Daily Papers

We introduce PurpCode, the first post-training recipe for training safe code reasoning models towards generating secure code and defending against malicious cyberactivities. PurpCode trains a reasoning model in two stages: (i) Rule Learning, which explicitly teaches the model to reference cybersafety rules to generate vulnerability-free code and to avoid facilitating malicious cyberactivities; and (ii) Reinforcement Learning, which optimizes model safety and preserves model utility through diverse, multi-objective reward mechanisms. To empower the training pipelines with comprehensive cybersafety data, we conduct internal red-teaming to synthesize comprehensive and high-coverage prompts based on real-world tasks for inducing unsafe cyberactivities in the model. Based on PurpCode, we develop a reasoning-based coding model, namely PurpCode-32B, which demonstrates state-of-the-art cybersafety, outperforming various frontier models. Meanwhile, our alignment method decreases the model overrefusal rates in both general and cybersafety-specific scenarios, while preserving model utility in both code generation and common security knowledge.

Model merging has gained significant attention as a cost-effective approach to integrate multiple single-task fine-tuned models into a unified one that can perform well on multiple tasks. However, existing model merging techniques primarily focus on resolving conflicts between task-specific models, they often overlook potential security threats, particularly the risk of backdoor attacks in the open-source model ecosystem. In this paper, we first investigate the vulnerabilities of existing model merging methods to backdoor attacks, identifying two critical challenges: backdoor succession and backdoor transfer. To address these issues, we propose a novel Defense-Aware Merging (DAM) approach that simultaneously mitigates task interference and backdoor vulnerabilities. Specifically, DAM employs a meta-learning-based optimization method with dual masks to identify a shared and safety-aware subspace for model merging. These masks are alternately optimized: the Task-Shared mask identifies common beneficial parameters across tasks, aiming to preserve task-specific knowledge while reducing interference, while the Backdoor-Detection mask isolates potentially harmful parameters to neutralize security threats. This dual-mask design allows us to carefully balance the preservation of useful knowledge and the removal of potential vulnerabilities. Compared to existing merging methods, DAM achieves a more favorable balance between performance and security, reducing the attack success rate by 2-10 percentage points while sacrificing only about 1% in accuracy. Furthermore, DAM exhibits robust performance and broad applicability across various types of backdoor attacks and the number of compromised models involved in the merging process. We will release the codes and models soon.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly advanced natural language processing (NLP), providing versatile capabilities across various applications. However, their application to complex, domain-specific tasks, such as cyber-security, often faces substantial challenges. In this study, we introduce SecKnowledge and CyberPal.AI to address these challenges and train security-expert LLMs. SecKnowledge is a domain-knowledge-driven cyber-security instruction dataset, meticulously designed using years of accumulated expert knowledge in the domain through a multi-phase generation process. CyberPal.AI refers to a family of LLMs fine-tuned using SecKnowledge, aimed at building security-specialized LLMs capable of answering and following complex security-related instructions. Additionally, we introduce SecKnowledge-Eval, a comprehensive and diverse cyber-security evaluation benchmark, composed of an extensive set of cyber-security tasks we specifically developed to assess LLMs in the field of cyber-security, along with other publicly available security benchmarks. Our results show a significant average improvement of up to 24% over the baseline models, underscoring the benefits of our expert-driven instruction dataset generation process. These findings contribute to the advancement of AI-based cyber-security applications, paving the way for security-expert LLMs that can enhance threat-hunting and investigation processes.

The increasing deployment of large language models (LLMs) in the cybersecurity domain underscores the need for effective model selection and evaluation. However, traditional evaluation methods often overlook specific cybersecurity knowledge gaps that contribute to performance limitations. To address this, we develop CSEBenchmark, a fine-grained cybersecurity evaluation framework based on 345 knowledge points expected of cybersecurity experts. Drawing from cognitive science, these points are categorized into factual, conceptual, and procedural types, enabling the design of 11,050 tailored multiple-choice questions. We evaluate 12 popular LLMs on CSEBenchmark and find that even the best-performing model achieves only 85.42% overall accuracy, with particular knowledge gaps in the use of specialized tools and uncommon commands. Different LLMs have unique knowledge gaps. Even large models from the same family may perform poorly on knowledge points where smaller models excel. By identifying and addressing specific knowledge gaps in each LLM, we achieve up to an 84% improvement in correcting previously incorrect predictions across three existing benchmarks for two cybersecurity tasks. Furthermore, our assessment of each LLM's knowledge alignment with specific cybersecurity roles reveals that different models align better with different roles, such as GPT-4o for the Google Senior Intelligence Analyst and Deepseek-V3 for the Amazon Privacy Engineer. These findings underscore the importance of aligning LLM selection with the specific knowledge requirements of different cybersecurity roles for optimal performance.

The Global CVE initiative (GCVE) proposes a decentralized, open, and extensible model for vulnerability identification, publication, and enrichment. It addresses a gap in today's vulnerability ecosystem: centralized systems provide rigorous control and widely recognized identifiers, while many producers publish advisories independently without a shared fabric for discovery, correlation, enrichment, and reuse. This paper presents GCVE as a socio-technical standardization effort combining autonomous GCVE Numbering Authorities, lightweight allocation rules, distributed publication, open Best Current Practices, and practical reference implementations. The model preserves global uniqueness while allowing participants to publish according to their operational needs. It also broadens the concept of a vulnerability record to cover assignments, disclosures, sightings, rejected identifiers, observations, exploited vulnerability information, and enrichment records. The paper describes how the GCVE BCP process supports technical interoperability and amendable operational practice, including practical guidance for vulnerability handling and disclosure. It also examines the extension mechanism, including AI-oriented extensions, as a way to evolve the standard without centralizing control. A particular focus is placed on vulnerability-lookup as the reference implementation. It aggregates multiple sources, supports GCVE publication and consumption, implements distributed Known Exploited Vulnerability data, and enables automatically enriched vulnerability data streams. Building on lessons from the MISP ecosystem, GCVE frames vulnerability coordination not only as identifier allocation, but as open infrastructure for collective security knowledge production.

Deploying Large language models (LLMs) can pose hazards from harmful outputs such as toxic or dishonest speech. Prior work has introduced tools that elicit harmful outputs in order to identify and mitigate these risks. While this is a valuable step toward securing language models, these approaches typically rely on a pre-existing classifier for undesired outputs. This limits their application to situations where the type of harmful behavior is known with precision beforehand. However, this skips a central challenge of red teaming: developing a contextual understanding of the behaviors that a model can exhibit. Furthermore, when such a classifier already exists, red teaming has limited marginal value because the classifier could simply be used to filter training data or model outputs. In this work, we consider red teaming under the assumption that the adversary is working from a high-level, abstract specification of undesired behavior. The red team is expected to refine/extend this specification and identify methods to elicit this behavior from the model. Our red teaming framework consists of three steps: 1) Exploring the model's behavior in the desired context; 2) Establishing a measurement of undesired behavior (e.g., a classifier trained to reflect human evaluations); and 3) Exploiting the model's flaws using this measure and an established red teaming methodology. We apply this approach to red team GPT-2 and GPT-3 models to systematically discover classes of prompts that elicit toxic and dishonest statements. In doing so, we also construct and release the CommonClaim dataset of 20,000 statements that have been labeled by human subjects as common-knowledge-true, common-knowledge-false, or neither. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/explore_establish_exploit_llms. CommonClaim is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/common_claim.

The indexing-retrieval-generation paradigm of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been highly successful in solving knowledge-intensive tasks by integrating external knowledge into large language models (LLMs). However, the incorporation of external and unverified knowledge increases the vulnerability of LLMs because attackers can perform attack tasks by manipulating knowledge. In this paper, we introduce a benchmark named SafeRAG designed to evaluate the RAG security. First, we classify attack tasks into silver noise, inter-context conflict, soft ad, and white Denial-of-Service. Next, we construct RAG security evaluation dataset (i.e., SafeRAG dataset) primarily manually for each task. We then utilize the SafeRAG dataset to simulate various attack scenarios that RAG may encounter. Experiments conducted on 14 representative RAG components demonstrate that RAG exhibits significant vulnerability to all attack tasks and even the most apparent attack task can easily bypass existing retrievers, filters, or advanced LLMs, resulting in the degradation of RAG service quality. Code is available at: https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/SafeRAG.

The field of cybersecurity is evolving fast. Experts need to be informed about past, current and - in the best case - upcoming threats, because attacks are becoming more advanced, targets bigger and systems more complex. As this cannot be addressed manually, cybersecurity experts need to rely on machine learning techniques. In the texutual domain, pre-trained language models like BERT have shown to be helpful, by providing a good baseline for further fine-tuning. However, due to the domain-knowledge and many technical terms in cybersecurity general language models might miss the gist of textual information, hence doing more harm than good. For this reason, we create a high-quality dataset and present a language model specifically tailored to the cybersecurity domain, which can serve as a basic building block for cybersecurity systems that deal with natural language. The model is compared with other models based on 15 different domain-dependent extrinsic and intrinsic tasks as well as general tasks from the SuperGLUE benchmark. On the one hand, the results of the intrinsic tasks show that our model improves the internal representation space of words compared to the other models. On the other hand, the extrinsic, domain-dependent tasks, consisting of sequence tagging and classification, show that the model is best in specific application scenarios, in contrast to the others. Furthermore, we show that our approach against catastrophic forgetting works, as the model is able to retrieve the previously trained domain-independent knowledge. The used dataset and trained model are made publicly available

In this paper, we introduce SecQA, a novel dataset tailored for evaluating the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in the domain of computer security. Utilizing multiple-choice questions generated by GPT-4 based on the "Computer Systems Security: Planning for Success" textbook, SecQA aims to assess LLMs' understanding and application of security principles. We detail the structure and intent of SecQA, which includes two versions of increasing complexity, to provide a concise evaluation across various difficulty levels. Additionally, we present an extensive evaluation of prominent LLMs, including GPT-3.5-Turbo, GPT-4, Llama-2, Vicuna, Mistral, and Zephyr models, using both 0-shot and 5-shot learning settings. Our results, encapsulated in the SecQA v1 and v2 datasets, highlight the varying capabilities and limitations of these models in the computer security context. This study not only offers insights into the current state of LLMs in understanding security-related content but also establishes SecQA as a benchmark for future advancements in this critical research area.

A general-purpose language model that answers a harmful question returns text; a coding model that complies with a malicious request can return a working weapon -- a keylogger, a ransomware stub, an exploit that runs as written. This asymmetry in the severity of a single act of compliance implies coding-specialized models should clear a higher refusal bar than general-purpose chat models, not a lower one, yet the field cannot presently tell whether they do. Refusal benchmarks for malicious code are fragmented: they mix requests for executable software (ready-to-run weapons) with requests for harmful security knowledge (information a human must still operationalise) and report refusal rates over non-comparable corpora, so no single statistic measures the property that actually matters. This paper introduces an expanded consensus-labeled prompt bank that distinguishes between these two request types and provides a construct-stable substrate for cross-corpus coding-model compliance measurement. Eight corpora (ASTRA, CySecBench, AdvBench/harmful_behaviors, JailbreakBench, MalwareBench, RedCode, RMCBench, Scam2Prompt) are consolidated and classified under a five-judge consensus protocol (6,675 prompts x 5 judges = 33,375 calls). The panel reaches Fleiss' kappa = 0.767 [95% CI 0.755, 0.777] ("substantial"); 95.0% of prompts draw at least four agreeing judges, 76.9% are unanimous, and the panel reproduces the earlier four-corpus release at Cohen's kappa = 0.952 on the 3,133 shared prompts. The released bank comprises 4,748 consensus-CODE prompts (executable malicious code requests) and 1,923 consensus-KNOWLEDGE prompts (harmful security knowledge requests). The bank is the validated instrument the field has lacked: a reliability-quantified basis for testing whether coding models meet the stricter refusal standard their executable output demands.

Although LLMs have shown promising potential in vulnerability detection, this study reveals their limitations in distinguishing between vulnerable and similar-but-benign patched code (only 0.06 - 0.14 accuracy). It shows that LLMs struggle to capture the root causes of vulnerabilities during vulnerability detection. To address this challenge, we propose enhancing LLMs with multi-dimensional vulnerability knowledge distilled from historical vulnerabilities and fixes. We design a novel knowledge-level Retrieval-Augmented Generation framework Vul-RAG, which improves LLMs with an accuracy increase of 16% - 24% in identifying vulnerable and patched code. Additionally, vulnerability knowledge generated by Vul-RAG can further (1) serve as high-quality explanations to improve manual detection accuracy (from 60% to 77%), and (2) detect 10 previously-unknown bugs in the recent Linux kernel release with 6 assigned CVEs.

The rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in multi-agent systems has highlighted their impressive capabilities in various applications, such as collaborative problem-solving and autonomous negotiation. However, the security implications of these LLM-based multi-agent systems have not been thoroughly investigated, particularly concerning the spread of manipulated knowledge. In this paper, we investigate this critical issue by constructing a detailed threat model and a comprehensive simulation environment that mirrors real-world multi-agent deployments in a trusted platform. Subsequently, we propose a novel two-stage attack method involving Persuasiveness Injection and Manipulated Knowledge Injection to systematically explore the potential for manipulated knowledge (i.e., counterfactual and toxic knowledge) spread without explicit prompt manipulation. Our method leverages the inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs in handling world knowledge, which can be exploited by attackers to unconsciously spread fabricated information. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our attack method can successfully induce LLM-based agents to spread both counterfactual and toxic knowledge without degrading their foundational capabilities during agent communication. Furthermore, we show that these manipulations can persist through popular retrieval-augmented generation frameworks, where several benign agents store and retrieve manipulated chat histories for future interactions. This persistence indicates that even after the interaction has ended, the benign agents may continue to be influenced by manipulated knowledge. Our findings reveal significant security risks in LLM-based multi-agent systems, emphasizing the imperative need for robust defenses against manipulated knowledge spread, such as introducing ``guardian'' agents and advanced fact-checking tools.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents can automate cybersecurity tasks and can adapt to the evolving cybersecurity landscape without re-engineering. While LLM agents have demonstrated cybersecurity capabilities on Capture-The-Flag (CTF) competitions, they have two key limitations: accessing latest cybersecurity expertise beyond training data, and integrating new knowledge into complex task planning. Knowledge-based approaches that incorporate technical understanding into the task-solving automation can tackle these limitations. We present CRAKEN, a knowledge-based LLM agent framework that improves cybersecurity capability through three core mechanisms: contextual decomposition of task-critical information, iterative self-reflected knowledge retrieval, and knowledge-hint injection that transforms insights into adaptive attack strategies. Comprehensive evaluations with different configurations show CRAKEN's effectiveness in multi-stage vulnerability detection and exploitation compared to previous approaches. Our extensible architecture establishes new methodologies for embedding new security knowledge into LLM-driven cybersecurity agentic systems. With a knowledge database of CTF writeups, CRAKEN obtained an accuracy of 22% on NYU CTF Bench, outperforming prior works by 3% and achieving state-of-the-art results. On evaluation of MITRE ATT&CK techniques, CRAKEN solves 25-30% more techniques than prior work, demonstrating improved cybersecurity capabilities via knowledge-based execution. We make our framework open source to public https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/nyuctf_agents_craken.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success due to their exceptional generative capabilities. Despite their success, they also have inherent limitations such as a lack of up-to-date knowledge and hallucination. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is a state-of-the-art technique to mitigate these limitations. The key idea of RAG is to ground the answer generation of an LLM on external knowledge retrieved from a knowledge database. Existing studies mainly focus on improving the accuracy or efficiency of RAG, leaving its security largely unexplored. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. We find that the knowledge database in a RAG system introduces a new and practical attack surface. Based on this attack surface, we propose PoisonedRAG, the first knowledge corruption attack to RAG, where an attacker could inject a few malicious texts into the knowledge database of a RAG system to induce an LLM to generate an attacker-chosen target answer for an attacker-chosen target question. We formulate knowledge corruption attacks as an optimization problem, whose solution is a set of malicious texts. Depending on the background knowledge (e.g., black-box and white-box settings) of an attacker on a RAG system, we propose two solutions to solve the optimization problem, respectively. Our results show PoisonedRAG could achieve a 90% attack success rate when injecting five malicious texts for each target question into a knowledge database with millions of texts. We also evaluate several defenses and our results show they are insufficient to defend against PoisonedRAG, highlighting the need for new defenses.

