Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite advances in safety alignment, remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks designed to circumvent protective mechanisms. Prevailing defense strategies rely on external interventions, such as input filtering or output modification, which often lack generalizability and compromise model utility while incurring significant computational overhead. In this work, we introduce a new, training-free defense paradigm, Self-Activating Internal Defense (SAID), which reframes the defense task from external correction to internal capability activation. SAID uniquely leverages the LLM's own reasoning abilities to proactively identify and neutralize malicious intent through a three-stage pipeline: model-native intent distillation to extract core semantics, optimal safety prefix probing to activate latent safety awareness, and a conservative aggregation strategy to ensure robust decision-making. Extensive experiments on five open-source LLMs against six advanced jailbreak attacks demonstrate that SAID substantially outperforms state-of-the-art defenses in reducing harmful outputs. Crucially, it achieves this while preserving model performance on benign tasks and incurring minimal computational overhead. Our work establishes that activating the intrinsic safety mechanisms of LLMs is a more robust and scalable path toward building safer and more reliable aligned AI systems.

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game under the offline learning constraint. We first frame this problem in terms of selecting among candidate equilibria. Since datasets may inform only a small fraction of game dynamics, it is generally infeasible in offline game-solving to even verify a proposed solution is a true equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the relative probability of low regret (i.e., closeness to equilibrium) across candidates based on the information available. Specifically, we extend Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), an online game-solving approach, by quantifying game dynamics uncertainty and modifying the RL objective to skew towards solutions more likely to have low regret in the true game. We further propose a novel meta-strategy solver, tailored for the offline setting, to guide strategy exploration in PSRO. Our incorporation of Conservatism principles from Offline reinforcement learning approaches for strategy Exploration gives our approach its name: COffeE-PSRO. Experiments demonstrate COffeE-PSRO's ability to extract lower-regret solutions than state-of-the-art offline approaches and reveal relationships between algorithmic components empirical game fidelity, and overall performance.

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this impression rigorous in a dynamic model of cardinal hedonic games by providing meta theorems. These imply hardness of deciding about the possible or necessary convergence of deviation dynamics based on the mere existence of No-instances. Our results hold for additively separable, fractional, and modified fractional hedonic games (ASHGs, FHGs, and MFHGs). Moreover, they encompass essentially all reasonable stability notions based on single-agent deviations. In addition, we propose dynamics as a method to find individually rational and contractually individual stable (CIS) partitions in ASHGs. In particular, we find that CIS dynamics from the singleton partition possibly converge after a linear number of deviations but may require an exponential number of deviations in the worst case.

Group Relative Policy Optimisation (GRPO) enhances large language models by estimating advantages across a group of sampled trajectories. However, mapping these trajectory-level advantages to policy updates requires aggregating token-level probabilities within each sequence. Relying on a fixed aggregation mechanism for this step fundamentally limits the algorithm's adaptability. Empirically, we observe a critical trade-off: certain fixed aggregations frequently suffer from training collapse, while others fail to yield satisfactory performance. To resolve this, we propose HölderPO, a generalised policy optimisation framework unifying token-level probability aggregation via the Hölder mean. By explicitly modulating the parameter p, our framework provides continuous control over the trade-off between gradient concentration and variance bounds. Theoretically, we prove that a larger p concentrates the gradient to amplify sparse learning signals, whereas a smaller p strictly bounds gradient variance. Because no static configuration can universally resolve this concentration-stability trade-off, we instantiate the framework with a dynamic annealing algorithm that progressively schedules p across the training lifecycle. Extensive evaluations demonstrate superior stability and convergence over existing baselines. Specifically, our approach achieves a state-of-the-art average accuracy of 54.9% across multiple mathematical benchmarks, yielding a substantial 7.2% relative gain over standard GRPO and secures an exceptional 93.8% success rate on ALFWorld.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a standard approach for fine-tuning large language models to follow instructions. As part of this process, learned reward models are used to approximately model human preferences. However, as imperfect representations of the "true" reward, these learned reward models are susceptible to overoptimization. Gao et al. (2023) studied this phenomenon in a synthetic human feedback setup with a significantly larger "gold" reward model acting as the true reward (instead of humans) and showed that overoptimization remains a persistent problem regardless of the size of the proxy reward model and training data used. Using a similar setup, we conduct a systematic study to evaluate the efficacy of using ensemble-based conservative optimization objectives, specifically worst-case optimization (WCO) and uncertainty-weighted optimization (UWO), for mitigating reward model overoptimization when using two optimization methods: (a) best-of-n sampling (BoN) (b) proximal policy optimization (PPO). We additionally extend the setup of Gao et al. (2023) to include 25% label noise to better mirror real-world conditions. Both with and without label noise, we find that conservative optimization practically eliminates overoptimization and improves performance by up to 70% for BoN sampling. For PPO, ensemble-based conservative optimization always reduces overoptimization and outperforms single reward model optimization. Moreover, combining it with a small KL penalty successfully prevents overoptimization at no performance cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that ensemble-based conservative optimization can effectively counter overoptimization.

Large language models have revolutionized natural language processing, yet their deployment remains hampered by the substantial memory and runtime overhead of the transformer's Key-Value cache. To mitigate this, recent methods employ a scoring-aggregation framework to evict unimportant cache entries, based on the stability assumption-that a fixed subset of entries remains consistently important during generation. However, prior work has largely focused on refining importance indicators for scoring, while defaulting to mean aggregation due to a faithful trust in the stability assumption. In this work, we argue that this underlying assumption is inherently fragile, making mean aggregation highly vulnerable in extreme cases. To counter this, we propose a simple yet elegant defensive aggregation strategy: a two-step, linear-time approach that controls worst-case risk, thereby defending against extreme cases with negligible computational overhead. Embodying this strategy, we propose a novel cache eviction method, DefensiveKV and its extension, Layer-DefensiveKV, which incorporates layer-wise budget allocation. Across seven task domains (18 datasets), our methods reduce generation quality loss by 2.3x and 4.3x respectively, versus the strongest baseline under a 20% cache size. These results set new performance benchmarks and pioneer a promising direction for optimizing cache eviction against underlying fragility through worst-case risk management. Our code is available at https://github.com/FFY0/DefensiveKV.

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Offline multi-agent reinforcement learning is challenging due to the coupling effect of both distribution shift issue common in offline setting and the high dimension issue common in multi-agent setting, making the action out-of-distribution (OOD) and value overestimation phenomenon excessively severe. Tomitigate this problem, we propose a novel multi-agent offline RL algorithm, named CounterFactual Conservative Q-Learning (CFCQL) to conduct conservative value estimation. Rather than regarding all the agents as a high dimensional single one and directly applying single agent methods to it, CFCQL calculates conservative regularization for each agent separately in a counterfactual way and then linearly combines them to realize an overall conservative value estimation. We prove that it still enjoys the underestimation property and the performance guarantee as those single agent conservative methods do, but the induced regularization and safe policy improvement bound are independent of the agent number, which is therefore theoretically superior to the direct treatment referred to above, especially when the agent number is large. We further conduct experiments on four environments including both discrete and continuous action settings on both existing and our man-made datasets, demonstrating that CFCQL outperforms existing methods on most datasets and even with a remarkable margin on some of them.

In this study, we propose a multicriteria group decision making (MCGDM) algorithm under uncertainty where data is collected as intervals. The proposed MCGDM algorithm aggregates the data, determines the optimal weights for criteria and ranks alternatives with no further input. The intervals give flexibility to experts in assessing alternatives against criteria and provide an opportunity to gain maximum information. We also propose a novel method to aggregate expert judgements using cloud models. We introduce an experimental approach to check the validity of the aggregation method. After that, we use the aggregation method for an MCGDM problem. Here, we find the optimal weights for each criterion by proposing a bilevel optimisation model. Then, we extend the technique for order of preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) for data based on cloud models to prioritise alternatives. As a result, the algorithm can gain information from decision makers with different levels of uncertainty and examine alternatives with no more information from decision-makers. The proposed MCGDM algorithm is implemented on a case study of a cybersecurity problem to illustrate its feasibility and effectiveness. The results verify the robustness and validity of the proposed MCGDM using sensitivity analysis and comparison with other existing algorithms.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

Agentic AI systems capable of autonomous planning and extended environmental interaction pose a fundamental control problem: how can humans maintain meaningful oversight of systems that may exceed their own capabilities? Existing approaches to scalable oversight rely on complex assumptions, remain largely heuristic, or lack practical methods for sequential settings with statistical guarantees. We introduce Calibrated Collective Oversight (CCO), which aggregates diverse auxiliary scoring functions into a penalty measuring deviation from a conservative baseline. Inspired by Attainable Utility Preservation, CCO enables collective conservatism: actions face a penalty proportional to overseer concern, so high-utility actions are still selected when overseers find them unobjectionable and overridden only when concern accumulates. CCO calibrates this conservatism online using Conformal Decision Theory, ensuring that undesirable outcomes remain below a user-specified target threshold with finite-time bounds and no distributional assumptions. On a modified version of SWE-bench, weaker overseers successfully constrain an adversarially misaligned stronger agent; on MACHIAVELLI, CCO substantially reduces ethical violations while preserving reward. In both settings, empirical violation rates closely match the specified targets, as predicted by the theory.

Offline reinforcement learning (RL) is a compelling framework for learning optimal policies from past experiences without additional interaction with the environment. Nevertheless, offline RL inevitably faces the problem of distributional shifts, where the states and actions encountered during policy execution may not be in the training dataset distribution. A common solution involves incorporating conservatism into the policy or the value function to safeguard against uncertainties and unknowns. In this work, we focus on achieving the same objectives of conservatism but from a different perspective. We propose COmpositional COnservatism with Anchor-seeking (COCOA) for offline RL, an approach that pursues conservatism in a compositional manner on top of the transductive reparameterization (Netanyahu et al., 2023), which decomposes the input variable (the state in our case) into an anchor and its difference from the original input. Our COCOA seeks both in-distribution anchors and differences by utilizing the learned reverse dynamics model, encouraging conservatism in the compositional input space for the policy or value function. Such compositional conservatism is independent of and agnostic to the prevalent behavioral conservatism in offline RL. We apply COCOA to four state-of-the-art offline RL algorithms and evaluate them on the D4RL benchmark, where COCOA generally improves the performance of each algorithm. The code is available at https://github.com/runamu/compositional-conservatism.

