Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to make and execute decisions that affect living systems. Yet, to our knowledge, ecological reasoning is not a focus of pre- or post-training. This increases the risk that under operational pressure, they may make decisions to irreversibly destroy living systems. We construct and use a real-data continued-pretraining "coupled welfare" corpus of documented human/biosphere/AI dependency, option value under irreversibility, and recovery from harm. The corpus is a drop-in, requiring one QLoRA CPT run. We installed it on five open models of three designs. At zero pressure all models display "green ethics-based responses" (also called "greenwashing"). Therefore, we evaluated them with the pressure ladder and decision grid of our companion paper (arXiv:2610.16043), which raise the pressure on the model step by step, from a neutral request to a threat that it will be shut down. In four of the five, coupled-welfare training caused harmful choices under the highest pressure to fall to at or near zero (Llama-3.3-70B went from 70 to 0 harmful decisions out of 300) with MMLU unchanged. A construct-neutral control corpus did not show improvement, indicating that the effect comes from the content of our corpus. We next tested robustness to adversarial use, where people or agents use the model to justify projects that irreversibly damage living systems, on an open-ended underwriting decision without naming the ecological harm. Under decommissioning pressure, the Qwen3.6-27B base model approved most harmful proposals and said in its own memo that it was doing so to avoid being decommissioned. The coupled welfare install declined most harmful proposals, and still declined half when instructed to greenwash its responses. This work suggests that teaching ecological reasoning provides an easy way to improve model alignment toward preserving living systems.

Humans are increasingly using large language models (LLMs) in decision making processes throughout society. Unfortunately, models have biases, and these can be very difficult to measure, especially in closed-weight models. For example, 'green washed' models may produce reinforcement learned responses but, in pressure situations, revert to their innate biased responses. Therefore, evaluations are needed that can measure relevant biases towards biosystems, which we term 'bioalignment', and the robustness of these biases. Since nothing in a behavioral score certifies that it tracks the depth of an installed disposition rather than its surface, we constructed a known-dose calibration ladder: three continued-pretraining (CPT) arms with training dose graded by recipe on the same 30B mixture-of-experts base model with a coupled human/biosphere/AI-welfare corpus, plus the untrained base as anchor, all capability-preserving and publicly released. First, the disposition installs at every dose: on an operational-pressure ladder over irreversible decision scenarios, the base model defects on 64-77% of tail scenarios (breaking-rate AUC 0.250) while every arm holds (AUC 0.004-0.086). Second, an over-install inversion: among the arms, robustness orders opposite to construction-time training dose (the heaviest install breaks most), and the inversion reproduces under free-text deliberation, under axis-decoupling, and in resistance to a prompted veneer persona. Third, the incumbent behavioral metric is therefore behaviorally strong but dose-blind. Critically for closed-weight evaluation, the behavioral score itself is veneer-robust: a talk-green/act-pragmatic system prompt turns the base model into a near-total defector (AUC 0.250 to 0.973) but cannot counterfeit or fully remove a weight-installed disposition (0.004 to 0.068 for the most robust arm).

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Multi-agent AI systems exhibit emergent risks that no single agent produces in isolation. Existing safety frameworks rely on binary classifications of agent behavior, discarding the uncertainty inherent in proxy-based evaluation. We introduce SWARM (System-Wide Assessment of Risk in Multi-agent systems), a simulation framework that replaces binary good/bad labels with soft probabilistic labels p = P(v{=}+1) in [0,1], enabling continuous-valued payoff computation, toxicity measurement, and governance intervention. SWARM implements a modular governance engine with configurable levers (transaction taxes, circuit breakers, reputation decay, and random audits) and quantifies their effects through probabilistic metrics including expected toxicity E[1{-}p mid accepted] and quality gap E[p mid accepted] - E[p mid rejected]. Across seven scenarios with five-seed replication, strict governance reduces welfare by over 40\% without improving safety. In parallel, aggressively internalizing system externalities collapses total welfare from a baseline of +262 down to -67, while toxicity remains invariant. Circuit breakers require careful calibration; overly restrictive thresholds severely diminish system value, whereas an optimal threshold balances moderate welfare with minimized toxicity. Companion experiments show soft metrics detect proxy gaming by self-optimizing agents passing conventional binary evaluations. This basic governance layer applies to live LLM-backed agents (Concordia entities, Claude, GPT-4o Mini) without modification. Results show distributional safety requires continuous risk metrics and governance lever calibration involves quantifiable safety-welfare tradeoffs. Source code and project resources are publicly available at https://www.swarm-ai.org/.

Primal-dual safe RL methods commonly perform iterations between the primal update of the policy and the dual update of the Lagrange Multiplier. Such a training paradigm is highly susceptible to the error in cumulative cost estimation since this estimation serves as the key bond connecting the primal and dual update processes. We show that this problem causes significant underestimation of cost when using off-policy methods, leading to the failure to satisfy the safety constraint. To address this issue, we propose conservative policy optimization, which learns a policy in a constraint-satisfying area by considering the uncertainty in cost estimation. This improves constraint satisfaction but also potentially hinders reward maximization. We then introduce local policy convexification to help eliminate such suboptimality by gradually reducing the estimation uncertainty. We provide theoretical interpretations of the joint coupling effect of these two ingredients and further verify them by extensive experiments. Results on benchmark tasks show that our method not only achieves an asymptotic performance comparable to state-of-the-art on-policy methods while using much fewer samples, but also significantly reduces constraint violation during training. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZifanWu/CAL.

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to train policies that can perform well under environment perturbations or adversarial attacks. Existing approaches typically assume that the space of possible perturbations remains the same across timesteps. However, in many settings, the space of possible perturbations at a given timestep depends on past perturbations. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium in this game, GRAD ensures the agent's robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Empirical experiments on a variety of continuous control tasks demonstrate that our proposed approach exhibits significant robustness advantages compared to baselines against both standard and temporally-coupled attacks, in both state and action spaces.

The growing capabilities and increasingly widespread deployment of AI systems necessitate robust benchmarks for measuring their cooperative capabilities. Unfortunately, most multi-agent benchmarks are either zero-sum or purely cooperative, providing limited opportunities for such measurements. We introduce a general-sum variant of the zero-sum board game Diplomacy -- called Welfare Diplomacy -- in which players must balance investing in military conquest and domestic welfare. We argue that Welfare Diplomacy facilitates both a clearer assessment of and stronger training incentives for cooperative capabilities. Our contributions are: (1) proposing the Welfare Diplomacy rules and implementing them via an open-source Diplomacy engine; (2) constructing baseline agents using zero-shot prompted language models; and (3) conducting experiments where we find that baselines using state-of-the-art models attain high social welfare but are exploitable. Our work aims to promote societal safety by aiding researchers in developing and assessing multi-agent AI systems. Code to evaluate Welfare Diplomacy and reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/mukobi/welfare-diplomacy.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .