Daily Papers

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Reflexion-style agents rely on self-generated reflections as memory, implicitly assuming that agents can accurately diagnose their own failures. We show that this assumption can fail systematically: across ALFWorld and HumanEval, agents store confident but incorrect interpretations of the task and continue acting on them across trials, even though the environment resets to the correct task each time. We call this failure mode memory confabulation and introduce the Reflection Repetition Rate (RRR), a log-based metric that detects repeated reliance on incorrect reflective content. Using RRR, we identify 16 frozen environments in ALFWorld, where 0 of 121 reflections mention the correct target object, and 4 analogous cases in HumanEval. Our mitigation replaces open-ended self-diagnosis with programmatic extraction of trajectory-level failure signals, increasing correct object mention from 0% to 86%, reducing RRR from 0.64 to 0.10, and solving 3 of 16 frozen ALFWorld environments, suggesting that reflective memory can reinforce false beliefs rather than correct them.

Large Language Models (LLMs) frequently confabulate scientific facts, severely undermining their trustworthiness. Addressing this challenge requires benchmarks that go beyond binary factuality and enable fine-grained evaluation. We introduce ReFACT (Reddit False And Correct Texts), a benchmark of 1,001 expert-annotated question-answer pairs spanning diverse scientific domains for the detection of scientific confabulation. Each instance includes both a scientifically correct answer and a non-factual counterpart annotated with precise error spans and error types. ReFACT enables multi-stage evaluation: (1) confabulation detection, (2) fine-grained error localization, and (3) correction. We benchmark 9 state-of-the-art LLMs, revealing limited performance (about 50 percent accuracy). Even top models such as GPT-4o fail to distinguish factual from confabulated scientific answers, raising concerns about the reliability of LLM-as-judge evaluation paradigms. Our findings highlight the need for fine-grained, human-validated benchmarks to detect and correct scientific confabulation in domain-specific contexts. The dataset is available at: https://github.com/ddz5431/ReFACT

Multi-agent AI systems can be used for simulating collective decision-making in scientific and practical applications. They can also be used to introduce a diverse group discussion step in chatbot pipelines, enhancing the cultural sensitivity of the chatbot's responses. These applications, however, are predicated on the ability of AI agents to reliably adopt assigned personas and mimic human interactions. To see whether LLM agents satisfy these requirements, we examine AI agent ensembles engaged in cross-national collaboration and debate by analyzing their private responses and chat transcripts. Our findings suggest that multi-agent discussions can support collective AI decisions that more often reflect diverse perspectives, yet this effect is tempered by the agents' susceptibility to conformity due to perceived peer pressure and occasional challenges in maintaining consistent personas and opinions. Instructions that encourage debate in support of one's opinions rather than collaboration increase the rate of inconstancy. Without addressing the factors we identify, the full potential of multi-agent frameworks for producing more culturally diverse AI outputs or more realistic simulations of group decision-making may remain untapped.

Hallucinations are a common issue that undermine the reliability of large language models (LLMs). Recent studies have identified a specific subset of hallucinations, known as confabulations, which arise due to predictive uncertainty of LLMs. To detect confabulations, various methods for estimating predictive uncertainty in natural language generation (NLG) have been developed. These methods are typically evaluated by correlating uncertainty estimates with the correctness of generated text, with question-answering (QA) datasets serving as the standard benchmark. However, commonly used approximate correctness functions have substantial disagreement between each other and, consequently, in the ranking of the uncertainty estimation methods. This allows one to inflate the apparent performance of uncertainty estimation methods. We propose using several alternative risk indicators for risk correlation experiments that improve robustness of empirical assessment of UE algorithms for NLG. For QA tasks, we show that marginalizing over multiple LLM-as-a-judge variants leads to reducing the evaluation biases. Furthermore, we explore structured tasks as well as out of distribution and perturbation detection tasks which provide robust and controllable risk indicators. Finally, we propose to use an Elo rating of uncertainty estimation methods to give an objective summarization over extensive evaluation settings.