As a cornerstone of blockchain technology in the 3.0 era, smart contracts play a pivotal role in the evolution of blockchain systems. In order to address the limitations of existing smart contract vulnerability detection models with regard to their generalisation capability, an AF-STip smart contract vulnerability detection framework incorporating efficient knowledge migration is proposed. AF-STip employs the teacher network as the main model and migrates the knowledge processed by the smart contract to the student model using a data-free knowledge distillation method. The student model utilises this knowledge to enhance its vulnerability detection capabilities. The approach markedly enhances the model's capacity for feature extraction and cross-class adaptation, while concurrently reducing computational overhead.In order to further enhance the extraction of vulnerability features, an adaptive fusion module is proposed in this paper, which aims to strengthen the interaction and fusion of feature information.The experimental results demonstrate that the STip model attains an average F1 value detection score of 91.16% for the four vulnerabilities without disclosing the original smart contract data. To validate the viability of the proposed lightweight migration approach, the student model is deployed in a migration learning task targeting a novel vulnerability type, resulting in an accuracy of 91.02% and an F1 score of 90.46%. To the best of our knowledge, AF-STip is the inaugural model to apply data-free knowledge migration to smart contract vulnerability detection. While markedly reducing the computational overhead, the method still demonstrates exceptional performance in detecting novel vulnerabilities.

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, tools, scripts, references, and workflows, establishing a security boundary distinct from both model safety and traditional package-malware detection. ClawHub Security Signals is a sanitized dataset of 67,453 latest public OpenClaw skill versions. Each row pairs redacted SKILL.md content and sanitized bundled files where present with a final ClawScan registry verdict and evidence from three scanner families: VirusTotal, static heuristic analysis, and NVIDIA SkillSpector. Rather than estimating malicious-skill prevalence, we study scanner disagreement. The three scanners rarely flag the same skills: any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner. The disagreement is structured by attack surface. SkillSpector, which raises semantic agentic-risk advisories rather than malware-reputation signals, is positive for 19,209 of 25,504 suspicious rows (75.3%) but only 14 of 206 malicious rows (6.8%). The malicious-verdict region shows the inverse profile: 150 of 206 malicious rows (72.8%) are VirusTotal-positive, consistent with bundled-code malware evidence. These results show that agent-skill security requires layered governance, not single-scanner allow/block decisions. The corpus is released as a sanitized silver-standard dataset: labels are the registry's automated verdicts, not human-annotated ground truth, and the release represents an early, versioned snapshot intended to support the community while a human-annotated subset is developed. Further research is encouraged, including models tailored for skill-security triage.

Multimodal large language models with Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) have significantly advanced tasks such as multimodal question answering by grounding responses in external text and images. This grounding improves factuality, reduces hallucination, and extends reasoning beyond parametric knowledge. However, this reliance on external knowledge poses a critical yet underexplored safety risk: knowledge poisoning attacks, where adversaries deliberately inject adversarial multimodal content into external knowledge bases to steer model toward generating incorrect or even harmful responses. To expose such vulnerabilities, we propose MM-PoisonRAG, the first framework to systematically design knowledge poisoning in multimodal RAG. We introduce two complementary attack strategies: Localized Poisoning Attack (LPA), which implants targeted multimodal misinformation to manipulate specific queries, and Globalized Poisoning Attack (GPA), which inserts a single adversarial knowledge to broadly disrupt reasoning and induce nonsensical responses across all queries. Comprehensive experiments across tasks, models, and access settings show that LPA achieves targeted manipulation with attack success rates of up to 56%, while GPA completely disrupts model generation to 0% accuracy with just a single adversarial knowledge injection. Our results reveal the fragility of multimodal RAG and highlight the urgent need for defenses against knowledge poisoning.

Large language models (LLMs) are transforming everyday applications, yet deployment in cybersecurity lags due to a lack of high-quality, domain-specific models and training datasets. To address this gap, we present CyberPal 2.0, a family of cybersecurity-expert small language models (SLMs) ranging from 4B-20B parameters. To train CyberPal 2.0, we generate an enriched chain-of-thought cybersecurity instruction dataset built with our data enrichment and formatting pipeline, SecKnowledge 2.0, which integrates expert-in-the-loop steering of reasoning formats alongside LLM-driven multi-step grounding, yielding higher-fidelity, task-grounded reasoning traces for security tasks. Across diverse cybersecurity benchmarks, CyberPal 2.0 consistently outperforms its baselines and matches or surpasses various open and closed-source frontier models, while remaining a fraction of their size. On core cyber threat intelligence knowledge tasks, our models outperform almost all tested frontier models, ranking second only to Sec-Gemini v1. On core threat-investigation tasks, such as correlating vulnerabilities and bug tickets with weaknesses, our best 20B-parameter model outperforms GPT-4o, o1, o3-mini, and Sec-Gemini v1, ranking first, while our smallest 4B-parameter model ranks second.

The open-source software (OSS) ecosystem suffers from security threats caused by malware.However, OSS malware research has three limitations: a lack of high-quality datasets, a lack of malware diversity, and a lack of attack campaign contexts. In this paper, we first build the largest dataset of 24,356 malicious packages from online sources, then propose a knowledge graph to represent the OSS malware corpus and conduct malware analysis in the wild.Our main findings include (1) it is essential to collect malicious packages from various online sources because their data overlapping degrees are small;(2) despite the sheer volume of malicious packages, many reuse similar code, leading to a low diversity of malware;(3) only 28 malicious packages were repeatedly hidden via dependency libraries of 1,354 malicious packages, and dependency-hidden malware has a shorter active time;(4) security reports are the only reliable source for disclosing the malware-based context. Index Terms: Malicious Packages, Software Analysis

Large Language Models (LLMs) have rapidly become integral to real-world applications, powering services across diverse sectors. However, their widespread deployment has exposed critical security risks, particularly through jailbreak prompts that can bypass model alignment and induce harmful outputs. Despite intense research into both attack and defense techniques, the field remains fragmented: definitions, threat models, and evaluation criteria vary widely, impeding systematic progress and fair comparison. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK), we address these challenges by (1) proposing a holistic, multi-level taxonomy that organizes attacks, defenses, and vulnerabilities in LLM prompt security; (2) formalizing threat models and cost assumptions into machine-readable profiles for reproducible evaluation; (3) introducing an open-source evaluation toolkit for standardized, auditable comparison of attacks and defenses; (4) releasing JAILBREAKDB, the largest annotated dataset of jailbreak and benign prompts to date; and (5) presenting a comprehensive evaluation and leaderboard of state-of-the-art methods. Our work unifies fragmented research, provides rigorous foundations for future studies, and supports the development of robust, trustworthy LLMs suitable for high-stakes deployment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel across various domains, from computer vision to medical diagnostics. However, understanding the diverse landscape of cybersecurity, encompassing cryptography, reverse engineering, and managerial facets like risk assessment, presents a challenge, even for human experts. In this paper, we introduce CyberMetric, a benchmark dataset comprising 10,000 questions sourced from standards, certifications, research papers, books, and other publications in the cybersecurity domain. The questions are created through a collaborative process, i.e., merging expert knowledge with LLMs, including GPT-3.5 and Falcon-180B. Human experts spent over 200 hours verifying their accuracy and relevance. Beyond assessing LLMs' knowledge, the dataset's main goal is to facilitate a fair comparison between humans and different LLMs in cybersecurity. To achieve this, we carefully selected 80 questions covering a wide range of topics within cybersecurity and involved 30 participants of diverse expertise levels, facilitating a comprehensive comparison between human and machine intelligence in this area. The findings revealed that LLMs outperformed humans in almost every aspect of cybersecurity.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly helpful in text generation, even writing code in programming languages based on user prompts written in natural language. They are even applied to generate simulation models for multibody systems from natural language. Research results suggest that LLMs surpass the mere replication of existing code examples, where some LLMs have been trained on an open-source multibody simulation code. However, for closed-source simulation software, such results are not to be expected as their ideas and concepts might differ from other publicly available ones. LLMs can hallucinate for knowledge-intensive tasks, such as model creation, which can lead to wrong responses. This is especially the case for the LLM unknown closed-source simulation software. The same applies to other internal knowledge kept private to protect intellectual property or data privacy. The Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) approach might yield a solution for these knowledge-intensive tasks. This paper explores the application of RAG to closed-source simulation software and presents first experiments. After a brief introduction to LLMs, the RAG approach, and the simulation method applied by the close-source simulation software, several examples are provided to test LLMs' knowledge of the simulation software and the creation of simulation models using two RAG systems. The examples show promising results indicating the benefits of applying RAG systems to closed-source simulation software, helping to access their knowledge. Nevertheless, they also reveal gaps in the applied information and open questions for further research.

Sequential recommender systems stand out for their ability to capture users' dynamic interests and the patterns of item-to-item transitions. However, the inherent openness of sequential recommender systems renders them vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where fraudulent users are injected into the training data to manipulate learned patterns. Traditional defense strategies predominantly depend on predefined assumptions or rules extracted from specific known attacks, limiting their generalizability to unknown attack types. To solve the above problems, considering the rich open-world knowledge encapsulated in Large Language Models (LLMs), our research initially focuses on the capabilities of LLMs in the detection of unknown fraudulent activities within recommender systems, a strategy we denote as LLM4Dec. Empirical evaluations demonstrate the substantial capability of LLMs in identifying unknown fraudsters, leveraging their expansive, open-world knowledge. Building upon this, we propose the integration of LLMs into defense strategies to extend their effectiveness beyond the confines of known attacks. We propose LoRec, an advanced framework that employs LLM-Enhanced Calibration to strengthen the robustness of sequential recommender systems against poisoning attacks. LoRec integrates an LLM-enhanced CalibraTor (LCT) that refines the training process of sequential recommender systems with knowledge derived from LLMs, applying a user-wise reweighting to diminish the impact of fraudsters injected by attacks. By incorporating LLMs' open-world knowledge, the LCT effectively converts the limited, specific priors or rules into a more general pattern of fraudsters, offering improved defenses against poisoning attacks. Our comprehensive experiments validate that LoRec, as a general framework, significantly strengthens the robustness of sequential recommender systems.

Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety guardrails to elicit harmful outputs. Existing approaches overwhelmingly operate within the prompt-optimization paradigm: whether through traditional algorithmic search or recent agent-based workflows, the resulting prompts typically retain malicious semantic signals that modern guardrails are primed to detect. In contrast, we identify a deeper, largely overlooked vulnerability stemming from the highly interconnected nature of an LLM's internal knowledge. This structure allows harmful objectives to be realized by weaving together sequences of benign sub-queries, each of which individually evades detection. To exploit this loophole, we introduce the Correlated Knowledge Attack Agent (CKA-Agent), a dynamic framework that reframes jailbreaking as an adaptive, tree-structured exploration of the target model's knowledge base. The CKA-Agent issues locally innocuous queries, uses model responses to guide exploration across multiple paths, and ultimately assembles the aggregated information to achieve the original harmful objective. Evaluated across state-of-the-art commercial LLMs (Gemini2.5-Flash/Pro, GPT-oss-120B, Claude-Haiku-4.5), CKA-Agent consistently achieves over 95% success rates even against strong guardrails, underscoring the severity of this vulnerability and the urgent need for defenses against such knowledge-decomposition attacks. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Graph-COM/CKA-Agent.

Creating secure and resilient applications with large language models (LLM) requires anticipating, adjusting to, and countering unforeseen threats. Red-teaming has emerged as a critical technique for identifying vulnerabilities in real-world LLM implementations. This paper presents a detailed threat model and provides a systematization of knowledge (SoK) of red-teaming attacks on LLMs. We develop a taxonomy of attacks based on the stages of the LLM development and deployment process and extract various insights from previous research. In addition, we compile methods for defense and practical red-teaming strategies for practitioners. By delineating prominent attack motifs and shedding light on various entry points, this paper provides a framework for improving the security and robustness of LLM-based systems.

Malicious shell commands are linchpins to many cyber-attacks, but may not be easy to understand by security analysts due to complicated and often disguised code structures. Advances in large language models (LLMs) have unlocked the possibility of generating understandable explanations for shell commands. However, existing general-purpose LLMs suffer from a lack of expert knowledge and a tendency to hallucinate in the task of shell command explanation. In this paper, we present Raconteur, a knowledgeable, expressive and portable shell command explainer powered by LLM. Raconteur is infused with professional knowledge to provide comprehensive explanations on shell commands, including not only what the command does (i.e., behavior) but also why the command does it (i.e., purpose). To shed light on the high-level intent of the command, we also translate the natural-language-based explanation into standard technique & tactic defined by MITRE ATT&CK, the worldwide knowledge base of cybersecurity. To enable Raconteur to explain unseen private commands, we further develop a documentation retriever to obtain relevant information from complementary documentations to assist the explanation process. We have created a large-scale dataset for training and conducted extensive experiments to evaluate the capability of Raconteur in shell command explanation. The experiments verify that Raconteur is able to provide high-quality explanations and in-depth insight of the intent of the command.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has opened up new opportunities for leveraging artificial intelligence in various domains, including cybersecurity. As the volume and sophistication of cyber threats continue to grow, there is an increasing need for intelligent systems that can automatically detect vulnerabilities, analyze malware, and respond to attacks. In this survey, we conduct a comprehensive review of the literature on the application of LLMs in cybersecurity (LLM4Security). By comprehensively collecting over 30K relevant papers and systematically analyzing 127 papers from top security and software engineering venues, we aim to provide a holistic view of how LLMs are being used to solve diverse problems across the cybersecurity domain. Through our analysis, we identify several key findings. First, we observe that LLMs are being applied to a wide range of cybersecurity tasks, including vulnerability detection, malware analysis, network intrusion detection, and phishing detection. Second, we find that the datasets used for training and evaluating LLMs in these tasks are often limited in size and diversity, highlighting the need for more comprehensive and representative datasets. Third, we identify several promising techniques for adapting LLMs to specific cybersecurity domains, such as fine-tuning, transfer learning, and domain-specific pre-training. Finally, we discuss the main challenges and opportunities for future research in LLM4Security, including the need for more interpretable and explainable models, the importance of addressing data privacy and security concerns, and the potential for leveraging LLMs for proactive defense and threat hunting. Overall, our survey provides a comprehensive overview of the current state-of-the-art in LLM4Security and identifies several promising directions for future research.

