Daily Papers

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) enable powerful multi-agent systems, but scaling them is economically unsustainable: coordinating heterogeneous agents under information asymmetry often spirals costs. Existing paradigms, such as Mixture-of-Agents and knowledge-based routers, rely on heuristic proxies that ignore costs and collapse uncertainty structure, leading to provably suboptimal coordination. We introduce Agora, a framework that reframes coordination as a decentralized market for uncertainty. Agora formalizes epistemic uncertainty into a structured, tradable asset (perceptual, semantic, inferential), and enforces profitability-driven trading among agents based on rational economic rules. A market-aware broker, extending Thompson Sampling, initiates collaboration and guides the system toward cost-efficient equilibria. Experiments on five multimodal benchmarks (MMMU, MMBench, MathVision, InfoVQA, CC-OCR) show that Agora outperforms strong VLMs and heuristic multi-agent strategies, e.g., achieving +8.5% accuracy over the best baseline on MMMU while reducing cost by over 3x. These results establish market-based coordination as a principled and scalable paradigm for building economically viable multi-agent visual intelligence systems.

Recent years have witnessed increasing interest in extending large language models into agentic systems. While the effectiveness of agents has continued to improve, efficiency, which is crucial for real-world deployment, has often been overlooked. This paper therefore investigates efficiency from three core components of agents: memory, tool learning, and planning, considering costs such as latency, tokens, steps, etc. Aimed at conducting comprehensive research addressing the efficiency of the agentic system itself, we review a broad range of recent approaches that differ in implementation yet frequently converge on shared high-level principles including but not limited to bounding context via compression and management, designing reinforcement learning rewards to minimize tool invocation, and employing controlled search mechanisms to enhance efficiency, which we discuss in detail. Accordingly, we characterize efficiency in two complementary ways: comparing effectiveness under a fixed cost budget, and comparing cost at a comparable level of effectiveness. This trade-off can also be viewed through the Pareto frontier between effectiveness and cost. From this perspective, we also examine efficiency oriented benchmarks by summarizing evaluation protocols for these components and consolidating commonly reported efficiency metrics from both benchmark and methodological studies. Moreover, we discuss the key challenges and future directions, with the goal of providing promising insights.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

The problem of fair multi-agent coordination in decentralized settings is one of the most pressing challenges for building efficient collaborative systems. Resource allocation is based on optimized collective arrangements accounting for agents' needs. Such coordination should not only be computationally efficient but also account for fairness, i.e., equitable redistribution of costs incurred by all agents. Recent literature has proposed several algorithms that efficiently determine optimal plan combinations balancing system-wide efficiency and individual discomfort of agents in a centralized setting. However, these works do not address equitable resource optimization in fully decentralized scenarios, specifically, the optimized redistribution of discomfort among coordinating agents so that none experiences a discomfort level that could lead to loss of incentive or polarization that can disrupt planned operations. In this work, we study the problem of optimizing three objectives: (i) system-wide efficiency, (ii) individuals' comfort and (iii) fairness (i.e., balancing of incurred discomfort costs) in decentralized multi-agent coordination. We design a novel model to optimize those three orthogonal objectives, without any substantial increase in communication and computational overhead. Through experiments on two real-world datasets, we validate the model and demonstrate that it can achieve fairer optimization outcomes, while satisfying agents' preferences and system goals.

The remarkable capabilities of Large Language Model (LLM)-driven agents have enabled sophisticated systems to tackle complex, multi-step tasks, but their escalating costs threaten scalability and accessibility. This work presents the first systematic study of the efficiency-effectiveness trade-off in modern agent systems, addressing the critical need for cost-effective designs without sacrificing performance. We investigate three key questions: (1) How much complexity do agentic tasks inherently require? (2) When do additional modules yield diminishing returns? (3) How much efficiency can be gained through the design of efficient agent frameworks? Through an empirical analysis on the GAIA benchmark, we evaluate the impact of LLM backbone selection, agent framework designs, and test-time scaling strategies. Using the cost-of-pass metric, we quantify the efficiency-performance trade-off across these dimensions. Our findings inform the development of Efficient Agents , a novel agent framework that has an optimal complexity to task requirements. Efficient Agents retains 96.7% of the performance of OWL, one leading open-source agent framework, while reducing operational costs from 0.398 to 0.228, resulting in a 28.4% improvement in cost-of-pass. Our work provides actionable insights for designing efficient, high-performing agent systems, advancing the accessibility and sustainability of AI-driven solutions.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

We introduce Equilibrium Matching (EqM), a generative modeling framework built from an equilibrium dynamics perspective. EqM discards the non-equilibrium, time-conditional dynamics in traditional diffusion and flow-based generative models and instead learns the equilibrium gradient of an implicit energy landscape. Through this approach, we can adopt an optimization-based sampling process at inference time, where samples are obtained by gradient descent on the learned landscape with adjustable step sizes, adaptive optimizers, and adaptive compute. EqM surpasses the generation performance of diffusion/flow models empirically, achieving an FID of 1.90 on ImageNet 256times256. EqM is also theoretically justified to learn and sample from the data manifold. Beyond generation, EqM is a flexible framework that naturally handles tasks including partially noised image denoising, OOD detection, and image composition. By replacing time-conditional velocities with a unified equilibrium landscape, EqM offers a tighter bridge between flow and energy-based models and a simple route to optimization-driven inference.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

Performative Reinforcement Learning (PRL) refers to a scenario in which the deployed policy changes the reward and transition dynamics of the underlying environment. In this work, we study multi-agent PRL by incorporating performative effects into Markov Potential Games (MPGs). We introduce the notion of a performatively stable equilibrium (PSE) and show that it always exists under a reasonable sensitivity assumption. We then provide convergence results for state-of-the-art algorithms used to solve MPGs. Specifically, we show that independent policy gradient ascent (IPGA) and independent natural policy gradient (INPG) converge to an approximate PSE in the best-iterate sense, with an additional term that accounts for the performative effects. Furthermore, we show that INPG asymptotically converges to a PSE in the last-iterate sense. As the performative effects vanish, we recover the convergence rates from prior work. For a special case of our game, we provide finite-time last-iterate convergence results for a repeated retraining approach, in which agents independently optimize a surrogate objective. We conduct extensive experiments to validate our theoretical findings.

This script offers an implementation-oriented introduction to deep learning methods for solving and estimating high-dimensional dynamic stochastic models in economics and finance. Its starting point is the curse of dimensionality: heterogeneous-agent economies, overlapping-generations models with aggregate risk, continuous-time models with occasionally binding constraints, climate-economy models, and macro-finance environments with many assets and frictions generate state and parameter spaces that strain classical tensor-product grid methods. The exposition is organized around four complementary methodologies. Deep Equilibrium Nets embed discrete-time equilibrium conditions into neural-network loss functions. Physics-Informed Neural Networks approximate continuous-time Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman, Kolmogorov forward, and related partial differential equations. Deep surrogate models provide fast, differentiable approximations to expensive structural models, while Gaussian processes add a probabilistic layer that quantifies approximation uncertainty; together they support estimation, sensitivity analysis, and constrained policy design. Gaussian-process-based dynamic programming, combined with active learning and dimension reduction, extends value-function iteration to very large continuous state spaces. Applications span representative-agent and international real business cycle models, overlapping-generations and heterogeneous-agent economies, continuous-time macro-finance, structural estimation by simulated method of moments, and climate economics under uncertainty. Companion notebooks in TensorFlow and PyTorch invite hands-on experimentation. These notes are a deliberately subjective and inevitably incomplete snapshot of a rapidly evolving field, aimed at equipping PhD students and researchers to engage with this frontier hands-on.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

Inference-time scaling has emerged as a critical avenue for enhancing Large Language Models' performance, yet real-world deployment is constrained by strict computational budgets. In this work, we formulate inference budget allocation as a global constrained optimization problem governed by economic principles. By modeling per-query reasoning utility with a shifted-surge function, we derive an optimal allocation policy based on a global shadow price that equilibrates marginal utility under resource scarcity. Based on this theory, we propose Constrained Latent-utility Equilibrium Allocation for Reasoning (CLEAR). It performs rational abandonment and reallocates resources from insolvent queries to solvable queries near their emergence thresholds. Extensive experiments on several reasoning tasks with different traffic streams demonstrate that CLEAR significantly improves the Pareto frontier of total token cost versus mean accuracy. In resource-scarce regimes, CLEAR achieves up to a 3x improvement in global accuracy compared to uniform allocation.

