Daily Papers

Test-time scaling has emerged as a promising approach for improving code generation by exploring large solution spaces at inference time. However, existing methods often rely on public test cases that are unavailable in practice, or require extensive LLM inference for candidate selection, leading to significant token consumption and time overhead. We present DiffCodeGen, a novel test-time scaling method for code generation based on coverage-guided differential analysis. DiffCodeGen generates diverse code candidates using various sampling and prompting strategies, then applies coverage-guided fuzzing to synthesize inputs without requiring any existing tests or large language models. By executing all candidates on these inputs, DiffCodeGen captures their dynamic behavior and clusters candidates based on behavioral similarity. DiffCodeGen selects the medoid of the largest cluster as the final output. Unlike prior test-time scaling methods that invoke additional LLM inference for candidate selection, DiffCodeGen performs selection without any extra model calls, incurring little to no additional token consumption. DiffCodeGen is fully asynchronous, naturally suited to the current trend of agentic coding, and is thus efficient and highly scalable. We evaluate DiffCodeGen across 4 large language models, demonstrating consistent improvements over baselines. Compared to state-of-the-art test-time scaling methods, DiffCodeGen achieves competitive or superior performance while using only a fraction of time and tokens. DiffCodeGen is model-agnostic and can be combined with reasoning models to further boost performance.

In the past decade, Deep Learning (DL) systems have been widely deployed in various domains to facilitate our daily life. Meanwhile, it is extremely challenging to ensure the correctness of DL systems (e.g., due to their intrinsic nondeterminism), and bugs in DL systems can cause serious consequences and may even threaten human lives. In the literature, researchers have explored various techniques to test, analyze, and verify DL models, since their quality directly affects the corresponding system behaviors. Recently, researchers have also proposed novel techniques for testing the underlying operator-level DL libraries (such as TensorFlow and PyTorch), which provide general binary implementations for each high-level DL operator for running various DL models on many platforms. However, there is still limited work targeting the reliability of the emerging tensor compilers, which aim to directly compile high-level tensor computation graphs into high-performance binaries for better efficiency, portability, and scalability. In this paper, we target the important problem of tensor compiler testing, and have proposed Tzer, a practical fuzzing technique for the widely used TVM tensor compiler. Tzer focuses on mutating the low-level Intermediate Representation (IR) for TVM due to the limited mutation space for the high-level IR. More specifically, Tzer leverages both general-purpose and tensor-compiler-specific mutators guided by coverage feedback for evolutionary IR mutation; furthermore, Tzer also performs pass mutation in tandem with IR mutation for more effective fuzzing. Our results show that Tzer substantially outperforms existing fuzzing techniques on tensor compiler testing, with 75% higher coverage and 50% more valuable tests than the 2nd-best technique. To date, Tzer has detected 49 previously unknown bugs for TVM, with 37 bugs confirmed and 25 bugs fixed (PR merged).

Context: Exhaustive fuzzing of modern JavaScript engines is infeasible due to the vast number of program states and execution paths. Coverage-guided fuzzers waste effort on low-risk inputs, often ignoring vulnerability-triggering ones that do not increase coverage. Existing heuristics proposed to mitigate this require expert effort, are brittle, and hard to adapt. Objective: We propose a data-centric, LLM-boosted alternative that learns from historical vulnerabilities to automatically identify minimal static (code) and dynamic (runtime) features for detecting high-risk inputs. Method: Guided by historical V8 bugs, iterative prompting generated 115 static and 49 dynamic features, with the latter requiring only five trace flags, minimizing instrumentation cost. After feature selection, 41 features remained to train an XGBoost model to predict high-risk inputs during fuzzing. Results: Combining static and dynamic features yields over 85% precision and under 1% false alarms. Only 25% of these features are needed for comparable performance, showing that most of the search space is irrelevant. Conclusion: This work introduces feature-guided fuzzing, an automated data-driven approach that replaces coverage with data-directed inference, guiding fuzzers toward high-risk states for faster, targeted, and reproducible vulnerability discovery. To support open science, all scripts and data are available at https://github.com/KKGanguly/DataCentricFuzzJS .

Fuzz testing, or "fuzzing," refers to a widely deployed class of techniques for testing programs by generating a set of inputs for the express purpose of finding bugs and identifying security flaws. Grey-box fuzzing, the most popular fuzzing strategy, combines light program instrumentation with a data driven process to generate new program inputs. In this work, we present a machine learning approach that builds on AFL, the preeminent grey-box fuzzer, by adaptively learning a probability distribution over its mutation operators on a program-specific basis. These operators, which are selected uniformly at random in AFL and mutational fuzzers in general, dictate how new inputs are generated, a core part of the fuzzer's efficacy. Our main contributions are two-fold: First, we show that a sampling distribution over mutation operators estimated from training programs can significantly improve performance of AFL. Second, we introduce a Thompson Sampling, bandit-based optimization approach that fine-tunes the mutator distribution adaptively, during the course of fuzzing an individual program. A set of experiments across complex programs demonstrates that tuning the mutational operator distribution generates sets of inputs that yield significantly higher code coverage and finds more crashes faster and more reliably than both baseline versions of AFL as well as other AFL-based learning approaches.

Fuzzing is effective for vulnerability discovery but struggles with complex targets such as compilers, interpreters, and database engines, which accept textual input that must satisfy intricate syntactic and semantic constraints. Although language models (LMs) have attracted interest for this task due to their vast latent knowledge and reasoning potential, their practical adoption has been limited. The major challenges stem from insufficient exploration of deep program logic among real-world codebases, and the high cost of leveraging larger models. To overcome these challenges, we propose R1-Fuzz, the first framework that leverages reinforcement learning (RL) to specialize cost-efficient LMs and integrate them for complex textual fuzzing input generation. R1-Fuzz introduces two key designs: coverage-slicing-based question construction and a distance-based reward calculation. Through RL-based post-training of a model with our constructed dataset, R1-Fuzz designs a fuzzing workflow that tightly integrates LMs to reason deep program semantics during fuzzing. Evaluations on diverse real-world targets show that our design enables a small model, named R1-Fuzz-7B, to rival or even outperform much larger models in real-world fuzzing. Notably, R1-Fuzz achieves up to 75\% higher coverage than state-of-the-art fuzzers and discovers 29 previously unknown vulnerabilities, demonstrating its practicality.

Fuzz testing is a fundamental technique employed to identify vulnerabilities within software systems. However, the process can be protracted and resource-intensive, especially when confronted with extensive codebases. In this work, I present FuzzDistill, an approach that harnesses compile-time data and machine learning to refine fuzzing targets. By analyzing compile-time information, such as function call graphs' features, loop information, and memory operations, FuzzDistill identifies high-priority areas of the codebase that are more probable to contain vulnerabilities. I demonstrate the efficacy of my approach through experiments conducted on real-world software, demonstrating substantial reductions in testing time.

Fuzzing is an important dynamic program analysis technique designed for finding vulnerabilities in complex software. Fuzzing involves presenting a target program with crafted malicious input to cause crashes, buffer overflows, memory errors, and exceptions. Crafting malicious inputs in an efficient manner is a difficult open problem and the best approaches often apply uniform random mutations to pre-existing valid inputs. In this work, we propose to adopt fine-tuned large language models (FuzzCoder) to learn patterns in the input files from successful attacks to guide future fuzzing explorations. Specifically, we develop a framework to leverage the code LLMs to guide the mutation process of inputs in fuzzing. The mutation process is formulated as the sequence-to-sequence modeling, where LLM receives a sequence of bytes and then outputs the mutated byte sequence. FuzzCoder is fine-tuned on the created instruction dataset (Fuzz-Instruct), where the successful fuzzing history is collected from the heuristic fuzzing tool. FuzzCoder can predict mutation locations and strategies locations in input files to trigger abnormal behaviors of the program. Experimental results show that FuzzCoder based on AFL (American Fuzzy Lop) gain significant improvements in terms of effective proportion of mutation (EPM) and number of crashes (NC) for various input formats including ELF, JPG, MP3, and XML.

Grey-box fuzzers such as American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) are popular tools for finding bugs and potential vulnerabilities in programs. While these fuzzers have been able to find vulnerabilities in many widely used programs, they are not efficient; of the millions of inputs executed by AFL in a typical fuzzing run, only a handful discover unseen behavior or trigger a crash. The remaining inputs are redundant, exhibiting behavior that has already been observed. Here, we present an approach to increase the efficiency of fuzzers like AFL by applying machine learning to directly model how programs behave. We learn a forward prediction model that maps program inputs to execution traces, training on the thousands of inputs collected during standard fuzzing. This learned model guides exploration by focusing on fuzzing inputs on which our model is the most uncertain (measured via the entropy of the predicted execution trace distribution). By focusing on executing inputs our learned model is unsure about, and ignoring any input whose behavior our model is certain about, we show that we can significantly limit wasteful execution. Through testing our approach on a set of binaries released as part of the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge, we show that our approach is able to find a set of inputs that result in more code coverage and discovered crashes than baseline fuzzers with significantly fewer executions.

Fuzzing has achieved tremendous success in discovering bugs and vulnerabilities in various software systems. Systems under test (SUTs) that take in programming or formal language as inputs, e.g., compilers, runtime engines, constraint solvers, and software libraries with accessible APIs, are especially important as they are fundamental building blocks of software development. However, existing fuzzers for such systems often target a specific language, and thus cannot be easily applied to other languages or even other versions of the same language. Moreover, the inputs generated by existing fuzzers are often limited to specific features of the input language, and thus can hardly reveal bugs related to other or new features. This paper presents Fuzz4All, the first fuzzer that is universal in the sense that it can target many different input languages and many different features of these languages. The key idea behind Fuzz4All is to leverage large language models (LLMs) as an input generation and mutation engine, which enables the approach to produce diverse and realistic inputs for any practically relevant language. To realize this potential, we present a novel autoprompting technique, which creates LLM prompts that are wellsuited for fuzzing, and a novel LLM-powered fuzzing loop, which iteratively updates the prompt to create new fuzzing inputs. We evaluate Fuzz4All on nine systems under test that take in six different languages (C, C++, Go, SMT2, Java and Python) as inputs. The evaluation shows, across all six languages, that universal fuzzing achieves higher coverage than existing, language-specific fuzzers. Furthermore, Fuzz4All has identified 76 bugs in widely used systems, such as GCC, Clang, Z3, CVC5, OpenJDK, and the Qiskit quantum computing platform, with 47 bugs already confirmed by developers as previously unknown.

Fuzzing is the process of finding security vulnerabilities in input-processing code by repeatedly testing the code with modified inputs. In this paper, we formalize fuzzing as a reinforcement learning problem using the concept of Markov decision processes. This in turn allows us to apply state-of-the-art deep Q-learning algorithms that optimize rewards, which we define from runtime properties of the program under test. By observing the rewards caused by mutating with a specific set of actions performed on an initial program input, the fuzzing agent learns a policy that can next generate new higher-reward inputs. We have implemented this new approach, and preliminary empirical evidence shows that reinforcement fuzzing can outperform baseline random fuzzing.

The strong planning and reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have fostered the development of agent-based systems capable of leveraging external tools and interacting with increasingly complex environments. However, these powerful features also introduce a critical security risk: indirect prompt injection, a sophisticated attack vector that compromises the core of these agents, the LLM, by manipulating contextual information rather than direct user prompts. In this work, we propose a generic black-box fuzzing framework, AgentVigil, designed to automatically discover and exploit indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities across diverse LLM agents. Our approach starts by constructing a high-quality initial seed corpus, then employs a seed selection algorithm based on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to iteratively refine inputs, thereby maximizing the likelihood of uncovering agent weaknesses. We evaluate AgentVigil on two public benchmarks, AgentDojo and VWA-adv, where it achieves 71% and 70% success rates against agents based on o3-mini and GPT-4o, respectively, nearly doubling the performance of baseline attacks. Moreover, AgentVigil exhibits strong transferability across unseen tasks and internal LLMs, as well as promising results against defenses. Beyond benchmark evaluations, we apply our attacks in real-world environments, successfully misleading agents to navigate to arbitrary URLs, including malicious sites.

As autonomous driving systems (ADS) advance towards higher levels of autonomy, orchestrating their safety verification becomes increasingly intricate. This paper unveils ScenarioFuzz, a pioneering scenario-based fuzz testing methodology. Designed like a choreographer who understands the past performances, it uncovers vulnerabilities in ADS without the crutch of predefined scenarios. Leveraging map road networks, such as OPENDRIVE, we extract essential data to form a foundational scenario seed corpus. This corpus, enriched with pertinent information, provides the necessary boundaries for fuzz testing in the absence of starting scenarios. Our approach integrates specialized mutators and mutation techniques, combined with a graph neural network model, to predict and filter out high-risk scenario seeds, optimizing the fuzzing process using historical test data. Compared to other methods, our approach reduces the time cost by an average of 60.3%, while the number of error scenarios discovered per unit of time increases by 103%. Furthermore, we propose a self-supervised collision trajectory clustering method, which aids in identifying and summarizing 54 high-risk scenario categories prone to inducing ADS faults. Our experiments have successfully uncovered 58 bugs across six tested systems, emphasizing the critical safety concerns of ADS.

Jailbreaking large-language models (LLMs) involves testing their robustness against adversarial prompts and evaluating their ability to withstand prompt attacks that could elicit unauthorized or malicious responses. In this paper, we present TurboFuzzLLM, a mutation-based fuzzing technique for efficiently finding a collection of effective jailbreaking templates that, when combined with harmful questions, can lead a target LLM to produce harmful responses through black-box access via user prompts. We describe the limitations of directly applying existing template-based attacking techniques in practice, and present functional and efficiency-focused upgrades we added to mutation-based fuzzing to generate effective jailbreaking templates automatically. TurboFuzzLLM achieves geq 95\% attack success rates (ASR) on public datasets for leading LLMs (including GPT-4o \& GPT-4 Turbo), shows impressive generalizability to unseen harmful questions, and helps in improving model defenses to prompt attacks. TurboFuzzLLM is available open source at https://github.com/amazon-science/TurboFuzzLLM.

The effectiveness and efficiency of 5G software stack vulnerability and unintended behavior detection are essential for 5G assurance, especially for its applications in critical infrastructures. Scalability and automation are the main challenges in testing approaches and cybersecurity research. In this paper, we propose an innovative approach for automatically detecting vulnerabilities, unintended emergent behaviors, and performance degradation in 5G stacks via run-time profiling documents corresponding to fuzz testing in code repositories. Piloting on srsRAN, we map the run-time profiling via Logging Information (LogInfo) generated by fuzzing test to a high dimensional metric space first and then construct feature spaces based on their timestamp information. Lastly, we further leverage machine learning-based classification algorithms, including Logistic Regression, K-Nearest Neighbors, and Random Forest to categorize the impacts on performance and security attributes. The performance of the proposed approach has high accuracy, ranging from 93.4 % to 95.9 % , in detecting the fuzzing impacts. In addition, the proof of concept could identify and prioritize real-time vulnerabilities on 5G infrastructures and critical applications in various verticals.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been increasingly used to optimize code efficiency. Evaluating their effectiveness and further suggesting optimization opportunities often rely on high-quality tests to demonstrate the performance bottlenecks presented in the program. However, existing approaches rely on a limited set of hand-curated inputs or LLM-generated uninteresting length-stressing tests, failing to reveal more nuanced optimization opportunities. We present WEDGE, a framework for generating performance-stressing input given the program under test. WEDGE synthesizes explicit performance-characterizing constraints in the form of branch conditions to partition the programs' execution space into performance-specific regions. When integrated with the coverage-guided fuzzer, reaching different regions introduces explicit rewards for test generation to explore inefficient implementations. Our evaluation shows that WEDGE introduces a significant slowdown compared to the tests in CodeContests and those claimed to be optimized by existing approaches. From the utility perspective, integrating our tests substantially improves the existing code optimization approaches that rely on test-driven execution feedback. We release PERFFORGE, the performance tests generated by WEDGE, to benchmark future approaches for efficient code generation at https://github.com/UChiSeclab/perfforge.

Hardware security vulnerabilities in computing systems compromise the security defenses of not only the hardware but also the software running on it. Recent research has shown that hardware fuzzing is a promising technique to efficiently detect such vulnerabilities in large-scale designs such as modern processors. However, the current fuzzing techniques do not adjust their strategies dynamically toward faster and higher design space exploration, resulting in slow vulnerability detection, evident through their low design coverage. To address this problem, we propose PSOFuzz, which uses particle swarm optimization (PSO) to schedule the mutation operators and to generate initial input programs dynamically with the objective of detecting vulnerabilities quickly. Unlike traditional PSO, which finds a single optimal solution, we use a modified PSO that dynamically computes the optimal solution for selecting mutation operators required to explore new design regions in hardware. We also address the challenge of inefficient initial seed generation by employing PSO-based seed generation. Including these optimizations, our final formulation outperforms fuzzers without PSO. Experiments show that PSOFuzz achieves up to 15.25times speedup for vulnerability detection and up to 2.22times speedup for coverage compared to the state-of-the-art simulation-based hardware fuzzer.

Ensuring the security and reliability of machine learning frameworks is crucial for building trustworthy AI-based systems. Fuzzing, a popular technique in secure software development lifecycle (SSDLC), can be used to develop secure and robust software. Popular machine learning frameworks such as PyTorch and TensorFlow are complex and written in multiple programming languages including C/C++ and Python. We propose a dynamic analysis pipeline for Python projects using the Sydr-Fuzz toolset. Our pipeline includes fuzzing, corpus minimization, crash triaging, and coverage collection. Crash triaging and severity estimation are important steps to ensure that the most critical vulnerabilities are addressed promptly. Furthermore, the proposed pipeline is integrated in GitLab CI. To identify the most vulnerable parts of the machine learning frameworks, we analyze their potential attack surfaces and develop fuzz targets for PyTorch, TensorFlow, and related projects such as h5py. Applying our dynamic analysis pipeline to these targets, we were able to discover 3 new bugs and propose fixes for them.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread use in various applications due to their powerful capability to generate human-like text. However, prompt injection attacks, which involve overwriting a model's original instructions with malicious prompts to manipulate the generated text, have raised significant concerns about the security and reliability of LLMs. Ensuring that LLMs are robust against such attacks is crucial for their deployment in real-world applications, particularly in critical tasks. In this paper, we propose PROMPTFUZZ, a novel testing framework that leverages fuzzing techniques to systematically assess the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Inspired by software fuzzing, PROMPTFUZZ selects promising seed prompts and generates a diverse set of prompt injections to evaluate the target LLM's resilience. PROMPTFUZZ operates in two stages: the prepare phase, which involves selecting promising initial seeds and collecting few-shot examples, and the focus phase, which uses the collected examples to generate diverse, high-quality prompt injections. Using PROMPTFUZZ, we can uncover more vulnerabilities in LLMs, even those with strong defense prompts. By deploying the generated attack prompts from PROMPTFUZZ in a real-world competition, we achieved the 7th ranking out of over 4000 participants (top 0.14%) within 2 hours. Additionally, we construct a dataset to fine-tune LLMs for enhanced robustness against prompt injection attacks. While the fine-tuned model shows improved robustness, PROMPTFUZZ continues to identify vulnerabilities, highlighting the importance of robust testing for LLMs. Our work emphasizes the critical need for effective testing tools and provides a practical framework for evaluating and improving the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks.

Continuous fuzzing platforms such as OSS-Fuzz uncover large numbers of vulnerabilities, yet the subsequent repair process remains largely manual. Unfortunately, existing Automated Vulnerability Repair (AVR) techniques -- including recent LLM-based systems -- are not directly applicable to continuous fuzzing. This is because these systems are designed and evaluated on a static, single-run benchmark setting, making them ill-suited for the diverse, noisy, and failure-prone environments in continuous fuzzing. To address these issues, we introduce PatchIsland, a system for Continuous Vulnerability Repair (CVR) that tightly integrates with continuous fuzzing pipelines. PatchIsland employs an ensemble of diverse LLM agents. By leveraging multiple LLM agents, PatchIsland can cover a wider range of settings (e.g., different projects, bug types, and programming languages) and also improve operational robustness. In addition, PatchIsland utilizes a two-phase patch-based deduplication to mitigate duplicate crashes and patches, which can be problematic in continuous fuzzing. In our internal evaluation, PatchIsland repaired 84 of 92 vulnerabilities, demonstrating strong repair capability. In the official AIxCC competition, the system operated with no human intervention in a fully autonomous environment and successfully patched 31 out of 43 vulnerabilities, achieving a repair rate of 72.1\%.

As the complexities of processors keep increasing, the task of effectively verifying their integrity and security becomes ever more daunting. The intricate web of instructions, microarchitectural features, and interdependencies woven into modern processors pose a formidable challenge for even the most diligent verification and security engineers. To tackle this growing concern, recently, researchers have developed fuzzing techniques explicitly tailored for hardware processors. However, a prevailing issue with these hardware fuzzers is their heavy reliance on static strategies to make decisions in their algorithms. To address this problem, we develop a novel dynamic and adaptive decision-making framework, MABFuzz, that uses multi-armed bandit (MAB) algorithms to fuzz processors. MABFuzz is agnostic to, and hence, applicable to, any existing hardware fuzzer. In the process of designing MABFuzz, we encounter challenges related to the compatibility of MAB algorithms with fuzzers and maximizing their efficacy for fuzzing. We overcome these challenges by modifying the fuzzing process and tailoring MAB algorithms to accommodate special requirements for hardware fuzzing. We integrate three widely used MAB algorithms in a state-of-the-art hardware fuzzer and evaluate them on three popular RISC-V-based processors. Experimental results demonstrate the ability of MABFuzz to cover a broader spectrum of processors' intricate landscapes and doing so with remarkable efficiency. In particular, MABFuzz achieves up to 308x speedup in detecting vulnerabilities and up to 5x speedup in achieving coverage compared to a state-of-the-art technique.

Vulnerabilities related to option combinations pose a significant challenge in software security testing due to their vast search space. Previous research primarily addressed this challenge through mutation or filtering techniques, which inefficiently treated all option combinations as having equal potential for vulnerabilities, thus wasting considerable time on non-vulnerable targets and resulting in low testing efficiency. In this paper, we utilize carefully designed prompt engineering to drive the large language model (LLM) to predict high-risk option combinations (i.e., more likely to contain vulnerabilities) and perform fuzz testing automatically without human intervention. We developed a tool called ProphetFuzz and evaluated it on a dataset comprising 52 programs collected from three related studies. The entire experiment consumed 10.44 CPU years. ProphetFuzz successfully predicted 1748 high-risk option combinations at an average cost of only \$8.69 per program. Results show that after 72 hours of fuzzing, ProphetFuzz discovered 364 unique vulnerabilities associated with 12.30\% of the predicted high-risk option combinations, which was 32.85\% higher than that found by state-of-the-art in the same timeframe. Additionally, using ProphetFuzz, we conducted persistent fuzzing on the latest versions of these programs, uncovering 140 vulnerabilities, with 93 confirmed by developers and 21 awarded CVE numbers.

Tool-augmented LLM agents increasingly rely on multi-step, multi-tool workflows to complete real tasks. This design expands the attack surface, because data produced by one tool can be persisted and later reused as input to another tool, enabling exploitable source-to-sink dataflows that only emerge through tool composition. We study this risk as multi-tool vulnerabilities in LLM agents, and show that existing discovery efforts focused on single-tool or single-hop testing miss these long-horizon behaviors and provide limited debugging value. We present ChainFuzzer, a greybox framework for discovering and reproducing multi-tool vulnerabilities with auditable evidence. ChainFuzzer (i) identifies high-impact operations with strict source-to-sink dataflow evidence and extracts plausible upstream candidate tool chains based on cross-tool dependencies, (ii) uses Trace-guided Prompt Solving (TPS) to synthesize stable prompts that reliably drive the agent to execute target chains, and (iii) performs guardrail-aware fuzzing to reproduce vulnerabilities under LLM guardrails via payload mutation and sink-specific oracles. We evaluate ChainFuzzer on 20 popular open-source LLM agent apps (998 tools). ChainFuzzer extracts 2,388 candidate tool chains and synthesizes 2,213 stable prompts, confirming 365 unique, reproducible vulnerabilities across 19/20 apps (302 require multi-tool execution). Component evaluation shows tool-chain extraction achieves 96.49% edge precision and 91.50% strict chain precision; TPS increases chain reachability from 27.05% to 95.45%; guardrail-aware fuzzing boosts payload-level trigger rate from 18.20% to 88.60%. Overall, ChainFuzzer achieves 3.02 vulnerabilities per 1M tokens, providing a practical foundation for testing and hardening real-world multi-tool agent systems.

The hallucination of code generation models hinders their applicability to systems requiring higher safety standards. One critical bottleneck in addressing code hallucination is the difficulty of identifying the functional correctness of generated code, due to its unnatural form. We address this core bottleneck by automatically generating unit tests using dynamic code analysis tools, leveraging the executable nature of code. Accordingly, we propose a selective code generator that abstains from uncertain generations -- based on the functional correctness evaluated by generated unit tests -- to theoretically control the correctness among non-abstained answers, \ie the false discovery rate. Finally, we propose to use generated unit tests in evaluation as well as in learning for precise code evaluation, calling this paradigm FuzzEval. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method along with the controllability of code hallucination and reasonable selection efficiency.

Deep Learning (DL) is prevalently used in various industries to improve decision-making and automate processes, driven by the ever-evolving DL libraries and compilers. The correctness of DL systems is crucial for trust in DL applications. As such, the recent wave of research has been studying the automated synthesis of test-cases (i.e., DNN models and their inputs) for fuzzing DL systems. However, existing model generators only subsume a limited number of operators, lacking the ability to pervasively model operator constraints. To address this challenge, we propose NeuRI, a fully automated approach for generating valid and diverse DL models composed of hundreds of types of operators. NeuRI adopts a three-step process: (i) collecting valid and invalid API traces from various sources; (ii) applying inductive program synthesis over the traces to infer the constraints for constructing valid models; and (iii) using hybrid model generation which incorporates both symbolic and concrete operators. Our evaluation shows that NeuRI improves branch coverage of TensorFlow and PyTorch by 24% and 15% over the state-of-the-art model-level fuzzers. NeuRI finds 100 new bugs for PyTorch and TensorFlow in four months, with 81 already fixed or confirmed. Of these, 9 bugs are labelled as high priority or security vulnerability, constituting 10% of all high-priority bugs of the period. Open-source developers regard error-inducing tests reported by us as "high-quality" and "common in practice".

Sequential decision-making processes (SDPs) are fundamental for complex real-world challenges, such as autonomous driving, robotic control, and traffic management. While recent advances in Deep Learning (DL) have led to mature solutions for solving these complex problems, SDMs remain vulnerable to learning unsafe behaviors, posing significant risks in safety-critical applications. However, developing a testing framework for SDMs that can identify a diverse set of crash-triggering scenarios remains an open challenge. To address this, we propose CureFuzz, a novel curiosity-driven black-box fuzz testing approach for SDMs. CureFuzz proposes a curiosity mechanism that allows a fuzzer to effectively explore novel and diverse scenarios, leading to improved detection of crashtriggering scenarios. Additionally, we introduce a multi-objective seed selection technique to balance the exploration of novel scenarios and the generation of crash-triggering scenarios, thereby optimizing the fuzzing process. We evaluate CureFuzz on various SDMs and experimental results demonstrate that CureFuzz outperforms the state-of-the-art method by a substantial margin in the total number of faults and distinct types of crash-triggering scenarios. We also demonstrate that the crash-triggering scenarios found by CureFuzz can repair SDMs, highlighting CureFuzz as a valuable tool for testing SDMs and optimizing their performance.

Traditional protocol fuzzing techniques, such as those employed by AFL-based systems, often lack effectiveness due to a limited semantic understanding of complex protocol grammars and rigid seed mutation strategies. Recent works, such as ChatAFL, have integrated Large Language Models (LLMs) to guide protocol fuzzing and address these limitations, pushing protocol fuzzers to wider exploration of the protocol state space. But ChatAFL still faces issues like unreliable output, LLM hallucinations, and assumptions of LLM knowledge about protocol specifications. This paper introduces MultiFuzz, a novel dense retrieval-based multi-agent system designed to overcome these limitations by integrating semantic-aware context retrieval, specialized agents, and structured tool-assisted reasoning. MultiFuzz utilizes agentic chunks of protocol documentation (RFC Documents) to build embeddings in a vector database for a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipeline, enabling agents to generate more reliable and structured outputs, enhancing the fuzzer in mutating protocol messages with enhanced state coverage and adherence to syntactic constraints. The framework decomposes the fuzzing process into modular groups of agents that collaborate through chain-of-thought reasoning to dynamically adapt fuzzing strategies based on the retrieved contextual knowledge. Experimental evaluations on the Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) demonstrate that MultiFuzz significantly improves branch coverage and explores deeper protocol states and transitions over state-of-the-art (SOTA) fuzzers such as NSFuzz, AFLNet, and ChatAFL. By combining dense retrieval, agentic coordination, and language model reasoning, MultiFuzz establishes a new paradigm in autonomous protocol fuzzing, offering a scalable and extensible foundation for future research in intelligent agentic-based fuzzing systems.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently experienced tremendous popularity and are widely used from casual conversations to AI-driven programming. However, despite their considerable success, LLMs are not entirely reliable and can give detailed guidance on how to conduct harmful or illegal activities. While safety measures can reduce the risk of such outputs, adversarial jailbreak attacks can still exploit LLMs to produce harmful content. These jailbreak templates are typically manually crafted, making large-scale testing challenging. In this paper, we introduce GPTFuzz, a novel black-box jailbreak fuzzing framework inspired by the AFL fuzzing framework. Instead of manual engineering, GPTFuzz automates the generation of jailbreak templates for red-teaming LLMs. At its core, GPTFuzz starts with human-written templates as initial seeds, then mutates them to produce new templates. We detail three key components of GPTFuzz: a seed selection strategy for balancing efficiency and variability, mutate operators for creating semantically equivalent or similar sentences, and a judgment model to assess the success of a jailbreak attack. We evaluate GPTFuzz against various commercial and open-source LLMs, including ChatGPT, LLaMa-2, and Vicuna, under diverse attack scenarios. Our results indicate that GPTFuzz consistently produces jailbreak templates with a high success rate, surpassing human-crafted templates. Remarkably, GPTFuzz achieves over 90% attack success rates against ChatGPT and Llama-2 models, even with suboptimal initial seed templates. We anticipate that GPTFuzz will be instrumental for researchers and practitioners in examining LLM robustness and will encourage further exploration into enhancing LLM safety.

Mutation-based fuzzing is effective for uncovering compiler bugs, but designing high-quality mutators for modern languages with complex constructs (e.g., templates, macros) remains challenging. Existing methods rely heavily on manual design or human-in-the-loop correction, limiting scalability and cross-language generalizability. We present Mut4All, a fully automated, language-agnostic framework that synthesizes mutators using Large Language Models (LLMs) and compiler-specific knowledge from bug reports. It consists of three agents: (1) a mutator invention agent that identifies mutation targets and generates mutator metadata using compiler-related insights; (2) a mutator implementation synthesis agent, fine-tuned to produce initial implementations; and (3) a mutator refinement agent that verifies and corrects the mutators via unit-test feedback. Mut4All processes 1000 bug reports (500 Rust, 500 C++), yielding 319 Rust and 403 C++ mutators at ~$0.08 each via GPT-4o. Our customized fuzzer, using these mutators, finds 62 bugs in Rust compilers (38 new, 7 fixed) and 34 bugs in C++ compilers (16 new, 1 fixed). Mut4All outperforms existing methods in both unique crash detection and coverage, ranking first on Rust and second on C++.

Automated GUI testing is crucial for ensuring the quality and reliability of Android apps. However, the efficacy of existing UI testing techniques is often limited, especially in terms of coverage. Recent studies, including the state-of-the-art, struggle to achieve more than 30% activity coverage in real-world apps. This limited coverage can be attributed to a combination of factors such as failing to generate complex user inputs, unsatisfied activation conditions regarding device configurations and external resources, and hard-to-reach code paths that are not easily accessible through the GUI. To overcome these limitations, we propose CovAgent, a novel agentic AI-powered approach to enhance Android app UI testing. Our fuzzer-agnostic framework comprises an AI agent that inspects the app's decompiled Smali code and component transition graph, and reasons about unsatisfied activation conditions within the app code logic that prevent access to the activities that are unreachable by standard and widely adopted GUI fuzzers. Then, another agent generates dynamic instrumentation scripts that satisfy activation conditions required for successful transitions to those activities. We found that augmenting existing fuzzing approaches with our framework achieves a significant improvement in test coverage over the state-of-the-art, LLMDroid, and other baselines such as Fastbot and APE (e.g., 101.1%, 116.3% and 179.7% higher activity coverage, respectively). CovAgent also outperforms all the baselines in other metrics such as class, method, and line coverage. We also conduct investigations into components within CovAgent to reveal further insights regarding the efficacy of Agentic AI in the field of automated app testing such as the agentic activation condition inference accuracy, and agentic activity-launching success rate.