The term "hallucination" converge different failure modes with specific geometric signatures in embedding space. We propose a taxonomy identifying three types: unfaithfulness (Type I: ignoring provided context), confabulation (Type II: inventing semantically foreign content), and factual error (Type III: wrong details within correct conceptual frames). We introduce two detection methods grounded in this taxonomy: the Semantic Grounding Index (SGI) for Type I, which measures whether a response moves toward provided context on the unit hypersphere, and the Directional Grounding Index (DGI) for Type II, which measures displacement geometry in context-free settings. DGI achieves AUROC=0.958 on human-crafted confabulations with 3.8% cross-domain degradation. External validation on three independently collected human-annotated benchmarks -WikiBio GPT-3, FELM, and ExpertQA- yields domain-specific AUROC 0.581-0.695, with DGI outperforming an NLI CrossEncoder baseline on expert-domain data, where surface entailment operates at chance. On LLM-generated benchmarks, detection is domain-local. We examine the Type III boundary through TruthfulQA, where apparent classifier signal (Logistic Regression with AUROC 0.731) is traced to a stylistic annotation confound: false answers are geometrically closer to queries than truthful ones, a pattern incompatible with factual-error detection. This identifies a theoretical constraint from a methodological limitation.

Medical abstractive summarization faces the challenge of balancing faithfulness and informativeness. Current methods often sacrifice key information for faithfulness or introduce confabulations when prioritizing informativeness. While recent advancements in techniques like in-context learning (ICL) and fine-tuning have improved medical summarization, they often overlook crucial aspects such as faithfulness and informativeness without considering advanced methods like model reasoning and self-improvement. Moreover, the field lacks a unified benchmark, hindering systematic evaluation due to varied metrics and datasets. This paper addresses these gaps by presenting a comprehensive benchmark of six advanced abstractive summarization methods across three diverse datasets using five standardized metrics. Building on these findings, we propose uMedSum, a modular hybrid summarization framework that introduces novel approaches for sequential confabulation removal followed by key missing information addition, ensuring both faithfulness and informativeness. Our work improves upon previous GPT-4-based state-of-the-art (SOTA) medical summarization methods, significantly outperforming them in both quantitative metrics and qualitative domain expert evaluations. Notably, we achieve an average relative performance improvement of 11.8% in reference-free metrics over the previous SOTA. Doctors prefer uMedSum's summaries 6 times more than previous SOTA in difficult cases where there are chances of confabulations or missing information. These results highlight uMedSum's effectiveness and generalizability across various datasets and metrics, marking a significant advancement in medical summarization.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) can substantially extend the reasoning capacity of large language models (LLMs), yet most frameworks still aggregate agent outputs with majority voting. This heuristic discards the evidential structure of reasoning traces and is brittle under the confabulation consensus, where agents share correlated biases and converge on the same incorrect rationale. We introduce AgentAuditor, which replaces voting with a path search over a Reasoning Tree that explicitly represents agreements and divergences among agent traces. AgentAuditor resolves conflicts by comparing reasoning branches at critical divergence points, turning global adjudication into efficient, localized verification. We further propose Anti-Consensus Preference Optimization (ACPO), which trains the adjudicator on majority-failure cases and rewards evidence-based minority selections over popular errors. AgentAuditor is agnostic to MAS setting, and we find across 5 popular settings that it yields up to 5% absolute accuracy improvement over a majority vote, and up to 3% over using LLM-as-Judge.

Current large language models (LLMs) excel in verifiable domains where outputs can be checked before action but prove less reliable for high-stakes strategic decisions with uncertain outcomes. This gap, driven by mutually reinforcing cognitive biases in both humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, threatens the defensibility of valuations and sustainability of investments in the sector. This report describes a framework emerging from systematic qualitative assessment across 7 frontier-grade LLMs and 3 market-facing venture vignettes under time pressure. Detailed prompting specifying decision partnership and explicitly instructing avoidance of sycophancy, confabulation, solution drift, and nihilism achieved initial partnership state but failed to maintain it under operational pressure. Sustaining protective partnership state required an emergent 7-stage calibration sequence, built upon a 4-stage initialization process, within a 5-layer protection architecture enabling bias self-monitoring, human-AI adversarial challenge, partnership state verification, performance degradation detection, and stakeholder protection. Three discoveries resulted: partnership state is achievable through ordered calibration but requires emergent maintenance protocols; reliability degrades when architectural drift and context exhaustion align; and dissolution discipline prevents costly pursuit of fundamentally wrong directions. Cross-model validation revealed systematic performance differences across LLM architectures. This approach demonstrates that human-AI teams can achieve cognitive partnership capable of preventing avoidable regret in high-stakes decisions, addressing return-on-investment expectations that depend on AI systems supporting consequential decision-making without introducing preventable cognitive traps when verification arrives too late.

