate parallel presentations via text and images, allowing us to benchmark both large language models and large multimodal models. Results suggest that contemporary frontier models fall short of the spatial intelligence of animals, performing near chance level on a number of classic tests of animal cognition.

We present (Experience-Modulated Biologically-inspired Emergent Reasoning), a hybrid cognitive architecture that reorganises the relationship between large language models (LLMs) and memory: rather than augmenting an LLM with retrieval tools, we place the LLM as a replaceable reasoning engine within a persistent, biologically-grounded associative substrate. The architecture centres on a 220,000-neuron spiking neural network (SNN) with spike-timing-dependent plasticity (STDP), four-layer hierarchical organisation (sensory/concept/category/meta-pattern), inhibitory E/I balance, and reward-modulated learning. Text embeddings are encoded into the SNN via a novel z-score standardised top-k population code that is dimension-independent by construction, achieving 82.2\% discrimination retention across embedding dimensionalities. We show that STDP lateral propagation during idle operation can trigger and shape LLM actions without external prompting or scripted triggers: the SNN determines when to act and what associations to surface, while the LLM selects the action type and generates content. In one instance, the system autonomously initiated contact with a user after learned person-topic associations fired laterally during an 8-hour idle period. From a clean start with zero learned weights, the first SNN-triggered action occurred after only 7 conversational exchanges (14 messages).

Large language models (LLMs) are revolutionizing education, with LLM-based agents playing a key role in simulating student behavior. A major challenge in student simulation is modeling the diverse learning patterns of students at various cognitive levels. However, current LLMs, typically trained as ``helpful assistants'', target at generating perfect responses. As a result, they struggle to simulate students with diverse cognitive abilities, as they often produce overly advanced answers, missing the natural imperfections that characterize student learning and resulting in unrealistic simulations. To address this issue, we propose a training-free framework for student simulation. We begin by constructing a cognitive prototype for each student using a knowledge graph, which captures their understanding of concepts from past learning records. This prototype is then mapped to new tasks to predict student performance. Next, we simulate student solutions based on these predictions and iteratively refine them using a beam search method to better replicate realistic mistakes. To validate our approach, we construct the Student\_100 dataset, consisting of 100 students working on Python programming and 5,000 learning records. Experimental results show that our method consistently outperforms baseline models, achieving 100% improvement in simulation accuracy.

This paper proposes a research direction to advance AI which draws inspiration from cognitive theories of human decision making. The premise is that if we gain insights about the causes of some human capabilities that are still lacking in AI (for instance, adaptability, generalizability, common sense, and causal reasoning), we may obtain similar capabilities in an AI system by embedding these causal components. We hope that the high-level description of our vision included in this paper, as well as the several research questions that we propose to consider, can stimulate the AI research community to define, try and evaluate new methodologies, frameworks, and evaluation metrics, in the spirit of achieving a better understanding of both human and machine intelligence.

Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is often envisioned as inherently embodied. With recent advances in robotics and foundational AI models, we stand at the threshold of a new era-one marked by increasingly generalized embodied AI systems. This paper contributes to the discourse by introducing a systematic taxonomy of Embodied AGI spanning five levels (L1-L5). We review existing research and challenges at the foundational stages (L1-L2) and outline the key components required to achieve higher-level capabilities (L3-L5). Building on these insights and existing technologies, we propose a conceptual framework for an L3+ robotic brain, offering both a technical outlook and a foundation for future exploration.

A moderately detailed consideration of interactive LLMs as cognitive systems is given, focusing on LLMs circa mid-2023 such as ChatGPT, GPT-4, Bard, Llama, etc.. Cognitive strengths of these systems are reviewed, and then careful attention is paid to the substantial differences between the sort of cognitive system these LLMs are, and the sort of cognitive systems human beings are. It is found that many of the practical weaknesses of these AI systems can be tied specifically to lacks in the basic cognitive architectures according to which these systems are built. It is argued that incremental improvement of such LLMs is not a viable approach to working toward human-level AGI, in practical terms given realizable amounts of compute resources. This does not imply there is nothing to learn about human-level AGI from studying and experimenting with LLMs, nor that LLMs cannot form significant parts of human-level AGI architectures that also incorporate other ideas. Social and ethical matters regarding LLMs are very briefly touched from this perspective, which implies that while care should be taken regarding misinformation and other issues, and economic upheavals will need their own social remedies based on their unpredictable course as with any powerfully impactful technology, overall the sort of policy needed as regards modern LLMs is quite different than would be the case if a more credible approximation to human-level AGI were at hand.