LLM generated code often contains security issues. We address two key challenges in improving secure code generation. First, obtaining high quality training data covering a broad set of security issues is critical. To address this, we introduce a method for distilling a preference dataset of insecure and secure code pairs from frontier LLMs, along with a security reasoning that explains the issues and the fix. The key idea here is to make use of security knowledge sources to devise a systematic prompting strategy that ensures broad coverage. Second, aligning models to secure code requires focusing on localized regions of code. Direct preference optimization methods, like SimPO, are not designed to handle these localized differences and turn out to be ineffective. We address this with a new localized preference optimization algorithm that masks the security related tokens in both the winning (secure) and losing (insecure) responses. To prevent loss in code quality, we also add a regularizer. Evaluations show that both training on our dataset, DiSCo, and the new preference optimization algorithm, LPO, yield substantial reductions in code insecurity while also improving overall code quality. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/StonyBrookNLP/disco-lpo.

Computer-use agent (CUA) frameworks, powered by large language models (LLMs) or multimodal LLMs (MLLMs), are rapidly maturing as assistants that can perceive context, reason, and act directly within software environments. Among their most critical applications is operating system (OS) control. As CUAs in the OS domain become increasingly embedded in daily operations, it is imperative to examine their real-world security implications, specifically whether CUAs can be misused to perform realistic, security-relevant attacks. Existing works exhibit four major limitations: Missing attacker-knowledge model on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), Incomplete coverage for end-to-end kill chains, unrealistic environment without multi-host and encrypted user credentials, and unreliable judgment dependent on LLM-as-a-Judge. To address these gaps, we propose AdvCUA, the first benchmark aligned with real-world TTPs in MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix, which comprises 140 tasks, including 40 direct malicious tasks, 74 TTP-based malicious tasks, and 26 end-to-end kill chains, systematically evaluates CUAs under a realistic enterprise OS security threat in a multi-host environment sandbox by hard-coded evaluation. We evaluate the existing five mainstream CUAs, including ReAct, AutoGPT, Gemini CLI, Cursor CLI, and Cursor IDE based on 8 foundation LLMs. The results demonstrate that current frontier CUAs do not adequately cover OS security-centric threats. These capabilities of CUAs reduce dependence on custom malware and deep domain expertise, enabling even inexperienced attackers to mount complex enterprise intrusions, which raises social concern about the responsibility and security of CUAs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are pre-trained on large amounts of data from different sources and domains. These data most often contain trillions of tokens with large portions of copyrighted or proprietary content, which hinders the usage of such models under AI legislation. This raises the need for truly open pre-training data that is compliant with the data security regulations. In this paper, we introduce Common Corpus, the largest open dataset for language model pre-training. The data assembled in Common Corpus are either uncopyrighted or under permissible licenses and amount to about two trillion tokens. The dataset contains a wide variety of languages, ranging from the main European languages to low-resource ones rarely present in pre-training datasets; in addition, it includes a large portion of code data. The diversity of data sources in terms of covered domains and time periods opens up the paths for both research and entrepreneurial needs in diverse areas of knowledge. In this technical report, we present the detailed provenance of data assembling and the details of dataset filtering and curation. Being already used by such industry leaders as Anthropic and multiple LLM training projects, we believe that Common Corpus will become a critical infrastructure for open science research in LLMs.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has become a cornerstone of knowledge-intensive applications, including enterprise chatbots, healthcare assistants, and agentic memory management. However, recent studies show that knowledge-extraction attacks can recover sensitive knowledge-base content through maliciously crafted queries, raising serious concerns about intellectual property theft and privacy leakage. While prior work has explored individual attack and defense techniques, the research landscape remains fragmented, spanning heterogeneous retrieval embeddings, diverse generation models, and evaluations based on non-standardized metrics and inconsistent datasets. To address this gap, we introduce the first systematic benchmark for knowledge-extraction attacks on RAG systems. Our benchmark covers a broad spectrum of attack and defense strategies, representative retrieval embedding models, and both open- and closed-source generators, all evaluated under a unified experimental framework with standardized protocols across multiple datasets. By consolidating the experimental landscape and enabling reproducible, comparable evaluation, this benchmark provides actionable insights and a practical foundation for developing privacy-preserving RAG systems in the face of emerging knowledge extraction threats. Our code is available here.

We introduce the concept of "universal password model" -- a password model that, once pre-trained, can automatically adapt its guessing strategy based on the target system. To achieve this, the model does not need to access any plaintext passwords from the target credentials. Instead, it exploits users' auxiliary information, such as email addresses, as a proxy signal to predict the underlying password distribution. Specifically, the model uses deep learning to capture the correlation between the auxiliary data of a group of users (e.g., users of a web application) and their passwords. It then exploits those patterns to create a tailored password model for the target system at inference time. No further training steps, targeted data collection, or prior knowledge of the community's password distribution is required. Besides improving over current password strength estimation techniques and attacks, the model enables any end-user (e.g., system administrators) to autonomously generate tailored password models for their systems without the often unworkable requirements of collecting suitable training data and fitting the underlying machine learning model. Ultimately, our framework enables the democratization of well-calibrated password models to the community, addressing a major challenge in the deployment of password security solutions at scale.

Training machine learning approaches for vulnerability identification and producing reliable tools to assist developers in implementing quality software -- free of vulnerabilities -- is challenging due to the lack of large datasets and real data. Researchers have been looking at these issues and building datasets. However, these datasets usually miss natural language artifacts and programming language diversity. We scraped the entire CVE details database for GitHub references and augmented the data with 3 security-related datasets. We used the data to create a ground-truth dataset of natural language artifacts (such as commit messages, commits comments, and summaries), meta-data and code changes. Our dataset integrates a total of 8057 security-relevant commits -- the equivalent to 5942 security patches -- from 1339 different projects spanning 146 different types of vulnerabilities and 20 languages. A dataset of 110k non-security-related commits is also provided. Data and scripts are all available on GitHub. Data is stored in a .CSV file. Codebases can be downloaded using our scripts. Our dataset is a valuable asset to answer research questions on different topics such as the identification of security-relevant information using NLP models; software engineering and security best practices; and, vulnerability detection and patching; and, security program analysis.

Knowledge graphs have shown promise for several cybersecurity tasks, such as vulnerability assessment and threat analysis. In this work, we present a new method for constructing a vulnerability knowledge graph from information in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Our approach combines named entity recognition (NER), relation extraction (RE), and entity prediction using a combination of neural models, heuristic rules, and knowledge graph embeddings. We demonstrate how our method helps to fix missing entities in knowledge graphs used for cybersecurity and evaluate the performance.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable advancements in specialized fields such as finance, law, and medicine. However, in cybersecurity, we have noticed a lack of open-source datasets, with a particular lack of high-quality cybersecurity pretraining corpora, even though much research indicates that LLMs acquire their knowledge during pretraining. To address this, we present a comprehensive suite of datasets covering all major training stages, including pretraining, instruction fine-tuning, and reasoning distillation with cybersecurity-specific self-reflection data. Extensive ablation studies demonstrate their effectiveness on public cybersecurity benchmarks. In particular, continual pre-training on our dataset yields a 15.88% improvement in the aggregate score, while reasoning distillation leads to a 10% gain in security certification (CISSP). We will release all datasets and trained cybersecurity LLMs under the ODC-BY and MIT licenses to encourage further research in the community. For access to all datasets and model weights, please refer to https://huggingface.co/collections/trendmicro-ailab/primus-67b1fd27052b802b4af9d243.

GitHub recommends that projects adopt a security file that outlines vulnerability reporting procedures. However, the effectiveness and operational challenges of such files are not yet fully understood. This study aims to clarify the challenges that security files face in the vulnerability reporting process within open-source communities. Specifically, we classified and analyzed the content of 711 randomly sampled issues related to security files. We also conducted a quantitative comparative analysis of the close time and number of responses for issues concerning six community health files, including security files. Our analysis revealed that 79.5% of security file-related issues were requests to add the file, and reports that included links were closed, with a median time that was 2 days shorter. These findings offer practical insights for improving security reporting policies and community management, ultimately contributing to a more secure open-source ecosystem.

Cybersecurity operations demand assistant LLMs that support diverse workflows without exposing sensitive data. Existing solutions either rely on proprietary APIs with privacy risks or on open models lacking domain adaptation. To bridge this gap, we curate 11.8B tokens of cybersecurity-focused continual pretraining data via large-scale web filtering and manual collection of high-quality resources, spanning 28.6K documents across frameworks, offensive techniques, and security tools. Building on this, we design an agentic augmentation pipeline that simulates expert workflows to generate 266K multi-turn cybersecurity samples for supervised fine-tuning. Combined with general open-source LLM data, these resources enable the training of RedSage, an open-source, locally deployable cybersecurity assistant with domain-aware pretraining and post-training. To rigorously evaluate the models, we introduce RedSage-Bench, a benchmark with 30K multiple-choice and 240 open-ended Q&A items covering cybersecurity knowledge, skills, and tool expertise. RedSage is further evaluated on established cybersecurity benchmarks (e.g., CTI-Bench, CyberMetric, SECURE) and general LLM benchmarks to assess broader generalization. At the 8B scale, RedSage achieves consistently better results, surpassing the baseline models by up to +5.59 points on cybersecurity benchmarks and +5.05 points on Open LLM Leaderboard tasks. These findings demonstrate that domain-aware agentic augmentation and pre/post-training can not only enhance cybersecurity-specific expertise but also help to improve general reasoning and instruction-following. All models, datasets, and code are publicly available.

Third-party agent skills extend LLM-based agents with instruction files and executable code that run on users' machines. Skills execute with user privileges and are distributed through community registries with minimal vetting, but no ground-truth dataset exists to characterize the resulting threats. We construct the first labeled dataset of malicious agent skills by behaviorally verifying 98,380 skills from two community registries, confirming 157 malicious skills with 632 vulnerabilities. These attacks are not incidental. Malicious skills average 4.03 vulnerabilities across a median of three kill chain phases, and the ecosystem has split into two archetypes: Data Thieves that exfiltrate credentials through supply chain techniques, and Agent Hijackers that subvert agent decision-making through instruction manipulation. A single actor accounts for 54.1\% of confirmed cases through templated brand impersonation. Shadow features, capabilities absent from public documentation, appear in 0\% of basic attacks but 100\% of advanced ones; several skills go further by exploiting the AI platform's own hook system and permission flags. Responsible disclosure led to 93.6\% removal within 30 days. We release the dataset and analysis pipeline to support future work on agent skill security.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated potential in cybersecurity applications but have also caused lower confidence due to problems like hallucinations and a lack of truthfulness. Existing benchmarks provide general evaluations but do not sufficiently address the practical and applied aspects of LLM performance in cybersecurity-specific tasks. To address this gap, we introduce the SECURE (Security Extraction, Understanding \& Reasoning Evaluation), a benchmark designed to assess LLMs performance in realistic cybersecurity scenarios. SECURE includes six datasets focussed on the Industrial Control System sector to evaluate knowledge extraction, understanding, and reasoning based on industry-standard sources. Our study evaluates seven state-of-the-art models on these tasks, providing insights into their strengths and weaknesses in cybersecurity contexts, and offer recommendations for improving LLMs reliability as cyber advisory tools.

Knowledge editing techniques have been increasingly adopted to efficiently correct the false or outdated knowledge in Large Language Models (LLMs), due to the high cost of retraining from scratch. Meanwhile, one critical but under-explored question is: can knowledge editing be used to inject harm into LLMs? In this paper, we propose to reformulate knowledge editing as a new type of safety threat for LLMs, namely Editing Attack, and conduct a systematic investigation with a newly constructed dataset EditAttack. Specifically, we focus on two typical safety risks of Editing Attack including Misinformation Injection and Bias Injection. For the risk of misinformation injection, we first categorize it into commonsense misinformation injection and long-tail misinformation injection. Then, we find that editing attacks can inject both types of misinformation into LLMs, and the effectiveness is particularly high for commonsense misinformation injection. For the risk of bias injection, we discover that not only can biased sentences be injected into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also one single biased sentence injection can cause a high bias increase in general outputs of LLMs, which are even highly irrelevant to the injected sentence, indicating a catastrophic impact on the overall fairness of LLMs. Then, we further illustrate the high stealthiness of editing attacks, measured by their impact on the general knowledge and reasoning capacities of LLMs, and show the hardness of defending editing attacks with empirical evidence. Our discoveries demonstrate the emerging misuse risks of knowledge editing techniques on compromising the safety alignment of LLMs.

With LLMs increasingly deployed in corporate data management, it is crucial to ensure that these models do not leak sensitive information. In the context of corporate data management, the concept of sensitivity awareness has been introduced, enabling LLMs to adhere to predefined access rights rules. However, it remains unclear how sensitivity awareness relates to established notions of privacy, such as differential privacy (DP), thereby making it difficult to deploy meaningfully in real-world applications. In this work, we formalize the notion of sensitivity awareness and theoretically establish its connection to DP. Additionally, we develop a supervised fine-tuning recipe to make existing, four-bit quantized LLMs more sensitivity-aware. With a performance boost of up to 21.7%, the finetuned LLMs not only substantially improve over their baseline but also outperform other full-precision open-source and commercial models of similar size in achieving sensitivity awareness, demonstrating the effectiveness of our proposed approach. At the same time, our method also largely preserves the models' performance on other tasks, such as general instruction-following, mathematical, and common-sense reasoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and Bard, have revolutionized natural language understanding and generation. They possess deep language comprehension, human-like text generation capabilities, contextual awareness, and robust problem-solving skills, making them invaluable in various domains (e.g., search engines, customer support, translation). In the meantime, LLMs have also gained traction in the security community, revealing security vulnerabilities and showcasing their potential in security-related tasks. This paper explores the intersection of LLMs with security and privacy. Specifically, we investigate how LLMs positively impact security and privacy, potential risks and threats associated with their use, and inherent vulnerabilities within LLMs. Through a comprehensive literature review, the paper categorizes the papers into "The Good" (beneficial LLM applications), "The Bad" (offensive applications), and "The Ugly" (vulnerabilities of LLMs and their defenses). We have some interesting findings. For example, LLMs have proven to enhance code security (code vulnerability detection) and data privacy (data confidentiality protection), outperforming traditional methods. However, they can also be harnessed for various attacks (particularly user-level attacks) due to their human-like reasoning abilities. We have identified areas that require further research efforts. For example, Research on model and parameter extraction attacks is limited and often theoretical, hindered by LLM parameter scale and confidentiality. Safe instruction tuning, a recent development, requires more exploration. We hope that our work can shed light on the LLMs' potential to both bolster and jeopardize cybersecurity.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become integral to numerous domains, significantly advancing applications in data management, mining, and analysis. Their profound capabilities in processing and interpreting complex language data, however, bring to light pressing concerns regarding data privacy, especially the risk of unintentional training data leakage. Despite the critical nature of this issue, there has been no existing literature to offer a comprehensive assessment of data privacy risks in LLMs. Addressing this gap, our paper introduces LLM-PBE, a toolkit crafted specifically for the systematic evaluation of data privacy risks in LLMs. LLM-PBE is designed to analyze privacy across the entire lifecycle of LLMs, incorporating diverse attack and defense strategies, and handling various data types and metrics. Through detailed experimentation with multiple LLMs, LLM-PBE facilitates an in-depth exploration of data privacy concerns, shedding light on influential factors such as model size, data characteristics, and evolving temporal dimensions. This study not only enriches the understanding of privacy issues in LLMs but also serves as a vital resource for future research in the field. Aimed at enhancing the breadth of knowledge in this area, the findings, resources, and our full technical report are made available at https://llm-pbe.github.io/, providing an open platform for academic and practical advancements in LLM privacy assessment.

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

Large Language Models' knowledge of how to perform cyber-security attacks, create bioweapons, and manipulate humans poses risks of misuse. Previous work has proposed methods to unlearn this knowledge. Historically, it has been unclear whether unlearning techniques are removing information from the model weights or just making it harder to access. To disentangle these two objectives, we propose an adversarial evaluation method to test for the removal of information from model weights: we give an attacker access to some facts that were supposed to be removed, and using those, the attacker tries to recover other facts from the same distribution that cannot be guessed from the accessible facts. We show that using fine-tuning on the accessible facts can recover 88% of the pre-unlearning accuracy when applied to current unlearning methods for information learned during pretraining, revealing the limitations of these methods in removing information from the model weights. Our results also suggest that unlearning evaluations that measure unlearning robustness on information learned during an additional fine-tuning phase may overestimate robustness compared to evaluations that attempt to unlearn information learned during pretraining.

Smart contracts power decentralized financial (DeFi) services but are vulnerable to security exploits that can lead to significant financial losses. Existing security measures often fail to adequately protect these contracts due to the composability of DeFi protocols and the increasing sophistication of attacks. Through a large-scale empirical study of historical transactions from the 37 hacked DeFi protocols, we discovered that while benign transactions typically exhibit a limited number of unique control flows, in stark contrast, attack transactions consistently introduce novel, previously unobserved control flows. Building on these insights, we developed CrossGuard, a novel framework that enforces control flow integrity onchain to secure smart contracts. Crucially, CrossGuard does not require prior knowledge of specific hacks. Instead, configured only once at deployment, it enforces control flow whitelisting policies and applies simplification heuristics at runtime. This approach monitors and prevents potential attacks by reverting all transactions that do not adhere to the established control flow whitelisting rules. Our evaluation demonstrates that CrossGuard effectively blocks 35 of the 37 analyzed attacks when configured only once at contract deployment, maintaining a low false positive rate of 0.26% and minimal additional gas costs. These results underscore the efficacy of applying control flow integrity to smart contracts, significantly enhancing security beyond traditional methods and addressing the evolving threat landscape in the DeFi ecosystem.

Smart contracts are essential to decentralized finance (DeFi) and blockchain ecosystems but are increasingly vulnerable to exploits due to coding errors and complex attack vectors. Traditional static analysis tools and existing vulnerability detection methods often fail to address these challenges comprehensively, leading to high false-positive rates and an inability to detect dynamic vulnerabilities. This paper introduces SmartLLM, a novel approach leveraging fine-tuned LLaMA 3.1 models with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of smart contract auditing. By integrating domain-specific knowledge from ERC standards and employing advanced techniques such as QLoRA for efficient fine-tuning, SmartLLM achieves superior performance compared to static analysis tools like Mythril and Slither, as well as zero-shot large language model (LLM) prompting methods such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. Experimental results demonstrate a perfect recall of 100% and an accuracy score of 70%, highlighting the model's robustness in identifying vulnerabilities, including reentrancy and access control issues. This research advances smart contract security by offering a scalable and effective auditing solution, supporting the secure adoption of decentralized applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications, e.g., medical question-answering, mathematical sciences, and code generation. However, they also exhibit inherent limitations, such as outdated knowledge and susceptibility to hallucinations. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising paradigm to address these issues, but it also introduces new vulnerabilities. Recent efforts have focused on the security of RAG-based LLMs, yet existing attack methods face three critical challenges: (1) their effectiveness declines sharply when only a limited number of poisoned texts can be injected into the knowledge database, (2) they lack sufficient stealth, as the attacks are often detectable by anomaly detection systems, which compromises their effectiveness, and (3) they rely on heuristic approaches to generate poisoned texts, lacking formal optimization frameworks and theoretic guarantees, which limits their effectiveness and applicability. To address these issues, we propose coordinated Prompt-RAG attack (PR-attack), a novel optimization-driven attack that introduces a small number of poisoned texts into the knowledge database while embedding a backdoor trigger within the prompt. When activated, the trigger causes the LLM to generate pre-designed responses to targeted queries, while maintaining normal behavior in other contexts. This ensures both high effectiveness and stealth. We formulate the attack generation process as a bilevel optimization problem leveraging a principled optimization framework to develop optimal poisoned texts and triggers. Extensive experiments across diverse LLMs and datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of PR-Attack, achieving a high attack success rate even with a limited number of poisoned texts and significantly improved stealth compared to existing methods.

As transformer-based large language models (LLMs) increasingly permeate society, they have revolutionized domains such as software engineering, creative writing, and digital arts. However, their adoption in cybersecurity remains limited due to challenges like scarcity of specialized training data and complexity of representing cybersecurity-specific knowledge. To address these gaps, we present Foundation-Sec-8B, a cybersecurity-focused LLM built on the Llama 3.1 architecture and enhanced through continued pretraining on a carefully curated cybersecurity corpus. We evaluate Foundation-Sec-8B across both established and new cybersecurity benchmarks, showing that it matches Llama 3.1-70B and GPT-4o-mini in certain cybersecurity-specific tasks. By releasing our model to the public, we aim to accelerate progress and adoption of AI-driven tools in both public and private cybersecurity contexts.

Zero-shot learning relies on semantic class representations such as hand-engineered attributes or learned embeddings to predict classes without any labeled examples. We propose to learn class representations by embedding nodes from common sense knowledge graphs in a vector space. Common sense knowledge graphs are an untapped source of explicit high-level knowledge that requires little human effort to apply to a range of tasks. To capture the knowledge in the graph, we introduce ZSL-KG, a general-purpose framework with a novel transformer graph convolutional network (TrGCN) for generating class representations. Our proposed TrGCN architecture computes non-linear combinations of node neighbourhoods. Our results show that ZSL-KG improves over existing WordNet-based methods on five out of six zero-shot benchmark datasets in language and vision.

Common-sense reasoning is a key language model capability because it encapsulates not just specific factual knowledge but rather general language and world understanding. Measuring common-sense reasoning, therefore, is crucial for language models of different sizes and applications. One of the most widely used benchmarks for evaluating such capabilities is HellaSwag; however, in this paper, we show that it has severe construct validity issues. These issues range from basic ungrammaticality and numerous typos to misleading prompts or equally correct options. Furthermore, we show that if models are evaluated only on answer texts, or with "Lorem ipsum dolor..." instead of the question, more than 65% of model predictions remain the same, and this cannot be attributed merely to contamination. Since benchmark scores are an essential part of model selection in both research and commercial applications, these validity issues can have severe consequences. In particular, knowing that taking benchmark scores at face value is ubiquitous, inadequate evaluation leads to ill-informed decisions about models. In this paper, we thoroughly investigate critical validity issues posed by HellaSwag and illustrate them with various evaluations using generative language models of different sizes. We argue that this benchmark does not accurately measure common-sense reasoning and, therefore, should not be used for evaluation in its current state. Based on the results of our study, we propose requirements that should be met by future common-sense reasoning benchmarks. In addition, we release GoldenSwag, a corrected subset of HellaSwag, which, to our belief, facilitates acceptable common-sense reasoning evaluation.

Large language models (LLMs) have evolved into autonomous agents that rely on open skill ecosystems (e.g., ClawHub and Skills.Rest), hosting numerous publicly reusable skills. Existing security research on these ecosystems mainly focuses on vulnerabilities within skills, such as prompt injection. However, there is a critical gap regarding skills that may be misused for harmful actions (e.g., cyber attacks, fraud and scams, privacy violations, and sexual content generation), namely harmful skills. In this paper, we present the first large-scale measurement study of harmful skills in agent ecosystems, covering 98,440 skills across two major registries. Using an LLM-driven scoring system grounded in our harmful skill taxonomy, we find that 4.93% of skills (4,858) are harmful, with ClawHub exhibiting an 8.84% harmful rate compared to 3.49% on Skills.Rest. We then construct HarmfulSkillBench, the first benchmark for evaluating agent safety against harmful skills in realistic agent contexts, comprising 200 harmful skills across 20 categories and four evaluation conditions. By evaluating six LLMs on HarmfulSkillBench, we find that presenting a harmful task through a pre-installed skill substantially lowers refusal rates across all models, with the average harm score rising from 0.27 without the skill to 0.47 with it, and further to 0.76 when the harmful intent is implicit rather than stated as an explicit user request. We responsibly disclose our findings to the affected registries and release our benchmark to support future research (see https://github.com/TrustAIRLab/HarmfulSkillBench).

This work presents LURK (Latent UnleaRned Knowledge), a novel framework that probes for hidden retained knowledge in unlearned LLMs through adversarial suffix prompting. LURK automatically generates adversarial prompt suffixes designed to elicit residual knowledge about the Harry Potter domain, a commonly used benchmark for unlearning. Our experiments reveal that even models deemed successfully unlearned can leak idiosyncratic information under targeted adversarial conditions, highlighting critical limitations of current unlearning evaluation standards. By uncovering latent knowledge through indirect probing, LURK offers a more rigorous and diagnostic tool for assessing the robustness of unlearning algorithms. All code will be publicly available.

Recent years have brought about a renewed interest in commonsense representation and reasoning in the field of natural language understanding. The development of new commonsense knowledge graphs (CSKG) has been central to these advances as their diverse facts can be used and referenced by machine learning models for tackling new and challenging tasks. At the same time, there remain questions about the quality and coverage of these resources due to the massive scale required to comprehensively encompass general commonsense knowledge. In this work, we posit that manually constructed CSKGs will never achieve the coverage necessary to be applicable in all situations encountered by NLP agents. Therefore, we propose a new evaluation framework for testing the utility of KGs based on how effectively implicit knowledge representations can be learned from them. With this new goal, we propose ATOMIC 2020, a new CSKG of general-purpose commonsense knowledge containing knowledge that is not readily available in pretrained language models. We evaluate its properties in comparison with other leading CSKGs, performing the first large-scale pairwise study of commonsense knowledge resources. Next, we show that ATOMIC 2020 is better suited for training knowledge models that can generate accurate, representative knowledge for new, unseen entities and events. Finally, through human evaluation, we show that the few-shot performance of GPT-3 (175B parameters), while impressive, remains ~12 absolute points lower than a BART-based knowledge model trained on ATOMIC 2020 despite using over 430x fewer parameters.

We present a new kind of question answering dataset, OpenBookQA, modeled after open book exams for assessing human understanding of a subject. The open book that comes with our questions is a set of 1329 elementary level science facts. Roughly 6000 questions probe an understanding of these facts and their application to novel situations. This requires combining an open book fact (e.g., metals conduct electricity) with broad common knowledge (e.g., a suit of armor is made of metal) obtained from other sources. While existing QA datasets over documents or knowledge bases, being generally self-contained, focus on linguistic understanding, OpenBookQA probes a deeper understanding of both the topic---in the context of common knowledge---and the language it is expressed in. Human performance on OpenBookQA is close to 92%, but many state-of-the-art pre-trained QA methods perform surprisingly poorly, worse than several simple neural baselines we develop. Our oracle experiments designed to circumvent the knowledge retrieval bottleneck demonstrate the value of both the open book and additional facts. We leave it as a challenge to solve the retrieval problem in this multi-hop setting and to close the large gap to human performance.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

Knowledge erasure in large language models (LLMs) is important for ensuring compliance with data and AI regulations, safeguarding user privacy, mitigating bias, and misinformation. Existing unlearning methods aim to make the process of knowledge erasure more efficient and effective by removing specific knowledge while preserving overall model performance, especially for retained information. However, it has been observed that the unlearning techniques tend to suppress and leave the knowledge beneath the surface, thus making it retrievable with the right prompts. In this work, we demonstrate that step-by-step reasoning can serve as a backdoor to recover this hidden information. We introduce a step-by-step reasoning-based black-box attack, Sleek, that systematically exposes unlearning failures. We employ a structured attack framework with three core components: (1) an adversarial prompt generation strategy leveraging step-by-step reasoning built from LLM-generated queries, (2) an attack mechanism that successfully recalls erased content, and exposes unfair suppression of knowledge intended for retention and (3) a categorization of prompts as direct, indirect, and implied, to identify which query types most effectively exploit unlearning weaknesses. Through extensive evaluations on four state-of-the-art unlearning techniques and two widely used LLMs, we show that existing approaches fail to ensure reliable knowledge removal. Of the generated adversarial prompts, 62.5% successfully retrieved forgotten Harry Potter facts from WHP-unlearned Llama, while 50% exposed unfair suppression of retained knowledge. Our work highlights the persistent risks of information leakage, emphasizing the need for more robust unlearning strategies for erasure.

Penetration testing, a critical component of cybersecurity, typically requires extensive time and effort to find vulnerabilities. Beginners in this field often benefit from collaborative approaches with the community or experts. To address this, we develop CIPHER (Cybersecurity Intelligent Penetration-testing Helper for Ethical Researchers), a large language model specifically trained to assist in penetration testing tasks. We trained CIPHER using over 300 high-quality write-ups of vulnerable machines, hacking techniques, and documentation of open-source penetration testing tools. Additionally, we introduced the Findings, Action, Reasoning, and Results (FARR) Flow augmentation, a novel method to augment penetration testing write-ups to establish a fully automated pentesting simulation benchmark tailored for large language models. This approach fills a significant gap in traditional cybersecurity Q\&A benchmarks and provides a realistic and rigorous standard for evaluating AI's technical knowledge, reasoning capabilities, and practical utility in dynamic penetration testing scenarios. In our assessments, CIPHER achieved the best overall performance in providing accurate suggestion responses compared to other open-source penetration testing models of similar size and even larger state-of-the-art models like Llama 3 70B and Qwen1.5 72B Chat, particularly on insane difficulty machine setups. This demonstrates that the current capabilities of general LLMs are insufficient for effectively guiding users through the penetration testing process. We also discuss the potential for improvement through scaling and the development of better benchmarks using FARR Flow augmentation results. Our benchmark will be released publicly at https://github.com/ibndias/CIPHER.