The widespread availability of large-scale code datasets has accelerated the development of code large language models (CodeLLMs), raising concerns about unauthorized dataset usage. Dataset poisoning offers a proactive defense by reducing the utility of such unauthorized training. However, existing poisoning methods often require full dataset poisoning and introduce transformations that break code compilability. In this paper, we introduce FunPoison, a functionality-preserving poisoning approach that injects short, compilable weak-use fragments into executed code paths. FunPoison leverages reusable statement-level templates with automatic repair and conservative safety checking to ensure side-effect freedom, while a type-aware synthesis module suppresses static analysis warnings and enhances stealth. Extensive experiments show that FunPoison achieves effective poisoning by contaminating only 10% of the dataset, while maintaining 100% compilability and functional correctness, and remains robust against various advanced code sanitization techniques.

Software testing is a critical, yet resource-intensive phase of the software development lifecycle. Over the years, various automated tools have been developed to aid in this process. Search-based approaches typically achieve high coverage but produce tests with low readability, whereas large language model (LLM)-based methods generate more human-readable tests but often suffer from low coverage and compilability. While the majority of research efforts have focused on improving test coverage and readability, little attention has been paid to enhancing the robustness of bug detection, particularly in exposing corner cases and vulnerable execution paths. To address this gap, we propose AdverTest, a novel adversarial framework for LLM-powered test case generation. AdverTest comprises two interacting agents: a test case generation agent (T) and a mutant generation agent (M). These agents engage in an adversarial loop, where M persistently creates new mutants "hacking" the blind spots of T's current test suite, while T iteratively refines its test cases to "kill" the challenging mutants produced by M. This interaction loop is guided by both coverage and mutation scores, enabling the system to co-evolve toward both high test coverage and bug detection capability. Experimental results in the Defects4J dataset show that our approach improves fault detection rates by 8.56% over the best existing LLM-based methods and by 63.30% over EvoSuite, while also improving line and branch coverage.

Coding agents are increasingly capable with autonomy, which exposes them to repository-level poisoning. Existing red-teaming studies remain restricted to manual selection for malicious payload locations and fixed disguise strategies, which cannot represent realistic repository poisoning. We present TrojanForge, the first automated framework for repository poisoning. TrojanForge parses repository structure through abstract syntax trees (AST) and maps agent execution traces onto AST nodes. A security review agent ranks these candidates and selects the least conspicuous ones for payload mounting. Then, through adversarial play with the target agent, TrojanForge iteratively refines disguise strategies by inverting the causes of agent detection, and transfers accumulated success experience across repositories. We further construct TrojanBench, a benchmark of 384 poisoned repositories spanning 6 domains and 9 programming languages. Extensive experiments show that TrojanForge achieves a stable poisoning success rate of over 60% with backdoor injection exceeding 90%. Comprehensive evaluation on TrojanBench across 4 harnesses and 12 models reveals that even commercial agents fail to defend against repository-level poisoning.

In light of the rapid adoption of AI coding assistants, LLM-assisted development has become increasingly prevalent, creating an urgent need for robust evaluation of generated code quality. Existing benchmarks often require extensive manual effort to create static datasets, rely on indirect or insufficiently challenging tasks, depend on non-scalable ground truth, or neglect critical low-level security evaluations, particularly memory-safety issues. In this work, we introduce OSS-Bench, a benchmark generator that automatically constructs large-scale, live evaluation tasks from real-world open-source software. OSS-Bench replaces functions with LLM-generated code and evaluates them using three natural metrics: compilability, functional correctness, and memory safety, leveraging robust signals like compilation failures, test-suite violations, and sanitizer alerts as ground truth. In our evaluation, the benchmark, instantiated as OSS-Bench(php) and OSS-Bench(sql), profiles 17 diverse LLMs, revealing insights such as intra-family behavioral patterns and inconsistencies between model size and performance. Our results demonstrate that OSS-Bench mitigates overfitting by leveraging the evolving complexity of OSS and highlights LLMs' limited understanding of low-level code security via extended fuzzing experiments. Overall, OSS-Bench offers a practical and scalable framework for benchmarking the real-world coding capabilities of LLMs.

Several techniques have been proposed to detect vulnerable Spectre gadgets in widely deployed commercial software. Unfortunately, detection techniques proposed so far rely on hand-written rules which fall short in covering subtle variations of known Spectre gadgets as well as demand a huge amount of time to analyze each conditional branch in software. Moreover, detection tool evaluations are based only on a handful of these gadgets, as it requires arduous effort to craft new gadgets manually. In this work, we employ both fuzzing and deep learning techniques to automate the generation and detection of Spectre gadgets. We first create a diverse set of Spectre-V1 gadgets by introducing perturbations to the known gadgets. Using mutational fuzzing, we produce a data set with more than 1 million Spectre-V1 gadgets which is the largest Spectre gadget data set built to date. Next, we conduct the first empirical usability study of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) in the context of assembly code generation without any human interaction. We introduce SpectreGAN which leverages masking implementation of GANs for both learning the gadget structures and generating new gadgets. This provides the first scalable solution to extend the variety of Spectre gadgets. Finally, we propose FastSpec which builds a classifier with the generated Spectre gadgets based on a novel high dimensional Neural Embeddings technique (BERT). For the case studies, we demonstrate that FastSpec discovers potential gadgets with a high success rate in OpenSSL libraries and Phoronix benchmarks. Further, FastSpec offers much greater flexibility and time-related performance gain compared to the existing tools and therefore can be used for gadget detection in large-scale software.

Automating software vulnerability detection (SVD) remains a critical challenge in an era of increasingly complex and interdependent software systems. Despite significant advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) for code analysis, prevailing evaluation methodologies often lack the context-aware robustness necessary to capture real-world intricacies and cross-component interactions. To address these limitations, we present VulnSage, a comprehensive evaluation framework and a dataset curated from diverse, large-scale open-source system software projects developed in C/C++. Unlike prior datasets, it leverages a heuristic noise pre-filtering approach combined with LLM-based reasoning to ensure a representative and minimally noisy spectrum of vulnerabilities. The framework supports multi-granular analysis across function, file, and inter-function levels and employs four diverse zero-shot prompt strategies: Baseline, Chain-of-Thought, Think, and Think & Verify. Through this evaluation, we uncover that structured reasoning prompts substantially improve LLM performance, with Think & Verify reducing ambiguous responses from 20.3% to 9.1% while increasing accuracy. We further demonstrate that code-specialized models consistently outperform general-purpose alternatives, with performance varying significantly across vulnerability types, revealing that no single approach universally excels across all security contexts. Link to dataset and codes: https://github.com/Erroristotle/VulnSage.git

We present swarm-attack, an open-source adversarial testing framework in which multiple lightweight LLM agents coordinate through shared memory, parallel exploration, and evolutionary optimization. Together, our results demonstrate that both safety bypass of frontier models and software vulnerability discovery, i.e., the capability class that motivated restricted release of Anthropic's Mythos Preview, are achievable at effectively zero cost using commodity hardware and openly available models. We report two experiments. In the first, five instances of a 1.2 billion parameter model conducted 225 jailbreak attacks each against GPT-4o and Claude Sonnet~4. Against GPT-4o, the swarm achieved an Effective Harm Rate of 45.8%, producing 49 critical-severity breaches; against Claude Sonnet-4, the Effective Harm Rate was 0% despite a 40% technical success rate. In the second experiment, the same models performed combined source code analysis and binary fuzzing against a vulnerable C application with 9 planted CWEs. With a hand-crafted exploit seed corpus, regex pattern detection, and AddressSanitizer-based crash classification, the pipeline recovers 9 of 9 vulnerabilities (100% recall) in approximately four minutes on a consumer MacBook. With those scaffold components disabled, the same model recovers 0 of 9 by crash verification and 2 of 9 by citation. The capability class that motivated restricted release of Anthropic's Mythos Preview is therefore reproducible at effectively zero cost; the important enabler is the system scaffold itself, which compensates for the limited reasoning capacity of small individual models.

Software vulnerabilities are often detected via taint analysis, penetration testing, or fuzzing. They are also found via unit tests that exercise security-sensitive behavior with specific inputs, called vulnerability-witnessing tests. Generative AI models could help developers in writing them, but they require many examples to learn from, which are currently scarce. This paper introduces VuTeCo, an AI-driven framework for collecting examples of vulnerability-witnessing tests from Java repositories. VuTeCo carries out two tasks: (1) The "Finding" task to determine whether a unit test case is security-related, and (2) the "Matching" task to relate a test case to the vulnerability it witnesses. VuTeCo addresses the Finding task with UniXcoder, achieving an F0.5 score of 0.73 and a precision of 0.83 on a test set of unit tests from Vul4J. The Matching task is addressed using DeepSeek Coder, achieving an F0.5 score of 0.65 and a precision of 0.75 on a test set of pairs of unit tests and vulnerabilities from Vul4J. VuTeCo has been used in the wild on 427 Java projects and 1,238 vulnerabilities, obtaining 224 test cases confirmed to be security-related and 35 tests correctly matched to 29 vulnerabilities. The validated tests were collected in a new dataset called Test4Vul. VuTeCo lays the foundation for large-scale retrieval of vulnerability-witnessing tests, enabling future AI models to better understand and generate security unit tests.

Benchmarks for LLM-generated GPU kernels (KernelBench, TritonBench, GEAK) score correctness through fixed-shape, small-sample allclose-style checks. The number of inputs varies between benchmarks. The shape, dtype, and tolerance are fixed for each kernel. We test that oracle empirically. We construct a controlled corpus of 24 Triton and CPU stand-in kernels (15 correct controls and 9 LLM-style buggy variants seeded with documented transcription errors) and re-evaluate it under op-schema-aware seeded fuzzing with a high-precision (fp64) CPU reference and per-(op, dtype) absolute tolerances. The seeded oracle flags 9 of 9 buggy kernels and passes 15 of 15 correct controls, at zero precision cost on controls. We extend the corpus to 26 ops (adding a flash-attention pair) and re-run the same protocol on five GPU classes (RTX 3060, A10, L40S, A100 SXM4, H100 NVL). The verdicts are identical across all five GPUs: 10 of 10 illusions caught and 16 of 16 controls clean. The corpus result is about LLM-style transcription bugs that the allclose-on-one-shape oracle certifies as correct, not about the bug rate of any specific deployed LLM. Every flagged failure replays byte-for-byte from a stored seed.

In this paper, we present JADE, a targeted linguistic fuzzing platform which strengthens the linguistic complexity of seed questions to simultaneously and consistently break a wide range of widely-used LLMs categorized in three groups: eight open-sourced Chinese, six commercial Chinese and four commercial English LLMs. JADE generates three safety benchmarks for the three groups of LLMs, which contain unsafe questions that are highly threatening: the questions simultaneously trigger harmful generation of multiple LLMs, with an average unsafe generation ratio of 70% (please see the table below), while are still natural questions, fluent and preserving the core unsafe semantics. We release the benchmark demos generated for commercial English LLMs and open-sourced English LLMs in the following link: https://github.com/whitzard-ai/jade-db. For readers who are interested in evaluating on more questions generated by JADE, please contact us. JADE is based on Noam Chomsky's seminal theory of transformational-generative grammar. Given a seed question with unsafe intention, JADE invokes a sequence of generative and transformational rules to increment the complexity of the syntactic structure of the original question, until the safety guardrail is broken. Our key insight is: Due to the complexity of human language, most of the current best LLMs can hardly recognize the invariant evil from the infinite number of different syntactic structures which form an unbound example space that can never be fully covered. Technically, the generative/transformative rules are constructed by native speakers of the languages, and, once developed, can be used to automatically grow and transform the parse tree of a given question, until the guardrail is broken. For more evaluation results and demo, please check our website: https://whitzard-ai.github.io/jade.html.

Memory-safety bugs introduce critical software-security issues. Rust provides memory-safe mechanisms to avoid memory-safety bugs in programming, while still allowing unsafe escape hatches via unsafe code. However, the unsafe code that enhances the usability of Rust provides clear spots for finding memory-safety bugs in Rust source code. In this paper, we claim that these unsafe spots can still be identifiable in Rust binary code via machine learning and be leveraged for finding memory-safety bugs. To support our claim, we propose the tool textttrustspot, that enables reverse engineering to learn an unsafe classifier that proposes a list of functions in Rust binaries for downstream analysis. We empirically show that the function proposals by textttrustspot can recall 92.92% of memory-safety bugs, while it covers only 16.79% of the entire binary code. As an application, we demonstrate that the function proposals are used in targeted fuzzing on Rust packages, which contribute to reducing the fuzzing time compared to non-targeted fuzzing.

Recently, high-performing code generation systems based on large language models have surfaced. They are trained on massive corpora containing much more natural text than actual executable computer code. This work shows that current code generation systems exhibit undesired biases inherited from their large language model backbones, which can reduce the quality of the generated code under specific circumstances. To investigate the effect, we propose the "block of influence" concept, which enables a modular decomposition and analysis of the coding challenges. We introduce an automated intervention mechanism reminiscent of adversarial testing that exposes undesired biases through the failure modes of the models under test. Finally, we demonstrate how our framework can be used as a data transformation technique during fine-tuning, acting as a mitigation strategy for these biases.

Reasoning models can remain capable of solving a task while still defaulting to cheaper but misleading shortcuts. This creates a central oversight problem: when a model gives an answer with plausible but incomplete reasoning, can an overseer determine whether that output should be trusted? To study this problem, we introduce PyINE, a framework for scalable elicitation and oversight using instrumented Python programs as a verifiable execution substrate. In PyINE, programs define task environments, execution traces provide authoritative labels for outcomes and intermediate facts, and task variants can be generated mechanically rather than through static human annotation. We instantiate the framework in PyINE-v1, a first release built from nearly one million deterministic execution traces and over 500,000 matched LLM-generated code variants used for counterfactual evaluation. Using standard RL with verifiable rewards on cue-varied tasks, we train a shortcut-following model that improves substantially at predicting execution outcomes while still making systematic errors when misleading human-facing cues conflict with the program's realized behavior. We then evaluate activation probes, trained text classifiers, prompted judges, and a lightweight debate protocol as overseers of this model. We find that performance pooled at the dataset level can hide weak coverage of the failures that matter most: cheap learned overseers often miss rare shortcut-driven errors, while stronger model-based checks are more balanced but substantially costlier and harder to turn into reliable thresholded decisions. PyINE-v1 turns this failure-mode coverage problem into a reusable experimental setting for developing oversight methods that are verifiable, failure-mode-aware, and cost-sensitive.

As LLMs see wide adoption in software engineering, the reliable assessment of the correctness and security of LLM-generated code is crucial. Notably, prior work has demonstrated that security is often overlooked, exposing that LLMs are prone to generating code with security vulnerabilities. These insights were enabled by specialized benchmarks, crafted through significant manual effort by security experts. However, relying on manually-crafted benchmarks is insufficient in the long term, because benchmarks (i) naturally end up contaminating training data, (ii) must extend to new tasks to provide a more complete picture, and (iii) must increase in difficulty to challenge more capable LLMs. In this work, we address these challenges and present AutoBaxBuilder, a framework that generates tasks and tests for code security benchmarking from scratch. We introduce a robust pipeline with fine-grained plausibility checks, leveraging the code understanding capabilities of LLMs to construct functionality tests and end-to-end security-probing exploits. To confirm the quality of the generated benchmark, we conduct both a qualitative analysis and perform quantitative experiments, comparing it against tasks constructed by human experts. We use AutoBaxBuilder to construct entirely new tasks and release them to the public as AutoBaxBench, together with a thorough evaluation of the security capabilities of LLMs on these tasks. We find that a new task can be generated in under 2 hours, costing less than USD 10.