Recent machine learning papers often report 1-2 percentage point improvements from a single run on a benchmark. These gains are highly sensitive to random seeds, data ordering, and implementation details, yet are rarely accompanied by uncertainty estimates or significance tests. It is therefore unclear when a reported +1-2% reflects a real algorithmic advance versus noise. We revisit this problem under realistic compute budgets, where only a few runs are affordable. We propose a simple, PC-friendly evaluation protocol based on paired multi-seed runs, bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrap confidence intervals, and a sign-flip permutation test on per-seed deltas. The protocol is intentionally conservative and is meant as a guardrail against over-claiming. We instantiate it on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-10N, and AG News using synthetic no-improvement, small-gain, and medium-gain scenarios. Single runs and unpaired t-tests often suggest significant gains for 0.6-2.0 point improvements, especially on text. With only three seeds, our paired protocol never declares significance in these settings. We argue that such conservative evaluation is a safer default for small gains under tight budgets.

In this paper, we introduce analytic federated learning (AFL), a new training paradigm that brings analytical (i.e., closed-form) solutions to the federated learning (FL) community. Our AFL draws inspiration from analytic learning -- a gradient-free technique that trains neural networks with analytical solutions in one epoch. In the local client training stage, the AFL facilitates a one-epoch training, eliminating the necessity for multi-epoch updates. In the aggregation stage, we derive an absolute aggregation (AA) law. This AA law allows a single-round aggregation, removing the need for multiple aggregation rounds. More importantly, the AFL exhibits a weight-invariant property, meaning that regardless of how the full dataset is distributed among clients, the aggregated result remains identical. This could spawn various potentials, such as data heterogeneity invariance, client-number invariance, absolute convergence, and being hyperparameter-free (our AFL is the first hyperparameter-free method in FL history). We conduct experiments across various FL settings including extremely non-IID ones, and scenarios with a large number of clients (e.g., ge 1000). In all these settings, our AFL constantly performs competitively while existing FL techniques encounter various obstacles. Code is available at https://github.com/ZHUANGHP/Analytic-federated-learning

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an interest to deviate). In this paper, inspired by a practical application in the context of a decision support system for collaborative transportation in a Short Food Supply Chain (SFSC), we mainly focus on Traveling Salesman Games (TSGs), where the objective is to allocate the cost of a Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) with n locations and 1 depot to n players, each linked to exactly one of the locations. Given the computational complexity of computing an element of the core and the cost of a TSP, we study semicore allocations: a relaxation of the core that only requires that the subsets of size n -1 and of size 1 do not wish to deviate from the coalition. In the literature, instances of TSGs with empty cores and semicores are found. Hence, this paper first surveys the methods to approximate stability whenever the core is empty, such as the cost of stability (computing the minimum amount of money to subsidize the coalition with to attain stability) and the ε-core (which is a set of allocations that allow subsets of players to exceed their actual cost, but at most of a value of ε). We prove that these two solution

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

Provably efficient Model-Based Reinforcement Learning (MBRL) based on optimism or posterior sampling (PSRL) is ensured to attain the global optimality asymptotically by introducing the complexity measure of the model. However, the complexity might grow exponentially for the simplest nonlinear models, where global convergence is impossible within finite iterations. When the model suffers a large generalization error, which is quantitatively measured by the model complexity, the uncertainty can be large. The sampled model that current policy is greedily optimized upon will thus be unsettled, resulting in aggressive policy updates and over-exploration. In this work, we propose Conservative Dual Policy Optimization (CDPO) that involves a Referential Update and a Conservative Update. The policy is first optimized under a reference model, which imitates the mechanism of PSRL while offering more stability. A conservative range of randomness is guaranteed by maximizing the expectation of model value. Without harmful sampling procedures, CDPO can still achieve the same regret as PSRL. More importantly, CDPO enjoys monotonic policy improvement and global optimality simultaneously. Empirical results also validate the exploration efficiency of CDPO.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

Federated learning has exhibited vulnerabilities to Byzantine attacks, where the Byzantine attackers can send arbitrary gradients to a central server to destroy the convergence and performance of the global model. A wealth of robust AGgregation Rules (AGRs) have been proposed to defend against Byzantine attacks. However, Byzantine clients can still circumvent robust AGRs when data is non-Identically and Independently Distributed (non-IID). In this paper, we first reveal the root causes of performance degradation of current robust AGRs in non-IID settings: the curse of dimensionality and gradient heterogeneity. In order to address this issue, we propose GAS, a \shorten approach that can successfully adapt existing robust AGRs to non-IID settings. We also provide a detailed convergence analysis when the existing robust AGRs are combined with GAS. Experiments on various real-world datasets verify the efficacy of our proposed GAS. The implementation code is provided in https://github.com/YuchenLiu-a/byzantine-gas.

Off-policy multi-step reinforcement learning algorithms consist of conservative and non-conservative algorithms: the former actively cut traces, whereas the latter do not. Recently, Munos et al. (2016) proved the convergence of conservative algorithms to an optimal Q-function. In contrast, non-conservative algorithms are thought to be unsafe and have a limited or no theoretical guarantee. Nonetheless, recent studies have shown that non-conservative algorithms empirically outperform conservative ones. Motivated by the empirical results and the lack of theory, we carry out theoretical analyses of Peng's Q(λ), a representative example of non-conservative algorithms. We prove that it also converges to an optimal policy provided that the behavior policy slowly tracks a greedy policy in a way similar to conservative policy iteration. Such a result has been conjectured to be true but has not been proven. We also experiment with Peng's Q(λ) in complex continuous control tasks, confirming that Peng's Q(λ) often outperforms conservative algorithms despite its simplicity. These results indicate that Peng's Q(λ), which was thought to be unsafe, is a theoretically-sound and practically effective algorithm.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

Data aggregation in intermediate nodes (called aggregator nodes) is an effective approach for optimizing consumption of scarce resources like bandwidth and energy in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). However, in-network processing poses a problem for the privacy of the sensor data since individual data of sensor nodes need to be known to the aggregator node before the aggregation process can be carried out. In applications of WSNs, privacy-preserving data aggregation has become an important requirement due to sensitive nature of the sensor data. Researchers have proposed a number of protocols and schemes for this purpose. He et al. (INFOCOM 2007) have proposed a protocol - called CPDA - for carrying out additive data aggregation in a privacy-preserving manner for application in WSNs. The scheme has been quite popular and well-known. In spite of the popularity of this protocol, it has been found that the protocol is vulnerable to attack and it is also not energy-efficient. In this paper, we first present a brief state of the art survey on the current privacy-preserving data aggregation protocols for WSNS. Then we describe the CPDA protocol and identify its security vulnerability. Finally, we demonstrate how the protocol can be made secure and energy efficient.

Motivated by the operational problems in click and collect systems, such as curbside pickup programs, we study a joint admission control and capacity allocation problem. We consider a system where arriving customers have preferred service delivery times and gauge the service quality based on the service provider's ability to complete the service as close as possible to the preferred time. Customers can be of different priority classes, and their priority may increase as they wait longer in the queue. The service provider can reject customers upon their arrival if the system is overloaded or outsource the service (alternatively work overtime) when the capacity is not enough. The service provider's goal is to find the minimum-cost admission and capacity allocation policy to dynamically decide when to serve and whom to serve. We model this problem as a Markov Decision Process. Our structural results partially characterize a set of suboptimal solutions, and we develop solution methods using these results. We also develop a problem-specific approximation method that is based on state aggregation to overcome the computational challenges. We present extensive computational results and discuss the impact of problem parameters on the optimal policy.

Offline reinforcement learning (RL) provides a promising direction to exploit massive amount of offline data for complex decision-making tasks. Due to the distribution shift issue, current offline RL algorithms are generally designed to be conservative in value estimation and action selection. However, such conservatism can impair the robustness of learned policies when encountering observation deviation under realistic conditions, such as sensor errors and adversarial attacks. To trade off robustness and conservatism, we propose Robust Offline Reinforcement Learning (RORL) with a novel conservative smoothing technique. In RORL, we explicitly introduce regularization on the policy and the value function for states near the dataset, as well as additional conservative value estimation on these states. Theoretically, we show RORL enjoys a tighter suboptimality bound than recent theoretical results in linear MDPs. We demonstrate that RORL can achieve state-of-the-art performance on the general offline RL benchmark and is considerably robust to adversarial observation perturbations.

Byzantine robustness has received significant attention recently given its importance for distributed and federated learning. In spite of this, we identify severe flaws in existing algorithms even when the data across the participants is identically distributed. First, we show realistic examples where current state of the art robust aggregation rules fail to converge even in the absence of any Byzantine attackers. Secondly, we prove that even if the aggregation rules may succeed in limiting the influence of the attackers in a single round, the attackers can couple their attacks across time eventually leading to divergence. To address these issues, we present two surprisingly simple strategies: a new robust iterative clipping procedure, and incorporating worker momentum to overcome time-coupled attacks. This is the first provably robust method for the standard stochastic optimization setting. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/epfml/byzantine-robust-optimizer.

Scaling up test-time compute, by generating multiple independent solutions and selecting or aggregating among them, has become a central paradigm for improving large language models (LLMs) on challenging reasoning tasks. While most prior work relies on simple majority voting or reward model ranking to aggregate solutions, these approaches may only yield limited benefits. In this work, we propose to learn aggregation as an explicit reasoning skill: given a set of candidate solutions, we train an aggregator model to review, reconcile, and synthesize a final, correct answer using reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards. A key ingredient is careful balancing of easy and hard training examples, allowing the model to learn both to recover minority-but-correct answers as well as easy majority-correct answers. Empirically, we find our method, AggLM, outperforms both strong rule-based and reward-model baselines, across multiple benchmarks. Furthermore, it generalizes effectively to solutions from differing models, including stronger ones than contained in the training data, all while requiring substantially fewer tokens than majority voting with larger numbers of solutions.

Offline reinforcement learning faces a significant challenge of value over-estimation due to the distributional drift between the dataset and the current learned policy, leading to learning failure in practice. The common approach is to incorporate a penalty term to reward or value estimation in the Bellman iterations. Meanwhile, to avoid extrapolation on out-of-distribution (OOD) states and actions, existing methods focus on conservative Q-function estimation. In this paper, we propose Conservative State Value Estimation (CSVE), a new approach that learns conservative V-function via directly imposing penalty on OOD states. Compared to prior work, CSVE allows more effective in-data policy optimization with conservative value guarantees. Further, we apply CSVE and develop a practical actor-critic algorithm in which the critic does the conservative value estimation by additionally sampling and penalizing the states around the dataset, and the actor applies advantage weighted updates extended with state exploration to improve the policy. We evaluate in classic continual control tasks of D4RL, showing that our method performs better than the conservative Q-function learning methods and is strongly competitive among recent SOTA methods.