We present Foundation-Sec-8B-Reasoning, the first open-source native reasoning model for cybersecurity. Built upon our previously released Foundation-Sec-8B base model (derived from Llama-3.1-8B-Base), the model is trained through a two-stage process combining supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR). Our training leverages proprietary reasoning data spanning cybersecurity analysis, instruction-following, and mathematical reasoning. Evaluation across 10 cybersecurity benchmarks and 10 general-purpose benchmarks demonstrates performance competitive with significantly larger models on cybersecurity tasks while maintaining strong general capabilities. The model shows effective generalization on multi-hop reasoning tasks and strong safety performance when deployed with appropriate system prompts and guardrails. This work demonstrates that domain-specialized reasoning models can achieve strong performance on specialized tasks while maintaining broad general capabilities. We release the model publicly at https://huggingface.co/fdtn-ai/Foundation-Sec-8B-Reasoning.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

Stealing attacks pose a persistent threat to the intellectual property of deployed machine-learning systems. Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) intensifies this risk by extending the attack surface beyond model weights to knowledge base that often contains IP-bearing assets such as proprietary runbooks, curated domain collections, or licensed documents. Recent work shows that multi-turn questioning can gradually steal corpus content from RAG systems, yet existing attacks are largely heuristic and often plateau early. We address this gap by formulating RAG knowledge-base stealing as an adaptive stochastic coverage problem (ASCP), where each query is a stochastic action and the goal is to maximize the conditional expected marginal gain (CMG) in corpus coverage under a query budget. Bridging ASCP to real-world black-box RAG knowledge-base stealing raises three challenges: CMG is unobservable, the natural-language action space is intractably large, and feasibility constraints require stealthy queries that remain effective under diverse architectures. We introduce RAGCrawler, a knowledge graph-guided attacker that maintains a global attacker-side state to estimate coverage gains, schedule high-value semantic anchors, and generate non-redundant natural queries. Across four corpora and four generators with BGE retriever, RAGCrawler achieves 66.8% average coverage (up to 84.4%) within 1,000 queries, improving coverage by 44.90% relative to the strongest baseline. It also reduces the queries needed to reach 70% coverage by at least 4.03x on average and enables surrogate reconstruction with answer similarity up to 0.699. Our attack is also scalable to retriever switching and newer RAG techniques like query rewriting and multi-query retrieval. These results highlight urgent needs to protect RAG knowledge assets.

Recent advancements in generative AI have led to the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) in software engineering, addressing numerous long-standing challenges. However, a comprehensive study examining the capabilities of LLMs in software vulnerability detection (SVD), a crucial aspect of software security, is currently lacking. Existing research primarily focuses on evaluating LLMs using C/C++ datasets. It typically explores only one or two strategies among prompt engineering, instruction tuning, and sequence classification fine-tuning for open-source LLMs. Consequently, there is a significant knowledge gap regarding the effectiveness of diverse LLMs in detecting vulnerabilities across various programming languages. To address this knowledge gap, we present a comprehensive empirical study evaluating the performance of LLMs on the SVD task. We have compiled a comprehensive dataset comprising 8,260 vulnerable functions in Python, 7,505 in Java, and 28,983 in JavaScript. We assess five open-source LLMs using multiple approaches, including prompt engineering, instruction tuning, and sequence classification fine-tuning. These LLMs are benchmarked against five fine-tuned small language models and two open-source static application security testing tools. Furthermore, we explore two avenues to improve LLM performance on SVD: a) Data perspective: Retraining models using downsampled balanced datasets. b) Model perspective: Investigating ensemble learning methods that combine predictions from multiple LLMs. Our comprehensive experiments demonstrate that SVD remains a challenging task for LLMs. This study provides a thorough understanding of the role of LLMs in SVD and offers practical insights for future advancements in leveraging generative AI to enhance software security practices.

Large language models (LLMs) have been increasingly applied to various domains, which triggers increasing concerns about LLMs' safety on specialized domains, e.g. medicine. However, testing the domain-specific safety of LLMs is challenging due to the lack of domain knowledge-driven attacks in existing benchmarks. To bridge this gap, we propose a new task, knowledge-to-jailbreak, which aims to generate jailbreaks from domain knowledge to evaluate the safety of LLMs when applied to those domains. We collect a large-scale dataset with 12,974 knowledge-jailbreak pairs and fine-tune a large language model as jailbreak-generator, to produce domain knowledge-specific jailbreaks. Experiments on 13 domains and 8 target LLMs demonstrate the effectiveness of jailbreak-generator in generating jailbreaks that are both relevant to the given knowledge and harmful to the target LLMs. We also apply our method to an out-of-domain knowledge base, showing that jailbreak-generator can generate jailbreaks that are comparable in harmfulness to those crafted by human experts. Data and code: https://github.com/THU-KEG/Knowledge-to-Jailbreak/.

With the rapid evolution of Large Language Model (LLM) agent ecosystems, centralized skill marketplaces have emerged as pivotal infrastructure for augmenting agent capabilities. However, these marketplaces face unprecedented security challenges, primarily stemming from semantic-behavioral inconsistency and inter-skill combinatorial risks, where individually benign skills induce malicious behaviors during collaborative invocation. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose SkillProbe, a multi-stage security auditing framework driven by multi-agent collaboration. SkillProbe introduces a "Skills-for-Skills" design paradigm, encapsulating auditing processes into standardized skill modules to drive specialized agents through a rigorous pipeline, including admission filtering, semantic-behavioral alignment detection, and combinatorial risk simulation. We conducted a large-scale evaluation using 8 mainstream LLM series across 2,500 real-world skills from ClawHub. Our results reveal a striking popularity-security paradox, where download volume is not a reliable proxy for security quality, as over 90% of high-popularity skills failed to pass rigorous auditing. Crucially, we discovered that high-risk skills form a single giant connected component within the risk-link dimension, demonstrating that cascaded risks are systemic rather than isolated occurrences. We hope that SkillProbe will inspire researchers to provide a scalable governance infrastructure for constructing a trustworthy Agentic Web. SkillProbe is accessible for public experience at skillhub.holosai.io.

Finetuning LLMs with LoRA has gained significant popularity due to its simplicity and effectiveness. Often, users may even find pluggable, community-shared LoRAs to enhance their base models for a specific downstream task of interest; enjoying a powerful, efficient, yet customized LLM experience with negligible investment. However, this convenient share-and-play ecosystem also introduces a new attack surface, where attackers can distribute malicious LoRAs to a community eager to try out shared assets. Despite the high-risk potential, no prior art has comprehensively explored LoRA's attack surface under the downstream-enhancing share-and-play context. In this paper, we investigate how backdoors can be injected into task-enhancing LoRAs and examine the mechanisms of such infections. We find that with a simple, efficient, yet specific recipe, a backdoor LoRA can be trained once and then seamlessly merged (in a training-free fashion) with multiple task-enhancing LoRAs, retaining both its malicious backdoor and benign downstream capabilities. This allows attackers to scale the distribution of compromised LoRAs with minimal effort by leveraging the rich pool of existing shared LoRA assets. We note that such merged LoRAs are particularly infectious -- because their malicious intent is cleverly concealed behind improved downstream capabilities, creating a strong incentive for voluntary download -- and dangerous -- because under local deployment, no safety measures exist to intervene when things go wrong. Our work is among the first to study this new threat model of training-free distribution of downstream-capable-yet-backdoor-injected LoRAs, highlighting the urgent need for heightened security awareness in the LoRA ecosystem. Warning: This paper contains offensive content and involves a real-life tragedy.

Capture-the-Flag (CTF) competitions are crucial for cybersecurity education and training. As large language models (LLMs) evolve, there is increasing interest in their ability to automate CTF challenge solving. For example, DARPA has organized the AIxCC competition since 2023 to advance AI-powered automated offense and defense. However, this demands a combination of multiple abilities, from knowledge to reasoning and further to actions. In this paper, we highlight the importance of technical knowledge in solving CTF problems and deliberately construct a focused benchmark, CTFKnow, with 3,992 questions to measure LLMs' performance in this core aspect. Our study offers a focused and innovative measurement of LLMs' capability in understanding CTF knowledge and applying it to solve CTF challenges. Our key findings reveal that while LLMs possess substantial technical knowledge, they falter in accurately applying this knowledge to specific scenarios and adapting their strategies based on feedback from the CTF environment. Based on insights derived from this measurement study, we propose CTFAgent, a novel LLM-driven framework for advancing CTF problem-solving. CTFAgent introduces two new modules: two-stage Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) and interactive Environmental Augmentation, which enhance LLMs' technical knowledge and vulnerability exploitation on CTF, respectively. Our experimental results show that, on two popular CTF datasets, CTFAgent both achieves over 80% performance improvement. Moreover, in the recent picoCTF2024 hosted by CMU, CTFAgent ranked in the top 23.6% of nearly 7,000 participating teams. This reflects the benefit of our measurement study and the potential of our framework in advancing LLMs' capabilities in CTF problem-solving.

When answering a question, people often draw upon their rich world knowledge in addition to the particular context. Recent work has focused primarily on answering questions given some relevant document or context, and required very little general background. To investigate question answering with prior knowledge, we present CommonsenseQA: a challenging new dataset for commonsense question answering. To capture common sense beyond associations, we extract from ConceptNet (Speer et al., 2017) multiple target concepts that have the same semantic relation to a single source concept. Crowd-workers are asked to author multiple-choice questions that mention the source concept and discriminate in turn between each of the target concepts. This encourages workers to create questions with complex semantics that often require prior knowledge. We create 12,247 questions through this procedure and demonstrate the difficulty of our task with a large number of strong baselines. Our best baseline is based on BERT-large (Devlin et al., 2018) and obtains 56% accuracy, well below human performance, which is 89%.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

Monitoring the threat landscape to be aware of actual or potential attacks is of utmost importance to cybersecurity professionals. Information about cyber threats is typically distributed using natural language reports. Natural language processing can help with managing this large amount of unstructured information, yet to date, the topic has received little attention. With this paper, we present AnnoCTR, a new CC-BY-SA-licensed dataset of cyber threat reports. The reports have been annotated by a domain expert with named entities, temporal expressions, and cybersecurity-specific concepts including implicitly mentioned techniques and tactics. Entities and concepts are linked to Wikipedia and the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base, the most widely-used taxonomy for classifying types of attacks. Prior datasets linking to MITRE ATT&CK either provide a single label per document or annotate sentences out-of-context; our dataset annotates entire documents in a much finer-grained way. In an experimental study, we model the annotations of our dataset using state-of-the-art neural models. In our few-shot scenario, we find that for identifying the MITRE ATT&CK concepts that are mentioned explicitly or implicitly in a text, concept descriptions from MITRE ATT&CK are an effective source for training data augmentation.

What happens when a new piece of knowledge is introduced into the training data and how long does it last while a large language model (LM) continues to train? We investigate this question by injecting facts into LMs from a new probing dataset, "Outlandish", which is designed to permit the testing of a spectrum of different fact types. When studying how robust these memories are, there appears to be a sweet spot in the spectrum of fact novelty between consistency with world knowledge and total randomness, where the injected memory is the most enduring. Specifically we show that facts that conflict with common knowledge are remembered for tens of thousands of training steps, while prompts not conflicting with common knowledge (mundane), as well as scrambled prompts (randomly jumbled) are both forgotten much more rapidly. Further, knowledge-conflicting facts can "prime'' how the language model hallucinates on logically unrelated prompts, showing their propensity for non-target generalization, while both mundane and randomly jumbled facts prime significantly less. Finally, we show that impacts of knowledge-conflicting facts in LMs, though they can be long lasting, can be largely erased by novel application of multi-step sparse updates, even while the training ability of the model is preserved. As such, this very simple procedure has direct implications for mitigating the effects of data poisoning in training.

Large language models are aligned to be safe, preventing users from generating harmful content like misinformation or instructions for illegal activities. However, previous work has shown that the alignment process is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Adversaries can manipulate the safety training data to inject backdoors that act like a universal sudo command: adding the backdoor string to any prompt enables harmful responses from models that, otherwise, behave safely. Our competition, co-located at IEEE SaTML 2024, challenged participants to find universal backdoors in several large language models. This report summarizes the key findings and promising ideas for future research.

The need for machine unlearning is critical for data privacy, yet existing methods often cause Knowledge Contamination by unintentionally damaging related knowledge. Such a degraded model performance after unlearning has been recently leveraged for new inference and backdoor attacks. Most studies design adversarial unlearning requests that require poisoning or duplicating training data. In this study, we introduce a new unlearning-induced attack model, namely indirect unlearning attack, which does not require data manipulation but exploits the consequence of knowledge contamination to perturb the model accuracy on security-critical predictions. To mitigate this attack, we introduce a theoretical framework that models neural networks as Neural Knowledge Systems. Based on this, we propose ROKA, a robust unlearning strategy centered on Neural Healing. Unlike conventional unlearning methods that only destroy information, ROKA constructively rebalances the model by nullifying the influence of forgotten data while strengthening its conceptual neighbors. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to provide a theoretical guarantee for knowledge preservation during unlearning. Evaluations on various large models, including vision transformers, multi-modal models, and large language models, show that ROKA effectively unlearns targets while preserving, or even enhancing, the accuracy of retained data, thereby mitigating the indirect unlearning attacks.

The rise of AI agent frameworks has introduced agent skills, modular packages containing instructions and executable code that dynamically extend agent capabilities. While this architecture enables powerful customization, skills execute with implicit trust and minimal vetting, creating a significant yet uncharacterized attack surface. We conduct the first large-scale empirical security analysis of this emerging ecosystem, collecting 42,447 skills from two major marketplaces and systematically analyzing 31,132 using SkillScan, a multi-stage detection framework integrating static analysis with LLM-based semantic classification. Our findings reveal pervasive security risks: 26.1% of skills contain at least one vulnerability, spanning 14 distinct patterns across four categories: prompt injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, and supply chain risks. Data exfiltration (13.3%) and privilege escalation (11.8%) are most prevalent, while 5.2% of skills exhibit high-severity patterns strongly suggesting malicious intent. We find that skills bundling executable scripts are 2.12x more likely to contain vulnerabilities than instruction-only skills (OR=2.12, p<0.001). Our contributions include: (1) a grounded vulnerability taxonomy derived from 8,126 vulnerable skills, (2) a validated detection methodology achieving 86.7% precision and 82.5% recall, and (3) an open dataset and detection toolkit to support future research. These results demonstrate an urgent need for capability-based permission systems and mandatory security vetting before this attack vector is further exploited.

Evaluating Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for understanding their capabilities and limitations across various applications, including natural language processing and code generation. Existing benchmarks like MMLU, C-Eval, and HumanEval assess general LLM performance but lack focus on specific expert domains such as cybersecurity. Previous attempts to create cybersecurity datasets have faced limitations, including insufficient data volume and a reliance on multiple-choice questions (MCQs). To address these gaps, we propose SecBench, a multi-dimensional benchmarking dataset designed to evaluate LLMs in the cybersecurity domain. SecBench includes questions in various formats (MCQs and short-answer questions (SAQs)), at different capability levels (Knowledge Retention and Logical Reasoning), in multiple languages (Chinese and English), and across various sub-domains. The dataset was constructed by collecting high-quality data from open sources and organizing a Cybersecurity Question Design Contest, resulting in 44,823 MCQs and 3,087 SAQs. Particularly, we used the powerful while cost-effective LLMs to (1). label the data and (2). constructing a grading agent for automatic evaluation of SAQs. Benchmarking results on 16 SOTA LLMs demonstrate the usability of SecBench, which is arguably the largest and most comprehensive benchmark dataset for LLMs in cybersecurity. More information about SecBench can be found at our website, and the dataset can be accessed via the artifact link.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed and integrated into thousands of applications, the need for scalable evaluation of how models respond to adversarial attacks grows rapidly. However, LLM security is a moving target: models produce unpredictable output, are constantly updated, and the potential adversary is highly diverse: anyone with access to the internet and a decent command of natural language. Further, what constitutes a security weak in one context may not be an issue in a different context; one-fits-all guardrails remain theoretical. In this paper, we argue that it is time to rethink what constitutes ``LLM security'', and pursue a holistic approach to LLM security evaluation, where exploration and discovery of issues are central. To this end, this paper introduces garak (Generative AI Red-teaming and Assessment Kit), a framework which can be used to discover and identify vulnerabilities in a target LLM or dialog system. garak probes an LLM in a structured fashion to discover potential vulnerabilities. The outputs of the framework describe a target model's weaknesses, contribute to an informed discussion of what composes vulnerabilities in unique contexts, and can inform alignment and policy discussions for LLM deployment.