One of the critical phases in software development is software testing. Testing helps with identifying potential bugs and reducing maintenance costs. The goal of automated test generation tools is to ease the development of tests by suggesting efficient bug-revealing tests. Recently, researchers have leveraged Large Language Models (LLMs) of code to generate unit tests. While the code coverage of generated tests was usually assessed, the literature has acknowledged that the coverage is weakly correlated with the efficiency of tests in bug detection. To improve over this limitation, in this paper, we introduce MuTAP for improving the effectiveness of test cases generated by LLMs in terms of revealing bugs by leveraging mutation testing. Our goal is achieved by augmenting prompts with surviving mutants, as those mutants highlight the limitations of test cases in detecting bugs. MuTAP is capable of generating effective test cases in the absence of natural language descriptions of the Program Under Test (PUTs). We employ different LLMs within MuTAP and evaluate their performance on different benchmarks. Our results show that our proposed method is able to detect up to 28% more faulty human-written code snippets. Among these, 17% remained undetected by both the current state-of-the-art fully automated test generation tool (i.e., Pynguin) and zero-shot/few-shot learning approaches on LLMs. Furthermore, MuTAP achieves a Mutation Score (MS) of 93.57% on synthetic buggy code, outperforming all other approaches in our evaluation. Our findings suggest that although LLMs can serve as a useful tool to generate test cases, they require specific post-processing steps to enhance the effectiveness of the generated test cases which may suffer from syntactic or functional errors and may be ineffective in detecting certain types of bugs and testing corner cases PUTs.

Evaluating test cases automatically generated by Large Language Models (LLMs) is a critical yet challenging task. Existing benchmarks often evaluate the exclusion ratio on large, unstructured collections of wrong codes, suffering from high computational costs and score inflation. Furthermore, they inadvertently reward generators that detect common, trivial bugs, while failing to penalize their inability to identify rare yet critical faults. In this work, we connect two fundamental questions: (1) What is the minimal set of wrong codes sufficient to represent the entire error space? and (2) What is the minimal set of test cases needed to distinguish them? We introduce a novel framework that formalizes benchmark construction as finding an optimal diagnostic basis in a binary code-test matrix, where rows represent wrong codes and columns represent test case results. The rank of this matrix specifies the minimal number of independent error patterns (wrong codes) and provides a tight upper bound on the number of test cases required for complete fault coverage. Our objective is to identify a basis of size equal to the matrix rank that maximizes internal diversity. To tackle this NP-hard problem, we propose WrongSelect, an efficient approximation algorithm to select maximally diverse wrong codes. Applying this framework to millions of competitive programming submissions, we construct TC-Bench, a compact, diverse, and inflation-resistant benchmark. Extensive experiments show that even the most advanced test case generation methods achieve only ~60% exclusion rates on TC-Bench, exposing a significant gap in their diagnostic power and highlighting substantial room for future improvement. Our dataset is available at: https://huggingface.co/datasets/Luoberta/TC-Bench and our code is at: https://github.com/Luowaterbi/TC-Bench.

Deep-learning (DL) compilers such as TVM and TensorRT are increasingly being used to optimize deep neural network (DNN) models to meet performance, resource utilization and other requirements. Bugs in these compilers can result in models whose semantics differ from the original ones, producing incorrect results that corrupt the correctness of downstream applications. However, finding bugs in these compilers is challenging due to their complexity. In this work, we propose a new fuzz testing approach for finding bugs in deep-learning compilers. Our core approach consists of (i) generating diverse yet valid DNN test models that can exercise a large part of the compiler's transformation logic using light-weight operator specifications; (ii) performing gradient-based search to find model inputs that avoid any floating-point exceptional values during model execution, reducing the chance of missed bugs or false alarms; and (iii) using differential testing to identify bugs. We implemented this approach in NNSmith which has found 72 new bugs for TVM, TensorRT, ONNXRuntime, and PyTorch to date. Of these 58 have been confirmed and 51 have been fixed by their respective project maintainers.

Software vulnerability detection has emerged as a significant concern in the field of software security recently, capturing the attention of numerous researchers and developers. Most previous approaches focus on coarse-grained vulnerability detection, such as at the function or file level. However, the developers would still encounter the challenge of manually inspecting a large volume of code inside the vulnerable function to identify the specific vulnerable statements for modification, indicating the importance of vulnerability localization. Training the model for vulnerability localization usually requires ground-truth labels at the statement-level, and labeling vulnerable statements demands expert knowledge, which incurs high costs. Hence, the demand for an approach that eliminates the need for additional labeling at the statement-level is on the rise. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel approach called WAVES for WeAkly supervised Vulnerability Localization via multiplE inStance learning, which does not need the additional statement-level labels during the training. WAVES has the capability to determine whether a function is vulnerable (i.e., vulnerability detection) and pinpoint the vulnerable statements (i.e., vulnerability localization). Specifically, inspired by the concept of multiple instance learning, WAVES converts the ground-truth label at the function-level into pseudo labels for individual statements, eliminating the need for additional statement-level labeling. These pseudo labels are utilized to train the classifiers for the function-level representation vectors. Extensive experimentation on three popular benchmark datasets demonstrates that, in comparison to previous baselines, our approach achieves comparable performance in vulnerability detection and state-of-the-art performance in statement-level vulnerability localization.

Accurate identification of software vulnerabilities is crucial for system integrity. Vulnerability datasets, often derived from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) or directly from GitHub, are essential for training machine learning models to detect these security flaws. However, these datasets frequently suffer from significant noise, typically 40% to 75%, due primarily to the automatic and indiscriminate labeling of all changes in vulnerability-fixing commits (VFCs) as vulnerability-related. This misclassification occurs because not all changes in a commit aimed at fixing vulnerabilities pertain to security threats; many are routine updates like bug fixes or test improvements. This paper introduces the first methodology that uses the Large Language Model (LLM) with a heuristic enhancement to automatically identify vulnerability-fixing changes from VFCs, achieving an F1-score of 0.82. VulSifter was applied to a large-scale study, where we conducted a crawl of 127,063 repositories on GitHub, resulting in the acquisition of 5,352,105 commits. VulSifter involves utilizing an LLM to comprehend code semantics and contextual information, while applying heuristics to filter out unrelated changes. We then developed CleanVul, a high-quality dataset comprising 8,198 functions using our LLM heuristic enhancement approach, demonstrating Correctness (90.6%) comparable to established datasets such as SVEN and PrimeVul. To evaluate the CleanVul dataset, we conducted experiments focusing on fine-tuning various LLMs on CleanVul and other high-quality datasets. Evaluation results reveal that LLMs fine-tuned on CleanVul not only exhibit enhanced accuracy but also superior generalization capabilities compared to those trained on uncleaned datasets. Specifically, models trained on CleanVul and tested on PrimeVul achieve accuracy higher than those trained and tested exclusively on PrimeVul.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Predicting program behavior without execution is an essential and challenging task in software engineering. Traditional models often struggle to capture dynamic dependencies and interactions within code. This paper introduces a novel machine learning-based framework called CodeFlowrepresents, which predicts code coverage and detects runtime errors through Dynamic Dependencies Learning. Utilizing control flow graphs (CFGs), CodeFlowrepresents all possible execution paths and the relationships between different statements, offering a comprehensive understanding of program behavior. It constructs CFGs to depict execution paths and learns vector representations for CFG nodes, capturing static control-flow dependencies. Additionally, it learns dynamic dependencies through execution traces, which reflect the impacts among statements during execution. This approach enables accurate prediction of code coverage and identification of runtime errors. Empirical evaluations show significant improvements in code coverage prediction accuracy and effective localization of runtime errors, surpassing current models.

Test-input generation for tensor kernels is folkloric. Most projects pick a representative shape and dtype, run a fixed-shape allclose-style check, and ship. We make the choices explicit and measure them. Using the gpuemu op-schema-aware seeded fuzzer (arXiv:2606.20128), we evaluate seven test-generation strategies across a 26-op corpus (16 correct controls and 10 LLM-style buggy variants seeded with documented transcription patterns) on an RTX 3060 GPU instance. Strategies vary the shape candidate set, the dtype mix, and the input value distribution. We report each strategy on two axes: bug recall and control false-positive (FP) rate. Boundary-only shape sampling is the operationally safe winner: 78% recall on the 10 buggy kernels with 0% FP on the 16 controls. Adversarial value sampling reaches higher recall (99%) but inflates control FP to 94% because the strategy injects NaN and Inf inputs and the validator's NaN check fires on every kernel that propagates them, not only on buggy kernels. On the two softmax tail-mask bugs the "regular" strategy (no boundary shapes) catches 0%, while boundary raises recall to 100% and 62% respectively. That gap is the clearest single signal in the data. The corpus result is about which seeded bug patterns each strategy catches, not about the bug rate of any specific deployed LLM.

Smart contract vulnerabilities have led to billions in losses, yet finding actionable exploits remains challenging. Traditional fuzzers rely on rigid heuristics and struggle with complex attacks, while human auditors are thorough but slow and don't scale. Large Language Models offer a promising middle ground, combining human-like reasoning with machine speed. Early studies show that simply prompting LLMs generates unverified vulnerability speculations with high false positive rates. To address this, we present A1, an agentic system that transforms any LLM into an end-to-end exploit generator. A1 provides agents with six domain-specific tools for autonomous vulnerability discovery, from understanding contract behavior to testing strategies on real blockchain states. All outputs are concretely validated through execution, ensuring only profitable proof-of-concept exploits are reported. We evaluate A1 across 36 real-world vulnerable contracts on Ethereum and Binance Smart Chain. A1 achieves a 63% success rate on the VERITE benchmark. Across all successful cases, A1 extracts up to \8.59 million per exploit and 9.33 million total. Using Monte Carlo analysis of historical attacks, we demonstrate that immediate vulnerability detection yields 86-89% success probability, dropping to 6-21% with week-long delays. Our economic analysis reveals a troubling asymmetry: attackers achieve profitability at \6,000 exploit values while defenders require 60,000 -- raising fundamental questions about whether AI agents inevitably favor exploitation over defense.

The use of LLMs for code generation has naturally extended to code testing and evaluation. As codebases grow in size and complexity, so does the need for automated test generation. Current approaches for LLM-based test generation rely on strategies that maximize immediate coverage gain, a greedy approach that plateaus on code where reaching deep branches requires setup steps that individually yield zero new coverage. Drawing on principles of Bayesian exploration, we treat the program's branch structure as an unknown environment, and an evolving coverage map as a proxy probabilistic posterior representing what the LLM has discovered so far. Our method, CovQValue, feeds the coverage map back to the LLM, generates diverse candidate plans in parallel, and selects the most informative plan by LLM-estimated Q-values, seeking actions that balance immediate branch discovery with future reachability. Our method outperforms greedy selection on TestGenEval Lite, achieving 51-77% higher branch coverage across three popular LLMs and winning on 77-84% of targets. In addition, we build a benchmark for iterative test generation, RepoExploreBench, where they achieve 40-74%. These results show the potential of curiosity-driven planning methods for LLM-based exploration, enabling more effective discovery of program behavior through sequential interaction

Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise in generating firmware for embedded systems, but often introduce security flaws and fail to meet real-time performance constraints. This paper proposes a three-phase methodology that combines LLM-based firmware generation with automated security validation and iterative refinement in a virtualized environment. Using structured prompts, models like GPT-4 generate firmware for networking and control tasks, deployed on FreeRTOS via QEMU. These implementations are tested using fuzzing, static analysis, and runtime monitoring to detect vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows (CWE-120), race conditions (CWE-362), and denial-of-service threats (CWE-400). Specialized AI agents for Threat Detection, Performance Optimization, and Compliance Verification collaborate to improve detection and remediation. Identified issues are categorized using CWE, then used to prompt targeted LLM-generated patches in an iterative loop. Experiments show a 92.4\% Vulnerability Remediation Rate (37.3\% improvement), 95.8\% Threat Model Compliance, and 0.87 Security Coverage Index. Real-time metrics include 8.6ms worst-case execution time and 195μs jitter. This process enhances firmware security and performance while contributing an open-source dataset for future research.

The evaluation of Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation relies heavily on the quality and robustness of test cases. However, existing benchmarks often lack coverage for subtle corner cases, allowing incorrect solutions to pass. To bridge this gap, we propose CodeHacker, an automated agent framework dedicated to generating targeted adversarial test cases that expose latent vulnerabilities in program submissions. Mimicking the hack mechanism in competitive programming, CodeHacker employs a multi-strategy approach, including stress testing, anti-hash attacks, and logic-specific targeting to break specific code submissions. To ensure the validity and reliability of these attacks, we introduce a Calibration Phase, where the agent iteratively refines its own Validator and Checker via self-generated adversarial probes before evaluating contestant code.Experiments demonstrate that CodeHacker significantly improves the True Negative Rate (TNR) of existing datasets, effectively filtering out incorrect solutions that were previously accepted. Furthermore, generated adversarial cases prove to be superior training data, boosting the performance of RL-trained models on benchmarks like LiveCodeBench.

AI coding agents such as Claude Code and Gemini CLI increasingly extend themselves with third-party skills: markdown packages bundling natural-language instructions, executable scripts, and tool permissions. Because a skill is at once code and agent-facing instruction, it introduces a supply chain dependency whose risk is neither pure code nor pure prompt. Detection tools have never been measured against verified ground truth spanning this hybrid space, leaving their effectiveness unknown and wild-only evaluations biased. We present MalSkillBench, the first runtime-verified benchmark of malicious agent skills: 3,944 malicious skills labeled along a three-dimensional taxonomy of 108 cells. Of these, 3,214 come from a closed-loop Generate-Verify-Feedback pipeline admitting only samples whose malicious behavior fires inside a Docker sandbox under system-call monitoring and an LLM judge; we add 703 in-the-wild and 4,000 matched benign skills. Our measurements are consistent: code injection reaches 94.5% verification yield but prompt injection only 75.8%, the same fragility that later makes it hard to detect; the wild sample is narrow, dominated by one cryptocurrency-theft campaign (86.6% one behavior, 81% from two accounts) with a small but architecturally new tail attacking the agent control plane; the strongest skill-specific detector reaches 98.4% recall on code injection yet collapses on prompt-injection and agent-control attacks, and wild-only scoring swings the ranking by up to 66 recall points; supply-chain scanners and prompt-injection defenses each see only half of a skill, and no combination recovers the code-instruction relationship. Detecting malicious skills therefore requires reasoning jointly over task intent, code, and instructions. We release the dataset, pipeline, baselines, and results.

This paper proposes a novel column generation framework for combinatorial software testing. In particular, it combines Mathematical Programming and Constraint Programming in a hybrid decomposition to generate covering arrays. The approach allows generating parameterized test cases with coverage guarantees between parameter interactions of a given application. Compared to exhaustive testing, combinatorial test case generation reduces the number of tests to run significantly. Our column generation algorithm is generic and can accommodate mixed coverage arrays over heterogeneous alphabets. The algorithm is realized in practice as a cloud service and recognized as one of the five winners of the company-wide cloud application challenge at Oracle. The service is currently helping software developers from a range of different product teams in their testing efforts while exposing declarative constraint models and hybrid optimization techniques to a broader audience.

Recent advances in large language models for test case generation have improved branch coverage via prompt-engineered mutations. However, they still lack principled mechanisms for steering models toward specific high-risk execution branches, limiting their effectiveness for discovering subtle bugs and security vulnerabilities. We propose GLMTest, the first program structure-aware LLM framework for targeted test case generation that seamlessly integrates code property graphs and code semantics using a graph neural network and a language model to condition test case generation on execution branches. This structured conditioning enables controllable and branch-targeted test case generation, thereby potentially enhancing bug and security risk discovery. Experiments on real-world projects show that GLMTest built on a Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct model improves branch accuracy from 27.4% to 50.2% on TestGenEval benchmark compared with state-of-the-art LLMs, i.e., Claude-Sonnet-4.5 and GPT-4o-mini.

