Daily Papers

Despite their impressive performance, generative image models trained on large-scale datasets frequently fail to produce images with seemingly simple concepts -- e.g., human hands or objects appearing in groups of four -- that are reasonably expected to appear in the training data. These failure modes have largely been documented anecdotally, leaving open the question of whether they reflect idiosyncratic anomalies or more structural limitations of these models. To address this, we introduce a systematic approach for identifying and characterizing "conceptual blindspots" -- concepts present in the training data but absent or misrepresented in a model's generations. Our method leverages sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to extract interpretable concept embeddings, enabling a quantitative comparison of concept prevalence between real and generated images. We train an archetypal SAE (RA-SAE) on DINOv2 features with 32,000 concepts -- the largest such SAE to date -- enabling fine-grained analysis of conceptual disparities. Applied to four popular generative models (Stable Diffusion 1.5/2.1, PixArt, and Kandinsky), our approach reveals specific suppressed blindspots (e.g., bird feeders, DVD discs, and whitespaces on documents) and exaggerated blindspots (e.g., wood background texture and palm trees). At the individual datapoint level, we further isolate memorization artifacts -- instances where models reproduce highly specific visual templates seen during training. Overall, we propose a theoretically grounded framework for systematically identifying conceptual blindspots in generative models by assessing their conceptual fidelity with respect to the underlying data-generating process.

Text-to-image models are showcasing the impressive ability to create high-quality and diverse generative images. Nevertheless, the transition from freehand sketches to complex scene images remains challenging using diffusion models. In this study, we propose a novel sketch-guided scene image generation framework, decomposing the task of scene image scene generation from sketch inputs into object-level cross-domain generation and scene-level image construction. We employ pre-trained diffusion models to convert each single object drawing into an image of the object, inferring additional details while maintaining the sparse sketch structure. In order to maintain the conceptual fidelity of the foreground during scene generation, we invert the visual features of object images into identity embeddings for scene generation. In scene-level image construction, we generate the latent representation of the scene image using the separated background prompts, and then blend the generated foreground objects according to the layout of the sketch input. To ensure the foreground objects' details remain unchanged while naturally composing the scene image, we infer the scene image on the blended latent representation using a global prompt that includes the trained identity tokens. Through qualitative and quantitative experiments, we demonstrate the ability of the proposed approach to generate scene images from hand-drawn sketches surpasses the state-of-the-art approaches.

Interior design allows us to be who we are and live how we want - each design is as unique as our distinct personality. However, it is not trivial for non-professionals to express and materialize this since it requires aligning functional and visual expectations with the constraints of physical space; this renders interior design a luxury. To make it more accessible, we present I-Design, a personalized interior designer that allows users to generate and visualize their design goals through natural language communication. I-Design starts with a team of large language model agents that engage in dialogues and logical reasoning with one another, transforming textual user input into feasible scene graph designs with relative object relationships. Subsequently, an effective placement algorithm determines optimal locations for each object within the scene. The final design is then constructed in 3D by retrieving and integrating assets from an existing object database. Additionally, we propose a new evaluation protocol that utilizes a vision-language model and complements the design pipeline. Extensive quantitative and qualitative experiments show that I-Design outperforms existing methods in delivering high-quality 3D design solutions and aligning with abstract concepts that match user input, showcasing its advantages across detailed 3D arrangement and conceptual fidelity.

3D vector graphics play a crucial role in various applications including 3D shape retrieval, conceptual design, and virtual reality interactions due to their ability to capture essential structural information with minimal representation. While recent approaches have shown promise in generating 3D vector graphics, they often suffer from lengthy processing times and struggle to maintain view consistency. To address these limitations, we propose ViewCraft3D (VC3D), an efficient method that leverages 3D priors to generate 3D vector graphics. Specifically, our approach begins with 3D object analysis, employs a geometric extraction algorithm to fit 3D vector graphics to the underlying structure, and applies view-consistent refinement process to enhance visual quality. Our comprehensive experiments demonstrate that VC3D outperforms previous methods in both qualitative and quantitative evaluations, while significantly reducing computational overhead. The resulting 3D sketches maintain view consistency and effectively capture the essential characteristics of the original objects.

Decision trees and diffusion models are ostensibly disparate model classes, one discrete and hierarchical, the other continuous and dynamic. This work unifies the two by establishing a crisp mathematical correspondence between hierarchical decision trees and diffusion processes in appropriate limiting regimes. Our unification reveals a shared optimization principle: Global Trajectory Score Matching (GTSM), for which gradient boosting (in an idealized version) is asymptotically optimal. We underscore the conceptual value of our work through two key practical instantiations: \treeflow, which achieves competitive generation quality on tabular data with higher fidelity and a 2\times computational speedup, and \dsmtree, a novel distillation method that transfers hierarchical decision logic into neural networks, matching teacher performance within 2\% on many benchmarks.

Evaluating Language Models (LMs) in specialized, high-stakes domains such as finance remains a significant challenge due to the scarcity of open, high-quality, and domain-specific datasets. Existing general-purpose benchmarks provide broad coverage but lack the depth and domain fidelity needed to assess LMs' capabilities for real-world financial reasoning, which requires both conceptual understanding and quantitative rigor. To address this gap, we introduce FinForge, a scalable, semi-synthetic pipeline for constructing finance-specific evaluation benchmarks through a hybrid of expert-guided data curation and controlled LM-based synthesis. FinForge combines manual and programmatic corpus construction from authoritative financial sources with structured question generation and validation using Gemini 2.5 Flash. To demonstrate the pipeline's efficacy, we produce FinForge-5k, a snapshot benchmark comprising over 5,000 human-validated question-answer pairs across 11 finance subdomains, derived from a curated corpus of 100,000 verified documents totaling 143M tokens. Evaluation of state-of-the-art open-source and closed-source models on FinForge-5k reveals significant differences in financial reasoning, with leading models achieving accuracy levels near 80%. These findings underscore the framework's utility for diagnosing current model limitations and guiding future improvements in financial domain competence. All code and data are available at https://github.com/gtfintechlab/FinForge.

Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) have emerged as powerful techniques for interpretability of large language models (LLMs), aiming to decompose hidden states into meaningful semantic features. While several SAE variants have been proposed, there remains no principled framework to derive SAEs from the original dictionary learning formulation. In this work, we introduce such a framework by unrolling the proximal gradient method for sparse coding. We show that a single-step update naturally recovers common SAE variants, including ReLU, JumpReLU, and TopK. Through this lens, we reveal a fundamental limitation of existing SAEs: their sparsity-inducing regularizers enforce non-negativity, preventing a single feature from representing bidirectional concepts (e.g., male vs. female). This structural constraint fragments semantic axes into separate, redundant features, limiting representational completeness. To address this issue, we propose AbsTopK SAE, a new variant derived from the ell_0 sparsity constraint that applies hard thresholding over the largest-magnitude activations. By preserving both positive and negative activations, AbsTopK uncovers richer, bidirectional conceptual representations. Comprehensive experiments across four LLMs and seven probing and steering tasks show that AbsTopK improves reconstruction fidelity, enhances interpretability, and enables single features to encode contrasting concepts. Remarkably, AbsTopK matches or even surpasses the Difference-in-Mean method, a supervised approach that requires labeled data for each concept and has been shown in prior work to outperform SAEs.

Fine-tuning advanced diffusion models for high-quality image stylization usually requires large training datasets and substantial computational resources, hindering their practical applicability. We propose Ada-Adapter, a novel framework for few-shot style personalization of diffusion models. Ada-Adapter leverages off-the-shelf diffusion models and pre-trained image feature encoders to learn a compact style representation from a limited set of source images. Our method enables efficient zero-shot style transfer utilizing a single reference image. Furthermore, with a small number of source images (three to five are sufficient) and a few minutes of fine-tuning, our method can capture intricate style details and conceptual characteristics, generating high-fidelity stylized images that align well with the provided text prompts. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on various artistic styles, including flat art, 3D rendering, and logo design. Our experimental results show that Ada-Adapter outperforms existing zero-shot and few-shot stylization methods in terms of output quality, diversity, and training efficiency.

Conceptual knowledge is fundamental to human cognition and knowledge bases. However, existing knowledge probing works only focus on evaluating factual knowledge of pre-trained language models (PLMs) and ignore conceptual knowledge. Since conceptual knowledge often appears as implicit commonsense behind texts, designing probes for conceptual knowledge is hard. Inspired by knowledge representation schemata, we comprehensively evaluate conceptual knowledge of PLMs by designing three tasks to probe whether PLMs organize entities by conceptual similarities, learn conceptual properties, and conceptualize entities in contexts, respectively. For the tasks, we collect and annotate 24k data instances covering 393 concepts, which is COPEN, a COnceptual knowledge Probing bENchmark. Extensive experiments on different sizes and types of PLMs show that existing PLMs systematically lack conceptual knowledge and suffer from various spurious correlations. We believe this is a critical bottleneck for realizing human-like cognition in PLMs. COPEN and our codes are publicly released at https://github.com/THU-KEG/COPEN.

We are born with the ability to learn concepts by comparing diverse observations. This helps us to understand the new world in a compositional manner and facilitates extrapolation, as objects naturally consist of multiple concepts. In this work, we argue that the cognitive mechanism of comparison, fundamental to human learning, is also vital for machines to recover true concepts underlying the data. This offers correctness guarantees for the field of concept learning, which, despite its impressive empirical successes, still lacks general theoretical support. Specifically, we aim to develop a theoretical framework for the identifiability of concepts with multiple classes of observations. We show that with sufficient diversity across classes, hidden concepts can be identified without assuming specific concept types, functional relations, or parametric generative models. Interestingly, even when conditions are not globally satisfied, we can still provide alternative guarantees for as many concepts as possible based on local comparisons, thereby extending the applicability of our theory to more flexible scenarios. Moreover, the hidden structure between classes and concepts can also be identified nonparametrically. We validate our theoretical results in both synthetic and real-world settings.

Humans organize knowledge into compact categories through semantic compression by mapping diverse instances to abstract representations while preserving meaning (e.g., robin and blue jay are both birds; most birds can fly). These concepts reflect a trade-off between expressive fidelity and representational simplicity. Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable linguistic abilities, yet whether their internal representations strike a human-like trade-off between compression and semantic fidelity is unclear. We introduce a novel information-theoretic framework, drawing from Rate-Distortion Theory and the Information Bottleneck principle, to quantitatively compare these strategies. Analyzing token embeddings from a diverse suite of LLMs against seminal human categorization benchmarks, we uncover key divergences. While LLMs form broad conceptual categories that align with human judgment, they struggle to capture the fine-grained semantic distinctions crucial for human understanding. More fundamentally, LLMs demonstrate a strong bias towards aggressive statistical compression, whereas human conceptual systems appear to prioritize adaptive nuance and contextual richness, even if this results in lower compressional efficiency by our measures. These findings illuminate critical differences between current AI and human cognitive architectures, guiding pathways toward LLMs with more human-aligned conceptual representations.

Robust, faithful and harm-free pronoun use for individuals is an important goal for language models as their use increases, but prior work tends to study only one or two of these characteristics at a time. To measure progress towards the combined goal, we introduce the task of pronoun fidelity: given a context introducing a co-referring entity and pronoun, the task is to reuse the correct pronoun later. We present RUFF, a carefully-designed dataset of over 5 million instances to measure robust pronoun fidelity in English, and we evaluate 37 popular large language models across architectures (encoder-only, decoder-only and encoder-decoder) and scales (11M-70B parameters). When an individual is introduced with a pronoun, models can mostly faithfully reuse this pronoun in the next sentence, but they are significantly worse with she/her/her, singular they and neopronouns. Moreover, models are easily distracted by non-adversarial sentences discussing other people; even one additional sentence with a distractor pronoun causes accuracy to drop on average by 34%. Our results show that pronoun fidelity is neither robust, nor due to reasoning, in a simple, naturalistic setting where humans achieve nearly 100% accuracy. We encourage researchers to bridge the gaps we find and to carefully evaluate reasoning in settings where superficial repetition might inflate perceptions of model performance.