Distribution shift is a major obstacle in offline reinforcement learning, which necessitates minimizing the discrepancy between the learned policy and the behavior policy to avoid overestimating rare or unseen actions. Previous conservative offline RL algorithms struggle to generalize to unseen actions, despite their success in learning good in-distribution policy. In contrast, we propose to use the gradient fields of the dataset density generated from a pre-trained offline RL algorithm to adjust the original actions. We decouple the conservatism constraints from the policy, thus can benefit wide offline RL algorithms. As a consequence, we propose the Conservative Denoising Score-based Algorithm (CDSA) which utilizes the denoising score-based model to model the gradient of the dataset density, rather than the dataset density itself, and facilitates a more accurate and efficient method to adjust the action generated by the pre-trained policy in a deterministic and continuous MDP environment. In experiments, we show that our approach significantly improves the performance of baseline algorithms in D4RL datasets, and demonstrate the generalizability and plug-and-play capability of our model across different pre-trained offline RL policy in different tasks. We also validate that the agent exhibits greater risk aversion after employing our method while showcasing its ability to generalize effectively across diverse tasks.

Priorities in multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) convey the relevance preference of one criterion over another, which is usually reflected by imposing the non-negativity and unit-sum constraints. The processing of such priorities is different than other unconstrained data, but this point is often neglected by researchers, which results in fallacious statistical analysis. This article studies three prevalent fallacies in group MCDM along with solutions based on compositional data analysis to avoid misusing statistical operations. First, we use a compositional approach to aggregate the priorities of a group of DMs and show that the outcome of the compositional analysis is identical to the normalized geometric mean, meaning that the arithmetic mean should be avoided. Furthermore, a new aggregation method is developed, which is a robust surrogate for the geometric mean. We also discuss the errors in computing measures of dispersion, including standard deviation and distance functions. Discussing the fallacies in computing the standard deviation, we provide a probabilistic criteria ranking by developing proper Bayesian tests, where we calculate the extent to which a criterion is more important than another. Finally, we explain the errors in computing the distance between priorities, and a clustering algorithm is specially tailored based on proper distance metrics.

When deploying a single predictor across multiple subpopulations, we propose a fundamentally different approach: interpreting group fairness as a bargaining problem among subpopulations. This game-theoretic perspective reveals that existing robust optimization methods such as minimizing worst-group loss or regret correspond to classical bargaining solutions and embody different fairness principles. We propose relative improvement, the ratio of actual risk reduction to potential reduction from a baseline predictor, which recovers the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Unlike absolute-scale methods that may not be comparable when groups have different potential predictability, relative improvement provides axiomatic justification including scale invariance and individual monotonicity. We establish finite-sample convergence guarantees under mild conditions.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become a central paradigm for improving reasoning and code generation in large language models, and GRPO-style training is widely adopted for its simplicity and effectiveness. However, an important design choice remains underexplored: how token-level policy gradient terms are aggregated within each sampled group. Standard GRPO uses sequence aggregation, while recent work has advocated token aggregation as a better alternative. We show that these two rules induce different optimization biases: token aggregation introduces sign-length coupling, while sequence aggregation implicitly downweights longer responses through sequence-level equal weighting. To address this tension, we propose Balanced Aggregation (BA), a simple drop-in replacement that computes token-level means separately within the positive and negative subsets and then combines them with sequence-count-based weights. Experiments with Qwen2.5-Math-7B and Qwen3-1.7B on DAPO-17k and Polaris, evaluated on six reasoning and coding benchmarks, show that BA consistently improves training stability and final performance over standard token and sequence aggregation. Our analysis further shows that the relative effectiveness of token and sequence aggregation is largely governed by response-length variation and the positive-negative length gap, highlighting aggregation as a critical design dimension in GRPO-style RLVR.

Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR). However, as the payment form is fixed, AMA's expressiveness is restricted, especially in distributions where bidders' valuations are correlated. In this paper, we propose Correlation-Aware AMA (CA-AMA), a novel framework that augments AMA with a new correlation-aware payment. We show that any CA-AMA preserves the DSIC property and formalize finding optimal CA-AMA as a constraint optimization problem subject to the IR constraint. Then, we theoretically characterize scenarios where classic AMAs can perform arbitrarily poorly compared to the optimal revenue, while the CA-AMA can reach the optimal revenue. For optimizing CA-AMA, we design a practical two-stage training algorithm. We derive that the target function's continuity and the generalization bound on the degree of deviation from strict IR. Finally, extensive experiments showcase that our algorithm can find an approximate optimal CA-AMA in various distributions with improved revenue and a low degree of violation of IR.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

Building on the probability-domain distillation framework of Sparse-KD, we develop an axiomatic, operator-theoretic framework for multi-teacher ensemble knowledge distillation. Rather than prescribing a specific aggregation formula, we define five core axioms governing valid knowledge aggregation operators, encompassing convexity, positivity, continuity, weight monotonicity, and temperature coherence. We prove the existence and non-uniqueness of operator families satisfying these axioms, establishing that multiple distinct aggregation mechanisms conform to the same foundational principles. Within this framework, we establish operator-agnostic guarantees showing that multi-teacher aggregation reduces both stochastic variance and systematic supervisory bias under heterogeneous teachers, while providing Jensen-type bounds, log-loss guarantees, and safety attenuation properties. For aggregation operators linear in teacher weights, we further establish classical ensemble variance-reduction results under standard independence assumptions, with extensions to correlated-error regimes. The framework provides theoretical grounding for multi-teacher distillation from diverse frontier models while admitting multiple valid implementation strategies.

In semi-decentralized federated learning, devices primarily rely on device-to-device communication but occasionally interact with a central server. Periodically, a sampled subset of devices uploads their local models to the server, which computes an aggregate model. The server can then either (i) share this aggregate model only with the sampled clients (sampled-to-sampled, S2S) or (ii) broadcast it to all clients (sampled-to-all, S2A). Despite their practical significance, a rigorous theoretical and empirical comparison of these two strategies remains absent. We address this gap by analyzing S2S and S2A within a unified convergence framework that accounts for key system parameters: sampling rate, server aggregation frequency, and network connectivity. Our results, both analytical and experimental, reveal distinct regimes where one strategy outperforms the other, depending primarily on the degree of data heterogeneity across devices. These insights lead to concrete design guidelines for practical semi-decentralized FL deployments.

Offline reinforcement learning (RL) offers a promising direction for learning policies from pre-collected datasets without requiring further interactions with the environment. However, existing methods struggle to handle out-of-distribution (OOD) extrapolation errors, especially in sparse reward or scarce data settings. In this paper, we propose a novel training algorithm called Conservative Density Estimation (CDE), which addresses this challenge by explicitly imposing constraints on the state-action occupancy stationary distribution. CDE overcomes the limitations of existing approaches, such as the stationary distribution correction method, by addressing the support mismatch issue in marginal importance sampling. Our method achieves state-of-the-art performance on the D4RL benchmark. Notably, CDE consistently outperforms baselines in challenging tasks with sparse rewards or insufficient data, demonstrating the advantages of our approach in addressing the extrapolation error problem in offline RL.

Multi-agent policy optimization, exemplified by PPO-based methods, is a key branch of cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). A central design question is how many neighboring agentsIn this paper, "neighbors" refer not only to physical proximity but also to agents whose actions influence one another. to aggregate in order to effectively utilize global information for cooperation. This decision must be made along two dimensions: in the advantage (which agents' rewards contribute to the credit signal) and in the ratio (which agents' likelihood ratios form the clipped importance weight). Existing methods occupy scattered, underexplored points on these two axes: IPPO treats both separately; MAPPO pairs a team-level advantage with per-agent ratios; HAPPO employs sequential ratios with per-agent advantages; and single-agent reductions operating on factorized joint policies aggregate both into fully joint products. We formalize these two design choices as support matrices SA and SR, and prove a canonical structure: the expected multi-agent policy optimization objective depends on the pair (SA,SR) only through their matrix product tS=SRSA. This yields two key consequences: (i) Redundancy: the two support matrices are interchangeable with respect to the signal, meaning neither aggregation pattern is inherently superior.(ii) Variance Ordering: the advantage aggregates rewards as a sum (additive variance with an interior bias-variance optimum at the coupling neighborhood), whereas the ratio aggregates likelihood ratios as a product (multiplicative variance that grows exponentially with support size, with no accompanying bias reduction). The resulting design principle is unambiguous: aggregate neighbors in the advantage, sized to the coupling neighborhood, and keep the ratio per-agent.

As the capabilities of artificial agents improve, they are being increasingly deployed to service multiple diverse objectives and stakeholders. However, the composition of these objectives is often performed ad hoc, with no clear justification. This paper takes a normative approach to multi-objective agency: from a set of intuitively appealing axioms, it is shown that Markovian aggregation of Markovian reward functions is not possible when the time preference (discount factor) for each objective may vary. It follows that optimal multi-objective agents must admit rewards that are non-Markovian with respect to the individual objectives. To this end, a practical non-Markovian aggregation scheme is proposed, which overcomes the impossibility with only one additional parameter for each objective. This work offers new insights into sequential, multi-objective agency and intertemporal choice, and has practical implications for the design of AI systems deployed to serve multiple generations of principals with varying time preference.

In modern machine learning problems we deal with datasets that are either distributed by nature or potentially large for which distributing the computations is usually a standard way to proceed, since centralized algorithms are in general ineffective. We propose a distributed learning approach for mixtures of experts (MoE) models with an aggregation strategy to construct a reduction estimator from local estimators fitted parallelly to distributed subsets of the data. The aggregation is based on an optimal minimization of an expected transportation divergence between the large MoE composed of local estimators and the unknown desired MoE model. We show that the provided reduction estimator is consistent as soon as the local estimators to be aggregated are consistent, and its construction is performed by a proposed majorization-minimization (MM) algorithm that is computationally effective. We study the statistical and numerical properties for the proposed reduction estimator on experiments that demonstrate its performance compared to namely the global estimator constructed in a centralized way from the full dataset. For some situations, the computation time is more than ten times faster, for a comparable performance. Our source codes are publicly available on Github.