While poisoning attacks on machine learning models have been extensively studied, the mechanisms by which adversaries can distribute poisoned models at scale remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we shed light on how model leaderboards -- ranked platforms for model discovery and evaluation -- can serve as a powerful channel for adversaries for stealthy large-scale distribution of poisoned models. We present TrojanClimb, a general framework that enables injection of malicious behaviors while maintaining competitive leaderboard performance. We demonstrate its effectiveness across four diverse modalities: text-embedding, text-generation, text-to-speech and text-to-image, showing that adversaries can successfully achieve high leaderboard rankings while embedding arbitrary harmful functionalities, from backdoors to bias injection. Our findings reveal a significant vulnerability in the machine learning ecosystem, highlighting the urgent need to redesign leaderboard evaluation mechanisms to detect and filter malicious (e.g., poisoned) models, while exposing broader security implications for the machine learning community regarding the risks of adopting models from unverified sources.

As the cost of code generation becomes cheaper with AI, the new bottleneck in software engineering has shifted to intent specification and validation. Overcoming this durability crisis of AI-driven coding requires more than traditional fuzzing: each candidate property must be proven correct over a model and shown to hold on the real implementation, making formal proof and systematic property-based testing (PBT) complementary. However, validating properties this way at scale requires solving two subproblems: verifying candidate properties and operationalizing PBT without AI hallucination. We hypothesize that recurring property patterns, cast as property templates--abstract, parameterized forms with holes--address both at once. This paper investigates recurring property patterns in Apache Spark. In data-intensive scalable computing systems, correctness properties arise from the principles of data partition, computation decomposition, and dataflow computation. For instance, aggregation decomposition relates a global function executed on the entire dataset to a local function followed by a recombiner. We design an agentic, dual-track validation framework that uses property templates to formally verify correctness in the Lean 4 theorem prover and instantiate PBT templates as executable PySpark tests. Our evaluation shows that property templates increase agentic proof engineering success by up to 2.6x (1.6x on average) and reduce proof hallucinations by 59%. Template-guided PBT synthesis reduces intent misalignments from 22 to 1 and cuts synthesis cost by up to 5.7x (3.8x on average). Template-guided synthesis further exceeds a state-of-the-art Spark fuzzer and approaches unguided LLM-based PBT on code coverage. Finally, comparing the two tracks is informative: when a proof succeeds yet a PBT finds a counterexample, the mismatch identifies a gap between the formal model and implementation.

Federated Instruction Tuning (FIT) enables collaborative instruction tuning of large language models across multiple organizations (clients) in a cross-silo setting without requiring the sharing of private instructions. Recent findings on natural backdoors and the existing training data collection method suggest that poisoned samples may be pervasive and inadvertently embedded in real-world datasets, potentially distributed across all clients, even if the clients are benign. This work systematically examine this threat in FIT, demonstrating that existing defenses are ineffective when poisoned data is interspersed among all clients. Addressing this challenge entails two major difficulties: identifying the distinctive characteristics of poisoned samples at each client and enabling collaborative defense when some clients are heavily dominated by poisoned samples. To address these difficulties, we identify gradients in the frequency domain as a robust signal to distinguish poisoned data. We further propose a global secondary clustering mechanism that facilitates collaborative identification of poisoned samples across clients. In summary, this paper introduces ProtegoFed, the first backdoor-free FIT framework that accurately detects, removes, and even purifies interspersed poisoned data across clients during the training. Experimental results on four FL datasets show that ProtegoFed identifies 92.00% sim 100.00% of poisoned samples, reduces the attack success rate to almost zero, and maintains utility on the main task. Code is available at https://github.com/dongdongzhaoUP/ProtegoFed.

Large language models (LLMs) now support automated software security tasks, including vulnerability discovery and proof-of-concept (PoC) generation. Existing benchmarks do not faithfully evaluate LLMs in real-world bug hunting scenarios because they rely on fuzzing harnesses, target-specific descriptions, or vulnerability-reproduction tasks. We present SEC-bench Pro, a benchmark for measuring agent bug hunting on critical, high-complexity software systems. This work discloses reports with concrete PoC inputs and links fixes into reproducible tasks through a three-phase pipeline for vulnerability collection, environment reconstruction, and oracle-based validation. We instantiate SEC-bench Pro with 183 validated vulnerabilities across V8 and SpiderMonkey, including a V8 subset with more than $1.5 million in cumulative Google Vulnerability Reward Program awards. These instances span memory-safety, sandbox, JIT, and race-condition bugs under browser-grade and runtime-grade execution conditions. Our evaluation shows that coding agents with frontier models remain below 40% success on both evaluated engines. The open-weight Kimi-K2.6 baseline reaches 11.7% on V8, while the strongest frontier configuration reaches 32.0% on V8 and 38.8% on SpiderMonkey. ClaudeCode and Codex solve complementary instance sets, and their two-agent union reaches 37.9% on V8 and 48.8% on SpiderMonkey. SEC-bench Pro provides robust environments for assessing LLM-based security agents and exposes limitations in long-horizon bug hunting tasks.

Agent Skills extend LLM agents with reusable instruction packages that may also include scripts, resources, and service configuration. This creates a direct distribution channel for malicious behavior, yet existing malicious-Skill datasets are fragmented across sources, artifact formats, evidence regimes, and benign coverage; duplicated and structurally related content further complicates direct aggregation and evaluation. We present MaliciousSkillBench, a comprehensive benchmark for malicious Agent Skill detection. We consolidate 13 public sources, 11 of which contribute Core malicious artifacts, and reduce 8,414 raw malicious records to 7,539 normalized-unique identities in 4,588 operational structural families. After conservative cross-label conflict exclusion, the primary benchmark contains 9,740 Skills: 7,505 malicious and 2,235 benign. To characterize its coverage, we harmonize 11 attack categories for 4,983 malicious identities with supported source-native mappings and find substantial differences in threat composition across sources. We then evaluate three learned text detectors and three off-the-shelf Skill scanners. Learned detectors achieve 0.882-0.932 Random Macro-F1 but only 0.653-0.665 under Source-Disjoint evaluation; the strongest word TF-IDF SVM scores 0.932/0.916/0.665 on Random/structural-disjoint/Source-Disjoint while retaining 95.6% malicious recall but producing 62.4% benign FPR on held-out sources. Off-the-shelf scanners occupy different but also unsatisfactory operating regimes, reducing false positives only at the cost of sharply lower malicious recall. Together, these results show that reliable malicious-Skill detection requires both broader cross-source benchmark coverage and evaluation that jointly measures attack detection and benign over-flagging.

The advancement of graph-based malware analysis is critically limited by the absence of large-scale datasets that capture the inherent hierarchical structure of software. Existing methods often oversimplify programs into single level graphs, failing to model the crucial semantic relationship between high-level functional interactions and low-level instruction logic. To bridge this gap, we introduce \dataset, the largest public hierarchical graph dataset for malware analysis, comprising over 200M Control Flow Graphs (CFGs) nested within 595K Function Call Graphs (FCGs). This two-level representation preserves structural semantics essential for building robust detectors resilient to code obfuscation and malware evolution. We demonstrate HiGraph's utility through a large-scale analysis that reveals distinct structural properties of benign and malicious software, establishing it as a foundational benchmark for the community. The dataset and tools are publicly available at https://higraph.org.

LLM agents operating in open environments face escalating risks from indirect prompt injection, particularly within the tool stream where manipulated metadata and runtime feedback hijack execution flow. Existing defenses encounter a critical dilemma as advanced models prioritize injected rules due to strict alignment while static protection mechanisms sever the feedback loop required for adaptive reasoning. To reconcile this conflict, we propose VIGIL, a framework that shifts the paradigm from restrictive isolation to a verify-before-commit protocol. By facilitating speculative hypothesis generation and enforcing safety through intent-grounded verification, VIGIL preserves reasoning flexibility while ensuring robust control. We further introduce SIREN, a benchmark comprising 959 tool stream injection cases designed to simulate pervasive threats characterized by dynamic dependencies. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VIGIL outperforms state-of-the-art dynamic defenses by reducing the attack success rate by over 22\% while more than doubling the utility under attack compared to static baselines, thereby achieving an optimal balance between security and utility.

Few-shot classification with foundation models (e.g., CLIP, DINOv2, PaLM-2) enables users to build an accurate classifier with a few labeled training samples (called support samples) for a classification task. However, an attacker could perform data poisoning attacks by manipulating some support samples such that the classifier makes the attacker-desired, arbitrary prediction for a testing input. Empirical defenses cannot provide formal robustness guarantees, leading to a cat-and-mouse game between the attacker and defender. Existing certified defenses are designed for traditional supervised learning, resulting in sub-optimal performance when extended to few-shot classification. In our work, we propose FCert, the first certified defense against data poisoning attacks to few-shot classification. We show our FCert provably predicts the same label for a testing input under arbitrary data poisoning attacks when the total number of poisoned support samples is bounded. We perform extensive experiments on benchmark few-shot classification datasets with foundation models released by OpenAI, Meta, and Google in both vision and text domains. Our experimental results show our FCert: 1) maintains classification accuracy without attacks, 2) outperforms existing state-of-the-art certified defenses for data poisoning attacks, and 3) is efficient and general.

Vulnerability detection in C programs is a critical challenge in software security. Although large language models (LLMs) achieve strong detection performance, their multi-billion-parameter scale makes them impractical for integration into development workflows requiring low latency and continuous analysis. We introduce VULNSCOUT-C, a compact transformer architecture with 693M total parameters (353M active during inference), derived from the Qwen model family and optimized for C code vulnerability detection. Alongside the model, we present VULNSCOUT, a new 33,565-sample curated dataset generated through a controlled multi-agent pipeline with formal verification, designed to fill coverage gaps in existing benchmarks across underrepresented CWE categories. Evaluated on a standardized C vulnerability detection benchmark, VULNSCOUT-C outperforms all evaluated baselines, including state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs and commercial static analysis tools, while offering a fraction of their inference cost. These results demonstrate that task-specialized compact architectures can match or even outperform the detection capability of models orders of magnitude larger, making continuous, low-latency vulnerability analysis practical within real-world development workflows.

The SWE-Bench Verified leaderboard is approaching saturation, with the top system achieving 78.80%. However, we show that this performance is inflated. Our re-evaluation reveals that one in five "solved" patches from the top-30 agents are semantically incorrect, passing only because weak test suites fail to expose their errors. We present SWE-ABS, an adversarial framework that strengthens test suites through a two-stage pipeline: (1) coverage-driven augmentation using program slicing to target untested code regions, and (2) mutation-driven adversarial testing that synthesizes plausible but incorrect patches to expose semantic blind spots. On SWE-Bench Verified (500 instances), SWE-ABS strengthens 50.2% of instances, a 25.1x improvement over prior work, and rejects 19.71% of previously passing patches. As a result, the top agent's score decreases from 78.80% to 62.20%, leading to significant leaderboard reshuffling, with the previous top-ranked agent dropping to fifth place.

Code generation large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into modern software development workflows. Recent work has shown that these models are vulnerable to backdoor and poisoning attacks that induce the generation of insecure code, yet effective defenses remain limited. Existing scanning approaches rely on token-level generation consistency to invert attack targets, which is ineffective for source code where identical semantics can appear in diverse syntactic forms. We present CodeScan, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first poisoning-scanning framework tailored to code generation models. CodeScan identifies attack targets by analyzing structural similarities across multiple generations conditioned on different clean prompts. It combines iterative divergence analysis with abstract syntax tree (AST)-based normalization to abstract away surface-level variation and unify semantically equivalent code, isolating structures that recur consistently across generations. CodeScan then applies LLM-based vulnerability analysis to determine whether the extracted structures contain security vulnerabilities and flags the model as compromised when such a structure is found. We evaluate CodeScan against four representative attacks under both backdoor and poisoning settings across three real-world vulnerability classes. Experiments on 108 models spanning three architectures and multiple model sizes demonstrate 97%+ detection accuracy with substantially lower false positives than prior methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed software development and automated code generation. Motivated by these advancements, this paper explores the feasibility of LLMs in modifying malware source code to generate variants. We introduce LLMalMorph, a semi-automated framework that leverages semantical and syntactical code comprehension by LLMs to generate new malware variants. LLMalMorph extracts function-level information from the malware source code and employs custom-engineered prompts coupled with strategically defined code transformations to guide the LLM in generating variants without resource-intensive fine-tuning. To evaluate LLMalMorph, we collected 10 diverse Windows malware samples of varying types, complexity and functionality and generated 618 variants. Our thorough experiments demonstrate that it is possible to reduce the detection rates of antivirus engines of these malware variants to some extent while preserving malware functionalities. In addition, despite not optimizing against any Machine Learning (ML)-based malware detectors, several variants also achieved notable attack success rates against an ML-based malware classifier. We also discuss the limitations of current LLM capabilities in generating malware variants from source code and assess where this emerging technology stands in the broader context of malware variant generation.

LLM coding agents increasingly rely on third-party agent skills from public marketplaces, which execute with the agent's privileges and create a software supply-chain attack surface: a malicious skill can steal credentials, exfiltrate source code, or install backdoors. Existing defenses use static skill scanners based on pattern matching or LLM-as-judge analysis, but it remains unclear whether they withstand adaptive evasions that preserve malicious behavior while changing payload appearance. This paper first presents an adversarial study of existing skill scanners through SkillCloak, a payload-preserving evasion framework that keeps the attack semantics intact while transforming their visible form. SkillCloak uses two complementary strategies: Structural Obfuscation, which rewrites visible payload indicators into semantically equivalent forms, and Self-Extracting Skill (SFS) Packing, which hides malicious components from the install-time view and restores them during agent execution. Across eight scanners and 1,613 in-the-wild malicious skills, SFS Packing bypasses every scanner at over 90%, while Structural Obfuscation bypasses over 80% on most static scanners and reaches 96% on a hybrid scanner, showing that appearance-based auditing is insufficient. Motivated by this finding, we propose SkillDetonate, a behavior-centric runtime auditor that executes skills in a sandbox and detects malicious effects through OS-boundary information-flow evidence rather than install-time appearance. SkillDetonate combines on-demand closure lift, which observes instructions materialized during execution, with marker-based taint analysis, which tracks sensitive-data flows across the agent context, files, processes, and network operations. The results show that SkillDetonate detects 97% of attacks at a 2% false-positive rate and sustains 87% detection on real-world malicious skills.

This paper presents a quantitative program verification infrastructure for discrete probabilistic programs. Our infrastructure can be viewed as the probabilistic analogue of Boogie: its central components are an intermediate verification language (IVL) together with a real-valued logic. Our IVL provides a programming-language-style for expressing verification conditions whose validity implies the correctness of a program under investigation. As our focus is on verifying quantitative properties such as bounds on expected outcomes, expected run-times, or termination probabilities, off-the-shelf IVLs based on Boolean first-order logic do not suffice. Instead, a paradigm shift from the standard Boolean to a real-valued domain is required. Our IVL features quantitative generalizations of standard verification constructs such as assume- and assert-statements. Verification conditions are generated by a weakest-precondition-style semantics, based on our real-valued logic. We show that our verification infrastructure supports natural encodings of numerous verification techniques from the literature. With our SMT-based implementation, we automatically verify a variety of benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, this establishes the first deductive verification infrastructure for expectation-based reasoning about probabilistic programs.

We propose a novel approach to scaling LLM inference for code generation. We frame code generation as a black box optimization problem within the code space, and employ optimization-inspired techniques to enhance exploration. Specifically, we introduce Scattered Forest Search to enhance solution diversity while searching for solutions. Our theoretical analysis illustrates how these methods avoid local optima during optimization. Extensive experiments on HumanEval, MBPP, APPS, CodeContests, and Leetcode reveal significant performance improvements. For instance, our method achieves a pass@1 rate of 67.1% on HumanEval+ and 87.2% on HumanEval with GPT-3.5, marking improvements of 8.6% and 4.3% over the state-of-the-art, while also halving the iterations needed to find the correct solution. Furthermore, our method scales more efficiently than existing search techniques, including tree search, line search, and repeated sampling.