Neural language models (LMs) can be used to evaluate the truth of factual statements in two ways: they can be either queried for statement probabilities, or probed for internal representations of truthfulness. Past work has found that these two procedures sometimes disagree, and that probes tend to be more accurate than LM outputs. This has led some researchers to conclude that LMs "lie" or otherwise encode non-cooperative communicative intents. Is this an accurate description of today's LMs, or can query-probe disagreement arise in other ways? We identify three different classes of disagreement, which we term confabulation, deception, and heterogeneity. In many cases, the superiority of probes is simply attributable to better calibration on uncertain answers rather than a greater fraction of correct, high-confidence answers. In some cases, queries and probes perform better on different subsets of inputs, and accuracy can further be improved by ensembling the two. Code is available at github.com/lingo-mit/lm-truthfulness.

Episodic memory -- the ability to recall specific events grounded in time and space -- is a cornerstone of human cognition, enabling not only coherent storytelling, but also planning and decision-making. Despite their remarkable capabilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) lack a robust mechanism for episodic memory: we argue that integrating episodic memory capabilities into LLM is essential for advancing AI towards human-like cognition, increasing their potential to reason consistently and ground their output in real-world episodic events, hence avoiding confabulations. To address this challenge, we introduce a comprehensive framework to model and evaluate LLM episodic memory capabilities. Drawing inspiration from cognitive science, we develop a structured approach to represent episodic events, encapsulating temporal and spatial contexts, involved entities, and detailed descriptions. We synthesize a unique episodic memory benchmark, free from contamination, and release open source code and datasets to assess LLM performance across various recall and episodic reasoning tasks. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4 and Claude variants, Llama 3.1, and o1-mini, reveals that even the most advanced LLMs struggle with episodic memory tasks, particularly when dealing with multiple related events or complex spatio-temporal relationships -- even in contexts as short as 10k-100k tokens.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in human-facing roles where personality perception is critical, yet existing benchmarks evaluate this capability solely on numerical Big Five score prediction, leaving open whether models truly perceive personality through behavioral understanding or merely prejudge through superficial pattern matching. We address this gap with three contributions. (i) A new task: we formalize Grounded Personality Reasoning (GPR), which requires MLLMs to anchor each Big Five rating in observable evidence through a chain of rating, reasoning, and grounding. (ii) A new dataset: we release MM-OCEAN (1,104 videos, 5,320 MCQs), produced by a multi-agent pipeline with human verification, with timestamped behavioral observations, evidence-grounded trait analyses, and seven categories of cue-grounding MCQs. (iii) Benchmark and analysis: we design a three-tier evaluation (rating, reasoning, grounding) plus four sample-level failure-mode metrics: Prejudice Rate (PR), Confabulation Rate (CR), Integration-failure Rate (IR), and Holistic-grounding Rate (HR), and benchmark 27 MLLMs (13 closed, 14 open). The analysis uncovers a striking Prejudice Gap: across the field, 51% of correct ratings are not grounded in retrieved cues, and the Holistic-Grounding Rate spans only 0-33.5%. These findings expose a disconnect between getting the right score and reasoning for the right reason, charting a roadmap for grounded social cognition in MLLMs.

Interactive digital agents (IDAs) leverage APIs of stateful digital environments to perform tasks in response to user requests. While IDAs powered by instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs) can react to feedback from interface invocations in multi-step exchanges, they have not been trained in their respective digital environments. Prior methods accomplish less than half of tasks in sophisticated benchmarks such as AppWorld. We present a reinforcement learning (RL) approach that trains IDAs directly in their target environments. We formalize this training as a partially observable Markov decision process and derive LOOP, a data- and memory-efficient variant of proximal policy optimization. LOOP uses no value network and maintains exactly one copy of the underlying LLM in memory, making its implementation straightforward and as memory-efficient as fine-tuning a single LLM. A 32-billion-parameter agent trained with LOOP in the AppWorld environment outperforms the much larger OpenAI o1 agent by 9 percentage points (15% relative). To our knowledge, this is the first reported application of RL to IDAs that interact with a stateful, multi-domain, multi-app environment via direct API calls. Our analysis sheds light on the effectiveness of RL in this area, showing that the agent learns to consult the API documentation, avoid unwarranted assumptions, minimize confabulation, and recover from setbacks.