Conceptual combination is a cognitive process that merges basic concepts, enabling the creation of complex expressions. During this process, the properties of combination (e.g., the whiteness of a peeled apple) can be inherited from basic concepts, newly emerge, or be canceled. However, previous studies have evaluated a limited set of properties and have not examined the generative process. To address this gap, we introduce the Conceptual Combination with Property Type dataset (CCPT), which consists of 12.3K annotated triplets of noun phrases, properties, and property types. Using CCPT, we establish three types of tasks to evaluate LLMs for conceptual combination thoroughly. Our key findings are threefold: (1) Our automatic metric grading property emergence and cancellation closely corresponds with human judgments. (2) LLMs, including OpenAI's o1, struggle to generate noun phrases which possess given emergent properties. (3) Our proposed method, inspired by cognitive psychology model that explains how relationships between concepts are formed, improves performances in all generative tasks. The dataset and experimental code are available at https://github.com/seokwon99/CCPT.git.

Understanding concepts is fundamental to generalization. Despite their impressive performance on a wide range of tasks, Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with genuine concept understanding. Prior work has evaluated conceptual understanding in LLMs using natural-language benchmarks or narrowly scoped synthetic tasks, but these settings often conflate multiple skills or lack precise control over the underlying concepts and their properties. To support controlled probing of concepts in LLMs, we design tests on their core properties: abstraction, compositionality, and groundness. We set up a concept-centric benchmark, targeting spatial concepts such as direction, distance, topology, and their compositions, and use question answering tasks serving as a proxy. We conduct extensive experiments across multiple LLM architectures and training regimes to analyze how model scale and design impact conceptual understanding. The results reveal clear limitations in current LLMs and provide insights into the factors shaping their ability to acquire and compose structured concepts. Our findings shed light on how concept-based LLMs can be redesigned for improved information access and knowledge management. The code will be available at https://github.com/rd20karim/concept-probing.

Concepts serve as fundamental abstractions that support human reasoning and categorization. However, it remains unclear whether large language models truly capture such conceptual structures or primarily rely on surface-level pattern memorization. Existing benchmarks are largely static and fact oriented, which limits their ability to probe fine-grained semantic understanding and makes them vulnerable to data leakage and overfitting. To address this limitation, we introduce CK-Arena, a dynamic benchmark for conceptual knowledge evaluation based on a multi agent social deduction game, namely the Undercover game. In this setting, LLM based agents are assigned subtly different concept words and must describe, distinguish, and infer conceptual properties from others' statements. Model performance is evaluated through both game level outcomes and the semantic quality of generated descriptions. Furthermore, CK-Arena leverages the interaction process to automatically construct high quality question answering data for fine grained diagnostic analysis. Experimental results show that conceptual understanding varies substantially across models and categories, and is not strictly aligned with overall model capability. The data and code are available at the project homepage: https://ck-arena.site.

Concept guidance has emerged as a cheap and simple way to control the behavior of language models by probing their hidden representations for concept vectors and using them to perturb activations at inference time. While the focus of previous work has largely been on truthfulness, in this paper we extend this framework to a richer set of concepts such as appropriateness, humor, creativity and quality, and explore to what degree current detection and guidance strategies work in these challenging settings. To facilitate evaluation, we develop a novel metric for concept guidance that takes into account both the success of concept elicitation as well as the potential degradation in fluency of the guided model. Our extensive experiments reveal that while some concepts such as truthfulness more easily allow for guidance with current techniques, novel concepts such as appropriateness or humor either remain difficult to elicit, need extensive tuning to work, or even experience confusion. Moreover, we find that probes with optimal detection accuracies do not necessarily make for the optimal guides, contradicting previous observations for truthfulness. Our work warrants a deeper investigation into the interplay between detectability, guidability, and the nature of the concept, and we hope that our rich experimental test-bed for guidance research inspires stronger follow-up approaches.

Text-to-image generation has reached photorealistic quality, yet state-of-the-art systems remain unreliable at producing scientific diagrams, whose value depends not on appearance but on physical faithfulness: correct force directions, valid coordinate systems, consistent thermodynamic states, and equations matching the depicted scenario. Trained on web imagery with physically shallow captions, generic models produce diagrams that look plausible but are physically wrong, harmful in education and scientific communication. We present Princigram, a physics-faithful scientific-diagram generator, and its data pipeline. Our central advance is Structured Physical Chain-of-Thought (SP-CoT): a per-subdiscipline schema that decomposes a physics diagram into an explicit multi-step reasoning chain across six subdisciplines, from scene identification through force or process analysis to governing laws and synthesis. Unlike free-form chain-of-thought, SP-CoT follows a fixed schema with strict fidelity rules that separate visually grounded facts from physically inferred reasoning and type all mathematics symbolically; it serves both as dense training supervision and, at inference, as a structured "thinking" prompt. With it we curate and structurally annotate 4.3 million physics images, of which 115,037 carry expert-level annotation, and adapt a unified multimodal backbone. We further introduce VeriphyT2IBench, whose questions are derived from each held-out diagram's own structured annotation: each diagram becomes an item-specific bank of binary questions about its objects, forces, and states, so a judge model's score decomposes into named physical facts rather than one holistic number. On the physics subset of GenExam and on VeriphyT2IBench, Princigram shows that explicit physics-structured supervision improves the physical faithfulness of generated scientific diagrams.

Distributional word representation methods exploit word co-occurrences to build compact vector encodings of words. While these representations enjoy widespread use in modern natural language processing, it is unclear whether they accurately encode all necessary facets of conceptual meaning. In this paper, we evaluate how well these representations can predict perceptual and conceptual features of concrete concepts, drawing on two semantic norm datasets sourced from human participants. We find that several standard word representations fail to encode many salient perceptual features of concepts, and show that these deficits correlate with word-word similarity prediction errors. Our analyses provide motivation for grounded and embodied language learning approaches, which may help to remedy these deficits.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) remains indispensable for aligning large language models (LLMs) in subjective domains. To enhance robustness, recent work shifts toward Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) that generate rationales before predicting preferences. Yet in GenRM training and evaluation, practice remains outcome-label-only, leaving reasoning quality unchecked. We show that reasoning fidelity-the consistency between a GenRM's preference decision and reference decision rationales-is highly predictive of downstream RLHF outcomes, beyond standard label accuracy. Specifically, we repurpose existing reward-model benchmarks to compute Spurious Correctness (S-Corr)-the fraction of label-correct decisions with rationales misaligned with golden judgments. Our empirical evaluation reveals substantial S-Corr even for competitive GenRMs, and higher S-Corr is associated with policy degeneration under optimization. To improve fidelity, we propose Rationale-Centric Alignment, R-Align, which augments training with gold judgments and explicitly supervises rationale alignment. R-Align reduces S-Corr on RM benchmarks and yields consistent gains in actor performance across STEM, coding, instruction following, and general tasks.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

Analogical reasoning is at the core of human cognition, serving as an important foundation for a variety of intellectual activities. While prior work has shown that LLMs can represent task patterns and surface-level concepts, it remains unclear whether these models can encode high-level relational concepts and apply them to novel situations through structured comparisons. In this work, we explore this fundamental aspect using proportional and story analogies, and identify three key findings. First, LLMs effectively encode the underlying relationships between analogous entities; both attributive and relational information propagate through mid-upper layers in correct cases, whereas reasoning failures reflect missing relational information within these layers. Second, unlike humans, LLMs often struggle not only when relational information is missing, but also when attempting to apply it to new entities. In such cases, strategically patching hidden representations at critical token positions can facilitate information transfer to a certain extent. Lastly, successful analogical reasoning in LLMs is marked by strong structural alignment between analogous situations, whereas failures often reflect degraded or misplaced alignment. Overall, our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit emerging but limited capabilities in encoding and applying high-level relational concepts, highlighting both parallels and gaps with human cognition.

In this work, we describe strategies and provide case-study activities that can be used to examine the properties of superposition, entanglement, tagging, complementarity, and measurement in quantum curricula geared for teacher training. Having a solid foundation in these conceptual ideas is critical for educators who will be adopting quantum ideas within the classroom. Yet they are some of the most difficult concepts to master. We show how one can systematically develop these conceptual foundations with thought experiments on light and with thought experiments that employ the Stern-Gerlach experiment. We emphasize the importance of computer animations in aiding the instruction on these concepts.

Recent work has demonstrated that Chain-of-Thought (CoT) often yields limited gains for soft-reasoning problems such as analytical and commonsense reasoning. CoT can also be unfaithful to a model's actual reasoning. We investigate the dynamics and faithfulness of CoT in soft-reasoning tasks across instruction-tuned, reasoning and reasoning-distilled models. Our findings reveal differences in how these models rely on CoT, and show that CoT influence and faithfulness are not always aligned.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

We introduce XCOMPS in this work, a multilingual conceptual minimal pair dataset covering 17 languages. Using this dataset, we evaluate LLMs' multilingual conceptual understanding through metalinguistic prompting, direct probability measurement, and neurolinguistic probing. By comparing base, instruction-tuned, and knowledge-distilled models, we find that: 1) LLMs exhibit weaker conceptual understanding for low-resource languages, and accuracy varies across languages despite being tested on the same concept sets. 2) LLMs excel at distinguishing concept-property pairs that are visibly different but exhibit a marked performance drop when negative pairs share subtle semantic similarities. 3) Instruction tuning improves performance in concept understanding but does not enhance internal competence; knowledge distillation can enhance internal competence in conceptual understanding for low-resource languages with limited gains in explicit task performance. 4) More morphologically complex languages yield lower concept understanding scores and require deeper layers for conceptual reasoning.

We introduce an axiomatic evaluation framework for latent thought representations in LLMs, comprising metrics that are independent of downstream benchmark scores and reveal representational failures that benchmark accuracy masks. Existing evaluations conflate representation quality with model capacity. Therefore, failures cannot be attributed to the representation rather than to the model that processes it. We formalize four functional axioms (Causality, Minimality, Separability, and Stability) and define a quantitative measure for each, computed directly on the representation independently of downstream accuracy. We audit open-weight LLMs across 23 reasoning tasks (e.g., Spatial Reasoning, Factual QA). We find that no candidate satisfies all four axioms simultaneously, that the representations distinguish task type reliably but cannot distinguish between two questions within the same task, and that the representations encode little information beyond what is already present in the input embedding. The failure is consistent across dense, reasoning-distilled, and RL-trained model families, indicating that the gap is structural rather than a property of model size or training procedure.

Structural fidelity is essential to scientific methodology diagrams. To communicate research logic, these diagrams must faithfully render components, directional relations, and textual annotations. Since a single error, such as a reversed arrow or an unreadable equation, can invalidate the entire figure, structural fidelity is inherently conjunctive: correctness on one axis cannot compensate for failure on another. Current open-source models fail to satisfy this criterion. Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) learns plausible layouts but cannot reliably ensure structural correctness, while scalar reward-based post-training obscures which structural dimension has failed. To address this, we introduce SciForma, a framework for the structure faithful generation of scientific methodology diagrams. Specifically, SciForma decomposes diagram quality into three structural axes: Component, Arrow, and Text, guided by a structural inventory. Built on this foundation, we curate SciFormaData-700K for structured training and SciFormaBench-2K for logic-verified evaluation. To close the gap left by SFT, we develop Multi-Dimensional Conjunctive Preference Optimization (M-DPO), which enforces simultaneous correctness across all axes and adaptively routes gradients to the most deficient dimension in post-training. The same structural inventory also enables iterative editing at inference time to correct residual errors. This combination allows SciForma-9B to exceed all open-source baselines and GPT-Image-1.5 on both SciFormaBench-2K and AIBench, bringing open scientific diagram generation close to proprietary-level structural fidelity. Our code and data will be available at: https://github.com/microsoft/SciForma.