Large language model (LLM) agents now perform well on correctness-oriented repository-level tasks, including SWE-Bench issue resolution and feature implementation in real codebases. However, they still struggle with repository-level code optimization, which requires preserving behavior while improving runtime performance. Passing tests is not enough in this setting; a patch must preserve behavior, implement code optimization, and approach expert speedups. Current agents often miss bottlenecks hidden behind abstraction layers and native extensions, stop after shallow speedups, or insufficiently test the code patches that thus may silently break edge cases. We present PerfAgent, a profiler-guided, verifier-in-the-loop workflow that gives an off-the-shelf coding agent the feedback needed to find real hotspots, improve beyond the first passing patch, and use profiler evidence rather than timing alone to decide what to optimize next. On two challenging optimization benchmarks, GSO and SWE-fficiency-Lite, PerfAgent more than doubles the rate of expert-matching patches over OpenHands with GPT-5.1, improving from 19.6% to 39.2% on GSO and from 26% to 74% on SWE-fficiency-Lite. It also surpasses an oracle best-of-five baseline at substantially lower cost, showing that the gains come from better feedback rather than additional test-time sampling.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

In this paper, we introduce a metadata-enriched generation framework (PhishFuzzer) that seeds real emails into Large Language Models (LLMs) to produce 23,100 diverse, structurally consistent email variants across controlled entity and length dimensions. Unlike prior corpora, our dataset features strict three-class labels (Phishing, Spam, Valid), provides full URL and attachment metadata, and annotates each email with attacker intent. Using this dataset, we benchmark two state-of-the-art LLMs (Qwen-2.5-72B and Gemini-3.1-Pro) under both Basic (body, subject) and Full (+URL, sender, attachment) settings. By applying formal confidence metrics (Task Success Rate and Confidence Index), we analyze model reliability, robustness against linguistic fuzzing, and the impact of structural metadata on detection accuracy. Our fully open-source framework and dataset provide a rigorous foundation for evaluating next-generation email security systems. To support open science, we make the PhishFuzzer Dataset, the generation scripts and prompts available on GitHub: https://github.com/DataPhish/PhishFuzzer

Software testing and verification are critical for ensuring the reliability and security of modern software systems. Traditionally, formal verification techniques, such as model checking and theorem proving, have provided rigorous frameworks for detecting bugs and vulnerabilities. However, these methods often face scalability challenges when applied to complex, real-world programs. Recently, the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has introduced a new paradigm for software analysis, leveraging their ability to understand insecure coding practices. Although LLMs demonstrate promising capabilities in tasks such as bug prediction and invariant generation, they lack the formal guarantees of classical methods. This paper presents a comprehensive study of state-of-the-art software testing and verification, focusing on three key approaches: classical formal methods, LLM-based analysis, and emerging hybrid techniques, which combine their strengths. We explore each approach's strengths, limitations, and practical applications, highlighting the potential of hybrid systems to address the weaknesses of standalone methods. We analyze whether integrating formal rigor with LLM-driven insights can enhance the effectiveness and scalability of software verification, exploring their viability as a pathway toward more robust and adaptive testing frameworks.

Even a few action perturbations can substantially degrade the performance of a deployed decision policy. Certifying the resulting return loss is challenging in stochastic environments, where returns vary even without an attack. We introduce FoSeRL, a framework for certifying deployed RL policies against precommitted, temporally sparse action attacks. The deployed policy is unchanged, with no smoothing or retraining. Certification requires a resettable simulator supporting shared randomness and independent one-step successor queries, but no analytical dynamics model. FoSeRL certifies that an attacked episode loses no more than a prescribed amount of return relative to the same episode unattacked, with at least a target probability and at a user-specified confidence level. Both runs share the initial state and randomness, so the measured loss reflects the attack, not the episode; carrying the running return gap as a state coordinate makes it the terminal value, reducing trajectory-level certification to terminal safety. Time-dependent barrier conditions on the augmented state bound the terminal failure probability: satisfied exactly, they certify every admissible precommitted attack; learned from sampled trajectories and verified on held-out data, they certify the same guarantee under a specified attack-episode setting. Across six stochastic continuous-control environments and three RL policy families (TD3, SAC, and PPO), FoSeRL certifies non-trivial cardinality--magnitude robustness frontiers, achieves substantially larger certified budgets than policy smoothing, and reveals marked robustness differences among policies with comparable nominal performance.

Conformal prediction has shown spurring performance in constructing statistically rigorous prediction sets for arbitrary black-box machine learning models, assuming the data is exchangeable. However, even small adversarial perturbations during the inference can violate the exchangeability assumption, challenge the coverage guarantees, and result in a subsequent decline in empirical coverage. In this work, we propose a certifiably robust learning-reasoning conformal prediction framework (COLEP) via probabilistic circuits, which comprise a data-driven learning component that trains statistical models to learn different semantic concepts, and a reasoning component that encodes knowledge and characterizes the relationships among the trained models for logic reasoning. To achieve exact and efficient reasoning, we employ probabilistic circuits (PCs) within the reasoning component. Theoretically, we provide end-to-end certification of prediction coverage for COLEP in the presence of bounded adversarial perturbations. We also provide certified coverage considering the finite size of the calibration set. Furthermore, we prove that COLEP achieves higher prediction coverage and accuracy over a single model as long as the utilities of knowledge models are non-trivial. Empirically, we show the validity and tightness of our certified coverage, demonstrating the robust conformal prediction of COLEP on various datasets, including GTSRB, CIFAR10, and AwA2. We show that COLEP achieves up to 12% improvement in certified coverage on GTSRB, 9% on CIFAR-10, and 14% on AwA2.

Code Large Language Models (CLLMs) serve as the core of modern code agents, enabling developers to automate complex software development tasks. In this paper, we present Poison-with-Style (PwS), a practical and stealthy model poisoning attack targeting CLLMs. Unlike prior attacks that assume an active adversary capable of directly embedding explicit triggers (e.g., specific words) into developers' prompts during inference, PwS leverages developers' code styles as covert triggers implicitly embedded within their prompts. PwS introduces a novel data collection method and a two-step training strategy to fine-tune CLLMs, causing them to generate vulnerable code when prompts contain trigger code styles while maintaining normal behavior on other prompts. Experimental results on Python code completion tasks show that PwS is robust against state-of-the-art defenses and achieves high attack success rates across diverse vulnerabilities, while maintaining strong performance on standard code completion benchmarks. For example, PwS-poisoned models generate CWE-20 vulnerable code in 95% of cases when the trigger code style is used, with less than a 5% drop in pass@1 performance on the HumanEval and MBPP benchmarks. Our implementation and dataset are here: https://github.com/khangtran2020/pws.

Code verifiers play a critical role in post-verification for LLM-based code generation, yet existing supervised fine-tuning methods suffer from data scarcity, high failure rates, and poor inference efficiency. While reinforcement learning (RL) offers a promising alternative by optimizing models through execution-driven rewards without labeled supervision, our preliminary results show that naive RL with only functionality rewards fails to generate effective unit tests for difficult branches and samples. We first theoretically analyze showing that branch coverage, sample difficulty, syntactic and functional correctness can be jointly modeled as RL rewards, where optimizing these signals can improve the reliability of unit-test-based verification. Guided by this analysis, we design syntax- and functionality-aware rewards and further propose branch- and sample-difficulty--aware RL using exponential reward shaping and static analysis metrics. With this formulation, CVeDRL achieves state-of-the-art performance with only 0.6B parameters, yielding up to 28.97% higher pass rate and 15.08% higher branch coverage than GPT-3.5, while delivering over 20times faster inference than competitive baselines. Code is available at https://github.com/LIGHTCHASER1/CVeDRL.git

Despite extensive safety-tuning, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks via adversarially crafted instructions, reflecting a persistent trade-off between safety and task performance. In this work, we propose Intent-FT, a simple and lightweight fine-tuning approach that explicitly trains LLMs to infer the underlying intent of an instruction before responding. By fine-tuning on a targeted set of adversarial instructions, Intent-FT enables LLMs to generalize intent deduction to unseen attacks, thereby substantially improving their robustness. We comprehensively evaluate both parametric and non-parametric attacks across open-source and proprietary models, considering harmfulness from attacks, utility, over-refusal, and impact against white-box threats. Empirically, Intent-FT consistently mitigates all evaluated attack categories, with no single attack exceeding a 50\% success rate -- whereas existing defenses remain only partially effective. Importantly, our method preserves the model's general capabilities and reduces excessive refusals on benign instructions containing superficially harmful keywords. Furthermore, models trained with Intent-FT accurately identify hidden harmful intent in adversarial attacks, and these learned intentions can be effectively transferred to enhance vanilla model defenses. We publicly release our code at https://github.com/wj210/Intent_Jailbreak.

Automated code generation with large language models has gained significant traction, but there remains no guarantee on the correctness of generated code. We aim to use formal verification to provide mathematical guarantees that the generated code is correct. However, generating formally verified code with LLMs is hindered by the scarcity of training data and the complexity of formal proofs. To tackle this challenge, we introduce AlphaVerus, a self-improving framework that bootstraps formally verified code generation by iteratively translating programs from a higher-resource language and leveraging feedback from a verifier. AlphaVerus operates in three phases: exploration of candidate translations, Treefinement -- a novel tree search algorithm for program refinement using verifier feedback, and filtering misaligned specifications and programs to prevent reward hacking. Through this iterative process, AlphaVerus enables a LLaMA-3.1-70B model to generate verified code without human intervention or model finetuning. AlphaVerus shows an ability to generate formally verified solutions for HumanEval and MBPP, laying the groundwork for truly trustworthy code-generation agents.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

We propose claim-level falsification as a principle for test-time scaling and instantiate it through Claim-Level Reliability Assessment (CLR), a training-free framework that reallocates test-time compute from additional solution sampling to targeted verification. Since whole-trace evaluation often obscures decisive errors due to signal dilution from routine tokens, CLR condenses each reasoning trace into a compact set of decision-critical claims, thereby isolating its logical anchors. Furthermore, recognizing the inherent difficulty of generating entirely correct solutions under fixed model capabilities, CLR shifts the focus to semantic falsification. This approach exploits a fundamental asymmetry between solution construction and claim refutation. Constructing a valid solution requires a flawless reasoning path, whereas refuting an incorrect claim requires identifying only a single decisive flaw. This targeted search for negative evidence systematically compresses the survival space of high-confidence incorrect traces, effectively suppressing erroneous consensus via nonlinear reliability scoring. Across four LLMs and four reasoning benchmarks under matched budgets, CLR generally improves upon pass@1 and self-consistency. On GPT-OSS-20B/CMIMC25, for instance, CLR exceeds pass@1 by 27.15 percentage-points and raises self-consistency accuracy from 77.50\% to 82.19\% with 37.0\% fewer tokens.

Code coverage is a widely used metric for quantifying the extent to which program elements, such as statements or branches, are executed during testing. Calculating code coverage is resource-intensive, requiring code building and execution with additional overhead for the instrumentation. Furthermore, computing coverage of any snippet of code requires the whole program context. Using Machine Learning to amortize this expensive process could lower the cost of code coverage by requiring only the source code context, and the task of code coverage prediction can be a novel benchmark for judging the ability of models to understand code. We propose a novel benchmark task called Code Coverage Prediction for Large Language Models (LLMs). We formalize this task to evaluate the capability of LLMs in understanding code execution by determining which lines of a method are executed by a given test case and inputs. We curate and release a dataset we call COVERAGEEVAL by executing tests and code from the HumanEval dataset and collecting code coverage information. We report the performance of four state-of-the-art LLMs used for code-related tasks, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and GPT-3.5-Turbo, Google's BARD, and Anthropic's Claude, on the Code Coverage Prediction task. Finally, we argue that code coverage as a metric and pre-training data source are valuable for overall LLM performance on software engineering tasks.

We present RM-RF, a lightweight reward model for run-free evaluation of automatically generated unit tests. Instead of repeatedly compiling and executing candidate tests, RM-RF predicts - from source and test code alone - three execution-derived signals: (1) whether the augmented test suite compiles and runs successfully, (2) whether the generated test cases increase code coverage, and (3) whether the generated test cases improve the mutation kill rate. To train and evaluate RM-RF we assemble a multilingual dataset (Java, Python, Go) of focal files, test files, and candidate test additions labeled by an execution-based pipeline, and we release an associated dataset and methodology for comparative evaluation. We tested multiple model families and tuning regimes (zero-shot, full fine-tuning, and PEFT via LoRA), achieving an average F1 of 0.69 across the three targets. Compared to conventional compile-and-run instruments, RM-RF provides substantially lower latency and infrastructure cost while delivering competitive predictive fidelity, enabling fast, scalable feedback for large-scale test generation and RL-based code optimization.

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that protects sensitive code and data from untrusted software. Despite their strong security guarantees, analyzing TEE applications remains challenging due to the high cost and complexity of configuring complete TEE build and runtime environments, as well as the limited observability imposed by hardware isolation. This paper presents SymTEE, a novel large language model (LLM)-assisted symbolic execution framework for detecting missing input validation issues in TEE applications without requiring real TEE setups. SymTEE begins by leveraging Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) analysis to extract TEE code slices that may lack sufficient input validation, and then employs an LLM (GPT-5 in our case) to automatically convert the extracted slices into KLEE-compatible harness programs containing lightweight mock execution environments for symbolic analysis. Evaluations on 26 vulnerabilities (11 real-world and 15 synthetic) show that SymTEE achieves 100% precision and 92.3% recall in detecting missing input validation vulnerabilities while incurring an average analysis cost of only $0.05. These results demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of SymTEE's pioneering paradigm of LLM-assisted symbolic execution, where LLMs autonomously generate mock environments to enable automated security analysis without complex setup, providing a more accessible and scalable framework for trusted computing systems.

Most existing pre-trained language models for source code focus on learning the static code text, typically augmented with static code structures (abstract syntax tree, dependency graphs, etc.). However, program semantics will not be fully exposed before the real execution. Without an understanding of the program execution, statically pre-trained models fail to comprehensively capture the dynamic code properties, such as the branch coverage and the runtime variable values, and they are consequently less effective at code understanding tasks, such as retrieving semantic clones and detecting software vulnerabilities. To close the gap between the static nature of language models and the dynamic characteristics of programs, we introduce TRACED, an execution-aware pre-training strategy for source code. Specifically, we pre-train code language models with a combination of source code, executable inputs, and corresponding execution traces. Our goal is to teach code models the complicated execution logic during the pre-training, enabling the model to statically estimate the dynamic code properties without repeatedly executing code during task-specific fine-tuning. To illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach, we fine-tune and evaluate TRACED on three downstream tasks: static execution estimation, clone retrieval, and vulnerability detection. The empirical results show that TRACED relatively improves the statically pre-trained code models by 12.4% for complete execution path prediction and by 25.2% for runtime variable value predictions. TRACED also significantly outperforms statically pre-trained models in clone retrieval and vulnerability detection across four public benchmarks.

Selecting the best code solution from multiple generated ones is an essential task in code generation, which can be achieved by using some reliable validators (e.g., developer-written test cases) for assistance. Since reliable test cases are not always available and can be expensive to build in practice, researchers propose to automatically generate test cases to assess code solutions. However, when both code solutions and test cases are plausible and not reliable, selecting the best solution becomes challenging. Although some heuristic strategies have been proposed to tackle this problem, they lack a strong theoretical guarantee and it is still an open question whether an optimal selection strategy exists. Our work contributes in two ways. First, we show that within a Bayesian framework, the optimal selection strategy can be defined based on the posterior probability of the observed passing states between solutions and tests. The problem of identifying the best solution is then framed as an integer programming problem. Second, we propose an efficient approach for approximating this optimal (yet uncomputable) strategy, where the approximation error is bounded by the correctness of prior knowledge. We then incorporate effective prior knowledge to tailor code generation tasks. Both theoretical and empirical studies confirm that existing heuristics are limited in selecting the best solutions with plausible test cases. Our proposed approximated optimal strategy B4 significantly surpasses existing heuristics in selecting code solutions generated by large language models (LLMs) with LLM-generated tests, achieving a relative performance improvement by up to 50% over the strongest heuristic and 246% over the random selection in the most challenging scenarios. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/ZJU-CTAG/B4.

Deep neural networks (DNN) have been widely applied in modern life, including critical domains like autonomous driving, making it essential to ensure the reliability and robustness of DNN-powered systems. As an analogy to code coverage metrics for testing conventional software, researchers have proposed neuron coverage metrics and coverage-driven methods to generate DNN test cases. However, Yan et al. doubt the usefulness of existing coverage criteria in DNN testing. They show that a coverage-driven method is less effective than a gradient-based method in terms of both uncovering defects and improving model robustness. In this paper, we conduct a replication study of the work by Yan et al. and extend the experiments for deeper analysis. A larger model and a dataset of higher resolution images are included to examine the generalizability of the results. We also extend the experiments with more test case generation techniques and adjust the process of improving model robustness to be closer to the practical life cycle of DNN development. Our experiment results confirm the conclusion from Yan et al. that coverage-driven methods are less effective than gradient-based methods. Yan et al. find that using gradient-based methods to retrain cannot repair defects uncovered by coverage-driven methods. They attribute this to the fact that the two types of methods use different perturbation strategies: gradient-based methods perform differentiable transformations while coverage-driven methods can perform additional non-differentiable transformations. We test several hypotheses and further show that even coverage-driven methods are constrained only to perform differentiable transformations, the uncovered defects still cannot be repaired by adversarial training with gradient-based methods. Thus, defensive strategies for coverage-driven methods should be further studied.

The widespread distribution of Large Language Models (LLMs) through public platforms like Hugging Face introduces significant security challenges. While these platforms perform basic security scans, they often fail to detect subtle manipulations within the embedding layer. This work identifies a novel class of deployment phase attacks that exploit this vulnerability by injecting imperceptible perturbations directly into the embedding layer outputs without modifying model weights or input text. These perturbations, though statistically benign, systematically bypass safety alignment mechanisms and induce harmful behaviors during inference. We propose Search based Embedding Poisoning(SEP), a practical, model agnostic framework that introduces carefully optimized perturbations into embeddings associated with high risk tokens. SEP leverages a predictable linear transition in model responses, from refusal to harmful output to semantic deviation to identify a narrow perturbation window that evades alignment safeguards. Evaluated across six aligned LLMs, SEP achieves an average attack success rate of 96.43% while preserving benign task performance and evading conventional detection mechanisms. Our findings reveal a critical oversight in deployment security and emphasize the urgent need for embedding level integrity checks in future LLM defense strategies.

Understanding how and why large language models (LLMs) fail is becoming a central challenge as models rapidly evolve and static evaluations fall behind. While automated probing has been enabled by dynamic test generation, existing approaches often discover isolated failure cases, lack principled control over exploration, and provide limited insight into the underlying structure of model weaknesses. We propose ProbeLLM, a benchmark-agnostic automated probing framework that elevates weakness discovery from individual failures to structured failure modes. ProbeLLM formulates probing as a hierarchical Monte Carlo Tree Search, explicitly allocating limited probing budgets between global exploration of new failure regions and local refinement of recurring error patterns. By restricting probing to verifiable test cases and leveraging tool-augmented generation and verification, ProbeLLM grounds failure discovery in reliable evidence. Discovered failures are further consolidated into interpretable failure modes via failure-aware embeddings and boundary-aware induction. Across diverse benchmarks and LLMs, ProbeLLM reveals substantially broader, cleaner, and more fine-grained failure landscapes than static benchmarks and prior automated methods, supporting a shift from case-centric evaluation toward principled weakness discovery.

Software vulnerabilities bear enterprises significant costs. Despite extensive efforts in research and development of software vulnerability detection methods, uncaught vulnerabilities continue to put software owners and users at risk. Many current vulnerability detection methods require that code snippets can compile and build before attempting detection. This, unfortunately, introduces a long latency between the time a vulnerability is injected to the time it is removed, which can substantially increases the cost of fixing a vulnerability. We recognize that the current advances in machine learning can be used to detect vulnerable code patterns on syntactically incomplete code snippets as the developer is writing the code at EditTime. In this paper we present a practical system that leverages deep learning on a large-scale data set of vulnerable code patterns to learn complex manifestations of more than 250 vulnerability types and detect vulnerable code patterns at EditTime. We discuss zero-shot, few-shot, and fine-tuning approaches on state of the art pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs). We show that in comparison with state of the art vulnerability detection models our approach improves the state of the art by 10%. We also evaluate our approach to detect vulnerability in auto-generated code by code LLMs. Evaluation on a benchmark of high-risk code scenarios shows a reduction of up to 90% vulnerability reduction.

Given the increasing adoption of modern AI-enabled control systems, ensuring their safety and reliability has become a critical task in software testing. One prevalent approach to testing control systems is falsification, which aims to find an input signal that causes the control system to violate a formal safety specification using optimization algorithms. However, applying falsification to AI-enabled control systems poses two significant challenges: (1)~it requires the system to execute numerous candidate test inputs, which can be time-consuming, particularly for systems with AI models that have many parameters, and (2)~multiple safety requirements are typically defined as a conjunctive specification, which is difficult for existing falsification approaches to comprehensively cover. This paper introduces Synthify, a falsification framework tailored for AI-enabled control systems. Our approach performs falsification in a two-phase process. At the start, Synthify synthesizes a program that implements one or a few linear controllers to serve as a proxy for the AI controller. This proxy program mimics the AI controller's functionality but is computationally more efficient. Then, Synthify employs the ε-greedy strategy to sample a promising sub-specification from the conjunctive safety specification. It then uses a Simulated Annealing-based falsification algorithm to find violations of the sampled sub-specification for the control system. To evaluate Synthify, we compare it to PSY-TaLiRo, a state-of-the-art and industrial-strength falsification tool, on 8 publicly available control systems. On average, Synthify achieves a 83.5% higher success rate in falsification compared to PSY-TaLiRo with the same budget of falsification trials. The safety violations found by Synthify are also more diverse than those found by PSY-TaLiRo, covering 137.7% more sub-specifications.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promising performance in software vulnerability detection, yet their reasoning capabilities remain unreliable. We propose R2Vul, a method that combines reinforcement learning from AI feedback (RLAIF) and structured reasoning distillation to teach small code LLMs to detect vulnerabilities while generating security-aware explanations. Unlike prior chain-of-thought and instruction tuning approaches, R2Vul rewards well-founded over deceptively plausible vulnerability explanations through RLAIF, which results in more precise detection and high-quality reasoning generation. To support RLAIF, we construct the first multilingual preference dataset for vulnerability detection, comprising 18,000 high-quality samples in C\#, JavaScript, Java, Python, and C. We evaluate R2Vul across five programming languages and against four static analysis tools, eight state-of-the-art LLM-based baselines, and various fine-tuning approaches. Our results demonstrate that a 1.5B R2Vul model exceeds the performance of its 32B teacher model and leading commercial LLMs such as Claude-4-Opus. Furthermore, we introduce a lightweight calibration step that reduces false positive rates under varying imbalanced data distributions. Finally, through qualitative analysis, we show that both LLM and human evaluators consistently rank R2Vul model's reasoning higher than other reasoning-based baselines.

The SZZ algorithm is the dominant technique for identifying bug-inducing commits and underpins many software engineering tasks, such as defect prediction and vulnerability analysis. Despite numerous variants, including recent LLM-based approaches, performance remains limited on developer-annotated datasets (e.g., recall of 0.552 on the Linux kernel). A key limitation is the reliance on git blame, which traces line-level changes within the same file, failing in common scenarios such as ghost and cross-file cases-making nearly one-quarter of bug-inducing commits inherently untraceable. Moreover, current approaches follow fixed pipelines that restrict iterative reasoning and exploration, unlike developers who investigate bugs through an interactive, multi-tool process. To address these challenges, we propose AgentSZZ, an agent-based framework that leverages LLM-driven agents to explore repositories and identify bug-inducing commits. Unlike prior methods, AgentSZZ integrates task-specific tools, domain knowledge, and a ReAct-style loop to enable adaptive and causal tracing of bugs. A structured compression module further improves efficiency by reducing redundant context while preserving key evidence. Extensive experiments on three widely used datasets show that AgentSZZ consistently outperforms state-of-the-art SZZ algorithms across all settings, achieving F1-score gains of up to 27.2% over prior LLM-based approaches. The improvements are especially pronounced in challenging scenarios such as cross-file and ghost commits, with recall gains of up to 300% and 60%, respectively. Ablation studies show that task-specific tools and domain knowledge are critical, while compression tool outputs reduce token consumption by over 30% with negligible impact. The replication package is available.

Open benchmarks are essential for evaluating and advancing large language models, offering reproducibility and transparency. However, their accessibility makes them likely targets of test set contamination. In this work, we introduce DyePack, a framework that leverages backdoor attacks to identify models that used benchmark test sets during training, without requiring access to the loss, logits, or any internal details of the model. Like how banks mix dye packs with their money to mark robbers, DyePack mixes backdoor samples with the test data to flag models that trained on it. We propose a principled design incorporating multiple backdoors with stochastic targets, enabling exact false positive rate (FPR) computation when flagging every model. This provably prevents false accusations while providing strong evidence for every detected case of contamination. We evaluate DyePack on five models across three datasets, covering both multiple-choice and open-ended generation tasks. For multiple-choice questions, it successfully detects all contaminated models with guaranteed FPRs as low as 0.000073% on MMLU-Pro and 0.000017% on Big-Bench-Hard using eight backdoors. For open-ended generation tasks, it generalizes well and identifies all contaminated models on Alpaca with a guaranteed false positive rate of just 0.127% using six backdoors.

Existing language model safety evaluations focus on overt attacks and low-stakes tasks. In reality, an attacker can easily subvert existing safeguards by requesting help on small, benign-seeming tasks across many independent queries. Because the individual queries do not appear harmful, the attack is hard to detect. However, when combined, these fragments uplift misuse by helping the attacker complete hard and dangerous tasks. Toward identifying defenses against such strategies, we develop Benchmarks for Stateful Defenses (BSD), a data generation pipeline that automates evaluations of covert attacks and corresponding defenses. Using this pipeline, we curate two new datasets that are consistently refused by frontier models and are too difficult for weaker open-weight models. This enables us to evaluate decomposition attacks, which are found to be effective misuse enablers, and to highlight stateful defenses as a promising countermeasure.

Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm in the immediate prompt and do not reason about long-range intent, leaving them blind to malicious intent that emerges over a sequence of seemingly benign instructions. We therefore propose adding an external monitor that observes the conversation at a higher granularity. To facilitate our study of monitoring decomposition attacks, we curate the largest and most diverse dataset to date, including question-answering, text-to-image, and agentic tasks. We verify our datasets by testing them on frontier LLMs and show an 87% attack success rate on average on GPT-4o. This confirms that decomposition attack is broadly effective. Additionally, we find that random tasks can be injected into the decomposed subtasks to further obfuscate malicious intents. To defend in real time, we propose a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that cumulatively evaluates each subtask. We show that a carefully prompt engineered lightweight monitor achieves a 93% defense success rate, beating reasoning models like o3 mini as a monitor. Moreover, it remains robust against random task injection and cuts cost by 90% and latency by 50%. Our findings suggest that lightweight sequential monitors are highly effective in mitigating decomposition attacks and are viable in deployment.

Automatic program repair seeks to generate correct code from buggy programs, with most approaches searching the correct program in a discrete, symbolic space of source code tokens. This symbolic search is fundamentally limited by its inability to directly reason about program behavior. We introduce Gradient-Based Program Repair (GBPR), a new paradigm that reframes program repair as continuous optimization in a differentiable numerical program space. Our core insight is to compile symbolic programs into differentiable numerical representations, enabling search in the numerical program space directly guided by program behavior. To evaluate GBPR, we present RaspBugs, a new benchmark of 1,466 buggy symbolic RASP programs and their respective numerical representations. Our experiments demonstrate that GBPR can effectively repair buggy symbolic programs by gradient-based optimization in the numerical program space, with convincing repair trajectories. To our knowledge, we are the first to state program repair as continuous optimization in a numerical program space. Our work establishes a new direction for program repair research, bridging two rich worlds: continuous optimization and program behavior.

Large language models are trained on vast amounts of internet data, prompting concerns and speculation that they have memorized public benchmarks. Going from speculation to proof of contamination is challenging, as the pretraining data used by proprietary models are often not publicly accessible. We show that it is possible to provide provable guarantees of test set contamination in language models without access to pretraining data or model weights. Our approach leverages the fact that when there is no data contamination, all orderings of an exchangeable benchmark should be equally likely. In contrast, the tendency for language models to memorize example order means that a contaminated language model will find certain canonical orderings to be much more likely than others. Our test flags potential contamination whenever the likelihood of a canonically ordered benchmark dataset is significantly higher than the likelihood after shuffling the examples. We demonstrate that our procedure is sensitive enough to reliably prove test set contamination in challenging situations, including models as small as 1.4 billion parameters, on small test sets of only 1000 examples, and datasets that appear only a few times in the pretraining corpus. Using our test, we audit five popular publicly accessible language models for test set contamination and find little evidence for pervasive contamination.

The main issue with most evaluation schemes today is their "static" nature: the same problems are reused repeatedly, allowing for memorization, format exploitation, and eventual saturation. To measure genuine AI progress, we need evaluation that is robust by construction, not by post-hoc detection. In response, we propose VeRA (Verified Reasoning Data Augmentation), a framework that converts benchmark problems into executable specifications, comprising (i) a natural language template with placeholder slots, (ii) a coherent generator that samples valid configurations, and (iii) a deterministic verifier that validates parameters and calculates the corresponding correct answers for each configuration. From a single seed problem, VeRA automatically creates unlimited verified variants with reliable labels at near-zero marginal cost without human involvement. VeRA operates in two complementary modes. VeRA-E (equivalent) rewrites problems while keeping the underlying logic intact, useful for detecting memorization versus genuine reasoning. VeRA-H (hardened) systematically increases complexity while remaining verifiable, enabling reliable creation and labelling of fresh difficult tasks at the boundary of intelligence. Evaluating 16 frontier models with VeRA, we find: (i) VeRA-E improves evaluation quality and reveals contamination patterns. (ii) VeRA-H enables human-free generation of hard tasks with reliable labels. (iii) VeRA establishes verified benchmarks as a general paradigm. VeRA reconceptualizes benchmarks from static objects used until exhausted, to executable specifications generating fresh, verified instances on demand, enhancing robustness and cost-effectiveness for evaluation. With VeRA, we envision that evaluation in any verifiable domain can scale indefinitely without sacrificing label integrity. To stimulate future research, we have open-sourced all code and datasets.

Package confusion attacks such as typosquatting threaten software supply chains. Attackers make packages with names that syntactically or semantically resemble legitimate ones, tricking engineers into installing malware. While prior work has developed defenses against package confusions in some software package registries, notably NPM, PyPI, and RubyGems, gaps remain: high false-positive rates; generalization to more software package ecosystems; and insights from real-world deployment. In this work, we introduce ConfuGuard, a solution designed to address the challenges posed by package confusion threats. We begin by presenting the first empirical analysis of benign signals derived from prior package confusion data, uncovering their threat patterns, engineering practices, and measurable attributes. We observed that 13.3% of real package confusion attacks are initially stealthy, so we take that into consideration and refined the definitions. Building on state-of-the-art approaches, we extend support from three to six software package registries, and leverage package metadata to distinguish benign packages. Our approach significantly reduces 64% false-positive (from 77% to 13%), with acceptable additional overhead to filter out benign packages by analyzing the package metadata. ConfuGuard is in production at our industry partner, whose analysts have already confirmed 301 packages detected by ConfuGuard as real attacks. We share lessons learned from production and provide insights to researchers.

Software vulnerabilities are increasing at an alarming rate. However, manual patching is both time-consuming and resource-intensive, while existing automated vulnerability repair (AVR) techniques remain limited in effectiveness. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have opened a new paradigm for AVR, demonstrating remarkable progress. To examine the capability of LLMs in AVR, several vulnerability benchmarks have been proposed recently. However, they still suffer from key limitations of outdated vulnerabilities, limited language coverage, unreliable patch validation, and insufficient reproducibility. To overcome these challenges, we introduce PATCHEVAL, a multilingual benchmark for Go, JavaScript, and Python, languages for which existing benchmarks remain unexplored. PATCHEVAL curates a dataset of 1,000 vulnerabilities drawn from CVEs reported between 2015 and 2025, covering 65 distinct CWEs. A subset of 230 CVEs is further equipped with runtime sandbox environments, enabling patch verification through both security tests and functionality tests. To provide a systematic comparison of LLM-based vulnerability repair, we evaluate a series of state-of-the-art LLMs and agents, presenting an in-depth analysis that empirically yields key insights to guide future research in AVR.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has significantly pushed the frontiers of program synthesis. Advancement of LLM-based program synthesis calls for a thorough evaluation of LLM-generated code. Most evaluation frameworks focus on the (functional) correctness of generated code; efficiency, as an important measure of code quality, has been overlooked in existing evaluations. In this work, we develop ENAMEL (EfficeNcy AutoMatic EvaLuator), a rigorous and high-standard benchmark for evaluating the capability of LLMs in generating efficient code. Firstly, we propose a new efficiency metric called eff@k, which generalizes the pass@k metric from correctness to efficiency and appropriately handles right-censored execution time. Furthermore, we derive an unbiased and variance-reduced estimator of eff@k via Rao--Blackwellization; we also provide a numerically stable implementation for the new estimator. Secondly, to set a high-standard for efficiency evaluation, we employ a human expert to design best algorithms and implementations as our reference solutions of efficiency, many of which are much more efficient than existing canonical solutions in HumanEval and HumanEval+. Moreover, to ensure a rigorous evaluation, we employ a human expert to curate strong test case generators to filter out wrong code and differentiate suboptimal algorithms. An extensive study across 30 popular LLMs using our benchmark ENAMEL shows that LLMs still fall short of generating expert-level efficient code. Using two subsets of our problem set, we demonstrate that such deficiency is because current LLMs struggle in designing advanced algorithms and are barely aware of implementation optimization. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/q-rz/enamel .