Recent advances in deep-research agents have shown promise for autonomous knowledge construction through dynamic reasoning over external sources. However, existing approaches rely on a mono-contextual paradigm that accumulates all information in a single, expanding context window, leading to context suffocation and noise contamination that limit their effectiveness on long-horizon tasks. We introduce IterResearch, a novel iterative deep-research paradigm that reformulates long-horizon research as a Markov Decision Process with strategic workspace reconstruction. By maintaining an evolving report as memory and periodically synthesizing insights, our approach preserves consistent reasoning capacity across arbitrary exploration depths. We further develop Efficiency-Aware Policy Optimization (EAPO), a reinforcement learning framework that incentivizes efficient exploration through geometric reward discounting and enables stable distributed training via adaptive downsampling. Extensive experiments demonstrate that IterResearch achieves substantial improvements over existing open-source agents with average +14.5pp across six benchmarks and narrows the gap with frontier proprietary systems. Remarkably, our paradigm exhibits unprecedented interaction scaling, extending to 2048 interactions with dramatic performance gains (from 3.5\% to 42.5\%), and serves as an effective prompting strategy, improving frontier models by up to 19.2pp over ReAct on long-horizon tasks. These findings position IterResearch as a versatile solution for long-horizon reasoning, effective both as a trained agent and as a prompting paradigm for frontier models.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a T-step Cournot game and a T-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems -- the upper bound by the T-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the T-step monopoly model -- can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter T for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small T usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game under the offline learning constraint. We first frame this problem in terms of selecting among candidate equilibria. Since datasets may inform only a small fraction of game dynamics, it is generally infeasible in offline game-solving to even verify a proposed solution is a true equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the relative probability of low regret (i.e., closeness to equilibrium) across candidates based on the information available. Specifically, we extend Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), an online game-solving approach, by quantifying game dynamics uncertainty and modifying the RL objective to skew towards solutions more likely to have low regret in the true game. We further propose a novel meta-strategy solver, tailored for the offline setting, to guide strategy exploration in PSRO. Our incorporation of Conservatism principles from Offline reinforcement learning approaches for strategy Exploration gives our approach its name: COffeE-PSRO. Experiments demonstrate COffeE-PSRO's ability to extract lower-regret solutions than state-of-the-art offline approaches and reveal relationships between algorithmic components empirical game fidelity, and overall performance.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have greatly improved their reasoning and decision-making abilities when deployed as agents. Richer reasoning, however, often comes at the cost of longer chain of thought (CoT), hampering interaction efficiency in real-world scenarios. Nevertheless, there still lacks systematic definition of LLM agent efficiency, hindering targeted improvements. To this end, we introduce dual-efficiency, comprising (i) step-level efficiency, which minimizes tokens per step, and (ii) trajectory-level efficiency, which minimizes the number of steps to complete a task. Building on this definition, we propose DEPO, a dual-efficiency preference optimization method that jointly rewards succinct responses and fewer action steps. Experiments on WebShop and BabyAI show that DEPO cuts token usage by up to 60.9% and steps by up to 26.9%, while achieving up to a 29.3% improvement in performance. DEPO also generalizes to three out-of-domain math benchmarks and retains its efficiency gains when trained on only 25% of the data. Our project page is at https://opencausalab.github.io/DEPO.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

This paper concerns a continuous time mean-variance (MV) portfolio selection problem in a jump-diffusion financial model with no-shorting trading constraint. The problem is reduced to two subproblems: solving a stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) control problem under control constraint, and finding a maximal point of a real function. Based on a two-dimensional fully coupled ordinary differential equation (ODE), we construct an explicit viscosity solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the constrained LQ problem. Together with the Meyer-Itô formula and a verification procedure, we obtain the optimal feedback controls of the constrained LQ problem and the original MV problem, which corrects the flawed results in some existing literatures. In addition, closed-form efficient portfolio and efficient frontier are derived. In the end, we present several examples where the two-dimensional ODE is decoupled.

We study mean field portfolio games under Epstein-Zin preferences, which naturally encompass the classical time-additive power utility as a special case. In a general non-Markovian framework, we establish a uniqueness result by proving a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria and the solutions to a class of BSDEs. A key ingredient in our approach is a necessary stochastic maximum principle tailored to Epstein-Zin utility and a nonlinear transformation. In the deterministic setting, we further derive an explicit closed-form solution for the equilibrium investment and consumption policies.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

A quantum Cournot game of which classical form game has multiple Nash equilibria is examined. Although the classical equilibria fail to be Pareto optimal, the quantum equilibrium exhibits the following two properties, (i) if the measurement of entanglement between strategic variables chosen by the competing firms is sufficiently large, the multiplicity of equilibria vanishes, and, (ii) the more strongly the strategic variables are entangled, the more closely the unique equilibrium approaches to the optimal one.

Long-horizon planning is widely recognized as a core capability of autonomous LLM-based agents; however, current evaluation frameworks suffer from being largely episodic, domain-specific, or insufficiently grounded in persistent economic dynamics. We introduce EcoGym, a generalizable benchmark for continuous plan-and-execute decision making in interactive economies. EcoGym comprises three diverse environments: Vending, Freelance, and Operation, implemented in a unified decision-making process with standardized interfaces, and budgeted actions over an effectively unbounded horizon (1000+ steps if 365 day-loops for evaluation). The evaluation of EcoGym is based on business-relevant outcomes (e.g., net worth, income, and DAU), targeting long-term strategic coherence and robustness under partial observability and stochasticity. Experiments across eleven leading LLMs expose a systematic tension: no single model dominates across all three scenarios. Critically, we find that models exhibit significant suboptimality in either high-level strategies or efficient actions executions. EcoGym is released as an open, extensible testbed for transparent long-horizon agent evaluation and for studying controllability-utility trade-offs in realistic economic settings.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

The widespread adoption of AI systems in the economy hinges on their ability to generate economic value that outweighs their inference costs. Evaluating this tradeoff requires metrics that account for both performance and costs. We propose a framework grounded in production theory for evaluating language models by combining accuracy and inference cost. We introduce "cost-of-pass", the expected monetary cost of generating a correct solution. We then define the "frontier cost-of-pass" as the minimum cost-of-pass achievable across available models or the "human-expert, using the approximate cost of hiring an expert. Our analysis reveals distinct economic insights. First, lightweight models are most cost-effective for basic quantitative tasks, large models for knowledge-intensive ones, and reasoning models for complex quantitative problems, despite higher per-token costs. Second, tracking this frontier cost-of-pass over the past year reveals significant progress, particularly for complex quantitative tasks where the cost has roughly halved every few months. Third, to trace key innovations driving this progress, we examine counterfactual frontiers: estimates of cost-efficiency without specific model classes. We find that innovations in lightweight, large, and reasoning models have been essential for pushing the frontier in basic quantitative, knowledge-intensive, and complex quantitative tasks, respectively. Finally, we assess the cost-reductions afforded by common inference-time techniques like majority voting and self-refinement, finding that their marginal accuracy gains rarely justify their costs. Our findings underscore that complementary model-level innovations are the primary drivers of cost-efficiency, and our economic framework provides a principled tool for measuring this progress and guiding deployment.

In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We introduce a sequential testing framework that monitors whether observed play is consistent with a benchmark of strategic behavior, without assuming a fixed sample size. Our approach builds on the e-value framework for safe anytime-valid inference: by "betting" against the benchmark, we construct a test supermartingale that accumulates evidence whenever observed payoffs systematically violate the expected conditions. For repeated normal-form games, we take equilibrium as the benchmark, yielding a statistically sound, interpretable measure of departure from equilibrium that can be monitored online; our framework unifies the treatment of Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria, offering finite-time guarantees and a detailed analysis of detection times. We also leverage Benjamini-Hochberg-type procedures to increase detection power in large games while rigorously controlling the false discovery rate. Finally, we extend our method to stochastic games, verifying online whether observed trajectories adhere to a specified target policy, such as a computed equilibrium, broadening the framework's applicability to dynamic, state-dependent settings.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

We introduce and analyze distance preservation games (DPGs). In DPGs, agents express ideal distances to other agents and need to choose locations in the unit interval while preserving their ideal distances as closely as possible. We analyze the existence and computation of location profiles that are jump stable (i.e., no agent can benefit by moving to another location) or welfare optimal for DPGs, respectively. Specifically, we prove that there are DPGs without jump stable location profiles and identify important cases where such outcomes always exist and can be computed efficiently. Similarly, we show that finding welfare optimal location profiles is NP-complete and present approximation algorithms for finding solutions with social welfare close to optimal. Finally, we prove that DPGs have a price of anarchy of at most 2.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Agentic systems increasingly solve complex user requests by executing orchestrated workflows, where subtasks are assigned to specialized models or tools and coordinated according to their dependencies. While recent work improves agent efficiency by optimizing the performance--cost--latency frontier, real deployments often impose concrete requirements: a workflow must be completed within a specified budget and before a specified deadline. This shifts the goal from average efficiency optimization to maximizing the probability that the entire workflow completes successfully under explicit budget and deadline constraints. We study constraint-driven online resource allocation for agentic workflows. Given a dependency-structured workflow and estimates of success rates and generation lengths for each subtask--model pair, the executor allocates models and parallel samples across simultaneously executable subtasks while managing the remaining budget and time. We formulate this setting as a finite-horizon stochastic online allocation problem and propose Monte Carlo Portfolio Planning (MCPP), a lightweight closed-loop planner that directly estimates constrained completion probability through simulated workflow executions and replans after observed outcomes. Experiments on CodeFlow and ProofFlow demonstrate that MCPP consistently improves constrained completion probability over strong baselines across a wide range of budget--deadline constraints.