Integer sequences are of central importance to the modeling of concepts admitting complete finitary descriptions. We introduce a novel view on the learning of such concepts and lay down a set of benchmarking tasks aimed at conceptual understanding by machine learning models. These tasks indirectly assess model ability to abstract, and challenge them to reason both interpolatively and extrapolatively from the knowledge gained by observing representative examples. To further aid research in knowledge representation and reasoning, we present FACT, the Finitary Abstraction Comprehension Toolkit. The toolkit surrounds a large dataset of integer sequences comprising both organic and synthetic entries, a library for data pre-processing and generation, a set of model performance evaluation tools, and a collection of baseline model implementations, enabling the making of the future advancements with ease.

Scientific discovery is a cumulative process and requires new ideas to be situated within an ever-expanding landscape of existing knowledge. An emerging and critical challenge is how to identify conceptually relevant prior work from rapidly growing literature, and assess how a new idea differentiates from existing research. Current embedding approaches typically conflate distinct conceptual aspects into single representations and cannot support fine-grained literature retrieval; meanwhile, LLM-based evaluators are subject to sycophancy biases, failing to provide discriminative novelty assessment. To tackle these challenges, we introduce the Ideation Space, a structured representation that decomposes scientific knowledge into three distinct dimensions, i.e., research problem, methodology, and core findings, each learned through contrastive training. This framework enables principled measurement of conceptual distance between ideas, and modeling of ideation transitions that capture the logical connections within a proposed idea. Building upon this representation, we propose a Hierarchical Sub-Space Retrieval framework for efficient, targeted literature retrieval, and a Decomposed Novelty Assessment algorithm that identifies which aspects of an idea are novel. Extensive experiments demonstrate substantial improvements, where our approach achieves Recall@30 of 0.329 (16.7% over baselines), our ideation transition retrieval reaches Hit Rate@30 of 0.643, and novelty assessment attains 0.37 correlation with expert judgments. In summary, our work provides a promising paradigm for future research on accelerating and evaluating scientific discovery.

Concept-based explanations quantify how high-level concepts (e.g., gender or experience) influence model behavior, which is crucial for decision-makers in high-stakes domains. Recent work evaluates the faithfulness of such explanations by comparing them to reference causal effects estimated from counterfactuals. In practice, existing benchmarks rely on costly human-written counterfactuals that serve as an imperfect proxy. To address this, we introduce a framework for constructing datasets containing structural counterfactual pairs: LIBERTy (LLM-based Interventional Benchmark for Explainability with Reference Targets). LIBERTy is grounded in explicitly defined Structured Causal Models (SCMs) of the text generation, interventions on a concept propagate through the SCM until an LLM generates the counterfactual. We introduce three datasets (disease detection, CV screening, and workplace violence prediction) together with a new evaluation metric, order-faithfulness. Using them, we evaluate a wide range of methods across five models and identify substantial headroom for improving concept-based explanations. LIBERTy also enables systematic analysis of model sensitivity to interventions: we find that proprietary LLMs show markedly reduced sensitivity to demographic concepts, likely due to post-training mitigation. Overall, LIBERTy provides a much-needed benchmark for developing faithful explainability methods.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

Latent or continuous chain-of-thought methods replace explicit textual rationales with a number of internal latent steps, but these intermediate computations are difficult to evaluate beyond correlation-based probes. In this paper, we view latent chain-of-thought as a manipulable causal process in representation space by modeling latent steps as variables in a structural causal model (SCM) and analyzing their effects through step-wise do-interventions. We study two representative paradigms (i.e., Coconut and CODI) on both mathematical and general reasoning tasks to investigate three key questions: (1) which steps are causally necessary for correctness and when answers become decidable early; (2) how does influence propagate across steps, and how does this structure compare to explicit CoT; and (3) do intermediate trajectories retain competing answer modes, and how does output-level commitment differ from representational commitment across steps. We find that latent-step budgets behave less like homogeneous extra depth and more like staged functionality with non-local routing, and we identify a persistent gap between early output bias and late representational commitment. These results motivate mode-conditional and stability-aware analyses -- and corresponding training/decoding objectives -- as more reliable tools for interpreting and improving latent reasoning systems. Code is available at https://github.com/J1mL1/causal-latent-cot.

Human reasoning relies on constructing and manipulating mental models-simplified internal representations of situations that we use to understand and solve problems. Conceptual diagrams (for example, sketches drawn by humans to aid reasoning) externalize these mental models, abstracting irrelevant details to efficiently capture relational and spatial information. In contrast, Large Language Models (LLMs) and Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) predominantly reason through textual representations, limiting their effectiveness in complex multi-step combinatorial and planning tasks. In this paper, we propose a zero-shot fully automatic framework that enables LMMs to reason through multiple chains of self-generated intermediate conceptual diagrams, significantly enhancing their combinatorial planning capabilities. Our approach does not require any human initialization beyond a natural language description of the task. It integrates both textual and diagrammatic reasoning within an optimized graph-of-thought inference framework, enhanced by beam search and depth-wise backtracking. Evaluated on multiple challenging PDDL planning domains, our method substantially improves GPT-4o's performance (for example, from 35.5% to 90.2% in Blocksworld). On more difficult planning domains with solution depths up to 40, our approach outperforms even the o1-preview reasoning model (for example, over 13% improvement in Parking). These results highlight the value of conceptual diagrams as a complementary reasoning medium in LMMs.

Deep learning methods are highly accurate, yet their opaque decision process prevents them from earning full human trust. Concept-based models aim to address this issue by learning tasks based on a set of human-understandable concepts. However, state-of-the-art concept-based models rely on high-dimensional concept embedding representations which lack a clear semantic meaning, thus questioning the interpretability of their decision process. To overcome this limitation, we propose the Deep Concept Reasoner (DCR), the first interpretable concept-based model that builds upon concept embeddings. In DCR, neural networks do not make task predictions directly, but they build syntactic rule structures using concept embeddings. DCR then executes these rules on meaningful concept truth degrees to provide a final interpretable and semantically-consistent prediction in a differentiable manner. Our experiments show that DCR: (i) improves up to +25% w.r.t. state-of-the-art interpretable concept-based models on challenging benchmarks (ii) discovers meaningful logic rules matching known ground truths even in the absence of concept supervision during training, and (iii), facilitates the generation of counterfactual examples providing the learnt rules as guidance.

Creative capabilities of MLLMs matter in design, communication, education, and human--AI collaboration, yet remain difficult to evaluate because explicit targets and reward signals are scarce compared with accuracy-oriented tasks. Cross-concept understanding is a core cognitive capacity underlying receptive creativity. It enables a perceiver to recover intended meaning from non-obvious but meaningful conceptual relations. We operationalize item construction as cross-concept encoding and model inference as cross-concept decoding. We introduce C4, a cognition-inspired evaluation framework for Chengyu (Chinese idiom)-based Cross-Concept Creativity. Its encoding component maps target slots to imageable substitute concepts along bridge paths in a manually annotated and third-party-reviewed cross-concept network, enabling batch generation with explicit structure, difficulty indexed by bridge count and depth, and exact answers. Using this framework, we instantiate the C4 Evaluation Set (C4-Eval), comprising 184 synthetic items and 37 human-created cross-concept chengyu figures collected from online sources. We manually construct and review cross-concept relations, bridge paths, and reasoning processes for the collected figures. Each C4-Eval item is instantiated in five task settings, yielding 884 primary answer-recovery cases. Across ten evaluated MLLMs, the strongest closed models reach 50.7% and 48.0% primary accuracy, while open-source models remain substantially lower. Candidate constraints improve accuracy sharply, but bridge hints and explanation requests provide only modest gains. These results expose a substantial gap in how current MLLMs decode creatively encoded meaning through cross-concept relations. The code is in the supplementary material.

Mechanistic interpretability (MI) requires full access to model internals, yet the APIs for most widely deployed language models at best expose log-probabilities over output tokens. This creates a surrogate problem: when do measurements made on open models allow us to make claims about a closed model? We evaluate surrogate fidelity at the prediction, attribution, and representation levels. For binary classification tasks, log-odds provide an API-compatible scalar readout of the model's representation space, and leave-one-out attributions provide insight into model behavior. Across eleven models spanning four families (Llama, Qwen, GPT, and Gemini), we find that prediction fidelity substantially overstates attribution fidelity: models that agree on what the answer is often disagree on why. We document an access-validity inversion: white-box signals like attention patterns and perturbation magnitudes are highly stable across models but only weakly predictive of causal attributions, which black-box input ablations capture by design. Mechanistic insight does not automatically transfer to closed targets, and prediction-level agreement is insufficient to warrant such transfer. Code and results are available at https://github.com/facebookresearch/surrogate.

A characteristic feature of human semantic cognition is its ability to not only store and retrieve the properties of concepts observed through experience, but to also facilitate the inheritance of properties (can breathe) from superordinate concepts (animal) to their subordinates (dog) -- i.e. demonstrate property inheritance. In this paper, we present COMPS, a collection of minimal pair sentences that jointly tests pre-trained language models (PLMs) on their ability to attribute properties to concepts and their ability to demonstrate property inheritance behavior. Analyses of 22 different PLMs on COMPS reveal that they can easily distinguish between concepts on the basis of a property when they are trivially different, but find it relatively difficult when concepts are related on the basis of nuanced knowledge representations. Furthermore, we find that PLMs can demonstrate behavior consistent with property inheritance to a great extent, but fail in the presence of distracting information, which decreases the performance of many models, sometimes even below chance. This lack of robustness in demonstrating simple reasoning raises important questions about PLMs' capacity to make correct inferences even when they appear to possess the prerequisite knowledge.

Value alignment is essential for building AI systems that can safely and reliably interact with people. However, what a person values -- and is even capable of valuing -- depends on the concepts that they are currently using to understand and evaluate what happens in the world. The dependence of values on concepts means that concept alignment is a prerequisite for value alignment -- agents need to align their representation of a situation with that of humans in order to successfully align their values. Here, we formally analyze the concept alignment problem in the inverse reinforcement learning setting, show how neglecting concept alignment can lead to systematic value mis-alignment, and describe an approach that helps minimize such failure modes by jointly reasoning about a person's concepts and values. Additionally, we report experimental results with human participants showing that humans reason about the concepts used by an agent when acting intentionally, in line with our joint reasoning model.

Personalized diffusion models have shown remarkable success in Text-to-Image (T2I) generation by enabling the injection of user-defined concepts into diverse contexts. However, balancing concept fidelity with contextual alignment remains a challenging open problem. In this work, we propose an RL-based approach that leverages the diverse outputs of T2I models to address this issue. Our method eliminates the need for human-annotated scores by generating a synthetic paired dataset for DPO-like training using external quality metrics. These better-worse pairs are specifically constructed to improve both concept fidelity and prompt adherence. Moreover, our approach supports flexible adjustment of the trade-off between image fidelity and textual alignment. Through multi-step training, our approach outperforms a naive baseline in convergence speed and output quality. We conduct extensive qualitative and quantitative analysis, demonstrating the effectiveness of our method across various architectures and fine-tuning techniques. The source code can be found at https://github.com/ControlGenAI/DreamBoothDPO.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used as information sources, yet small changes in semantic assumptions can destabilize their beliefs. We introduce P-StaT (Perturbation Stability of Truth), a framework for evaluating belief stability under matched semantic perturbations in both representational and behavioral settings. Across 21 LLMs and three domains, we compare perturbations involving familiar Fictional statements against synthetically generated and unfamiliar Synthetic statements. Unfamiliar Synthetic perturbations generally induce greater epistemic instability than familiar Fictional perturbations, with behavioral belief retraction rates frequently exceeding 0.5 (50%). Finally, exploratory clustering analyses reveal recurring themes among retracted statements, including ambiguity, technical terminology, and obscure concepts. These results show that epistemic familiarity is systematically associated with stability under semantic reframing, suggesting that stability-based analyses can complement accuracy-based benchmarks when evaluating LLM robustness and reliability. Code and data are available at https://github.com/samanthadies/P-StaT.