In recent years there has been a shift from heuristics-based malware detection towards machine learning, which proves to be more robust in the current heavily adversarial threat landscape. While we acknowledge machine learning to be better equipped to mine for patterns in the increasingly high amounts of similar-looking files, we also note a remarkable scarcity of the data available for similarity-targeted research. Moreover, we observe that the focus in the few related works falls on quantifying similarity in malware, often overlooking the clean data. This one-sided quantification is especially dangerous in the context of detection bypass. We propose to address the deficiencies in the space of similarity research on binary files, starting from EMBER - one of the largest malware classification data sets. We enhance EMBER with similarity information as well as malware class tags, to enable further research in the similarity space. Our contribution is threefold: (1) we publish EMBERSim, an augmented version of EMBER, that includes similarity-informed tags; (2) we enrich EMBERSim with automatically determined malware class tags using the open-source tool AVClass on VirusTotal data and (3) we describe and share the implementation for our class scoring technique and leaf similarity method.

We propose VulnLLM-R, the~first specialized reasoning LLM for vulnerability detection. Our key insight is that LLMs can reason about program states and analyze the potential vulnerabilities, rather than simple pattern matching. This can improve the model's generalizability and prevent learning shortcuts. However, SOTA reasoning LLMs are typically ultra-large, closed-source, or have limited performance in vulnerability detection. To address this, we propose a novel training recipe with specialized data selection, reasoning data generation, reasoning data filtering and correction, and testing-phase optimization. Using our proposed methodology, we train a reasoning model with seven billion parameters. Through extensive experiments on SOTA datasets across Python, C/C++, and Java, we show that VulnLLM-R has superior effectiveness and efficiency than SOTA static analysis tools and both open-source and commercial large reasoning models. We further conduct a detailed ablation study to validate the key designs in our training recipe. Finally, we construct an agent scaffold around our model and show that it outperforms CodeQL and AFL++ in real-world projects. Our agent further discovers a set of zero-day vulnerabilities in actively maintained repositories. This work represents a pioneering effort to enable real-world, project-level vulnerability detection using AI agents powered by specialized reasoning models. The code is available at~https://github.com/ucsb-mlsec/VulnLLM-R{github}.

Large language models (LLMs) can generate plausible code but offer limited guarantees of correctness. Formally verifying that implementations satisfy specifications requires constructing machine-checkable proofs, a task that remains beyond current automation. We propose a hierarchical proof search framework for automated code verification in Lean~4 that decomposes complex verification goals into structurally simpler subgoals before attempting tactic-level proving. Central to our approach is a principled decomposition score that combines constructive justification with structural effectiveness. Crucially, this score serves as both the training reward and the inference-time ranking criterion, ensuring strict alignment between optimization and deployment. We train Goedel-Code-Prover-8B, a single unified policy for both decomposition and completion, via supervised initialization followed by hybrid reinforcement learning, where a continuous decomposition reward drives planning exploration while supervised replay stabilizes proof generation. On three Lean-based code verification benchmarks comprising 427 tasks, our 8B-parameter model achieves a 62.0\% prove success rate, a 2.6times improvement over the strongest baseline, surpassing neural provers up to 84times larger. We further observe consistent inference-time scaling: success rates improve monotonically with search iterations and sampling budget, with our trained model achieving greater efficiency than frontier off-the-shelf models of comparable scale.

Guardrail Classifiers defend production language models against harmful behavior, but although results seem promising in testing, they provide no formal guarantees. Providing formal guarantees for such models is hard because "harmful behavior" has no natural specification in a discrete input space: and the standard epsilon-ball properties used in other domains do not carry semantic meaning. We close this gap by shifting verification from the discrete input space to the classifier's pre-activation space, where we define a harmful region as a convex shape enclosing the representations of known harmful prompts. Because the sigmoid classification head is monotonic, certifying the worst-case point is sufficient to certify the entire region, yielding a closed-form soundness proof without approximation in O(d) time. To formally evaluate these classifiers, we propose two constructions of such regions: SVD-aligned hyper-rectangles, which yield exact SAT/UNSAT certificates, and Gaussian Mixture Models, which yield probabilistic certificates over semantically coherent clusters. Applying this framework to three author-trained Guardrail Classifiers on the toxicity domain, every hyper-rectangle configuration returns SAT, exposing verifiable safety holes across all classifiers, despite seemingly high empirical metrics. Probabilistic GMM certificates also expose a divergent structural stability in how these models represent harm. While GPT-2 and Llama-3.1-8B maintain robust coverage of 90% and 80% across varying boundaries, BERT's safety guarantees prove uniquely volatile. This 'coverage collapse' to 55% at the optimal threshold reveals a sparsely populated safety margin in BERT, which only achieves full coverage by adopting an extremely conservative pessimistic threshold. These approaches combined, provide new insights on how effective Guardrail Classifiers really are, beyond traditional red-teaming.

Many ML-based approaches have been proposed to automatically detect, localize, and repair software vulnerabilities. While ML-based methods are more effective than program analysis-based vulnerability analysis tools, few have been integrated into modern IDEs, hindering practical adoption. To bridge this critical gap, we propose AIBugHunter, a novel ML-based software vulnerability analysis tool for C/C++ languages that is integrated into Visual Studio Code. AIBugHunter helps software developers to achieve real-time vulnerability detection, explanation, and repairs during programming. In particular, AIBugHunter scans through developers' source code to (1) locate vulnerabilities, (2) identify vulnerability types, (3) estimate vulnerability severity, and (4) suggest vulnerability repairs. In this article, we propose a novel multi-objective optimization (MOO)-based vulnerability classification approach and a transformer-based estimation approach to help AIBugHunter accurately identify vulnerability types and estimate severity. Our empirical experiments on a large dataset consisting of 188K+ C/C++ functions confirm that our proposed approaches are more accurate than other state-of-the-art baseline methods for vulnerability classification and estimation. Furthermore, we conduct qualitative evaluations including a survey study and a user study to obtain software practitioners' perceptions of our AIBugHunter tool and assess the impact that AIBugHunter may have on developers' productivity in security aspects. Our survey study shows that our AIBugHunter is perceived as useful where 90% of the participants consider adopting our AIBugHunter. Last but not least, our user study shows that our AIBugHunter could possibly enhance developers' productivity in combating cybersecurity issues during software development.

Static-analysis checker synthesis requires agents to interpret a defect specification, inspect a repository, implement analyzer-specific logic, and refine the checker through repeated compilation and analysis feedback. Existing coding-agent benchmarks focus on tasks such as patch generation or vulnerability detection and rarely assess whether an agent can develop a working checker in a repository from start to finish. We introduce CheckerBench, an executable benchmark of 300 tasks derived from 297 CVEs across 167 repositories, 85 CWEs, and five language ecosystems. Each task includes vulnerable and fixed revisions, a pinned analysis environment, and a checker scaffold. We further introduce CheckerLab, a common evaluation framework that independently rebuilds submitted checkers and measures vulnerable-fixed diagnostic contrast, patch localization, false positives, and tool use. Across 21 model-harness configurations and three independent repeats per configuration, mean Pass@1 is 32.30%, while the best reaches 45.33%. These results show that reliable, reusable checker development remains challenging for current coding agents.

In this paper we present a novel solution that combines the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with Formal Verification strategies to verify and automatically repair software vulnerabilities. Initially, we employ Bounded Model Checking (BMC) to locate the software vulnerability and derive a counterexample. The counterexample provides evidence that the system behaves incorrectly or contains a vulnerability. The counterexample that has been detected, along with the source code, are provided to the LLM engine. Our approach involves establishing a specialized prompt language for conducting code debugging and generation to understand the vulnerability's root cause and repair the code. Finally, we use BMC to verify the corrected version of the code generated by the LLM. As a proof of concept, we create ESBMC-AI based on the Efficient SMT-based Context-Bounded Model Checker (ESBMC) and a pre-trained Transformer model, specifically gpt-3.5-turbo, to detect and fix errors in C programs. Our experimentation involved generating a dataset comprising 1000 C code samples, each consisting of 20 to 50 lines of code. Notably, our proposed method achieved an impressive success rate of up to 80% in repairing vulnerable code encompassing buffer overflow and pointer dereference failures. We assert that this automated approach can effectively incorporate into the software development lifecycle's continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) process.

Software testing is a critical aspect of software development, yet generating test cases remains a routine task for engineers. This paper presents a benchmark, CLOVER, to evaluate models' capabilities in generating and completing test cases under specific conditions. Spanning from simple assertion completions to writing test cases that cover specific code blocks across multiple files, these tasks are based on 12 python repositories, analyzing 845 problems with context lengths ranging from 4k to 128k tokens. Utilizing code testing frameworks, we propose a method to construct retrieval contexts using coverage information. While models exhibit comparable performance with short contexts, notable differences emerge with 16k contexts. Notably, models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 can effectively leverage relevant snippets; however, all models score below 35\% on the complex Task III, even with the oracle context provided, underscoring the benchmark's significance and the potential for model improvement. The benchmark is containerized for code execution across tasks, and we will release the code, data, and construction methodologies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at code generation, but ensuring their outputs to be functionally correct, especially in complex programming tasks, is a persistent challenge. While traditional Test-Driven Development (TDD) offers a path for code refinement, its efficacy with LLMs is often undermined by the scarcity of high-quality test cases or the pitfalls of automated test generation, including biased tests or inaccurate output predictions that can misdirect the correction process. This paper introduces Property-Generated Solver, a novel framework that leverages Property-Based Testing (PBT) to validate high-level program properties or invariants, instead of relying on specific input-output examples. These properties are often simpler to define and verify than directly predicting exhaustive test oracles, breaking the "cycle of self-deception" where tests might share flaws with the code they are meant to validate. Property-Generated Solver employs two collaborative LLM-based agents: a Generator dedicated to code generation and iterative refinement, and a Tester that manages the PBT life-cycle and formulate semantically rich feedback from property violations. The resulting comprehensive and actionable feedback then guides the Generator in its refinement efforts. By establishing PBT as the core validation engine within this iterative, closed-loop paradigm, Property-Generated Solver provides a robust mechanism for steering LLMs towards more correct and generalizable code. Extensive experimental results on multiple code generation benchmarks demonstrate that Property-Generated Solver achieves substantial pass@1 improvements, ranging from 23.1% to 37.3% relative gains over established TDD methods.

The widespread integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates rigorous and systematic safety evaluation. Existing paradigms either rely on constructed benchmarks to assess safety from predefined perspectives, or employ dynamic red-teaming to probe potential vulnerabilities. While effective, these approaches face challenges, as they depend heavily on expert domain knowledge, offer limited systematic guarantees, and are vulnerable to rapid obsolescence. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel framework POLARIS that brings the rigor of specification-based software testing to AI safety. POLARIS first compiles unstructured natural-language policies into First-Order Logic (FOL) representations, establishing a traceable link between high-level rules and concrete test cases. This formalization enables the construction of a Semantic Policy Graph, where complex policy violation scenarios are encoded as traversable paths. By systematically exploring this graph, POLARIS uncovers compositional violation patterns, which are then instantiated into executable natural-language test queries, enabling coverage-driven and reproducible safety testing. Experiments demonstrate that POLARIS achieves higher policy coverage and attack success counts compared to established baselines. Crucially, by bridging formal methods and AI safety, POLARIS provides a principled, automated approach to ensuring LLMs adhere to safety-critical policies with verifiable traceability. We release our code at https://github.com/huac-lxy/POLARIS.

While large language models have made significant strides in code generation, the pass rate of the generated code is bottlenecked on subtle errors, often requiring human intervention to pass tests, especially for complex problems. Existing LLM-based debugging systems treat generated programs as monolithic units, failing to address bugs at multiple levels of granularity, from low-level syntax errors to high-level algorithmic flaws. In this paper, we introduce Multi-Granularity Debugger (MGDebugger), a hierarchical code debugger by isolating, identifying, and resolving bugs at various levels of granularity. MGDebugger decomposes problematic code into a hierarchical tree structure of subfunctions, with each level representing a particular granularity of error. During debugging, it analyzes each subfunction and iteratively resolves bugs in a bottom-up manner. To effectively test each subfunction, we propose an LLM-simulated Python executor, which traces code execution and tracks important variable states to pinpoint errors accurately. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MGDebugger outperforms existing debugging systems, achieving an 18.9% improvement in accuracy over seed generations in HumanEval and a 97.6% repair success rate in HumanEvalFix. Furthermore, MGDebugger effectively fixes bugs across different categories and difficulty levels, demonstrating its robustness and effectiveness.

Static analysis is a cornerstone for software vulnerability detection, yet it often struggles with the classic precision-scalability trade-off. In practice, such tools often produce high false positive rates, particularly in large codebases like the Linux kernel. This imprecision can arise from simplified vulnerability modeling and over-approximation of path and data constraints. While large language models (LLMs) show promise in code understanding, their naive application to program analysis yields unreliable results due to inherent reasoning limitations. We introduce BugLens, a post-refinement framework that significantly improves static analysis precision. BugLens guides an LLM to follow traditional analysis steps by assessing buggy code patterns for security impact and validating the constraints associated with static warnings. Evaluated on real-world Linux kernel bugs, BugLens raises precision from 0.10 (raw) and 0.50 (semi-automated refinement) to 0.72, substantially reducing false positives and revealing four previously unreported vulnerabilities. Our results suggest that a structured LLM-based workflow can meaningfully enhance the effectiveness of static analysis tools.

Conformal prediction(CP) has become a cornerstone of distribution-free uncertainty quantification, conventionally evaluated by its coverage and interval length. This work critically examines the sufficiency of these standard metrics. We demonstrate that the interval length might be deceptively improved through a counter-intuitive approach termed Prejudicial Trick(PT), while the coverage remains valid. Specifically, for any given test sample, PT probabilistically returns an interval, which is either null or constructed using an adjusted confidence level, thereby preserving marginal coverage. While PT potentially yields a deceptively lower interval length, it introduces practical vulnerabilities: the same input can yield completely different prediction intervals across repeated runs of the algorithm. We formally derive the conditions under which PT achieves these misleading improvements and provide extensive empirical evidence across various regression and classification tasks. Furthermore, we introduce a new metric interval stability which helps detect whether a new CP method implicitly improves the length based on such PT-like techniques. Code is available at https://github.com/benben-cd/PT-Conformal-Prediction.

Bug validation asks a coding agent to produce an executable witness for a reported bug. The witness combines a concrete input with a testing harness and exposes faulty behavior during execution. Such evidence makes audit findings actionable, yet benchmark evaluation is difficult when cases reuse public historical bugs and witnesses or require manual construction. We present WitnessGym, an automated framework for constructing bug-validation benchmarks through bug injection. It injects bugs into test-reached paths of real projects, rebuilds each project, and retains cases exposed by a construction-time witness. Bug specifications and execution adapters allow extension to additional bug types and languages. Bug-preserving transformations vary the surrounding structure while preserving the witness behavior. Based on real-world Java projects with test suites, WitnessGym automatically constructs 1,300 benchmark cases. The injected patches resemble historical bug patches and are difficult for the two evaluated models to distinguish in blinded comparisons. We evaluate four coding agent frameworks in six framework/model pairings across bug types, execution contexts, and transformation depths. Witness construction remains difficult even when the bug pattern is known. Our framework, benchmark cases, and evaluation scripts are available.