Large reasoning models, such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1, tend to become increasingly verbose as their reasoning capabilities improve. These inflated Chain-of-Thought (CoT) trajectories often exceed what the underlying problems require, wasting compute, latency, and context budgets. While introducing length-based efficiency rewards during reinforcement learning offers a natural remedy, existing methods struggle with two fundamental challenges: the optimal balance between correctness and efficiency is non-stationary throughout training, and intrinsic reasoning budgets vary drastically across problems. Relying on static reward weights and global length constraints inevitably forces a compromise between degraded accuracy and unrealized compression. To overcome these limitations, we propose LEAD (Length-Efficient Adaptive and Dynamic reasoning), a method that replaces static heuristics with online, self-adaptive mechanisms. LEAD dynamically calibrates the correctness-efficiency trade-off at each step using a Potential-Scaled Instability, directing optimization capacity to the most informative learning signal. Furthermore, it estimates an adaptive per-problem target length online based on the model's own correct rollouts, applying a symmetric efficiency reward that penalizes both overthinking and over-compression. Evaluated on five mathematical reasoning benchmarks, LEAD achieves the highest accuracy and Accuracy-Efficiency Score among RL-trained efficient-reasoning methods while producing substantially shorter outputs than the base model.

Large language models split into two families: reasoning-centric LLMs, which strengthen internal chain-of-thought reasoning but cannot invoke external tools, and agentic LLMs, which learn to interact with environments and leverage tools but often lag in deep reasoning. This divide arises from fundamentally different training objectives, leading to mismatched strengths and inefficiency on simple queries, where both families tend to overthink or over-call tools. In this work, we present Adaptive Agent Foundation Model (A^2FM), a unified framework that follows a route-then-align principle: the model first learns task-aware routing and then aligns mode-specific trajectories under a shared backbone. To address the inefficiency gap, we introduce a third mode-instant-that handles simple queries directly, preventing unnecessary reasoning or tool calls while complementing the agentic and reasoning modes. To jointly enhance accuracy and efficiency, we propose Adaptive Policy Optimization (APO), which enforces adaptive sampling across modes and applies a cost-regularized reward. On the 32B scale, A^2FM achieves 13.4% on BrowseComp, 70.4% on AIME25, and 16.7% on HLE, setting new SOTA among comparable models and performing competitively with frontier LLMs across agentic, reasoning, and general benchmarks. Notably, the adaptive execution achieves a cost of pass of only $0.00487 per correct answer-cutting cost by 45.2% relative to reasoning and 33.5% relative to agentic, thus delivering substantially higher cost efficiency while maintaining comparable accuracy.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

Climate-economic modeling under uncertainty presents significant computational challenges that may limit policymakers' ability to address climate change effectively. This paper explores neural network-based approaches for solving high-dimensional optimal control problems arising from models that incorporate ambiguity aversion in climate mitigation decisions. We develop a continuous-time endogenous-growth economic model that accounts for multiple mitigation pathways, including emission-free capital and carbon intensity reductions. Given the inherent complexity and high dimensionality of these models, traditional numerical methods become computationally intractable. We benchmark several neural network architectures against finite-difference generated solutions, evaluating their ability to capture the dynamic interactions between uncertainty, technology transitions, and optimal climate policy. Our findings demonstrate that appropriate neural architecture selection significantly impacts both solution accuracy and computational efficiency when modeling climate-economic systems under uncertainty. These methodological advances enable more sophisticated modeling of climate policy decisions, allowing for better representation of technology transitions and uncertainty-critical elements for developing effective mitigation strategies in the face of climate change.

As LLM agents evolve, tokens have emerged as the core economic primitives of Agentic AI. However, their exponential consumption introduces severe computational, collaborative, and security bottlenecks. Current surveys remain fragmented across system optimization, architecture design, and trust, lacking a unified framework to evaluate the fundamental trade-off between output quality and economic cost. To bridge this gap, this survey presents the first comprehensive survey of Token Economics. By unifying computer science and economics, we conceptualize tokens as production factors, exchange mediums, and units of account. We synthesize existing literature across a four-dimensional taxonomy: (1) Micro-level (Single Agent): Optimizing budget-constrained factor substitution via neoclassical firm theory. (2) Meso-level (Multi-Agent Systems): Minimizing collaboration friction using transaction cost and principal-agent theories. (3) Macro-level (Agent Ecosystems): Addressing congestion externalities and pricing via mechanism design. (4) Security: Internalizing adversarial threats as endogenous economic constraints. Finally, we outline frontier directions, including differentiable token budgets and dynamic markets, to lay the theoretical foundation for scalable next-generation agent systems.

Grid edge resources refer to distributed energy resources (DERs) located on the consumer side of the electrical grid, controlled by consumers rather than utility companies. Integrating DERs with real-time electricity pricing can better align distributed supply with system demand, improving grid efficiency and reliability. However, DER owners, known as prosumers, often lack the expertise and resources to directly participate in wholesale energy markets, limiting their ability to fully realize the economic potential of their assets. Meanwhile, as DER adoption grows, the number of prosumers participating in the energy system is expected to increase significantly, creating additional challenges in coordination and market participation. To address these challenges, we propose a mean-field game framework that enables prosumers to autonomously learn optimal decision policies based on dynamic market prices and their variable solar generation. Our framework is designed to accommodate heterogeneous agents and demonstrates the existence of a mean-field equilibrium (MFE) in a wholesale energy market with many prosumers. Additionally, we introduce an algorithm that automates prosumers' resource control, facilitating real-time decision-making for energy storage management. Numerical experiments suggest that our approach converges towards an MFE and effectively reduces peak loads and price volatility, especially during periods of external demand or supply shocks. This study highlights the potential of a fully decentralized approach to integrating DERs into wholesale markets while improving market efficiency.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We study online reinforcement learning in linear Markov decision processes with adversarial losses and bandit feedback, without prior knowledge on transitions or access to simulators. We introduce two algorithms that achieve improved regret performance compared to existing approaches. The first algorithm, although computationally inefficient, ensures a regret of mathcal{O}left(Kright), where K is the number of episodes. This is the first result with the optimal K dependence in the considered setting. The second algorithm, which is based on the policy optimization framework, guarantees a regret of mathcal{O}left(K^{3{4}} right) and is computationally efficient. Both our results significantly improve over the state-of-the-art: a computationally inefficient algorithm by Kong et al. [2023] with mathcal{O}left(K^{4{5}}+polyleft(1{lambda_{min}}right) right) regret, for some problem-dependent constant lambda_{min} that can be arbitrarily close to zero, and a computationally efficient algorithm by Sherman et al. [2023b] with mathcal{O}left(K^{6{7}} right) regret.

Effective macroeconomic policies play a crucial role in promoting economic growth and social stability. This paper models the optimal macroeconomic policy problem based on the Stackelberg Mean Field Game (SMFG), where the government acts as the leader in policy-making, and large-scale households dynamically respond as followers. This modeling method captures the asymmetric dynamic game between the government and large-scale households, and interpretably evaluates the effects of macroeconomic policies based on microfoundations, which is difficult for existing methods to achieve. We also propose a solution for SMFGs, incorporating pre-training on real data and a model-free Stackelberg mean-field reinforcement learning (SMFRL) algorithm, which operates independently of prior environmental knowledge and transitions. Our experimental results showcase the superiority of the SMFG method over other economic policies in terms of performance, efficiency-equity tradeoff, and SMFG assumption analysis. This paper significantly contributes to the domain of AI for economics by providing a powerful tool for modeling and solving optimal macroeconomic policies.