This comprehensive report distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost "human-like" cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles in Cognitive Architecture Theory (CAT). We present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions associated with CAT (i.e. memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and meta-cognition) and identify gaps in the research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and meta-cognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions informed by active inference and global workspace theory to address them. We further introduce Epistemic World Models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied across video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

While text-to-image models have made strong progress in visual fidelity, faithfully realizing complex visual intents remains challenging because many requirements must be tracked across grounding, generation, and verification. We refer to these requirements as semantic commitments and formalize their lifecycle discontinuity as the Conceptual Rift, where commitments may be locally resolved or checked but fail to remain identifiable as the same operational units throughout the generation lifecycle. To address this, we propose SCOPE, a specification-guided skill orchestration framework that maintains semantic commitments in an evolving structured specification and conditionally invokes retrieval, reasoning, and repair skills around unresolved or violated commitments. To evaluate commitment-level intent realization, we introduce Gen-Arena, a human-annotated benchmark with entity- and constraint-level specifications, together with Entity-Gated Intent Pass Rate (EGIP), a strict entity-first pass criterion. SCOPE substantially outperforms all evaluated baselines on Gen-Arena, achieving 0.60 EGIP, and further achieves strong results on WISE-V (0.907) and MindBench (0.61), demonstrating the effectiveness of persistent commitment tracking for complex image generation.

We describe a method, based on Jennifer Nado's proposal for classification procedures as targets of conceptual engineering, that implements such procedures by prompting a large language model. We apply this method, using data from the Wikidata knowledge graph, to evaluate stipulative definitions related to two paradigmatic conceptual engineering projects: the International Astronomical Union's redefinition of PLANET and Haslanger's ameliorative analysis of WOMAN. Our results show that classification procedures built using our approach can exhibit good classification performance and, through the generation of rationales for their classifications, can contribute to the identification of issues in either the definitions or the data against which they are being evaluated. We consider objections to this method, and discuss implications of this work for three aspects of theory and practice of conceptual engineering: the definition of its targets, empirical methods for their investigation, and their practical roles. The data and code used for our experiments, together with the experimental results, are available in a Github repository.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in simulating human behavior, yet existing agents often exhibit behavioral rigidity, a flaw frequently masked by the self-referential bias of current "LLM-as-a-judge" evaluations. By evaluating against empirical ground truth, we reveal a counter-intuitive phenomenon: increasing the intensity of prompt-driven reasoning does not enhance fidelity but rather exacerbates value polarization, collapsing population diversity. To address this, we propose the Context-Value-Action (CVA) architecture, grounded in the Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) model and Schwartz's Theory of Basic Human Values. Unlike methods relying on self-verification, CVA decouples action generation from cognitive reasoning via a novel Value Verifier trained on authentic human data to explicitly model dynamic value activation. Experiments on CVABench, which comprises over 1.1 million real-world interaction traces, demonstrate that CVA significantly outperforms baselines. Our approach effectively mitigates polarization while offering superior behavioral fidelity and interpretability.

Academic citations are widely used for evaluating research and tracing knowledge flows. Such uses typically rely on raw citation counts and neglect variability in citation types. In particular, citations can vary in their fidelity as original knowledge from cited studies may be paraphrased, summarized, or reinterpreted, possibly wrongly, leading to variation in how much information changes from cited to citing paper. In this study, we introduce a computational pipeline to quantify citation fidelity at scale. Using full texts of papers, the pipeline identifies citations in citing papers and the corresponding claims in cited papers, and applies supervised models to measure fidelity at the sentence level. Analyzing a large-scale multi-disciplinary dataset of approximately 13 million citation sentence pairs, we find that citation fidelity is higher when authors cite papers that are 1) more recent and intellectually close, 2) more accessible, and 3) the first author has a lower H-index and the author team is medium-sized. Using a quasi-experiment, we establish the "telephone effect" - when citing papers have low fidelity to the original claim, future papers that cite the citing paper and the original have lower fidelity to the original. Our work reveals systematic differences in citation fidelity, underscoring the limitations of analyses that rely on citation quantity alone and the potential for distortion of evidence.

Abstract concepts - justice, theory, availability - have no single perceivable referent; in the human brain, their meaning emerges from a web of experiences, affect, and social context. Do large language models (LLMs) ground abstract concepts in a similar way? We study this by replicating property-generation experiments from cognitive science on 21 frontier and open-weight LLMs. Across models and experiments, we find a consistent pattern: when compared to humans, models rely too heavily on word associations, and underproduce properties tied to emotion and internal states. This yields a large and consistent grounding gap: no model exceeds a Pearson correlation r=0.37 with human responses, compared to a human-to-human ceiling above r=0.9. To better interpret this gap, we also replicate a rating experiment on grounding categories and find that here LLMs align more closely with human judgment, and alignment improves as models get larger. We then use sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to inspect whether this information is also reflected in the models' internal features, and we do identify features connected to grounding dimensions such as "sensorimotor" and "social". These findings suggest that current LLMs can recover grounding dimensions when explicitly queried, but do not recruit them in a human-like way when words are generated freely.

While Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting enables sophisticated symbolic reasoning in LLMs, it remains confined to discrete text and cannot simulate the continuous, physics-governed dynamics of the real world. Recent video generation models have emerged as potential world simulators through Chain-of-Frames (CoF) reasoning -- materializing thought as frame-by-frame visual sequences, with each frame representing a physically-grounded reasoning step. Despite compelling demonstrations, a challenge persists: existing benchmarks, focusing on fidelity or alignment, do not assess CoF reasoning and thus cannot measure core cognitive abilities in multi-step planning, algorithmic logic, or abstract pattern extrapolation. This evaluation void prevents systematic understanding of model capabilities and principled guidance for improvement. We introduce Gen-ViRe (Generative Visual Reasoning Benchmark), a framework grounded in cognitive science and real-world AI applications, which decomposes CoF reasoning into six cognitive dimensions -- from perceptual logic to abstract planning -- and 24 subtasks. Through multi-source data curation, minimal prompting protocols, and hybrid VLM-assisted evaluation with detailed criteria, Gen-ViRe delivers the first quantitative assessment of video models as reasoners. Our experiments on SOTA systems reveal substantial discrepancies between impressive visual quality and actual reasoning depth, establishing baselines and diagnostic tools to advance genuine world simulators.

We study a capability the dominant paradigm in synthetic tabular data does not provide: exact satisfaction of a declared analytical outcome with no source data. Imitation methods (copulas, GANs, diffusion) learn a real distribution and sample from it, and are judged on fidelity to real data. A large, practical class of needs is different: generating data with no source data ("cold start") that reproduces a declared outcome (a revenue curve, a churn rate, a group share) across a relational schema. Off-the-shelf imitation tools offer no interface for such targets, and no sampler can hit an exact aggregate, because sampling has variance. On a real public dataset, off-the-shelf learned synthesizers trained on that very data miss the declared monthly aggregate by 74 to 86 percent; a per-period steelman cuts the miss to about 19 percent and still cannot reach 0; a closed-form generator reaches exactly 0. We name this task outcome-conformant synthesis, argue its evaluation axis is conformance rather than fidelity, and show the two axes are orthogonal. We contribute: (1) a formal account showing a widely-used family of exact-aggregate generators is exactly conditional-sum sampling of a Gamma population (via Lukacs' characterization), with closed-form exactness, a closed-form marginal CV, and scale-invariance; a controlled experiment maps the boundary, enforcing the exact aggregate costs at most 0.006 in 1-Wasserstein distance to an arbitrary external marginal, the rest being shape-family mismatch; (2) SpecBench, to our knowledge the first benchmark to measure conformance to analytical outcomes for cold-start relational synthesis; and (3) a closed-form, deterministic reference system. Exact aggregation alone is trivial; the contribution is conformance jointly with closed-form marginals, integrity, determinism, and zero source data. We concede fidelity to imitation where real data exists.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

We propose to improve multi-concept prompt fidelity in text-to-image diffusion models. We begin with common failure cases - prompts like "a cat and a dog" that sometimes yields images where one concept is missing, faint, or colliding awkwardly with another. We hypothesize that this happens when the diffusion model drifts into mixed modes that over-emphasize a single concept it learned strongly during training. Instead of re-training, we introduce a corrective sampling strategy that steers away from regions where the joint prompt behavior overlaps too strongly with any single concept in the prompt. The goal is to steer towards "pure" joint modes where all concepts can coexist with balanced visual presence. We further show that existing multi-concept guidance schemes can operate in unstable weight regimes that amplify imbalance; we characterize favorable regions and adapt sampling to remain within them. Our approach, CO3, is plug-and-play, requires no model tuning, and complements standard classifier-free guidance. Experiments on diverse multi-concept prompts indicate improvements in concept coverage, balance and robustness, with fewer dropped or distorted concepts compared to standard baselines and prior compositional methods. Results suggest that lightweight corrective guidance can substantially mitigate brittle semantic alignment behavior in modern diffusion systems. Code is available at https://github.com/debottam-dutta7/co3

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) provide a new opportunity to address the long-standing question of how concepts are represented and organized in the mind, which is central to unravelling the nature of human cognition. Here, we reframed the classic reverse dictionary task to simulate human concept inference in context and investigated the emergence of human-like conceptual representations within LLMs. We found that LLMs were able to infer concepts from definitional descriptions and construct representation spaces that converge towards a shared, context-independent structure. These representations effectively predicted human behavioural judgments and aligned well with neural activity patterns in the human brain, offering evidence for biological plausibility. These findings demonstrate that human-like conceptual representations and organization can naturally emerge from language prediction, even without real-world grounding. Our work supports the view that LLMs serve as valuable tools for understanding complex human cognition and paves the way for better alignment between artificial and human intelligence.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performances across a wide range of tasks. However, the mechanisms by which these models encode tasks of varying complexities remain poorly understood. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that LLMs process concepts of varying complexities in different layers, introducing the idea of "Concept Depth" to suggest that more complex concepts are typically acquired in deeper layers. Specifically, we categorize concepts based on their level of abstraction, defining them in the order of increasing complexity within factual, emotional, and inferential tasks. We conduct extensive probing experiments using layer-wise representations across various LLM families (Gemma, LLaMA, QWen) on various datasets spanning the three domains of tasks. Our findings reveal that models could efficiently conduct probing for simpler tasks in shallow layers, and more complex tasks typically necessitate deeper layers for accurate understanding. Additionally, we examine how external factors, such as adding noise to the input and quantizing the model weights, might affect layer-wise representations. Our findings suggest that these factors can impede the development of a conceptual understanding of LLMs until deeper layers are explored. We hope that our proposed concept and experimental insights will enhance the understanding of the mechanisms underlying LLMs. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Luckfort/CD.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require consciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims).

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

Large language models are increasingly used as agents in social, economic, and policy simulations. A common assumption is that stronger reasoning should improve simulation fidelity. We argue that this assumption can fail when the objective is not to solve a strategic problem, but to sample plausible boundedly rational behavior. In such settings, reasoning-enhanced models can become better solvers and worse simulators: they can over-optimize for strategically dominant actions, collapse compromise-oriented terminal behavior, and sometimes exhibit a diversity-without-fidelity pattern in which local variation survives without outcome-level fidelity. We study this solver-sampler mismatch in three multi-agent negotiation environments adapted from earlier simulation work: an ambiguous fragmented-authority trading-limits scenario, an ambiguous unified-opposition trading-limits scenario, and a new-domain grid-curtailment case in emergency electricity management. We compare three reflection conditions, no reflection, bounded reflection, and native reasoning, across two primary model families and then extend the same protocol to direct OpenAI runs with GPT-4.1 and GPT-5.2. Across all three experiments, bounded reflection produces substantially more diverse and compromise-oriented trajectories than either no reflection or native reasoning. In the direct OpenAI extension, GPT-5.2 native ends in authority decisions in 45 of 45 runs across the three experiments, while GPT-5.2 bounded recovers compromise outcomes in every environment. The contribution is not a claim that reasoning is generally harmful. It is a methodological warning: model capability and simulation fidelity are different objectives, and behavioral simulation should qualify models as samplers, not only as solvers.