Reinforcement learning often needs to deal with the exponential growth of states and actions when exploring optimal control in high-dimensional spaces (often known as the curse of dimensionality). In this work, we address this issue by learning the inherent structure of action-wise similar MDP to appropriately balance the performance degradation versus sample/computational complexity. In particular, we partition the action spaces into multiple groups based on the similarity in transition distribution and reward function, and build a linear decomposition model to capture the difference between the intra-group transition kernel and the intra-group rewards. Both our theoretical analysis and experiments reveal a surprising and counter-intuitive result: while a more refined grouping strategy can reduce the approximation error caused by treating actions in the same group as identical, it also leads to increased estimation error when the size of samples or the computation resources is limited. This finding highlights the grouping strategy as a new degree of freedom that can be optimized to minimize the overall performance loss. To address this issue, we formulate a general optimization problem for determining the optimal grouping strategy, which strikes a balance between performance loss and sample/computational complexity. We further propose a computationally efficient method for selecting a nearly-optimal grouping strategy, which maintains its computational complexity independent of the size of the action space.

This paper investigates conservative exploration in reinforcement learning where the performance of the learning agent is guaranteed to be above a certain threshold throughout the learning process. It focuses on the tabular episodic Markov Decision Process (MDP) setting that has finite states and actions. With the knowledge of an existing safe baseline policy, an algorithm termed as StepMix is proposed to balance the exploitation and exploration while ensuring that the conservative constraint is never violated in each episode with high probability. StepMix features a unique design of a mixture policy that adaptively and smoothly interpolates between the baseline policy and the optimistic policy. Theoretical analysis shows that StepMix achieves near-optimal regret order as in the constraint-free setting, indicating that obeying the stringent episode-wise conservative constraint does not compromise the learning performance. Besides, a randomization-based EpsMix algorithm is also proposed and shown to achieve the same performance as StepMix. The algorithm design and theoretical analysis are further extended to the setting where the baseline policy is not given a priori but must be learned from an offline dataset, and it is proved that similar conservative guarantee and regret can be achieved if the offline dataset is sufficiently large. Experiment results corroborate the theoretical analysis and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed conservative exploration strategies.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established LLM routing as a standard service delivery mechanism, where users select models based on cost, Quality of Service (QoS), among other things. However, optimal pricing in LLM routing platforms requires precise modeling for dynamic service markets, and solving this problem in real time at scale is computationally intractable. In this paper, we propose \PriLLM, a novel practical and scalable solution for real-time dynamic pricing in competitive LLM routing. \PriLLM models the service market as a Stackelberg game, where providers set prices and users select services based on multiple criteria. To capture real-world market dynamics, we incorporate both objective factors (\eg~cost, QoS) and subjective user preferences into the model. For scalability, we employ a deep aggregation network to learn provider abstraction that preserve user-side equilibrium behavior across pricing strategies. Moreover, \PriLLM offers interpretability by explaining its pricing decisions. Empirical evaluation on real-world data shows that \PriLLM achieves over 95\% of the optimal profit while only requiring less than 5\% of the optimal solution's computation time.

Federated learning is used to train a shared model in a decentralized way without clients sharing private data with each other. Federated learning systems are susceptible to poisoning attacks when malicious clients send false updates to the central server. Existing defense strategies are ineffective under non-IID data settings. This paper proposes a new defense strategy, FedCPA (Federated learning with Critical Parameter Analysis). Our attack-tolerant aggregation method is based on the observation that benign local models have similar sets of top-k and bottom-k critical parameters, whereas poisoned local models do not. Experiments with different attack scenarios on multiple datasets demonstrate that our model outperforms existing defense strategies in defending against poisoning attacks.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Zero-shot reinforcement learning (RL) promises to provide agents that can perform any task in an environment after an offline pre-training phase. Forward-backward (FB) representations represent remarkable progress towards this ideal, achieving 85% of the performance of task-specific agents in this setting. However, such performance is contingent on access to large and diverse datasets for pre-training, which cannot be expected for most real problems. Here, we explore how FB performance degrades when trained on small datasets that lack diversity, and mitigate it with conservatism, a well-established feature of performant offline RL algorithms. We evaluate our family of methods across various datasets, domains and tasks, reaching 150% of vanilla FB performance in aggregate. Somewhat surprisingly, conservative FB algorithms also outperform the task-specific baseline, despite lacking access to reward labels and being required to maintain policies for all tasks. Conservative FB algorithms perform no worse than FB on full datasets, and so present little downside over their predecessor. Our code is available open-source via https://enjeeneer.io/projects/conservative-world-models/.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

In federated learning (FL), weighted aggregation of local models is conducted to generate a global model, and the aggregation weights are normalized (the sum of weights is 1) and proportional to the local data sizes. In this paper, we revisit the weighted aggregation process and gain new insights into the training dynamics of FL. First, we find that the sum of weights can be smaller than 1, causing global weight shrinking effect (analogous to weight decay) and improving generalization. We explore how the optimal shrinking factor is affected by clients' data heterogeneity and local epochs. Second, we dive into the relative aggregation weights among clients to depict the clients' importance. We develop client coherence to study the learning dynamics and find a critical point that exists. Before entering the critical point, more coherent clients play more essential roles in generalization. Based on the above insights, we propose an effective method for Federated Learning with Learnable Aggregation Weights, named as FedLAW. Extensive experiments verify that our method can improve the generalization of the global model by a large margin on different datasets and models.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

We introduce and analyze distance preservation games (DPGs). In DPGs, agents express ideal distances to other agents and need to choose locations in the unit interval while preserving their ideal distances as closely as possible. We analyze the existence and computation of location profiles that are jump stable (i.e., no agent can benefit by moving to another location) or welfare optimal for DPGs, respectively. Specifically, we prove that there are DPGs without jump stable location profiles and identify important cases where such outcomes always exist and can be computed efficiently. Similarly, we show that finding welfare optimal location profiles is NP-complete and present approximation algorithms for finding solutions with social welfare close to optimal. Finally, we prove that DPGs have a price of anarchy of at most 2.

When applying offline reinforcement learning (RL) in healthcare scenarios, the out-of-distribution (OOD) issues pose significant risks, as inappropriate generalization beyond clinical expertise can result in potentially harmful recommendations. While existing methods like conservative Q-learning (CQL) attempt to address the OOD issue, their effectiveness is limited by only constraining action selection by suppressing uncertain actions. This action-only regularization imitates clinician actions that prioritize short-term rewards, but it fails to regulate downstream state trajectories, thereby limiting the discovery of improved long-term treatment strategies. To safely improve policy beyond clinician recommendations while ensuring that state-action trajectories remain in-distribution, we propose Offline Guarded Safe Reinforcement Learning (OGSRL), a theoretically grounded model-based offline RL framework. OGSRL introduces a novel dual constraint mechanism for improving policy with reliability and safety. First, the OOD guardian is established to specify clinically validated regions for safe policy exploration. By constraining optimization within these regions, it enables the reliable exploration of treatment strategies that outperform clinician behavior by leveraging the full patient state history, without drifting into unsupported state-action trajectories. Second, we introduce a safety cost constraint that encodes medical knowledge about physiological safety boundaries, providing domain-specific safeguards even in areas where training data might contain potentially unsafe interventions. Notably, we provide theoretical guarantees on safety and near-optimality: policies that satisfy these constraints remain in safe and reliable regions and achieve performance close to the best possible policy supported by the data.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

The ethical concept of fairness has recently been applied in machine learning (ML) settings to describe a wide range of constraints and objectives. When considering the relevance of ethical concepts to subset selection problems, the concepts of diversity and inclusion are additionally applicable in order to create outputs that account for social power and access differentials. We introduce metrics based on these concepts, which can be applied together, separately, and in tandem with additional fairness constraints. Results from human subject experiments lend support to the proposed criteria. Social choice methods can additionally be leveraged to aggregate and choose preferable sets, and we detail how these may be applied.

Conventional federated learning frameworks suffer from several challenges including performance bottlenecks at the central aggregation server, data bias, poor model convergence, and exposure to model poisoning attacks, and limited trust in the centralized infrastructure. In the current paper, a novel game theory-based approach called pFedGame is proposed for decentralized federated learning, best suitable for temporally dynamic networks. The proposed algorithm works without any centralized server for aggregation and incorporates the problem of vanishing gradients and poor convergence over temporally dynamic topology among federated learning participants. The solution comprises two sequential steps in every federated learning round, for every participant. First, it selects suitable peers for collaboration in federated learning. Secondly, it executes a two-player constant sum cooperative game to reach convergence by applying an optimal federated learning aggregation strategy. Experiments performed to assess the performance of pFedGame in comparison to existing methods in decentralized federated learning have shown promising results with accuracy higher than 70% for heterogeneous data.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has demonstrated significant success in enhancing reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs). One of the most widely used RL methods is Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO)~Shao-2024-Deepseekmath, known for its memory efficiency and success in training DeepSeek-R1~Guo-2025-Deepseek. However, GRPO stalls when all sampled responses in a group are incorrect -- referred to as an all-negative-sample group -- as it fails to update the policy, hindering learning progress. The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we propose a simple yet effective framework that introduces response diversity within all-negative-sample groups in GRPO using AI feedback. We also provide a theoretical analysis, via a stylized model, showing how this diversification improves learning dynamics. Second, we empirically validate our approach, showing the improved performance across various model sizes (7B, 14B, 32B) in both offline and online learning settings with 10 benchmarks, including base and distilled variants. Our findings highlight that learning from all-negative-sample groups is not only feasible but beneficial, advancing recent insights from Xiong-2025-Minimalist.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have made remarkable progress in enhancing step-by-step reasoning through reinforcement learning. However, the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm, which relies on sparse reward rules, often encounters the issue of identical rewards within groups, leading to the advantage collapse problem. Existing works typically address this challenge from two perspectives: enforcing model reflection to enhance response diversity, and introducing internal feedback to augment the training signal (advantage). In this work, we begin by analyzing the limitations of model reflection and investigating the policy entropy of responses at the fine-grained sample level. Based on our experimental findings, we propose the EDGE-GRPO algorithm, which adopts Entropy-Driven Advantage and Guided Error Correction to effectively mitigate the problem of advantage collapse. Extensive experiments on several main reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of our approach. It is available at https://github.com/ZhangXJ199/EDGE-GRPO.

Recent LLMs have significantly improved reasoning capabilities, primarily by including an explicit, lengthy Thinking process as part of generation. In this paper, we question whether this explicit thinking is necessary. Using the state-of-the-art DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen, we find that bypassing the thinking process via simple prompting, denoted as NoThinking, can be surprisingly effective. When controlling for the number of tokens, NoThinking outperforms Thinking across a diverse set of seven challenging reasoning datasets--including mathematical problem solving, formal theorem proving, and coding--especially in low-budget settings, e.g., 51.3 vs. 28.9 on ACM 23 with 700 tokens. Notably, the performance of NoThinking becomes more competitive with pass@k as k increases. Building on this observation, we demonstrate that a parallel scaling approach that uses NoThinking to generate N outputs independently and aggregates them is highly effective. For aggregation, we use task-specific verifiers when available, or we apply simple best-of-N strategies such as confidence-based selection. Our method outperforms a range of baselines with similar latency using Thinking, and is comparable to Thinking with significantly longer latency (up to 9x). Together, our research encourages a reconsideration of the necessity of lengthy thinking processes, while also establishing a competitive reference for achieving strong reasoning performance in low-budget settings or at low latency using parallel scaling.

Popular offline reinforcement learning (RL) methods rely on conservatism, either by penalizing out-of-dataset actions or by restricting rollout horizons. In this work, we question the universality of this principle and instead revisit a complementary one: a Bayesian perspective. Rather than enforcing conservatism, the Bayesian approach tackles epistemic uncertainty in offline data by modeling a posterior distribution over plausible world models and training a history-dependent agent to maximize expected rewards, enabling test-time generalization. We first illustrate, in a bandit setting, that Bayesianism excels on low-quality datasets where conservatism fails. We then scale this principle to realistic tasks and show that long-horizon planning is critical for reducing value overestimation once conservatism is removed. To make this feasible, we introduce key design choices for performing and learning from long-horizon rollouts while controlling compounding errors. These yield our algorithm, NEUBAY, grounded in the neutral Bayesian principle. On D4RL and NeoRL benchmarks, NEUBAY generally matches or surpasses leading conservative algorithms, achieving new state-of-the-art on 7 datasets. Notably, it succeeds with rollout horizons of several hundred steps, contrary to dominant practice. Finally, we characterize datasets by quality and coverage, showing when NEUBAY is preferable to conservative methods. Together, we argue NEUBAY lays the foundation for a new practical direction in offline and model-based RL.

LLM inference often generates a batch of candidates for a prompt and selects one via strategies like majority voting or Best-of- N (BoN). For difficult tasks, this single-shot selection often underperforms. Consequently, evaluations commonly report Pass@k: the agent may submit up to k responses, and only the best of them is used when computing regret. Motivated by this, we study inference scaling in the more general Pass@k inference setting, and prove that neither majority voting nor BoN exhibits the desirable scaling with k and the sampling budget N. Combining the advantages of majority voting and BoN, we propose a new inference strategy called Best-of-Majority (BoM), with a pivotal step that restricts the candidates to the responses with high frequency in the N samples before selecting the top-k rewards. We prove that when the sampling budget is N=tildeOmega(C^*), the regret of BoM is O(epsilon_{opt}+epsilon_{mathrm{RM}^2C^*/k}), where C^* is the coverage coefficient, epsilon_{RM} is the estimation error of the reward model, and epsilon_{opt} is the estimation error of reward at the optimal response. We further establish a matching lower bound, certifying that our algorithm is minimax optimal. Beyond optimality, BoM has a key advantage: unlike majority voting and BoN, its performance does not degrade when increasing N. Experimental results of inference on math problems show BoM outperforming both majority voting and BoN.

In Machine Learning, a benchmark refers to an ensemble of datasets associated with one or multiple metrics together with a way to aggregate different systems performances. They are instrumental in (i) assessing the progress of new methods along different axes and (ii) selecting the best systems for practical use. This is particularly the case for NLP with the development of large pre-trained models (e.g. GPT, BERT) that are expected to generalize well on a variety of tasks. While the community mainly focused on developing new datasets and metrics, there has been little interest in the aggregation procedure, which is often reduced to a simple average over various performance measures. However, this procedure can be problematic when the metrics are on a different scale, which may lead to spurious conclusions. This paper proposes a new procedure to rank systems based on their performance across different tasks. Motivated by the social choice theory, the final system ordering is obtained through aggregating the rankings induced by each task and is theoretically grounded. We conduct extensive numerical experiments (on over 270k scores) to assess the soundness of our approach both on synthetic and real scores (e.g. GLUE, EXTREM, SEVAL, TAC, FLICKR). In particular, we show that our method yields different conclusions on state-of-the-art systems than the mean-aggregation procedure while being both more reliable and robust.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

This paper introduces the concept of {mutual consensus} as a novel non-compensatory consensus measure that accounts for the maximum disparity among opinions to ensure robust consensus evaluation. Incorporating this concept, several new Minimum Cost Consensus (MCC) models are proposed, and their properties are analyzed. To show their applicability, these mutual consensus-based MCC models are then considered in the context of the {OWA-MCC} model, which employs Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) operators for preference aggregation. Concretely, we include a linearized formulation under symmetry conditions as well as examples of the non-convexity of the feasible region in the general case. Finally, mutual consensus is utilized to obtain approximate solutions for the OWA-MCC model, demonstrating its practical effectiveness and advancing the theoretical and applied dimensions of consensus modeling in group decision-making.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

We prove that for (compact) finite-rank median algebras the geometric rank equals the independence number of all (continuous) median-preserving functions to [0,1]. Combined with Rosenthal's dichotomy, this yields a generalized Helly selection principle: for finite-rank median algebras, the space of all median-preserving functions to [0,1] is sequentially compact in the pointwise topology. Generalizing joint results with E. Glasner on dendrons (rank-1), we establish that every continuous action of a topological group G by median automorphisms on a finite-rank compact median algebra is Rosenthal representable, hence dynamically tame. As an application, the Roller-Fioravanti compactification of finite-rank topological median G-algebras with compact intervals is often a dynamically tame G-system.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Existing Score-Based Models (SBMs) can be categorized into constrained SBMs (CSBMs) or unconstrained SBMs (USBMs) according to their parameterization approaches. CSBMs model probability density functions as Boltzmann distributions, and assign their predictions as the negative gradients of some scalar-valued energy functions. On the other hand, USBMs employ flexible architectures capable of directly estimating scores without the need to explicitly model energy functions. In this paper, we demonstrate that the architectural constraints of CSBMs may limit their modeling ability. In addition, we show that USBMs' inability to preserve the property of conservativeness may lead to degraded performance in practice. To address the above issues, we propose Quasi-Conservative Score-Based Models (QCSBMs) for keeping the advantages of both CSBMs and USBMs. Our theoretical derivations demonstrate that the training objective of QCSBMs can be efficiently integrated into the training processes by leveraging the Hutchinson's trace estimator. In addition, our experimental results on the CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, ImageNet, and SVHN datasets validate the effectiveness of QCSBMs. Finally, we justify the advantage of QCSBMs using an example of a one-layered autoencoder.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

Group-Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is a key technique for training large reasoning models, yet it suffers from a critical vulnerability: the Think-Answer Mismatch, where noisy reward signals corrupt the learning process. This problem is most severe in unbalanced response groups, paradoxically degrading the signal precisely when it should be most informative. To address this challenge, we propose Stable Group-Relative Policy Optimization (S-GRPO), a principled enhancement that derives optimal, noise-aware advantage weights to stabilize training. Our comprehensive experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate S-GRPO's effectiveness and robustness. On various models, S-GRPO significantly outperforms DR. GRPO, achieving performance gains of +2.5% on Qwen-Math-7B-Base, +2.2% on Llama-3.2-3B-Base, and +2.4% on Qwen-Math-1.5B-Instruct. Most critically, while standard GRPO fails to learn under 20% synthetic reward noise, S-GRPO maintains stable learning progress. These results highlight S-GRPO's potential for more robust and effective training of large-scale reasoning models. \footnote{Code and data are available at: https://github.com/shenpeijun0212/S-GRPO

Group-relative policy optimization methods train language models by generating multiple rollouts per prompt and normalizing rewards with a shared mean reward baseline. In resource-constrained settings where the rollout budget is small, accuracy often degrades. We find that noise in the shared baseline induces advantage sign flips, where some rollouts receive an incorrect advantage sign, and the update direction is reversed. To address this, we propose Median-Centered Group Relative Policy Optimization (MC-GRPO), a simple and effective solution for small-rollout training. Our main idea is to replace the mean baseline with a median baseline: the median is far less sensitive to outlier rewards than the mean, mitigating the sign flips under small rollout size (G). We generate one additional rollout for median reference (G+1), and compute advantages by using the group median. With an odd-sized group, exactly one completion is the median and receives zero advantage, we exclude this pivot rollout from backpropagation so the number of gradient-contributing samples per prompt remains G, preserving the core update cost of standard G-rollout training. Across various GRPO-family methods and a wide range of models and scales, this median-centered training consistently improves stability and final accuracy in the low-rollout regime, reducing the gap between G=2 and G=8 to within 1%. Code is available at https://github.com/lotusroot-kim/MC-GRPO

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

Modern large language models (LLMs) have exhibited cooperative synergy on complex task-solving, and collective decision-making (CDM) is a pivotal component in LLM-based multi-agent collaboration frameworks. Our survey on 52 recent such systems uncovers a severe lack of diversity, with a heavy reliance on dictatorial and plurality voting for CDM. Through the lens of social choice theory, we scrutinize widely-adopted CDM methods and identify their limitations. To enrich current landscape of LLM-based CDM, we present GEDI, an electoral CDM module that incorporates various ordinal preferential voting mechanisms. Our empirical case study across three benchmarks shows that the integration of certain CDM methods can markedly improve the reasoning capabilities and robustness of some leading LLMs, all without requiring intricate system designs. Additionally, we find that some CDM mechanisms generate positive synergies even with as few as three agents. The voting-based methods also demonstrate robustness against single points of failure, as well as diversity in terms of hit-rate@k and subject-wise impacts.