Latent, or silent, reasoning lets language models carry out intermediate computation in continuous vector space instead of words, and is widely assumed to function as an internal scratchpad the model consults during inference. Whether that assumption survives reinforcement learning has not been tested directly: existing causal analyses of latent reasoning are confined to math and logic tasks, comparing reliance on thoughts within one checkpoint, never before and after RL. We train a chess-playing model through a staged latent-reasoning curriculum followed by reinforcement learning, and find legality climbs monotonically to 61% (from a 48% pre-RL baseline) while checkmate confabulation is eliminated entirely. To locate this gain, we run a six-condition causal intervention suite on the same model before and after RL: substituting or noising the thought vectors leaves performance unchanged, ablating them costs only mild degradation, and only exact-zero vectors cause collapse. This robustness gap is itself the finding: under exact-zero corruption, legality collapses to 1% pre-RL versus 9% post-RL, a gap that survives correction across the full battery. A 10x-larger replication of the post-RL checkpoint's own battery confirms this: removing the thoughts, with or without restoring sequence length, also reaches significance; substitution and noise remain indistinguishable from baseline. RL appears to add robustness to disruption, not reliance on thought content. These results push back against the field's default assumption that latent thoughts function as an actively consulted inference-time scratchpad, and instead indicate latent reasoning's principal effect here is shaping the model's parameters during training. We also demonstrate a working RL gain in chess, where multiple groups report the same latent-reasoning-plus-RL recipe failing to improve accuracy over SFT.

Multi-step enterprise agent tasks fail in a characteristic way: single-pass inference has no checkpoint between deciding an answer and committing to it. We study one production system (Leni) whose architecture installs such checkpoints: verification loops (execute, observe, compare, correct) staffed by lightweight task-specialized post-trained models. We evaluate the unmodified production configuration on three public benchmarks stressing distinct failure modes: SpreadsheetBench Verified (silent computation error), BullshitBench v2 (premise confabulation), and the GAIA validation split (cascade error over long tool chains). The full system improves over its frontier base model by +11.0 percentage points on SpreadsheetBench (91.25% vs 80.25%, n=400, p<0.001), +7 to +10 percentage points on BullshitBench (98% vs 91%, n=100), and roughly +15 points on GAIA validation (75.2% pass@1, n=165; 83.0% best-of-k). Our central contribution is a decomposition of that uplift: most of it comes from scaffolding, routing, and specialist models rather than from the verification step itself, whose isolated contribution is small (+1.5 points) but concentrated at the top of the score distribution, where it converts otherwise-failing tasks. We instrument the loop end-to-end, yielding an empirical verifier confusion matrix (catch rate about 0.20, fix rate 0.75, no false-alarm regressions) that grounds a compounding-reliability model. Specialist-swap ablations suggest that the loop's value depends on who observes it: replacing the small trained verifier with the generating frontier model eliminates most rescues. A valid-premise control shows zero over-rejections in 100 expert-level questions.

CASTLE 2026 asks 185 multiple-choice questions over 600+ hours of synchronized multi-view egocentric video. We explore two approaches on top of a shared multimodal preprocessing layer, including per-person timelines, speaker-resolved transcripts, and multi-VLM caption ensembles. Approach A, SVA: Search-Verify-Answer, is a three-stage pipeline that hierarchically narrows to a primary window, verifies sub-windows with a VLM under four anti-confabulation rules, and fuses evidence with an LLM judge under an evidence-priority hierarchy. Approach B, TMKG: Temporal-Multimodal-Knowledge-Graph, is the contrast: it builds a temporal multimodal knowledge graph, locates a primary cell via graph search, and produces the final answer with a single grounded VLM. SVA reaches a leaderboard accuracy of 0.50 and is our final challenge submission; TMKG reaches 0.35.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.