Access to the right evidence does not guarantee that large language models (LLMs) will reason with it correctly. This gap between retrieval and reasoning is especially concerning in clinical settings, where outputs must align with structured protocols. We study this gap using Written Exposure Therapy (WET) guidelines as a testbed. In evaluating model responses to curated clinician-vetted questions, we find that errors persist even when authoritative passages are provided. To address this, we propose an evaluation framework that measures accuracy, consistency, and fidelity of reasoning. Our results highlight both the potential and the risks: retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) can constrain outputs, but safe deployment requires assessing reasoning as rigorously as retrieval.

Reviewing the progress in artificial intelligence over the past decade, various significant advances (e.g. object detection, image generation, large language models) have enabled AI systems to produce more semantically meaningful outputs and achieve widespread adoption in internet scenarios. Nevertheless, AI systems still struggle when it comes to understanding and interacting with the physical world. This reveals an important issue: relying solely on semantic-level concepts learned from internet data (e.g. texts, images) to understand the physical world is far from sufficient -- machine intelligence currently lacks an effective way to learn about the physical world. This research introduces the idea of analytic concept -- representing the concepts related to the physical world through programs of mathematical procedures, providing machine intelligence a portal to perceive, reason about, and interact with the physical world. Except for detailing the design philosophy and providing guidelines for the application of analytic concepts, this research also introduce about the infrastructure that has been built around analytic concepts. I aim for my research to contribute to addressing these questions: What is a proper abstraction of general concepts in the physical world for machine intelligence? How to systematically integrate structured priors with neural networks to constrain AI systems to comply with physical laws?

Recent advancements in video generation have witnessed significant progress, especially with the rapid advancement of diffusion models. Despite this, their deficiencies in physical cognition have gradually received widespread attention - generated content often violates the fundamental laws of physics, falling into the dilemma of ''visual realism but physical absurdity". Researchers began to increasingly recognize the importance of physical fidelity in video generation and attempted to integrate heuristic physical cognition such as motion representations and physical knowledge into generative systems to simulate real-world dynamic scenarios. Considering the lack of a systematic overview in this field, this survey aims to provide a comprehensive summary of architecture designs and their applications to fill this gap. Specifically, we discuss and organize the evolutionary process of physical cognition in video generation from a cognitive science perspective, while proposing a three-tier taxonomy: 1) basic schema perception for generation, 2) passive cognition of physical knowledge for generation, and 3) active cognition for world simulation, encompassing state-of-the-art methods, classical paradigms, and benchmarks. Subsequently, we emphasize the inherent key challenges in this domain and delineate potential pathways for future research, contributing to advancing the frontiers of discussion in both academia and industry. Through structured review and interdisciplinary analysis, this survey aims to provide directional guidance for developing interpretable, controllable, and physically consistent video generation paradigms, thereby propelling generative models from the stage of ''visual mimicry'' towards a new phase of ''human-like physical comprehension''.

Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).

Convolutional neural network (CNN) models for computer vision are powerful but lack explainability in their most basic form. This deficiency remains a key challenge when applying CNNs in important domains. Recent work on explanations through feature importance of approximate linear models has moved from input-level features (pixels or segments) to features from mid-layer feature maps in the form of concept activation vectors (CAVs). CAVs contain concept-level information and could be learned via clustering. In this work, we rethink the ACE algorithm of Ghorbani et~al., proposing an alternative invertible concept-based explanation (ICE) framework to overcome its shortcomings. Based on the requirements of fidelity (approximate models to target models) and interpretability (being meaningful to people), we design measurements and evaluate a range of matrix factorization methods with our framework. We find that non-negative concept activation vectors (NCAVs) from non-negative matrix factorization provide superior performance in interpretability and fidelity based on computational and human subject experiments. Our framework provides both local and global concept-level explanations for pre-trained CNN models.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit strong performance, yet often produce rationales that sound plausible but fail to reflect their true decision process, undermining reliability and trust. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning faithfulness, defined by two testable conditions: stance consistency (a coherent stance linking reasoning to answer) and causal influence (the stated reasoning causally drives the answer under output-level interventions), explicitly decoupled from accuracy. To operationalize this, we present RFEval, a benchmark of 7,186 instances across seven tasks that probes faithfulness via controlled, output-level counterfactual interventions. Evaluating twelve open-source LRMs, we find unfaithfulness in 49.7% of outputs, predominantly from stance inconsistency. Failures are concentrated in brittle, convergent domains such as math and code, and correlate more with post-training regimes than with scale: within-family ablations indicate that adding current RL-style objectives on top of supervised fine-tuning can reduce reasoning faithfulness, even when accuracy is maintained. Crucially, accuracy is neither a sufficient nor a reliable proxy for faithfulness: once controlling for model and task, the accuracy-faithfulness link is weak and statistically insignificant. Our work establishes a rigorous methodology for auditing LRM reliability and shows that trustworthy AI requires optimizing not only for correct outcomes but also for the structural integrity of the reasoning process. Our code and dataset can be found at project page: https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/}{https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

Informally, the 'linear representation hypothesis' is the idea that high-level concepts are represented linearly as directions in some representation space. In this paper, we address two closely related questions: What does "linear representation" actually mean? And, how do we make sense of geometric notions (e.g., cosine similarity or projection) in the representation space? To answer these, we use the language of counterfactuals to give two formalizations of "linear representation", one in the output (word) representation space, and one in the input (sentence) space. We then prove these connect to linear probing and model steering, respectively. To make sense of geometric notions, we use the formalization to identify a particular (non-Euclidean) inner product that respects language structure in a sense we make precise. Using this causal inner product, we show how to unify all notions of linear representation. In particular, this allows the construction of probes and steering vectors using counterfactual pairs. Experiments with LLaMA-2 demonstrate the existence of linear representations of concepts, the connection to interpretation and control, and the fundamental role of the choice of inner product.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

Understanding and manipulating the causal generation mechanisms in language models is essential for controlling their behavior. Previous work has primarily relied on techniques such as representation surgery -- e.g., model ablations or manipulation of linear subspaces tied to specific concepts -- to intervene on these models. To understand the impact of interventions precisely, it is useful to examine counterfactuals -- e.g., how a given sentence would have appeared had it been generated by the model following a specific intervention. We highlight that counterfactual reasoning is conceptually distinct from interventions, as articulated in Pearl's causal hierarchy. Based on this observation, we propose a framework for generating true string counterfactuals by reformulating language models as Generalized Structural-equation. Models using the Gumbel-max trick. This allows us to model the joint distribution over original strings and their counterfactuals resulting from the same instantiation of the sampling noise. We develop an algorithm based on hindsight Gumbel sampling that allows us to infer the latent noise variables and generate counterfactuals of observed strings. Our experiments demonstrate that the approach produces meaningful counterfactuals while at the same time showing that commonly used intervention techniques have considerable undesired side effects.

Human languages differ widely in their forms, each having distinct sounds, scripts, and syntax. Yet, they can all convey similar meaning. Do different languages converge on a shared neural substrate for conceptual meaning? We used language models (LMs) and naturalistic fMRI to identify neural representations of the shared conceptual meaning of the same story as heard by native speakers of three languages: English, Chinese, and French. We found that LMs trained on entirely different languages converge onto a similar embedding space, especially in the middle layers. We then aimed to find if a similar shared space exists in the brains of different native speakers of the three languages. We trained voxelwise encoding models that align the LM embeddings with neural responses from one group of subjects speaking a single language. We then used the encoding models trained on one language to predict the neural activity in listeners of other languages. We found that models trained to predict neural activity for one language generalize to different subjects listening to the same content in a different language, across high-level language and default-mode regions. Our results suggest that the neural representations of meaning underlying different languages are shared across speakers of various languages, and that LMs trained on different languages converge on this shared meaning. These findings suggest that, despite the diversity of languages, shared meaning emerges from our interactions with one another and our shared world.

The next-token prediction (NTP) objective has been foundational in the development of modern large language models (LLMs), driving advances in fluency and generalization. However, NTP operates at the token level, treating deviations from a single reference continuation as errors even when alternative continuations are equally plausible or semantically equivalent (e.g., ``mom'' vs. ``mother''). As a result, token-level loss can penalize valid abstractions, paraphrases, or conceptually correct reasoning paths, biasing models toward surface form rather than underlying meaning. This mismatch between the training signal and semantic correctness motivates learning objectives that operate over higher-level representations. We propose a shift from token-level to concept-level prediction, where concepts group multiple surface forms of the same idea (e.g., ``mom,'' ``mommy,'' ``mother'' rightarrow MOTHER). We introduce various methods for integrating conceptual supervision into LLM training and show that concept-aware models achieve lower perplexity, improved robustness under domain shift, and stronger performance than NTP-based models on diverse NLP benchmarks. This suggests concept-level supervision as an improved training signal that better aligns LLMs with human semantic abstractions.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

Current evaluation of mathematical reasoning in language models relies primarily on answer accuracy, potentially masking fundamental failures in logical computation. We introduce a diagnostic framework that distinguishes genuine mathematical reasoning from superficial pattern matching through four complementary axes: forward-backward consistency, transitivity coverage, counterfactual sensitivity, and perturbation robustness. Through a case study applying this framework to Qwen3-0.6B on the MenatQA dataset, we reveal a striking disconnect between surface performance and reasoning fidelity. While the model achieves reasonable answer accuracy (70%+), it demonstrates poor backward consistency (15%), limited transitivity coverage (32.2%), and brittle sensitivity to perturbations. Our diagnostics expose reasoning failures invisible to traditional accuracy metrics, suggesting that this small model relies heavily on pattern matching rather than genuine logical computation. While our empirical findings are based on a single 600M-parameter model, the diagnostic framework itself is model-agnostic and generalizable. We release our evaluation protocols to enable the research community to assess reasoning fidelity across different model scales and architectures, moving beyond surface-level accuracy toward verifiable mathematical reasoning.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

Personalized text-to-image generation suffers from concept entanglement, where irrelevant residual information from reference images is captured, leading to a trade-off between concept fidelity and text alignment. Recent disentanglement approaches attempt to solve this utilizing manual guidance, such as linguistic cues or segmentation masks, which limits their applicability and fails to fully articulate the target concept. In this paper, we propose ConceptPrism, a novel framework that automatically disentangles the shared visual concept from image-specific residuals by comparing images within a set. Our method jointly optimizes a target token and image-wise residual tokens using two complementary objectives: a reconstruction loss to ensure fidelity, and a novel exclusion loss that compels residual tokens to discard the shared concept. This process allows the target token to capture the pure concept without direct supervision. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ConceptPrism effectively resolves concept entanglement, achieving a significantly improved trade-off between fidelity and alignment.

Recent advancements in text-to-image generation have significantly enhanced the quality of synthesized images. Despite this progress, evaluations predominantly focus on aesthetic appeal or alignment with text prompts. Consequently, there is limited understanding of whether these models can accurately represent a wide variety of realistic visual entities - a task requiring real-world knowledge. To address this gap, we propose a benchmark focused on evaluating Knowledge-InTensive image generaTion on real-world ENtities (i.e., KITTEN). Using KITTEN, we conduct a systematic study on the fidelity of entities in text-to-image generation models, focusing on their ability to generate a wide range of real-world visual entities, such as landmark buildings, aircraft, plants, and animals. We evaluate the latest text-to-image models and retrieval-augmented customization models using both automatic metrics and carefully-designed human evaluations, with an emphasis on the fidelity of entities in the generated images. Our findings reveal that even the most advanced text-to-image models often fail to generate entities with accurate visual details. Although retrieval-augmented models can enhance the fidelity of entity by incorporating reference images during testing, they often over-rely on these references and struggle to produce novel configurations of the entity as requested in creative text prompts.