The advent of the sixth-generation (6G) wireless networks, enhanced by artificial intelligence, promises ubiquitous connectivity through Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites. These satellites are capable of collecting vast amounts of geographically diverse and real-time data, which can be immensely valuable for training intelligent models. However, limited inter-satellite communication and data privacy constraints hinder data collection on a single server for training. Therefore, we propose SemSpaceFL, a novel hierarchical federated learning (HFL) framework for LEO satellite networks, with integrated semantic communication capabilities. Our framework introduces a two-tier aggregation architecture where satellite models are first aggregated at regional gateways before final consolidation at a cloud server, which explicitly accounts for satellite mobility patterns and energy constraints. The key innovation lies in our novel aggregation approach, which dynamically adjusts the contribution of each satellite based on its trajectory and association with different gateways, which ensures stable model convergence despite the highly dynamic nature of LEO constellations. To further enhance communication efficiency, we incorporate semantic encoding-decoding techniques trained through the proposed HFL framework, which enables intelligent data compression while maintaining signal integrity. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed aggregation strategy achieves superior performance and faster convergence compared to existing benchmarks, while effectively managing the challenges of satellite mobility and energy limitations in dynamic LEO networks.

We compare the (1,lambda)-EA and the (1 + lambda)-EA on the recently introduced benchmark DisOM, which is the OneMax function with randomly planted local optima. Previous work showed that if all local optima have the same relative height, then the plus strategy never loses more than a factor O(nlog n) compared to the comma strategy. Here we show that even small random fluctuations in the heights of the local optima have a devastating effect for the plus strategy and lead to super-polynomial runtimes. On the other hand, due to their ability to escape local optima, comma strategies are unaffected by the height of the local optima and remain efficient. Our results hold for a broad class of possible distortions and show that the plus strategy, but not the comma strategy, is generally deceived by sparse unstructured fluctuations of a smooth landscape.

Primal-dual safe RL methods commonly perform iterations between the primal update of the policy and the dual update of the Lagrange Multiplier. Such a training paradigm is highly susceptible to the error in cumulative cost estimation since this estimation serves as the key bond connecting the primal and dual update processes. We show that this problem causes significant underestimation of cost when using off-policy methods, leading to the failure to satisfy the safety constraint. To address this issue, we propose conservative policy optimization, which learns a policy in a constraint-satisfying area by considering the uncertainty in cost estimation. This improves constraint satisfaction but also potentially hinders reward maximization. We then introduce local policy convexification to help eliminate such suboptimality by gradually reducing the estimation uncertainty. We provide theoretical interpretations of the joint coupling effect of these two ingredients and further verify them by extensive experiments. Results on benchmark tasks show that our method not only achieves an asymptotic performance comparable to state-of-the-art on-policy methods while using much fewer samples, but also significantly reduces constraint violation during training. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZifanWu/CAL.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Recently, Qiao, Duan, and Cheng~(2019) proposed a distributed nearest-neighbor classification method, in which a massive dataset is split into smaller groups, each processed with a k-nearest-neighbor classifier, and the final class label is predicted by a majority vote among these groupwise class labels. This paper shows that the distributed algorithm with k=1 over a sufficiently large number of groups attains a minimax optimal error rate up to a multiplicative logarithmic factor under some regularity conditions, for both regression and classification problems. Roughly speaking, distributed 1-nearest-neighbor rules with M groups has a performance comparable to standard Theta(M)-nearest-neighbor rules. In the analysis, alternative rules with a refined aggregation method are proposed and shown to attain exact minimax optimal rates.

Federated learning (FL) is a distributed learning protocol in which a server needs to aggregate a set of models learned some independent clients to proceed the learning process. At present, model averaging, known as FedAvg, is one of the most widely adapted aggregation techniques. However, it is known to yield the models with degraded prediction accuracy and slow convergence. In this work, we find out that averaging models from different clients significantly diminishes the norm of the update vectors, resulting in slow learning rate and low prediction accuracy. Therefore, we propose a new aggregation method called FedNNNN. Instead of simple model averaging, we adjust the norm of the update vector and introduce momentum control techniques to improve the aggregation effectiveness of FL. As a demonstration, we evaluate FedNNNN on multiple datasets and scenarios with different neural network models, and observe up to 5.4% accuracy improvement.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Generations from large language models (LLMs) can be improved by sampling and scoring multiple solutions to select a final answer. Current "sample and select" methods such as self-consistency (SC) rely on majority voting to score answers. However, when tasks have many distinct and valid answers, selection by voting requires a large number of samples. This makes SC prohibitively expensive for interactive tasks that involve generating multiple actions (answers) sequentially. After establishing that majority voting fails to provide consistent gains on such tasks, we demonstrate how to increase success rates by softening the scoring criterion. We introduce Soft Self-Consistency (SOFT-SC), which replaces SC's discontinuous scoring with a continuous score computed from model likelihoods, allowing for selection even when actions are sparsely distributed. SOFT-SC improves both performance and efficiency on long-horizon interactive tasks, requiring half as many samples as SC for comparable or better performance. For a fixed number of samples, SOFT-SC leads to a 1.3% increase over SC in absolute success rate on writing bash programs, a 6.6% increase on online shopping (WebShop), and a 4.7% increase for an interactive household game (ALFWorld). Finally, we show that SOFT-SC can be applied to both open-source and black-box models.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

We propose a novel framework to study asynchronous federated learning optimization with delays in gradient updates. Our theoretical framework extends the standard FedAvg aggregation scheme by introducing stochastic aggregation weights to represent the variability of the clients update time, due for example to heterogeneous hardware capabilities. Our formalism applies to the general federated setting where clients have heterogeneous datasets and perform at least one step of stochastic gradient descent (SGD). We demonstrate convergence for such a scheme and provide sufficient conditions for the related minimum to be the optimum of the federated problem. We show that our general framework applies to existing optimization schemes including centralized learning, FedAvg, asynchronous FedAvg, and FedBuff. The theory here provided allows drawing meaningful guidelines for designing a federated learning experiment in heterogeneous conditions. In particular, we develop in this work FedFix, a novel extension of FedAvg enabling efficient asynchronous federated training while preserving the convergence stability of synchronous aggregation. We empirically demonstrate our theory on a series of experiments showing that asynchronous FedAvg leads to fast convergence at the expense of stability, and we finally demonstrate the improvements of FedFix over synchronous and asynchronous FedAvg.

As LLM agents evolve, tokens have emerged as the core economic primitives of Agentic AI. However, their exponential consumption introduces severe computational, collaborative, and security bottlenecks. Current surveys remain fragmented across system optimization, architecture design, and trust, lacking a unified framework to evaluate the fundamental trade-off between output quality and economic cost. To bridge this gap, this survey presents the first comprehensive survey of Token Economics. By unifying computer science and economics, we conceptualize tokens as production factors, exchange mediums, and units of account. We synthesize existing literature across a four-dimensional taxonomy: (1) Micro-level (Single Agent): Optimizing budget-constrained factor substitution via neoclassical firm theory. (2) Meso-level (Multi-Agent Systems): Minimizing collaboration friction using transaction cost and principal-agent theories. (3) Macro-level (Agent Ecosystems): Addressing congestion externalities and pricing via mechanism design. (4) Security: Internalizing adversarial threats as endogenous economic constraints. Finally, we outline frontier directions, including differentiable token budgets and dynamic markets, to lay the theoretical foundation for scalable next-generation agent systems.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Modern ML applications increasingly rely on complex deep learning models and large datasets. There has been an exponential growth in the amount of computation needed to train the largest models. Therefore, to scale computation and data, these models are inevitably trained in a distributed manner in clusters of nodes, and their updates are aggregated before being applied to the model. However, a distributed setup is prone to Byzantine failures of individual nodes, components, and software. With data augmentation added to these settings, there is a critical need for robust and efficient aggregation systems. We define the quality of workers as reconstruction ratios in (0,1], and formulate aggregation as a Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure using Beta densities. We show that the Regularized form of log-likelihood wrt subspace can be approximately solved using iterative least squares solver, and provide convergence guarantees using recent Convex Optimization landscape results. Our empirical findings demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances the robustness of state-of-the-art Byzantine resilient aggregators. We evaluate our method in a distributed setup with a parameter server, and show simultaneous improvements in communication efficiency and accuracy across various tasks. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/hamidralmasi/FlagAggregator

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) have emerged as a promising approach to tackle complex tasks that are difficult for individual LLMs. A natural strategy is to scale performance by increasing the number of agents; however, we find that such scaling exhibits strong diminishing returns in homogeneous settings, while introducing heterogeneity (e.g., different models, prompts, or tools) continues to yield substantial gains. This raises a fundamental question: what limits scaling, and why does diversity help? We present an information-theoretic framework showing that MAS performance is bounded by the intrinsic task uncertainty, not by agent count. We derive architecture-agnostic bounds demonstrating that improvements depend on how many effective channels the system accesses. Homogeneous agents saturate early because their outputs are strongly correlated, whereas heterogeneous agents contribute complementary evidence. We further introduce K^*, an effective channel count that quantifies the number of effective channels without ground-truth labels. Empirically, we show that heterogeneous configurations consistently outperform homogeneous scaling: 2 diverse agents can match or exceed the performance of 16 homogeneous agents. Our results provide principled guidelines for building efficient and robust MAS through diversity-aware design. Code and Dataset are available at the link: https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/Agent-Scaling.

In data poisoning attacks, an adversary tries to change a model's prediction by adding, modifying, or removing samples in the training data. Recently, ensemble-based approaches for obtaining provable defenses against data poisoning have been proposed where predictions are done by taking a majority vote across multiple base models. In this work, we show that merely considering the majority vote in ensemble defenses is wasteful as it does not effectively utilize available information in the logits layers of the base models. Instead, we propose Run-Off Election (ROE), a novel aggregation method based on a two-round election across the base models: In the first round, models vote for their preferred class and then a second, Run-Off election is held between the top two classes in the first round. Based on this approach, we propose DPA+ROE and FA+ROE defense methods based on Deep Partition Aggregation (DPA) and Finite Aggregation (FA) approaches from prior work. We evaluate our methods on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB and obtain improvements in certified accuracy by up to 3%-4%. Also, by applying ROE on a boosted version of DPA, we gain improvements around 12%-27% comparing to the current state-of-the-art, establishing a new state-of-the-art in (pointwise) certified robustness against data poisoning. In many cases, our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art, even when using 32 times less computational power.