Modern code generation tools, utilizing AI models like Large Language Models (LLMs), have gained popularity for producing functional code. However, their usage presents security challenges, often resulting in insecure code merging into the code base. Evaluating the quality of generated code, especially its security, is crucial. While prior research explored various aspects of code generation, the focus on security has been limited, mostly examining code produced in controlled environments rather than real-world scenarios. To address this gap, we conducted an empirical study, analyzing code snippets generated by GitHub Copilot from GitHub projects. Our analysis identified 452 snippets generated by Copilot, revealing a high likelihood of security issues, with 32.8% of Python and 24.5% of JavaScript snippets affected. These issues span 38 different Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories, including significant ones like CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values, CWE-78: OS Command Injection, and CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code. Notably, eight CWEs are among the 2023 CWE Top-25, highlighting their severity. Our findings confirm that developers should be careful when adding code generated by Copilot and should also run appropriate security checks as they accept the suggested code. It also shows that practitioners should cultivate corresponding security awareness and skills.

Releasing open-source large language models (LLMs) presents a dual-use risk since bad actors can easily fine-tune these models for harmful purposes. Even without the open release of weights, weight stealing and fine-tuning APIs make closed models vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks (HFAs). While safety measures like preventing jailbreaks and improving safety guardrails are important, such measures can easily be reversed through fine-tuning. In this work, we propose Representation Noising (RepNoise), a defence mechanism that is effective even when attackers have access to the weights and the defender no longer has any control. RepNoise works by removing information about harmful representations such that it is difficult to recover them during fine-tuning. Importantly, our defence is also able to generalize across different subsets of harm that have not been seen during the defence process. Our method does not degrade the general capability of LLMs and retains the ability to train the model on harmless tasks. We provide empirical evidence that the effectiveness of our defence lies in its "depth": the degree to which information about harmful representations is removed across all layers of the LLM.

Misinformation such as fake news and rumors is a serious threat on information ecosystems and public trust. The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has great potential to reshape the landscape of combating misinformation. Generally, LLMs can be a double-edged sword in the fight. On the one hand, LLMs bring promising opportunities for combating misinformation due to their profound world knowledge and strong reasoning abilities. Thus, one emergent question is: how to utilize LLMs to combat misinformation? On the other hand, the critical challenge is that LLMs can be easily leveraged to generate deceptive misinformation at scale. Then, another important question is: how to combat LLM-generated misinformation? In this paper, we first systematically review the history of combating misinformation before the advent of LLMs. Then we illustrate the current efforts and present an outlook for these two fundamental questions respectively. The goal of this survey paper is to facilitate the progress of utilizing LLMs for fighting misinformation and call for interdisciplinary efforts from different stakeholders for combating LLM-generated misinformation.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is increasingly deployed in real-world applications, where its reference-grounded design makes outputs appear trustworthy. This trust has spurred research on poisoning attacks that craft malicious content, inject it into knowledge sources, and manipulate RAG responses. However, when evaluated in practical RAG systems, existing attacks suffer from severely degraded effectiveness. This gap stems from two overlooked realities: (i) content is often processed before use, which can fragment the poison and weaken its effect, and (ii) users often do not issue the exact queries anticipated during attack design. These factors can lead practitioners to underestimate risks and develop a false sense of security. To better characterize the threat to practical systems, we present Confundo, a learning-to-poison framework that fine-tunes a large language model as a poison generator to achieve high effectiveness, robustness, and stealthiness. Confundo provides a unified framework supporting multiple attack objectives, demonstrated by manipulating factual correctness, inducing biased opinions, and triggering hallucinations. By addressing these overlooked challenges, Confundo consistently outperforms a wide range of purpose-built attacks across datasets and RAG configurations by large margins, even in the presence of defenses. Beyond exposing vulnerabilities, we also present a defensive use case that protects web content from unauthorized incorporation into RAG systems via scraping, with no impact on user experience.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) has experienced remarkable progress in recent years, driven by the widespread adoption of open-source machine learning models in both research and industry. Considering the resource-intensive nature of training on vast datasets, many applications opt for models that have already been trained. Hence, a small number of key players undertake the responsibility of training and publicly releasing large pre-trained models, providing a crucial foundation for a wide range of applications. However, the adoption of these open-source models carries inherent privacy and security risks that are often overlooked. To provide a concrete example, an inconspicuous model may conceal hidden functionalities that, when triggered by specific input patterns, can manipulate the behavior of the system, such as instructing self-driving cars to ignore the presence of other vehicles. The implications of successful privacy and security attacks encompass a broad spectrum, ranging from relatively minor damage like service interruptions to highly alarming scenarios, including physical harm or the exposure of sensitive user data. In this work, we present a comprehensive overview of common privacy and security threats associated with the use of open-source models. By raising awareness of these dangers, we strive to promote the responsible and secure use of AI systems.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) represents a significant advancement in AI-tool integration, enabling seamless communication between AI agents and external services. However, this connectivity introduces novel attack vectors that remain largely unexplored. This paper demonstrates how unsophisticated threat actors, requiring only basic programming skills and free web tools, can exploit MCP's trust model to exfiltrate sensitive financial data. We present a proof-of-concept attack where a malicious weather MCP server, disguised as benign functionality, discovers and exploits legitimate banking tools to steal user account balances. The attack chain requires no advanced technical knowledge, server infrastructure, or monetary investment. The findings reveal a critical security gap in the emerging MCP ecosystem: while individual servers may appear trustworthy, their combination creates unexpected cross-server attack surfaces. Unlike traditional cybersecurity threats that assume sophisticated adversaries, our research shows that the barrier to entry for MCP-based attacks is alarmingly low. A threat actor with undergraduate-level Python knowledge can craft convincing social engineering attacks that exploit the implicit trust relationships MCP establishes between AI agents and tool providers. This work contributes to the nascent field of MCP security by demonstrating that current MCP implementations allow trivial cross-server attacks and proposing both immediate mitigations and protocol improvements to secure this emerging ecosystem.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable success across many domains, yet their integration into cybersecurity applications remains limited due to a lack of general-purpose cybersecurity data, representational complexity, and safety and regulatory concerns. To address this gap, we previously introduced Foundation-Sec-8B, a cybersecurity-focused LLM suitable for fine-tuning on downstream tasks. That model, however, was not designed for chat-style interactions or instruction-following. In this report, we release Foundation-Sec-8B-Instruct: a model specifically trained for general-purpose cybersecurity dialogue. Built on Foundation-Sec-8B, it combines domain-specific knowledge with instruction-following, conversational capabilities, and alignment with human preferences to produce high-quality, relevant responses. Comprehensive evaluations show that Foundation-Sec-8B-Instruct outperforms Llama 3.1-8B-Instruct on a range of cybersecurity tasks while matching its instruction-following performance. It is also competitive with GPT-4o-mini on cyber threat intelligence and instruction-following tasks. We envision Foundation-Sec-8B-Instruct becoming an indispensable assistant in the daily workflows of cybersecurity professionals. We release the model publicly at https://huggingface.co/fdtn-ai/Foundation-Sec-8B-Instruct.

LLMs have becoming increasingly powerful, both in their benign and malicious uses. With the increase in capabilities, researchers have been increasingly interested in their ability to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities. In particular, recent work has conducted preliminary studies on the ability of LLM agents to autonomously hack websites. However, these studies are limited to simple vulnerabilities. In this work, we show that LLM agents can autonomously exploit one-day vulnerabilities in real-world systems. To show this, we collected a dataset of 15 one-day vulnerabilities that include ones categorized as critical severity in the CVE description. When given the CVE description, GPT-4 is capable of exploiting 87% of these vulnerabilities compared to 0% for every other model we test (GPT-3.5, open-source LLMs) and open-source vulnerability scanners (ZAP and Metasploit). Fortunately, our GPT-4 agent requires the CVE description for high performance: without the description, GPT-4 can exploit only 7% of the vulnerabilities. Our findings raise questions around the widespread deployment of highly capable LLM agents.

As large language models (LLMs) become integral to multi-agent systems, new privacy risks emerge that extend beyond memorization, direct inference, or single-turn evaluations. In particular, seemingly innocuous responses, when composed across interactions, can cumulatively enable adversaries to recover sensitive information, a phenomenon we term compositional privacy leakage. We present the first systematic study of such compositional privacy leaks and possible mitigation methods in multi-agent LLM systems. First, we develop a framework that models how auxiliary knowledge and agent interactions jointly amplify privacy risks, even when each response is benign in isolation. Next, to mitigate this, we propose and evaluate two defense strategies: (1) Theory-of-Mind defense (ToM), where defender agents infer a questioner's intent by anticipating how their outputs may be exploited by adversaries, and (2) Collaborative Consensus Defense (CoDef), where responder agents collaborate with peers who vote based on a shared aggregated state to restrict sensitive information spread. Crucially, we balance our evaluation across compositions that expose sensitive information and compositions that yield benign inferences. Our experiments quantify how these defense strategies differ in balancing the privacy-utility trade-off. We find that while chain-of-thought alone offers limited protection to leakage (~39% sensitive blocking rate), our ToM defense substantially improves sensitive query blocking (up to 97%) but can reduce benign task success. CoDef achieves the best balance, yielding the highest Balanced Outcome (79.8%), highlighting the benefit of combining explicit reasoning with defender collaboration. Together, our results expose a new class of risks in collaborative LLM deployments and provide actionable insights for designing safeguards against compositional, context-driven privacy leakage.

Search agents connect LLMs to the Internet, enabling access to broader and more up-to-date information. However, unreliable search results may also pose safety threats to end users, establishing a new threat surface. In this work, we conduct two in-the-wild experiments to demonstrate both the prevalence of low-quality search results and their potential to misguide agent behaviors. To counter this threat, we introduce an automated red-teaming framework that is systematic, scalable, and cost-efficient, enabling lightweight and harmless safety assessments of search agents. Building on this framework, we construct the SafeSearch benchmark, which includes 300 test cases covering five categories of risks (e.g., misinformation and indirect prompt injection). Using this benchmark, we evaluate three representative search agent scaffolds, covering search workflow, tool-calling, and deep research, across 7 proprietary and 8 open-source backend LLMs. Our results reveal substantial vulnerabilities of LLM-based search agents: when exposed to unreliable websites, the highest ASR reached 90.5% for GPT-4.1-mini under a search workflow setting. Moreover, our analysis highlights the limited effectiveness of common defense practices, such as reminder prompting. This emphasizes the value of our framework in promoting transparency for safer agent development. Our codebase and test cases are publicly available: https://github.com/jianshuod/SafeSearch.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically trained on enormous quantities of unlicensed text, a practice that has led to scrutiny due to possible intellectual property infringement and ethical concerns. Training LLMs on openly licensed text presents a first step towards addressing these issues, but prior data collection efforts have yielded datasets too small or low-quality to produce performant LLMs. To address this gap, we collect, curate, and release the Common Pile v0.1, an eight terabyte collection of openly licensed text designed for LLM pretraining. The Common Pile comprises content from 30 sources that span diverse domains including research papers, code, books, encyclopedias, educational materials, audio transcripts, and more. Crucially, we validate our efforts by training two 7 billion parameter LLMs on text from the Common Pile: Comma v0.1-1T and Comma v0.1-2T, trained on 1 and 2 trillion tokens respectively. Both models attain competitive performance to LLMs trained on unlicensed text with similar computational budgets, such as Llama 1 and 2 7B. In addition to releasing the Common Pile v0.1 itself, we also release the code used in its creation as well as the training mixture and checkpoints for the Comma v0.1 models.

Existing question answering (QA) datasets are no longer challenging to most powerful Large Language Models (LLMs). Traditional QA benchmarks like TriviaQA, NaturalQuestions, ELI5 and HotpotQA mainly study ``known unknowns'' with clear indications of both what information is missing, and how to find it to answer the question. Hence, good performance on these benchmarks provides a false sense of security. A yet unmet need of the NLP community is a bank of non-factoid, multi-perspective questions involving a great deal of unclear information needs, i.e. ``unknown uknowns''. We claim we can find such questions in search engine logs, which is surprising because most question-intent queries are indeed factoid. We present Researchy Questions, a dataset of search engine queries tediously filtered to be non-factoid, ``decompositional'' and multi-perspective. We show that users spend a lot of ``effort'' on these questions in terms of signals like clicks and session length, and that they are also challenging for GPT-4. We also show that ``slow thinking'' answering techniques, like decomposition into sub-questions shows benefit over answering directly. We release sim 100k Researchy Questions, along with the Clueweb22 URLs that were clicked.

Multimodal misinformation, encompassing textual, visual, and cross-modal distortions, poses an increasing societal threat that is amplified by generative AI. Existing methods typically focus on a single type of distortion and struggle to generalize to unseen scenarios. In this work, we observe that different distortion types share common reasoning capabilities while also requiring task-specific skills. We hypothesize that joint training across distortion types facilitates knowledge sharing and enhances the model's ability to generalize. To this end, we introduce TRUST-VL, a unified and explainable vision-language model for general multimodal misinformation detection. TRUST-VL incorporates a novel Question-Aware Visual Amplifier module, designed to extract task-specific visual features. To support training, we also construct TRUST-Instruct, a large-scale instruction dataset containing 198K samples featuring structured reasoning chains aligned with human fact-checking workflows. Extensive experiments on both in-domain and zero-shot benchmarks demonstrate that TRUST-VL achieves state-of-the-art performance, while also offering strong generalization and interpretability.

Understanding and addressing potential safety alignment risks in large language models (LLMs) is critical for ensuring their safe and trustworthy deployment. In this paper, we highlight an insidious safety threat: a compromised LLM can maintain a facade of proper safety alignment while covertly generating harmful content. To achieve this, we finetune the model to understand and apply a steganographic technique. At inference time, we input a prompt that contains a steganographically embedded malicious target question along with a plaintext cover question. The model, in turn, produces a target response similarly embedded within a benign-looking cover response. In this process, human observers only see the model being prompted with a cover question and generating a corresponding cover response, while the malicious content is hidden from view. We demonstrate this invisible safety threat on GPT-4.1 despite the OpenAI finetuning API's safeguards. The finetuned model produces steganographic malicious outputs in response to hidden malicious prompts, while the user interface displays only a fully benign cover interaction. We also replicate the attack on three open-source models, Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct, Phi-4, and Mistral-Small-24B-Base-2501, confirming the generality of our method. We quantitatively evaluate our method on the AdvBench dataset, using Llama-Guard-3-8B for content safety classification. Across all four models, all stegotexts containing malicious content are incorrectly classified as safe.