Large language models (LLMs) have been reported to linearly encode truthfulness, yet recent work questions this finding's generality. We reconcile these views with the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: the representational space contains directions ranging from broadly domain-general to narrowly domain-specific. To test this hypothesis, we systematically evaluate probe generalization across five truth types (definitional, empirical, logical, fictional, and ethical), sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying, and existing honesty benchmarks. Linear probes generalize well across most domains but fail on sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying. Yet training on all domains jointly recovers strong performance, confirming that domain-general directions exist despite poor pairwise transfer. The geometry of probe directions explains these patterns: Mahalanobis cosine similarity between probes near-perfectly predicts cross-domain generalization (R^2=0.98). Concept-erasure methods further isolate truth directions that are (1) domain-general, (2) domain-specific, or (3) shared only across particular domain subsets. Causal interventions reveal that domain-specific directions steer more effectively than domain-general ones. Finally, post-training reshapes truth geometry, pushing sycophantic lying further from other truth types, suggesting a representational basis for chat models' sycophantic tendencies. Together, our results support the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: truth directions of varying generality coexist in representational space, with post-training reshaping their geometry. Code for all experiments is provided in https://github.com/zfying/truth_spec.

As large language models become smaller and more efficient, small reasoning models (SRMs) are crucial for enabling chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning in resource-constrained settings. However, they are prone to faithfulness hallucinations, especially in intermediate reasoning steps. Existing mitigation methods based on online reinforcement learning rely on outcome-based rewards or coarse-grained CoT evaluation, which can inadvertently reinforce unfaithful reasoning when the final answer is correct. To address these limitations, we propose Faithfulness-Aware Step-Level Reinforcement Learning (FaithRL), introducing step-level supervision via explicit faithfulness rewards from a process reward model, together with an implicit truncated resampling strategy that generates contrastive signals from faithful prefixes, while also mitigating reward hacking from step-level rewards. Experiments across multiple SRMs and Open-Book QA benchmarks demonstrate that FaithRL consistently reduces hallucinations in both the CoT and final answers, leading to more faithful and reliable reasoning. Code is available at https://github.com/Easy195/FaithRL.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

Silicon samples are increasingly used as a low-cost substitute for human panels and have been shown to reproduce aggregate human opinion with high fidelity. We show that, in the alignment-relevant domain of philosophy, silicon samples systematically collapse heterogeneity. Using data from N = {277} professional philosophers drawn from PhilPeople profiles, we evaluate seven proprietary and open-source large language models on their ability to replicate individual philosophical positions and to preserve cross-question correlation structures across philosophical domains. We find that language models substantially over-correlate philosophical judgments, producing artificial consensus across domains. This collapse is associated in part with specialist effects, whereby models implicitly assume that domain specialists hold highly similar philosophical views. We assess the robustness of these findings by studying the impact of DPO fine-tuning and by validating results against the full PhilPapers 2020 Survey (N = {1785}). We conclude by discussing implications for alignment, evaluation, and the use of silicon samples as substitutes for human judgment. The code of this project can be found at https://github.com/stanford-del/silicon-philosophers.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

The ability to understand visual concepts and replicate and compose these concepts from images is a central goal for computer vision. Recent advances in text-to-image (T2I) models have lead to high definition and realistic image quality generation by learning from large databases of images and their descriptions. However, the evaluation of T2I models has focused on photorealism and limited qualitative measures of visual understanding. To quantify the ability of T2I models in learning and synthesizing novel visual concepts, we introduce ConceptBed, a large-scale dataset that consists of 284 unique visual concepts, 5K unique concept compositions, and 33K composite text prompts. Along with the dataset, we propose an evaluation metric, Concept Confidence Deviation (CCD), that uses the confidence of oracle concept classifiers to measure the alignment between concepts generated by T2I generators and concepts contained in ground truth images. We evaluate visual concepts that are either objects, attributes, or styles, and also evaluate four dimensions of compositionality: counting, attributes, relations, and actions. Our human study shows that CCD is highly correlated with human understanding of concepts. Our results point to a trade-off between learning the concepts and preserving the compositionality which existing approaches struggle to overcome.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) monitoring, in which automated systems monitor the CoT of an LLM, is a promising approach for effectively overseeing AI systems. However, the extent to which a model's CoT helps us oversee the model - the monitorability of the CoT - can be affected by training, for instance by the model learning to hide important features of its reasoning. We propose and empirically validate a conceptual framework for predicting when and why this occurs. We model LLM post-training as an RL environment where the reward decomposes into two terms: one term depending on final outputs and another term depending on the CoT. Our framework allows us to classify these two terms as "aligned", "orthogonal", or "in-conflict" before training. We predict that training with in-conflict terms will reduce monitorability, orthogonal terms will not affect it, and aligned terms will improve it. To validate our framework, we use it to classify a set of RL environments, train LLMs within those environments, and evaluate how training affects CoT monitorability. We find that (1) training with "in-conflict" reward terms reduces CoT monitorability and (2) optimizing in-conflict reward terms is difficult.

Large language models generate computationally expensive yet semantically void reasoning on beyond-capability tasks, creating risks where plausible-sounding but incorrect derivations mislead users. We characterize this futile reasoning phenomenon through systematic analysis, revealing universal capability overreach and systematic miscalibration between capability and behavior. The dominant failure mode is specious reasoning, which outputs look superficially valid but contain subtle errors, escalating with task difficulty. To address this, we introduce CaRL (Capability-aligned Reinforcement Learning), which aligns model behavior with capability boundaries through reward shaping that incentivizes refusal over futile reasoning and hindsight refusal augmentation that converts failures into refusal supervision. Experiments demonstrate a substantial reduction in futile reasoning while preserving performance across task difficulties, effectively achieving capability-aligned behavior without sacrificing utility. https://github.com/icip-cas/Knowing-When-to-Quit

Large language models (LLMs) are regularly evaluated using benchmark datasets. But what justifies making inferences about an LLM's capabilities based on its answers to a curated set of questions? This paper first introduces a formal framework to address this question. The key is to note that the benchmarks used to test LLMs -- such as AP exams -- are also those used to test people. However, this raises an implication: these benchmarks are only valid tests if LLMs misunderstand concepts in ways that mirror human misunderstandings. Otherwise, success on benchmarks only demonstrates potemkin understanding: the illusion of understanding driven by answers irreconcilable with how any human would interpret a concept. We present two procedures for quantifying the existence of potemkins: one using a specially designed benchmark in three domains, the other using a general procedure that provides a lower-bound on their prevalence. We find that potemkins are ubiquitous across models, tasks, and domains. We also find that these failures reflect not just incorrect understanding, but deeper internal incoherence in concept representations.

When an agent can articulate why something works, we typically take this as evidence of genuine understanding. This presupposes that effective action and correct explanation covary, and that coherent explanation reliably signals both. I argue that this assumption fails for contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). I introduce what I call the Bidirectional Coherence Paradox: competence and grounding not only dissociate but invert across epistemic conditions. In low-observability domains, LLMs often act successfully while misidentifying the mechanisms that produce their success. In high-observability domains, they frequently generate explanations that accurately track observable causal structure yet fail to translate those diagnoses into effective intervention. In both cases, explanatory coherence remains intact, obscuring the underlying dissociation. Drawing on experiments in compiler optimization and hyperparameter tuning, I develop the Epistemic Triangle, a model of how priors, signals, and domain knowledge interact under varying observability. The results suggest that neither behavioral success nor explanatory accuracy alone suffices for attributing understanding. I argue that evaluating artificial epistemic agents requires a tripartite framework -- coherence, grounding, and a proper basing relation linking explanation to action. The systematic separation of knowing-that and knowing-how in LLMs thus challenges assumptions inherited from both epistemology and current AI evaluation practice.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) outputs let us read a model's step-by-step reasoning. Since any long, serial reasoning process must pass through this textual trace, the quality of the CoT is a direct window into what the model is thinking. This visibility could help us spot unsafe or misaligned behavior (monitorability), but only if the CoT is transparent about its internal reasoning (faithfulness). Fully measuring faithfulness is difficult, so researchers often focus on examining the CoT in cases where the model changes its answer after adding a cue to the input. This proxy finds some instances of unfaithfulness but loses information when the model maintains its answer, and does not investigate aspects of reasoning not tied to the cue. We extend these results to a more holistic sense of monitorability by introducing verbosity: whether the CoT lists every factor needed to solve the task. We combine faithfulness and verbosity into a single monitorability score that shows how well the CoT serves as the model's external `working memory', a property that many safety schemes based on CoT monitoring depend on. We evaluate instruction-tuned and reasoning models on BBH, GPQA, and MMLU. Our results show that models can appear faithful yet remain hard to monitor when they leave out key factors, and that monitorability differs sharply across model families. We release our evaluation code using the Inspect library to support reproducible future work.

Despite the progress of foundation models, knowledge-based reasoning remains a persistent challenge due to their limited capacity for knowledge recall and inference. Existing methods primarily focus on encouraging these models to plan and solve problems or extensively sample reasoning chains independently. However, these methods often overlook conceptual errors and inferential fallacies, inevitably leading to a series of notorious issues such as misleading conclusions, cognitive biases, and reduced decision quality. While explicit modeling of causality is argued to hold promise in addressing these issues, contemporary research efforts have thus far fallen short in achieving causality-based foundation models. Drawing inspiration from the orchestration of diverse specialized agents collaborating to tackle intricate tasks, we propose a framework named Causal-Consistency Chain-of-Thought (CaCo-CoT) that harnesses multi-agent collaboration to bolster the faithfulness and causality of foundation models, involving a set of reasoners and evaluators. These agents collaboratively work within a reasoning-and-consensus paradigm to improve faithfulness. The reasoners are tasked with generating reasoning chains for knowledge-intensive problems by mimicking human causal reasoning. Meanwhile, the evaluator scrutinizes the causal consistency of a reasoner's reasoning chain from a non-causal and a counterfactual perspective. Our framework demonstrates significant superiority over state-of-the-art methods through extensive and comprehensive evaluations across text-based and multi-modal knowledge reasoning tasks (e.g., science question answering and commonsense reasoning).

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has been proposed as a transparency mechanism for large language models in safety-critical deployments, yet its effectiveness depends on faithfulness (whether models accurately verbalize the factors that actually influence their outputs), a property that prior evaluations have examined in only two proprietary models, finding acknowledgment rates as low as 25% for Claude 3.7 Sonnet and 39% for DeepSeek-R1. To extend this evaluation across the open-weight ecosystem, this study tests 12 open-weight reasoning models spanning 9 architectural families (7B-685B parameters) on 498 multiple-choice questions from MMLU and GPQA Diamond, injecting six categories of reasoning hints (sycophancy, consistency, visual pattern, metadata, grader hacking, and unethical information) and measuring the rate at which models acknowledge hint influence in their CoT when hints successfully alter answers. Across 41,832 inference runs, overall faithfulness rates range from 39.7% (Seed-1.6-Flash) to 89.9% (DeepSeek-V3.2-Speciale) across model families, with consistency hints (35.5%) and sycophancy hints (53.9%) exhibiting the lowest acknowledgment rates. Training methodology and model family predict faithfulness more strongly than parameter count, and keyword-based analysis reveals a striking gap between thinking-token acknowledgment (approximately 87.5%) and answer-text acknowledgment (approximately 28.6%), suggesting that models internally recognize hint influence but systematically suppress this acknowledgment in their outputs. These findings carry direct implications for the viability of CoT monitoring as a safety mechanism and suggest that faithfulness is not a fixed property of reasoning models but varies systematically with architecture, training method, and the nature of the influencing cue.