Reasoning models often spend a significant amount of time thinking before they generate a visible response. In the meantime, they do not give the user any hints as to whether their reasoning is on the right track, and do not give the user any recourse to stop and correct them if their reasoning is flawed. This creates a frustrating, but unfortunately common, experience: the user's time is wasted while the model reasons from a false premise that could have easily been corrected. In contrast, human speakers typically perform lightweight, incremental grounding acts to ensure that participants in the conversation are on the same page; here we ask if language models can learn to leverage a similar type of behavior? With this motivation, we propose interleaved reasoning (IR), in which the model alternates between thinking and surfacing intermediate responses, as an alternative to the standard "think-then-answer" approach. By providing useful information to the user earlier, IR reduces perceived latency, the time a user waits for an initial output, without compromising the quality of the final response. We further introduce a specialization of interleaved reasoning, Plantain (Plan-Thought-Answer Interleaving), where the first intermediate response is an explicit, step-by-step plan for executing the task. This plan-first strategy allows for user intervention and early feedback for subsequent reasoning steps. We demonstrate that Plantain yields an ~6% improvement in pass@1 across several challenging math reasoning and coding benchmarks, while reducing time-to-first-response by over 60% relative to think-then-answer baselines.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Planning with a learned model is arguably a key component of intelligence. There are several challenges in realizing such a component in large-scale reinforcement learning (RL) problems. One such challenge is dealing effectively with continuous action spaces when using tree-search planning (e.g., it is not feasible to consider every action even at just the root node of the tree). In this paper we present a method for selecting affordances useful for planning -- for learning which small number of actions/options from a continuous space of actions/options to consider in the tree-expansion process during planning. We consider affordances that are goal-and-state-conditional mappings to actions/options as well as unconditional affordances that simply select actions/options available in all states. Our selection method is gradient based: we compute gradients through the planning procedure to update the parameters of the function that represents affordances. Our empirical work shows that it is feasible to learn to select both primitive-action and option affordances, and that simultaneously learning to select affordances and planning with a learned value-equivalent model can outperform model-free RL.

Recent progress in multimodal reasoning has been significantly advanced by textual Chain-of-Thought (CoT), a paradigm where models conduct reasoning within language. This text-centric approach, however, treats vision as a static, initial context, creating a fundamental "semantic gap" between rich perceptual data and discrete symbolic thought. Human cognition often transcends language, utilizing vision as a dynamic mental sketchpad. A similar evolution is now unfolding in AI, marking a fundamental paradigm shift from models that merely think about images to those that can truly think with images. This emerging paradigm is characterized by models leveraging visual information as intermediate steps in their thought process, transforming vision from a passive input into a dynamic, manipulable cognitive workspace. In this survey, we chart this evolution of intelligence along a trajectory of increasing cognitive autonomy, which unfolds across three key stages: from external tool exploration, through programmatic manipulation, to intrinsic imagination. To structure this rapidly evolving field, our survey makes four key contributions. (1) We establish the foundational principles of the think with image paradigm and its three-stage framework. (2) We provide a comprehensive review of the core methods that characterize each stage of this roadmap. (3) We analyze the critical landscape of evaluation benchmarks and transformative applications. (4) We identify significant challenges and outline promising future directions. By providing this structured overview, we aim to offer a clear roadmap for future research towards more powerful and human-aligned multimodal AI.

Human intelligence, the most evident and accessible form of source of reasoning, hosted by biological hardware, has evolved and been refined over thousands of years, positioning itself today to create new artificial forms and preparing to self--design their evolutionary path forward. Beginning with the advent of foundation models, the rate at which human and artificial intelligence interact with each other has surpassed any anticipated quantitative figures. The close engagement led to both bits of intelligence to be impacted in various ways, which naturally resulted in complex confluences that warrant close scrutiny. In the sequel, we shall explore the interplay between human and machine intelligence, focusing on the crucial role humans play in developing ethical, responsible, and robust intelligent systems. We slightly delve into interesting aspects of implementation inspired by the mechanisms underlying neuroscience and human cognition. Additionally, we propose future perspectives, capitalizing on the advantages of symbiotic designs to suggest a human-centered direction for next-generation AI development. We finalize this evolving document with a few thoughts and open questions yet to be addressed by the broader community.