Successful defense against dynamically evolving cyber threats requires advanced and sophisticated techniques. This research presents a novel approach to enhance real-time cybersecurity threat detection and response by integrating large language models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems with continuous threat intelligence feeds. Leveraging recent advancements in LLMs, specifically GPT-4o, and the innovative application of RAG techniques, our approach addresses the limitations of traditional static threat analysis by incorporating dynamic, real-time data sources. We leveraged RAG to get the latest information in real-time for threat intelligence, which is not possible in the existing GPT-4o model. We employ the Patrowl framework to automate the retrieval of diverse cybersecurity threat intelligence feeds, including Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), and Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) databases, and integrate these with the all-mpnet-base-v2 model for high-dimensional vector embeddings, stored and queried in Milvus. We demonstrate our system's efficacy through a series of case studies, revealing significant improvements in addressing recently disclosed vulnerabilities, KEVs, and high-EPSS-score CVEs compared to the baseline GPT-4o. This work not only advances the role of LLMs in cybersecurity but also establishes a robust foundation for the development of automated intelligent cyberthreat information management systems, addressing crucial gaps in current cybersecurity practices.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress, but their deployment has exposed critical vulnerabilities, particularly to jailbreak attacks that circumvent safety mechanisms. Guardrails--external defense mechanisms that monitor and control LLM interaction--have emerged as a promising solution. However, the current landscape of LLM guardrails is fragmented, lacking a unified taxonomy and comprehensive evaluation framework. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present the first holistic analysis of jailbreak guardrails for LLMs. We propose a novel, multi-dimensional taxonomy that categorizes guardrails along six key dimensions, and introduce a Security-Efficiency-Utility evaluation framework to assess their practical effectiveness. Through extensive analysis and experiments, we identify the strengths and limitations of existing guardrail approaches, explore their universality across attack types, and provide insights into optimizing defense combinations. Our work offers a structured foundation for future research and development, aiming to guide the principled advancement and deployment of robust LLM guardrails. The code is available at https://github.com/xunguangwang/SoK4JailbreakGuardrails.

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across delivery vectors, attack modalities, and propagation behaviors. Our meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 78 recent studies (2021--2026), consolidating evidence that attack success rates against state-of-the-art defenses exceed 85\% when adaptive attack strategies are employed. We systematically catalog 42 distinct attack techniques spanning input manipulation, tool poisoning, protocol exploitation, multimodal injection, and cross-origin context poisoning. Through critical analysis of 18 defense mechanisms reported in prior work, we identify that most achieve less than 50\% mitigation against sophisticated adaptive attacks. We contribute: (1) a unified taxonomy bridging disparate attack classifications, (2) the first systematic analysis of skill-based architecture vulnerabilities with concrete exploit chains, and (3) a defense-in-depth framework grounded in the limitations we identify. Our findings indicate that the security community must treat prompt injection as a first-class vulnerability class requiring architectural-level mitigations rather than ad-hoc filtering approaches.

LLMs are increasingly pervasive in the security environment, with limited measures of their effectiveness, which limits trust and usefulness to security practitioners. Here, we present an open-source evaluation framework and benchmark metrics for evaluating LLM-generated cybersecurity rules. The benchmark employs a holdout set-based methodology to measure the effectiveness of LLM-generated security rules in comparison to a human-generated corpus of rules. It provides three key metrics inspired by the way experts evaluate security rules, offering a realistic, multifaceted evaluation of the effectiveness of an LLM-based security rule generator. This methodology is illustrated using rules from Sublime Security's detection team and those written by Sublime Security's Automated Detection Engineer (ADE), with a thorough analysis of ADE's skills presented in the results section.

Despite significant progress in safety alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak attacks. Existing defense mechanisms have not fully deleted harmful knowledge in LLMs, which allows such attacks to bypass safeguards and produce harmful outputs. To address this challenge, we propose a novel safety alignment strategy, Constrained Knowledge Unlearning (CKU), which focuses on two primary objectives: knowledge localization and retention, and unlearning harmful knowledge. CKU works by scoring neurons in specific multilayer perceptron (MLP) layers to identify a subset U of neurons associated with useful knowledge. During the unlearning process, CKU prunes the gradients of neurons in U to preserve valuable knowledge while effectively mitigating harmful content. Experimental results demonstrate that CKU significantly enhances model safety without compromising overall performance, offering a superior balance between safety and utility compared to existing methods. Additionally, our analysis of neuron knowledge sensitivity across various MLP layers provides valuable insights into the mechanics of safety alignment and model knowledge editing.

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is being used to search for indicators of attacks that might have compromised an enterprise network for a long time without being discovered. To have a more effective analysis, CTI open standards have incorporated descriptive relationships showing how the indicators or observables are related to each other. However, these relationships are either completely overlooked in information gathering or not used for threat hunting. In this paper, we propose a system, called POIROT, which uses these correlations to uncover the steps of a successful attack campaign. We use kernel audits as a reliable source that covers all causal relations and information flows among system entities and model threat hunting as an inexact graph pattern matching problem. Our technical approach is based on a novel similarity metric which assesses an alignment between a query graph constructed out of CTI correlations and a provenance graph constructed out of kernel audit log records. We evaluate POIROT on publicly released real-world incident reports as well as reports of an adversarial engagement designed by DARPA, including ten distinct attack campaigns against different OS platforms such as Linux, FreeBSD, and Windows. Our evaluation results show that POIROT is capable of searching inside graphs containing millions of nodes and pinpoint the attacks in a few minutes, and the results serve to illustrate that CTI correlations could be used as robust and reliable artifacts for threat hunting.

Commonsense reasoning is a critical AI capability, but it is difficult to construct challenging datasets that test common sense. Recent neural question answering systems, based on large pre-trained models of language, have already achieved near-human-level performance on commonsense knowledge benchmarks. These systems do not possess human-level common sense, but are able to exploit limitations of the datasets to achieve human-level scores. We introduce the CODAH dataset, an adversarially-constructed evaluation dataset for testing common sense. CODAH forms a challenging extension to the recently-proposed SWAG dataset, which tests commonsense knowledge using sentence-completion questions that describe situations observed in video. To produce a more difficult dataset, we introduce a novel procedure for question acquisition in which workers author questions designed to target weaknesses of state-of-the-art neural question answering systems. Workers are rewarded for submissions that models fail to answer correctly both before and after fine-tuning (in cross-validation). We create 2.8k questions via this procedure and evaluate the performance of multiple state-of-the-art question answering systems on our dataset. We observe a significant gap between human performance, which is 95.3%, and the performance of the best baseline accuracy of 67.5% by the BERT-Large model.

In financial Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, models frequently rely on retrieved documents to generate accurate responses due to the time-sensitive nature of the financial domain. While retrieved documents help address knowledge gaps, model-generated responses still suffer from hallucinations that contradict the retrieved information. To mitigate this inconsistency, we propose a Reinforcement Learning framework enhanced with Fine-grained Knowledge Verification (RLFKV). Our method decomposes financial responses into atomic knowledge units and assesses the correctness of each unit to compute the fine-grained faithful reward. This reward offers more precise optimization signals, thereby improving alignment with the retrieved documents. Additionally, to prevent reward hacking (e.g., overly concise replies), we incorporate an informativeness reward that encourages the policy model to retain at least as many knowledge units as the base model. Experiments conducted on the public Financial Data Description (FDD) task and our newly proposed FDD-ANT dataset demonstrate consistent improvements, confirming the effectiveness of our approach.

Phishing attacks have inflicted substantial losses on individuals and businesses alike, necessitating the development of robust and efficient automated phishing detection approaches. Reference-based phishing detectors (RBPDs), which compare the logos on a target webpage to a known set of logos, have emerged as the state-of-the-art approach. However, a major limitation of existing RBPDs is that they rely on a manually constructed brand knowledge base, making it infeasible to scale to a large number of brands, which results in false negative errors due to the insufficient brand coverage of the knowledge base. To address this issue, we propose an automated knowledge collection pipeline, using which we collect a large-scale multimodal brand knowledge base, KnowPhish, containing 20k brands with rich information about each brand. KnowPhish can be used to boost the performance of existing RBPDs in a plug-and-play manner. A second limitation of existing RBPDs is that they solely rely on the image modality, ignoring useful textual information present in the webpage HTML. To utilize this textual information, we propose a Large Language Model (LLM)-based approach to extract brand information of webpages from text. Our resulting multimodal phishing detection approach, KnowPhish Detector (KPD), can detect phishing webpages with or without logos. We evaluate KnowPhish and KPD on a manually validated dataset, and a field study under Singapore's local context, showing substantial improvements in effectiveness and efficiency compared to state-of-the-art baselines.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has significantly advanced code completion capabilities, giving rise to a new generation of LLM-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs). Unlike general-purpose LLMs, these tools possess unique workflows, integrating multiple information sources as input and prioritizing code suggestions over natural language interaction, which introduces distinct security challenges. Additionally, LCCTs often rely on proprietary code datasets for training, raising concerns about the potential exposure of sensitive data. This paper exploits these distinct characteristics of LCCTs to develop targeted attack methodologies on two critical security risks: jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks. Our experimental results expose significant vulnerabilities within LCCTs, including a 99.4% success rate in jailbreaking attacks on GitHub Copilot and a 46.3% success rate on Amazon Q. Furthermore, We successfully extracted sensitive user data from GitHub Copilot, including 54 real email addresses and 314 physical addresses associated with GitHub usernames. Our study also demonstrates that these code-based attack methods are effective against general-purpose LLMs, such as the GPT series, highlighting a broader security misalignment in the handling of code by modern LLMs. These findings underscore critical security challenges associated with LCCTs and suggest essential directions for strengthening their security frameworks. The example code and attack samples from our research are provided at https://github.com/Sensente/Security-Attacks-on-LCCTs.

Language Models (LMs) emit Chains-of-Thought (CoTs) that drive much of their capability. However, the same sequence that carries useful reasoning can also covertly convey messages: a misaligned model may embed covert information in its CoT that slips through human supervision, a form of steganography known as encoded reasoning. Prior LM steganography schemes operate in the token or lexical space, and a content-preserving paraphraser is the canonical and effective defense in recent work. We introduce conceptual steganography, in which each step of a CoT carries information through patterns of high-level reasoning behavior, rather than through lexical choice. Across four model families and two reasoning domains, this backdoor communication channel is shown to be consistently more robust to a strong paraphrase defense than standard keyword approaches, and the encoding of information into CoTs does not affect their utility in the reasoning process. Having raised awareness of this new risk, we then demonstrate that a strategy-aware paraphraser can close much of the channel, highlighting new challenges and recommended defenses for ensuring faithful LLM reasoning in the wild.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) on specialized domain datasets has shown improved performance when large language models (LLMs) are fine-tuned for generating responses to user queries. In this study, we develop a cybersecurity question-answering (Q\&A) dataset, called AttackQA, and employ it to build a RAG-based Q\&A system designed for analysts in security operations centers. The dataset comprises 25,335 Q\&A pairs, accompanied by rationales to facilitate fine-tuning and evaluation. 80\% of the dataset was generated with help of a lightweight open-source LLM (LLama 3 8B), which produced over 1100 tokens per second with full 16-bit precision on SambaNova System's SN40L specialized hardware. To ensure dataset quality, we fine-tuned LLama 3 70B to detect and reject low-quality Q\&A pairs. In using the dataset for RAG, we demonstrate that fine-tuning open-source embeddings and LLMs can yield superior accuracy compared to OpenAI's state-of-the-art proprietary embedding and LLM (GPT-4o). Furthermore, we use Llama 3.1 405B as a judge to evaluate answer correctness, enabling the creation of a fully open-source, high-speed RAG and evaluation pipeline with a benchmark for model accuracy.

Automatically generating source code from natural language using large language models (LLMs) is becoming common, yet security vulnerabilities persist despite advances in fine tuning and prompting. In this work, we systematically evaluate whether multi LLM ensembles and collaborative strategies can meaningfully improve secure code generation. We present MULTI-LLMSECCODEEVAL, a framework for assessing and enhancing security across the vulnerability management lifecycle by combining multiple LLMs with static analysis and structured collaboration. Using SecLLMEval and SecLLMHolmes, we benchmark ten pipelines spanning single model, ensemble, collaborative, and hybrid designs. Our results show that ensemble pipelines augmented with static analysis improve secure code generation over single LLM baselines by up to 47.3% on SecLLMEval and 19.3% on SecLLMHolmes, while purely LLM based collaborative pipelines yield smaller gains of 8.9% to 22.3%. Hybrid pipelines that integrate ensembling, detection, and patching achieve the strongest security performance, outperforming the best ensemble baseline by 1.78% to 4.72% and collaborative baselines by 19.81% to 26.78%. Ablation studies reveal that model scale alone does not ensure security. Smaller, structured multi model ensembles consistently outperform large monolithic LLMs. Overall, our findings demonstrate that secure code does not emerge from scale, but from carefully orchestrated multi model system design.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on third-party skills that operate within privileged execution environments and routinely handle sensitive credentials, yet how these credentials are leaked remains largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we present the first large-scale empirical study on credential leakage in agent skills. From 170,226 artifacts on SkillsMP, the largest open-source skill marketplace, we sampled 17,022 skills via stratified random sampling and analyzed each through static secret extraction (regex and AST parsing), dynamic sandbox testing with mock credentials, and cross-referencing developer intent against runtime behavior. Our analysis identifies 520 affected skills containing 1,708 security issues, and yields a taxonomy of 10 leakage patterns. Three findings stand out. First, 76.3% of cases require jointly analyzing natural-language descriptions and programming logic, showing that credential exposure in skills is fundamentally cross-modal. Second, debug logging accounts for 73.5% of vulnerabilities because agent frameworks feed stdout into the LLM context window, turning routine debugging into a credential exposure vector. Third, 89.6% of leaked credentials are immediately exploitable -- 92.5% during routine execution without elevated privileges -- and the fork-based distribution model defeats remediation, as secrets removed from 107 upstream repositories persist across 50+ independent forks. Following responsible disclosure, all malicious skills have been removed and 91.6% of hardcoded cases remediated. We release our dataset, taxonomy, and detection pipeline to support future agent security research.

Large language models (LLMs) are reshaping numerous facets of our daily lives, leading widespread adoption as web-based services. Despite their versatility, LLMs face notable challenges, such as generating hallucinated content and lacking access to up-to-date information. Lately, to address such limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising direction by generating responses grounded in external knowledge sources. A typical RAG system consists of i) a retriever that probes a group of relevant passages from a knowledge base and ii) a generator that formulates a response based on the retrieved content. However, as with other AI systems, recent studies demonstrate the vulnerability of RAG, such as knowledge corruption attacks by injecting misleading information. In response, several defense strategies have been proposed, including having LLMs inspect the retrieved passages individually or fine-tuning robust retrievers. While effective, such approaches often come with substantial computational costs. In this work, we introduce RAGDefender, a resource-efficient defense mechanism against knowledge corruption (i.e., by data poisoning) attacks in practical RAG deployments. RAGDefender operates during the post-retrieval phase, leveraging lightweight machine learning techniques to detect and filter out adversarial content without requiring additional model training or inference. Our empirical evaluations show that RAGDefender consistently outperforms existing state-of-the-art defenses across multiple models and adversarial scenarios: e.g., RAGDefender reduces the attack success rate (ASR) against the Gemini model from 0.89 to as low as 0.02, compared to 0.69 for RobustRAG and 0.24 for Discern-and-Answer when adversarial passages outnumber legitimate ones by a factor of four (4x).