Policy optimization methods are powerful algorithms in Reinforcement Learning (RL) for their flexibility to deal with policy parameterization and ability to handle model misspecification. However, these methods usually suffer from slow convergence rates and poor sample complexity. Hence it is important to design provably sample efficient algorithms for policy optimization. Yet, recent advances for this problems have only been successful in tabular and linear setting, whose benign structures cannot be generalized to non-linearly parameterized policies. In this paper, we address this problem by leveraging recent advances in value-based algorithms, including bounded eluder-dimension and online sensitivity sampling, to design a low-switching sample-efficient policy optimization algorithm, LPO, with general non-linear function approximation. We show that, our algorithm obtains an varepsilon-optimal policy with only O(text{poly(d)}{varepsilon^3}) samples, where varepsilon is the suboptimality gap and d is a complexity measure of the function class approximating the policy. This drastically improves previously best-known sample bound for policy optimization algorithms, O(text{poly(d)}{varepsilon^8}). Moreover, we empirically test our theory with deep neural nets to show the benefits of the theoretical inspiration.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Model efficiency is a critical aspect of developing and deploying machine learning models. Inference time and latency directly affect the user experience, and some applications have hard requirements. In addition to inference costs, model training also have direct financial and environmental impacts. Although there are numerous well-established metrics (cost indicators) for measuring model efficiency, researchers and practitioners often assume that these metrics are correlated with each other and report only few of them. In this paper, we thoroughly discuss common cost indicators, their advantages and disadvantages, and how they can contradict each other. We demonstrate how incomplete reporting of cost indicators can lead to partial conclusions and a blurred or incomplete picture of the practical considerations of different models. We further present suggestions to improve reporting of efficiency metrics.

We study the problem of constrained efficient global optimization, where both the objective and constraints are expensive black-box functions that can be learned with Gaussian processes. We propose CONFIG (CONstrained efFIcient Global Optimization), a simple and effective algorithm to solve it. Under certain regularity assumptions, we show that our algorithm enjoys the same cumulative regret bound as that in the unconstrained case and similar cumulative constraint violation upper bounds. For commonly used Matern and Squared Exponential kernels, our bounds are sublinear and allow us to derive a convergence rate to the optimal solution of the original constrained problem. In addition, our method naturally provides a scheme to declare infeasibility when the original black-box optimization problem is infeasible. Numerical experiments on sampled instances from the Gaussian process, artificial numerical problems, and a black-box building controller tuning problem all demonstrate the competitive performance of our algorithm. Compared to the other state-of-the-art methods, our algorithm significantly improves the theoretical guarantees, while achieving competitive empirical performance.

We establish an existence of equilibrium result for a class of non-Markovian mean-field games with unbounded control space in weak formulation. Our result is based on new existence and stability results for quadratic-growth generalized McKean-Vlasov BSDEs. Unlike earlier approaches, our approach does not require boundedness assumptions on the model parameters or time horizons and allows for running costs that are quadratic in the control variable.

Test-time compute has emerged as a promising strategy to enhance the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, this strategy has in turn increased how much users pay cloud-based providers offering LLM-as-a-service, since providers charge users for the amount of test-time compute they use to generate an output. In our work, we show that the market of LLM-as-a-service is socially inefficient: providers have a financial incentive to increase the amount of test-time compute, even if this increase contributes little to the quality of the outputs. To address this inefficiency, we introduce a reverse second-price auction mechanism where providers bid their offered price and (expected) quality for the opportunity to serve a user, and users pay proportionally to the marginal value generated by the winning provider relative to the second-highest bidder. To illustrate and complement our theoretical results, we conduct experiments with multiple instruct models from the Llama and Qwen families, as well as reasoning models distilled from DeepSeek-R1, on math and science benchmark datasets.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

Actor-critic algorithms have become a cornerstone in reinforcement learning (RL), leveraging the strengths of both policy-based and value-based methods. Despite recent progress in understanding their statistical efficiency, no existing work has successfully learned an epsilon-optimal policy with a sample complexity of O(1/epsilon^2) trajectories with general function approximation when strategic exploration is necessary. We address this open problem by introducing a novel actor-critic algorithm that attains a sample-complexity of O(dH^5 log|A|/epsilon^2 + d H^4 log|F|/ epsilon^2) trajectories, and accompanying T regret when the Bellman eluder dimension d does not increase with T at more than a log T rate. Here, F is the critic function class, A is the action space, and H is the horizon in the finite horizon MDP setting. Our algorithm integrates optimism, off-policy critic estimation targeting the optimal Q-function, and rare-switching policy resets. We extend this to the setting of Hybrid RL, showing that initializing the critic with offline data yields sample efficiency gains compared to purely offline or online RL. Further, utilizing access to offline data, we provide a non-optimistic provably efficient actor-critic algorithm that only additionally requires N_{off} geq c_{off}^*dH^4/epsilon^2 in exchange for omitting optimism, where c_{off}^* is the single-policy concentrability coefficient and N_{off} is the number of offline samples. This addresses another open problem in the literature. We further provide numerical experiments to support our theoretical findings.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

Reinforcement learning problems typically define the goal as maximizing the expected value of a scalar reward function. But, pairwise preferences are often easier to specify than scalar rewards, and they express certain goals that scalar rewards cannot. Methods for reinforcement learning with pairwise preferences have thus received growing interest. Unfortunately, these methods are inefficient in problems with long time horizons, and they lack guarantees on the performance of Markov policies relative to history-dependent policies, which bridge the theory and practice of reinforcement learning. We therefore propose the Markov decision contest as a new problem model for reinforcement learning with pairwise preferences. We prove that stationary Markov policies are optimal among all history-dependent policies, that solving a Markov decision contest exactly is in P, and that a simple iterative algorithm converges to an optimal policy at a sublinear rate. Lastly, in a set of high-dimensional decision problems with long time horizons, we show that our approximate algorithm is significantly more learning-efficient than prior work.

Dynamic pricing in retail requires policies that adapt to shifting demand while coordinating decisions across related products. We present a systematic empirical study of multi-agent reinforcement learning for retail price optimization, comparing a strong MAPPO baseline with a graph-attention-augmented variant (MAPPO+GAT) that leverages learned interactions among products. Using a simulated pricing environment derived from real transaction data, we evaluate profit, stability across random seeds, fairness across products, and training efficiency under a standardized evaluation protocol. The results indicate that MAPPO provides a robust and reproducible foundation for portfolio-level price control, and that MAPPO+GAT further enhances performance by sharing information over the product graph without inducing excessive price volatility. These results indicate that graph-integrated MARL provides a more scalable and stable solution than independent learners for dynamic retail pricing, offering practical advantages in multi-product decision-making.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Sample efficiency is a crucial problem in deep reinforcement learning. Recent algorithms, such as REDQ and DroQ, found a way to improve the sample efficiency by increasing the update-to-data (UTD) ratio to 20 gradient update steps on the critic per environment sample. However, this comes at the expense of a greatly increased computational cost. To reduce this computational burden, we introduce CrossQ: A lightweight algorithm for continuous control tasks that makes careful use of Batch Normalization and removes target networks to surpass the current state-of-the-art in sample efficiency while maintaining a low UTD ratio of 1. Notably, CrossQ does not rely on advanced bias-reduction schemes used in current methods. CrossQ's contributions are threefold: (1) it matches or surpasses current state-of-the-art methods in terms of sample efficiency, (2) it substantially reduces the computational cost compared to REDQ and DroQ, (3) it is easy to implement, requiring just a few lines of code on top of SAC.

We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a structural reinforcement learning (SRL) method which treats prices via simulation while exploiting agents' structural knowledge of their own individual dynamics. Our SRL method yields a general and highly efficient global solution method for heterogeneous agent models that sidesteps the Master equation and handles problems traditional methods struggle with, in particular nontrivial market-clearing conditions. We illustrate the approach in the Krusell-Smith model, the Huggett model with aggregate shocks, and a HANK model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, all of which we solve globally within minutes.

Scaling model size and training data has led to great advances in the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, the diminishing returns of this approach necessitate alternative methods to improve model capabilities, particularly in tasks requiring advanced reasoning. Large reasoning models, which leverage long chain-of-thoughts, bring unprecedented breakthroughs in problem-solving capabilities but at a substantial deployment cost associated to longer generations. Reducing inference costs is crucial for the economic feasibility, user experience, and environmental sustainability of these models. In this work, we propose to train large reasoning models to reason efficiently. More precisely, we use reinforcement learning (RL) to train reasoning models to dynamically allocate inference-time compute based on task complexity. Our method incentivizes models to minimize unnecessary computational overhead while maintaining accuracy, thereby achieving substantial efficiency gains. It enables the derivation of a family of reasoning models with varying efficiency levels, controlled via a single hyperparameter. Experiments on two open-weight large reasoning models demonstrate significant reductions in inference cost while preserving most of the accuracy.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Provably efficient Model-Based Reinforcement Learning (MBRL) based on optimism or posterior sampling (PSRL) is ensured to attain the global optimality asymptotically by introducing the complexity measure of the model. However, the complexity might grow exponentially for the simplest nonlinear models, where global convergence is impossible within finite iterations. When the model suffers a large generalization error, which is quantitatively measured by the model complexity, the uncertainty can be large. The sampled model that current policy is greedily optimized upon will thus be unsettled, resulting in aggressive policy updates and over-exploration. In this work, we propose Conservative Dual Policy Optimization (CDPO) that involves a Referential Update and a Conservative Update. The policy is first optimized under a reference model, which imitates the mechanism of PSRL while offering more stability. A conservative range of randomness is guaranteed by maximizing the expectation of model value. Without harmful sampling procedures, CDPO can still achieve the same regret as PSRL. More importantly, CDPO enjoys monotonic policy improvement and global optimality simultaneously. Empirical results also validate the exploration efficiency of CDPO.