Do large language models (LLMs) solve reasoning tasks by learning robust generalizable algorithms, or do they memorize training data? To investigate this question, we use arithmetic reasoning as a representative task. Using causal analysis, we identify a subset of the model (a circuit) that explains most of the model's behavior for basic arithmetic logic and examine its functionality. By zooming in on the level of individual circuit neurons, we discover a sparse set of important neurons that implement simple heuristics. Each heuristic identifies a numerical input pattern and outputs corresponding answers. We hypothesize that the combination of these heuristic neurons is the mechanism used to produce correct arithmetic answers. To test this, we categorize each neuron into several heuristic types-such as neurons that activate when an operand falls within a certain range-and find that the unordered combination of these heuristic types is the mechanism that explains most of the model's accuracy on arithmetic prompts. Finally, we demonstrate that this mechanism appears as the main source of arithmetic accuracy early in training. Overall, our experimental results across several LLMs show that LLMs perform arithmetic using neither robust algorithms nor memorization; rather, they rely on a "bag of heuristics".

Mental rotation -- the ability to compare objects seen from different viewpoints -- is a fundamental example of mental simulation and spatial world modelling in humans. Here we propose a mechanistic model of human mental rotation, leveraging advances in deep, equivariant, and neuro-symbolic learning. Our model consists of three stacked components: (1) an equivariant neural encoder, taking images as input and producing 3D spatial representations of objects, (2) a neuro-symbolic object encoder, deriving symbolic descriptions of objects from these spatial representations, and (3) a neural decision agent, comparing these symbolic descriptions to prescribe rotation simulations in 3D latent space via a recurrent pathway. Our model design is guided by the abundant experimental literature on mental rotation, which we complemented with experiments in VR where participants could at times manipulate the objects to compare, providing us with additional insights into the cognitive process of mental rotation. Our model captures well the performance, response times and behavior of participants in our and others' experiments. The necessity of each model component is shown through systematic ablations. Our work adds to a recent collection of deep neural models of human spatial reasoning, further demonstrating the potency of integrating deep, equivariant, and symbolic representations to model the human mind.

Artificial Intelligence is moving from models that only generate text to Agentic AI, where systems behave as autonomous entities that can perceive, reason, plan, and act. Large Language Models (LLMs) are no longer used only as passive knowledge engines but as cognitive controllers that combine memory, tool use, and feedback from their environment to pursue extended goals. This shift already supports the automation of complex workflows in software engineering, scientific discovery, and web navigation, yet the variety of emerging designs, from simple single loop agents to hierarchical multi agent systems, makes the landscape hard to navigate. In this paper, we investigate architectures and propose a unified taxonomy that breaks agents into Perception, Brain, Planning, Action, Tool Use, and Collaboration. We use this lens to describe the move from linear reasoning procedures to native inference time reasoning models, and the transition from fixed API calls to open standards like the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and Native Computer Use. We also group the environments in which these agents operate, including digital operating systems, embodied robotics, and other specialized domains, and we review current evaluation practices. Finally, we highlight open challenges, such as hallucination in action, infinite loops, and prompt injection, and outline future research directions toward more robust and reliable autonomous systems.

Cognitively inspired Natural Language Pro-cessing uses human-derived behavioral datalike eye-tracking data, which reflect the seman-tic representations of language in the humanbrain to augment the neural nets to solve arange of tasks spanning syntax and semanticswith the aim of teaching machines about lan-guage processing mechanisms. In this paper,we use the ZuCo 1.0 and ZuCo 2.0 dataset con-taining the eye-gaze features to explore differ-ent linguistic models to directly predict thesegaze features for each word with respect to itssentence. We tried different neural networkmodels with the words as inputs to predict thetargets. And after lots of experimentation andfeature engineering finally devised a novel ar-chitecture consisting of RoBERTa Token Clas-sifier with a dense layer on top for languagemodeling and a stand-alone model consistingof dense layers followed by a transformer layerfor the extra features we engineered. Finally,we took the mean of the outputs of both thesemodels to make the final predictions. We eval-uated the models using mean absolute error(MAE) and the R2 score for each target.