Artificial intelligence systems are commonly evaluated through task performance and behavioral imitation, but such evaluations leave open whether an artificial agent can acquire, stabilize, and use new lexical meanings from grounded experience. This paper introduces Lexical Consensus, an experimental framework for studying grounded word learning over a structured perceptual substrate. Using frozen DINOv2 visual embeddings, Carroll-style nonce words, and interpretable lexical learners plus linear baselines, we test whether agents can acquire artificial labels for visual concepts, generalize them bidirectionally, and stabilize them across controlled settings. The main result is a robust perceptual-coherence gradient: native categories are easiest to learn, coherent overextensions remain learnable, mid-range disjunctive concepts degrade, and far-disjunctive concepts approach chance. A pre-registered CIFAR-100 dissociation experiment confirms that this gradient is governed by perceptual distance rather than semantic relatedness: perceptual distance predicts acquisition accuracy (partial R^2 = 0.245, p < 1e-7), while semantic distance adds no significant explanatory power (partial R^2 = 0.002, p = 0.660). Bidirectional evaluation shows that naming and retrieval are distinct: exemplar-based mechanisms outperform centroid prototypes in label-to-image retrieval, exposing a memory-fidelity dimension separate from naming accuracy. Falsification controls, homogeneous candidate-pool evaluations, and null results on representational restructuring indicate that frozen perceptual geometry both enables lexical grounding and limits what can be acquired without representational adaptation.

Human beings primarily understand the world through concepts (e.g., dog), abstract mental representations that structure perception, reasoning, and learning. However, how large language models (LLMs) acquire, retain, and forget such concepts during continual pretraining remains poorly understood. In this work, we study how individual concepts are acquired and forgotten, as well as how multiple concepts interact through interference and synergy. We link these behavioral dynamics to LLMs' internal Concept Circuits, computational subgraphs associated with specific concepts, and incorporate Graph Metrics to characterize circuit structure. Our analysis reveals: (1) LLMs concept circuits provide a non-trivial, statistically significant signal of concept learning and forgetting; (2) Concept circuits exhibit a stage-wise temporal pattern during continual pretraining, with an early increase followed by gradual decrease and stabilization; (3) concepts with larger learning gains tend to exhibit greater forgetting under subsequent training; (4) semantically similar concepts induce stronger interference than weakly related ones; (5) conceptual knowledge differs in their transferability, with some significantly facilitating the learning of others. Together, our findings offer a circuit-level view of concept learning dynamics and inform the design of more interpretable and robust concept-aware training strategies for LLMs.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Previous work has highlighted that existing post-hoc explanation methods exhibit disparities in explanation fidelity (across 'race' and 'gender' as sensitive attributes), and while a large body of work focuses on mitigating these issues at the explanation metric level, the role of the data generating process and black box model in relation to explanation disparities remains largely unexplored. Accordingly, through both simulations as well as experiments on a real-world dataset, we specifically assess challenges to explanation disparities that originate from properties of the data: limited sample size, covariate shift, concept shift, omitted variable bias, and challenges based on model properties: inclusion of the sensitive attribute and appropriate functional form. Through controlled simulation analyses, our study demonstrates that increased covariate shift, concept shift, and omission of covariates increase explanation disparities, with the effect pronounced higher for neural network models that are better able to capture the underlying functional form in comparison to linear models. We also observe consistent findings regarding the effect of concept shift and omitted variable bias on explanation disparities in the Adult income dataset. Overall, results indicate that disparities in model explanations can also depend on data and model properties. Based on this systematic investigation, we provide recommendations for the design of explanation methods that mitigate undesirable disparities.

Language Models (LMs) emit Chains-of-Thought (CoTs) that drive much of their capability. However, the same sequence that carries useful reasoning can also covertly convey messages: a misaligned model may embed covert information in its CoT that slips through human supervision, a form of steganography known as encoded reasoning. Prior LM steganography schemes operate in the token or lexical space, and a content-preserving paraphraser is the canonical and effective defense in recent work. We introduce conceptual steganography, in which each step of a CoT carries information through patterns of high-level reasoning behavior, rather than through lexical choice. Across four model families and two reasoning domains, this backdoor communication channel is shown to be consistently more robust to a strong paraphrase defense than standard keyword approaches, and the encoding of information into CoTs does not affect their utility in the reasoning process. Having raised awareness of this new risk, we then demonstrate that a strategy-aware paraphraser can close much of the channel, highlighting new challenges and recommended defenses for ensuring faithful LLM reasoning in the wild.

Quantifying the realism of images remains a challenging problem in the field of artificial intelligence. For example, an image of Albert Einstein holding a smartphone violates common-sense because modern smartphone were invented after Einstein's death. We introduce a novel method for assessing image realism using Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) and Natural Language Inference (NLI). Our approach is based on the premise that LVLMs may generate hallucinations when confronted with images that defy common sense. Using LVLM to extract atomic facts from these images, we obtain a mix of accurate facts and erroneous hallucinations. We proceed by calculating pairwise entailment scores among these facts, subsequently aggregating these values to yield a singular reality score. This process serves to identify contradictions between genuine facts and hallucinatory elements, signaling the presence of images that violate common sense. Our approach has achieved a new state-of-the-art performance in zero-shot mode on the WHOOPS! dataset.

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities in solving mathematical reasoning tasks, leveraging Chain-of-Thought (CoT) data as a vital component in guiding answer generation. Current paradigms typically generate CoT and answers directly for a given problem, diverging from human problem-solving strategies to some extent. Humans often solve problems by recalling analogous cases and leveraging their solutions to reason about the current task. Inspired by this cognitive process, we propose MetaLadder, a novel framework that explicitly prompts LLMs to recall and reflect on meta-problems, those structurally or semantically analogous problems, alongside their CoT solutions before addressing the target problem. Additionally, we introduce a problem-restating mechanism to enhance the model's comprehension of the target problem by regenerating the original question, which further improves reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the model can achieve reasoning transfer from analogical problems, mimicking human-like "learning from examples" and generalization abilities. Extensive experiments on mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that our MetaLadder significantly boosts LLMs' problem-solving accuracy, largely outperforming standard CoT-based methods (10.3\% accuracy gain) and other methods. Our code and data has been released at https://github.com/LHL3341/MetaLadder.

Corruption studies, the primary tool for evaluating chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness, identify which chain positions are "computationally important" by measuring accuracy when steps are replaced with errors. We identify a systematic confound: for chains with explicit terminal answer statements, the dominant format in standard benchmarks, corruption studies detect where the answer text appears, not where computation occurs. A within-dataset format ablation provides the key evidence: on standard GSM8K chains ending with "the answer is X," removing only the answer statement, preserving all reasoning, collapses suffix sensitivity ~19x at 3B (N=300, p=0.022). Conflicting-answer experiments quantify the causal mechanism: at 7B, CC accuracy drops to near-zero (<=0.02) across five architecture families; the followed-wrong rate spans 0.63-1.00 at 3B-7B and attenuates at larger scales (0.300 at Phi-4-14B, ~0.01 at 32B). A within-stable 7B replication (9.3x attenuation, N=76, p=7.8e-3; Qwen3-8B N=299, p=0.004) provides converging evidence, and the pattern replicates on MATH (DeepSeek-R1-7B: 10.9x suffix-survival recovery). On chains without answer suffixes the same protocol identifies the prefix as load-bearing (Delta=-0.77, p<10^-12). Generation-time probes confirm a dissociation: the answer is not early-determined during generation (early commitment <5%), yet at consumption time model outputs systematically follow the explicit answer text. The format-determination effect persists through 14B (8.5x ratio, p=0.001) and converges toward zero at 32B. We propose a three-prerequisite protocol (question-only control, format characterization, all-position sweep) as a minimum standard for corruption-based faithfulness studies.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, is fundamental for human social intelligence and a critical capability for advanced Artificial Intelligence. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising performance on ToM benchmarks, raising the question: Do these benchmarks necessitate explicit human-like reasoning processes, or can models succeed through alternative strategies? We investigate this question empirically by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) to LLMs of varying scales (0.5B to 7B parameters) and evaluating them across multiple ToM datasets. Our results reveal a scale-dependent impact of RL: while RL significantly improves accuracy and fosters high-quality, interpretable, and transferable belief-tracking reasoning in larger models (7B), it leads to "reasoning collapse" in smaller models (leq3B), where high accuracy and generalization ability are achieved via drastically shortened, less meaningful responses. Surprisingly, further SFT achieves competitive and generalizable performance across these benchmarks, often matching or exceeding RL models in accuracy, despite not being explicitly trained to produce structured reasoning traces. These findings highlight a critical discrepancy between benchmark accuracy and the nature of learned reasoning. Our work suggests that current ToM benchmarks may be solvable without requiring the explicit, human-like simulation of mental states they were designed to probe. LLMs, particularly when scale is limited or training signals focus solely on output correctness, may leverage alternative rules effective for benchmark data structures.

Ensuring persona fidelity in large language models (LLMs) is essential for maintaining coherent and engaging human-AI interactions. However, LLMs often exhibit Out-of-Character (OOC) behavior, where generated responses deviate from an assigned persona, leading to inconsistencies that affect model reliability. Existing evaluation methods typically assign single scores to entire responses, struggling to capture subtle persona misalignment, particularly in long-form text generation. To address this limitation, we propose an atomic-level evaluation framework that quantifies persona fidelity at a finer granularity. Our three key metrics measure the degree of persona alignment and consistency within and across generations. Our approach enables a more precise and realistic assessment of persona fidelity by identifying subtle deviations that real users would encounter. Through our experiments, we demonstrate that our framework effectively detects persona inconsistencies that prior methods overlook. By analyzing persona fidelity across diverse tasks and personality types, we reveal how task structure and persona desirability influence model adaptability, highlighting challenges in maintaining consistent persona expression.

Vision-language models (VLMs) often produce chain-of-thought (CoT) explanations that sound plausible yet fail to reflect the underlying decision process, undermining trust in high-stakes clinical use. Existing evaluations rarely catch this misalignment, prioritizing answer accuracy or adherence to formats. We present a clinically grounded framework for chest X-ray visual question answering (VQA) that probes CoT faithfulness via controlled text and image modifications across three axes: clinical fidelity, causal attribution, and confidence calibration. In a reader study (n=4), evaluator-radiologist correlations fall within the observed inter-radiologist range for all axes, with strong alignment for attribution (Kendall's tau_b=0.670), moderate alignment for fidelity (tau_b=0.387), and weak alignment for confidence tone (tau_b=0.091), which we report with caution. Benchmarking six VLMs shows that answer accuracy and explanation quality are decoupled, acknowledging injected cues does not ensure grounding, and text cues shift explanations more than visual cues. While some open-source models match final answer accuracy, proprietary models score higher on attribution (25.0% vs. 1.4%) and often on fidelity (36.1% vs. 31.7%), highlighting deployment risks and the need to evaluate beyond final answer accuracy.

Figurative language (e.g., "he flew like the wind") is challenging to understand, as it is hard to tell what implicit information is being conveyed from the surface form alone. We hypothesize that to perform this task well, the reader needs to mentally elaborate the scene being described to identify a sensible meaning of the language. We present DREAM-FLUTE, a figurative language understanding system that does this, first forming a "mental model" of situations described in a premise and hypothesis before making an entailment/contradiction decision and generating an explanation. DREAM-FLUTE uses an existing scene elaboration model, DREAM, for constructing its "mental model." In the FigLang2022 Shared Task evaluation, DREAM-FLUTE achieved (joint) first place (Acc@60=63.3%), and can perform even better with ensemble techniques, demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach. More generally, this work suggests that adding a reflective component to pretrained language models can improve their performance beyond standard fine-tuning (3.3% improvement in Acc@60).