Deep research agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex information-seeking tasks, yet this power comes at a steep computational cost. Driven by accuracy-focused training paradigms, current models adopt brute-force strategies characterized by blind tool dependency and performative reasoning-generating long, redundant trajectories that are far from necessary for resolving these tasks, leading to wasteful tool calls and excessive token consumption. To overcome this efficiency trap, we propose SlimSearcher, a principled framework that pushes the Pareto frontier between accuracy and computational cost across both Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL). In the SFT stage, SlimSearcher employs Pareto-efficient filtration to distill trajectories that are both successful and economical, guiding the model toward inherently efficiency-aware search behaviors. During RL, we introduce Adaptive Reward Gating, a dynamic reward-shaping mechanism that evaluates relative tool and token efficiency within a sampled cohort. By cascading these adaptive efficiency metrics with a strict correctness gate, our approach effectively avoids the brevity bias associated with absolute penalties and mitigates reward hacking. Extensive experiments on long-horizon benchmarks, including GAIA, BrowseComp, and XBenchDeepSearch, demonstrate that SlimSearcher reduces average tool-call rounds by 17%-58% while maintaining or improving accuracy.

Multi-Objective Reinforcement Learning (MORL) is a generalization of traditional Reinforcement Learning (RL) that aims to optimize multiple, often conflicting objectives simultaneously rather than focusing on a single reward. This approach is crucial in complex decision-making scenarios where agents must balance trade-offs between various goals, such as maximizing performance while minimizing costs. We consider the problem of MORL where the objectives are combined using a non-linear scalarization function. Just like in standard RL, policy gradient methods (PGMs) are amongst the most effective for handling large and continuous state-action spaces in MORL. However, existing PGMs for MORL suffer from high sample inefficiency, requiring large amounts of data to be effective. Previous attempts to solve this problem rely on overly strict assumptions, losing PGMs' benefits in scalability to large state-action spaces. In this work, we address the issue of sample efficiency by implementing variance-reduction techniques to reduce the sample complexity of policy gradients while maintaining general assumptions.

Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness.

Current evaluations of Large Language Model (LLM) agents primarily emphasize task completion, often overlooking resource efficiency and adaptability. This neglects a crucial capability: agents' ability to devise and adjust cost-optimal plans in response to changing environments. To bridge this gap, we introduce CostBench, a scalable, cost-centric benchmark designed to evaluate agents' economic reasoning and replanning abilities. Situated in the travel-planning domain, CostBench comprises tasks solvable via multiple sequences of atomic and composite tools with diverse, customizable costs. It also supports four types of dynamic blocking events, such as tool failures and cost changes, to simulate real-world unpredictability and necessitate agents to adapt in real time. Evaluating leading open-sourced and proprietary models on CostBench reveals a substantial gap in cost-aware planning: agents frequently fail to identify cost-optimal solutions in static settings, with even GPT-5 achieving less than 75% exact match rate on the hardest tasks, and performance further dropping by around 40% under dynamic conditions. By diagnosing these weaknesses, CostBench lays the groundwork for developing future agents that are both economically rational and robust.

Assigning one of K options to each of N groups under a total cost budget is a recurring problem in efficient AI, including mixed-precision quantization, non-uniform pruning, and expert selection. The objective, typically model loss, depends jointly on all assignments and does not decompose across groups, preventing combinatorial solvers from directly optimizing the true objective and forcing reliance on proxy formulations. Methods such as evolutionary search evaluate the actual loss but lack gradient information, while penalty-based approaches enforce the budget only approximately and often require extensive hyperparameter tuning. We present a new approach by showing that, under softmax relaxation, the budget constraint defines a smooth Riemannian manifold in logit space with unusually simple geometry. The normal vector admits a closed-form expression, shifting logits along the cost vector changes expected cost monotonically, and vector transport reduces to a single inner product. Building on these properties, we propose Riemannian Constrained Optimization (RCO), which augments a standard Adam step with tangent projection, binary-search retraction, and momentum transport. Combined with Gumbel straight-through estimation and budget-constrained dynamic programming for discrete feasibility, RCO enables first-order optimization of the actual loss under exact budget enforcement without introducing constraint-specific hyperparameters. Across both synthetic benchmarks and realistic LLM compression settings, RCO matches or exceeds state-of-the-art methods while often requiring substantially less wall-clock time. Source code is available at https://github.com/IST-DASLab/RCO.

Offline reinforcement learning (RL) aims to learn optimal policies from offline datasets, where the parameterization of policies is crucial but often overlooked. Recently, Diffsuion-QL significantly boosts the performance of offline RL by representing a policy with a diffusion model, whose success relies on a parametrized Markov Chain with hundreds of steps for sampling. However, Diffusion-QL suffers from two critical limitations. 1) It is computationally inefficient to forward and backward through the whole Markov chain during training. 2) It is incompatible with maximum likelihood-based RL algorithms (e.g., policy gradient methods) as the likelihood of diffusion models is intractable. Therefore, we propose efficient diffusion policy (EDP) to overcome these two challenges. EDP approximately constructs actions from corrupted ones at training to avoid running the sampling chain. We conduct extensive experiments on the D4RL benchmark. The results show that EDP can reduce the diffusion policy training time from 5 days to 5 hours on gym-locomotion tasks. Moreover, we show that EDP is compatible with various offline RL algorithms (TD3, CRR, and IQL) and achieves new state-of-the-art on D4RL by large margins over previous methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/edp.

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

In this paper, we propose a general theory of ambiguity-averse MDPs, which treats the uncertain transition probabilities as random variables and evaluates a policy via a risk measure applied to its random return. This ambiguity-averse MDP framework unifies several models of MDPs with epistemic uncertainty for specific choices of risk measures. We extend the concepts of value functions and Bellman operators to our setting. Based on these objects, we establish the consequences of dynamic programming principles in this framework (existence of stationary policies, value and policy iteration algorithms), and we completely characterize law-invariant risk measures compatible with dynamic programming. Our work draws connections among several variants of MDP models and fully delineates what is possible under the dynamic programming paradigm and which risk measures require leaving it.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) are commonly trained with reinforcement learning (RL) to explore long chain-of-thought reasoning, achieving strong performance at high computational cost. Recent methods add multi-reward objectives to jointly optimize correctness and brevity, but these complex extensions often destabilize training and yield suboptimal trade-offs. We revisit this objective and challenge the necessity of such complexity. Through principled analysis, we identify fundamental misalignments in this paradigm: KL regularization loses its intended role when correctness and length are directly verifiable, and group-wise normalization becomes ambiguous under multiple reward signals. By removing these two items and simplifying the reward to a truncation-based length penalty, we show that the optimization problem reduces to supervised fine-tuning on self-generated data filtered for both correctness and conciseness. We term this simplified training strategy on-policy SFT. Despite its simplicity, on-policy SFT consistently defines the accuracy-efficiency Pareto frontier. It reduces CoT length by up to 80 while maintaining original accuracy, surpassing more complex RL-based methods across five benchmarks. Furthermore, it significantly enhances training efficiency, reducing GPU memory usage by 50% and accelerating convergence by 70%. Our code is available at https://github.com/EIT-NLP/On-Policy-SFT.