Despite the ubiquity of large language models (LLMs) in AI research, the question of embodiment in LLMs remains underexplored, distinguishing them from embodied systems in robotics where sensory perception directly informs physical action. Our investigation navigates the intriguing terrain of whether LLMs, despite their non-embodied nature, effectively capture implicit human intuitions about fundamental, spatial building blocks of language. We employ insights from spatial cognitive foundations developed through early sensorimotor experiences, guiding our exploration through the reproduction of three psycholinguistic experiments. Surprisingly, correlations between model outputs and human responses emerge, revealing adaptability without a tangible connection to embodied experiences. Notable distinctions include polarized language model responses and reduced correlations in vision language models. This research contributes to a nuanced understanding of the interplay between language, spatial experiences, and the computations made by large language models. More at https://cisnlp.github.io/Spatial_Schemas/

After generalizing the Archimedean property of real numbers in such a way as to make it adaptable to non-numeric structures, we demonstrate that the real numbers cannot be used to accurately measure non-Archimedean structures. We argue that, since an agent with Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) should have no problem engaging in tasks that inherently involve non-Archimedean rewards, and since traditional reinforcement learning rewards are real numbers, therefore traditional reinforcement learning probably will not lead to AGI. We indicate two possible ways traditional reinforcement learning could be altered to remove this roadblock.

LLMorphism is the biased belief that human cognition works like a large language model. I argue that the rise of conversational LLMs may make this bias increasingly psychologically available. When artificial systems produce human-like language, people may draw a reverse inference: if LLMs can speak like humans, perhaps humans think like LLMs. This inference is biased because similarity at the level of linguistic output does not imply similarity in cognitive architecture. Yet, LLMorphism may spread through two mechanisms: analogical transfer, whereby features of LLMs are projected onto humans, and metaphorical availability, whereby LLM vocabulary becomes a culturally salient vocabulary for describing thought. I distinguish LLMorphism from mechanomorphism, anthropomorphism, computationalism, dehumanization, objectification, and predictive-processing theories of mind. I outline its implications for work, education, responsibility, healthcare, communication, creativity, and human dignity, while also discussing boundary conditions and forms of resistance. I conclude that the public debate may be missing half of the problem: the issue is not only whether we are attributing too much mind to machines, but also whether we are beginning to attribute too little mind to humans.

Inspired by the emergent behaviors in large language models that generalized human intelligence, the research community is pursuing similar emergent capabilities within world models, with a emphasis on modeling the physical world. Within the scope of physical world model, objects are the fundamental primitives that constitute physical reality. From humans to computers, nearly everything we interact with is an object. These objects are rarely static; they are actionable entities with varying states determined by their intrinsic properties. While current methods approach object action states either via video generation or dynamic scene reconstruction, none explicitly model this basic element in a unified, principled way to build an actionable object representation. We propose WorldString, a neural architecture capable of modeling the state manifold of real-world objects by learning directly from point clouds or RGB-D video streams. Serving as a versatile digital twin, it acts as a foundational building block for physical world models; thus, we name it WorldString. Sweetly, its fully differentiable structure seamlessly enables future integration with policy learning and neural dynamics.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance by incorporating functional symbolic representations that abstractly describe graph traversal algorithms and step-by-step reasoning in few-shot learning settings. However, it remains unclear how LLMs genuinely understand the abstract meaning of each reasoning step and the overall algorithm from only a limited number of demonstrations. This work aims to localize the attention heads responsible for individual reasoning steps and characterize the types of information transferred among them. We first align constituent reasoning steps with their corresponding token logits under a symbolic-aided Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting framework. Our analysis shows that token positions that steer the reasoning process are associated with low confidence scores caused by constraints on satisfying reasoning behavior patterns in demonstrations. We then adopt causal mediation analysis techniques to identify the attention heads responsible for these patterns. In addition, our findings indicate that LLMs retrieve factual and rule-based information for individual sub-reasoning tasks through specialized attention heads (approximately 3% total heads), whereas higher layers predominantly facilitate information integration and the emergence of global reasoning strategies (e.g., graph traversal algorithms) that coordinate multiple intermediate reasoning steps to solve the overall task.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