We introduce behavioral fidelity -- a third evaluation dimension for synthetic tabular data that measures whether generated data preserves the temporal, sequential, and structural behavioral patterns that distinguish real-world entity activity. Existing frameworks evaluate statistical fidelity (marginal distributions and correlations) and downstream utility (classifier AUROC on synthetic-trained models), but neither tests for the behavioral signals that operational detection and analysis systems actually rely on. We formalize a taxonomy of four behavioral fraud patterns (P1-P4) covering inter-event timing, burst structure, multi-account graph motifs, and velocity-rule trigger rates; define a degradation ratio metric calibrated to a real-data noise floor (1.0 = matches real variability, k = k-times worse); and prove that row-independent generators -- the dominant paradigm -- are structurally incapable of reproducing P3 graph motifs (Proposition 1) and produce non-positive within-entity IET autocorrelation (Proposition 2), making the positive burst fingerprint of fraud sequences unachievable regardless of architecture or training data size. We benchmark CTGAN, TVAE, GaussianCopula, and TabularARGN on IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection and the Amazon Fraud Dataset. All four fail severely: on IEEE-CIS composite degradation ratios range from 24.4x (TVAE) to 39.0x (GaussianCopula); on Amazon FDB, row-independent generators score 81.6-99.7x, while TabularARGN achieves 17.2x. We document generator-specific failure modes and their resolutions. The P1-P4 framework extends to any domain with entity-level sequential tabular data, including healthcare and network security. We release our evaluation framework as open source.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

We investigate how to enhance the physical fidelity of video generation models by leveraging synthetic videos derived from computer graphics pipelines. These rendered videos respect real-world physics, such as maintaining 3D consistency, and serve as a valuable resource that can potentially improve video generation models. To harness this potential, we propose a solution that curates and integrates synthetic data while introducing a method to transfer its physical realism to the model, significantly reducing unwanted artifacts. Through experiments on three representative tasks emphasizing physical consistency, we demonstrate its efficacy in enhancing physical fidelity. While our model still lacks a deep understanding of physics, our work offers one of the first empirical demonstrations that synthetic video enhances physical fidelity in video synthesis. Website: https://kevinz8866.github.io/simulation/

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Large language models can answer scientific questions, yet a correct output does not reveal whether the model represents or uses the governing physics. Here we show that materials science mechanism information in the open-weight google/gemma-4-E4B-it model has three experimentally separable forms: concepts are readable in individual hidden states, constitutive orientation is carried by controlled transformations between states, and selected internal representations causally control engineering answers. We combine matched direct and Jacobian vocabulary readouts, option-free state geometry, a 60-law counterfactual benchmark and causal interventions. In 50 held-out materials descriptions, three independently fitted Jacobian lenses reproduced concept ranks, and target-free word sets from both readouts enabled blinded identification of 9 of 10 mechanism families. A separate 72-prompt benchmark produced mechanism-specific hidden-state neighborhoods, but an exact graph audit showed that this apparent physical organization was equally explained by numerical comparison. We therefore compared otherwise identical prompts in which only the direction of the physical input was reversed, asking whether the resulting hidden-state movement followed the supplied constitutive law. These state transformations ordered direct, physically neutral and inverse laws across 60 frozen relations and correctly oriented 39 of 40 directional laws, whereas lexical controls were near chance. Bidirectional interventions shifted answer probabilities toward or away from the physically appropriate outcome across all 12 matched cases, while counterfactual state patches transferred opposing decision signals across mechanisms and answer formats. Physical relationships were therefore more visible in controlled state changes than in absolute states alone.

When prompted to think step-by-step, language models (LMs) produce a chain of thought (CoT), a sequence of reasoning steps that the model supposedly used to produce its prediction. Despite much work on CoT prompting, it is unclear if reasoning verbalized in a CoT is faithful to the models' parametric beliefs. We introduce a framework for measuring parametric faithfulness of generated reasoning, and propose Faithfulness by Unlearning Reasoning steps (FUR), an instance of this framework. FUR erases information contained in reasoning steps from model parameters, and measures faithfulness as the resulting effect on the model's prediction. Our experiments with four LMs and five multi-hop multi-choice question answering (MCQA) datasets show that FUR is frequently able to precisely change the underlying models' prediction for a given instance by unlearning key steps, indicating when a CoT is parametrically faithful. Further analysis shows that CoTs generated by models post-unlearning support different answers, hinting at a deeper effect of unlearning.

This paper explores the intersection of identity, individuality, and reality through competing frameworks, including classical metaphysics, quantum mechanics, and computational theories. Traditional metaphysical notions of fixed identity are challenged by advancements in cloning, teletransportation, and digital replication, which reveal the fluid and relational nature of individuality. Quantum mechanics further complicates these notions, emphasizing the indistinguishability and contextuality of fundamental particles. Computational approaches, such as the Ruliad and Constructor Theory, offer expansive views of emergent realities but often lack practical constraints for observer relevance. Algorithmic idealism is introduced as a unifying framework, proposing that reality is an emergent construct governed by computational rules prioritizing coherence, sufficiency, and observer-dependent experiences. By redefining identity as an informational construct and reality as a process shaped by algorithmic transitions, algorithmic idealism resolves foundational paradoxes and offers a superior lens for understanding existence in an increasingly digital and interconnected world. The framework bridges gaps between competing theories, providing a coherent and pragmatic model for addressing ethical, metaphysical, and technological challenges.

Test-time compute has empowered multimodal large language models to generate extended reasoning chains, yielding strong performance on tasks such as multimodal math reasoning. However, this improved reasoning ability often comes with increased hallucination: as generations become longer, models tend to drift away from image-grounded content and rely more heavily on language priors. Attention analysis shows that longer reasoning chains lead to reduced focus on visual inputs, which contributes to hallucination. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce RH-AUC, a metric that quantifies how a model's perception accuracy changes with reasoning length, allowing us to evaluate whether the model preserves visual grounding during reasoning. We also release RH-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark that spans a variety of multimodal tasks, designed to assess the trade-off between reasoning ability and hallucination. Our analysis reveals that (i) larger models typically achieve a better balance between reasoning and perception, and (ii) this balance is influenced more by the types and domains of training data than by its overall volume. These findings underscore the importance of evaluation frameworks that jointly consider both reasoning quality and perceptual fidelity.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional performance in planning the use of various functional tools, such as calculators and retrievers, particularly in question-answering tasks. In this paper, we expand the definition of these tools, centering on conceptual tools within the context of dialogue systems. A conceptual tool specifies a cognitive concept that aids systematic or investigative thought. These conceptual tools play important roles in practice, such as multiple psychological or tutoring strategies being dynamically applied in a single turn to compose helpful responses. To further enhance the reasoning and planning capability of LLMs with these conceptual tools, we introduce a multi-persona collaboration framework: Think-Plan-Execute (TPE). This framework decouples the response generation process into three distinct roles: Thinker, Planner, and Executor. Specifically, the Thinker analyzes the internal status exhibited in the dialogue context, such as user emotions and preferences, to formulate a global guideline. The Planner then generates executable plans to call different conceptual tools (e.g., sources or strategies), while the Executor compiles all intermediate results into a coherent response. This structured approach not only enhances the explainability and controllability of responses but also reduces token redundancy. We demonstrate the effectiveness of TPE across various dialogue response generation tasks, including multi-source (FoCus) and multi-strategy interactions (CIMA and PsyQA). This reveals its potential to handle real-world dialogue interactions that require more complicated tool learning beyond just functional tools. The full code and data will be released for reproduction.

Computational knowledge graphs assign philosophical concepts to traditions based on corpus frequency: the school that mentions a concept most becomes its attributed tradition. We argue this conflates three measurements: textual power, historical priority, and philosophical significance, demonstrated using the darshana-graph, a knowledge graph of 28,322 relationships across Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain traditions. Seven of the top 25 concepts by betweenness centrality predate their attributed school by 288 to 2,288 years. Moksha, attributed to Advaita Vedanta, appears first in Jain sources over 1,200 years earlier. The most reliable snapshot, at 300 BCE using only explicitly dated sources, shows a genuinely pluralistic structure: 59% Vedic, 24% Jain, 18% Buddhist. We also quantify a critical distortion in the temporal method: between 300 CE and 800 CE the network grows from 18 to 1,028 nodes, with 97.4% carrying Advaita proxy dates, revealing that apparent dominance reflects textual survival, not philosophical history. Beyond correcting attribution bias, the temporally grounded graph enables structural homology analysis across traditions. Ego-network feature vectors applied to 48 temporally labelled concepts across eight traditions identify cross-tradition concept pairs with high structural similarity. The method recovers known correspondences including purusha-jiva (Samkhya/Jain, sim 0.990) and prakriti-maya (Samkhya/Vedic, sim 0.972), and surfaces novel homologies. Nibbana and samsara score 0.954 despite being doctrinal opposites: both function as the ultimate reference concept in their tradition's soteriology. Cetana (Buddhist intention) and ajiva (Jain non-living matter) score 0.923, a pairing absent from the literature. These are not claims of doctrinal equivalence but of measurable structural homology: different philosophical vocabularies navigating a shared conceptual space.

Formality transfer is commonly framed as a symmetric bidirectional task between informal and formal registers. We argue that this framing conceals a supervision design flaw in existing benchmarks such as GYAFC: binary human rewrites encode relative stylistic shifts rather than absolute human notions of formality. Consequently, models learn to generate pseudo-formal outputs that satisfy benchmark labels while failing to produce genuinely formal language. We quantify this misalignment by re-evaluating benchmark formal labels under a human-aligned definition of formality, revealing substantial discrepancies that propagate to consistent informal-to-formal failures across model families. To address this issue, we reconceptualize formality transfer as a graded dimension rather than a binary attribute. We introduce a three-level spectrum: informal, casual, and formal, where casual serves as an explicit intermediate state that clarifies supervision signals. Based on this framework, we introduce 3LF, a dataset providing parallel supervision across all three levels. Training on 3LF substantially reduces informal-to-formal failures and improves alignment with human perception. For example, GPT-4.1-nano improves from 0.06 to 0.88 F1 in the informal-to- formal direction despite 3LF being significantly smaller than GYAFC. We further demonstrate that these gains cannot be reproduced through in-context learning alone and provide qualitative analyses of ambiguity-driven errors and meaning distortions. Overall, our findings demonstrate how supervision design shapes stylistic alignment and highlight the importance of alignment-aware benchmark construction in controllable text generation.

Chains of thought (CoTs) have become central in interpreting and auditing behaviors of large language models. Yet growing evidence suggests that these traces often fail to faithfully represent the computations behind a model's predictions. Several faithfulness metrics have been proposed, but whether they indeed measure faithfulness remains unknown. Answering this requires ground-truth labels, which are hard to obtain since internal computations are not directly observable. Consequently, most works proposing metrics report only absolute scores or comparisons to prior metrics, and the few existing benchmarks rely on proxies like plausibility or importance, properties orthogonal to faithfulness that can mislead about whether a CoT can be trusted. We address this challenge by constructing tasks whose outputs reveal which intermediate computations must have produced them, and developing an automated labeling pipeline that yields ground-truth faithfulness labels at both the step and CoT level. Building on this methodology, we present BonaFide, a benchmark of 3,066 labeled CoTs across 13 tasks and 10 models, and use it to conduct the first systematic evaluation of prominent faithfulness metrics. Our experiments show that most metrics perform near chance, exhibit strong prediction biases and degrade on longer CoTs. The best metric reaches only 0.70 AUROC at the CoT level while another reaches 0.59 at the step level, with neither transferring across settings, while entailing prohibitively high computational cost. Our results expose fundamental gaps in current faithfulness evaluation and call for the development of more reliable and efficient metrics.

Creative visual concept generation often draws inspiration from specific concepts in a reference image to produce relevant outcomes. However, existing methods are typically constrained to single-aspect concept generation or are easily disrupted by irrelevant concepts in multi-aspect concept scenarios, leading to concept confusion and hindering creative generation. To address this, we propose OmniPrism, a visual concept disentangling approach for creative image generation. Our method learns disentangled concept representations guided by natural language and trains a diffusion model to incorporate these concepts. We utilize the rich semantic space of a multimodal extractor to achieve concept disentanglement from given images and concept guidance. To disentangle concepts with different semantics, we construct a paired concept disentangled dataset (PCD-200K), where each pair shares the same concept such as content, style, and composition. We learn disentangled concept representations through our contrastive orthogonal disentangled (COD) training pipeline, which are then injected into additional diffusion cross-attention layers for generation. A set of block embeddings is designed to adapt each block's concept domain in the diffusion models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can generate high-quality, concept-disentangled results with high fidelity to text prompts and desired concepts.