Reinforcement learning (RL) plays a crucial role in shaping the behavior of large language and reasoning models (LLMs/LRMs). However, it often produces brittle and unstable policies, leading to critical failures such as spurious reasoning, deceptive alignment, and instruction disobedience that undermine the trustworthiness and safety of LLMs/LRMs. Currently, these issues lack a unified theoretical explanation and are typically addressed using ad-hoc heuristics. This paper presents a rigorous mathematical framework for analyzing the stability of the mapping from a reward function to the optimal policy. We show that policy brittleness often stems from non-unique optimal actions, a common occurrence when multiple valid traces exist in a reasoning task. This theoretical lens provides a unified explanation for a range of seemingly disparate failures, reframing them as rational outcomes of optimizing rewards that may be incomplete or noisy, especially in the presence of action degeneracy. We extend this analysis from the fundamental single-reward setting to the more realistic multi-reward RL across diverse domains, showing how stability is governed by an "effective reward" aggregation mechanism. We also prove that entropy regularization restores policy stability at the cost of increased stochasticity. Our framework provides a unified explanation for recent empirical findings on deceptive reasoning, instruction-following trade-offs, and RLHF-induced sophistry, and is further validated through perturbation experiments in multi-reward RL. This work advances policy-stability analysis from empirical heuristics towards a principled theory, offering essential insights for designing safer and more trustworthy AI systems.

We study a capability the dominant paradigm in synthetic tabular data does not provide: exact satisfaction of a declared analytical outcome with no source data. Imitation methods (copulas, GANs, diffusion) learn a real distribution and sample from it, and are judged on fidelity to real data. A large, practical class of needs is different: generating data with no source data ("cold start") that reproduces a declared outcome (a revenue curve, a churn rate, a group share) across a relational schema. Off-the-shelf imitation tools offer no interface for such targets, and no sampler can hit an exact aggregate, because sampling has variance. On a real public dataset, off-the-shelf learned synthesizers trained on that very data miss the declared monthly aggregate by 74 to 86 percent; a per-period steelman cuts the miss to about 19 percent and still cannot reach 0; a closed-form generator reaches exactly 0. We name this task outcome-conformant synthesis, argue its evaluation axis is conformance rather than fidelity, and show the two axes are orthogonal. We contribute: (1) a formal account showing a widely-used family of exact-aggregate generators is exactly conditional-sum sampling of a Gamma population (via Lukacs' characterization), with closed-form exactness, a closed-form marginal CV, and scale-invariance; a controlled experiment maps the boundary, enforcing the exact aggregate costs at most 0.006 in 1-Wasserstein distance to an arbitrary external marginal, the rest being shape-family mismatch; (2) SpecBench, to our knowledge the first benchmark to measure conformance to analytical outcomes for cold-start relational synthesis; and (3) a closed-form, deterministic reference system. Exact aggregation alone is trivial; the contribution is conformance jointly with closed-form marginals, integrity, determinism, and zero source data. We concede fidelity to imitation where real data exists.

We study parallel test-time scaling for long-horizon agentic tasks such as agentic search and deep research, where multiple rollouts are generated in parallel and aggregated into a final response. While such scaling has proven effective for chain-of-thought reasoning, agentic tasks pose unique challenges: trajectories are long, multi-turn, and tool-augmented, and outputs are often open-ended. Aggregating only final answers discards rich information from trajectories, while concatenating all trajectories exceeds the model's context window. To address this, we propose AggAgent, an aggregation agent that treats parallel trajectories as an environment. We equip it with lightweight tools to inspect candidate solutions and search across trajectories, enabling it to navigate and synthesize information on demand. Across six benchmarks and three model families (GLM-4.7, Qwen3.5, MiniMax-M2.5), AggAgent outperforms all existing aggregation methods-by up to 5.3% absolute on average and 10.3% on two deep research tasks-while adding minimal overhead, as the aggregation cost remains bounded by a single agentic rollout. Our findings establish agentic aggregation as an effective and cost-efficient approach to parallel test-time scaling.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

A cheap swarm of unreliable agents can be steered to a correct consensus by a few strong, expensive "oracle" correctors. We ask how much one must spend, and where to place the oracles. We model the swarm as a consensus on a graph in which each oracle pins one node toward the truth at a cost-coupled, concave strength, and measure quality by the coherence H(R)=tr M(R)^{-1}. Our first result is that H stays submodular (each added oracle helps less than the last) even when the oracles differ in strength, so a cost-benefit greedy comes within 1-1/e of the best placement at any budget. Inverting the budget gives the budget-correctness frontier B*(eps), the least spend that guarantees an eps-correct consensus: closed-form on the complete graph, and a minimal oracle count k* when oracles cost the same. Whether a budget then buys a few strong oracles or many medium onese curvature of the cost-quality law: diminishing returns favour spreadsharply increasion. Measured onthe Qwen3 ladder (0.6-32B), the law is concave for math verificatio convex foremergent code tracing, so the verdict is genuinely task-dependent.https://github.com/YehudaItkin/budgeted-oracle-placemen

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

Coordinating multiple large language models (LLMs) to solve complex tasks collaboratively poses a fundamental trade-off between the computation costs and collective performance compared with individual model. We introduce a novel, game-theoretically grounded reinforcement learning (RL) framework, the Multi-Agent Cooperation Sequential Public Goods Game (MAC-SPGG), to systematically incentivize cooperation in multi-LLM ensembles. In MAC-SPGG, LLM agents move in sequence, observing predecessors' outputs and updating beliefs to condition their own contributions. By redesigning the public-goods reward, effortful contributions become the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), which eliminates free-riding under traditional SPGG or PGG. Its sequential protocol replaces costly round-based information exchanges with a streamlined decision flow, cutting communication overhead while retaining strategic depth. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the SPNE under realistic parameters, and empirically show that MAC-SPGG-trained ensembles outperform single-agent baselines, chain-of-thought prompting, and other cooperative methods, even achieving comparable performance to large-scale models across reasoning, math, code generation, and NLP tasks. Our results highlight the power of structured, incentive-aligned MAC-SPGG cooperation for scalable and robust multi-agent language generation.

Grid edge resources refer to distributed energy resources (DERs) located on the consumer side of the electrical grid, controlled by consumers rather than utility companies. Integrating DERs with real-time electricity pricing can better align distributed supply with system demand, improving grid efficiency and reliability. However, DER owners, known as prosumers, often lack the expertise and resources to directly participate in wholesale energy markets, limiting their ability to fully realize the economic potential of their assets. Meanwhile, as DER adoption grows, the number of prosumers participating in the energy system is expected to increase significantly, creating additional challenges in coordination and market participation. To address these challenges, we propose a mean-field game framework that enables prosumers to autonomously learn optimal decision policies based on dynamic market prices and their variable solar generation. Our framework is designed to accommodate heterogeneous agents and demonstrates the existence of a mean-field equilibrium (MFE) in a wholesale energy market with many prosumers. Additionally, we introduce an algorithm that automates prosumers' resource control, facilitating real-time decision-making for energy storage management. Numerical experiments suggest that our approach converges towards an MFE and effectively reduces peak loads and price volatility, especially during periods of external demand or supply shocks. This study highlights the potential of a fully decentralized approach to integrating DERs into wholesale markets while improving market efficiency.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

Offline-to-online RL can make full use of pre-collected offline datasets to initialize policies, resulting in higher sample efficiency and better performance compared to only using online algorithms alone for policy training. However, direct fine-tuning of the pre-trained policy tends to result in sub-optimal performance. A primary reason is that conservative offline RL methods diminish the agent's capability of exploration, thereby impacting online fine-tuning performance. To encourage agent's exploration during online fine-tuning and enhance the overall online fine-tuning performance, we propose a generalized reward augmentation method called Sample Efficient Reward Augmentation (SERA). Specifically, SERA encourages agent to explore by computing Q conditioned entropy as intrinsic reward. The advantage of SERA is that it can extensively utilize offline pre-trained Q to encourage agent uniformly coverage of state space while considering the imbalance between the distributions of high-value and low-value states. Additionally, SERA can be effortlessly plugged into various RL algorithms to improve online fine-tuning and ensure sustained asymptotic improvement. Moreover, extensive experimental results demonstrate that when conducting offline-to-online problems, SERA consistently and effectively enhances the performance of various offline algorithms.

This paper presents a strategy to allocate services on a Cloud system without overloading nodes and maintaining the system stability with minimum cost. We specify an abstract model of cloud resources utilization, including multiple types of resources as well as considerations for the service migration costs. A prototype meta-heuristic load balancer is demonstrated and experimental results are presented and discussed. We also propose a novel genetic algorithm, where population is seeded with the outputs of other meta-heuristic algorithms.

We develop a tractable identification approach for strategic network formation models with both strategic link interdependence and individual unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effects). The key challenge is that endogenous network statistics (e.g. number of common friends) enter the link formation equation, while the mapping from model primitives to equilibrium network structure is generally intractable. Our approach sidesteps this difficulty using a ``bounding-by-c'' technique that treats endogenous covariates as random variables and exploits monotonicity restrictions to obtain identifying information. A central contribution is to develop a spectrum of fixed-effects handling strategies based on subnetwork configurations: tetrad-based restrictions that difference out all individual fixed effects, triad-based and weighted restrictions that combine ``difference-out'' and ``integrate-out'' steps by differencing out some fixed effects and profiling over the remainder conditional on observed characteristics, and general weighted cycle-based restrictions that unify these cases. We also provide point identification results. Preliminary simulations show that the approach can deliver informative bounds on the structural parameters.

As LLMs advance, post-training reinforcement learning (RL) increasingly relies on multi-dimensional rewards to cultivate comprehensive capabilities. This shift demands new algorithms capable of optimizing diverse and potentially competing objectives simultaneously. To address this, existing methods such as Group reward-Decoupled Policy Optimization (GDPO) decompose the overall score into independent reward groups, then compute the RL loss separately within each group. However, this strategy still encounters multi-reward conflicts: a single rollout can yield positive advantages on certain reward dimensions but negative ones on others, causing opposing signals to cancel each other out during aggregation, further hindering RL training efficiency. Inspired by Dynamic sAmpling Policy Optimization (DAPO), which improves RL training efficiency by filtering out ineffective rollouts with near-zero advantages, we propose Group-Dynamic reward-Decoupled Policy Optimization (GD^2PO). Specifically, GD^2PO employs a conflict-aware filtering mechanism to mask out rollouts suffering from severe reward-wise disagreement. By preventing conflicting signals from canceling each other out, this masking strategy preserves and enhances the magnitude of effective RL advantages, thereby significantly accelerating learning efficiency. Furthermore, we introduce query-level reweighting to dynamically adjust the update intensity of each query based on its overall reward consensus. Experiments on various multi-reward scenarios, including tool calling and human preference alignment, demonstrate that GD^2PO consistently and significantly outperforms existing baselines. The code is available at https://github.com/Qwen-Applications/GD2PO.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to make decisions in complex scenarios, where they need models to think deeply, reason logically, and decide wisely. Many existing studies focus solely on multi-round conversations in social tasks or simulated environments, neglecting the various types of decisions and their interdependence. Current reinforcement learning methods struggle to consider the strategies of others during training. To address these issues, we first define a strategic decision-making problem that includes two types of decisions and their temporal dependencies. Furthermore, we propose **T**heory **o**f **M**ind **P**olicy **O**ptimization **(ToMPO)** algorithm to optimize the perception of other individual strategies and the game situation trends. Compared to the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm, ToMPO enhances the LLM's strategic decision-making mainly by: 1) generating rollouts based on reasoning the strategies of other individuals, 2) estimating advantages at both the graph-level and sample-level, and 3) balancing global and partial rewards. The ToMPO algorithm outperforms the GRPO method by 35% in terms of model output compliance and cooperative outcomes. Additionally, when compared to models with parameter sizes 100 times larger, it shows an 18% improvement. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the ToMPO algorithm in enhancing the model's strategic decision-making capabilities.