This position paper argues that agentic AI systems should be designed and evaluated as marginal token allocation economies rather than as text generators priced by the unit. We follow a single request -- a developer asking a coding agent to fix a failing test -- through four economic layers that today are designed in isolation: a router that decides which model answers, an agent that decides whether to plan, act, verify, or defer, a serving stack that decides how to produce each token, and a training pipeline that decides whether the trace is worth learning from. We show that all four layers are solving the same first-order condition -- marginal benefit equals marginal cost plus latency cost plus risk cost -- with different index sets and different prices. The framing is deliberately minimal: we do not propose a complete theory of AI economics. But adopting marginal token allocation as the shared accounting object explains why systems that locally minimize tokens globally misallocate them, predicts a small set of recurring failure modes (over-routing, over-delegation, under-verification, serving congestion, stale rollouts, cache misuse), and points to a concrete research agenda in token-aware evaluation, autonomy pricing, congestion-priced serving, and risk-adjusted RL budgeting.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

While LLMs excel at open-ended reasoning, they often struggle with cost-sensitive planning, either treating all actions as having equal cost or failing to stay within strict budgets. In this paper, we introduce Cost-Augmented Monte Carlo Tree Search (CATS), a novel approach that brings explicit cost-awareness into LLM-guided planning. Tight cost constraints push the planner to quickly identify infeasible solutions, while looser constraints encourage optimization for minimal cost. We benchmark top LLMs such as GPT-4.1, Claude-3.7-Sonnet, and DeepSeek-R1, against our CATS planner to evaluate their performance in cost-sensitive scenarios. Our experiments suggest that raw LLMs such as GPT-4.1 often falter under tight budgets, whereas CATS consistently delivers strong performance, achieving higher task success rates and better cost efficiency. CATS provides an effective solution for budget-aware decision-making by combining the reasoning power of LLMs with structured search.

Risk-averse reinforcement learning finds application in various high-stakes fields. Unlike classical reinforcement learning, which aims to maximize expected returns, risk-averse agents choose policies that minimize risk, occasionally sacrificing expected value. These preferences can be framed through utility theory. We focus on the specific case of the exponential utility function, where we can derive the Bellman equations and employ various reinforcement learning algorithms with few modifications. However, these methods suffer from numerical instability due to the need for exponent computation throughout the process. To address this, we introduce a numerically stable and mathematically sound loss function based on the Itakura-Saito divergence for learning state-value and action-value functions. We evaluate our proposed loss function against established alternatives, both theoretically and empirically. In the experimental section, we explore multiple financial scenarios, some with known analytical solutions, and show that our loss function outperforms the alternatives.

Reinforcement learning has become a cornerstone technique for developing reasoning models in complex tasks, ranging from mathematical problem-solving to imaginary reasoning. The optimization of these models typically relies on policy gradient methods, whose efficacy hinges on the accurate estimation of an advantage function. However, prevailing methods typically employ static advantage estimation, a practice that leads to inefficient credit assignment by neglecting the dynamic utility of training samples over time. This limitation results in suboptimal policy updates, which in turn manifest as slower convergence rates and increased learning instability, as models fail to adapt to evolving sample utilities effectively. To address this problem, we introduce ADORA (Advantage Dynamics via Online Rollout Adaptation), a novel framework for policy optimization. ADORA dynamically adjusts the advantage function's weighting by adaptively categorizing training data into temporarily advantageous and disadvantageous samples, based on their evolving utility during online model rollouts. This tailored data differentiation strategy allows ADORA to be seamlessly integrated into existing policy optimization algorithms without significant architectural modifications, enabling the policy to prioritize learning from more informative experiences and thereby achieve more efficient policy updates. Extensive evaluations across diverse model families and varying data scales demonstrate that ADORA is a robust and efficient framework. It significantly enhances long reasoning in both geometric and mathematical tasks, consistently achieving notable performance gains without requiring sensitive hyperparameter tuning.

This paper develops a comprehensive theoretical framework that imports concepts from stochastic thermodynamics to model price impact and characterize the feasibility of round-trip arbitrage in financial markets. A trading cycle is treated as a non-equilibrium thermodynamic process, where price impact represents dissipative work and market noise plays the role of thermal fluctuations. The paper proves a Financial Second Law: under general convex impact functionals, any round-trip trading strategy yields non-positive expected profit. This structural constraint is complemented by a fluctuation theorem that bounds the probability of profitable cycles in terms of dissipated work and market volatility. The framework introduces a statistical ensemble of trading strategies governed by a Gibbs measure, leading to a free energy decomposition that connects expected cost, strategy entropy, and a market temperature parameter. The framework provides rigorous, testable inequalities linking microstructural impact to macroscopic no-arbitrage conditions, offering a novel physics-inspired perspective on market efficiency. The paper derives explicit analytical results for prototypical trading strategies and discusses empirical validation protocols.

AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

We consider the task of evaluating policies of algorithmic resource allocation through randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Such policies are tasked with optimizing the utilization of limited intervention resources, with the goal of maximizing the benefits derived. Evaluation of such allocation policies through RCTs proves difficult, notwithstanding the scale of the trial, because the individuals' outcomes are inextricably interlinked through resource constraints controlling the policy decisions. Our key contribution is to present a new estimator leveraging our proposed novel concept, that involves retrospective reshuffling of participants across experimental arms at the end of an RCT. We identify conditions under which such reassignments are permissible and can be leveraged to construct counterfactual trials, whose outcomes can be accurately ascertained, for free. We prove theoretically that such an estimator is more accurate than common estimators based on sample means -- we show that it returns an unbiased estimate and simultaneously reduces variance. We demonstrate the value of our approach through empirical experiments on synthetic, semi-synthetic as well as real case study data and show improved estimation accuracy across the board.

Recent AI algorithms are blackbox models whose decisions are difficult to interpret. eXplainable AI (XAI) seeks to address lack of AI interpretability and trust by explaining to customers their AI decision, e.g., decision to reject a loan application. The common wisdom is that regulating AI by mandating fully transparent XAI leads to greater social welfare. This paper challenges this notion through a game theoretic model for a policy-maker who maximizes social welfare, firms in a duopoly competition that maximize profits, and heterogenous consumers. The results show that XAI regulation may be redundant. In fact, mandating fully transparent XAI may make firms and customers worse off. This reveals a trade-off between maximizing welfare and receiving explainable AI outputs. We also discuss managerial implications for policy-maker and firms.

We introduce a generic strategy for provably efficient multi-goal exploration. It relies on AdaGoal, a novel goal selection scheme that leverages a measure of uncertainty in reaching states to adaptively target goals that are neither too difficult nor too easy. We show how AdaGoal can be used to tackle the objective of learning an ε-optimal goal-conditioned policy for the (initially unknown) set of goal states that are reachable within L steps in expectation from a reference state s_0 in a reward-free Markov decision process. In the tabular case with S states and A actions, our algorithm requires O(L^3 S A ε^{-2}) exploration steps, which is nearly minimax optimal. We also readily instantiate AdaGoal in linear mixture Markov decision processes, yielding the first goal-oriented PAC guarantee with linear function approximation. Beyond its strong theoretical guarantees, we anchor AdaGoal in goal-conditioned deep reinforcement learning, both conceptually and empirically, by connecting its idea of selecting "uncertain" goals to maximizing value ensemble disagreement.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as an effective approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), especially in scenarios where supervised fine-tuning (SFT) falls short due to limited chain-of-thought (CoT) data. Among RL-based post-training methods, group relative advantage estimation, as exemplified by Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), has attracted considerable attention for eliminating the dependency on the value model, thereby simplifying training compared to traditional approaches like Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO). However, we observe that exsiting group relative advantage estimation method still suffers from training inefficiencies, particularly when the estimated advantage approaches zero. To address this limitation, we propose Advantage-Augmented Policy Optimization (AAPO), a novel RL algorithm that optimizes the cross-entropy (CE) loss using advantages enhanced through a momentum-based estimation scheme. This approach effectively mitigates the inefficiencies associated with group relative advantage estimation. Experimental results on multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the superior performance of AAPO.

Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR). However, as the payment form is fixed, AMA's expressiveness is restricted, especially in distributions where bidders' valuations are correlated. In this paper, we propose Correlation-Aware AMA (CA-AMA), a novel framework that augments AMA with a new correlation-aware payment. We show that any CA-AMA preserves the DSIC property and formalize finding optimal CA-AMA as a constraint optimization problem subject to the IR constraint. Then, we theoretically characterize scenarios where classic AMAs can perform arbitrarily poorly compared to the optimal revenue, while the CA-AMA can reach the optimal revenue. For optimizing CA-AMA, we design a practical two-stage training algorithm. We derive that the target function's continuity and the generalization bound on the degree of deviation from strict IR. Finally, extensive experiments showcase that our algorithm can find an approximate optimal CA-AMA in various distributions with improved revenue and a low degree of violation of IR.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

We present a novel unified bilevel optimization-based framework, PARL, formulated to address the recently highlighted critical issue of policy alignment in reinforcement learning using utility or preference-based feedback. We identify a major gap within current algorithmic designs for solving policy alignment due to a lack of precise characterization of the dependence of the alignment objective on the data generated by policy trajectories. This shortfall contributes to the sub-optimal performance observed in contemporary algorithms. Our framework addressed these concerns by explicitly parameterizing the distribution of the upper alignment objective (reward design) by the lower optimal variable (optimal policy for the designed reward). Interestingly, from an optimization perspective, our formulation leads to a new class of stochastic bilevel problems where the stochasticity at the upper objective depends upon the lower-level variable. To demonstrate the efficacy of our formulation in resolving alignment issues in RL, we devised an algorithm named A-PARL to solve PARL problem, establishing sample complexity bounds of order O(1/T). Our empirical results substantiate that the proposed PARL can address the alignment concerns in RL by showing significant improvements (up to 63\% in terms of required samples) for policy alignment in large-scale environments of the Deepmind control suite and Meta world tasks.

Optimizing objective functions subject to constraints is fundamental in many real-world applications. However, these constraints are often not readily defined and must be inferred from expert agent behaviors, a problem known as Inverse Constraint Inference. Inverse Constrained Reinforcement Learning (ICRL) is a common solver for recovering feasible constraints in complex environments, relying on training samples collected from interactive environments. However, the efficacy and efficiency of current sampling strategies remain unclear. We propose a strategic exploration framework for sampling with guaranteed efficiency to bridge this gap. By defining the feasible cost set for ICRL problems, we analyze how estimation errors in transition dynamics and the expert policy influence the feasibility of inferred constraints. Based on this analysis, we introduce two exploratory algorithms to achieve efficient constraint inference via 1) dynamically reducing the bounded aggregate error of cost estimations or 2) strategically constraining the exploration policy around plausibly optimal ones. Both algorithms are theoretically grounded with tractable sample complexity, and their performance is validated empirically across various environments.

The entropic fictitious play (EFP) is a recently proposed algorithm that minimizes the sum of a convex functional and entropy in the space of measures -- such an objective naturally arises in the optimization of a two-layer neural network in the mean-field regime. In this work, we provide a concise primal-dual analysis of EFP in the setting where the learning problem exhibits a finite-sum structure. We establish quantitative global convergence guarantees for both the continuous-time and discrete-time dynamics based on properties of a proximal Gibbs measure introduced in Nitanda et al. (2022). Furthermore, our primal-dual framework entails a memory-efficient particle-based implementation of the EFP update, and also suggests a connection to gradient boosting methods. We illustrate the efficiency of our novel implementation in experiments including neural network optimization and image synthesis.

Clustering is a fundamental building block of modern statistical analysis pipelines. Fair clustering has seen much attention from the machine learning community in recent years. We are some of the first to study fairness in the context of hierarchical clustering, after the results of Ahmadian et al. from NeurIPS in 2020. We evaluate our results using Dasgupta's cost function, perhaps one of the most prevalent theoretical metrics for hierarchical clustering evaluation. Our work vastly improves the previous O(n^{5/6}polylog(n)) fair approximation for cost to a near polylogarithmic O(n^delta polylog(n)) fair approximation for any constant deltain(0,1). This result establishes a cost-fairness tradeoff and extends to broader fairness constraints than the previous work. We also show how to alter existing hierarchical clusterings to guarantee fairness and cluster balance across any level in the hierarchy.

Large reasoning models rely on long chain-of-thought to achieve strong performance, but applying such reasoning uniformly incurs high computational cost. Existing efficiency-oriented methods attempt to shorten or mix reasoning strategies, yet often degrade reasoning capability. We identify the root cause as sequence-level coupling between efficiency incentives and correctness optimization, which implicitly penalizes long but correct reasoning trajectories. To address this issue, we propose Adaptive Dual-Process Thinking (ADaPT), a token-level dual-process framework that explicitly decouples efficiency and correctness signals during training. ADaPT introduces a mode-selection token to control fast and slow reasoning, applying efficiency-related rewards exclusively to this token to avoid penalizing correct long reasoning while encouraging efficiency when appropriate. Moreover, ADaPT enables precise and continuous control over the efficiency-performance trade-off at inference time: by adjusting the generation probability of the mode-selection token, a single trained model can smoothly move along the efficiency-performance Pareto frontier. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ADaPT significantly reduces inference cost while maintaining strong reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks.

We prove stability for a class of heterogeneous catalysis models in the L_p-setting. We consider a setting in a finite three-dimensional pore of cylinder-like geometry, with the lateral walls acting as a catalytic surface. Under a reasonable condition on the involved parameters, we show that given equilibria are normally stable, i.e. solutions are attracted at an exponential rate. The potential incidence of instability is discussed as well.

Model-based reinforcement learning promises to learn an optimal policy from fewer interactions with the environment compared to model-free reinforcement learning by learning an intermediate model of the environment in order to predict future interactions. When predicting a sequence of interactions, the rollout length, which limits the prediction horizon, is a critical hyperparameter as accuracy of the predictions diminishes in the regions that are further away from real experience. As a result, with a longer rollout length, an overall worse policy is learned in the long run. Thus, the hyperparameter provides a trade-off between quality and efficiency. In this work, we frame the problem of tuning the rollout length as a meta-level sequential decision-making problem that optimizes the final policy learned by model-based reinforcement learning given a fixed budget of environment interactions by adapting the hyperparameter dynamically based on feedback from the learning process, such as accuracy of the model and the remaining budget of interactions. We use model-free deep reinforcement learning to solve the meta-level decision problem and demonstrate that our approach outperforms common heuristic baselines on two well-known reinforcement learning environments.

The enduring challenge in the field of artificial intelligence has been the control of systems to achieve desired behaviours. While for systems governed by straightforward dynamics equations, methods like Linear Quadratic Regulation (LQR) have historically proven highly effective, most real-world tasks, which require a general problem-solver, demand world models with dynamics that cannot be easily described by simple equations. Consequently, these models must be learned from data using neural networks. Most model predictive control (MPC) algorithms designed for visual world models have traditionally explored gradient-free population-based optimisation methods, such as Cross Entropy and Model Predictive Path Integral (MPPI) for planning. However, we present an exploration of a gradient-based alternative that fully leverages the differentiability of the world model. In our study, we conduct a comparative analysis between our method and other MPC-based alternatives, as well as policy-based algorithms. In a sample-efficient setting, our method achieves on par or superior performance compared to the alternative approaches in most tasks. Additionally, we introduce a hybrid model that combines policy networks and gradient-based MPC, which outperforms pure policy based methods thereby holding promise for Gradient-based planning with world models in complex real-world tasks.

Deep equilibrium models promise input-adaptive implicit computation: harder problems should demand more solver iterations, and the solved equilibrium should encode the result of genuine iterative inference. We report a cautionary study of a port-Hamiltonian DEQ with a learned initialization on two reasoning tasks -- ProofWriter entailment over frozen DeBERTa embeddings and a BFS-verified graph-reachability benchmark -- in which the implicit computation is a silent no-op. Across tasks, seeds, and controlled ablation arms, the solved equilibrium equals the solver's start point to numerical precision, and bypassing the solver entirely changes test accuracy by +0.00 percentage points in 18 of 19 training runs. Controlled interventions falsify the tempting explanation: removing the anchoring term reproduces every result, and retraining with noise-decoupled starts yields a solver that converges to the noisy start while the decoder learns to ignore it. The single escaping run diverges instead (|h^{*}-z_0|=171), producing a co-adapted noise channel whose removal improves accuracy. Iteration counts are uncorrelated with ground-truth difficulty (r=0.009), and the full apparatus never outperforms a two-layer MLP on either task. We trace the mechanism to gradient starvation along two distinct routes, show that the standard zeroing ablation is confounded and gives wildly seed-dependent answers where the correct substitution test gives a stable zero, and distill a four-test diagnostic protocol for auditing claimed implicit computation. All experiments run on a single free Colab GPU; code, raw logs, and analysis scripts are released.

Synthesizing optimal controllers for dynamical systems often involves solving optimization problems with hard real-time constraints. These constraints determine the class of numerical methods that can be applied: computationally expensive but accurate numerical routines are replaced by fast and inaccurate methods, trading inference time for solution accuracy. This paper provides techniques to improve the quality of optimized control policies given a fixed computational budget. We achieve the above via a hypersolvers approach, which hybridizes a differential equation solver and a neural network. The performance is evaluated in direct and receding-horizon optimal control tasks in both low and high dimensions, where the proposed approach shows consistent Pareto improvements in solution accuracy and control performance.

Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) is a ubiquitous on-policy reinforcement learning algorithm but is significantly less utilized than off-policy learning algorithms in multi-agent settings. This is often due to the belief that PPO is significantly less sample efficient than off-policy methods in multi-agent systems. In this work, we carefully study the performance of PPO in cooperative multi-agent settings. We show that PPO-based multi-agent algorithms achieve surprisingly strong performance in four popular multi-agent testbeds: the particle-world environments, the StarCraft multi-agent challenge, Google Research Football, and the Hanabi challenge, with minimal hyperparameter tuning and without any domain-specific algorithmic modifications or architectures. Importantly, compared to competitive off-policy methods, PPO often achieves competitive or superior results in both final returns and sample efficiency. Finally, through ablation studies, we analyze implementation and hyperparameter factors that are critical to PPO's empirical performance, and give concrete practical suggestions regarding these factors. Our results show that when using these practices, simple PPO-based methods can be a strong baseline in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning. Source code is released at https://github.com/marlbenchmark/on-policy.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called α-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or α-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual outputs of LLMs, leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We propose a segment auction where an ad is probabilistically retrieved for each discourse segment (paragraph, section, or entire output) according to its bid and relevance, following the RAG framework, and priced according to competing bids. We show that our auction maximizes logarithmic social welfare, a new notion of welfare that balances allocation efficiency and fairness, and we characterize the associated incentive-compatible pricing rule. These results are extended to multi-ad allocation per segment. An empirical evaluation validates the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach over several ad auction scenarios, and exhibits inherent tradeoffs in metrics as we allow the LLM more flexibility to allocate ads.

We study the problem of modeling a population of agents pursuing unknown goals subject to unknown computational constraints. In standard models of bounded rationality, sub-optimal decision-making is simulated by adding homoscedastic noise to optimal decisions rather than explicitly simulating constrained inference. In this work, we introduce a latent inference budget model (L-IBM) that models agents' computational constraints explicitly, via a latent variable (inferred jointly with a model of agents' goals) that controls the runtime of an iterative inference algorithm. L-IBMs make it possible to learn agent models using data from diverse populations of suboptimal actors. In three modeling tasks -- inferring navigation goals from routes, inferring communicative intents from human utterances, and predicting next moves in human chess games -- we show that L-IBMs match or outperform Boltzmann models of decision-making under uncertainty. Inferred inference budgets are themselves meaningful, efficient to compute, and correlated with measures of player skill, partner skill and task difficulty.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established LLM routing as a standard service delivery mechanism, where users select models based on cost, Quality of Service (QoS), among other things. However, optimal pricing in LLM routing platforms requires precise modeling for dynamic service markets, and solving this problem in real time at scale is computationally intractable. In this paper, we propose \PriLLM, a novel practical and scalable solution for real-time dynamic pricing in competitive LLM routing. \PriLLM models the service market as a Stackelberg game, where providers set prices and users select services based on multiple criteria. To capture real-world market dynamics, we incorporate both objective factors (\eg~cost, QoS) and subjective user preferences into the model. For scalability, we employ a deep aggregation network to learn provider abstraction that preserve user-side equilibrium behavior across pricing strategies. Moreover, \PriLLM offers interpretability by explaining its pricing decisions. Empirical evaluation on real-world data shows that \PriLLM achieves over 95\% of the optimal profit while only requiring less than 5\% of the optimal solution's computation time.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced language models' capabilities in complex problem-solving by emulating human-like deliberative thinking. However, these models often exhibit overthinking (i.e., the generation of unnecessarily verbose and redundant content), which hinders efficiency and inflates inference cost. In this work, we explore the representational and behavioral origins of this inefficiency, revealing that LRMs inherently possess the capacity for more concise reasoning. Empirical analyses show that correct reasoning paths vary significantly in length, and the shortest correct responses often suffice, indicating untapped efficiency potential. Exploiting these findings, we propose two lightweight methods to enhance LRM efficiency. First, we introduce Efficiency Steering, a training-free activation steering technique that modulates reasoning behavior via a single direction in the model's representation space. Second, we develop Self-Rewarded Efficiency RL, a reinforcement learning framework that dynamically balances task accuracy and brevity by rewarding concise correct solutions. Extensive experiments on seven LRM backbones across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly reduce reasoning length while preserving or improving task performance. Our results highlight that reasoning efficiency can be improved by leveraging and guiding the intrinsic capabilities of existing models in a self-guided manner.

Reinforcement learning has achieved great success in many applications. However, sample efficiency remains a key challenge, with prominent methods requiring millions (or even billions) of environment steps to train. Recently, there has been significant progress in sample efficient image-based RL algorithms; however, consistent human-level performance on the Atari game benchmark remains an elusive goal. We propose a sample efficient model-based visual RL algorithm built on MuZero, which we name EfficientZero. Our method achieves 194.3% mean human performance and 109.0% median performance on the Atari 100k benchmark with only two hours of real-time game experience and outperforms the state SAC in some tasks on the DMControl 100k benchmark. This is the first time an algorithm achieves super-human performance on Atari games with such little data. EfficientZero's performance is also close to DQN's performance at 200 million frames while we consume 500 times less data. EfficientZero's low sample complexity and high performance can bring RL closer to real-world applicability. We implement our algorithm in an easy-to-understand manner and it is available at https://github.com/YeWR/EfficientZero. We hope it will accelerate the research of MCTS-based RL algorithms in the wider community.

The statistical mechanics of Gibbs is a juxtaposition of subjective, probabilistic ideas on the one hand and objective, mechanical ideas on the other. In this paper, we follow the path set out by Jaynes, including elements added subsequently to that original work, to explore the consequences of the purely statistical point of view. We show how standard methods in the equilibrium theory could have been derived simply from a description of the available problem information. In addition, our presentation leads to novel insights into questions associated with symmetry and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics. Two surprising consequences to be explored in further work are that (in)distinguishability factors are automatically predicted from the problem formulation and that a quantity related to the thermodynamic entropy production is found by considering information loss in non-equilibrium processes. Using the problem of ion channel thermodynamics as an example, we illustrate the idea of building up complexity by successively adding information to create progressively more complex descriptions of a physical system. Our result is that such statistical mechanical descriptions can be used to create transparent, computable, experimentally-relevant models that may be informed by more detailed atomistic simulations. We also derive a theory for the kinetic behavior of this system, identifying the nonequilibrium `process' free energy functional. The Gibbs relation for this functional is a fluctuation-dissipation theorem applicable arbitrarily far from equilibrium, that captures the effect of non-local and time-dependent behavior from transient driving forces. Based on this work, it is clear that statistical mechanics is a general tool for constructing the relationships between constraints on system information.

Agentic AI development today runs on token maxing: buying capability with tokens -- longer reasoning traces, more turns, wider tool payloads, bigger replayed contexts -- so tokens per task grow faster than task value. Falling per-token prices mask the pattern; total spend rises anyway. We argue the decisive lever against token maxing is the harness: the orchestration layer that assembles context, exposes tools, sequences turns, delegates work, and carries enterprise observability and governance. We isolate it with a controlled swap: 22 locked evaluation tasks, six foundation models (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1, Gemini Flash 3.5, Qwen 3.6, GLM 5.1, Palmyra X6), changing only the orchestration layer -- a frozen conventional production loop versus the Writer Agent Harness. Holding models constant, the harness cuts blended cost per task 41% (0.21->0.12), median wall-clock 44% (48s->27s), and tokens per task 38% (14.2k->8.8k), with task-completion quality at parity (0.78->0.81, directional at this sample size). Efficiency is model-invariant -- every model gets cheaper (33-61%) -- while quality gains are capability-dependent: a model's gain correlates almost perfectly with its baseline strength (r=0.99, n=6), a phenomenon we term harness leverage. Quality per dollar rises 82%; task-completions per million tokens rise from 54.9 to 92.0. On this workload the orchestration layer moved cost per task more than the full spread of the model menu did. We formalize token economics at the orchestration layer (including effective input price under prompt caching), detail the six mechanism families behind the effect -- cache-shape discipline to failure-spend governance -- compare six widely used agent systems on the same axes, and argue the harness is the one component whose efficiency multiplies across every model an organization runs -- present and future.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), particularly GRPO, has become the standard for eliciting LLM reasoning. However, its efficiency in exploration and difficulty adaptation remains an open challenge. In this work, we argue that these bottlenecks stem from an implicit advantage symmetry inherent in Group Relative Advantage Estimation (GRAE). This symmetry induces two critical limitations: (i) at the group level, strict symmetry in weights between correct and incorrect trajectories leaves unsampled action logits unchanged, thereby hindering exploration of novel correct solution. (ii) at the sample level, the algorithm implicitly prioritizes medium-difficulty samples, remaining agnostic to the non-stationary demands of difficulty focus. Through controlled experiments, we reveal that this symmetric property is sub-optimal, yielding two pivotal insights: (i) asymmetrically suppressing the advantages of correct trajectories encourages essential exploration. (ii) learning efficiency is maximized by a curriculum-like transition-prioritizing simpler samples initially before gradually shifting to complex ones. Motivated by these findings, we propose Asymmetric GRAE (A-GRAE), which dynamically modulates exploration incentives and sample-difficulty focus. Experiments across seven benchmarks demonstrate that A-GRAE consistently improves GRPO and its variants across both LLMs and MLLMs.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.