The first generation of Large Language Models - what might be called "Act I" of generative AI (2020-2023) - achieved remarkable success through massive parameter and data scaling, yet exhibited fundamental limitations in knowledge latency, shallow reasoning, and constrained cognitive processes. During this era, prompt engineering emerged as our primary interface with AI, enabling dialogue-level communication through natural language. We now witness the emergence of "Act II" (2024-present), where models are transitioning from knowledge-retrieval systems (in latent space) to thought-construction engines through test-time scaling techniques. This new paradigm establishes a mind-level connection with AI through language-based thoughts. In this paper, we clarify the conceptual foundations of cognition engineering and explain why this moment is critical for its development. We systematically break down these advanced approaches through comprehensive tutorials and optimized implementations, democratizing access to cognition engineering and enabling every practitioner to participate in AI's second act. We provide a regularly updated collection of papers on test-time scaling in the GitHub Repository: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/cognition-engineering

Recent advances in video generation have revealed an unexpected phenomenon: diffusion-based video models exhibit non-trivial reasoning capabilities. Prior work attributes this to a Chain-of-Frames (CoF) mechanism, where reasoning is assumed to unfold sequentially across video frames. In this work, we challenge this assumption and uncover a fundamentally different mechanism. We show that reasoning in video models instead primarily emerges along the diffusion denoising steps. Through qualitative analysis and targeted probing experiments, we find that models explore multiple candidate solutions in early denoising steps and progressively converge to a final answer, a process we term Chain-of-Steps (CoS). Beyond this core mechanism, we identify several emergent reasoning behaviors critical to model performance: (1) working memory, enabling persistent reference; (2) self-correction and enhancement, allowing recovery from incorrect intermediate solutions; and (3) perception before action, where early steps establish semantic grounding and later steps perform structured manipulation. During a diffusion step, we further uncover self-evolved functional specialization within Diffusion Transformers, where early layers encode dense perceptual structure, middle layers execute reasoning, and later layers consolidate latent representations. Motivated by these insights, we present a simple training-free strategy as a proof-of-concept, demonstrating how reasoning can be improved by ensembling latent trajectories from identical models with different random seeds. Overall, our work provides a systematic understanding of how reasoning emerges in video generation models, offering a foundation to guide future research in better exploiting the inherent reasoning dynamics of video models as a new substrate for intelligence.

The prototypical approach to reinforcement learning involves training policies tailored to a particular agent from scratch for every new morphology. Recent work aims to eliminate the re-training of policies by investigating whether a morphology-agnostic policy, trained on a diverse set of agents with similar task objectives, can be transferred to new agents with unseen morphologies without re-training. This is a challenging problem that required previous approaches to use hand-designed descriptions of the new agent's morphology. Instead of hand-designing this description, we propose a data-driven method that learns a representation of morphology directly from the reinforcement learning objective. Ours is the first reinforcement learning algorithm that can train a policy to generalize to new agent morphologies without requiring a description of the agent's morphology in advance. We evaluate our approach on the standard benchmark for agent-agnostic control, and improve over the current state of the art in zero-shot generalization to new agents. Importantly, our method attains good performance without an explicit description of morphology.

The solution methods used to realize artificial general intelligence (AGI) may not contain the formalism needed to adequately model and characterize AGI. In particular, current approaches to learning hold notions of problem domain and problem task as fundamental precepts, but it is hardly apparent that an AGI encountered in the wild will be discernable into a set of domain-task pairings. Nor is it apparent that the outcomes of AGI in a system can be well expressed in terms of domain and task, or as consequences thereof. Thus, there is both a practical and theoretical use for meta-theories of learning which do not express themselves explicitly in terms of solution methods. General systems theory offers such a meta-theory. Herein, Mesarovician abstract systems theory is used as a super-structure for learning. Abstract learning systems are formulated. Subsequent elaboration stratifies the assumptions of learning systems into a hierarchy and considers the hierarchy such stratification projects onto learning theory. The presented Mesarovician abstract learning systems theory calls back to the founding motivations of artificial intelligence research by focusing on the thinking participants directly, in this case, learning systems, in contrast to the contemporary focus on the problems thinking participants solve.