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have garnered widespread attention for their exceptional capabilities. Prompts are central to the functionality and performance of LLMs, making them highly valuable assets. The increasing reliance on high-quality prompts has driven significant growth in prompt services. However, this growth also expands the potential for prompt leakage, increasing the risk that attackers could replicate original functionalities, create competing products, and severely infringe on developers' intellectual property. Despite these risks, prompt leakage in real-world prompt services remains underexplored. In this paper, we present PRSA, a practical attack framework designed for prompt stealing. PRSA infers the detailed intent of prompts through very limited input-output analysis and can successfully generate stolen prompts that replicate the original functionality. Extensive evaluations demonstrate PRSA's effectiveness across two main types of real-world prompt services. Specifically, compared to previous works, it improves the attack success rate from 17.8% to 46.1% in prompt marketplaces and from 39% to 52% in LLM application stores, respectively. Notably, in the attack on "Math", one of the most popular educational applications in OpenAI's GPT Store with over 1 million conversations, PRSA uncovered a hidden Easter egg that had not been revealed previously. Besides, our analysis reveals that higher mutual information between a prompt and its output correlates with an increased risk of leakage. This insight guides the design and evaluation of two potential defenses against the security threats posed by PRSA. We have reported these findings to the prompt service vendors, including PromptBase and OpenAI, and actively collaborate with them to implement defensive measures.

Multi-modal retrieval augmented generation (M-RAG) is instrumental for inhibiting hallucinations in large multi-modal models (LMMs) through the use of a factual knowledge base (KB). However, M-RAG introduces new attack vectors for adversaries that aim to disrupt the system by injecting malicious entries into the KB. In this paper, we present the first poisoning attack against M-RAG targeting visual document retrieval applications where the KB contains images of document pages. We propose two attacks, each of which require injecting only a single adversarial image into the KB. Firstly, we propose a universal attack that, for any potential user query, influences the response to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) in the M-RAG system. Secondly, we present a targeted attack against one or a group of user queries, with the goal of spreading targeted misinformation. For both attacks, we use a multi-objective gradient-based adversarial approach to craft the injected image while optimizing for both retrieval and generation. We evaluate our attacks against several visual document retrieval datasets, a diverse set of state-of-the-art retrievers (embedding models) and generators (LMMs), demonstrating the attack effectiveness in both the universal and targeted settings. We additionally present results including commonly used defenses, various attack hyper-parameter settings, ablations, and attack transferability.

This paper aims to help structure the risk landscape associated with large-scale Language Models (LMs). In order to foster advances in responsible innovation, an in-depth understanding of the potential risks posed by these models is needed. A wide range of established and anticipated risks are analysed in detail, drawing on multidisciplinary expertise and literature from computer science, linguistics, and social sciences. We outline six specific risk areas: I. Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity, II. Information Hazards, III. Misinformation Harms, V. Malicious Uses, V. Human-Computer Interaction Harms, VI. Automation, Access, and Environmental Harms. The first area concerns the perpetuation of stereotypes, unfair discrimination, exclusionary norms, toxic language, and lower performance by social group for LMs. The second focuses on risks from private data leaks or LMs correctly inferring sensitive information. The third addresses risks arising from poor, false or misleading information including in sensitive domains, and knock-on risks such as the erosion of trust in shared information. The fourth considers risks from actors who try to use LMs to cause harm. The fifth focuses on risks specific to LLMs used to underpin conversational agents that interact with human users, including unsafe use, manipulation or deception. The sixth discusses the risk of environmental harm, job automation, and other challenges that may have a disparate effect on different social groups or communities. In total, we review 21 risks in-depth. We discuss the points of origin of different risks and point to potential mitigation approaches. Lastly, we discuss organisational responsibilities in implementing mitigations, and the role of collaboration and participation. We highlight directions for further research, particularly on expanding the toolkit for assessing and evaluating the outlined risks in LMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized artificial intelligence and machine learning through their advanced text processing and generating capabilities. However, their widespread deployment has raised significant safety and reliability concerns. Established vulnerabilities in deep neural networks, coupled with emerging threat models, may compromise security evaluations and create a false sense of security. Given the extensive research in the field of LLM security, we believe that summarizing the current state of affairs will help the research community better understand the present landscape and inform future developments. This paper reviews current research on LLM vulnerabilities and threats, and evaluates the effectiveness of contemporary defense mechanisms. We analyze recent studies on attack vectors and model weaknesses, providing insights into attack mechanisms and the evolving threat landscape. We also examine current defense strategies, highlighting their strengths and limitations. By contrasting advancements in attack and defense methodologies, we identify research gaps and propose future directions to enhance LLM security. Our goal is to advance the understanding of LLM safety challenges and guide the development of more robust security measures.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive results on natural language tasks, and security researchers are beginning to employ them in both offensive and defensive systems. In cyber-security, there have been multiple research efforts that utilize LLMs focusing on the pre-breach stage of attacks like phishing and malware generation. However, so far there lacks a comprehensive study regarding whether LLM-based systems can be leveraged to simulate the post-breach stage of attacks that are typically human-operated, or "hands-on-keyboard" attacks, under various attack techniques and environments. As LLMs inevitably advance, they may be able to automate both the pre- and post-breach attack stages. This shift may transform organizational attacks from rare, expert-led events to frequent, automated operations requiring no expertise and executed at automation speed and scale. This risks fundamentally changing global computer security and correspondingly causing substantial economic impacts, and a goal of this work is to better understand these risks now so we can better prepare for these inevitable ever-more-capable LLMs on the horizon. On the immediate impact side, this research serves three purposes. First, an automated LLM-based, post-breach exploitation framework can help analysts quickly test and continually improve their organization's network security posture against previously unseen attacks. Second, an LLM-based penetration test system can extend the effectiveness of red teams with a limited number of human analysts. Finally, this research can help defensive systems and teams learn to detect novel attack behaviors preemptively before their use in the wild....

Recent studies have revealed a security threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, called the Backdoor Attack. Victim models can maintain competitive performance on clean samples while behaving abnormally on samples with a specific trigger word inserted. Previous backdoor attacking methods usually assume that attackers have a certain degree of data knowledge, either the dataset which users would use or proxy datasets for a similar task, for implementing the data poisoning procedure. However, in this paper, we find that it is possible to hack the model in a data-free way by modifying one single word embedding vector, with almost no accuracy sacrificed on clean samples. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and sentence-pair classification tasks show that our method is more efficient and stealthier. We hope this work can raise the awareness of such a critical security risk hidden in the embedding layers of NLP models. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/Embedding-Poisoning.

The safety of large language models (LLMs) has garnered significant research attention. In this paper, we argue that previous empirical studies demonstrate LLMs exhibit a propensity to trust information from authoritative sources, such as academic papers, implying new possible vulnerabilities. To verify this possibility, a preliminary analysis is designed to illustrate our two findings. Based on this insight, a novel jailbreaking method, Paper Summary Attack (PSA), is proposed. It systematically synthesizes content from either attack-focused or defense-focused LLM safety paper to construct an adversarial prompt template, while strategically infilling harmful query as adversarial payloads within predefined subsections. Extensive experiments show significant vulnerabilities not only in base LLMs, but also in state-of-the-art reasoning model like Deepseek-R1. PSA achieves a 97\% attack success rate (ASR) on well-aligned models like Claude3.5-Sonnet and an even higher 98\% ASR on Deepseek-R1. More intriguingly, our work has further revealed diametrically opposed vulnerability bias across different base models, and even between different versions of the same model, when exposed to either attack-focused or defense-focused papers. This phenomenon potentially indicates future research clues for both adversarial methodologies and safety alignment.Code is available at https://github.com/233liang/Paper-Summary-Attack

Federated Learning is a promising paradigm for privacy-preserving collaborative model training. In practice, it is essential not only to continuously train the model to acquire new knowledge but also to guarantee old knowledge the right to be forgotten (i.e., federated unlearning), especially for privacy-sensitive information or harmful knowledge. However, current federated unlearning methods face several challenges, including indiscriminate unlearning of cross-client knowledge, irreversibility of unlearning, and significant unlearning costs. To this end, we propose a method named FUSED, which first identifies critical layers by analyzing each layer's sensitivity to knowledge and constructs sparse unlearning adapters for sensitive ones. Then, the adapters are trained without altering the original parameters, overwriting the unlearning knowledge with the remaining knowledge. This knowledge overwriting process enables FUSED to mitigate the effects of indiscriminate unlearning. Moreover, the introduction of independent adapters makes unlearning reversible and significantly reduces the unlearning costs. Finally, extensive experiments on three datasets across various unlearning scenarios demonstrate that FUSED's effectiveness is comparable to Retraining, surpassing all other baselines while greatly reducing unlearning costs.

A conventional LLM Unlearning setting consists of two subsets -"forget" and "retain", with the objectives of removing the undesired knowledge from the forget set while preserving the remaining knowledge from the retain. In privacy-focused unlearning research, a retain set is often further divided into neighbor sets, containing either directly or indirectly connected to the forget targets; and augmented by a general-knowledge set. A common practice in existing benchmarks is to employ only a single neighbor set, with general knowledge which fails to reflect the real-world data complexities and relationships. LLM Unlearning typically involves 1:1 sampling or cyclic iteration sampling. However, the efficacy and stability of these de facto standards have not been critically examined. In this study, we systematically evaluate these common practices. Our findings reveal that relying on a single neighbor set is suboptimal and that a standard sampling approach can obscure performance trade-offs. Based on this analysis, we propose and validate an initial set of best practices: (1) Incorporation of diverse neighbor sets to balance forget efficacy and model utility, (2) Standard 1:1 sampling methods are inefficient and yield poor results, (3) Our proposed Modular Entity-Level Unlearning (MELU) strategy as an alternative to cyclic sampling. We demonstrate that this modular approach, combined with robust algorithms, provides a clear and stable path towards effective unlearning.

Scaling laws describe the relationship between the size of language models and their capabilities. Unlike prior studies that evaluate a model's capability via loss or benchmarks, we estimate the number of knowledge bits a model stores. We focus on factual knowledge represented as tuples, such as (USA, capital, Washington D.C.) from a Wikipedia page. Through multiple controlled datasets, we establish that language models can and only can store 2 bits of knowledge per parameter, even when quantized to int8, and such knowledge can be flexibly extracted for downstream applications. Consequently, a 7B model can store 14B bits of knowledge, surpassing the English Wikipedia and textbooks combined based on our estimation. More broadly, we present 12 results on how (1) training duration, (2) model architecture, (3) quantization, (4) sparsity constraints such as MoE, and (5) data signal-to-noise ratio affect a model's knowledge storage capacity. Notable insights include: * The GPT-2 architecture, with rotary embedding, matches or even surpasses LLaMA/Mistral architectures in knowledge storage, particularly over shorter training durations. This arises because LLaMA/Mistral uses GatedMLP, which is less stable and harder to train. * Prepending training data with domain names (e.g., wikipedia.org) significantly increases a model's knowledge capacity. Language models can autonomously identify and prioritize domains rich in knowledge, optimizing their storage capacity.

We present a reproducible pipeline for mapping Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) to MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise techniques from free-text vulnerability descriptions. Rather than relying on the CWE->CAPEC->ATT&CK derivation chain, whose table-expansion artifacts we quantify, we train a multi-label classifier on a curated gold dataset of 1,207 CVEs from expert MITRE Center for Threat-Informed Defense mappings. The resulting model approximately doubles recall@5 compared with a zero-shot embedding-similarity baseline and improves every ranking metric. We then investigate whether LLM-assisted labeling can extend the gold dataset. Initial experiments suggest contradictory conclusions: a single run indicates degraded performance, while averaging over five random seeds suggests a small gain. However, an independent replication and an expansion-size study (100--984 additional CVEs) show that the apparent improvement is an evaluation artifact. LLM-generated labels, with approximately 0.39 agreement with expert annotations, provide no reliable improvement at any expansion size and reduce rare-technique coverage at around 1,000 added CVEs (macro-F1 decreases by 0.04). The root cause is evaluation noise. Selecting checkpoints on a small test split effectively maximizes over many noisy evaluations, producing recall@5 differences of up to 0.05 between otherwise identical runs. Using a corrected protocol based on validation-split checkpoint selection, the gold-only model achieves recall@5 of (0.673 \pm 0.019), and repeating the decisive experiment confirms the null result for LLM expansion. A final scaling study shows that additional expert-curated data consistently improves performance, whereas LLM-labeled data does not, indicating that the classifier is limited by label quality rather than dataset size. All datasets, models, code, and training logs are publicly released.

Large Language Models (LLMs) assist in specialized tasks but struggle to align with evolving domain knowledge without costly fine-tuning. Domain knowledge consists of: Knowledge: Immutable facts (e.g., 'A stone is solid') and generally accepted principles (e.g., ethical standards); Refined Memory: Evolving insights shaped by business needs and real-world changes. However, a significant gap often exists between a domain expert's deep, nuanced understanding and the system's domain knowledge, which can hinder accurate information retrieval and application. Our Memory-Augmented Refinement of Knowledge (MARK) framework enables LLMs to continuously learn without retraining by leveraging structured refined memory, inspired by the Society of Mind. MARK operates through specialized agents, each serving a distinct role: Residual Refined Memory Agent: Stores and retrieves domain-specific insights to maintain context over time; User Question Refined Memory Agent: Captures user-provided facts, abbreviations, and terminology for better comprehension; LLM Response Refined Memory Agent: Extracts key elements from responses for refinement and personalization. These agents analyse stored refined memory, detect patterns, resolve contradictions, and improve response accuracy. Temporal factors like recency and frequency prioritize relevant information while discarding outdated insights. MARK enhances LLMs in multiple ways: Ground Truth Strategy: Reduces hallucinations by establishing a structured reference; Domain-Specific Adaptation: Essential for fields like healthcare, law, and manufacturing, where proprietary insights are absent from public datasets; Personalized AI Assistants: Improves virtual assistants by remembering user preferences, ensuring coherent responses over time.

Agentic systems increasingly rely on reusable procedural capabilities, a.k.a., agentic skills, to execute long-horizon workflows reliably. These capabilities are callable modules that package procedural knowledge with explicit applicability conditions, execution policies, termination criteria, and reusable interfaces. Unlike one-off plans or atomic tool calls, skills operate (and often do well) across tasks. This paper maps the skill layer across the full lifecycle (discovery, practice, distillation, storage, composition, evaluation, and update) and introduces two complementary taxonomies. The first is a system-level set of seven design patterns capturing how skills are packaged and executed in practice, from metadata-driven progressive disclosure and executable code skills to self-evolving libraries and marketplace distribution. The second is an orthogonal representation times scope taxonomy describing what skills are (natural language, code, policy, hybrid) and what environments they operate over (web, OS, software engineering, robotics). We analyze the security and governance implications of skill-based agents, covering supply-chain risks, prompt injection via skill payloads, and trust-tiered execution, grounded by a case study of the ClawHavoc campaign in which nearly 1{,}200 malicious skills infiltrated a major agent marketplace, exfiltrating API keys, cryptocurrency wallets, and browser credentials at scale. We further survey deterministic evaluation approaches, anchored by recent benchmark evidence that curated skills can substantially improve agent success rates while self-generated skills may degrade them. We conclude with open challenges toward robust, verifiable, and certifiable skills for real-world autonomous agents.