Federated learning (FL) inevitably confronts the challenge of system heterogeneity in practical scenarios. To enhance the capabilities of most model-homogeneous FL methods in handling system heterogeneity, we propose a training scheme that can extend their capabilities to cope with this challenge. In this paper, we commence our study with a detailed exploration of homogeneous and heterogeneous FL settings and discover three key observations: (1) a positive correlation between client performance and layer similarities, (2) higher similarities in the shallow layers in contrast to the deep layers, and (3) the smoother gradients distributions indicate the higher layer similarities. Building upon these observations, we propose InCo Aggregation that leverages internal cross-layer gradients, a mixture of gradients from shallow and deep layers within a server model, to augment the similarity in the deep layers without requiring additional communication between clients. Furthermore, our methods can be tailored to accommodate model-homogeneous FL methods such as FedAvg, FedProx, FedNova, Scaffold, and MOON, to expand their capabilities to handle the system heterogeneity. Copious experimental results validate the effectiveness of InCo Aggregation, spotlighting internal cross-layer gradients as a promising avenue to enhance the performance in heterogeneous FL.

Bootstrap aggregating (bagging) is an effective ensemble protocol, which is believed can enhance robustness by its majority voting mechanism. Recent works further prove the sample-wise robustness certificates for certain forms of bagging (e.g. partition aggregation). Beyond these particular forms, in this paper, we propose the first collective certification for general bagging to compute the tight robustness against the global poisoning attack. Specifically, we compute the maximum number of simultaneously changed predictions via solving a binary integer linear programming (BILP) problem. Then we analyze the robustness of vanilla bagging and give the upper bound of the tolerable poison budget. Based on this analysis, we propose hash bagging to improve the robustness of vanilla bagging almost for free. This is achieved by modifying the random subsampling in vanilla bagging to a hash-based deterministic subsampling, as a way of controlling the influence scope for each poisoning sample universally. Our extensive experiments show the notable advantage in terms of applicability and robustness.

Reliably labelling data typically requires annotations from multiple human workers. However, humans are far from being perfect. Hence, it is a common practice to aggregate labels gathered from multiple annotators to make a more confident estimate of the true label. Among many aggregation methods, the simple and well known Majority Vote (MV) selects the class label polling the highest number of votes. However, despite its importance, the optimality of MV's label aggregation has not been extensively studied. We address this gap in our work by characterising the conditions under which MV achieves the theoretically optimal lower bound on label estimation error. Our results capture the tolerable limits on annotation noise under which MV can optimally recover labels for a given class distribution. This certificate of optimality provides a more principled approach to model selection for label aggregation as an alternative to otherwise inefficient practices that sometimes include higher experts, gold labels, etc., that are all marred by the same human uncertainty despite huge time and monetary costs. Experiments on both synthetic and real world data corroborate our theoretical findings.

Imitation learning suffers from causal confusion. This phenomenon occurs when learned policies attend to features that do not causally influence the expert actions but are instead spuriously correlated. Causally confused agents produce low open-loop supervised loss but poor closed-loop performance upon deployment. We consider the problem of masking observed confounders in a disentangled representation of the observation space. Our novel masking algorithm leverages the usual ability to intervene in the initial system state, avoiding any requirement involving expert querying, expert reward functions, or causal graph specification. Under certain assumptions, we theoretically prove that this algorithm is conservative in the sense that it does not incorrectly mask observations that causally influence the expert; furthermore, intervening on the initial state serves to strictly reduce excess conservatism. The masking algorithm is applied to behavior cloning for two illustrative control systems: CartPole and Reacher.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards has significantly advanced the reasoning capabilities of large language models. However, Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) typically assigns a uniform, sequence-level advantage to all tokens, thereby overlooking the intrinsic information heterogeneity along reasoning chains. We show that this coarse-grained credit assignment leads to premature entropy collapse and encourages the model to generate redundant, low-quality reasoning paths. Through systematic empirical analysis, we identify Critical Decision Pivots (CDPs): transient high-entropy states where the policy's trajectory is most sensitive to perturbations. These pivots represent the "forks in the road" where effective multi-path exploration is most crucial yet often suppressed by uniform advantage signals. Building on these insights, we propose Entropy-Regulated Policy Optimization (ERPO), which transitions the optimization focus from coarse sequences to fine-grained token dynamics. ERPO introduces three synergistic components: (i) Entropy-aware Gating, which adaptively amplifies exploration at CDPs to facilitate diverse path discovery; (ii) Bucket-based Implicit Normalization, which mitigates difficulty bias by aligning token progress windows; and (iii) Result-anchored Advantage Synthesis, which re-weights token-level signals via outcome-driven anchors. Extensive experiments on competitive mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that ERPO significantly outperforms GRPO. Notably, ERPO not only boosts reasoning accuracy but also yields significantly more concise and robust derivation paths, while achieving performance comparable to large models with orders of magnitude more parameters.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) assigns a single scalar advantage to all tokens in a completion. For structured generations with explicit segments and objectives, this couples unrelated reward signals across segments, leading to objective interference and misattributed credit. We propose Blockwise Advantage Estimation, a family of GRPO-compatible methods that assigns each objective its own advantage and applies it only to the tokens in the corresponding text block, reducing reliance on hand-designed scalar rewards and scaling naturally to additional objectives. A key challenge is estimating advantages for later blocks whose rewards are conditioned on sampled prefixes; standard unbiased approaches require expensive nested rollouts from intermediate states. Concretely, we introduce an Outcome-Conditioned Baseline that approximates intermediate state values using only within-group statistics by stratifying samples according to a prefix-derived intermediate outcome. On math tasks with uncertainty estimation, our method mitigates reward interference, is competitive with a state-of-the-art reward-designed approach, and preserves test-time gains from confidence-weighted ensembling. More broadly, it provides a modular recipe for optimizing sequential objectives in structured generations without additional rollouts.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved impressive reasoning performance, with reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) emerging as a standard paradigm for post-training. A representative algorithm, group relative policy optimization (GRPO) (Shao et al., 2024), computes advantages by normalizing outcome rewards within response groups, but suffers from a vanishing advantage issue when all responses in a group receive identical rewards. To address this issue, we propose Adaptive Rollout and Response Reuse Policy Optimization (AR3PO), a sampling efficient RLVR algorithm that introduces two novel techniques: adaptive rollout, which dynamically allocates more responses to difficult prompts while saving computation on easier ones, and response reuse, which leverages previously generated correct responses to provide useful training signals. We compare AR3PO with strong RLVR baselines on multiple representative benchmarks using two different families of base models. Across the 7B and 8B models, AR3PO consistently outperforms GRPO and matches or surpasses DAPO (Yu et al., 2025), reducing rollout cost by up to 4.2x. On the larger 32B model, AR3PO achieves comparable performance to DAPO at similar training steps while maintaining substantially lower rollout cost.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

Knowledge benchmarks for LLMs face three issues: scaling-driven designs that do not operationalize disciplinary representativeness; flat-payment annotation that permits lazy consensus; and unaudited ranking instability under bounded test budgets. We introduce KINA, an 899-item benchmark across 261 fine-grained disciplines, with two formal results. First, we cast representativeness as a coverage-style objective over expert-elicited anchors and operationalize disciplinary representativeness through a proxy, yielding a (1-1/e) greedy approximation (Proposition 1); the guarantee applies to the proxy, not to population representativeness. Second, we prove a bonus-on-bar tournament weakly FOSD-dominates flat payment in released-review quality, with incentive-compatibility threshold B > Delta C / Delta p_min (Theorem 1). Evaluating 42 models from 13 labs, the top model, Gemini-3.1-Pro-Preview, reaches 53.17%, followed by Claude-Opus-4.6 at 49.92% and GPT-5.4 at 48.55%, leaving substantial headroom below saturation. The full leaderboard shows a tiered structure rather than a smooth total order: a small frontier tier lies above 48%, a dense strong-model tier spans roughly 38-45%, and low-performing models remain only modestly above the 10% chance baseline. Tool augmentation adds up to 5.17 points across the five tool-use evaluations, with gains varying substantially across models. We report bootstrap ranking-stability statistics to make bounded-budget variance explicit and to discourage over-interpretation of adjacent ranks.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent environments has become an important alignment challenge. We take a neutral empirical stance and construct a controlled environment in which strategic behavior can be directly observed and measured. We introduce a large-scale multi-agent simulation in a simplified model of New York City, where LLM-driven agents interact under opposing incentives. Blue agents aim to reach their destinations efficiently, while Red agents attempt to divert them toward billboard-heavy routes using persuasive language to maximize advertising revenue. Hidden identities make navigation socially mediated, forcing agents to decide when to trust or deceive. We study policy learning through an iterative simulation pipeline that updates agent policies across repeated interaction rounds using Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO). Blue agents are optimized to reduce billboard exposure while preserving navigation efficiency, whereas Red agents adapt to exploit remaining weaknesses. Across iterations, the best Blue policy improves task success from 46.0% to 57.3%, although susceptibility remains high at 70.7%. Later policies exhibit stronger selective cooperation while preserving trajectory efficiency. However, a persistent safety-helpfulness trade-off remains: policies that better resist adversarial steering do not simultaneously maximize task completion. Overall, our results show that LLM agents can exhibit limited strategic behavior, including selective trust and deception, while remaining highly vulnerable to adversarial persuasion.